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
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

AND

THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

CONDUCTED BY
B. B. EDWARDS AND E. A. PARK,
Professors at Andover,
WITH THE SPECIAL CO-OPERATION OF
DR. ROBINSON AND PROF. STUART.

VOL. VII.



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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA
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THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXV.

JANUARY, 1850.

ARTICLE I.

PRESENT STATE OF BIBLICAL SCIENCE.

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

It may not be altogether inopportune at the commencement of another year of our labors, and at the beginning of 1850, to refer briefly to the existing position of Biblical Science, or to survey, cursorily though it may be, a part of the field which we attempt to occupy. Such a survey, also, has been suggested by the recent decease of Dr. De Wette, the patriarch of biblical critics and commentators. His life, though passed, for the most part, in the retirement of the study, is not without impressive lessons. The passing away of a man so active who, for twenty or thirty years, has been a leader in certain great departments of knowledge, constitutes a kind of epoch in the career of all who are devoted to similar pursuits.

We speak of biblical science. Perhaps the propriety of the term may be doubted. In the view of some it can hardly lay claim to an appellation so dignified. In every part of Christendom, where there is any freedom of investigation, views are propounded and methods of interpretation practised which are indicative of anything but science. We meet with heterogeneous or contradictory expositions, the use of the same texts to support perhaps a score of conflicting opinions, and even a want of agreement in regard to the most simple and fundamental rules of interpretation. In the country where there has been the most pretension to rigid science in the pursuit of biblical studies, there has often been a sad deficiency of truly liberal and comprehensive views. A criticism has had wide currency, which has been rightly named de-

structive, which substitutes theory for judicious investigation, which violently dislocates ancient history, and attempts to reconstruct it by an arbitrary subjective opinion; which has, in short, adopted a method of handling the Scriptures which, if carried out, would annihilate all ancient history, and render anything like rules of evidence impossible. A criticism may well be called destructive that refuses to receive a document as true which would be admitted without gainsaying, on one half of the evidence which it offers, in any court of justice on earth.¹ We do not here refer to such men as Strauss and the later Tübingen school, but to professed defenders of biblical truth, to those who would possibly shrink from being named skeptics.

Again, there may seem to be little of true science in a department which appears to run counter so often with the discoveries of the naturalist. That should seem to have poor claims to a settled interpretation which is liable to be jostled or overturned at any moment by the revelations of the natural philosopher or antiquarian. The positive declarations of the Bible come into direct collision with the unimpeachable testimony of sienite or the colored walls of a tomb. Either Ethnography or Moses must be mistaken. But the evidence of visible and tangible forms cannot be set aside, it is said, by a few dusky characters in a dead language, copied, it may be, no one knows when, from a monkish, mouldering parchment. What is written on hard granite, or is dug up from a mummy chest must be true, however it may fare with a Jewish historian. At least, we must wait till science has unfolded all her mysteries, before we can affirm that sacred philology has fixed and established laws. In other words, the test of the truth of a written revelation is to be found in nature.

It may be thought preposterous, also, to speak of biblical science, when there is so little agreement, or rather so wide a disagreement in respect to the exposition of the prophetic and symbolical portions of the Scriptures. Many in this department run to and fro, but knowledge is not increased. Arbitrary systems of rules are laid down as if they were the axioms of geometry. All preceding interpreters have totally mistaken their vocation, and darkened the counsel of Jehovah by words without knowledge. Events, which an indefinite futurity only can disclose, are laid off and marked out with the precision of a chart. A position is first confidently assumed, and then the innocent text is interpreted or wrested so as to sustain it. It is sad to know that many excellent men, especially in Great Britain, are poring over the prophetic Scriptures with a zeal which is not according to knowledge,

¹ See Prof. Greenleaf's *Examination of the Four Evangelists*.

with a labor which satisfieth not. They take no warning by the fate of many analogous theories, and indulge in empty dreams, to which almost every-preceding century of the Christian era has given birth. How can science dwell in such confusion? How can we speak of fundamental principles, methodical arrangement, systems of rules, when so many prophetic theories, alike unsatisfactory, and often mutually destructive, abound?

Still, notwithstanding this diversity and apparent confusion of views, there are certain fixed principles which are now generally acknowledged among the biblical students of all Protestant countries. There are rules of procedure, methods of interpretation, which command the confidence of most if not all intelligent students of the Scriptures. Let us name some of them.

1. One of these leading principles is, that all true interpretation is founded on grammar and lexicography. We use a lexicon to ascertain the meaning of single words, and a grammar to ascertain their meaning when combined in sentences. An honest and careful use of a good dictionary and grammar of the Greek and Hebrew languages lies at the foundation of biblical study. The Greek of the New Testament is to be subjected to the same processes precisely as that of the classical dialects. It claims no exemption from the same rigid, scientific analysis. The sacred character of the Hebrew does not take it out of the category of languages. The laws of syntax are no more to be violated in Isaiah than they are in Arabic. We are to support a doctrine of the gospel, if at all, by the strictest grammatical exposition of a text. If the divinity of the Logos, in the first verse of John's Gospel, can be defended only by a violation of the laws of Greek grammar, then it cannot be defended at all, so far as relates to the testimony of that passage.

Adherence to this method of interpretation implies, first, the avoidance of conjectural emendations of the text. We are to take the text as it is, except as emendations are borne out by the adequate testimony of manuscripts. We are to leave a difficulty unsolved, rather than to cut the knot by doing violence to the text. The harsh method pursued by Lowth in Isaiah in this respect, would find few advocates now. It is evidence of the weakness, mistaken ingenuity, or erroneous views of an interpreter, to tamper with that which he is simply called upon to explain. This rule implies, secondly, that the main source of explanation is the language itself. It furnishes its own definitions, reveals its own laws; its usages are to be learned from its own literature. Recourse is to be had even to a kindred speech only in cases of clear necessity. We are not to seek the aid of the Arabic or Syriac, or of classical Greek, while there remain sources of comparison in the language itself.

Only a spare and cautious use of kindred dialects would now be recommended. No one would be disposed to repeat the experiments to which Albert Schultens subjected the book of Job. The rule, in the third place, would dispense with all the ambiguities and trifling of the double sense. Grammars and lexicons would be of little use, were there one simple and another occult meaning to be attached to a narrative or the statement of a doctrine. The Bible is by eminence a book addressed to the common apprehension, to the rules and laws of popular discourse. It is not a collection of enigmas. Its aims are too serious for that. It may prefigure and foreshadow. Events, usages, ceremonies may point to some great fulfilling hour in the distant future, but its words have one and but one signification.

It may be here proper to allude to the apparatus which is now furnished for the grammatical and lexical study of the Bible. Perhaps it is not too much to affirm that neither of the classical languages is better, if it is so well furnished, as yet, with helps of this nature. We have the New Testament Grammar of Winer, which, especially in the last edition, is marked by a clear analysis of the more difficult texts in illustration of various principles, by a thorough digest and application of the most recent and able investigations in Greek syntax, by a fine grammatical tact, by a wary and sound judgment, and by copious stores of knowledge. We have also the prospect of soon possessing a New Testament Lexicon, worthy of the present advanced state of knowledge. In Hebrew we have the copious and philosophical grammar of Nordheimer, the original, ingenious, and often profound discussions of Ewald, especially in his "Copious Manual" of 1844, the long known and standard grammatical work of Gesenius, enriched by the remarks of Rödiger, and the Lexicon of the same prince of Hebraists, which it would be superfluous to praise. So admirable are these various helps, that professed commentaries come to be of quite secondary importance.

2. Biblical Science recognizes the fundamental importance of historical interpretation. The value of history as a means of ascertaining the sense of the biblical records, has indeed ever been more or less acknowledged. At the same time, history has not unfrequently been made, in fact, to yield to abstract reasoning or to logical deductions. Systems of divinity have been constructed, to a large extent, from passages of Scripture perverted or forced out of their historical and obvious meaning. But it is now practically acknowledged, to a greater extent than ever before, that the Bible is, for the most part, a series of detached historical records, notices of God's dealings with men, statements, more or less connected, of their conduct in relation to Him and to one another. What an enigma would the Epistle to the Hebrews be with-

out the historical records of the Old Testament! How dark would be many passages in Paul's doctrinal epistles, were it not for the history by Luke! How vitally connected is every part of the Bible with the Pentateuch! In how many hundreds of instances is the historical truth of those five books taken for granted in the subsequent narratives! To dislodge them from their present form, or to reduce them to the category of myths, would make the Bible a great Torso fragment, an enormous trunk without its head. To interpret the prophecies successfully, how indispensable is a minute acquaintance with the historical records of the earlier portions of the Bible and of contemporary profane accounts. History is the key to all fulfilled prophecy, and it supplies essential rules for the comprehension of those portions that remain unaccomplished. A searching examination into the remains of antiquity, and a luminous exhibition of the results are indispensable for one who would be a truly able interpreter of the prophets. In this field the Germans have labored with distinguished success. One leading excellence of the Commentary on Isaiah by Gesenius, is the fresh and clear light which his accurate historical researches throw upon the sacred page. The same is true, perhaps in a higher degree, of the work of Knobel. "The prophets of the Old Covenant," he truly remarks, "have to do, not so much with general ideas which as teachers they follow, as rather and predominantly with the special relations of the times and of the people for whom as practical orators they point out and inculcate the right course of conduct; by these relations were their prophecies occasioned, and to these were they specially directed. Therefore is it a main point in the interpretation of the prophets to unfold, as fundamentally as possible, all the contemporary relations of which they treat, and to define them exactly, in order to make the reader at home in the field on which they move. Without this knowledge, which must be obtained, partly from the historical books, partly by the combination of the historical notices contained in the prophetic writings, a sure and full understanding of the prophets in general, or a thorough acquaintance with particulars, is not possible."

In connection with the historical is what may be called the antiquarian interpretation, i. e. an employment of the stores of information furnished by modern researches into Oriental life, manners, and antiquities. It is but recently that the Oriental world has been laid fairly open. We had, indeed, the accurate and conscientious explorations of Niebuhr and Burckhardt. But they were limited to some portions of the East, and their reports of some districts which they visited were necessarily hurried and imperfect. But within the last few years, the number of able and accomplished travellers has been greatly increased. In

Western Asia the incidental labors of American missionaries have contributed largely to the stores of biblical science. To their other facilities they have added an accurate acquaintance with the languages spoken in the countries where they sojourn: The names of Smith, Dwight, Perkins, Thomson, Van Dyck and others, will readily occur. The *Researches* of Dr. Robinson has become a classical work throughout Protestant Christendom. In Egypt the investigations of Rosellini, Wilkinson, Lane and others, have enabled the inquirer to reap a rich harvest. The indefatigable labors of Lieut. Lynch have given us exact information in respect to the Jordan and the Dead Sea. At the same time, Layard and others are unveiling the long buried secrets of the Mesopotamian Plain, and throwing new light on the Mosaic and prophetic records.

These antiquarian treasures which serve to illustrate so many obscure passages in the Scriptures, are characterized, first, by their extraordinary amount; secondly, by their comprehending all, or nearly all, the countries to which much reference is made in the Scriptures; thirdly, by, in general, exactness of investigation and scientific accuracy in statement; and fourthly, by their vivid presentation to the eye through the admirable maps, fac-similes, drawings, or actual specimens of various objects. The result is, accordingly, not the mere correction of errors and mistranslations, but the ability which one acquires to look at the whole Bible in a new light. We can see all objects, in a measure, under an oriental sky. It requires less effort of imagination than formerly to transport ourselves to the East. We are enabled by clear descriptions and exact drawings to gain an accurate conception of an oriental city, of the dress and manners of the people, of life in the desert, and thus we may mingle more familiarly with the patriarchs as they wandered, "seeking a better country," or with kings and prophets in the "city beautiful for situation," or with that great Teacher whose footsteps made it indeed the Holy Land.

3. Another principle of biblical interpretation relates to the harmony of the Scriptures with the discoveries of natural science. Such propositions as the following would now be undisputed: There can never exist any absolute discordancy between a law of nature and a disclosure of Divine Revelation, because the same Being is the author of both. If there seems to be a real discrepancy, it is owing either to the misinterpretation of the written record, or to the fact that the alleged scientific discovery has no foundation. It is a hasty generalization, or a position assumed without sufficient evidence, or in the progress of discovery it will admit of an explanation which is consistent with the law of philology. A natural science, while in its infancy, when but par-

tially developed, while some of its main features are still under discussion, is not to be placed on the same footing with sciences whose laws have been long established. Its earliest revelations, though seemingly adverse to biblical truth, need not occasion alarm or anxiety. The laws of philology are to be admitted as unhesitatingly as those of any physical science. There is the same certainty that the Bible came from God as that the solar system did. It would be no greater mark of folly to reject the evidence on which the facts of the material sciences rest, than that by which spiritual truth is supported. The laws of language, the principles of philology, are not to be summarily set aside when they come into apparent conflict with the discoveries of nature, as if less confidence were necessarily to be placed in them. Skepticism may be as really produced by the representation that the principles of language, or of intellectual science, are shifting and uncertain, as by making the same representation in regard to chemistry or geology. The laws of human belief, the usages of language, the records of history may come to us with testimony irresistible and unimpeachable. One thing is certain; no absolute contradiction between physical and biblical truth has yet been pointed out. The monuments of Egypt do not convict Moses of falsehood. The valley of the Nile has not yet converted the Pentateuch into a myth. Ethnology still leaves the doctrine of the unity of the human race intact. The various configurations of the skull, or the various colors of the hair upon it, as found four thousand years ago, have not thus far been proved to require a plurality of the original race, or an indefinite extension of the life of man on earth. Geology rather testifies to the comparatively recent creation of man. With such propositions, we suppose the most intelligent biblical philologists would accord. While ready to welcome truth in all the realms of physical nature, and by whomsoever brought to light, while entertaining the most enlarged conceptions of the glory of the Creator in the material universe, they are not disposed to lower the claims of their own science, or to be in haste to explain away a biblical truth, lest it may come into collision with a material phenomenon. Miracles, a supernatural revelation, may be supported by a weight of evidence so convincing, that not to believe in them, would be the greatest miracle of all.

4. Again, the Bible is to be interpreted in perfect consistency with the laws of the human constitution. This complete harmony has never, perhaps, been acknowledged so fully as it is now. The law of the Sabbath, e. g., is not merely Jewish or Christian. It seems to be the law of man's physical and moral nature. It appears to be made out by experience, or by a sufficient number of facts, that man needs a

stated portion of the week for rest, by virtue of the same natural laws that enforce upon him the repose of night. If so, we need not hesitate to give the widest extension to our exposition of the Sabbath law announced at the creation.

When a comment does not receive its justification from man's universal nature, it still may be vindicated from the human constitution as modified by climate, and physical and mental peculiarities. Hence, the main internal objection to the reception of the Canticles into the Canon, is removed. The book is precisely fitted to the eastern taste. Its method of instruction is indigenous in Arabia and Persia. Metaphorical language in all its forms is the language of every day life there. Provision is made by the enticing forms of parable and allegory for the spiritual sustenance of half, it may be, of the human race. There is no more objection to the spiritual interpretation of this book in principle, especially as it appears in the original, than there is to that of the forty-fifth Psalm, or to the allegory which Paul adduces in the Epistle to the Galatians. Our refined and fastidious taste is not to be the rule for the millions of Asiatics. They have the same necessity as the polished European that the Scriptures should be adapted to their idiosyncracies. The recognition of this fitness of the Bible to the nature and intellectual cultivation of the nations to whom it was first addressed, removes many difficulties, and justifies the Divine procedure, on points where it has been often impugned.

Another illustration may be found in the interpretation of the poetic and prophetic Scriptures. Here it is eminently necessary to study the laws of the imagination. The interpreter is ill fitted for his vocation who has not quick and delicate sensibilities, a true taste, some power of imagination, who has not thoroughly studied the laws and recorded operations of this part of man's nature. In the Hebrew poets and prophets, there are not a few passages which, so far as grammar, the context, the scope, etc., are concerned, will admit of two or three interpretations. The only key that will unlock the mystery may be in that power which takes exquisite delight in reading Homer and Milton. The logical faculty cannot solve the doubt. The industrious collection of parallel texts will throw no light upon it. It appeals to the highest endowment of man's intellectual nature, and, in addition, it may be, to a simple and liberal taste. The presence of these powers of imagination and taste gives peculiar value to Lowth's biblical works, and to De Wette's German translation of the Bible.

5. We may briefly advert to one more acknowledged fact of Biblical Science. The interpreter must feel some real sympathy with the truths which he is studying. All other gifts and facilities are not a substitute

for this. A man may possess exact and extensive learning, the soundest judgment, the nicest critical tact, and still fail to recognize the true and full significance of the more spiritual portions of the Bible. He may be an honest man, and sincerely desirous to explain the Bible correctly, but without a spirit in some degree accordant with that which reigns in the Scriptures, he will not accomplish his end. The Bible on one essential point is not analogous to other books. It reveals truths which are to be believed, prescribes duties which are universally obligatory. It speaks with authority to the interpreter himself. It is as impossible as it is undesirable for him to approach his work with an indifferent state of mind. What is sometimes vaunted as perfect impartiality in a biblical critic, never had existence. The student has the deepest personal stake in the pages which he is pondering. Its truths touch his moral nature at innumerable points. His mind cannot be in a perfect equilibrium. Entirely to segregate his intellectual from his moral nature is an impossibility. Feelings will course through his soul in a thousand directions, and must modify and color his mental decisions. Besides, no one can interpret the writings of another, without entering into his spirit. The apostle Paul possessed great fervor of feeling, a tender and ardent love to the Saviour, comprehensive and profound views of the scheme of redemption, and a desire that men should experience its efficacy so great as almost to absorb every other emotion. These characteristics pervade every epistle which he has left. They shine out in all his discourses. They tinge all his language. They account for many peculiarities of his style and diction. Now one who has little or no sympathy with the pure and profound spirit of this great evangelist cannot adequately expound his language. He is deficient in one of the essential qualifications. In his method of handling, the glowing words lose their fire. The parenthesis becomes inextricably involved. He does not see that feeling lies at the bottom of the interjected clause. A rational interpreter, e. g., Grotius, with but little emotion, will explain away or dilute words which came from the depths of the heart, vital and overflowing with truth. Interpreters like Melancthon, Calvin, Olshausen, Tholuck, possess a qualification of fundamental importance, which is denied to the whole neological school. This school furnishes many most accomplished critics and philologists, but they would find a more congenial home in Greek and Roman literature, than among the practical and profound truths of the New Testament. There is also a fine and delicate spiritual apprehension, which is a result of a sympathizing study of the Gospel, and which detects a thousand nice shades of thought, almost invisible graces of language, to which a common critic, or a man of mere learning is blind. The

great current of thought has numerous tributary rivulets, little springs that send in their contributions, which will be wholly unobserved by the gross and worldly sense. It is only to the "pure in heart" to whom those finer lineaments of Christian truth stand revealed. We need not, however, expand these thoughts. They are happily recognized by biblical scholars throughout this country and Great Britain, and to a gratifying extent, in other lands.

In bringing these remarks to a close, we will briefly advert to certain desiderata in biblical science. There are aspects of it which cannot be contemplated with entire satisfaction. We are still reminded of painful deficiencies.

In the first place, the educated and Christian community fail to entertain adequate conceptions of the importance of sacred philology, and of the necessity of pecuniary means for the attainment of its objects. The channels of benevolence are too circumscribed, from the want of enlarged ideas of the value of money. The streams of beneficence do not flow too much, but too exclusively, in certain practical directions, or for the accomplishment of results which are immediately useful. Benevolent and wealthy gentlemen have not yet learned to bestow of their abundance upon fields where the richest harvests may be ultimately reaped. Public notoriety, popular sentiment, determine too much the destination of charitable bequests. It is not sufficiently considered that the happiest results often flow from obscure and almost impalpable causes. Physical science may receive a greater impulse from timely aid rendered to a periodical journal, which from its scientific character is addressed to but few readers, than by the founding of a professorship. A few hundred dollars seasonably bestowed upon a young man of decided genius in the walks of science may result in a most useful discovery. The donation to the library of a college of the most important books in the department of sacred literature might keep the flame of divine knowledge ever burning brightly there. A young man in one country of Europe, who discovers an extraordinary aptitude for music, is generously supported several years at the public expense, till he has laid a broad foundation for his profession. But in intellectual and sacred science, works of the fairest promise are left to languish and die, for want of a little timely encouragement. A journal of acknowledged value, and, from the nature of the case, of very limited circulation, is left to struggle for years, unable to avail itself of the aid of invaluable illustrations, and of other costly contributions. An enlarged philanthropy would surely prompt to a different course. A comprehensive charity would apply its means where the vital forces are most concentrated.

It is essential, in the second place, to the prosperity of biblical science, that its elements should be studied at an earlier period of the student's life than is now common. Hebrew is a part of the required course in the German gymnasia. There is no adequate reason, so far as we can see, why it should not be required as a part of the college course in the United States. The study of it is indeed optional for a small portion of the senior year, at some institutions. But it has shared the same fate, doubtless, with fluxions, and other optional studies. It has either been wholly neglected, or pursued under great disadvantages. What is not a part of the required system will find but few earnest students. The result is that an invaluable part of the theological course is consumed in imperfectly studying that which might be acquired in half the time a few years earlier. Viewed in the light of philology, as elementary grammatical principles, as an important ancient dialect, the Hebrew does not pertain to professional education. It belongs to those general studies which are appropriate to the college. Could one lesson a day for three months of one of the college years be devoted to a Hebrew grammar and Chrestomathy, a foundation would be laid for the subsequent mastery of interpretation, and for a far more useful ministry. We cannot imagine why a sacred language, in a Christian country, settled by a race almost passionately attached to the Old Testament, and that founded the first colleges for the glory of God and the good of the church, should be so sedulously excluded from the collegiate curriculum of later times.

We may advert, in the third place, to certain desiderata in the way of helps for biblical study. The Septuagint version of the Old Testament has as yet received but slight attention compared with its importance. A fundamental work on that version has long been needed, which shall give us a carefully revised text, which shall sift all the facts and traditions in regard to the history of the translation, which shall determine, as far as possible, the relative value and character of the different parts, how far the language coincides with the New Testament dialect, with Josephus, and with the later classical Greek. We need also a carefully discriminated treatise on the Synonymes both of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. The materials for such a treatise may be found, in a measure, in the Lexicons and in commentaries, but, for the most part, they must be collected from an independent and careful reading and comparison of the original. A book of synonymes, such as we have of the German and Latin languages, would be an inestimable acquisition. Again, the Hebrew Syntax has not yet been investigated with that completeness which the subject demands. Invaluable as the labors of Gesenius, Nordheimer and Ewald are in this depart-

ment, yet every intelligent student must perceive, that in certain topics, e. g., the article and the tenses of the verbs, much yet remains obscure and unsettled. The same remarks apply in a measure to the Compound Verbs of the New Testament. Winer, in his *Programmæ*, has given an earnest of what yet remains in this hitherto neglected part of the language. Finally, we need Commentaries of a different character from what can now be found, with a few exceptions, either in the German or English languages. An adequate commentary deals both with the letter and spirit; it has its basis on the sure principles of grammar; but it does not rest in a jejune analysis of the outward form; it seeks to unfold whatever is in the text, however profound and spiritual it may be; it lays out its strength on the really difficult texts, and passes lightly over what is obvious to the cursory reader; it makes no display of the details of interpretation, or the formulæ of science; it goes into these details only when the exigencies of the interpretation which is adopted, require; it chooses rather to give the results than the process of an inquiry; it directs its most strenuous efforts to present the exact idea of the original, and in that form, neither so compressed as to become obscure, nor so diffuse as to be wearisome, which will be most satisfactory in giving the full impression of the text. We have many commentaries which are marked by a great ability in a particular direction. They have prominent and characteristic excellencies. But we have few which are symmetrical, well adjusted, which meet the precise demands of the intelligent and Christian reader. The materials for a commentary, somewhat approximating to this ideal, are now liberally furnished. A combining and moulding hand only is required.

Again, there is needed a profounder faith in the reality and harmony of all truth. The student of God's word should proceed in his inquiries with quiet confidence, though the waves of skepticism may rise around him. He may rest assured that ultimately the apparent discordancy shall vanish. Physical science, reverently and earnestly prosecuted, will do homage to that which is divine. Anxiety as to the final verdict of the two great classes of testimony is, in the highest degree, unreasonable. He has no occasion to shun an examination of any of the results of geology or astronomy, ethnography, history, or antiquities. He may admit every fact and just conclusion established by these sciences. They cannot shake the rock on which scriptural truth rests. They cannot impugn the Bible as a literal, simple, credible history. At least no contradiction, no irreconcilable discrepancy has as yet been pointed out. Neither may he shrink from any of the demands of philological criticism. He may subject the records of

Christianity to the sharpest tests without any fear. They will come out unimpaired from the severest cross questioning. After all the efforts of the most sagacious and clear sighted critics of the present day. the life and works of our Saviour, as recorded by four independent witnesses, appear in beautiful harmony. After the fiery ordeal which the Gospels have gone through at the hands of many of the later critics; and after the strenuous efforts of a number of able scholars to break up and rearrange the earlier portions of the Old Testament, it is delightful to find that the integrity and historical value both of the Gospels and the Pentateuch are, in various forms, receiving fresh confirmation and support. The monuments of Egypt, the disintombed cities of Assyria, the searching investigations of accomplished travelers in Palestine, the voice of profane history, the last and severest critical inquiries, all testify that "the foundation of God standeth sure."

ARTICLE II.

EXEGETICAL AND THEOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF JOHN

1: 1—18.

By M. Stuart, late Prof. of Sac. Lit. in the Theol. Sem. at Andover.

[THE title which is given above to the disquisition that follows, is not perhaps exactly descriptive of it. My design is not simply that of a philologist or interpreter, nor merely that of a theologian. My ultimate object is indeed to develop, if I can, the *sentiments* which the words of John were intended to convey; and these, if they can be made manifest, ought, in my apprehension, to be regarded as truths deeply concerned with theology. But this development I do not undertake to bring about by *theological* argument and reasoning, except in quite a subordinate manner. When the inquiry is made: What has John taught? I know of no satisfactory way of answering this question, except by a resort to the fundamental and well established principles of exegesis. In the present disquisition it is my aim, on all occasions where it is feasible, to pursue this method.

I need make no apology to the well informed reader, for an endeavor to cast some light on John's introduction to his Gospel. It has been hitherto regarded, by most interpreters and many theologians, as one

of the most difficult portions of the New Testament; perhaps I might even say, as the greatest problem in it which yet remains to be fully solved. Certain it is, that there are many readers who still find doubts springing up, and meet with difficulties, which they feel unable to solve. May I not venture to believe, without any assumption on my part, that these will be ready to welcome any serious attempt to aid them in the removal of their embarrassments? Having in a great measure satisfied my own mind, it is natural for me to hope, that I may do something in the way of assisting others to satisfy their minds.

That I have been wholly impartial in my investigations and decisions, and have never dogmatized, is not for me to assert. I can only say, that I have aimed to be what the first requires, and not to do the last. So far as partiality or dogmatism may cleave to my performance, so far I can reasonably expect nothing but injury to the efforts I have made in order to convince others. With such views, I could not well aim to admit the one or practise the other. It is however for the reader to say, after all, whether I have in fact admitted or done what is contrary to my intention. If he shall acquit me in both respects, I would hope that he will lend me a listening ear, and weigh seriously what is advanced, like one who feels that he must give an account, before he comes to conclusions opposite to those which seem to me at least to be deducible, in a fair and direct manner, from the teachings of the beloved apostle.

The nature of my undertaking has led me to indulge in various remarks on several topics, which rigid order in exegesis or scientific theology might be bound to exclude. But if these are not irrelevant, nor unmeaning, the reader I hope will cheerfully concede me the privilege of such an indulgence. I may perhaps reasonably ask, that, with such objects as I have in view, I may not be confined within the stricter rules of mere philological or theological discussion.

The closing part of the present disquisition may be regarded, by some, as uncalled for and inapposite. I can only say, for the purpose of vindicating it, that its design is to point out what connection, in my view, the great truths which John teaches have, with the Christian's highest spiritual experience and his most pressing wants. The number of those who will assent to the views there expressed, I am confident is very great. From those who may dissent, I would solicit an indulgent lenity toward me, in regard to the expression of feelings which I could not well suppress. My earnest hope and wishes are, that it may not, in their minds, impair in any measure the force of what is said in the pages that precede the close.]

Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

Ἐν ἀρχῇ is an exact translation of *רִאשִׁית* in Gen. 1: 1; and this last verse is plainly the prototype and exemplar of John 1: 1—3, with the exception that a new personage, viz. the Logos, is introduced by the apostle. Strictly speaking, the word *רִאשִׁית* designates the exact point when time began. But in John the assertion is, that at that point the Logos was already in existence, *ἦν*. In the sequel we have the assertion, that the Logos created all things without any exception, which have been created. Of course the Logos himself is assumed to be an uncreated being. In effect, therefore, *ἐν ἀρχῇ* in such a construction is equivalent to the phrase *πρὸ τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι*, Prov. 8: 22, which there is parallel to and explains *ἐν ἀρχῇ*. It is also equivalent to *πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι*, in John 17: 5; to *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, in John 17: 24 and Eph. 1: 4; also to *πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος* in Prov. 8: 23. And although in strictness of speech *ἐν ἀρχῇ* does not of itself directly indicate *eternity*, yet in consequence of its connection here, and by implication, it necessarily designates, or rather implies, this idea. What is uncreated must be *eternal*; that which existed before all things, or (to use the language of John) before any one created thing, must be *eternal*; the author of all created things, must of course be *self-existent*.

The affirmation that *ἀρχῇ* here means *the beginning of the Gospel-dispensation* (Crellius), is so plainly against the tenor of the context, that scarcely any critics have been found to patronize it. The creation of *all things* is said (v. 3) to have been accomplished by the Logos; and in v. 10 it is affirmed that the *world* was created by him. In neither case can the Christian church be meant, (as Crellius would have it). Not in the first, for *πάντα* never has such a meaning; not in the second, because the assertion is made by John, that this same world which the Logos created *did not know him*, while the special characteristic of Christians is, that “they know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent.”

In a grammatical respect, the word *ἀρχῇ*, as here employed, would seem to demand the *article*. So our version: “In *the* beginning;” and so in most languages that have the article. But in Greek, this word is one of those which by usage and special license frequently omit the article, even when (as in the present case) they have a meaning that is monadic and specific. Accordingly, *ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς*, *ἐξ ἀρχῆς*

and *ἐν ἀρχῇ* (all without the article), are frequent both in the N. Test., the Sept., and in the Greek classics. (See Win. N. T. Gram. § 18.) It should be noted, moreover, that our idiom would employ a mode of expression somewhat different from that of the text. We should say: "*At* the beginning," (not *in*). But *in* has become familiar to us, by reason of the biblical mode of expression.

ἦν, *was*, i. e. existed; or, to translate more exactly according to the Imperfect tense, *was existing*. This is the nearest we can come to giving the *relative* sense of the Greek Imperf. in our language. The *relative* sense in this case has respect to something else in the past, which existed or was done. This is designated in v. 9 and the sequel, which exhibit the Logos in his *incarnate* condition. His antecedent condition is contrasted with his incarnate one; and as both belong to the past time, the Imperf. *ἦν* is employed in its proper sense, viz. that of denoting action or being in the past, antecedent to something else that *was* or *was done* in the past. To say, as some have said, that *ἦν* of itself denotes *timeless existence* (like *ἔστι* in *Θεὸς ἔστι*), seems not to be well founded in the laws of grammatical usage. The assertion of the *eternity* of the Logos depends not on the use of *ἦν*, but on the nature of the declarations respecting him. Our simple English preterite (*was*) fails to give here the *relative* sense of the Greek, as already remarked; nor can we easily remedy this difficulty in our language, for the expression *was existing* would seem to be in a measure unusual and cumbrous.

Ὁ Λόγος, the Word. According to the *general* usage of the Greek language, *λόγος* may designate either *word* or *wisdom* (*reason*). But in the language of the O. Test. and of the New, *λόγος* never has the meaning of *reason*, *understanding*, or *wisdom*, in God. The usual form, in relation to God, is *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*. But with such a limitation, the meaning of *λόγος* is quite diverse from that in our text, (Rev. 18: 19 only excepted). *God's word* means, in both Testaments, something spoken by him, or some communication or message from him. But in what possible sense could it be said, that such a word was "with him," or that it "became flesh and dwelt amongst us?"

Equally remote from the sense of *λόγος*, here in John, is that of *wisdom* or *reason*; for (1), such a meaning of *λόγος* is without any example in the Scriptures, which usually express it by *σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and sometimes by *καρδία, σοῦς*, or *πνεῦμα*. It cannot well be supposed that John has here departed from the elsewhere universal usage of the Scriptures. But (2), if this could be supposed, then in what possible sense can it be said of *wisdom* or *reason*, that it "became incarnate and dwelt among us?" (v. 14.)

From whatever source the appellation now in question may have

been derived, it is plain that the word is not employed in any of its ordinary senses. If it could be shown that John meant to employ it merely in the way of *personification*, then, whether we give the meaning of *word* or *wisdom* to it, we might easily interpret it in reference to merely a creating or enlightening and saving power; for we have parallels in the O. Test. of the like nature, e. g. Ps. 33: 6. Prov. 8: 22 seq., where, to the *word of God* and to *wisdom*, creative power and saving influence are ascribed. But the assertion of the *incarnation* of the *Logos* (v. 14) forbids us to regard it as a personification here either of word or wisdom. A *hypostasis* it must be. Even the very first assertion respecting it, viz. that it *was with God*, indicates this; for what could be the design of the writer in asserting here, that God's *wisdom* (as an attribute) was *with him*? Did any one ever doubt, or need to be informed, whether the *wisdom* of any being is *with him*? And even if information of this kind were intended to be given, would not the writer have said: *ἐν αὐτῷ*, and not *πρὸς αὐτόν*? As to *word*, such an assertion would be unintelligible and unmeaning. Besides, to this *Logos* is ascribed both *life* and *light* (v. 4), where the form of expression (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) indicates more than that the *Logos* was merely the instrumental cause of life and light, for it fully expresses the idea that he was the *source* of both. John even goes farther than this in the strength of his expression. In 1 John 1: 1, 2, he calls him, first, *the Logos of life*; and then he declares that "the Life . . . the eternal Life that was with the Father (*πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*), was exhibited to us in a visible and tangible shape." So in John 1: 9 he is called *the true Light* of men, and in 8: 12, *the Light of the world*.

If now we compare these and the like expressions together, and give them their proper force, how can they be supposed to indicate less, than that they are intended to designate attributives which belong to a *hypostasis*? And in this, indeed, nearly all classes of interpreters appear at present to be united. But in respect to the *nature* and *rank* of this hypostasis, there is, as there long has been, a great diversity of sentiment. But our present concern is merely with the appellation *Logos*, and not with the rank which the being so named holds. In accordance with this we ask: Why did John so name him? And in giving him such a name, what was the special signification which he attached to it?

One thing, at least, seems to be quite probable, if not certain, in respect to this matter. Every rational and sober writer wishes and expects to be understood by his readers. Consequently he employs language which he supposes will be intelligible to them. On this ground we must suppose, that John employed the word *Logos* here in a sense which his contemporary readers would be able to understand. There must

then have been something in the linguistic usage of that period, among the Hebrews or the Hebrew Greeks, which led the apostle to employ the appellation in question, or, at all events, which led him to suppose that it might be understood. Do the Scriptures, or does the history of the Hebrew *usus loquendi* of that period, cast any light on this subject?

A careful examination of the Scriptures will lead us to see, that the Hebrews were accustomed to speak of *the word of God* in a manner which not unfrequently led to *personification*; and at times they expressed themselves almost as if it were a *hypostasis*. The foundation of this seems to be laid in Gen. 1: 3, "God said: Let there be light; and there was light." This is equivalent to a declaration that the word of God has in it a creative power. Expressly after this tenor is Ps. 23: 6, "By the *word* of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the *breath of his mouth*." There can indeed be no reasonable ground to doubt, that all this is figurative, or (in other words) that it is a symbolical representation of God's executive power or energy. The analogy, which leads to and forms the basis of such representations, is easily explained. *Words* are with us the signs of internal ideas, feelings, desires, purposes, etc.; and, consequently, they are as it were the outward development or representation of the internal man, or of the energies of the soul. Words are the means or instruments by which we make our desire or will known, and cause it to be executed. Nay, so closely connected are they with us, that they become the usual medium by which we carry on the process of thinking. Carrying over now to the Godhead, (as is usual in cases of representation without number), the analogy drawn from human things, the sacred writers have represented his *word* as accomplishing the purposes of his will. Hence a creating power, a life-giving power, a regenerating power, an enlightening power, and the like, are ascribed to *the word of God*. Not unfrequently is it spoken of in such a way as would seem, at first view, to indicate that it is regarded as a *being*, a *hypostasis*, which possesses and exercises attributes of its own. It is easy to illustrate and confirm this view, from both the O. Test. and the New.

Thus, in accordance with Gen. 1: 3 and Ps. 33: 6, it is said in Heb. 11: 3, that "the worlds were framed by the word of God." So in 2 Pet. 3: 5, "By the word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth." This *word* is a life-giving power: "Man doth not live by bread only, but by every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord," Deut. 8: 3. Matt. 4: 4. Luke 4: 4. It gives *spiritual* as well as physical life: "Thy word hath quickened me," Ps. 119: 50; and so 1 Pet. 1: 23, "Born of incorruptible seed . . . by the word of God which liveth and abideth forever." It has attributes or qualities ascribed to it; e. g.

"Forever thy word is settled in the heavens," Ps. 119: 89, i. e. thy word is established and eternal. "The word of our God shall stand forever," Isa. 40: 3 and 1 Pet. 1: 23. It is an agent in the execution of the divine commands: "He sent his word and healed them," Ps. 107: 20; "His word runneth very swiftly," Ps. 147: 15; "He sendeth out his word and melteth them," Ps. 147: 18; "My word that goeth out of my mouth . . . it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it," Isa. 55: 11. It is a messenger, going and imparting admonition: "The word of God came unto She-maiah, saying," 1 K. 12: 22; "The same night, the word of God came to Nathan, saying," 1 Chr. 17: 3; "This word from the Lord came to Jeremiah, saying," Jer. 27: 1; and so in Jer. 34: 8. 36: 1. To the word of God is ascribed the power of searching and discerning the most secret thoughts of men: "The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit . . . and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart," Heb. 4: 12.

In addition to the many vivid representations of this nature in the Scriptures, it should be specially considered, that the word of God, in the form of precept, prohibition, law, doctrinal instruction, prediction, and the like, is everywhere brought to view in both Testaments. It is the peculiar medium of all that may be called revelation in a specific sense. It is the principal instrument of all the communications that have been made from above to ignorant and erring man. Well may we exclaim, with the Psalmist: "Thou hast magnified thy *word* above all thy name."

We must not suppose, however, that an enlightened and spiritual Hebrew regarded the *word* of God as a real *hypostasis* or *substantial being*, notwithstanding the strong language thus employed respecting it. In a primary and literal sense, *word* means something spoken or uttered by means of the lungs, the tongue, and other material organs. God, who is a spirit, possesses no material organs; and the Hebrew, who well knew this, can hardly be regarded as literally interpreting descriptions of this nature. That on some occasions, when God, or his angel, assumed the form of man in order to hold converse with his servants, words audible to the outward ear may have been uttered, need not be denied. Indeed, this seems to be clear from such an account as we have in Gen. xviii, and from some others of a similar tenor. So at the giving of the law on mount Sinai, Ex. 19: 19 seq. Heb. 12: 19. But in general, when God is represented as *speaking*, we must, in accordance with his spiritual nature, suppose him to communicate with the internal man, *speaking* to the mind by the influences of his Spirit. The Hebrew who understood this, would of course regard the phrase *word*

of God, as simply designating for the most part the idea of a *communication* from him, and not as conveying by any necessity the idea of an audible word, and still less that of a real and hypostatical existence. The vivid personifications of the word of God, like those above produced, are, however, very striking and expressive; and we cannot but admit, that the high importance attached everywhere in the Scriptures to God's word, has given birth to a variety of figurative, animated, and intensive representations of it. And I may now add, that if communications of such a nature are honored with the appellation *word of God* in such a high sense, then it is nothing strange, that he who is the medium and the author of all saving communication between God and men, should be called *the Logos of God*. But of this more in the sequel.

Another important circumstance, pertaining to the *usus loquendi* of the Jews at the time when John wrote his Gospel, deserves to be brought distinctly into view, at the present stage of our inquiries. When the Jews returned from Babylon, the mass of them spoke the Chaldee language, modified in some degree by the ancient Hebrew. Hence it became necessary that this same mass should have the Scriptures translated into the Chaldee or Hebraeo-Chaldaic dialect. In the time of Ezra, such an *interpretation* of the Hebrew Scriptures seems to have been made *viva voce* to the people at large, who were assembled together, Neh. 8: 8. But not far from the beginning of the Christian era, the Targums or translations into Chaldee of the Hebrew Scriptures, were made and committed to writing; of the Pentateuch by Onkelos, and of most of the remaining books by Jonathan ben Uzziel. In these works, and in other Targums, a special idiom prevails, to a wide extent, respecting the use of the phrase *word of the Lord*; and it presents some views of the *usus loquendi* of the Jews of that period, which are not only remarkable but very striking. In my own apprehension, they have an important bearing upon the use of *Logos* in our text; and a brief statement, therefore, respecting the usage in question seems to be necessary.

The Chaldee word for *Logos* is *מִקְרָא*, a noun with formative *מ* derived from *אָמַר*, *dixit*. To this noun the Targumists subjoin the Gen. *דִּי יְהוָה* (abridged *דִּי*), which then is exactly equivalent to *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ*. This expression is employed in the Targums, in cases almost without number, instead of the simple *יהוָה* or *אֱלֹהִים* of the Hebrew text. In particular, wherever the Heb. represents the divine Being as in action, or as revealing himself by his works, or by communications to individuals, in a word, whenever God operates *ad extra* and thus reveals himself, it is common for the Targumists to say that his *word* operates, or makes the revelation. A few examples are necessary to show the manner of this.

In Ex. 19: 17, the Hebrew runs thus, "And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God;" in the Targum, "To meet with *the word of the Lord*." Job 42: 9 (Heb.), "The Lord accepted Job;" in the Targum, "The word of the Lord accepted Job." Ps. 2: 4 (Heb.), "The Lord shall have them in derision;" in the Targum, "The word of the Lord shall deride them." Gen. 26: 8 (Heb.), "I will be with thee;" Targum, "My word shall be thy helper." Gen. 39: 2 (Heb.), "The Lord was with Joseph;" Targum, "The word of the Lord was with Joseph." Lightfoot, that great master of Rabbinical learning, says of these and the like cases; "So, all along, that kind of phrase is most familiar amongst them," Hor. Heb. in Johan. 1: 1. Specially is this the case, when God is represented as transacting affairs of moment between himself and his people. Thus in Lev. 26: 46 (Heb.), "These are the statutes which the Lord made between him and the children of Israel;" Targum, "Between his word and the children of Israel." Deut. 5: 5 (Heb.), "I stood between you and the Lord, at that time;" Targum, "I stood between you and the word of the Lord." Deut. 20: 1 (Heb.), "The Lord thy God is with thee;" Targum, "Jehovah is thy God, his word is with thee."

Such is the striking usage of the Targumists, in respect to the phrase *word of God*. They carry it indeed still further, and often express by מִיְּקָרָא the emphatic pronouns *myself*, *thyself*, *himself*. Thus instead of the Heb. (Gen. 6: 6), "It repented Jehovah," the Targum has it, "Jehovah repented himself;" or lit. "repented in his word," i. e., in himself. Gen. 8: 21 (Heb.), "And Jehovah said in his heart;" Targum, "And Jehovah said in his word," i. e., within himself. Strikingly is this idiom illustrated in a later Targum of 2 Chron. 16: 3, where the Hebrew runs thus, "There is a league between me and thee;" Targum, "between my word and thy word." Thus מִיְּקָרָא came, by usage among the Jews, to be employed not only to designate God as acting or making some revelation of himself or of his will, but to be employed as a kind of intensive periphrastic pronoun to designate God himself. The transition was not unnatural. That which is often employed to express *God revealed*, may easily come at last to express the idea of *God simply considered*.

What now are we to say, as to the real nature and design of the idiom in question? Is it *personification*, or does it amount to the assertion of *hypostasis*? If we were to judge of this matter, only in view of the leading instances produced above, we might be ready to say, that it amounts to asserting hypostasis. But when we compare the idiom in its whole extent, we cannot view the matter in such a light. Even those cases which present *word* in the sense of the reciprocal

pronoun, cannot be regarded as hypostatically designating a being different from God. But if those cases first produced above do indeed imply *hypostasis*, they must be understood of a being distinct and separate from God. Had the ancient Hebrews any idea of this nature? The Old Testament every where ascribes creative power and other divine attributes to God alone, in distinction from all inferior and subordinate beings. If John's doctrine of the Logos was understood by the ancient Jews, it cannot be well affirmed that it is any where fairly developed in the Heb. Scriptures. Indeed it seems to be plainly asserted in John 1:18, that Christ, the Light of the world, was the first who fully developed the Godhead: "No man hath seen God at any time, the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, *he hath declared him.*" In the connection in which this passage stands, the implication is, that neither Moses, nor any other Old Testament writer, has made a full disclosure of the gospel-doctrine respecting God. "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," (v. 17.)

In very late Targums, there are indeed passages which plainly imply a hypostatic use of *אֱלֹהִים*, i. e. *word*. But in those that were extant in the time of John, we find none which necessarily convey such a meaning. A sufficient explanation of the *usus loquendi* in question may be found, by resorting to *personification*, or (in other words) to *symbolic representation*. The *words of men* are the expressions of their desires, feelings, and wishes. They represent or symbolize the internal man. So when the *word of God* has efficiency, action, development ascribed to it, this ascription is made because it is the symbol or representative of the will or mind or energy of the Godhead. In this light we ought to regard the idiom of the Targums in question. A *hypostasis*, such as John presents, cannot well be found in them.

For what purpose, then, do we resort to them? My answer would be, that we do so in order to show how the way was already prepared for John to apply the name of Logos to Christ. The *word of God* in the Old Testament, and the same *word* in the Targums, is a symbol of God in some way revealing himself, or making himself known to men. Was it not easy and natural for the apostle to name him *Word*, "who alone has fully declared God," and "brought life and immortality to light?"

Still more easily may we conceive of this, in case the context in the prologue of John, and also the general tenor of his works, unite in showing that Christ is the true light of the world, and the great medium of all saving communication between God and man. Let us see if this be not the predominant idea in the introduction to John's gospel.

First of all, the *Logos* is with God, and is God; next he is the Creator of all things; then he is the source and author of all life, specially of that which is spiritual; and lastly he communicates this higher life to men, by becoming *the light of men*, a light shining on the darkened world of the ungodly, although not comprehended by the mass of them. John the Baptist, the forerunner of Christ, is next introduced. He came, not as the great light that was needed, but to bear witness respecting it, that so he might induce men to regard it. The true light, in distinction both from all false ones and from all inadequate ones, was Christ. He who made the world came into it, but it rejected him; he came even to his own peculiar people, and they in general did not receive him. The *Logos* became incarnate; his glory, as of the only begotten of the Father, was seen by his disciples, and it was because he was "full of grace and *truth*" that his disciples wondered and admired. The Law, indeed, existed before. There was an Old Testament revelation respecting God and our duty. But this was only a preparatory step for the complete illumination of the world. No legislator or prophet preceding the incarnation could accomplish this in an adequate manner, for no one had penetrated the secrets of the Divine bosom. "The only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him," v. 18.

Such is the tenor and substance of the prologue before us. It lies now upon the very face of it, that Christ, as *the light of the world*, is its main subject. I do not indeed consider this as indicating, that the instruction given by Christ was of itself the most important of all the things that he did, in order to secure our salvation, but as indicating that the light of truth must precede the conversion of men, and that without this, we should neither know the nature and extent of our malady, nor where we are to seek for adequate relief. The first thing which Christ did, was to *instruct*; after that he became the holy victim, the expiatory sacrifice, which was necessary to complete his work and secure the great end of all the light which he had diffused. As "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," John has everywhere exhibited him, almost beyond any other New Testament writer. But while he exhibits this truth in all its extent and excellence, he insists, perhaps more than any other sacred writer, on the work which Christ performed in fully revealing God, and in bringing life and immortality to light.

I must glance at a few passages out of his prologue, as specimens of John's views in regard to this subject.

The work of the Redeemer, while on earth, was to 'make known the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom he has sent; which work

he performed,' John 17: 3, 4. "To his disciples did he manifest the name of God, for their salvation," 17: 6, 26. "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true," 1 John 5: 20. "I have given unto them the words that thou gavest me; and they have received them," John 17: 8. "As the Father hath taught me, I speak these things," 8: 28. So 12: 49, 14: 10. "Thou hast the words of eternal life, 6: 68. "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life," 6: 68. "I am the light of the world . . . the light of life," 8: 12, and again in 9: 5. "Yet a little while is the light with you," 12: 35, 36. "I am come a light to the world," 12: 46. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life," 14: 6. "The anointing which ye have received of him . . . teacheth you all things, and is truth," 1 John 2: 27.

These are only specimens, and they might be greatly enlarged. But I deem this unnecessary. The prologue itself is so replete with the idea of Christ as *the light of the world*, as the grand medium of communicating divine and saving knowledge, that it seems to offer a plain and ready solution of the question, why Christ is styled *the Logos*. *Communication* to men of the will of God, of the doctrines of truth, of the way of salvation—the making known the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent—the bringing of life and immortality to light—are all significantly implied in the word *Logos*. That the word is an *abstract* and not a concrete one, is not a matter of chance or of insignificance. A concrete appellation here, e. g., *ὁ λέγων, ὁ διδάσκαλος*, or any like word, would be much tamer and less significant than the word now employed. John abounds in this kind of idiom. "I am the resurrection and the life," 11: 25. "I am the door," 10: 9. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life," 14: 6. "The words that I speak, they are spirit, and they are life," 6: 63. "God is light," 1 John 1: 5. "God is love," 1 John 4: 8. Can any one, who enters into the spirit of the Hebrew writers, fail to discern the intensity of expression which such an idiom presents? *God is love* is surely more impressive, yea more comprehensive, than *God is benevolent*, or *God is kind*. It implies not merely that he loves, but (if the expression may be allowed) that his very essence or nature comprises the element of love in itself. *Christ is the way, and the truth, and the life*, implies more than to say, that he points out the way, that he teaches the truth, and that he bestows life. As there is no other name under heaven given among men, whereby we can be saved; as none can come to the Father except by him; Christ is himself most significantly named the *way* of salvation, not merely him who points it out. And so of the *truth*; for all essential and saving truth concentrates in him. As to *life*,

he does not merely bestow it. "The Father has given the Son to have life in himself," (5 : 26) ; "In him was life," (1 : 4) ; i. e., the life-giving principle pervades him, and makes a part of his very nature. In like manner Paul : "Christ is of God made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption," 1 Cor. 1 : 30. Will any one say, then, that the abstract word *Logos* is not the most significant of all that could be chosen to designate Christ as the great medium of communication between God and man, as the revealer of the mysteries of God, as the discloser of all that pertains to our duty or our happiness? In a word, the essential meaning of Θεὸς λόγος, is *God revealed* — God who communicates with his creatures, and discloses to them the way of salvation. What more appropriate appellation could be given, than that which John has chosen?

If now this process of reasoning and illustration seems in any good degree satisfactory to the reader, it may help to augment this satisfaction, if he reflect that the principle of interpretation, which I have now endeavored to follow out, is altogether plain and of a fundamental nature. It is simply *grammatico-historical*. First of all, if possible, we must interpret a writer by the aid of his own writings. Next, when this fails, or is not entirely satisfactory, we may then resort to the *usus loquendi*, to the circumstances, the usages, the opinions, and the like, of the time in which the writer lived. I have, in the preceding pages, endeavored to do both. I have mainly relied on the leading views, which John's prologue and gospel present, of him who came to redeem lost man. In these I have found, as it seems to me, a good reason for choosing the appellation *Logos*. In resorting to the Hebrew Scriptures and the Chaldee translations of them, and the idiom which pervades these in regard to *word of God*, I have endeavored to show, that the way was fully prepared for John to apply the appellation in question with great significance, and (taking his own explanations of the word into view) with little danger of mistake as to his design in giving to Christ such an appellation.

If the preceding view of the appellation *Logos* is well grounded, it follows that the solution of the question by Beza, Tittmann, and others, viz., that ὁ λόγος is equivalent to ὁ λεγόμενος, and that this means the *promised one*, is not entitled to our assent. Ὁ λεγόμενος is not employed in such a sense in the Scriptures ; nor does the context show that the subject-matter of the writer here is prediction or promise respecting the Messiah. We have already seen that ὁ λέγων cannot be substituted for ὁ λόγος, without greatly impairing its significant emphasis. The opinion of Doederlein, Storr, and others, that λογός stands for *author of the word*, is somewhat nearer to correctness than either

of the preceding ones. But even this view of the appellation is defective. These critics defend it by alleging, that $\phi\omega\varsigma$ applied to Christ means *author of light*; and $\zeta\omega\eta$ applied in like manner means *author of life*. But we have already seen that these abstract nouns mean more than this. They designate the idea, that light and life centre in him as their source and essence.

But other views different from these, and from any that have here been exhibited, have been taken by many of the later and recent critics. They compare the Logos of John with the representation of *wisdom*, as made in Prov. viii. and ix. 1—12. There wisdom is personified, and is represented as the first-born of God, as being with him and being his delight, as assisting in the creation of the heavens and of the earth, as rejoicing in the habitable parts of the earth and taking delight in the sons of men, as instructing and enlightening and guiding men, specially kings and princes and nobles, and in a word as opening the way, by counsel and the communication of knowledge, to all peace and prosperity and happiness.

Very easy, it must be confessed, would it be to apply all this to the Logos. But it should be remembered, first, that *wisdom* is poetically personified here as a divine *attribute*. Such an attribute the Logos is not, inasmuch as it became flesh. Next, it is clear that $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, in scriptural usage, never means *wisdom* or *reason*. If now John meant simply to follow in the steps of Solomon, why did he change the appellation? Christ is more than once called *wisdom* in the New Testament, Matt. 11: 19, Luke 7: 35, 1 Cor. 1: 30. Why should John scruple to name him in the same way, specially since he has predicated so many things of the Logos which are also predicated of Wisdom? Plainly, I should reply, because wisdom in Prov. viii. is a *divine attribute*, and this could neither be represented as becoming incarnate, nor be called *God*. Lastly, John's view of the Logos is given in prose, plain historico-didactic prose, while wisdom in Prov. viii. is manifestly a poetic personification of the highest and most imaginative stamp. That John has merely, or even at all, imitated or copied this, there is no good evidence in the prologue before us. The manner and style of the composition are palpably different from that which we find in the work of Solomon.

In the book of Jesus Sirach, one of the apocryphal works composed not long before the Christian era, there is a copious eulogy of *Wisdom*, (in chap. i. and xxiv.), which corresponds to that in the book of Proverbs, and doubtless is grounded on it. In chap. i., wisdom is declared to be "unsearchable; to have been created before all things; to be poured out over all the works of God; as given to all who fear God;

and the beginning of wisdom, her crown, her fulness, her root, is the fear of the Lord." Thus far there is scarcely any palpable personification; and the latter declarations respecting it, show that it is spoken of as a virtue or grace, and not as a hypostasis. But in chap. xxiv., wisdom is represented as 'proceeding from the mouth of the Most High, before time and from the beginning (vs. 3, 9); as having sought after a resting place, and found one in Israel, at Jerusalem, in Zion, among the people of God, where she flourished like the cedar of Lebanon, etc., and produced abundant fruit. In the law of Moses she developed herself in great fulness and abundance, like an unfathomable stream sending forth divine revelations, prophecies, knowledge, and love, for all generations.'

All this falls far short of Prov. viii. as to boldness and lofty conception. The detail of the imagery, moreover, shows an anxiety on the part of the writer to appear ornate and imaginative, and exhibits much more of tinsel than of taste. Indeed one cannot for a moment suppose, after comparing the prologue of John with the chapters before us, that the apostle had before his mind at all, while writing the prologue, the picture drawn by the Son of Sirach. The personification even of wisdom, in the apocryphal writer, is on the whole but feebly developed; and far, very far indeed, is this author from representing wisdom either as being God, or as having become incarnate.

I do not see how the probability is to be made out, indeed, that any of the New Testament writers, either John or any other of them, was familiar with the *apocryphal* writings. It is remarkable, that nothing in all the New Testament is built on them, either of sentiment or of style. That some of the apostolic writers may have met with those apocryphal books, and read them more or less, I would not deny. But where is the passage in all the New Testament that copies after them, or is even modified by them? At any rate, John 1:1—18 is as discrepant from what Jesus Sirach has written as we can well imagine, when we consider the kindred nature, or rather the kindred offices, of *λόγος* and *σοφία*.

In the book of Baruch, 3:1—4:4, is a similar but much more indistinct representation of *σοφία* or *φρόνησις*. But it is not sufficiently prominent to require special notice now.

The so-called *Wisdom of Solomon* is throughout an eulogy of wisdom. Most of the book is occupied with showing how wisdom is to be sought, and what have been the fruits of it among the people of God, in securing their happiness and advancing the interests of true religion in the world, in contrast with the folly, i. e. the idolatry of the heathen. But in 6:22—9:18 is a particular and descriptive eulogy

of wisdom. The writer says that it is the sum of all knowledge and virtue, etc.; it is the gift of God bestowed only on the pious through their prayers; and then, 7: 22 seq., he describes it in the following manner: "Wisdom is a *spirit* intelligent, holy, simple, manifold, subtle, very mobile, piercing, undefiled, clear, invulnerable, benevolent, keen, unrestrained, beneficent, man-loving, steadfast, never-deceiving, carefreed, almighty, all-seeing, and pervading all intelligent, pure, and tender spirits." He then exhibits it as "the breath of God, the pure emanation of his majesty, incapable of defilement, the radiance of eternal light, the spotless mirror of the divine activity, the reflection of his goodness. It is but one, and yet does everything; itself changes not, while it renews all things; it descends, from age to age, into the souls of the friends and prophets of God, and these only are loved by God. It is more resplendent than the sun, dwells above all the stars, and is to be preferred before the light. Its power reaches from one end of the world to the other, and it directs all things in the best manner."

Here then wisdom is not only called a *spirit*, but divine attributes are seemingly ascribed to it. It is the organ of God in creating, preserving, governing, and enlightening the world. At times, in this work, wisdom seems to be neither more nor less than the Holy Spirit of God, in the sense of his efficient agency; see 1: 4—7: 7, 22, and comp. 9: 17. 7: 7. 12: 1. In chap. x. seq., it is sometimes exchanged with *Κύριος*, and the same things are predicated of it.

Is this *personification*, or is it *hypostasis*? It seems indeed to be something more than the first, but clearly it is not the last, at least not in the sense of making this hypostasis a being separate from God. It is sometimes presented as a kind of *emanation* from God, tantamount to a species of spiritual substance everywhere diffused, and everywhere irresistibly active. In 8: 2—9: 18, the mode of representing wisdom is merely one of *personification*. In x. seq., a different view seems to be taken, for *σοφία* is sometimes the equivalent of *Κύριος*. But the writer is so diffuse in many parts of his work, and so prodigal of epithets and imagery, that one would find it difficult indeed to make out from him a view both consistent and intelligible. At all events, the manner and matter are, for the most part, widely different from those of John. No trace can be found in the latter of leaning upon the former. The pictures drawn by each, are as diverse as the nature of the case well admits.

But there is another Jewish writer, Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of the apostles, from whom, as some eminent critics of late affirm, John may have borrowed. Lücke, in his commentary on John (edit. 2), has strenuously labored to prove, that John's views were in

fact moulded and modified by Philo's speculations on the Logos, if not directly derived from them. To this De Wette assents, in his *Exegetical Manual*. These critics profess, indeed, not to be wholly satisfied that John drew directly from this source; but they think that at all events he must have been acquainted with Philo's speculations, and influenced by them.

The same thing has often been asserted before, and many have labored to establish the probability of the assertion. The numerous resemblances that are found in Philo, between his Logos and that of John, are the main sources of argument to which all these critics resort. Some of these resemblances, at first view, appear to be very striking. But a careful examination and comparison of the whole, leads to a conclusion very different from that which a hasty or a superficial reader might make. Dorner has recently made such an examination. He has shown, as it seems to me every unprejudiced reader must now acknowledge, that the Logos of Philo is not a *hypostasis*; that nothing was farther from Philo's mind than the union of God and man in one person; that he had no belief in the need of any special atoning mediator like Christ, and no expectation of a Messiah like him who is described by John. "But," to use the words of Dorner, "blinding as the resemblance between many of his ideas and modes of expression and those of Christianity may be to the superficial reader, yet the essential principle of the two is to its very foundation diverse. Even that which sounds like [the expressions of John] has, in its entire connection, a meaning altogether diverse. . . . His system stalks by the cradle of Christianity only as a spectral counterpart. It appears like the floating, dissolving *Fata Morgana*, on the horizon where Christianity is about to arise." (I. s. 56.)

Such is the conclusion of the ablest writer, who has yet treated of the matter before us. It would detain me too long were I to produce, in this place, the views of Philo and the reasoning of Dorner respecting them. My intention however is, considering the importance of the subject, to exhibit them in the way of appendix, at the close of the present examination.

I must add a few general remarks, before quitting the subject of the various productions which I have already brought to view, on the efforts that have been made to show that John drew his views of the Logos from them.

Every one who is acquainted with the prejudices of the Palestine Jews against the foreign and the Grecian literature, during the apostolic age, will be slow to believe, that a fisherman from the lake of Galilee was conversant with the philosophy of Philo, or even that of

the apocryphal books of the Old Testament. John might indeed, while at Ephesus, have formed an acquaintance with the writings of the Egyptian Hebrews. But were they in any repute at that time, or regarded at all as authority, among the Palestine Jews? The Sept. version of the O. Test. might be, and seems to have been, favorably regarded, by all the Jews acquainted with Greek. But the reason of this is plain. It was still the O. Test., although its costume was changed. But that Philo, or the apocryphal writers, were sources to which a genuine Hebrew would resort, in order to obtain his religious views, is a thing of which the N. Test. affords no good and certain evidence. John could not expect to commend his gospel to his countrymen in this way. The evidence, then, that he drew from such a source, ought to be very strong, in order to justify us in giving credit to it.

One more general remark, and I shall pass on to the sequel of the verse before us. This is, that when so many resemblances of the *σοφία* of Philo and of the Apocrypha to the Logos of John are produced, we must consider the obvious coincidence of these two words, in a variety of respects. In speaking of *σοφία*, a writer like Philo, or Jesus Sirach, or even like the author of the book of Proverbs, might naturally say very much like that which John has said of the Logos; for all of the first named writers *personify* the wisdom of the Godhead, and in this way of course they say much that may be appropriately predicated of the Logos as represented by John. The former extend the idea of wisdom to all the manifestations of the Godhead. They represent it as a creative, life-giving, governing, enlightening, sanctifying power. John has predicated the same things of the Logos. Hence the apparent similarity. But the discrepancy, after all, is striking and fundamental. They evidently, for the most part, merely *personify*, or, when they go beyond this (if indeed they do), they employ the word *wisdom* as a mere periphrasis for God himself; just as we use *Omnipotence* or *Omniscience* to designate him who possesses these attributes. But with John, Logos is not an attribute. It is a hypostasis in some respects diverse from God, while still it is God. Withal, it "became flesh and dwelt among us." This last circumstance, in a most special manner, widely distinguishes the Logos of John from the *σοφία* of the other writers. Plainly, therefore, when the whole development in both cases is taken into view, and the nature of the subject in each is duly considered, the resemblances in some respects do not prove the derivation of John's views from those of the former writers, inasmuch as the discrepancies are so wide and so palpable as to preclude any supposition of such a nature. Indeed I cannot resist the impression, that John purposely chose the word *λόγος*, in preference

to *σοφία*, in order that he might avoid representing a divine attribute as becoming incarnate, and also avoid being confounded with the other writers who had treated of *wisdom*.

Πρὸς τὸν Θεόν — *with God*. So our version, and so the nature of the case obliges us to translate. The more usual meaning of *πρὸς* with the Acc., is *towards, to, unto*. But the sense of the passage here would be marred, and indeed unintelligible, if we should so translate it. *Πρὸς* has a multiplicity of meanings, and may stand before the Gen., Dat. or Accusative. In all these cases, it designates, among other things, *space-relations*; and with either of the cases *πρὸς* may denote *proximity, nearness*. That the idea which we express by *at, with, near by, close to*, is sometimes designated by *πρὸς* with the Acc., both in the classics and in the N. Test., is plain from abundance of examples; see Mark 6: 3, *πρὸς ἡμᾶς, with us*; Matt. 13: 56 id. Mark 9: 19, *πρὸς ὑμᾶς, with you*; Matt. 26: 55. 1 Cor. 16: 6, 7. Gal. 1: 18. 4: 18. Mark 2: 2. In such cases *πρὸς* is equivalent to *παρά* with the Dat., as Winer has abundantly shown in his Grammar, and as any good lexicon will demonstrate. Indeed John himself has decided this by his *παρὰ πατρὶ* and *παρὰ σοί* in 17: 5, where the very same connection of the Son with the Father is expressed as here, viz. one that preceded the creation of the world. The same idea is also expressed (in 1: 18) by the phrase, *Who is in (or on, εἰς) the bosom of the Father*. *Nearness, intimate communion or the most intimate union*, of the *λόγος* with God, seems plainly to be the idea aimed at by *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. Still it differs from what would be expressed by *ἐν τῷ θεῷ*. The latter would carry with it the idea that the *λόγος* was (so to speak) a part or portion of the Godhead, as an attribute, etc., if metaphysically considered; or if *morally* understood, it would designate a moral union, harmony, or agreement. *Πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* expresses neither of these ideas, but designates an *ontological* connection and communion, with the implication, moreover, that in some respect or other there is a diversity. We should not think of saying, with any intelligible meaning, that *God is with himself*, when simply and absolutely considered. To say, then, that the *Logos is with him*, must mean, that there is a diversity of some kind between the Logos and God; although the writer has not undertaken to define in what that diversity consists. I have named the connection *ontological*, because it is evidently of a nature different from that which is designated in such passages as assert the *moral* union of God and Christ and believers; e. g. John 17: 21—23, comp. vs. 10, 11.

But, after all, the inquiry remains: What is the exact idea which John means to designate? The word *πρὸς* designates, in its primary

and literal sense, a *space-relation*, viz. the *proximity* of one thing to another. It may also have a kindred secondary and tropical sense; in which case it means *in respect to, as to, in reference to, according to, on account of*, and the like. But plainly none of these or the like tropical senses fit the passage before us. We must return, then, to the ontological view, and ask: What in this respect does *πρός* mean?

At the outset of this inquiry, some things appear to be plain and certain. An actual literal *space-relation* is out of the question, as has already been hinted, for the Logos and God are *spiritual* beings, yea purely spiritual. Now *space-relations* can belong only to *material* things, and cannot be literally transferred to *spiritual* ones. To say that the Logos was literally *near to* or *with* God, would therefore convey no intelligible and rational meaning. It would imply that both God and the Logos are of limited extension; an idea incompatible with the omnipresence of both. John could not have meant to teach such a doctrine; for his views of the Godhead are evidently and palpably of the most spiritual kind. Something different from this he surely designed to express. But what this was, can be discovered, if indeed it is capable of being developed, only by an accurate and careful survey of the nature of language, when applied to beings spiritual and divine. To do this effectually, we must glance at some of the fundamental principles that belong to the nature of language, and to its application to the Godhead.

(1) All language is the expression of thought and feeling. Beyond this circle it cannot go, and yet retain any definite meaning. Whatever it originally expresses, must be ideas within the circle of sensation, reflection, or consciousness, for in one or other of these ways we obtain all our ideas.

(2) No nation or people coin words beyond their necessity. They have no store-house where they are laid up. The power of coining is all they need; and this they possess. Hence it is, that in neither Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, can we find any words appropriate to express ideas or things, beyond the circle of knowledge among the nations who spoke these languages. For example, nearly all the modern *technics* of the arts and sciences, also all such words as designate objects that were unknown to them, whether they have relation to government, manners, customs, manufactures and instruments of various kinds, or to plants, trees, minerals, animals, and the like—all such words, which now make up one half of our language, are entirely wanting in the ancient languages. It is easy to illustrate this, by a moment's delay. Let us choose, as an example; things now connected with the art of carrying on war by land and by sea, a matter so well known and so often practised by the ancients. How would any one translate into Hebrew or Greek,

words expressive of the common implements of war at the present day? Let him be called on to translate gunpowder, gun, rifle, swivel, bomb, cannon, Congreve rocket, and many other instruments of destruction; can he do it? Or if we transfer the scene of contest to the waters of the ocean, we may then ask him to translate this (to us very intelligible) sentence: "The brig was hulled by a broad-side from a frigate, and blown up by a Congreve rocket from a man of war." What is the reason, now, that in not one of the cases in question, or in a multitude more of the like tenor, not a single portion of this sentence can be expressed in Hebrew or Greek, in a manner like that in which we express ourselves, or even at all, except by diffuse and inadequate circumlocution? The reason, I answer, is plain enough. All these and the like objects were never within the circle of Greek or Hebrew cognition, and of course they have no names in the respective languages. This exemplifies the position, that no store-house of words was furnished in ancient times for future use, and sufficiently illustrates our assertion, that the coining of words is limited by the need of them.

Let us pause here, for a moment, and reverse the case. The Hebrews and Greeks were cognizant of many objects natural and artificial, which are entirely out of the circle of our acquaintance, and for which we have no names. How then can we translate many things named in the Scriptures of both Testaments? We cannot do it with any exactness. We must either transfer the words of the original, and explain as we best may, or we must employ a diluted and feeble circumlocution.

(3) We have seen that no people form words to designate things out of the circle of their cognition. So long then as the *invisible world* is known to them neither by experience nor intuition, men do not form words intended specifically to designate the objects of that world. But before a revelation, the true spiritual nature of God, and of heavenly beings, was wholly unknown to men. An imaginary future, and imaginary gods, the heathen nations indeed thought and spoke much of. But all they said and thought, in regard to these, is deeply tinged with their supposed resemblance to material and earthly objects. Their gods are of course full of human passions and infirmities. Their heaven and hell are but copies of terrestrial scenes of happiness or of misery. They were unable to go beyond this, in their conceptions or their expressions. And it was by men of such a cast, that the Hebrew and Greek languages were moulded. Joshua tells us that the ancestors of Abraham "served other gods," 24: 2; and we know what was the state of the Greeks. When prophets and apostles, then, were called to deliver inspired messages, they were compelled to employ languages

formed and fashioned by heathen polytheists and idolaters, who had no true idea of a spiritual Godhead, or of heaven, or hell. They must needs take the language as they found it, or else make a new one. But a new one would be intelligible only to the inspired, and of course it could make no revelation at all to the mass of men. What could they do, what did they do, in such an exigency as this?

They did what the necessity of the case constrained them to do. In a few cases they formed new designations, by compounding words which bore a sense in some respects similar to the one they wished to express. They gave to some words a more prolonged or a shorter form, to indicate some discrepancy from former usage. But in far the greatest number of cases, they assigned to the old words a sense in some respects new, leaving it to the context and the nature of the case to point out the meaning of them. Nothing is plainer, than that, so far as the invisible world is concerned, all the words, which designate objects there, have a meaning in some respects quite new attached to them. Take, for example, *θεός*, *κύριος*, *ἄγγελος*, *διάβολος*, *οὐρανός*, and the like, and a moment's reflection will show, that not one of all these words was ever employed by the heathen Greek, before the Christian era, in the N. Test. sense. But the sacred writers did not, and could not, stop to define in all these cases. The context and the pervading tenor of the sentiment of course define the meaning of nearly all such words.

But beyond the objects of the invisible world, the like usage was necessarily extended. Of some of the Christian graces and virtues, and of all the peculiar truths of Christianity, the heathen were ignorant. How then can they be supposed to have formed words to express those things of which they had no cognizance? The Christian grace of *humility*, for example, which is expressed by the newly coined word *ταπεινοφροσύνη*, they regarded only as *pusillanimity*. *Ἀρέτη* was with them the name of *bravery*, *courage*, *martial spirit*, a word kindred to *Ἄρης*, *Mars*. In like manner, they assigned to *πίστις*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *χάρις*, and other like words, a sense quite discrepant from the evangelical one. There is not a page, nor scarcely a paragraph of the N. Test., which is not stamped with that character which a new revelation of necessity assigns to words. Scarcely ever has a greater error in philology been committed, than that of the Purists, who maintained that the Greek of the N. Test. is entirely *classical*. If it were so, then we should find only classical, i. e. heathen ideas in it; and then, moreover, such a style would afford demonstrative evidence to the critic, that these books were not written by Hebrews.

We have now taken a view of the general nature of the case, which has respect to the invisible world. Leaving this general view, let us,

(4) Make some more special investigation of the manner in which the Scriptures of both Testaments have disclosed to us the nature and developments of the Godhead.

In the expression of all our views of God, we borrow analogies drawn from ourselves; and abstracting from them all that savors of the finite and the imperfect, we arrive at the idea of the infinite and the perfect. So *we* do now, and so we are compelled to do, notwithstanding all our advantages of an improved philosophy. The ancients went all lengths in these analogies. To God is assigned by them all the members of the human body, eyes, mouth, ears, arms, hands, feet, breast, etc. To God are assigned all the passions and emotions of the human mind, sinful ones only excepted. God loves, hates, is jealous, is grieved, mocks, scorns, derides, is angry, avenges himself, and the like. He ascends, he descends, he sits enthroned, he puts on dazzling costume, he makes war, he employs the bow and arrows, the spear, the helmet, and the breastplate. In a word, all that man *is* or *does*, with the exception of what is degrading or sinful, is ascribed to God in the Scriptures. How comes it, then, that no enlightened mind ever commits mistakes in regard to the interpretation of all such passages? The answer is easy. God is a *spirit*. This is the essence of his nature. An innumerable multitude of texts in the Scriptures exhibit him in this light, and predicate of him what can belong only to an infinite and perfect spirit. At once we say, then, that all such representations as are borrowed from our material nature and outward actions, are to be *tropically* understood. They are mere costume, not person. They are nothing more than symbols drawn from well known and familiar things, to indicate what we have no language to express in a direct and literal manner. Those representations, indeed, which are borrowed from the operations and affections of our own minds, comprise somewhat more of real analogy; but most of them must, when we interpret them, be greatly modified and limited. *God repents* means that he changes the course of his providential action. When we repent of anything, we refrain from it, and alter our course of action. The *change* in the course pursued, is applicable to the divine dealings; but the state of mind, in God and in us, is far from being the same. *Anger* in God must be a very different thing from what it is in us; but disapprobation or aversion, which lie at the basis of anger, may truly be predicated of the Divine Being. When he is said to be angry, the phraseology expresses his strong disapprobation. In saying that God *derides* or *laughs at* the attempts of his enemies, there is a vivid designation of the utterly vain and futile na-

ture of those attempts as viewed by him. And the like may be said of most of the mental operations and affections ascribed to the supreme Being. Even *loving* and *hating* must be understood in a sense that divests these affections of all imperfection and weakness. Our exegetical guide, in all such cases, is the nature and perfections of God. We cannot reasonably apply anything to him, which shall be so understood as to derogate from his spotless and all-perfect being.

In all the *ontological* descriptions of the Godhead, moreover, there must of course be much of modification applied to the interpretation of the language. What pure spirit is in itself, we do not know; much less, what an infinite and uncreated spirit is. When we say: 'God is *omnipresent*,' we do not mean, at least we should not mean, that he is everywhere diffused, like the original fiery vapor of some geologists, or like some subtle and ethereal fluid. If we say: 'God is mighty,' we must not conceive that his might, like ours, implies compactness and vigor of muscle and sinew, and of corporeal frame in general. Even when we speak of the operations of the divine mind, we must be careful how we compare them with our own. *God remembers* does not imply that he makes mental effort to recal past occurrences or impressions. *God knows* seems, at first view, to be literally applicable. But it is not exactly so. We study, compare, reason, judge, and remember, in order to know. But through these processes the divine mind does not pass. We must abstract from the application to him all the efforts and methods of acquiring knowledge, and retain only the simple idea of perfect cognition.

It were easy to extend this examination to almost everything that we ascribe to God, in respect to his ontological nature, to his thinking, or his acting; and we should find, nearly without exception, that we must use and understand language in a modified sense. The *modus in quo* must be left out of the account. We, when speaking of ourselves, of necessity include this. But as God is a spirit, uncreated, perfect, eternal, without parts or passions, whatever is predicated of him should not partake of what belongs to us merely as human, mortal, progressive, and never perfect.

I have said that what we affirm of the Godhead must be *modified* in the interpretation of it. I prefer this mode of characterizing the interpretation, to that of saying that the language is always *tropically* used. The latter would imply too much. When we say, *God knows*, it is no trope. There is the assertion of cognition in the phrase. But to apply *knowing* to God in the same sense as we apply it to ourselves, with all the implications that it necessarily suggests to our minds when affirmed of ourselves, would be altogether an erroneous application. As has

already been said, we must abstract from this, and from most other expressions that have respect to the divine actions and emotions, the *modus in quo* throughout. Otherwise, we overlook the nature of an infinite and perfect spirit.

Let us now return, after this long but I would hope not useless digression, to *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. Clear it is, if the principles that have now been brought to view are well grounded, that a proper *space-relation* or *proximity* is out of the question. *Θεός* and *Λόγος* are *spiritual* beings, and therefore such an idea is irrelevant. The allegation that the Logos cannot be God, because he is said to be *with him*, and therefore must be different from him with whom he is, seems often to be founded mainly on the conception of a *space-relation*; and so far as it is so, it is not well grounded. The *with*, in this case, is something diverse from local proximity.

What then is it? A positive and direct answer, except in a modified sense, we cannot make to this question. But we may say thus much, *viz.* that an *intimate union* or *connection* between the Logos and God is asserted; and, as the case is, a connection of an *ontological* nature; for it is evidently the design of the writer to say something concerning the nature of the Logos. The *fact* then of an *intimate connection* is averred by him. But the *manner* of this, is not the subject of affirmation. When we assert that God is *omnipresent*, we assert a plain, simple, credible truth or fact. But do we assert or know anything of the *manner* in which he is so? When we assert his *self-existence*, is the manner of it brought into view? Or, (to come nearer to objects with which we are conversant), when we assert the union of soul and body, which makes a human being, do we even pretend to know anything of the manner of this? It were easy to extend the same inquiry to ten thousand thousand things, that we assert and believe as facts or truths, where the *modus in quo* is utterly beyond our reach. Even the blade of grass beneath our feet puts at defiance all our powers of knowledge, in regard to many particulars respecting it.

The fact, then, of an intimate connection between God and the Logos, may be asserted, and be credible, without any explanation of the manner of that connection. Indeed, an explanation in human language may be, and probably is, utterly impossible. Of course, then, we are not able to allege that the *unity* of the divine being is infringed by such a connection. We must have something that is inconsistent with that unity positively disclosed, before we can come to such a conclusion. But this cannot be said of the allegation before us. There may be a diversity, in some respect or other, in a being, which does not destroy its unity. Some diversity, indeed, we are constrained to acknowledge, in the

present case. *Connection* or *community* necessarily implies some diversity or other, between the objects connected or in community. There is a *ἑτερότης*, as the Greeks expressed it, i. e. lit. an *otherness*, in some sense or other. And is not this what all believe, who maintain the doctrine of the Trinity? The Father is not in all respects the Son, nor the Son the Father. But whether the diversity in question is such as to forbid us to believe that the Son is truly divine, that is another question, and one to which our context affords an answer. For the present, I have only to add, that we must rest content with this idea of the meaning of our text, viz. that it imports the most intimate connection between God and the Logos, with the implication, at the same time, of some diversity between them. The spiritual and uncreated nature of God and the Logos, and the consequent incapacity of human language specifically to describe their nature and connection, forbid us to go beyond the generic idea of the simple fact presented to our view.

One other question remains, respecting the object or design which John had in view, when he made the declaration before us. That it was important in his view, is manifest from the fact, that he has immediately repeated the assertion that *the Logos was with God*, in the second verse. Why this repetition? And specially, why does he not also repeat, at the same time, the declaration that *the Logos is God*? The earnestness of his affirmation, manifested by the repetition, is palpable indeed to every reader; but the reason or ground of that earnestness is a matter not so obvious. In fact, I know not where to look, among the commentators, for an entirely satisfactory explanation. The whole passage seems plainly to wear the appearance of opposition to some prevailing error of the times, in regard to the Logos.

That Cerinthus was a contemporary of John, and that he taught his Gnostic doctrines at Ephesus, and was opposed by the apostle, the voice of antiquity has proclaimed. The Gnostics ascribed the creation of the world to an inferior *Æon*, as they named their imaginary spiritual emanations from the great Supreme. With them all matter was a production of an evil-minded being, and was in itself evil and a source of evil. Hence they denied the possibility of a real union between the Logos and a human fleshly nature. That John has controverted this heresy, in his epistles, there can be no good room for doubt; indeed it is now generally conceded. In 1 John 4: 2, 3, and in 2 John v. 7, are found plain and explicit declarations of an opinion opposite to that of the Gnostics respecting the Logos. Various passages, moreover, in John's epistles are of a like tenor, and are to be interpreted by the aid of these explicit texts. And in respect to the Gospel of

John, there seems to be no good reason to suppose, that the heresy in question is entirely out of its view. Doubtless we are not to regard the apostle as having intended, in his great work, principally to contend against Cerinthus, so as to take the attitude of a polemic throughout. But that he had in his mind, when he wrote the prologue before us, some of the errors of the Gnostics, in regard to the *Æons*, and specially in regard to the *Æon* whom they represented as being the *Logos*, seems to be altogether probable. They regarded and represented the *Logos* as only one of the seven primary *Æons*, all of which were emanations or secondary beings, separate from God and liable to change. They maintained that this *Logos* neither created the world, nor in reality became incarnate. The visible creation sprung, as they averred, only from the lowest of the *Æons*, who was apostate and degenerate; and the union of the *Logos* with the man Jesus they regarded as only temporary and apparent, not lasting or real. In opposition to these and the like views we may very naturally suppose John to have asserted, that the *Logos* was the creator of all things; that to be so, he must of course have been in union with God before the creation, and not merely one of a separate and inferior order of emanated beings; and that this same *Logos* became incarnate and dwelt among men. All this stands opposed to the heretical doctrines in question; not (so to speak) individually and polemically opposed to Cerinthus, but still asserting or declaring what, if admitted, would undermine the whole structure of the Gnostics. That there must have been some special call for the expression of sentiments like those in the prologue before us, every considerate reader will naturally see and feel. That the Gnostic views in question were already prevalent in a considerable degree, at the time when John wrote his Gospel, there is no good reason to doubt. Is it not natural, then, to suppose that John meant to oppose and undermine those views? Not that this was his sole or even his main object; for besides opposing Gnosticism, he was inculcating or developing truths very important.

If now the *Logos* was *with God* before the creation, and was eternal, then might he be the Creator of all things. But if he was a subsequent emanation, or belonged to a separate and inferior order of emanated beings, then he could not have been Creator, nor Redeemer in that high sense in which John speaks of him, viz. as the *μονογένης τοῦ πατρὸς*. Hence the three declarations contained in the verse before us, that he was eternal, was with God, and was God. In the repetition of the assertion that the *Logos* was with God (vs. 1, 2), there is, as has already been remarked, beyond all doubt an emphasis. But it does not follow, that the sentiment of this clause is in itself more important

than the assertion which is not formally repeated, viz. that the Logos is God. The reason for omitting here a direct repetition of this last idea, seems to be offered to our view by the subsequent context, where the Logos is represented as the *Creator* of all things. Is not this virtually a repetition, even with intensity, of the idea that he was God? So it must appear to most readers; for why may we not suppose them to believe, with Paul, that "he who made all things is God?" Heb. 3: 4. Creatorship is the highest evidence we can have of the being and power of God.

Had we the religious history of the times and of the place, when and where John wrote his Gospel, there can be scarcely a doubt, that the entire meaning and design of the clause *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* would be made plain to our apprehension. But as we have it not, we must content ourselves with such an approximation to the object desired, as the nature of the case at present admits. To sum up all in a word: Gnosticism maintained, that the Logos was an emanation from God, which not only became a separate being, but belonged to an inferior and secondary order; while John asserts that he was ever in the most intimate union with God, and moreover was truly divine. Viewed in such a light, our text is full of appropriate and apposite meaning.

We may now advance to the clause that follows *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*; which is, *καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*.

The first question is, Which is the *subject* of the clause, *θεός* or *ὁ λόγος*? The fact that *λόγος* has the article and *θεός* omits it, is not decisive, although this is the more common and classical usage. But still, a predicate may, and not unfrequently does, have the article; e. g. v. 4 here, *ἡ Ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς*. 2 Cor. 3: 17, *ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστι*. 1 John 3: 4, *ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, and so elsewhere in many cases. On the other hand, that *θεός* lacks the article, would not decide that it may not be the subject of the sentence; for it is one of those words which by usage often dispense with the article. (See Win. Gram. N. Test. on the Article.) It is the nature of the case, therefore, to which we must here appeal, in order to decide the question. If *θεός* be the subject, then the affirmation would be, that *God is the Word*; which would make no sense, unless *word* be made to mean an attribute equivalent to *wisdom* or *reason*. This, however, is contrary to all the scriptural usage. Moreover, this would remove the *diversity* between God and the Logos, which the preceding clause implies, as it would make *λόγος* merely an attribute of God. To all this we must add, that *λόγος* is, throughout the passage, the dominant subject. Like constructions in John may easily be found; e. g. *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός*, John 4: 24. *ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν*, 1 John 4: 8, 16. That

the predicate (*θεός*) should hold the first place in the clause before us, is altogether in accordance with what usage permits and sanctions. Such a position indicates of course that the word is emphatic, i. e. that special stress is laid upon it.

But in what sense is *θεός*, as a predicate, to be taken? Origen suggested, in accordance with his views of the inferiority and dependence of the Son, that "the name *θεός* has the article, when it means the *unbegotten God*, but omits it when the Logos is called *θεός*." It is somewhat difficult to account for such an assertion, on the part of Origen; for even in this very prologue, the unbegotten God is twice named without the article, vs. 13, 18. Often is the same usage found elsewhere, as any Concordance will show. Besides, if *θεός* had the article prefixed, in this case, the sense of the passage would be entirely marred; for then there would be an assertion of the entire identity of the Logos and of God, while the writer is in the very act of bringing to view some distinction between them. De Wette has seen and candidly acknowledged this. "The omission of the article," says he, "is designed; . . . and it is full of meaning; for such a clause as *ὁ λόγος ἦν ὁ θεός* would take away all definitive idea of the Logos, and yield only the senseless meaning (*sinnlosen Sinn*) that *the Son is the Father*." (Exeg. Handbuch in loc.) Lücke, in his Commentary, has ventured to suggest, that if John meant to assert of the Logos a nature truly divine, he could not well have omitted the article, for this would prevent all ambiguity. Had he inserted it, however, instead of making his meaning plain, he would, as we have seen, have presented his readers with the very unmeaning or paradoxical sentiment, that the Son is the Father, or that the Logos is in all respects the very same as the God with whom he is. Well might De Wette say, then, that the omission of the article here is designed, and full of meaning. By the very nature of the case, when *θεός* becomes a predicate in a sentence, it attains a *predicative*, i. e. *attributive* or *adjective* meaning, designating some essence or quality inhering in the subject with which it is connected. From the very nature of the case, also, it cannot mean, that one person, strictly considered, is another person, or that one being is another being; for this is a palpable impossibility. *Θεός*, therefore, must be understood as designating a nature or quality which may belong to the Logos, e. g. divine essence or attributes. But whether it means *a divine nature, divinity, Godhead*, in a higher or lower sense, remains to be investigated in the sequel. Yet so far as the nature of a predicate is concerned, in the present case, we are obliged to suppose that it indicates something which belongs to, or is inherent in, the Lo-

gos which is the subject of the sentence. That something we can reasonably make out, only in the way that has just been indicated.

I must remark however, in this place, that although the predicate, in this and the like cases, obtains a kind of *adjective* meaning, it does not follow that *θεός* can here be exchanged for *θεῖος*, *divine*; for this adjective is not unfrequently employed in a wider and less intensive sense than that which the noun *θεός* designates in the present case, when interpreted according to its scriptural usage. Nor can we translate *θεός* a *God*; for this would designate the Logos only as one among other gods, i. e. a particular individual among other individuals of the like rank. It would moreover be at variance with the *adjective* or *attributive* meaning of *θεός* as a predicate here, and present John as asserting, or at least assuming, the existence of a class of inferior divinities, which he surely did not admit.

If the view of the *omission* of the article, which has been given above, be correct, it follows that what has been affirmed of this omission, viz. that it indicates of itself the inferior nature of *θεός*, has no ground that is stable. John has done just what the nature of the case required him to do; and had he done otherwise, the whole tenor of v. 1 would have been inexplicable, and the design of the writer marred; for he would either have said, that the Logos was the identical God with whom he was, or that he was the only supreme God, exclusive of the Father and of the Holy Ghost. Neither of these has John affirmed.

The question whether *θεός* indicates a divine nature in its highest or in a lower sense, has often been raised, and is argued with much ingenuity and ability by Lücke. As he has exhibited the argument in favor of the lower sense in its best form, it becomes expedient to examine his positions.

He says that two views may be taken of the clause *καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. Its design may be to limit and restrain the preceding *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*; or it may be merely a further unfolding of the idea of community with God, "so as to prevent its being taken in a sense either too wide or too narrow." He regards these two positions as quite distinct, and in some measure opposed to each other. I am unable to see this. In either case, something is added which prevents a wrong interpretation of *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. In the first case, the writer would say, that *being with God* is not to be so taken as to exclude the Logos from possessing a divine nature; in the second he would say, that in addition to the idea of *being with God*, we must also include the idea that *he was God*, so as not to take the first assertion "in a sense too broad or too loose." It comes to the same thing, at last, in both cases; for

both turn on preventing a misconception of *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. The whole must depend, then, on the meaning of *θεός*.

Lücke further argues, that in the first case, the diversity of the writer's design would have required a *δέ* or an *ἀλλά* before the last clause, instead of a *καί*. To this we might reply, by alleging (what is well known and quite frequent), that *καί* often has an *adversative* sense — *and yet, and still*; e. g., in v. 10, last clause. So also in John 6:70. 7:19. 9:30. 17:25. 1 John 2:4, et al., see Lex. It even expresses the stronger adversative, viz: *but*; e. g., Matt. 12:39. 13:14, 17:26:60, al. The Classics themselves occasionally exhibit this idiom; and above all, the Heb. *ו* is very often employed in an adversative sense, as any one may see by consulting a good Lexicon. If necessary, we might resort to this answer, in a way merely philological. But it seems to be unnecessary. The true solution lies in the aphoristic style of John, which is quite remarkable. The nicer connecting particles, which cast such exquisite light and shade over the Attic Greek, are very often neglected in the New Testament, and the more simple Heb. structure is followed. So in the case before us. The Logos was thus and so, and the Logos was also so and so. Now if the latter addition in reality explains and limits the former clause, and does this by virtue of the sentiment which it contains, it is not necessary to put it in an adversative costume. The sentiment answers a double purpose; it teaches a truth or doctrine of high importance, and this truth at the same time prevents an erroneous conception of what had gone before. An adversative form would show that the principal design was mere explanation or limitation of what precedes. But this would not do justice to our text. John's views extend beyond mere epexegetis.

Lücke further asserts, that the last clause cannot be regarded as a new thought, because it is not repeated in v. 2, as the rest of the verse is. But it has already been suggested, that v. 3, which asserts *creatorship* of the Logos, virtually and energetically repeats the idea that the Logos is God. He adds, that the article before *θεός* would be necessary, if it meant true Godhead. But to this, an answer has already been given.

Last of all, he takes it for granted, that John drew his ideas of the Logos from Philo Judæus. Philo asserts of the Logos, that he was *δυνάμεως θεός*, and *θεός . . . ἐν καταρχῇ*. Now, says he, if Philo thus modifies *θεός*, with such loose views of the Godhead as he had, must not John, who had so much purer and more exalted ideas of God than Philo, of course be understood as applying the epithet *θεός* to the Logos, in a modified and inferior sense?

In reply to this I can only say, at present, that it takes for granted

far more than can be proved, or even rendered probable. That John studied the speculative works and borrowed from the store-house of the half *Gentilizing, Platonizing* Philo, seems to me altogether improbable. In the sequel, by the aid of Dorner, I trust it will be satisfactorily shown, that an assumption like that of Lücke has no stable foundation.

Here Lücke has left the subject before us. But why? Has he given us any fair view of the usage of the sacred writers, in both Testaments, with regard to the word *θεός*, or its equivalent in Hebrew? None. It becomes necessary, then, to make some suggestions in regard to this matter.

The sum of all may be expressed in a few words. Never, in all the Scriptures, is an individual called *God* simply, as the *Logos* here is, unless there is something in the context to show that the word is to be taken in a qualified sense. In Ex. 7 : 1, the Lord says to Moses : "I have made thee a god to Pharaoh." In 4 : 16 it is thus expressed : "Thou shalt be to him [to Pharaoh] instead of God." In both cases the meaning is plain, viz : 'Thou shalt address Pharaoh, and work miracles, in the place of the God who commissions thee.' When magistrates are called *gods* (מַלְאָכִים), or angels are so named, the context always develops what will prevent mistake, on the part of any intelligent reader. When idols are called gods, or a single idol is named a god, there never can be any doubt in what sense the words are employed. They are spoken of, as their worshippers speak of them. *Jehovah* they are never named. There is but one alone, to whom this name belongs. And in the New Testament, beyond all doubt, the word *θεός* predominantly designates the same being.

At all events we challenge a single instance of the application, in the New Testament, of the name *θεός* to any individual, excepting to God and Christ, or to the Holy Spirit. There is no accommodation here. The usage is uniform ; it pervades the whole New Testament ; and it is withal a thing so plain, that he who runneth may read.

But this is not all ; for John has not only added nothing to soften the force and natural meaning of *θεός*, but he has immediately subjoined predicates of the *Logos*, which render the sense of *θεός* here quite plain and inevitable. The *Logos* was not only eternal and with God, but he was the *θεός who created all things* ; and this in so high and absolute a sense, that not even one thing was made which he did not make, v. 3. Now Paul says, that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen *by the creation of the world*, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead," so that the very heathen are without excuse for unbelief, Rom. 1 : 20. Again he has

said, that "he who made all things, is God," Heb. 3 : 4. Throughout the Old Testament it is everywhere asserted and declared, that "the everlasting God, Jehovah, is the Creator of the ends of the earth," Isa. 40 : 28. When the ancient prophets bring to view the claims of idolaters for their idol gods, they never fail to put them in comparison with the exclusive claim of Jehovah to have created all things. They all perish ; their gods are the work of men's hands ; but he endureth forever, and is the eternal and self-existent God, from whom alone came all created things. The fact that the heathen gods are not *creators*, shows them to be no gods. There is no act of the Godhead, which is so high, so striking, so exclusively his, as that of creation ; and consequently the author of creation is at all events God to us.

If this view is scriptural and correct, then has John, who not only calls the *Logos God* but declares that *he made all things*, taught us that he is true God, supreme God, and not a mere *θεὸς δεύτερος*, or a *θεὸς . . . ἐν καταρχῇ*. That John and Paul agree in their leading views of Christianity, will not be questioned, I presume, by any serious and considerate inquirer. But Paul has directly asserted, that Christ is supreme God, *ὁ ὢν ἐνὶ πάντων θεός*, i. e., the existing God over all, Rom. 9 : 9. And to make this still more strong, he adds, *blessed forever, Amen*. Paul also has told us, that "all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, were created by Christ," Col. 1 : 16 ; and again that "God made the worlds by his Son," Heb. 1 : 2 ; and in Heb. 2 : 8—10, he has directly ascribed creation to the Son. Paul also speaks of "the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ," Tit. 2 : 13 ; where the circumstance of *appearing* seems plainly, according to New Testament analogy, to indicate that *Christ* is spoken of. John himself has called Christ *the true God and eternal life*, 1 John 5 : 20 ; for the *ὄντος* here ("this is the true God," etc.) cannot grammatically relate to any antecedent but the immediate one, and this is Jesus Christ. Besides the *ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, in this case, belongs to *ὄντος* as a predicate, and this is the name which John unquestionably gives to Christ, and not to God the Father, John 1 : 4. 14 : 6. 1 John 1 : 1, 2. Now if the same being who is *eternal life* is also true God, (and this the construction of the sentence most plainly declares, for *ὄντος* belongs to both predicates), then does John here call Christ the *true God*. If so, can any words show more plainly, that John did not regard Christ as merely a secondary or subordinate God ?

I am aware that Lücke and De Wette give a different exegesis of the last two texts, as others before them had done. But I cannot help dissenting from them, on grounds that are grammatical and philological. De Wette himself ingenuously states, that, as to Tit. 2 : 13, the

New Testament Christology, which represents Christ as making his *appearance*, and not God the Father, is somewhat against his view. He also acknowledges, that where God the Father and Christ are both spoken of, it is usual for Paul to insert something which makes the line of separation clear; e. g., Tit. 1:4. 3:4—6. 1 Tim. 1:2. 2:5. 2 Tim. 4:1, and often elsewhere. All this is well, for it is plainly a matter of fact in regard to the usage of Paul. Why then, in the case before us, viz: Tit. 2:13, did not the apostle put the article *τοῦ* before *σωτήρος*? I am aware that where several nouns follow each other in succession, and specially when they are of the same number and gender, the article may be, and often is, omitted after the first noun; even in cases where the sense implies the presence or rather the necessity of an article. This practice, however, is for the most part limited to particulars belonging to one whole. But wherever *diversity* is to be marked, or the sense becomes emphatic, the repetition of the article is necessary. In the case before us, if the *great God* is, as he maintains, to be separated from the Saviour, we may then well ask, why was not the article inserted after it? This consideration has appeared so weighty to most minds, that from Chrysostom down to the present time, the great mass of interpreters have been guided by it. The cases appealed to by De Wette, in support of his allegation that the article is not necessary, (2 Thess. 1:12. 2 Pet. 1:1), are diverse from the present one; for there *ἡμῶν* follows *θεοῦ* and precedes *κυρίου* in the first case, and so before *σωτήρος* in the latter. This of course makes the distinction that is necessary to the sense required, without the aid of the article. He also appeals to Jude v. 4, “Denying *τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χριστόν*”; where, he says, *the only Lord* means God the Father. But this is the only example, in all the N. Test., which is of the same construction as the one before us in Tit. 2:13; and in respect to the meaning of this clause, I cannot accede to his view. *Δεσπότης*, as applied to the divine Being, is a word of very rare occurrence in the N. Test.; but a case occurs in 2 Pet. 2:1, where this apostle speaks of some “who deny the Lord (*δεσπότην*) who bought them.” From the striking resemblance of Jude, in style, to the second epistle of Peter, we may argue with great probability, that *δεσπότην* is applied by the former to Christ, in the passage under consideration. The absence of the article before the second clause, renders this almost grammatically certain. If so, then De Wette has merely argued in a circle. In both cases, we seem to be grammatically and philologically obliged, to apply the highest epithets to Christ. He is *the great God*, and he is *the only Lord*.

I have already said what I deem to be a sufficient vindication of the

sense given above to 1 John 5: 20. Lücke has argued at great length against this view, but not in any good measure to the satisfaction of one who seeks after a clear, intelligible, and grammatical meaning in John. He accuses the orthodox of strong prejudices in regard to the exegesis of it; but he seems to me to be under opposite influences quite as strong. The main objection of De Wette is, that John does not elsewhere apply *θεός* with the article to Christ, (he means in John 1: 1). True; but in this latter case, De Wette himself has shown that the article was omitted by design, and because it would have made nonsense if it had been inserted. Besides this, his statement seems not to be quite exact. In John 20: 28, Thomas is represented as saying to Christ: "My Lord, *καὶ ὁ θεός μου*." If John did not utter this himself, it is clear that both he and the Saviour assented to and approved of it. The truth is, that as *θεός* is often applied to God the Father, or (if one will so have it) God supreme, both with the article and without it, we may well ask: Why cannot the like usage take place in respect to Christ, when he is called *θεός*? And if so, we can found no solid argument against his true divinity, upon the absence of the article in any case. I would merely suggest, in addition to what has been already said on 1 John 5: 20, that if *ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός* is to be applied to God the Father, then is the course of the writer's thought both singular and tautologous. He had just said: "We are in *the true one*, [i. e. the true God, or the Father], *in his Son Jesus Christ*." He then subjoins: "*The same (ὁὗτος) is the true God. . .*" That is, according to Lücke, De Wette, and others, the apostle says: "We are in the true [God], . . . the same true God (ὁὗτος) is the true God." This seems not to be making much progress. But quite different is the case, when (following the laws of grammar) we refer *ὁὗτος* to Jesus Christ. We have then an assertion full of meaning. And what more of difficulty is there, in supposing that John calls Christ *the true God*, than in the fact that he calls him God, and represents him as eternal, and then most explicitly declares him to be the Creator of the universe? Again, we may well ask: Can any but the true God be eternal and the Creator of all things?

But I must desist. My only apology for this unexpectedly prolonged discussion, is the importance of the subject. I shall content myself, for the rest, with much briefer hints.

I might add to the N. Test. usage of calling Christ *God*, the passage in 1 Tim. 3: 16, "God was manifest in the flesh." I am fully aware of the controversy about the reading here, viz. *ὁς* instead of *θεός*. But I take it to be now settled, beyond all fair controversy, that *θεός* is the true reading; and only Griesbach and Lachmann have ventured

on the other, in their critical editions of the N. Test. Dr. Henderson, in his Essay on this text, (reprinted in the older Bib. Repository), has placed this matter beyond fair critical objections.

I might also appeal to Heb. 1: 8: "But unto the Son he saith: Thy throne, O God, is forever and ever;" and that the true God is here meant, appears from the sequel, which ascribes the creation of all things to this same *God*. But as my purpose is not to exhaust the subject, but only to give leading touches and outlines, I must turn the reader's attention to a somewhat different view and illustration of the matter before us, by asking the question, Whether the general usage of the N. Test. will justify us in ascribing to *θεός*; a secondary, subordinate, catachrestic sense?

As John will best explain himself, we will proceed still further with him. In John 5: 17, Jesus says, in order to justify himself against the accusations of the Jews that he had violated the sabbath, by healing the impotent man at the pool of Bethesda on that day: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;" i. e. I have the same authority that he has to supersede the law of the sabbath. In 14: 9 he says: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." In 10: 30, "I and my Father are one;" which does not seem here to mean a unity or harmony of a moral nature, as in 17: 11, 22. In 17: 5, Jesus speaks of "the glory which he had with the Father before the world was," i. e. from eternity. Glory from whom? Not from creatures. It must then have been *essential* glory. In 5: 19, he says: "Whatsoever things he [the Father] doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." In 5: 21, "The Son quickeneth whom he will;" v. 25, "The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God and live;" v. 26, "The Son hath life in himself." In 5: 22, 23, "All judgment is committed to the Son, that all men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father.

These are only a small selection out of John's many declarations respecting Christ. If we follow him to the Apocalypse, we open (1: 6) with the ascription of "glory and dominion to him [Christ], forever and ever, Amen;" and in 6: 8—14, the whole of the heavenly world are represented as ascribing to "the Lamb that was slain, power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing;" and then, again, as repeating this doxology by once more ascribing "blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, to him that sitteth on the throne, and to the *Lamb*, forever and ever;" to which a solemn *Amen* is responded. If any greater honor and praise are ascribed to God than this, I know not where to find an account of it.

In four different places does John represent, in the Apocalypse, the Saviour as saying of himself: "I am the first and the last;" and (with

a variation of phraseology) as declaring the same by saying repeatedly of himself, that he is "the Alpha and Omega," and "the beginning and the end;" viz. in Rev. 1: 11, 17. 2: 8. 21: 6. 22: 13. The very same description of Jehovah is given by Isaiah, in Isa. 41: 4. 44: 6. 48: 12. In Rev. 7: 13, the Lamb is spoken of by calling him *ὁ καθήμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ θρόνου*—an appellation often employed in the Apocalypse to designate God supreme.

That the Lord our God is to be worshipped in a *spiritual* manner, and that he alone is entitled to such homage, is as much a doctrine of the N. Testament as of the Old. Indeed, it lies upon the face of both Testaments. Yet that *spiritual* homage, prayer, and praise, are spoken of as directed and given to Christ, and as being due to him, lies also on the face of the N. Test. writings. When Judas fell, and the apostles were about to select another apostle, they appealed in prayer to Christ, saying: "Thou, Lord, who knowest the hearts of all men," etc. i. e. *do thou, who art omniscient, direct us to a right and proper choice*, Acts 1: 24. The dying Stephen said, with his last breath, when filled with the Holy Ghost, and looking up to heaven: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit!" Acts 7: 59. Christians are familiarly spoken of as "those who call on, i. e. invoke, the name of Christ." So Ananias, Acts 9: 14. So Paul, 1 Cor. 1: 2. 2 Tim. 2: 22. Even a heathen writer (Pliny) has noted it as a prominent characteristic of early Christian worship, that in their public assemblies, "they sung a hymn to Christ as to God." Paul prayed thrice to the Lord, i. e. Christ, that the thorn in his flesh might be removed, 2 Cor. 12: 8. He has assured us that "whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord [Christ] shall be saved," Rom. 10: 13. The fragments of very ancient Christian hymns, moreover, are filled with praises of Christ. But the most magnificent and ample of all that is said, in any one place, of the worship and glorification of Christ, is that sublime passage of John in Rev. v., which has already been quoted, and which leaves no question whether the worship is *spiritual*. In heaven, what other worship can be rendered?

But I must refrain from further pursuing the subject of Christ's true and proper rank, as it is presented by John himself, or by the other writers of the N. Test. The *usus loquendi* of the apostles and primitive Christians, with regard to their manner of speaking in respect to Christ, and also the manner in which Christ spake of himself, are now, I would hope, sufficiently before us to enable us to decide, whether John has probably called Christ *θεός*; in merely a subordinate and secondary sense. And now what says *conscience*? I ask not merely for what an ordinary Christian conscience may say, but I would appeal, in all sincerity and honesty of heart, to the enlightened and

candid *critical conscience*. I am aware of the many objections which philosophy can raise against the doctrine of Christ's divine nature. I am also aware, that very many objections have been and may be raised from declarations respecting Christ, which have their foundation entirely in the fact, that he was possessed of a *nature truly human*. But can all these change our opinion, as to the plain and obvious meaning of such texts as have now been brought to view? Can they furnish us with any satisfactory evidence, that John has left his readers to make out, as they can, the probability that he employs *θεός* in a sense foreign to that of all the Bible besides?

It is not my duty nor my province, to decide these questions for others. For myself, I cannot see good reason to doubt, that John believed, and meant to teach, the real and essential divinity or godhead of the Logos. I came to the present investigation, with an effort to lay aside, for the time being, all my previous convictions and views. I have done my best to pursue the investigation in the simple way of philological and historical exegesis. I know of no ultimate appeal but this, and no higher one than this, when the question is made: What does the sacred writer mean? Did we possess the gift of inspiration, or had we an *a priori* knowledge of all that appertains to the mysteries of the Godhead and of the incarnation, we might then decide in an easier and more certain way, and with more authority. But as I make no claim to either of these, I have felt bound to follow the simple path of historico-exegetical inquiry. I have, after repeating the study of this portion of Scripture, and lecturing more or less upon it every year for the last forty years, gradually settled down upon the views which I have now given, and can sincerely aver, that my understanding, my heart, and my conscience, are satisfied with them. Others, of course, must judge for themselves. If I could, I would not refuse to them the liberty that I have myself taken.

I must confess, however, that it is not without pain and the most sincere regret, that I see such men as De Wette and F. Lücke virtually rejecting conclusions such as those to which I have come. The extensive critical knowledge of these writers, their general sobriety and candor and ingenuoussness as interpreters, and their kindness of feeling toward those who differ in opinion from them, all commend an attentive and respectful perusal and consideration of what they say, on any topic of such a nature as that before us. But after all, when I find that Lücke, in his Commentary, depends principally on the alleged resemblance of John's views of the Logos to those of Philo Judæus, in order to make out a secondary and lower sense of *θεός* in the case before us, I am not prepared to follow him. He does indeed assign some other

reasons for his conclusion (I. s. 266); but these have already been examined, and shown, at least as it seems to me, to be altogether unsatisfactory and inadequate to establish it. His last argument, and the one on which he appears to have most relied, I have already briefly stated on p. 43 above. I bring it to view again, merely for the sake of some additional remarks not there made. It runs thus: 'If Philo, with his looser and indefinite conceptions about the divine unity and attributes, deemed it necessary to caution the reader against taking *θεός* in its usual and proper meaning, when applied to the Logos, how much more must we suppose such a strenuous assertor of the divine unity as John, intended to employ the same word in a qualified sense, when applied by him to the Logos?'

But what now, I ask, is this, except to transfer Lücke's own difficulties about the infringement on the divine unity to the mind of John? At all events, however, the argument on this score can be turned strongly against Lücke. In our turn we have a fair claim to ask: How came John, with his high and pure and strenuous views of the divine unity, to neglect doing what even the looser and less accurate Philo has not ventured to leave undone? The latter, it is admitted, has specially cautioned and guarded his readers against giving to *θεός* its full and obvious meaning; and so he has saved them from mistaking him. But where has John done this? Not a word of the kind; nay, he has taken a course directly the contrary. In the next breath, after he has declared the Logos to be *θεός*, he tells us that he was the very *θεός*; who created the Universe, and who is the original author of all life and light. We have moreover seen, above, how fully all his writings confirm this view. And why may we not, or rather, why *must* we not, believe with Paul, that "he who made all things is GOD?"

De Wette takes a course somewhat different. He first brings together the prominent attributes and powers of the divine word, as developed in both Testaments. He then suggests, that inasmuch as Christ was fully commissioned to dispense this word so powerful and even creative; since, moreover, he rose from the dead, was exalted to heaven, and made Lord and Governor of the Universe; it is no wonder that John was led to represent Christ as having borne a part in the creation of the world, and as now sustaining a part in the preservation of it (s. 12). He moreover deems it probable, that Philo's works had an influence upon John. But he does not think it would be correct to say, that John had *Arian* views of the Logos; yet he cautions us against ascribing to him *Trinitarian* views. He says: "The half-Athanasian idea of a person, who has a separate subsistence, and yet forms no proper being for itself, but partakes of one in common with other persons, we must not ascribe to John." (s. 14).

According to the first of these two representations, then, it was only the fervid and exuberant love and wonder of the apostle, which led him to make the lofty ascriptions of attributes divine to Christ. We, of course, must not interpret them in plain and sober earnest, but with all due regard to the rhetorical language and hyperbolical nature of the expressions employed. In the second case, where it is averred that John probably borrowed from Philo, we are admonished that we must be cautious, how we make out any *Trinitarian* deductions from him; for Philo knew nothing of a Trinity.

What then, I would respectfully yet earnestly ask, are we to make out from John, as to the *Logos*? De Wette has not told us what we ought to think or believe concerning him; at least I cannot make out from him any explicit answer to this question. The suggestions which he has made, partake so largely of the quality of surmises and conjectures, that I can find no *punctum stans*; and on this account, I deem it unnecessary further to canvass them.

With a deeper interest still, then, I now return to the question: *What says conscience?* conscience both critical and Christian. The demands of criticism I have endeavored to meet. The *usus loquendi* of the Scriptures throughout, in regard to *θεός*, admits of no doubt in any other case. Why should we doubt here? *Our* philosophical or speculative difficulties are not to be obtruded upon John. The simple question is: Has he been his own interpreter? That question has been discussed. If we act the part of critics and simple interpreters, we cannot find good reason for doubt. Is there, then, any other satisfactory reason, why we should refuse our assent, to what he has so plainly, and (may I not now say?) unequivocally asserted?

If the appeal may now be made to a *conscience both critical and Christian*, then I would ask, in all serious earnestness, why we are not to give credit to that apostle whom Jesus specially loved, on whose bosom he leaned, and to whom he seems to have imparted more of the secrets of his bosom, than to any other man? I am aware of the repeated and violent efforts that have been made to destroy the credit of John's Gospel, by impeaching its genuineness. But it has stood the fiery trial; it has passed unscathed through the furnace that was seven times heated. The time is now near, if not already arrived, when no sober critic will venture on such an impeachment. A reader intelligent, feeling, and devout, cannot well study attentively the Gospel of John, without a deep conviction, that he has developed more minutely and exactly the manner of his Master's peculiar thoughts and expressions, than any other New Testament writer. Why then should we not give him full credit? Why not anxiously ask of him, what He who leaned upon his bosom disclosed, respecting his person and his work?

A deep Christian feeling must naturally be inclined to do this. It is easy, indeed, to speculate as philologists and philosophers, on any and every part of John's writings, with great coolness, or even with icy indifference. In the midst of the literary and intellectual, it is easy, and even natural, to become exclusively intent on the pursuit of what belongs to these respective domains. But let him, who is descending toward the grave, and has renounced the expectation of returning to the active pursuits of life, or let any one under a deep conviction of sin, of his accountability, and of the frailty of human life, once urge on himself the questions: What am I? And whither am I going? and conscience will press upon him inquiries of awful moment. That will tell him that he is a *sinner*; a sinner against light and love. It will tell him, that although, through divine mercy, he may have shunned the vices that bring on him who commits them the reproaches of men, yet that every passing day and hour of conscious action has been adding to the number of his sins; yea, that even his most holy acts and desires have been attended with much imperfection, since they have fallen short of that measure of intensity and entireness which both the law and the gospel demand. Where then, and to whom, is he to look? How is he to meet in judgment that God who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, before whom the heavens are not clean, and who has said that the soul which sinneth shall die? He cannot atone for one sin. He cannot avert the sentence of condemnation. If there be any deliverance for him, it must be through him who came down from that throne where he had glory with the Father before the world was, who became flesh and dwelt amongst us, who died that we might live, and who purchased eternal redemption for us.

And that Glorious Being, full of grace and truth, who has done all this, and will do all that we can ask or need — in what light shall the dying sinner view him, that he may obtain the peace which he needs? Will he not feel constrained to say, as did an eminently devoted minister of Christ: "Whatever others may think or feel in regard to their sins and their need of a Saviour, I am fully persuaded, that nothing less than an *almighty Saviour* will do for me."

At such an hour, and in such a condition as has now been described, I cannot well conceive how a Christian conscience can refrain from grasping with a strong hand, on those precious truths which John has so often and so strikingly set forth, and specially in the introduction to his Gospel. Here the trembling sinner may see the almighty, the everlasting Saviour that he needs. Here he may learn, that when looking to Christ as his only and all-sufficient Saviour, he may confidently direct his humble supplications to him. He may come even with

boldness to the throne of grace on which he is seated, and lift up his voice before him, while pleading for mercy, and say: "O thou, who wast from everlasting with God, and wast God; thou, who art God manifest in the flesh; who art the great God and only Saviour; who art the true God and eternal life; who art the King of kings, and Lord of lords; who hast all power in heaven and on earth; who art God over all and blessed forever; who art therefore able to save, even to the uttermost, all who come to thee; thou Lamb of God that takest away the sins of the world, have mercy upon me!" And in a dying hour, what shall he do and say as his last decisive act, before he appears in the presence of his Maker? If he be full of the Holy Ghost as the dying Stephen was, he will look up to heaven, and see Jesus standing on the right hand of God, and like that martyr with his latest breath exclaim: "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit!"

Let me be one of those truly righteous, who thus feel and thus pray; and let my last end be like theirs!

[The remaining verses, 2-18, will be commented on in a much more brief and summary manner, in the next No. of this *Miscellany*, in case a kind Providence should permit the writer to continue his labors.]

ARTICLE III.

THE PROGRESS OF CHURCH HISTORY AS A SCIENCE.

By Professor Philip Schaff, Mercersburg, Pa.

CHURCH HISTORY, like every other branch of learning, has its own history, serving to bring its true object and proper method gradually more and more into view. It may throw some light on the nature of the science, and at the same time assist our sense of the necessary qualifications of a church historian, to trace its progress from the beginning down to the present time. In this sketch we shall pay particular attention to the Protestant historians.

I. HISTORIANS BEFORE THE REFORMATION.

§ 1. *The Fathers.*

Here, as in all other departments of theology, the *Greek* church leads the way. Leaving out of view the Acts of the Apostles by

LUKE, and the five lost books of Ecclesiastical Memoirs by HEGESIPPUS, a Jewish Christian writer of the second century, the title 'father of church history' belongs undoubtedly to EUSEBIUS († 340), the learned and truth-loving bishop of Caesarea. In his church history, which reaches in ten books to the year 324, he has made faithful use of the libraries of his friend Pamphilus of Caesarea and Alexander bishop of Jerusalem, the canonical and apocryphal writings, the works of the disciples, of the apostles, the apologists and oldest church fathers, including many valuable documents which have since perished.¹ Less worthy of confidence is his biography of Constantine the Great; he was too much blinded by the favors which this emperor had shown towards the church, not to sacrifice the character of the historian frequently to that of the panegyrist. He was followed and continued in the fifth century, first by two jurists of Constantinople; SOCRATES, who carried forward the history of the church, in seven books, from the beginning of Constantine's reign (306) to the year 439, in unpretending, often careless style, but without prejudice and with more critical tact than Eusebius; and HERMIAS SOZOMENUS, of Palestine, whose nine books embrace the same period (323—423), but have more respect to monasticism, of which he was an enthusiastic admirer. Then comes THEODORET, bishop of Cyrus, who wrote his work, in five books (from 325—429), about the year 450, and excels both the last named in style and richness of matter. In his Lives of Thirty Hermits however (*βίαιος ἱστορία*), he relates in part the most marvellous events of his heroes, without leaving the least room for doubt. While all these writers belonged to the Catholic church, PHILOSTORGUS on the other hand wrote in the interest of Arianism; of his twelve books, however (from 300—425), we have only extracts, in the Bibliotheca of Photius. From the sixth century are to be named, THEODORUS of Constantinople, who continued the history to the year 518, and the Syrian lawyer, EVAGRIUS of Antioch, who brought it down to 594. Photius boasts of him, that he was more orthodox than all his predecessors.² The later Greek church, whose life altogether since its separation from the Latin may be styled a progressive stagnation, has accomplished but little for our science. In the fourteenth century NICEPHORUS CALLISTI, a monk of Constantinople (about 1333), compiled out of two older historians a new church history in twenty-three

¹ A detailed account of his sources, sixty in number, is given by Hefke, *Verzeich einer Geschichte der theolog. Wissenschaften*, Halle. 1797. Part II. P. 321 ff.

² All these seven historians have been published together, in Greek and Latin, with notes, by VALSIUS, in three volumes folio (Par. 1659—1677, also Amsterdam. 1695, and Cantabr. 1790).

books, of which, however, only eighteen (to A. D. 610) are preserved in a single manuscript of the Vienna library. From the close connection of church and State in the Byzantine empire, however, the so called *SCRIPTORES BYZANTINI* may also be reckoned in part to the literature of church history.

The *Latin* church historians were wholly dependent on Greek models. *RUFINUS*, presbyter of Aquileia († 410), translated the work of Eusebius, and added two books, carrying it on to the death of Theodosius the Great (395). *SULPICIOUS SEVERUS* († about 420) wrote a *Historia sacra* from the creation of the world to the year 400, which however hardly deserves the name of a history. *CASSIODORUS*, consul and monk († about 562), towards the end of his life, from the works of Socrates, Sozomen and Theodoret, which he had translated for him into Latin by his friend Epiphanius Scholasticus, composed his *Historia tripartita*, in twelve books; and this extract served the Latin church as a manual through the whole period of the Middle Ages.

§ 2. The Middle Ages.

This period furnished no independent exhibitions of general church history. For the *Historiae ecclesiasticae* of *HAYMO*, bishop of Halberstadt († 853), in ten books, are a mere extract of the translation of Eusebius by Rufinus; and the *Historia ecclesiastica*, or *Chronographia tripartita*, of the Roman presbyter and librarian *ANASTASIUS* († about 886), is partly a translation of the Chronography of Nicephorus, and in part an extract from the works of Syncellus and Theophanes. On the other hand, we have from this time a multitude of chronicles, biographies of saints, histories of single convents and monastic orders, which are mostly indeed simple, often uncritical narrations, but full of valuable material; and then, works on single national churches, as the church history of the Franks by *GREGORY OF TOURS* († 595), the old British and Anglo-Saxon church history by *VENERABLE BEDE* († 735), to the year 731, the four books of the canon, *ADAM OF BREMEN*, on the period from Charlemagne to the year 1076, which is important for the spread of Christianity among the Saxons and in Scandinavia, in particular for the archbishopric of Hamburg-Bremen. The revival of classical studies roused here and there the spirit of critical inquiry; of which we have an example in the Roman canon, *LAURENTIUS VALLA* († 1457), who ventured to prove the utter groundlessness of Constantine's donation to Pope Sylvester, and combated also the traditional opinion that the apostles had each composed a part of the Apostle's Creed.

In all these works from the time before the Reformation, invaluable as they are in their way, we have church history in its infancy or childhood. The church was not brought yet to reflect on her own existence, the power of tradition was unshaken. For this reason, the spirit of free inquiry and genuine scientific method, were almost entirely wanting. The whole apprehension of what history is was one-sided, as it embraced properly only facts, or the activity of the spirit in its outward direction. No real history of dogma had place at all, as implying the idea that the doctrine of the church itself goes through a living process of development. The only form in which this most important branch of historical theology existed, and made its first appearance, was the history of heresies, as may be seen in the principal works of ecclesiastical antiquity on this subject by EPIPHANIUS and THEODORET.

II. ROMAN CATHOLIC HISTORIANS SINCE THE REFORMATION.

§ 3. *General Character of Roman Catholic Historiography.*

From the old Catholic church historians, we pass forward directly to the *Roman Catholic* since the Reformation, as most nearly related to them in spirit and tendency. With these two the idea of development is wanting, and along with it all free and unbiassed criticism. Their position is settled for them beforehand; it is the position of *fixed orthodoxy* and *exclusive churchdom*. Their doctrine of the infallible authority of the papacy cramps inquiry on all sides, and since the conception of the church is for them that of the Roman church, they look upon all variations from this of course as apostasy and corruption, as damnable heresy and schism. Hence no justice is to be expected from them towards non-Catholic movements, and this exclusiveness stands out most harshly in the treatment of the last three centuries, which it is plain have been ruled predominantly by the spirit of the Reformation. The pure historical character is here troubled and disturbed by apologetic interest for the papacy, and polemic zeal against all that is anti-Roman. The endeavor is everywhere to carry up the Roman doctrines and institutions into the most gray antiquity, and to vindicate for them if possible apostolical authority, which of necessity involves the greatest violence in many cases to history. Still the Roman Catholic historians are not wanting in extensive learning. On the field of their own church they have gone into the most searching and profound investigations, moved to them mainly by the antagonistic force of Protestantism itself, and altogether deserve well, in many

ways, for what they have done to promote our science ; in the nature of the case too they could not fail, particularly the most influential among them, to proceed more cautiously, giving up many manifest fables and superstitions which had been received before without question as historical facts, and accommodating themselves more to modern taste, both in matter and manner.

§ 4. (1) *Italian Historians.*

The first Protestant church history, the Magdeburg Centuries, created such a sensation, that the Roman Church was forced to bestir itself earnestly for its counteraction in the same form. This service was undertaken by the Neapolitan, CAESAR BARONIUS, properly BARONIO, at the instance of his teacher, Philip Neri, in a very learned and acute work, on which he labored for thirty years, till his death, (A. D. 1607,) with unwearied diligence, and for which he was rewarded with the dignity of a cardinal. His *Annales ecclesiastici*, which appeared first at Rome (1588—1607), and which have been since many times reprinted, as well as excerpted from, translated, and continued by other Italians, though with small skill, embrace in twelve folio volumes as many centuries, from the birth of Christ to the year 1198. They furnish from the papal archives, and from many libraries, in particular from the Vatican, a multitude of documents and public papers which were previously unknown, and contain so much that is valuable, with all their faults, that to this day it is not easy to dispense with them in a thorough course of study. The cardinal came forward with the feeling, that the first true church history was that offered by himself. He complains of Eusebius that he had favored the Arians, of Socrates and Sozomen that they had favored the Novatians, and of all his predecessors that they had gone to work without critical discrimination. The Magdeburg Centuries he styles up and down Centuries of Satan. He wrote in the interest unconditionally of the absolute Papacy, and endeavors to show that it was instituted by Christ, that it has remained always the same in doctrine and constitution, that the Reformation accordingly was an apostasy from the true Church, and an insurrection against the order of God. This purpose required however the help of many fictitious or corrupted facts and spurious documents, as well as the suppression or distortion, on the other hand, of important records. Hence he found opponents, not only among the Protestants, but among the Catholics also, above all in the profoundly learned French Franciscan ANTON PAGI.

For single portions of church history, valuable collections of docu-

ments and editions of older writers, distinguishing credit is due among the Italians to MURATORI, ZACCAGNI, ZACCARIA, MANSI and GALLANDI. The most genial and free-minded among the Italian church historians, is PAOLO SARPI, (1628) from whom it is to be regretted that we have only a history of the Council of Trent.

§ 5. (2) *French Historians.*

The first merit, among the Catholic writers in this department, belongs collectively to the *French*, whose free position over against the Roman See has here been in their favor. The defence of the Gallican church freedom indeed served itself to call forth, in part, the most interesting and thorough investigations. In this view wrote first Bishop GODEAU, of Vence, in popular form, (1635) coming down however only to the end of the 9th century, then the far more learned Dominican NATALIS ALEXANDER (*Noël*), whose work, in twenty-four volumes (1676—86) comes down to the year 1600. He defends, in direct opposition to Baronius, the rights of the Church and of the secular princes against the Popes, and declares the reformatory councils of Pisa, Constance and Basel to be œcumenical; justifies still however the cruel persecutions of the Albigenses, and is full of zeal against the Protestant heretics. Innocent XI. prohibited this work, in 1684, under pain of excommunication; but thirty years later, Benedict XIII., also a Dominican, set it free again. In the year 1690, CLAUDE FLEURY, confessor of Louis XV., who lived however as an anchorite at court, began the publication of his *Histoire ecclésiastique*, which reaches in twenty volumes to the year 1414, and was continued by FABRE, though with no inward vocation, down to the year 1595. Fleury writes diffusely and in the spirit of a monk, but with taste and skill, in mild temper and strong love for the Church and Christianity, and with a view always to edify as well as to instruct. He follows the order of time, though not slavishly, prefacing some of his volumes with general characteristics. He also defends antiquity and the Gallican ecclesiastical constitution, without however surrendering at all the credit of the Church, its general tradition, or the necessity of the Pope as its head. His principal concern is with doctrine, discipline, and practical piety. The spirited and eloquent bishop, BOSSUET, in his universal history, (*Discours sur l'histoire universelle*, 1681), which reaches from the creation to Charlemagne, exhibits religion and the Church as the soul and centre of all history. The Jansenist TILLEMONT pursued a new plan, composing a church history of the first six centuries, in sixteen volumes, (1693—1712), from original sources purely, with the most

accurate and conscientious fidelity, and adding his learned investigations in the way of notes.

In addition however to these general works, great service has been rendered to the science by the learned monastic institutions of France, in single departments of church history, costly editions of the fathers, and other auxiliary apparatus. Special mention here is due to the St. Maur Benedictines, D'ACHERY, RUINART, MABILLON, MARTÈNE, DURAND, MONTFAUCON,³ and to the Jesuits SIRMOND and PETAU (*Petavius*), who by his celebrated work *de theologicis dogmatibus* (1644—50) forms an epoch in dogmatic history.

§ 6. (3) *German Historians.*

Among the Catholics of *Germany*, an independent and free interest in church history began to show itself first in the Josephine period, but still more through the stimulus of Protestant theology; so that the most has been done there for the science recently. General works, though in part unfinished, have been furnished by ROYKO, DANNE-MAYR, the well known convert, Count STOLBERG,⁴ RITTER, LOCH-ERER, HORTIG, ALZOG, DÖLLINGER; valuable monographs, by HUR-TER,⁵ HEFELE, and others. The fullest inward call must be allowed in

³ In the congregation of St. Maur, a complete system of studies prevailed. The general was authorized, in extensive literary enterprises, to assign their parts to the different members according to their talents and tastes, so that one collected material, another arranged, a third manufactured, a fourth finished off, a fifth took charge of the press, etc. Each was required to labor, without regard to his own credit, for the benefit of the world only, and the honor of the order. In many cases, the authors are not even named. By this coöperation of different scholars, who were at the same time free from all secular cares, and favored with wealth and the most ample literary helps, vast works were produced, such as an academy of sciences even could hardly undertake. The best edition of the church fathers, Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Gregory the Great, Bernard of Clairvaux, etc., we owe to the diligence of the St. Maurists, which was not equalled, in a literary respect, by the Jesuits.

⁴ HASE says of him strikingly, that he has written and composed (*gedichtet*) the history of the Jewish nation, as well as of the ancient Church, with the zeal, the unction, and unreserved devotion of a proselyte, but with a heart also full of enthusiasm and love.

⁵ HURTER, it is true, when he wrote his learned and skilful work, (in four volumes) on Innocent III., was nominally still Reformed antistes in Schaffhausen; but the Roman Catholic tendency already shows itself, beyond all mistake, in his unqualified praise of his hero, and of the age to which he belonged, as also in his strongly marked partiality for a brilliant hierarchy and pompous ceremonial. It

favor of the ingenious and pious MÖHLER, († 1838), the greatest Roman Catholic theologian since Bellarmine and Bossuet. He has helped his Church again to self-consciousness, and breathed into it a new polemic zeal against Protestantism; although he betrays himself in truth throughout the influence, which the study of Protestant theology, especially that of Schleiermacher, and the whole modern culture, have exercised over his own idealistic apprehension and defence of the Roman dogmas and usages. He wrote indeed no church history; but his larger works (*Symbolik, Patristik, Athanasius M.*), and shorter tracts, (as that on *Anselm*, the *Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals*, *Gnosticism, Monasticism, etc.*), have to do almost all more or less with the historical sphere, particularly with the history of doctrines, and in freshness of spirit and vigorous animated style surpass all the writers now mentioned.

III. PROTESTANT HISTORIANS.

§ 7. General character of Protestant Historiography.

With the Reformation of the sixteenth century commences a new era, as for the Church and theology in general, so also for our science in particular; yea, we may say that church history first became a free and independent science only by its means. The historian before was, so to speak, of one growth with his subject; but now he raised himself by reflection above it, and instead of accepting on mere authority whatever was catholic as at once true, and condemning everything non-catholic as false, began to subject the whole development of the Church itself to critical trial, making the word of God and common reason the measure of judgment, without regard to Papal decrees. This involved the possibility of a negative tendency, the contempt and rejection of all history, such as we meet with in Rationalism and among Sects; but at the same time the possibility also of such unprejudiced inquiry and free conviction, as should reconcile the subject in full with the objective course of God's kingdom, causing him to see in it the rational and necessary evolution of its inward sense or plan; and to this result the most important recent labors in church history, would seem continually more and more to lead.

is plain everywhere, that with the author, in his blind infatuation for the Middle Ages, the dome of St. Peter stands higher than the manger of Bethlehem, and the decretals of the Popes than the word of God. His dissatisfaction with the moral insecurity of the present age, and the politico-religious distractions of his own country, decided and justified to his conscience finally a transition which was inwardly complete long before.

It required considerable time however to bring the Protestant science here to a clear perception of its mission, and it had itself to pass through different periods, which fall widely asunder from one another in the view taken of its object and proper method. We may distinguish five such periods, the *orthodox-polemic*, the *unchurchly pietistic*, the *pragmatic-supranaturalistic*, the *rationalistic*, and the *scientific*. Among these, the first and fourth are related to each other as extremes, the second and third as stages of transition from the position of church orthodoxy over to that of rationalism, while the fifth seeks to unite the advantages of all before, without their errors; falling itself again, however, into different schools, which makes it difficult to bring it under any general character.

§ 8. (1) *The Period of Polemic Orthodoxy.*

This embraces the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Reformers themselves did nothing directly for church history, save only as they gave it new interest and roused a new spirit of inquiry; which however must be allowed to be itself a very great merit. They were mainly occupied with the settlement of points of faith and the exposition of the Scriptures. Argument from the Scriptures alone, however, could not permanently satisfy. As the Catholics appealed continually to the Fathers, and declared the Reformation to be a novelty, which had no ground whatever in the past, it became an object with the Protestants to wrest the historical argument out of their hands, and to draw ecclesiastical antiquity to their own side. For that pure Christianity had disappeared from the earth, and again come to light only in the sixteenth century, they could not admit, in face of their Lord's promise to be with his church to the end of the world; and they wished to be counted also, not heretics, but true catholics. It was an apologetic interest, then, and their conflict with Rome, that urged the Protestants into the study of history. Of course their first productions bore throughout, directly or indirectly, a polemic character.

The *Lutheran* church takes the lead; here too, not the moderate and irenical school of Melancthon, but that section which set itself stiffly against all attempts to come to an agreement with the Catholics and the Reformed, and which came to its symbolical expression afterwards in the Form of Concord. MATTHIAS FLACIUS, one of the most zealous controversialists of his age, composed, A. D. 1552 and onwards, while settled at Magdeburg, in connection with several rigid Lutheran divines, (Wigand, Judex, Faber, Holthuter,) and younger assistants, the celebrated *Centuriæ Magdeburgenses*, as the work is called, making use of

published and unpublished sources for the purpose, with the liberality of princes and cities to support his undertaking. This work, which forms an epoch, exhibits in thirteen volumes as many centuries of the Christian era, each century in sixteen sections, with the express design of justifying the Reformation and confuting the Papacy. The Centuries found such approval, that for a hundred years after, it was counted sufficient to compile text-books out of their material and in their spirit. In the dogmatic works of the seventeenth century however, particularly in GERHARD'S *Loci theologici*, and in QUENSTEDT'S *Theologia dogmatico-polemica*, we find collected, under the same controversial view, a vast mass of material for dogmatic history, which is still in part of great worth; while among works treating of single periods, the most important place belongs to SECKENDORF'S History of the Reformation.

In the Reformed church, JOHN H. HOTTINGER of Zurich, proposed to furnish a counterpart to the Centuries. His work⁶ shows great knowledge, particularly of the East, also order and love for truth, but is unequal, five volumes being given to the sixteenth century alone, and drags in much foreign matter according to the taste which then prevailed, the history for instance of Jews, Pagans and Mohammedans, notices of remarkable natural phenomena, as foretoking the fortunes of the church, earthquakes, locusts, famines, floods, monstrosities, eclipses of the sun and moon, etc. FREDERICK SPANHEIM, of Leyden, grounded his *Summa historiae eccl.* (A. D. 1689) on an accurate use of sources, and searching criticism, having in view also the confutation of Baronius. The two Frenchmen, JAMES BASNAGE,⁷ minister at the Hague, and SAMUEL BASNAGE,⁸ minister in Zütphen, wrote with controversial reference, the first to Bossuet, the last to Baronius, both proposing to show, but especially James, that the true church of Christ has never failed, and that it has had true witnesses at all times.

With far better success, however, the Reformed church, the French especially, cultivated during the seventeenth century, in controversy with the Roman Catholic theologians, *particular parts* of history, shedding light on patristic antiquity, the course of the Papacy, and the period of the Reformation, with profound learning and keen penetration, though not indeed without some controversial bias. Such monographies, still of great value in part, reflect credit on the names of HOSPINIAN and HEIDEGGER among the German Swiss; BEZA, DU PLESSIS MORNAY, PETER DU MOULIN, DAVID BLONDEL, JEAN DAILLÉ

⁶ In 9 voll. Tig. 1655—67.

⁷ Histoire de l'église depuis Jésus Chr. jusqu'à présent. Rotterd. 1699.

⁸ Annales politico-ecclesiastici, etc. 1706, 3 voll. (reach only to A. D. 602).

(Dallaeus), CL. SAUMAISE (Salmasius), JEAN CLAUDE, ISAAC BEAU-SOBRE, among the French; archbishop USHER, H. DODWELL, J. PEARSON, W. BEVERIDGE, GILBERT BURNET, JOSEPH BINGHAM, GEORGE BULL, W. CAVE, J. E. GRABE,⁹ and later the Dissenter NATH. LARDNER, among the English, who directed their main attention to the government and antiquities of the church, with an eye to the Presbyterian controversy, as well as to that with Rome.

§ 9. (2) *The Pietistic Period.*

The next epoch after the Magdeburg Centuries was produced by GOTTFRIED ARNOLD (†1714), a friend and follower of SPENER, for a short time professor at Giessen, by his "Impartial History of the Church and of Heretics from the beginning of the N. Testament to the year 1688," (Frankf. 1699 f.), which precisely reverses the principle that reigned before. Instead of the prevailing church, he made the *sects* rather to be the channel of progress for the Christian life, and is the historian accordingly of *unchurchly separatistic religion*. This grows out of the decided practical tendency of Pietism, and the resistance it suffered from Lutheran orthodoxy. Arnold placed the essence of Christianity in experimental personal piety, which seemed to him at home with the oppressed and persecuted minority, while the reigning visible church, Protestant as well as Catholic, was felt to be more or less an apostasy. The orthodox church historians of the seventeenth century also took part, indeed, with the Albigenses and Waldenses, with Wickliffe, Huss, and other "witnesses of the truth," in the Middle Ages, against the reigning Catholicism. Arnold, however, carried the same way of thinking back also into the first six centuries, or at least to the age of Constantine, as well as forward into the Protestant church; which of course made a very material difference. Still he could not carry out absolutely his own principle. Being a pious man, and holding fast to the essential doctrines of the Reformation, he stood more in harmony at bottom with the ancient church orthodoxy, than with the Gnostics, Arians, Pelagians, and other such sects, although he espoused their cause as far as possible. Thus bent on showing fair play however, as no historian before, to all sorts of heretics and schismatics, particularly to the Mystics, for whom he had a special predilection, Arnold fell into the most gross wrong towards the representatives of orthodoxy, ascribing to them the basest motives, and aspersing their character in

⁹ A German Lutheran originally, who passed over to the Episcopal church (†1711).

every possible way ; so that his work, in contradiction to its own title, is a passionate party interest against the Catholics, and still more against the orthodox Protestants, most of all the Lutheran church. It makes a most gloomy impression, and is adapted to upset all faith in one holy apostolical church, to undermine confidence in God's presence in history, and in the ultimate triumph of good, and to promote in this way a hopeless skepticism. Many Pietists indeed were highly pleased with the History of Heretics, and the celebrated THOMASius of Halle, who stands halfway between Pietism and the "Aufklärung," proclaimed it the best of books next to the Bible. SPENER however was by no means satisfied with it, and the orthodox Lutherans, CYPRIAN, for instance, VEIEL, CORVINUS, GÖTZ, LÖSCHER, FAUSTKING, WACHTER, exposed a mass of perversions and errors in it, matching its intemperance in some cases however with the intemperate passion of their replies.¹⁰

Arnold at all events has the merit of having introduced a new way of looking at the sects, and of having laid special stress on the relation of church history to the purposes of piety. He was the first also, who wrote in the German language instead of the Latin, though in that tasteless periwig style, it must be confessed, full of half and whole Latinisms, which characterizes the period after Mitz down to Bodmer, and makes it the most gloomy in the history of German literature.

By the side of Arnold may be placed, in some sense, the later English historian JOSEPH MILNER, († 1797), a pious minister of the English Episcopal Church. His Church History, in five volumes, reaches to the Reformation, on which he is specially full, and follows the current division by centuries. He too saw in the sects, even in the Paulicians and Catharists, the main bearers of piety, and in the Middle Ages accordingly, which find very poor favor at his hands, by far the most room is given to the Waldenses. He too wrote for edification, in the spirit of Methodistical piety, which is intimately related to that of the Pietists, though it has less sympathy with the inward contemplative life and the different forms of mysticism. Greatly surpassed by Arnold in learning and original research, Milner excels him on the other hand in popular style and in fairness towards the reigning Church of the first six centuries. Pope Gregory, the Great, for example, fares much better in his hands. His aim moreover is *exclusively* practical, leading him thus to pass over entirely all subjects that serve not the purpose of edi-

¹⁰ These writings may be found quoted in the third volume of J. G. WALCH's *Bibliotheca Theologica selecta*. Jenae. p. 129, sqq. They appear at large, with replies and illustrations, in the third volume of the Schaffhausen edition of Arnold's History (1742).

fication, after his own narrow view, such as church government, most theological controversies, the scholastic and mystical divinity, sacred art and learning. He proposes to exhibit only the spiritual life of the *invisible church*.¹¹ Milner's work accordingly is almost entirely free from controversy, which abounds with Arnold, and is so far much better suited for practical and popular use, a work still worthy indeed of recommendation. Nay, we may even say that it was the best church history of this sort, till NEANDER again raised into credit the interest of practical piety, the truth in Pietism and Methodism, only on a vastly more liberal scale indeed and with immensely greater knowledge, without consigning other interests for this reason to omission or neglect.

§ 10. (8). *The Pragmatic Supranaturalistic Period.*

The third form of Protestant church history, here named, resulted from the conjunction of the two previous principles, the Old Orthodox and the Pietistic. By *supranaturalism* in the historical sense,¹² we un-

¹¹ Or as he himself says in his introduction: "Nothing but what appears to me to belong to Christ's kingdom, shall be admitted, *genuine piety is the only thing, which I intend to celebrate.* He was right so far in styling his work, "An Ecclesiastical History on a new plan." How onesided his views of piety were, however, may be seen in his judgment, for instance, of Tertullian, of whom he says: "Were it not for some light which he throws on the state of Christianity in his own times, he would scarcely deserve to be distinctly noticed. I have seldom seen so large a collection of tracts, all professedly on Christian subjects, containing so little matter for useful instruction." (Vol. I. Boston ed. p. 220). When on the other hand, he exalts Cyprian so high, defends him against the reproaches of Mosheim, and places him far above Origen, he is inconsistent with himself, since Cyprian was formed throughout on Tertullian's writings, making them his daily food, and contributed more than any of the older fathers to the development of the principle of Catholicism, the hierarchy in particular. He was in fact the first who saw in the Roman See the *cathedra Petri*, and the centre of church unity (*unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est*,) or at least the first who distinctly spoke of it in this way. Augustine, Anselm, and Bernard, Milner owns as truly pious men, and dwells upon them with delight; but still he presents them only on one side, so far namely as they seem to agree with his own theory of religion; their decidedly Catholic features, he either overlooks altogether, or else treats them as accidental, merely outward appendages, which are to be excused in them on the ground of the reigning spirit of their age, whereas in truth they enter most intimately and influentially into their whole system of teaching and manner of life.

¹² For in the doctrinal and philosophical sense the old orthodoxy, and every Christian theology indeed, is also supranaturalistic; that is, it rests upon the view that Christianity is a supernatural revelation; while Rationalism allows no such revelation, either declaring it impossible, or else in its undue estimate of man's powers, his reason in particular, holding it to be of no use.

derstand the last outshoot of the Protestant orthodoxy, that tendency namely in theology, which under the influence of Pietism and Liberal Christianity relaxed considerably from the strict and exclusive orthodoxy of the seventeenth century, took refuge in the Bible simply instead of the church symbols, and in a number of its representatives approached itself, the very threshold of Rationalism. The church historians also of this period accordingly, including some who date before the proper supranaturalism, show no longer the old stiffness and severity; confessional controversy and horror of heretics, in whom Arnold had found so much good to celebrate, fall more and more into the background, and make room for a conciliatory irenical spirit, of which an example had been previously given, in several monographies, by CALIXTUS, that man so actively persecuted by the orthodox zealots of the seventeenth century. The effort prevails to do justice to all parties; and in truth the works of a Mosheim, Schröckh and Walch, must be allowed the praise of an *impartiality*, which belonged to neither of the schools before noticed. This virtue however, it must be owned, loses itself at times in doctrinal indifference and latitudinarianism. We style the period *Pragmatic*, in view of its reigning method. It had come to be required of the historian namely, from the time of Mosheim and Walch, that he should proceed pragmatically; that is, that he should not simply relate events, but investigate also their causes psychologically in the secret springs and inclinations of the human heart, for the purpose of making history practically useful. This gave the treatment of it a very subjective character, especially in time under the hands of the Rationalists, the reference of events being for the most part to very external, accidental and arbitrary causes, as their supposed principle and reason. In the diligent explanation of these subjective factors, sight was lost of the claims of the objective idea, and in the end, of the highest and most sacred power in history, the all-ruling providence of God, the spirit of Jesus Christ immanent in his own Church.

Here it is to be remarked, that since the middle of the last century our science has been cultivated and advanced almost exclusively in Germany, by the Lutheran or more lately the United Evangelical Church especially, whilst in other Protestant countries it has made no progress whatever.

Among works of a universal character is to be mentioned first, CHR. E. WEISMANN'S *Introductio in memorabilia ecclesiastica historię sacrę N. T. etc.* (Tübingen, 1718), distinguished for its pious, mild spirit, its quiet, moderate tone, its predilection for the school of Spener and the better Mystics, and its regard to practical ends in the selection of its matter. He was soon eclipsed however by the celebrated chancellor of

Göttingen, JOHN LAWRENCE VON MOSHEIM, († 1755,) who holds the first place among the church historians generally of the last century. His *Institutiones historiæ ecclesiasticæ* (Helmstadt, 1755), in four books, translated into German also, and continued by SCHLEGEL and VON EINEM, gained in England and North America a still greater authority than in Germany, being used even to this day as a text book in most Seminaries. But little known on the other hand out of Germany are his valuable monographies, on the Period before Constantine, on the History of Heretics, (the Ophites, Apostle-Brethren, Michael Servetus,) and his *Institutiones. H. E. Majores*, of which however only the first volume (saec. I.) was published. Mosheim distinguishes himself in all these works, by his thorough use of sources, his critical acuteness, his large culture and knowledge of men, his bold combinatory skill, at times inordinate, his power of historical contemplation, and his mastery beyond all his predecessors and contemporaries of a clear, tasteful and agreeable style, both Latin and German. The practical element, on the other hand, falls with him into the background. He too takes the side of heretics frequently; not however by praising them enthusiastically and heaping reproaches on their orthodox adversaries, like Arnold, but with calm and dignified criticism, showing the sense and inward connection of their systems; as he was the first, for instance, who felt in the Gnostic speculations the presence of the deep sense which they derive from the philosophy of an older time. It is strange that he did not abandon the current division by centuries, and that he should have adopted so mechanical an arrangement, as that of external and internal, prosperous and adverse events. His contemporary, PFAFF of Tübingen, was equally learned indeed, but his *Institutiones* are not so clearly and interestingly written, and are too much burdened with citations. The indefatigable scholar S. J. Baumgarten brought down his "Abstract of Church History" only to the end of the ninth century. COTTA's "New Testament Church History in detail," (1768—73), remained also incomplete. The most extensive work from this school, showing also its gradual transition over into latitudinarianism and rationalism, is the Church History of J. M. SCHRÖCKH, Prof. in Wittenberg († 1808), which makes with TZSCHIRNER's continuation forty-five volumes, and was published between the years 1768 and 1810. In spite of its wearisome diffuseness, its want of right proportion and its wholly injudicious method, it is still invaluable for its faithful transcriptions from the original authorities, and will long remain a real mine of historical learning. Smaller text books were published by SCHRÖCKH, SPITTLER and STÄUDLIN, the last in the interest of Kant's moral philosophy. J. F. ROOS wrote popularly for a larger public.

After these general works, however, a number of others deserve honorable mention, produced by Lutheran theologians in the service of particular parts of church history. J. A. CRAMER, chancellor, in the end, of the university of Kiel († 1788), in his continuation of Bossuet's *Universal History*, has thoroughly investigated the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and was the next German after Mosheim who wrote history with elegance and force in his vernacular tongue. J. GEORGE WALCH, Prof. in Jena († 1775), and still more his son, W. FRANCIS WALCH, Prof. in Göttingen († 1784), belong to the most industrious, solid and honest inquirers who have ever lived. The last gave himself mainly to the history of heresies, divisions and religious controversies, and his work on this field, in eleven parts, is still indispensable. He occupies Lutheran ground fully indeed in his own mind, but shows no polemic zeal, being conscientiously intent throughout on understanding and representing his sources, in a critical pragmatic way, without sympathy or antipathy. The historical sense is already so far matured with him, that he cannot conceive of history without change, while he distinguishes properly between the immutability of the Christian truth itself and the changing form of its apprehension among men. He lacks however organic sense and graphic life. The elder PLANCK († 1838), who has immortalized himself especially by his learned and able history of Protestant Doctrine,¹³ stands at the extreme end of this school, where it is just ready to pass over into Rationalism. He carries the subjective view, pragmatism, to its highest pitch, and sees in history already the dry theatre only of human interests and passions. To the contents of the doctrinal strifes which he relates, he holds himself quite indifferent; his interest in them is not religious or theological, but psychological only and formal.¹⁴ With such indifference to church doctrine, it is truly marvellous indeed

¹³ Six volumes, 2nd ed. 1791—1800.

¹⁴ Comp. e. g. his preface to Vol. IV., which brings him to the dogmatico-historical part of his work, where he candidly allows, p. 6, that the subject is one in which even the theological public of his time can hardly take any more a real interest, inasmuch as most of the doctrinal questions about which our fathers contended, "have lost for our present theology not only the importance once attached to them on their own account, but even the negative interest which their history had for the spirit of our age formerly, in its gradually ripening and advancing aversion to them. Ten years ago it might have dwelt upon them with some interest, since ten years ago it had not still cleared itself of their power. . . . Now, however, this bond also is gone. A wholly new theology is founded. Not only those forms, but many also of the old fundamental ideas, are left behind. There is no fear besides that the spirit of our theology can ever return of itself, or be forced back thither, and they are viewed accordingly as an indifferent antiquation." No Rationalist could well express himself more unfavorably on the doctrinal controversies of the church.

that such a man should expend so much toilsome study and learned industry on subjects so "fully antiquated" as the theological contentions of the 16th and 17th centuries. Of course this work, with all its great and enduring merits, could not fail to have a bad effect, in assisting to sunder the doctrinal consciousness of its age fully from the position of the older church orthodoxy, and to justify such rupture also as an imaginary progress or advance.

The *Reformed* church produced, in this period, but one work of considerable size, the *Institutiones h. eccl. V. et N. T.* of the learned Hollander, VENEMA, carefully drawn from the sources and reaching down to the year 1600. It had become the fashion in Holland, from the time of Cocceius, to place church history in close connection with the exposition of the Scriptures, especially of the Apocalypse, where the picture of Popery was seen clear as the sun, also with systematic theology, which of course destroyed its independence as a science and put an end to its progress. The popular and edifying work of the English MILNER has been already noticed. Smaller text-books, good in their kind, were furnished by the Genevan divine, TURRETIN, A. D. 1734, by P. E. JABLONSKY, professor in Frankfort on the O., A. D. 1755, and by MÜNSCHER, professor in Marburg, A. D. 1804. The last has still more reputation from his Dogmatic History, but belongs rather of right already, like Planck, to the Rationalistic school, to which we now pass.

§ 11. (4) *The Rationalistic Period.*

Arnold's *unchurchly* view of history, and his defence of all sorts of heretics and schismatics, as well as the confessional laxness and doctrinal indifference of the last representatives of the Supranaturalistic school, had already prepared the way fully for Rationalism; so that we are forced to admit for this a certain historical necessity. While however Pietism loved the sects for their real or supposed piety, Rationalism was pleased with them for their heresies, and the dogmatic indifference of a Planck and Münscher advanced into formal hostility against the doctrine and faith of the church.

Now Arius, with his denial of Christ's divinity, was right against Athanasius, Pelagius with his doctrine of an undepraved human will against Augustine, the Paulicians, Catharists, etc., against Catholicism, the Socinians against the Reformers, the Arminians against the synod of Dort, the Deists against the English church. They were in truth only congenial forerunners of Rationalism, in its contest with the church doctrine, nay in the end with the revelation of God in the Bible itself. For the unprejudiced must allow that at least the main sub-

stance of the church doctrine is grounded in the Bible; and hence Rationalism in its last phases has rejected, consistently, not only the material principle of Protestantism, but its formal principle also, taking for the source and measure of truth and faith, or of unbelief rather, instead of God's word, human reason (thus *Rationalism*), and this not as it actuates history and the church, but the subjective reason of the reigning spirit of its own age, at bottom the every day finite understanding, what we call "common sense" in its baldest form. This tendency is constitutionally unhistorical in full; it takes no interest in history as such, but only the negative satisfaction of practising upon it its own destructive criticism. It denies the objective forces of history, and expels out of it, not only Satan, who is for it the phantom only of a superstitious, heated fancy, but what is of course far more serious, God himself, changing it thus into an eyeless monster, a labyrinth of human perversions, caprices and passions. All is referred to a subjective ground. Rationalism fancies itself to have grasped the greatest and most lofty facts, when it derives them out of the most accidental and external, or even the most common and ignoble causes and motives; the doctrine of Christ's divinity, for instance, and of the Holy Trinity, from the active fancy and Platonism of the Greek fathers; the evangelical doctrines of sin and grace, from Augustine's restless metaphysics; the papacy of the Middle Ages, from the trick of the false Isidorian decretals and the ambition of the "rascal" Hildebrand; the Reformation from the pecuniary embarrassment of Leo X., and the impudence of Tetzel; Luther's view of the Lord's supper, from his own stiff and stubborn humor, etc. This way of looking at history, so supremely subjective, not only cast censure on God, as having made the world so badly that it went to ruin in his hands, or as having no more care of its history than a watchmaker for a watch long since finished and sold, affording rich matter thus for full skepticism and *nihilism*; but it put at the same time the greatest possible dishonor on our human nature also, which was robbed in this way of all its dignity and higher worth. That so much diligence and learning should have been expended still on so heartless a work would be incomprehensible, were it not explained by the interest of opposing the church, and the indomitable tendency of the German mind to theory and speculation.¹⁵

And yet Rationalism, on the other side, has also its undeniable merits, in regard to church history. In the first place, it has exer-

¹⁵ The greatest *English* master of history, however, GIBBON († 1794), in his celebrated *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, has also often noticed the history of the early church, and with a bitterness too towards Christianity, with which hardly any German Rationalist can be charged.

cised the boldest criticism, setting many things thus in a new light, and opening the way for a more free and unprejudiced judgment. Then again, it served to advance the conception of history itself, though rather in a merely negative way. Almost all earlier historians, Protestant as well as Catholic, saw movement and change only in the history of *heresies*, while they regarded the church doctrine as something once for all done, fixed and unchangeable, a view which cannot possibly stand before impartial inquiry. For although Christianity itself, the divine plan of salvation, is always the same and needs no change, the same thing cannot be affirmed at all of its apprehension in the different ages of the church, as is sufficiently shown at once by the great distinction of Catholicism and Protestantism, and in this last again by the differences of Lutheranism, Zwinglianism and Calvinism. Rationalism now saw, however, in the church as well as in the sects, change, movement, alteration, and prepared the way thus for that idea of organic development which lies at the ground of the latest German style of history. Still it went not beyond this vague notion of change. It overlooked in it wholly the truth contained in the old view, namely, that there is something enduring also with all this change, and that the church in the midst of it remains always in her inmost life one with herself. Church history became, under its hands, a storm-lost vessel, without helmsman or rudder, a wild chaos, without unity or living order, the play of chance, without any divine plan or definite end. It knew of no such development, as proceeds by necessary, rational laws, remains in its progress identical with itself, preserves the sum of every preceding stage, and though it be through many obstructions and much opposition, and in perpetual conflict with the kingdom of evil, makes its way still forward always towards a better state. Rather it took the course of history for a steady deterioration, or more accurately speaking for a process of continuous rarefaction and dilution, in which the church loses her doctrinal and religious substance more and more, till at last the age of Illumination makes the happy discovery that the whole of Christianity may be resolved at last into a few common-place moral maxims and notions of virtue.

The man by whom this great revolution in the idea and treatment of church history was mainly brought about, and who deserves with full right the title, father of neology, was JOHN SOLOMON SEMLER, Professor of Theology in Halle (†1791). He had been educated in the bosom of an anxious and pedantic Pietism, and retained from this his "private piety," which he held to be independent of all theory, and in virtue of which he opposed the appointment of the notorious Bahrdt, and wrote against the Wolfenbüttel Fragments. To Arnold's "*Ketzerhistorie*" he

was early indebted for a considerable amount of dislike to orthodoxy and partiality for heretics, to Bayle's Dictionary for all sorts of doubts, and to his preceptor Baumgarten for the conviction, that the church doctrine as it then stood "had by no means carried always the same form." His own studies showed him more and more, that all is flow and motion, all in transition or past, that every time has its particular veins and modes of thought, a consciousness of its own, into which a man must set himself beforehand in order to understand it. He was endowed with a rare inventive quickness, but without system or method, tasteless in style, unsteady and impulsive, the very embodiment indeed of his own favorite notion of change. With gigantic diligence and insatiable curiosity, he traversed the most retired works of history, particularly too the Middle Ages, everywhere trying to see if things might not be different from the common previous acceptance. Everywhere he made new discoveries, and roused the spirit of inquiry, without however bringing anything solid and enduring to pass.¹⁶ "His whole activity is merely preparatory, laying the ground, an agitation of all possibilities, a perpetual raising of doubts and suspicions, conjectures and combinations, a vast working up of material. His writings on dogmatic history resemble an unbroken field that is yet to be tilled, a building place where, amid rubbish and ruins, the materials for a new edifice lie still in endless confusion."¹⁷

The most characteristic and energetic work from Semler's school, is HENKE's "General History of the Christian Church," in eight parts (1788. ff.) He aims mainly to show the mischief, which religious despotism and doctrinal constraint, as he supposes, have produced everywhere through all ages, and presents a flaring, keenly sarcastic picture of enthusiasm, superstition, stupidity and wickedness. VATER, in his continuation and fifth edition of the work, has softened considerably its sharp features, and breathed into it a more kindly spirit.

After Henke and others had thus let out their hatred towards the ecclesiastical past, in full measure, there succeeded a complete indifference to the religious import of church history. In such spirit SCHMIDT of Giessen compiled his instructive work, continued by RETTBERG, purely from original sources. DANZ pursued a similar course.

They were all surpassed, however, by GIESELER, in the skill of his

¹⁶ Of his 171 works, hardly one is now read, except by historians of profession. They comprise, among much else, treatises also on the habit of snails in winter, and on making gold, his interest in which however was owing not simply to his literary errantry, but as Tholuck at least suspects, (*Vermischte Schriften*, Th. II. S. 82.) to his devotion to the god Pluto.

¹⁷ Thus is he described very characteristically by Dr. F. C. BAUM, who himself greatly resembles him in many things, (*Lehrb. d. Christl. Dogmengesch.* 1847. S. 40.)

extracts and his judicious criticism. In his indispensable, though yet unfinished Church History, Rationalism appears still more cool, and falls into the background behind the interest of learned inquiry and purely objective narration.

§ 12. (5) *The Scientific Period.*

As different causes, the English Deism, the French Materialism, the Popular Philosophy of Wolff, Kant's Criticism, etc. conspired to raise the vulgar Rationalism, towards the close of the last century, into general power, so men like Herder, Hamann, Jacobi, the Romantic School, and still more Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel, contributed each his part to overcome it scientifically, and to make room for a theology full of spirit and faith. Thus begins the fifth and last period of Protestant church historiography, in which we ourselves still stand. This has done vastly more than any other for the advancement of the science, both materially and formally. In Germany, during the last thirty years, an active emulation has displayed itself in this sphere, as in science generally; whose results will yet long be felt, and redound to the benefit also of other nations.¹⁸ Here we must distinguish, 1. Works embracing the whole range of church history, as besides that of GEISELER already named, those of NEANDER, ENGELHARDT, HASE, SCHLEIERMACHER, (published after his death, from manuscript sketches,) GUERICKE, NIEDNER, GFRÖRER; 2. Such as relate to dogmatic history, as those of BAUMGARTEN-CRUSIUS, ENGELHARDT, HAGENBACH, BAUR; and finally, 3. The almost countless monographies, devoted to a single dogma, or to some one branch of church polity, or worship, or Christian life, or to an important individual, or to a particular period, or to a national church. The relation of the general works to the special is that of reciprocal completion. The first, as *Dr. Kliefoth* strikingly observes,¹⁹ have a double task: "first to go before the monographies and show the chasms that still need to be filled by such special labor; and then again to come after the monographies, and incorporate their results properly into the living organism of history."

¹⁸ WINER, in the first supplement to his *Manual of theological literature*, mentions not less than five hundred works pertaining to the sphere of church history, which appeared in two years only (between 1839 and 41). In addition to this, the theological journals of Germany, such as Ilgen's "*Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*," Ullmann's and Umbreit's "*Studien und Kritiken*," contain a multitude of historical tracts; while almost all the later exegetical and dogmatic works are interwoven with rich historical material throughout. More on this point may be found in the first section of the author's tract: "*What is Church History?*"

¹⁹ In Reuter's *Repertorium* for 1845, p. 106, where the reader will find several instructive and spirited essays from the pen of Kliefoth, on "the later ecclesiastical historiography of the German Evangelical Church."

The latest style of history may be designated formally *scientific*, inasmuch as its leading representatives at least, in distinction from the mode before prevalent, propose always to *comprehend* truly the events, ruling ideas and actions of a period, and to unfold them before the eyes of their readers just as they have had place. The object is not merely to know *what* has been and come to pass, but also *how* it has come to pass. To be a historian, it is no longer enough to collect learned material, however faithfully, in an outward and aggregate way, nor yet, in the pragmatic style, to investigate psychologically the simply subjective causes and motives of events; but he is bound now to apprehend history as *spirit* and *life*, and this as *rational* spirit, the manifestation of *eternal, divine ideas*, and so to reproduce it also in a spiritual and living way. Only thus can the study or the exhibition of church history have a deep and abiding interest. For it is spirit only that can speak to spirit, and life only that can produce life. But all life is essentially process, development, which runs through different stages, ascends always to a higher position, and yet remains identical with itself, so that the end is only the full evolution of the beginning. Church history thus becomes also an organism, springing from the person of Jesus Christ, as the author and progenitor of the new humanity, extending itself outwardly and inwardly always more widely, engaged in perpetual conflict with sin and error from without and from within, moving forward through all sorts of difficulty and hindrance, and still surely tending always towards a definite end. This idea of *organic development* unites what is true in the Orthodox notion of something constant and unchangeable in church history, with what is true also in the Rationalistic notion of a perpetual movement and flow, and is the only view that makes room for any deep apprehension of the life of Christianity in time. It is a rich gain, never to be given up, which we owe to the later German Philosophy since Schelling, and which the most opposite schools of our time, those of Neander and Baur, though under different modification, alike appropriate to their use. With this view of church history, as an inwardly correct whole, pervaded with a common blood and reaching towards a common end, is intimately associated as a farther characteristic of the works in general now noticed, the spirit of genuine *catholicity* and *impartiality*. They show a like interest in almost all the portions of this vast organism, the fulness of whose inward life is thus unfolded in the flow of time; though with due subordination, of course, of the less essential and important, always, to what is of main significance and weight. Christianity is not shaped on the last of a fixed human formula; its own inward boundless and inexhaustible fulness is acknowledged. A Neander

kisses the footprints of the Lord, and bows before his Spirit, wherever he finds him, and he finds him of right in all ages and among all nations, though it be with widely different displays of his glory. Church history is now more regarded from a central and universal position, and is exhibited *sine ira et studio*, for its own sake, and just as God has allowed it to come to pass. A onesided apologetic and polemic interest is no longer suffered to prevail, allowing only a troubled view of the Saviour's majestic person through the colored spectacles of a particular sect or party, but the spirit of truth is followed without bias, under the conviction that the boundless life of the Church can be fully represented only through the collective Christianity of all periods, nations and persons, and with the persuasion that the truth finds its best justification in the simple dispassionate exhibition of its own historical course. In this respect, in general, the spirit of the later evangelical theology of Germany is already raised, principally, above the existing divisions of Christendom, and occupies the position of a union, which carries in itself the pledge of its own full accomplishment in time to come. The later church history in fact, as is already shown by many works of the popular sort, among which BÖHRINGER's Biographies are the most thorough, will win thus a practical influence on life, and from the old foundations of the Church sketch forth the plan for its new structure.

These merits do not hold indeed of all later works, and still less of all in the same degree. In a theological view especially the difference among them is considerable. Looking away from those theologians who present no distinct theological character,²⁰ or who belong still in substance to a former period,²¹ we meet mainly two schools, which are related to each other partly in the way of complement, but still more in the way of antagonism, with equal claims to spirit and learning; that namely of SCHLEIERMACHER AND NEANDER, to which belong in a wide sense such men as HOSSBACH, RHEINWALD, LIEBNER, VOGT, SEMISCH, HENRY, PIPER, JACOBI, BINDEMANN, and others; and that

²⁰ As for instance ENGELHARDT, who in his thoroughly learned historical investigations makes it his business simply to report, with scrupulous exactness and monotony, from the sources, withholding all judgment of his own. NIEDNER's "Geschichte d. Christl. Kirche" too, (1846), with its strange terminology, offers us no clear theory. Its value consists mainly in the richness of its single views.

²¹ As GUERICKE, where he is independent, falls back to the polemic method of the 17th century. GFRÖRER is in the commencement of his work rather rationalizing, afterwards catholicizing. The manuals of HASE and HAGENBACH, full of spirit and taste, remind us often of Herder's humanism, the tinge of which is more æsthetical with the first, more practical with the other.

of HEGEL, which however falls again into two essentially different branches, the one *unchurchly* and *destructive*, with BAUR at its head, the other *churchly* and *conservative*, of which DORNER may be taken as the most learned representative. In attempting briefly to characterize these tendencies, we will not forget the personal respect and gratitude we owe to their leaders, *Neander*, *Dorner*, and even *Baur* himself, who were all formerly our teachers, the first at the close, the other two at the commencement of our university studies.

§ 13. *Neander and his School.*

NEANDER has himself admirably described his immortal work, when, on his first presentation of it to the public,²² he declared it to be the grand aim of his life to exhibit the history of the Church, "as a speaking argument of the divine power of Christianity, as a school for Christian experience, a voice of edification, doctrine and warning, sounding through all centuries for all who are willing to hear." Like Spener and Franke, he looks upon theology as a business of the heart, and has chosen for his motto accordingly the words: *Pectus est quod theologum facit*. This causes the treatment of history of itself to assume a practical and edifying character, and to turn with preference to the revelations of the interior religious life, the actings of Christ's Spirit in his genuine followers, whilst those relations in which the Church touches the world and its politics are less, and often indeed quite too little, regarded. Neander has served thus by his writings to bring thousands of youth to Christ, and has contributed largely to the revival of religious life in Germany. His religion however is by no means of the narrow pietistic sort, but possesses rather a broad and liberal character, which owns sympathy with the most different forms of the Christian spirit, shows great leniency of judgment, often perhaps too great, even towards heretical aberrations, while however it finds most delight in contemplative inward tendencies like that of John. As little is he opposed in any way to science, being distinguished rather for profound inquiry, and a great talent for the organic exposition of different theological systems. Hence dogmatic history fills a very considerable space in his work, especially in the patristic period, where he feels most at home and has been most extensive in his studies. His scientific position in theology may be characterized as that of *subjectivity*, which belongs to the Schleiermacherian system in general, making it just the contrary pole to Catholicism, in which the individual is

²² In the Preface to the first volume, 1st ed. in 1825.

absorbed by the general spirit. We do not mean by this that Neander wholly loses sight of the objective forces of history; on the contrary, he speaks very frequently of universal spiritual tendencies, revealing themselves in individuals; and the contrasts of idealism and realism, rationalism and supranaturalism, dialectic understanding and mystical contemplation, belong to the standing categories of his historical thinking. But he refers these tendencies themselves to a psychological basis only, to the peculiarity of the human nature, still in a certain sense thus to a simply subjective ground. The predominant view with him is, that the kingdom of God forms itself out of individuals, and so in some sense up from below, and that, as Schleiermacher once says, "the doctrine of the Church is composed from the opinions of single Christians." No theologian has had so high a conception of the worth of the person, so fine a feeling for individual peculiarity, as Schleiermacher; and what he brings out thus in a more speculative and doctrinal way, is turned to account historically by Neander. Hence he so often urges the thought, that Christianity, the heaven which is destined to pervade our entire humanity, does not destroy the natural capacities and peculiarities of men, but only purifies and sanctifies them; hence his great concern to secure for the personal, the individual and particular, the acknowledgment of its full right; hence the powerful impulse given by him mainly, also, through his monographies on Julian the Apostate, Tertullian, Chrysostom, Bernard of Clairvaux, to the culture of ecclesiastical biography, that most valuable species of literature, in which the mirror of a single great personality is made to reflect in concrete view the spirit and sense of a whole age.

Just in this preponderance however, which is allowed to the subjective interest, is found, along with its strength, the weakness also of the Schleiermacher-Neandrian school. It has an excessive sensibility, where the rights of the individual are laid under limit for the sake of the general welfare, and an undue repugnance towards all law, the distinct assertion of the principle of authority, whether in theory or in practice. In all this it sees at once "bondage to the letter," the "mechanism of forms," "dry scholasticism," "symbololatry," and the like. It does not always distinguish sufficiently the idea of freedom from that of vagueness and arbitrariness, and seems at times to forget that true liberty can prosper only in the sphere of authority, the individual only in due subjection to the general or universal. Christianity and churchdom are taken by it more or less for opposites, which explains how it is that the Rationalists have affected to find an ally in Neander, in their war upon the dogma of inspiration and confessional orthodoxy, although the fundamental principle of their theology is totally different. We

cannot deny, therefore, that over against these faults a *relative* and *partial* right belongs, in a scientific respect, to the Hegelian scholasticism, in a practical respect, to the *unionistic* church tendency of Hengstenberg's "Kirchenzeitung," and the rigid Lutheranism of a Harless, Rudelbach, and Guericke, particularly in these times of fluctuation, distraction and disorder.

§ 14. Baur and his School. *Logical Pantheism.*

In direct opposition to the Neandrian method of history, stands the new *Tübingen* school, in the most close connection with the *Hegelian Philosophy*. This philosophy, which properly carries out only and completes on all sides the principal views of Schelling, is characterized primarily in distinction from Schleiermacher just by its objective spirit. It was in a certain sense a philosophy of restoration, in full antagonism to the revolutionary, self-sufficient "aufklärung" of the previous century. In arbitrary self-will it opposed the earnestness of law, to subjective opinion the general reason, as being alone true. History throughout is, for it, something essentially rational, not the sport of accident and caprice; it sees in it, everywhere, the movement of higher powers, not indeed the Holy Ghost in the biblical sense, but a rational world spirit, that makes use of single men for the accomplishment of its plans. Christianity is recognized by Hegel as the absolute religion, whilst he ascribes to the ideas of the Incarnation and the Trinity, in a sense very different it is true from the church doctrine, a deep philosophical truth, comprehending for instance the whole universe, external nature as well as the human spirit, under his trinitarian view. These general principles, however, allowed room for wholly opposite tendencies, accordingly as true objective forces, from which the process of history according to Hegel, is derived and constituted, might be taken to be essential realities or mere abstract conceptions, accordingly as a living faith in Christianity or a one-sided philosophical interest might lead the way. We notice first the destructive tendency, which has proceeded from the pantheistic elements in Hegel's system.

Dr. FERDINAND CHRISTIAN BAUR of Tübingen, a man of imposing learning, bold criticism, surprising power of combination, and restless productivity, but we may say too philosophical to be a true historian, and too historical to be an original philosopher, has founded within the last twenty years a formal school, which in the negation of the positive has gone still farther than the vulgar Rationalism, and brought forward a wholly new view of primitive Christianity. Baur is totally destitute of the fairest ornament of the Neandrian style of history, its active

sense namely for living, practical Christianity. He is a pure theorist, and a true representative thus of a leading disease among German scholars, the one-sided unpractical intellectualism of the study. He has confined himself, accordingly, almost altogether to the history of *doctrines*, and particularly to such as possess a philosophical interest. Thus he has investigated Manichaeism, Gnosticism,²³ the history of the dogma of the Atonement, still more the dogma of the Trinity and the Incarnation, (in three large volumes,) and produced works which make an epoch in their way, and altogether are uncommonly suggestive and instructive. Such dogmatico-historical monographies fall in with his taste much more than biographies, which require a living interest in real persons. Besides this, he has written a great many tracts on primitive Christianity, in which the process, (applied by his more consistent disciple Dr. DAVID FR. STRAUSS to the Life of Jesus, so as to turn the evangelical miracles into a mythical picture of the idea of the Messiah, as it grew from the unconscious imagination of the early church,) is so tried upon the history of the apostles and the age following, as wholly to revolutionize the view previously taken of the first two centuries. This new construction of early Christian unity appears most fully in BAUR's "*Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ*" (1845), and in SCHWEGGLER's "*Age after the Apostles*" (1846). Christianity as we now have it is here taken to be a product first, from the middle of the second century. In the mind of Jews and the first Christians it existed simply as a perfected Judaism, or Ebionitism, or, what is counted much the same, in the form of Petrinism. Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles, first emancipated Christianity from Judaism, and apprehended it as a peculiar and new system. Of the thirteen epistles, however, which are ascribed to him, only four are genuine, that namely to the Romans, that to the Galatians, and the two to the Corinthians; the rest were fabricated, and put forth under his name, in the second century. The Acts of the Apostles, falsely ascribed to Luke, is written from an apologetic position, and misrepresents the apostle of the Gentiles. It is proposed namely to defend him against the reproaches of the Jewish party, and this is done by bringing Paul as nearly as possible to Peter, that is to Jewish Christianity, in the second part, and Peter as nearly as possible to Paul, that is, to the free position of Gentile Christianity, in the first. The final reconciliation of this antagonism of Petrine and Pauline Christianity, and with it the establishment of the church faith, is the work of the fourth Gospel, which, however, flows not from the

²³ Under this term he understands, not merely the proper Gnosticism of antiquity, but all attempts to reduce Christianity to a philosophical form. *Gnosis* is, for him, thus the same as the philosophy of religion.

apostle John, although the author so pretends, but from some unknown person in the middle of the second century — the most profound and spiritual of all productions thus from an obscure nobody, the most sublime and ideal portrait of the Saviour from an impostor — and is not to be considered an actual history, but a sort of philosophico-religious romance, the offspring of the speculative fancy!! The critical acuteness and constructive method of this panlogistic school has reached a point thus, where, by its contempt for all outward historical testimonies and by the most palpable extravagance, it confutes itself, so that nothing more is needed than a simple exhibition of this last result, to repel every unsophisticated mind from its method.

But wherein consists now the fundamental fault of this whole historical method of Baur? We find it in *logical pantheism*, the denial of the *personality* both of God and of man. Baur finds fault with Neander as recognizing the single only, and nothing general, in the history of doctrine, and claims for himself the merit of having raised it from an empirical to a speculative view, and of having found in the conception of *spirit* the ruling principle of the historical process.²⁴ But what at last is this "spirit," the "dogma," which in his ever recurring terminology, "comes to terms with itself," (*sich mit sich selbst vermittelt*), which "unfolds itself into the boundless multiplicity of its predicates and there gathers itself up again into the unity of self-consciousness?" Is it the personal living God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ? Of that this philosophy knows nothing. Are the objective forces, which Baur declares to be the factors of history, substantial essences at all or living realities? No! They are bare forms of the understanding, abstract conceptions, shadowy phantoms. The entire history of doctrine is nothing more, according to this school, than a dialectic process of thought, which thinks thought itself, the tedious mechanism of method, "reeling off of a thin logical thread," that runs out always again at last into Hegelian pantheism. The efforts of the most profound and pious minds for centuries, on the incarnation and the atonement, result simply in formulæ at last of the identity of thought and being, the finite and the infinite, subject and object. Thus withers beneath the simoom breath of a purely dialectic process, the garden of the Lord, with all its endless wealth of flowers, its innumerable fruits of love to the Saviour, of faith, of prayer, of sanctification, the whole transformed into a metaphysical desert, without green oasis or refreshing fountain. Of course this method fails most in those parts of church history, where practical interests take the lead, as in the apostolical and next following periods, falling over

²⁴ *Lehrbuch der Christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, S. 52 and 53.

here from a pretended objectivity into the most wretched subjectivity of a hypercriticism, that rests on no ground and sets at defiance all the laws of history. But even the purely doctrinal investigations of Baur need a complete revision, as from his one-sided position he turns also the church fathers and the schoolmen, Calvin and Schleiermacher, into mere "speculators on the dry heath," sunders their thinking from its religious life-ground, and so not unfrequently loads them with opinions that never in dream even entered into their heads.

§ 15. *Marheinecke, Leo, Dörner, Ullmann and others.*

Along with this however, the Hegelian philosophy, even before the appearance of the famous "*Leben Jesu*" by Strauss (1835), called forth other wholly different tendencies, which have sought to keep terms with history as it is, and with the Christianity of the Bible and the Church, though some of those Christian Hegelians, as MARHEINECKE, DAUB, GÖSCHEL, have frequently spiritualized it, and at times inflicted arbitrary violence upon it by the logical process. MARHEINECKE, the theological head of the "right" wing of this school, exhibited the German Reformation under a purely objective form, from the sources, in genuine German nationality. This work, unsurpassed in its kind, is fortunately besides free altogether from the heavy dialectic accoutrement in which his "Dogmatic" is made to move. HEINRICH LEO, an original, vigorous mind, not without tendency also however to excess and rudeness, threw off it is true in later life the strait-jacket of the Hegelian logic altogether, but the influence of it is seen in his *Universal History*, where religion and the church are also very carefully noticed, but always with the entire subordination of the subject to objective powers, of the individual to the general. These objective powers with him however are not dialectic forms and conceptions, but concrete realities, laws and institutions of the personal Christian God, which to resist is sin and guilt, which to obey is man's true freedom, glory and honor. History in his view forms itself downward from above; God's will, and not popular will, least of all individual will, is its moving force. Hence his favorable treatment of the Middle Ages, and his unfavorable, nay, one-sided and unjust, judgment of the Reformation. Leo's view of history is out and out ethical, churchly, conservative, absolutely anti-revolutionary, we might say catholicising, did we not know that he has too much historical sense to believe in the possibility of restoring an antiquated position, and that just in relentless opposition to the unbound and dissolute habit of the present time he heeds it for his duty to lay the sharpest emphasis on the side of positive authority and law. In the

case of so violent, excitable and uncalculating a polemic as Leo, who often falls on his opponents like a bulldog, we must never take single utterances too strictly, as little as with Luther, whose posture also under different circumstances he would make his own.

Finally however there are dogmatic historians, who stand in direct opposition to the new Tübingen school, on decidedly believing and churchly ground, and still have appropriated to themselves all the formal helps that are offered by the Hegelian logic. To this class belong such theologians as TH. KLIEFOTH, G. A. MEIER, but above all Dr. DORNER, formerly of Tübingen, now in Bonn. This last, in his *History of the Development of the Doctrine of Christ*, a great work which however is not free from scientific pretension and stiffness, has furnished a positive refutation of Baur's work on the Trinity and of his views in regard to primitive Christianity. He is not a whit behind his opponent in learning, acuteness and speculative talent, whilst he excels him far in sound comprehension, and writes in the service not of science merely but also of the Church.

Whilst Leo is a man of the extreme, Kliefoth and Dorner may be styled on the other hand men of the mean or middle, in whom the different elements of modern culture seek to come to a reconciliation. Still more may this be said of RANKE, whose *History of the Popes and of the German Reformation* entitle him to a place also among theologians, but especially of ULLMANN and HUNDESHAGEN, although with the two last the influence of Schleiermacher carries the ascendancy. They belong, beyond doubt, to the most complete and influential historians of our time. The work of Ullmann on the Reformers before the Reformation is a real masterpiece of thorough, mild, and clear historical representation; and Hundeshagen's *Review of German Protestantism* reveals likewise a heart-sound universal insight into the defects under which it is suffering at this time, while it points with right to the practical path which German theology is called at once to pursue, if that country is to be rescued from the evil consequences of a one-sided literary existence.

Thus then we find mirrored in the latest literature of church and dogmatic history, in Germany, all the manifold elements of modern culture, as they severally repel or attract one another, or seek to come together in a common whole, at one time bound in full or in part by the fetters of a system, at another with free untrammelled spirit taking all according to its own nature and allowing to it its separate right. Unite the pious feeling and tender conscientiousness of a *Neander*, the sober investigation of a *Giesel*, the speculative talent of a *Baur* and a *Dorner*, the energetic decision of a *Leo*, the fine diplomatic wisdom of a *Ranke*,

the quiet mildness and clear representation of an *Ullmann*, the spiritual vivacity and comprehensive brevity of a *Hase*; unite all this, we say, in one person, actuated at the same time with the spirit of genuine faith and love, and wholly devoted to the service of the Church, and we have, so to speak, the true ideal of a church historian in full form before us; an ideal which may never be fully realized in any one individual, but which should at all events float before the mind of those who are content otherwise to sit at the feet of great masters.

Whether finally Germany, after being frightened out of its one-sided literary existence, and excessive scientific productivity, by the revolutionary storms of the world-year 1848, shall go on at once to carry into life her theoretic creations, and thus make them to become first really fruitful; or whether, like Greece of old, after it had produced an Aristotle and an Alexander, or the African church after it had produced an Augustine, it may be destined to die spiritually, and leave the prosecution of its work, and the practical application of its ideas, to other times and other nations — this is a question which the future itself must be left to decide.

§ 16. *Church Historians out of Germany.*

Casting a brief glance in conclusion on the latest performances in church history out of Germany, we are met (not to speak of some works which are only known to us by their titles²⁵), in the French Reformed church, by the name of MERLE D' AUBIGNÉ, of Geneva, whom we are the more bound to notice, as his History of the Reformation, still incomplete, has obtained in England and America an unexampled celebrity and circulation, reaching to circles also where such reading would not otherwise have come.²⁶ As regards the contents of the work itself, he has depended almost entirely thus far on German industry, by which this whole period especially has been thoroughly explored, in countless publications, on all sides. This use of foreign inquiry was here also wholly in place, and even a duty. He has had skill however to work up the matter handsomely, and to clothe it with a high degree of interest, by his uncommon power of lively and graphic dramatic representation. This, taken in connection with his decided evangelical tone and his polemic zeal against the Papacy, explains

²⁵ Namely, P. HOFSTEEDE DE GROOT, *Institutiones hist. eccles. Gronov.* 1835; and M. J. MATTER, *Histoire du Christianisme et de la société chrétienne*, ed. 2. Paris, 1838. 4 Vols. 8vo.

²⁶ He himself informs us in the preface to the fourth volume, that from 150,000 to 200,000 copies of his work had been sold, in the English language alone.

also his popularity just noticed particularly in the Puritanic section of Protestantism. His perfection here however runs by excess, on the other side, into a fault. Merle d' Aubigné presents, like Macaulay in his celebrated History of England, a series of brilliant pictures, without being able at the same time to rise to philosophical, universal views. Aiming, moreover, to make all the fortunes and deeds of his hero as interesting as possible, and to secure in this way a constant gratification to the reader, he often wrongs the history itself, and forgets the task of the historian in that of the romance writer. Marheinecke's History of the Reformation is of much less pretension, but far more correct and true. A sound simple sense for truth never seeks to make more out of history than it actually is, and takes little or no thought for effect. In the end, however, the quiet passionless objectivity and artless simplicity of the evangelists make a more enduring impression, than all rhetorical ornament and all dramatic parade. Then again that hot polemic zeal, that finds vent with Merle d' Aubigné, almost on every page, in exclamations and apostrophes against the hated Papists, is not such as becomes the dignity of a historian, who should argue *indirectly* only, though in this way precisely with most effect, by the representation of *facts*. As it is, the authority of this spirited and gifted writer in the sphere of history, is likely to wane, in proportion as with the farther progress of his work, his other peculiar sympathies and antipathies, may come probably to mix themselves with the narration, along with the anti-Roman tendency, so as to touch many of his past admirers on their own sensitive side. We cannot say, at least, that he has increased his reputation by his late work on *Cromwell*; where, carried away by the fresh impression of Carlyle's book, swallowed without digestion, he makes himself the unqualified panegyrist of a military and political genius, who sought to advance the cause of religion by war and bloodshed, the decapitation of a king, the dissolution of parliament, the exercise of dictatorial power, etc.; the direct opposite thus, in this respect, of Martin Luther, in whom notwithstanding, the same historian, inconsistently enough, praises as truly Christian and apostolic an aversion to all tumult and violence, while on the other hand most undue censure, in the fourth volume, is heaped on the good Zuingli, for becoming in the end a sort of general and appearing on the battle field at Cappel. We cannot therefore forbear remarking, that the immoderate praise bestowed upon the Genevan Doctor (whom we also hold in high honor, only within proper bounds), by the English and American religious press, reflects a very doubtful credit to say the least on its own character.

In England and America thus far it has been held sufficient gen-
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erally to follow Mosheim, taking along with him perhaps as a complement to his learning the more pious work of Milner. The thoroughly learned and highly valuable monographies of the Scotch theologian, THOMAS M'CRIE, on the Life of John Knox and the Reformation in Spain and Italy, have called forth unfortunately no imitation; and even the Puseyitic controversy has led to nothing more than party illustrations of particular doctrines and usages in Patristic and English-Episcopal church history.²⁷ On the other hand, however, we meet at times in English and American *Reviews*, with very thorough and interesting essays in the sphere of church history; and the excellent translations of Gieseler by DAVIDSON, and Neander by TORREY, show plainly enough that the later literature of Germany in this department is beginning to be prized, and that it may be expected in due time to lead also to independent productions. England has her MACAULAY, America has her PRESCOTT, and why then should they not be capable of producing also a great church historian? True, our system of sects and denominations, with the narrow spirit of party which it seems to nourish, stands greatly in the way of any impartial study and representation of *universal* church history, for this supposes a wide and Catholic mind; but it is to be hoped, that an increasing interest in historical theology will counteract the force of this bigotry, and be itself still farther advanced by its decline. Which result may God hasten, in his own time.

§ 17. THE USES OF CHURCH HISTORY.

We conclude this sketch with a few remarks on the value and use of church history, as it results from a proper treatment of it.

1. The knowledge of church history is the self-consciousness the church has of her own development, which as such carries its unconditional value and use first *in itself*. This we must lay stress upon over against the one-sided utilitarian view, by which it is cultivated for certain party and private interests only, and so degraded into a mere tool for transient ends. The present is the result of the past, and cannot possibly be comprehended in full without the knowledge of this in

²⁷ The work of WILLIAM PALMER: *A Compendious Ecclesiastical History, from the earliest to the present time*, can make no pretension to scientific worth. The well known convert, Newman, before his transition, passed a most unfavorable, no doubt too unfavorable, judgment on his countrymen, in regard to their acquaintance with church history, where he wrote among other things, "It is melancholy to say it; but the chief, perhaps the only English writer, who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical historian, is the infidel Gibbon." *Essay on the Dev. of Chr. Doct.* Appleton's edition, p. 14.

a thorough way. The church consequently also, to understand herself, must know her origin and her genesis. Her past deeds, sufferings and fortunes, belong to the substance of her life, are integral elements of her being, that require the succession of time for their evolution. We need no outward impulse first to engage our interest in the history of the kingdom of God; the nature of the Christian faith itself is sufficient for this with every one, according to inward vocation and outward opportunity. Faith seeks always a clearer apprehension of its object, and thus takes the deepest interest in the ways of God, the words and deeds of his servants, the cloud of witnesses looking forth without and from the past. In the same way that man, as man, according to the old saying: *homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto*, is prompted and bound to take an interest in all that is strictly human, it becomes the Christian also, as a Christian, to have the most active sympathy with the doings and fortunes of all his brethren in the faith, with whom he is joined in one body. Theology altogether, apprehended and pursued in the right spirit, is not simply a theoretic process, but divine worship. Church history then deserves to be studied for its own sake; it is an essential part of the knowledge of the being and work of the Triune God, in which consists eternal life.²⁸

Out of this higher internal worth of church history, flows its practical use and necessity for certain ends and callings, especially for the teachers and leaders of the Christian congregation. Our science, like all human knowledge and activity, should be employed to the honor of God, to glorify his name and build up his kingdom.

2. Thus the knowledge of church history is farther one of the most *powerful helps for successful action in the service of the kingdom of God*. The present is not only the product of the past, but the motherly soil also of the future, which he that cultivates must understand, and which no one can understand thoroughly except by intimate acquaintance with the past. No one, for example, is prepared to govern a State *well* and to advance its prosperity, who has not made himself familiar with its wants and its history. Ignorance can produce only a bungling work, that must soon go again to wreck. History is next to the word of God the richest source of wisdom and experience. Her treasures are inexhaustible. Why is it that so much is wrought in church and State, that after a few years is again forgotten? Because the authors had no knowledge of history and no respect for it. *That tree only defies the storm, whose roots strike far into the earth. So that work only can stand, whose foundation rests in the solid ground of history.*

²⁸ Comp. John 17: 3.

3. Again, church history is the best and most complete *defence of Christianity*, and so is eminently fitted to establish our faith, and minister comfort and edification largely to our souls. It is a perpetual commentary on that word of the Lord: "Lo, I am with you alway, to the end of the world." He moves with the fulness of his grace through all Christian centuries, he reveals himself in the most different personalities, employing them as organs of his spirit, his will, his truth, his peace. The apostles and martyrs, the apologists and church fathers, the schoolmen and mystics, the reformers and all those countless witnesses, whose names are indelibly traced on the pages of church history, form themselves into one choir, which sings an everlasting doxology to the Redeemer, and proclaims with loud voice that the Gospel is no fable, no fancy, but power and life, peace and joy, all in one word that man can desire in the way of good or glory. Such examples, in which the life of the God-man comes to actual and as it were corporeal expression, speak far more forcibly than all intellectual proofs and abstract theories. In the same way church history furnishes the strongest argument for the indestructibility of Christianity. To the word of the Lord: "On this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," every century responds, *Yea and Amen!* There is no hostile power on the earth, or under it, which has not already conspired against the congregation of the redeemed, and bent its whole force for its annihilation. But it has overcome them all. Stiff-necked and blinded Judaism laid its hand on the Anointed of the Lord and his servants; but the Lord has risen from the dead, his followers have adored his wonderful judgments over the desolate ruins of Jerusalem, the chosen people wanders dispersed, without shepherd and without sanctuary, through all nations and times, a perpetual living proof of the truth of the threatenings of the divine word, and "this generation shall not pass away" till the Lord come again in his glory. Greece applied all its art and philosophy, to confute the doctrine of the cross and make it ridiculous in the eyes of the cultivated world; but her wisdom was turned into folly, or made to serve as a bridge to Christianity. Rome, proud mistress of the world, devised the most unnatural torments, to torture Christians to death and root out their name from the earth; but tender virgins showed more courage in face of eternity than tried soldiers and Stoic philosophers; and, lo, after a couple of centuries of the most bloody persecution, the Roman emperor himself cast his crown at the feet of the despised Nazarene, and was baptized into his name. The crescent of Islam sought to overshadow the sun of Christianity, and moved blood-red along the horizon of the Oriental and the African Church, nay passed over even into

Spain and France ; but the messengers of the Lord have driven back the false prophet, and his kingdom resembles now a decaying corpse. All sorts of heresies and schisms rose in the bosom of the Church itself, even with its earliest history, and seemed for a time to have forced aside the pure doctrine of the gospel ; but this has still always recovered its ground again, and brought the army of errorists to shame. The popes surrounded the simple doctrine of salvation with so many human additions, that it was hard any longer to get at it, and they exercised despotic rule over the whole Western Christian world ; but the inmost life-force of the Church worked itself powerfully through the rubbish, placed the light of the pure word again in its place, and set conscience free from the oppressive chains of the hierarchy. Deists, materialists and atheists, in the 17th and 18th centuries, set themselves to undermine the Bible ; nay, the heroes of the French Revolution went so far, in their mad fanaticism, as to set aside the God of Christians, and place the goddess of reason on the throne of the world, and the most frightful scenes of cruelty accompanied the act ; but in a short time they had to revoke their own folly ; the Lord in heaven laughed at them and had them in derision. Napoleon, the greatest potentate and captain of modern times, proposed to substitute for the universal dominion of Christianity, the universal dominion of his own sword, and to degrade the church into an instrument for his own political ends ; but the Lord of the Church hurled him from his throne, and the giant spirit, that had thrown all Europe out of joint, must die, a prisoner on a lonely rock of the ocean, of a broken heart. In the bosom of Protestantism has risen, since the close of the last century, a Rationalism, which armed with learning and philosophy, has proceeded gradually to the denial even of a personal God and of immortality, turning the history of the Saviour into a mythological book of fables ; but over against it has appeared also already a believing theology, which has triumphantly driven its objections from the field, while in the camp of the foe itself division has taken place, and one system of unbelief is found actively refuting another. Spiritual death and indifference, in the train of Rationalism, spread itself over whole sections of the Church ; but the Christian life already celebrates again its own resurrection, banished out of one country it flourishes with fresh vigor in another, and extends its activity out to the farthest limits of the heathen world. The most important kingdoms, the best constructed systems of human wisdom, have perished ; while the simple faith of the Galilean fishermen shows itself at this day as powerful as ever, regenerating the most hardened sinners, imparting strength for good, joy in affliction, and triumph in death. The Lord of hosts has ever been a wall round about his Zion.

The gates of hell, through eighteen centuries, have not prevailed against the Church; as little will they prevail against it in time to come. To have stood so many and such various storms, and to have come forth from all only more pure and strong, she must indeed be formed of indestructible material. This church history raises to an absolute certainty, for him who studies it with a truth loving spirit. It is therefore, next to the word of God, the best and richest book of devotion, that will not allow us even then to faint, when thick darkness covers the present, and the walls of Zion are beset with foes on every side.

4. Finally, church history, in proportion as it serves to confirm our faith in the divine origin and indestructible nature of Christianity, must exert a wholesome *moral influence* also on our own character and life, and so prove an important help to *practical religion*. It is morality in the form of facts, Christ and his gospel preached from the annals of his own kingdom.²⁹ The shining examples of godly men, which it causes to pass before our spirit, powerfully challenge us to imitation, that we like them may consecrate our thoughts and actions to the honor of the Lord and the welfare of man, and so continue to be felt with happy influence long after our death. Especially is the study of history adapted also, to free our minds from all sorts of prejudice, narrowness, party and sect feeling, and to fill us with true catholic spirit; with that love which joyfully acknowledges the most manifold forms of the Christian life in their proper right, in the blooming variety of flowers that deck the garden of God adores the wonderful wisdom of the heavenly gardener, and feels itself in living union with the pious of all ages and nations; with that love, which must be poured out in large measure upon the Church, before her present mournful divisions can be brought to an end, accomplishing thus the precious promise of the One Shepherd and one flock, and the prayer of our great High Priest: "That they all may be one, as Thou Father, art in me, and I

²⁹ Luther says admirably: "It is a rare worth that belongs to histories; for all that philosophy, wise men and general reason can teach or think out, that is profitable for good life, this history forcibly presents by examples and cases, and sets it at once before the eyes, as though we were by and saw it so happen. And when we look at it deeply, we find that from histories and annals have flowed, almost all rights, art, good counsel, warning, threatening, terror, consolation, strengthening, instruction, providence, prudence, along with all virtues, as out of a living spring. In this view, histories are nothing else than the advertisement, monument and mark, of God's work and judgment, how he upholds, governs, hinders, enlarges, punishes and honors the world, men especially, as every one may deserve, be it evil or good."

in thee ; that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me."

Here indeed all depends on the mind and spirit with which church history is studied ; for like the Bible itself it may be, and often has been, scandalously abused in the service of bad ends, as may be sufficiently inferred from the foregoing history of this science.

ARTICLE IV.

REVIEW OF TALVJ ON THE COLONIZATION OF NEW ENGLAND.

By Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D., Cincinnati.

Geschichte der Colonisation von New England, von den ersten Niederlassungen daselbst im Jahre 1607, bis zur Einführung der Provinzialverfassung von Massachusetts im Jahre 1692. Nach den Quellen bearbeitet von Talvj. Nebst einer Karte von New England im Jahre 1674. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1847.

History of the Colonization of New England, from the first Settlements there in the year 1607 to the Introduction of the Provincial Government of Massachusetts in the year 1692. Investigated from the Original Sources by Talvj. With a Map of New England in the year 1674. Leipsic: F. A. Brockhaus. 1847.

"*Perversi difficile corriguntur et stultorum infinitus est numerus,*" says the wise Preacher, according to the Vulgate, Eccl. 1: 15. Every day we have occasion to notice the justness of this remark, and in nothing more strikingly than in what is said and written respecting the Puritans.

Should some typographer of our day examine the printing apparatus of Guttenberg and Faust, notice how unwieldy and clumsy it was, how very slowly and imperfectly it executed its work, and on comparing it with the more perfect machinery of these times, should pour contempt on the inventors of the art, pronounce them entirely unworthy the gratitude of posterity, and hold them up to ridicule as mere bunglers and impudent pretenders, what should we think but *Perversi difficile corriguntur*?

If some little dapper fellow should climb upon the Kentucky giant, and placing one foot on each shoulder should stand upright, and with

the most innocent simplicity, exclaim : " How tall I am — what a dwarf is this famous Kentucky giant compared with me — see ! the top of his head reaches only to my knees " — what better could we say than *stultorum infinitus est numerus* ?

Some verdant arithmetical genius might take Newton's Principia, examine it carefully, find in it nothing which is not now regarded as elementary, familiar to every student, and set forth far more comprehensively and clearly — and wonder why it is that Newton has so great a name for an amount of knowledge scarcely up to the level of what are now ordinary attainments, and with no small self-gratulation and self-conceit, publish his wonderment abroad, and put down the world-renowned Sir Isaac Newton as quite below the average stature of scientific men.

Some bustling mechanician might hunt up the ghost of Robert Fulton's first steam-boat, that with great noise and puffing and infinite pulling and tugging, was able to move some four or six miles an hour, when wind and tide were favorable, and compare that with the noiseless, swift-working, faultless machinery of our speedy steamers, and gravely conclude that Fulton was a senseless blunderer, wholly undeserving the credit which had been awarded him. This would be the more noticeable if the fellow were himself a descendant of Fulton, and took pride and pleasure in tearing to pieces the well-earned reputation of his ancestor, and endeavoring on all occasions to hold him up to ridicule and contempt.

If any should venture on such a course in regard to Sir Isaac Newton or Robert Fulton, they would be treated by the whole community of mathematicians and mechanicians with the utmost contempt ; they would be too much despised to be able to excite even a respectable feeling of indignation ; and the unscientific public would regard them as lunatics or idiots.

It is well known and should be well considered, that the beginning of a new idea is the difficult part of it — that in its first launching into the world it is necessarily feeble and imperfect ; and yet precisely here is the great labor and the great merit ; and that when it is once fairly afloat, the subsequent developments and improvements are comparatively easy and the work of far inferior minds. Who despises the infant because it is not a full grown man, or says contemptuously to the rejoicing mother, *what hast thou brought forth*, because the product of her throes and pangs is but a small and helpless child ? who but a fool, of whom the number is infinite, as the wise man said ?

Now this is precisely the way in which many judge and speak of the Puritans, and yet pass for decent, intelligent men ; — many even of

the descendants of the Puritans, who still hold up their heads in society without being ashamed of themselves.

To venerate one's ancestors is as natural to the generous mind as to honor one's own immediate parents; and he who takes pleasure in ridiculing his forefathers, is quite as mean as he who strikes his mother.

It is the instinct of all noble minded men, however faulty their ancestors, to veil their defects as much as may be, and dwell with pleasure on what is praiseworthy. Who is most to be respected, Ham and Canaan, who gloated over their father's nakedness, or Shem and Japheth, who modestly covered their unconscious and dishonored parent? In exalting our ancestors, we do honor to ourselves — we show an honorable feeling — a heart susceptible of generous emotion. The Romans in their best days — how proud were they of their sires — how glowingly they speak of them, and how readily and justly we honor them for the feelings they show in this respect; yet, when we examine the matter closely, a sad set of rogues those founders of the Roman State must have been. Never was there a more honorable, upright, intelligent race of men than the Puritans. Never were the beginnings of a commonwealth more praiseworthy than theirs, or results more glorious. Never did ancestors exist of whom their posterity had better reason to be proud. Yet, while all other races honor their ancestry and delight in its glories, it is strange that the Puritan race alone should produce so many who take pleasure in decrying their progenitors. The fathers were noble, but they certainly have been cursed with some very mean children; and some of those mean children are still alive, the foulest blot the memory of their fathers has ever been tarnished with.

It is not difficult to account for this. The Puritans broke away from the public sentiment of their times and struck out for themselves a new path, the path of truth, usefulness and honor. By this they mortally offended the leaders of what was then the established order of things and brought upon themselves the hatred and contempt of the existing magnates. This has been handed down from generation to generation as a precious heir-loom, and the expressions of it continue to be repeated from many of these high places of power and influence. There are some who never have either ideas or feelings of their own, but just take such as are ready made to their hand. These readily take what they see current in certain quarters; and thus they learn to think and speak ill of those to whom they owe their existence and all its enjoyments. They blind and befool themselves with the prejudices of an age and race to which they do not belong. Again, there are some even among the descendants of the Puritans, who hate the simple gospel and popular freedom more than they love family honor, and who never

can forgive their ancestors for being evangelical in faith and republican in policy. They are like some parents, who are forbearing and tolerant and tender to their children while they are only dissipated and worthless; but who storm with rage and disinherit them if they become worthy and respectable by becoming pious and joining an evangelical church. Happily the number of such members of the Puritan family is rapidly diminishing and bids fair for utter extinction.

Is it a real love of truth, is it a pure sense of justice, that leads any of the children of the Puritans to dishonor the graves of their ancestors? No, never. Truth and justice, so far as the Puritans are concerned, can never lead in that direction. In this case, truth and justice can never lead to contempt and ridicule — nor in any case, to misrepresentation and one-sided interpretation. Men can be impartial without being scornful, can expose a fault without sarcastic triumph, can rejoice in an improvement which time has made, without pouring contempt on the glories of an honorable though imperfect beginning. Truth and justice in this case would be calm and respectful, even where they criticise and condemn. The Puritans were the introducers of a new era in civilization, the beginners of a new and improved development of society, a development which has already become predominant in more than half the civilized world, and in which all nations will yet participate. They were the *beginners*, and that is glory enough; they were *but beginners*, and that is no disgrace: it is no discredit to them, nor will it be imputed to them as such by any honorable mind.

It is by no means necessary, in order to do honor to the Puritans, that we should claim perfection either for their theories or their practices, or that we should close our eyes to the improvements which have naturally grown from what they gloriously but imperfectly begun. Do we honor Gutenberg by condemning all modern improvement in printing, by claiming that his wooden types and clumsy press, and slow, tedious and costly manipulations were the very perfections of the typographical art, and that all the inventions of recent date are to be regretted and mourned over as the heresy of the times and proof of progressive degeneracy? Should we see a company of antiquated travellers on board a modern steamer going, sorely against their will, twenty miles an hour, without noise, or jarring, or scarcely the perception of motion — expressing their admiration of Fulton by lauding the excellence of his noisy, jarring, plodding boat, and mourning over the grievous innovations of the recent facilities in the line of steam travelling, — what could we think of but our old text again, *Perversi difficile corriguntur, et stultorum infinitus est numerus*? No, that is not the way in which we would honor the Puritans. They in their day were the men of pro-

gress — that is the thing for which we honor them ; and we would show the legitimacy of our descent from them ; we would prove ourselves to be not unworthy children of our parents, by being in our day the men of progress too. They begun a new era, gloriously begun it, in religion, in politics, in social life — most gloriously did they begin it, amid many obstacles and imperfections — and we would carry it on still more gloriously with fewer obstacles and fewer imperfections ; and, with the great advantages which we owe to their virtue, and labors, and sufferings, we will do better than they did — for they did better than any who went before them, and we are their sons ; at least this shall be our aim and object, and endeavor — or we are bastards and not sons. They were no models of perfection either in theology, or policy, or social life, nor did they ever claim to be. They labored to make improvements in all those things ; and improvements, very great improvements they did make, and this is their glory, and in this they have *left us an example that we should follow their steps.*

Most men, at least most descendants of the Puritans, readily admit both the possibility and the desirableness of improvement in social life and in civil government, who yet may be startled at the idea of improvement in theology. “What (say they) have we not the Bible, and is not the theology of the Bible perfect? And can we improve on perfection?” Doubtless the theology of the Bible is perfect, but the difficulty is to get a perfect understanding of it in all its parts. Who yet has attained to this? Have we? Had our Puritan fathers? A faultless interpretation of the Bible faultlessly combined with a faultless mental philosophy makes a faultless theology ; and when this faultless combination has proceeded so far as to exhaust all that is knowable on the subject ; then theology becomes perfect and fixed. Have we reached this point? Did our Puritan fathers reach it? No indeed, neither they nor we. They left us something to do in this matter ; and when we have done all we can, we shall leave enough for our posterity to do after us.

The fundamental principles of the Puritans, their great leading outline thoughts, their germinating, fructifying ideas, as regards theology, civil government, and social organization, were in the main correct, and far in advance of the public sentiment of their age, but they were not yet by any means wrought out perfectly into the clear. If I may so express myself, the process of incubation had but just terminated ; and though the ideas were living, active, progressive, many fragments of the old shell were still hanging to them, and some of the pieces were pretty large, some quite cumbrous and impedimentally. The virtues of the Puritans, great as they were, were mainly their own — in respect to

these they stood on independent ground and were their own masters — while their faults were mostly the faults of the times in which they lived — were derived to them from the company which they had been compelled to keep — and these very faults existed in tenfold greater strength in the class which reproach than among the Puritans who are reproached. Moreover, the Puritans early saw their errors, repented of them, and gradually shook them off as fast as they could; while their persecutors and revilers never repented, reformed but very little, and for the most part obstinately retain the like errors and faults to this very hour.

Let us try to look at this matter a little impartially, and see if this be not really the case.

It is said, the Puritans persecuted some for their religious opinions. It is true, there were a few instances of persecution, for a short time and under circumstances of peculiar provocation and aggravation. All the churches they were acquainted with, all the civil governments which then existed with scarcely an exception, were habitual persecutors, had taught and practised persecution as a sacred duty — and why are the Puritans required to escape all contamination from example and precept in their time so universal and habitual? Their glory is that they were so far in advance of all the rest of their age on this very point — that they persecuted so little while others persecuted so much — that they did it with reluctance, with relentings, with speedy cessation, while others went into it heart and soul, without reluctance, relentings or cessation — that they and they alone established the principles which very early broke up all persecution among themselves, and which have gradually forced their way through the world till now, after a lapse of two centuries or more. Protestants and even papists, wherever the Puritan influence has penetrated, are ashamed openly to persecute, or very loudly to avow the principle of persecution.

But they hung the witches. True, there was one brief, dark, sad, transient storm on this subject, and only one. For the space of a year or less, they were involved practically in the universal error of their age; but they speedily saw the error, bitterly repented of it, and amended their statute book accordingly; while the rest of the world murdered witches ten times more, did not see their error, did not repent, did not amend their statutes; and in many, especially of the Roman Catholic countries, these superstitions and sanguinary laws continue unamended unrepealed even to this day. During the witchcraft delusion, twenty persons lost their lives in New-England; but a little before this more than sixty had been executed for the same imaginary offence in a single county in England; some twenty years after this, eighty-five witches

including twenty children were burnt at one time in Sweden. In Scotland — in Switzerland, it was equally bad — and in the Roman Catholic countries of Europe infinitely worse. How is it that the Puritans alone are to be blamed? Is it because they were so much less guilty than others?

It is said they were stern and severe in their families and in the government of their households. So they were; and so were all the rest of the world at that time, at least all the civilized and cultivated part of the world. The highest of the nobility of the age, the most chivalrous of the cavaliers, were as strenuous in their demands of respect and obedience from their families as were the sternest of the Puritans; and far more unrelenting and cruel in their punishment for disobedience. Examine the history of the times and all the romances founded on chivalry, and see everywhere the proof of this. And perhaps the Puritans were not so far wrong.

The Puritans made very long prayers. Very likely; they loved to pray, and an exercise which men like they are quite apt to protract. But even in this they were not far from the mark of the old churches to which only they had to look for example, and whose liturgies and litanies were never made shorter than a Puritan prayer; and these same old liturgies and litanies still retain even in our time, very much of their original tedious longitude, while the Puritan devotions, in accommodation to the spirit of the age, are growing shorter and shorter every year, till now, the comparison, as to shortness, never very much in favor, is loud and long against those who make the complaint.

But the Puritans whined and drawled in their worship. Probably they did, but certainly they could never go far beyond the whining and drawling of the cathedral worship of their persecutors. And while the Puritan drawling, devotional tone has entirely died away, so that scarce an echo of it can now anywhere be heard, the papal and prelatial recitative on the same key and in the same notes, is still toned out in all its pristine vigor in every cathedral of the old world, and something very like it is heard in similar places in the new. Let any one in an English cathedral listen for once to the ecclesiastical twang of the sentence in the prayer book — “*Give peace in our time, because there is none other that fighteth for us but only thou O Lord,*” — and if he be a man of any bowels he will forever after hold his peace about the Puritan whine and drawl.

Again it is said the Puritans were very strict and rigid in their religion, and scrupulously severe in their morals. Here I see not but we must plead guilty in their behalf, and acknowledge that in both

these respects they were very different from their opponents both in former and later times.

We cheerfully admit that the Puritans were neither perfect nor infallible. Neither they nor their defenders have any of the responsibilities or the inconveniences of infallibility. They were men, men only, and real men. They have done a great work in this imperfect, staggering, progressive world of ours. And what is this work which they have done? They have broken the chains of superstition, persecution, and tyranny; when before there were only the rights of orders, they have established the rights of persons; they have developed the individual man and taught his worth; they have colonized a new world and given to its population a freedom, a life, an energy, a standing which no population of anything like equal extent and numbers ever had before; they have introduced a new civilization into the human family, infinitely higher and more beneficent than any which has preceded it, and absorbing all antecedent civilizations, as the serpent rod of the Hebrew sage swallowed all the serpents of the Egyptian magicians. They have conquered their persecutors and led captivity captive. The ideas for which they suffered and which their enemies fondly thought they had crushed, are now the world over the prominent conquering ideas, and even those who now revile them find no repose except under the shadow of their wing.

In a world like this such miracles of good are not to be obtained without some incidental evils; but to dwell on these evils and forget the good shows the mind of the Anglian exquisite, who learns with terror that all our dining tables are not furnished with finger glasses, and is struck with dismay to find that some of our far west steam-boats have not the convenience of a butter knife, and in the indignation with which he contemplates these enormities, quite forgets that Irish laborers and English manufacturers are by millions unfed, untaught, overtasked, living lives and dying deaths too bad for brutes, in order that their wealthy superiors may be furnished with the means of living in luxury, dissipation and idleness.

We have scarcely alluded to the hardships and dangers and difficulties amid which the Puritans accomplished their great work — hardships which might well make the stoutest shrink — dangers enough to appal the most fearless, and difficulties that would have crushed the strongest, who did not feel assured that *underneath them were the everlasting arms*. The magnitude and difficulty of the work which the Puritans accomplished may in some degree be estimated by this one fact, namely, *that of all the nations which dwell, or have dwelt, on the face of the whole earth, not one has yet been found capable of a happy*

self-government, except the one which the Puritans taught and fitted for the enjoyment of freedom.

We have read no work which on the whole appears to us to give so accurate a picture of the Puritan character as that of Talvj, whose title we have written at the head of this article. It is just and discriminating, disposed to commend and not fearing to censure. The author is in a good position to develop the subject according to its real merit. Born and educated in Germany, and becoming well versed in the learning of that most learned of nations, residing for many years in Russia and Eastern Europe, and becoming familiar with institutions and people the most diverse from ours, the uniting her destinies with those of the descendants of the Puritans, and investigating their history and character under the most advantageous circumstances for discovering the truth, having religious and political principles and an intellectual culture excellently adapted to the task which she has undertaken, she has produced a work of great and permanent interest, which "posterity will not willingly let die." She stands in the attitude of a spectator, yet with enough of interest in the scene and of sympathy with it to give a lively and glowing picture of it.

A tolerably correct idea of the general tone and spirit, of the style and sentiment of the work may be formed from the first two paragraphs, which we have translated for the benefit of our readers.

"No State in the world can boast of a basis so purely moral as can the North American free States which are comprehended under the general name of New England. The love of dominion, the love of fame, a noble desire of independence, have founded empires — ambition and avarice have discovered and conquered new regions — but none of these motives, however great the achievements they have in other cases called forth, had any influence on the resolve of that handful of noble men, who exchanged their native land for a wilderness for the purpose of building to the Lord a temple in which, as they believed, they could worship him according to their conscience, and in forms which alone they supposed would be well pleasing to the Most High. Closely interwoven as was, in their convictions, the temporal and the eternal of the Christian, this temple became at the same time the ground-work of their political existence; and an edifice arose under their creative hands, in the circuit of whose strong walls there arose the *rights of men* instead of the *right of orders*, freedom in the place of privileges, equality in the place of dominion and servitude. *Out of small beginnings great things have been produced*, (well says their earlier historian,) *and as one small candle may light a thousand, so the light here kindled hath shone to many.*" The political principles on which the earliest settlers of New

England built, have gradually spread themselves over the world ; and although the refreshing west wind, when it first touched Europe, broke out into a desolating storm, which tore down many a venerable edifice, yet it also permanently purified the air from the pestilential vapor of those eternal diseases, which have dragged themselves through centuries under the name of 'ancient rights and hereditary privileges.' The history of these beginnings, therefore, must be of the highest interest even to Europeans." (p. 42.)

We know not how the real character and influence of the early planters of New England could be more exactly, happily, and justly expressed than they are in those few lines. Two other paragraphs, pertaining to the first settlement of Connecticut, and to the condition and character of the people of that colony after they were settled, are equally worthy of translation as specimens of the manner and spirit of the writer.

"In the following spring (1636), almost the entire congregation, numbering about one hundred persons, broke up from Newtown, with Hooker their celebrated preacher at their head. Many individual features of this wearisome emigration have come down to our times. They were surrounded by a dense forest, which was inhabited by small beasts of prey of every kind, wolves, foxes, wild-cats, and the like, but especially by moose, and various species of snakes ; and the grass, as at present on the Western prairies, stood to the height of a man. Their road was an Indian foot-path, the compass their only guide. Hooker's wife was carried in a litter. Most of the others travelled on foot, with their little bundles under their arm. For fourteen nights the open heavens were their roof, and the stones in the way their pillows. One hundred and sixty head of cattle were driven along with them, and the milk of the cows was the principal nourishment of the wanderers. As they painfully and slowly toiled along, they sung psalms and hymns, and at every halt they uttered aloud their prayers to Heaven. The Indians, whose huts they passed, stared upon them in mute astonishment ; for Connecticut had not, like the Eastern shores of New England, been depopulated by a desolating pestilence. It was densely inhabited and by the most warlike tribes of the land. But they offered to the wanderers no resistance ; and these went fearlessly on their way, for they knew in whom they trusted, and had besides a good conscience, for they would not take possession of a foot of land which they had not acquired by an honorable purchase."

"The Constitution of Connecticut so entirely satisfied the needs and the wishes of its inhabitants, that though for nearly seventy years they have had full liberty to make alterations in it, it has in all essential

particulars continued unchanged to the present day. Freedom of conscience to a certain extent, that is the toleration of churches not Congregational, such as Baptists, Quakers, Presbyterians, and even Episcopalians, if they chose to settle there, fully answered the wants of the times. A productive soil, free trade, unrestricted manufacturing activity, carefully sustained common schools whose basis was the Bible; a government whose officers were selected by themselves and whose annual cost after fifty years amounted to not more than 800 pounds sterling, and which could easily be defrayed by a very light tax; an administration of justice which by the simplicity of its forms was intelligible, and by its cheapness was accessible to the poorest; all these combined made Connecticut one of the happiest spots on earth, and nourished a proud contentment among its citizens. There were few rich, and poor there were none; to a community of farmers a small trade limited mostly to New York and the New England colonies gave little prospect of amassing wealth. At the time of the union of the two colonies (that is of New Haven and Connecticut in 1665) they numbered nineteen flourishing towns scattered over the surface of the country, and inhabited by 11,000 souls. After fifteen years the towns numbered six and twenty, of which the most had churches and every church its learned pastor, and the population had increased to 15,000. Every town transacted its own business under the simplest forms, without any fear of interference from the government; and the citizen whom the voice of the people called to be the leader of the community, was trained by the administration of the smaller affairs of the town to administer the greater affairs of the State." (p. 267, 68, and 485, 86).¹

A beginning how simple and godlike! A result how glorious and beneficent! What a lesson of wisdom and utility to the emigrating and colonizing spirit of a generation like ours, equally enterprising but far less simple-hearted and religious!

Talvj's view of the Quaker affair is singularly judicious and discriminating, and well worth the serious attention of all who have regard for historical truth and justice. She says, "Among all the instances of religious intolerance and persecution, the government of Massachusetts have been most severely censured by after generations and by foreigners for their conduct towards the Quakers, and yet it is precisely here that in consequence of the extreme aggravations of the case occasioned by the intolerably contemptuous bearing of the obstinate victims of their severity, they deserve some apology. Never was there punishment threatened where there was less inclination to inflict it. The Quakers on their first appearance were not the peacefully industrious, actively benevolent people, 'wise as serpents and harmless as doves,' which a

quarter of a century of judicious toleration afterwards made them. Their public conduct was such that the government of no country could or ought to endure it. Full of spiritual arrogance, they were loud against their teachers, openly declaring the deepest contempt for their laws and ordinances, preaching in the open streets with screaming voices against all that was established, and denouncing woes against all the rulers, spiritual and temporal, for leading the people astray. From the windows of their prisons they showered insulting words upon the governor and magistrates as they were passing by. Before the courts no authority, no warnings, no punishments could bring them to submit to the established orders. The questions of the judges they answered by long speeches full of reproaches and denunciations; or what seemed still worse, by obstinate silence, with their heads covered. Men and women showed an equal longing for martyrdom. When one of them was brought before the magistrate, three or four others, apparently by mutual understanding, would break in upon the proceedings with reproaches against the authority claimed by the judges or with prophesying of evil which amazed the by-standers."

"They cherished a fanatical hatred particularly against the clergy, which, it must be confessed, was by them fully reciprocated. To them the ministers were nothing but hirelings, priests of Baal, deceivers of the people, the seed of the serpent. During the Sunday worship, they rushed into the churches; one of them, Thomas Newhouse by name, with two glass bottles in his hand, which he dashed jingling to the ground, with the warning, *thus will the Lord dash you in pieces*. Others again came with no weapons but their tongues, and interrupted the preacher with the cry that *his words were an abomination to the Lord*, etc. A certain Brewster once entered a meeting-house, having blackened himself all over with coal, to give in his testimony against their blackness. In Cambridge a woman, and in Boston a man, ran howling through the streets, proclaiming that the Lord was coming with fire and sword. In Salem a Quakeress by the name of Deborah Wilson, suddenly appeared in the public streets, as naked as nature had made her. A brother of the faith remarked in her defence: "When the Lord stirs up one of his daughters to be a sign of your nakedness, it must indeed to a modest lady be a heavy cross, but the Lord will have obedience." Another appealed to the command of God to the prophet Isaiah, Chapter 20, verse 2. Perhaps no sect was ever carried farther by the insanity of fanaticism." (p. 457 — 459).

"When at last the lawgivers of Massachusetts fixed the penalty of death upon the return of a banished Quaker, they did not once think that the law would ever have to be enforced. Their object was to de-

ter, not to punish. "We would a thousand times rather that they should live being absent than die being present," was the observation of the legislators. The clergyman Norton, the least of the persecutors, said, in vindication of the measures of the government — "For the security of the flock we must corner the wolf; but we will leave him an open door to escape if he pleases." (p. 460).

The persecution of the Quakers was indeed ill judged and wrong. They should rather have been guarded and cared for as insane persons when they were outrageous, and let alone when they were peaceable. But the world had not yet learned this. The same people were persecuted in Old England and Virginia worse than they were in New England. The Puritans with all their intolerance, were more tolerant than their contemporaries. The laws against the Quakers were never acceptable to the great body of the people even of Massachusetts, the most high church and aristocratic of all the colonies; and the public sentiment at last became so strong that the magistrates were obliged to write in their own defence; and all those laws were soon repealed. What other government at that period, what other people showed any thing like the same tolerance or patience in circumstances of so much provocation? In any other country the gag and the thumb-screw, the rack and the faggot would have been unscrupulously resorted to for the suppression of these unhappy fanatics. But those persecutions were wrong. The Puritans soon learned that they were wrong (sooner did they learn it than any other men of their times), and like noble and Christian men as they were, they confessed and forsook the wrong as soon as their eyes were open to see it. Even Cotton Mather, usually represented as the fiercest of the persecutors, says in regard to the Quaker persecution, "If any man will appear in vindication of it, let him do as he pleases; for my part I will not" — "nor do I look upon hereticide as an evangelical way for extinguishing heresies." "A Bethlehem seems to have been fitter for them (the Quakers) than a gallows." (Mag. II. 453).

Winthrop when called upon in his old days to sign an act for the banishment of a dissident, declined, saying, "I fear I have during my life already done too much of this." (Talvj, 385). Who that has any right feeling can avoid being deeply moved at the humiliation and sorrow of Judge Sewall for the part he sincerely took in the affair of the Salem witches? How deeply he mourned over it in his private journal! For example, entry Dec. 1696: "Heard Sam. recite in Latin Matt. xii. from 6th verse to the end of the 12th. The 9th verse did awfully bring to my mind the Salem Tragedie." The government of the colony proclaimed a public fast for humiliation and supplications of

pardon on account of their error, and on the fast day Judge Sewall with unfeigned humility procured the public reading of his confession from the pulpit of the Old South, himself standing in the presence of the congregation while it was read by the pastor, Rev. Mr. Willard (*Holmes' Annals*, I. 440, *Talvj*, 703); and this was not a solitary instance, (see *Talvj*). Where in all the history of persecutions will you find another instance of this kind?

The case of Judge Sewall is the more remarkable as his pastor Mr. Willard had always been opposed to these proceedings, and had openly differed with the Judge on the subject at the time. Where do we find any thing of this kind in the biographies of a Laud or a Torquemada, whose little finger all their lives long was thicker than all the loins of all the Puritans together? who shed more blood in the service of intolerance and superstition in a single day, and inflicted more pain in a single hour, than the whole nation of the Puritans during the entire period of their national existence! Why this exhibition of Christian penitence and humility on the one part and the entire absence of it on the other? It is because the Puritans were Christians, really and heartily so; while none of the stamp of Torquemada and Laud had anything of Christianity but the name: and it is men of this stamp who reproach the Puritans for intolerance and persecution.

We recommend to the particular attention of the reader *Talvj's* whole account of the witchcraft delusion, (p. 680 — 709) and regret we have not room to translate it here. Though *Talvj* is evidently inclined to do justice to the Puritans and cherishes no prejudice against them; yet she does not hesitate occasionally to censure them, and sometimes severely where in our judgment censure is little deserved, for example in reference to their religious persecutions she says, "That even Luther in his passionate anguish at seeing the gospel dishonored would have the Anabaptists annihilated with the sword, that Melancthon approved Calvin's bloody participation in the sacrifice of Servetus and all their great contemporaries sympathized with them — this certainly can neither justify nor excuse the severe measures of the Puritans in the seventeenth century. Those admirable men were but just emerging from a long night which had buried in slumber all free thought on the relation of men to God. And it would have been a miracle indeed if they, the only light-bringing stars, should at once have turned the night to day. But the Puritan legislators of Massachusetts lived a whole century later, a century during which the doctrines and the natural consequences of Protestantism had variously developed themselves. Still only a few of them had yet come to those clear views of the freedom of conscience which in our day have gained in all Protestant and in most Catholic countries a

preponderance so decided that no legislators can any more act contrary to them." (p. 325, 6).

If there be any justice in this censure, it must rest in the idea that the Puritans were behind the men of their own age, were less enlightened on the subject of religious liberty than the other legislators of the 17th century — which certainly is not true — but the very reverse of it is true, as is perfectly manifest from the history so ably and so interestingly written by Talvj herself. What in all conscience was there during the reigns of Elizabeth and the Jameses and the Charleses to teach the Puritans the true doctrine of religious liberty? They were obliged to feel their way along in the midst of the deepest darkness on this subject; and it is glory enough for them that some among them did see clearly, and most of them saw something where the rest of the world were still as blind as bats; it is glory enough for them that they set in motion those ideas which have since banished religious persecution from almost all Protestant, and even from some Papal countries.

So our author censures the colonial government for the death of Miantonomoh, as it seems without very good reason. Miantonomoh was a savage chief engaged in war with another savage chief; and according to the rules of savage warfare, which he well understood before he commenced the conflict, in being taken prisoner he was to be put to death by prolonged torture; the colonial government did rescue him from the torture, but not from death. Why should they, unless they were bound to adopt the Quaker principle in regard to all war and all capital punishment? There are a few other instances of censure which we feel somewhat disposed to criticise, but we let them pass.

Talvj brings prominently to view the difference between the original planters of the Plymouth and those of the Massachusetts Colony. The difference is important, and must not be lost sight of by any who would gain a right idea of the elements from which New England and the United States have developed themselves. The Plymouth colonists for the most part were poor, simple hearted, fully democratic and tolerant. The planters of Massachusetts, on the other hand, were many of them comparatively rich, aristocratic in feeling, republican but not democratic in their political principles, and with few exceptions very considerably high church in their ecclesiastical notions.

Connecticut was rather a mollifying combination of the Massachusetts with the Plymouth element; while Rhode Island was a sort of drainage, a receptacle of all the uncombining ultrasisms, the radical democracies, the red republicanism, the through and through *come outerisms* of that day. In the subsequent growth of the nation the Ply-

mouth and the Rhode Island development have increased much faster than the Massachusetts; and will in the end most probably give character to the whole. At least such is the present tendency of things, and so it has been ever since the close of the revolutionary war. At present nothing seems likely to arrest it, unless it be the vast immigration from the continent of Europe. The literature, the ideas, the habits which those immigrants bring with them, though the immigrants are mostly receptive rather than productive, acted upon rather than acting, will in the end exert a powerfully modifying influence on our national character.

Roger Williams, the conscientious and able leader of the democracy of these times, the most formidable and the most estimable of the opponents of the Puritans, deserves a special notice. Roger Williams was the prototype of the best sort of ultra reformers. There are many of his class at the present day, though but few as good and as amiable as he. It is a race that always will exist in every age of advancement and reform, and it is a *kind that goeth not out except by prayer and fasting*. Denunciation, persecution, blind conservatism, do not the least good. The reforms which are needed must be conscientiously, faithfully, and with all possible dispatch, accomplished, and thus the exciting, sustaining cause of the ultraism be taken out of the way. You must cure ultraisms in society as you cure delirium tremens in the individual, by abstaining from all that intoxicates. If this be not practicable, why, then the disease must ever and anon make its appearance.

Williams was an honest, earnest, good man, at heart a Christian, benevolent towards all, forbearing and forgiving to his enemies. In his controversies he was severe and bitter as any of his contemporaries; and no man ever said harder or more cutting things against the Quakers than he. But it is to his credit, and posterity ought ever to bear it in mind to his honor and with never ceasing gratitude to his memory, that he utterly repudiated physical pains and penalties and the burden of civil disabilities for mere matters of opinion.

The great duty of religious toleration he saw clearly, and practised consistently; and in this he was greatly in advance of most of the men of his age. The Puritans generally had begun to see something of this truth; though like the blind man in the gospel whose eyes had just begun to receive the light, they saw men as trees walking. Cromwell, Milton, Vane, and a few others, understood the matter clearly; but they were exceptions to the general rule; and for nothing was Cromwell more severely blamed by that great and good man, Richard Baxter, than for his principles of entire religious toleration. This may show what the age was in that respect. We honor Williams for contending in behalf of this great principle, we honor him for his consist-

ent practice in regard to it, and we cheerfully acknowledge the debt of gratitude which we owe him for it. Nor was he ultra on this point. He well understood and very happily pointed out the limitations of religious tolerance. He compared the members of a commonwealth to a ship's crew and passengers on the ocean, including men of every sort. The shipmaster is at liberty to establish daily worship, but not to compel others to attend it; nor are those who do not attend at liberty to disturb those who do. All are bound to submit to the rules of the ship in whatever pertains to the safety and comfort of the voyage, to bear their part of the expenses, to respect and obey the officers; and if any should refuse to do this, should any under pretext that all are equal in Christ, preach or write that there ought to be no officers or rules or punishments, *I have never denied (said he) that such transgressors ought to be judged, restrained, compelled and punished, if they deserve.* (Talvj p. 390, 91.)

Williams had an ardent, impatient mind; an idea burnt in him with such heat and flame that he could not stop to see its connection with other ideas, or its adaptedness to existing circumstances. While the iron was hot he hammered away with all his might, regardless of the shape he was giving to it, or of the use that was afterwards to be made of it. Hence many of his blows and much of his toil and sweat were thrown away. As soon as he got a thought he must work it out, must make everything else consistent with it through and through, whatever inconsistencies and incongruities might grow out of this one string of consistencies. It is pleasant to see the two boots of a pair perfectly matched; but if the feet on which they are to be worn are unlike, such perfect mates make a very bad fit. He changed his opinions many times during his life, and knew perfectly well that the process of conviction in his own mind was not instantaneous, but progressive. Yet he could not wait for other minds to go through a like process. They must change when he did, or rather they *must be changed when he was changed*, no sooner and no later, or he must excommunicate them; he could not conscientiously do otherwise. Williams gave the Puritans much trouble, and there was fault on both sides. In some parts of his career he was much like the refractory men on ship board, whom he himself affirmed *ought to be judged, restrained, compelled and punished as they deserve*. No commonwealth, especially in times of feebleness and danger, could without self-annihilation tolerate such a course as he sometimes took in regard to the government of the colonies. Yet in all these disputes and the consequent measures of violence, it is interesting to see that not a few of the colonists loved and respected Williams as a good man, though mistaken; and that this affection and es-

teem was on his part fully reciprocated. Here is a striking difference between those who are really Christians, and those who are Christians in name only.

The Puritans, though like other human beings imperfect, were Christians, gospel men, good men, full of the Holy Ghost and of faith; and a great and good work it was theirs to do, a work of which we and all the world are now reaping the benefit, and blessings be on their memory and peace to their ashes; and let their revilers and the violators of their graves meet everywhere the contempt they deserve.

ARTICLE V.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION IN THE GERMAN GYMNASIA.

By Dr. Hermann Wimmer, late Professor in the Blochmann College, Dresden, Saxony.

THE political reformation of Germany, for a long time sought by philosophers and politicians, and fostered by the general desire of union, though its progress is now apparently stopped through the failure of the late revolution, is not likely to stand still until it has effected its object. The happy accomplishment of the revolution may indeed fall to the lot of a more fortunate posterity, but the passions of a revolutionary age will not cease to disturb the peace of the living generation, and to impress their stamp on the entire face of society. Changes are brought about to be changed again after the sun of freedom has risen; but these are now unavoidable, as the shadows of night precede the morning light. Professors have been writing in newspapers or speaking in parliaments; students fighting on barricades or haranguing the people in clubs; some are prisoners; others fugitive. In "the country of thoughtfulness and learning," a political pamphlet is preferred to a scientific book, and the speech of a noisy partisan to the lecture of a learned professor. All the institutions of learning, gymnasia or universities, will suffer from the vehement shock, and the vulgar reproach often brought against classical learning as not being practical enough, will now overwhelm the reasoning of its adherents, while on the opposite side the victorious governments do not feel bound to look graciously down on institutions which brought out that pernicious spirit of freedom and union. And whatever may be the state of

classical studies in Germany for times to come, it is but too certain, that now the political clouds darken the light of philological learning, and while every year produces volumes of modern history, the study of by-gone times and nations is in danger of being set aside, before Greek and Roman ideas of republican freedom succeed in dethroning the kings. There is no doubt but this free and glorious country, destined by Providence to be the asylum of the old world, will take in the pilgrim and make him its own. For a long time Germany has been considered by the other civilized countries as the common teacher of philology, and from Paris to Kasan, and from Edinburgh to Odessa, one may find German professors of Greek or Latin in the chairs of the universities, and German books on the study-tables of the native professors; and in this country, too, philology looks up to Germany as to her mother-land. But in order to naturalize classical learning and to attain a similar or higher degree of perfection, there seems to be no better method than to observe the way which the German philologists themselves have gone, and to pursue the same as far as circumstances may direct. The following lines are intended to throw some light upon the subject in a practical way, by showing the organisation of the German schools for classical learning. The writer of this article, who has gone through the gymnasium and university, and taught afterwards the ancient languages in a college for a series of years, indulges the hope that his statements will be regarded as true.

It will not be considered out of place, to commence the description of the higher education in Germany with a few words on the common school education. "The sad chapter in the year-book of the schools," as Mr. Horace Mann calls his chapter on Attendance and Non-Attendance, in his excellent Twelfth Annual Report, may be superseded in Saxony, where parents are required by law to send their children to school. The sixth year of age is the first year of attending school, and parents who keep their children away from school longer, without being excused by sickness, are subject to a fine. The regular course of common education extends to the thirteenth or fourteenth year of age, when the boys and girls are dismissed from school by public confirmation as evangelical Christians, after having gone three or four months, twice a week, to the minister for religious instruction and examination. Teachers, like all other officers, are appointed for life-time, i. e. they themselves can change, but cannot be changed; they teach winter and summer, lead the singing in the church, play on the organ, precede with their little choir the funeral; in short, the schoolmaster of the village is at the same time the cantor, organist and sexton of the church. The small city or town (*Stadt*) of about two thousand in-

habitants and upwards is like the village (Dorf) in having but one school (though divided usually into two parts, one for boys and one for girls), but differs from it by having all the qualities of a village-teacher represented by several individuals; the rector or principal is teacher of the first class, the cantor is teacher of the second class, the organist is teacher of the girls, and the sexton is teacher of the smallest children. In the larger cities there are generally district-schools, as in Dresden; but Leipzig has one great burgher-school (Bürgerschule) with about ten teachers. The branches taught in all these schools are nearly the same, and do not differ much from what is taught here in town or grammar-schools; but while the boys of the peasants (the gentleman of the village has his tutor or governess, and the clergyman instructs his children himself) learn, besides reading, writing and counting, but little in history, geography and mathematics, the sons of the burghers acquire a good deal of knowledge in the same, and also in higher branches. The schoolmasters in the villages are now all bred in Teachers' Seminaries; but sometime ago there might have been found in the poorer districts, many teachers in small villages (such as have no church by themselves, but belong to a neighboring parish), who had very little education, and worked, besides, as carpenters or shoemakers for a livelihood. But now, since the income of teachers has been somewhat regulated and increased, there are even many candidates of theology teaching in village-schools, in order to support themselves in the long decade of expectation and to please the government, or some country gentleman who has the eventual disposition in regard to the ministry. A village schoolmaster has now in Saxony at least a salary of 120 to 150 thalers; there are, however, in the wealthier districts many places with an income of 300 thalers and upwards, as the interest of some old foundation in land or forest. It will be understood that the city teachers are paid at a far better rate. The tuition in the common schools is very low, and there are also free schools in the largest cities. Besides these common schools, there are in Leipzig a "Real School," in Dresden a "Real Gymnasium," so called in contradistinction from the institutions for *humanistic* or classical learning, and to be compared with the High Schools here; two (private) Mercantile Schools in Dresden and Leipzig, three or more "Gewerb Schools," i. e. technical schools in the manufacturing districts, one great Polytechnic institution with a school for architects in Dresden, a celebrated academy for miners in Freiberg, an academy for agriculturists and foresters in Tharand, five seminaries for teachers (it will be recollected that the first Normal school was erected in Germany at the beginning of the last century by Francke), an academy for drawing

and painting, military schools, etc., in all of which the mathematical or technical instruction prevails to such an extent, as to leave very little or no place for the ancient languages. In some of these institutions, the Latin is studied a few hours in a week, but usually without any farther advantage than to facilitate the learning of the languages derived from the Roman, and to give a superficial acquaintance with those *termini technici* which form an essential part of the philosophical language of all nations.

The classical studies have their chief seat in the "*gymnasia*," where must resort all those who intend starting for professional life, and often those who wish to receive some liberal and scholar-like education, without desiring to make subsequently any particular use of their scholarship. The latter class was numerous in former times, before the many technical institutions, as above, had been erected, when the gymnasium was the only resort for such as wished to acquire some higher and more refined education than that which could be acquired in the common schools. Saxony, the Massachusetts of Germany, numbers twelve gymnasia, to wit, two in Dresden, two in Leipzig, one each in Meissen, Grimma, Freiberg, Annaberg, Bautzen, Zittau, Zwickau and Plauen. The average number of all the students in the gymnasia (*Gymnasiasten*) is about one thousand — just about the number of the students in the university at Leipzig, where the graduates of all the gymnasia come together to study their respective professions. The gymnasium consists, like the American college, of four classes, called *Prima* (*Primaner* — *Seniors*), *Secunda*, *Tertia* and *Quarta*, but each one of these classes is usually subdivided into two parts, Upper and Lower *Prima*, etc., which are in some scientific branches combined, but in the Latin and Greek instructed separately, so that a student has to pass properly through eight classes instead of four before he comes to his last examination (*Maturitäts-Examen*), which decides whether he is prepared to graduate and emancipate himself from the stern discipline of the college, and if he be, to what degree he is so. Yet let us not anticipate this happiest of all times in the life of a German scholar, but rather accompany the little man in his inflated state, the great Luther, Melancthon, Kepler, Humboldt, Heyne, Hermann, Kant, Hegel, Lessing, Winckelmann, Göthe or Schiller in a nutshell, to the great nursery of the Muses. In the average, we think, a German "*Quartaner*" is two years younger than an American freshman, and thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years old, but he is grown quite as old when he graduates, since his course comprises generally a term of six years. But now when we are settling our boy in some gymnasium, we cannot help exclaiming: There is nothing in the world like Ameri-

can uniformity and German variety! Perhaps this involuntary exclamation will excuse our somewhat complicated statements, which an American might expect to be pretty simple and easy. Saxony has had since the Reformation, three great boarding-gymnasias, called *Fürstenschulen*, i. e. Prince Schools, because they were founded by the first Protestant princes, and were under the superintendence of the electoral government, or *Klosterschulen*, i. e. Cloister schools, because they were erected on the place and with the funds of old cloisters. These are in Meissen (schola-Afrana) near Dresden, in Grimma near Leipzig, and in Schulpforte (schola Portensis) near Naumburg in the now Prussian province of Saxony, and well deserve to be considered as the hearths of classical learning in the heart of Germany. There was a time, when the illustrious Illgen was rector or president of Schulpfort, that its fame reëchoed throughout Germany, and still now every German scholar will speak with reverence of the old sanctuary of Greek and Roman deities. Should we bring our boy into one of those gloomy and awful Gothic buildings, he might well look sad in entering the high walls which are to surround him for six years with but short annual intervals, and still look sadder after a month's experience, when he has perceived that besides the cannon balls from the officers if he does not his duty, he is subject to the rattling of small shot from a battalion of seniors, should he not please them. The only advantage of that old tyrannic usage, which, except its memory, the philanthropic character of the nineteenth century has destroyed in Europe and America, was to make the freshman soon become unconscious of the whole length of time for which he had been immured, and above all desirous to get rid of the performance of services to be rendered to his superiors by being transferred to a middle class, until in the highest classes he had become an easy convert to the doctrine, which he had hated in his state of inferiority. But the brighter side of the picture is to be found in the great educational influence, which the older adepts of science exert on their younger room-mates by appointed lessons of repetition and general superintendence of their studies.

Besides these Fürsten schools there existed, thirty years ago, gymnasias called also *Lycea* or *Gelehrten schulen*, in nearly all the cities, of superior or inferior rank according to the size of the place. But some of them came short of what ought to be the end of a liberal education, and at the same time caused a good deal of trouble to the city-cashier, so that at last government and municipalities agreed in abolishing them. Others that were not sufficiently provided for by city taxes or income of tuition, though indispensable because situated in the principal cities of districts, now received assistance from the government,

and the supply of the necessary teachers. And in such cases, of course, the government took the entire care and released the burgher-master and senators of any sorrow about the costly and glorious institution. These eight gymnasia are open schools without any lodging or boarding for students, who live at home or where they please, and attend school only at the regular recitation-hours. It is evident that a student's life in such a gymnasium, where he depends out of school entirely on his own will, differs essentially from that in a Fürstenschule. Between those two extremes, so far as the dependence or independence of a student is concerned, stand in Saxony two colleges of a peculiar kind, the Thomas school in Leipzig and the Blochmann-Vizthum gymnasium at Dresden, which are half open, half boarding-colleges; consequently, and because of their being situated in large cities, less strict in their disciplinary character than Meissen and Grimma, and more so than the common gymnasia. The Thomas school is partly a classical, partly a musical institution; that is to say, more than half its students form the great vocal choir of Leipzig, celebrated for its performances on Saturdays and Sundays in the Thomas church, and at any time when sacred vocal music is wanted. These alumni, as they are called, have their tuition and board free, and make in the latter part of their college life even some money by their occasional singing. Naturally, only such boys have a chance of being admitted, as are endowed with a good voice and an ear for music. It will be understood, that under such circumstances, the Cantor is a chief officer of the school, almost as important as the Rector, and since the time of the great Bach, the place is hallowed and looked upon as the seat of some musical authority. No one could be surprised, if the one Muse had banished her sisters or kept them down in unworthy dependence; but men like Ernesti, Fischer, Rost, and Stallbaum, at the head of the college, could not but exert the greatest influence among their pupils and keep up the standard of classical learning against any attempt to encroach upon its right. This success was facilitated by the necessity of paying attention to the *Externi*, i. e. Not Alumni, who have nothing to do with any kind of musical training or performing. Some other city-gymnasia have the same institution of alumni-singing in churches and streets, but what is characteristic and of great moment in the Thomas school, is a poor appendage to others, though by itself valuable and sometimes indispensable.

The Blochmann-Vizthum college, combined from a foundation of and for the family of count Vizthum, made in the beginning of the seventeenth century, and from the boarding-school of Dr. Karl Justus Blochmann in 1829, has besides its fifteen or more (Vizthum) free

scholars, (the greater part of whom are poor boys not connected with the family, but according to the will of the founder clothed, fed, and educated as the companions of the young counts, to stimulate them by their zeal and diligence to equal accomplishments),—princes, counts, barons, Americans (during my appointment there, it had two Bostonians,) English, Polish (from the province Posen; Russians and Polish-Russians are not permitted to receive their education in Germany), and other foreigners; in short, it is the aristocratic college of Germany. Although the tuition for lessons and study-hours is one hundred and fifty thalers, while it is, in the other common gymnasium at Dresden but twenty-four thalers, yet the number of day-scholars amounts to about thirty. This institution is remarkable for having three parallel classes, Realgymnasium, the first class of which corresponds with the second of the *humanistic* or proper gymnasium; an experiment which was tried also, some time ago, we know not with what success, in Prussia. The young men in the Realgymnasium, generally, start in after life for some mercantile business or retire to their estates, acquiring beforehand a liberal and noble education, higher than the technical but inferior to the classical. They have an easier work than their hard studying brethren in the neighboring rooms, who contrive to keep themselves on a level with the "Realists" in mathematics, which are taught mostly in combined classes, and have, moreover, the study of Greek and Latin almost exclusively by themselves. The healthy situation of the college, the large and pleasant garden for playing, the arrangements for gymnastics, walking, bathing, etc., the noble society and high standing of the gymnasium, make it desirable for parents as well as for young gentlemen; and our boy, whom we could not help pitying at the entrance of the gloomy cloister school, if he could be transferred to the laughing play-ground in the Blochmann garden, would change his countenance and look gay once more.

Having given a short description of the different kinds of gymnasia in Saxony, before we come to the method of instruction, we beg leave to dwell a few moments on the subject of discipline, which is acknowledged to be as important for the success of teaching and studying as for the moral training in general. After what has been said about the difference of the institutions, and what is generally known about the different influence of the presidents upon the character of their colleges, no one could expect a uniform picture; and a description of those abstract features, which might be pointed out in all, would appear too vague and unsatisfactory. Therefore let us select one, the Virthum college, the director of which, Charles T. Blochmann, is a disciple of Pestalozzi, having been teacher some time in the school of that great

man. All the boarding students, about eighty, are distributed into nine rooms. The occupants of a room are under the special care of one of the teachers, who has generally an adjoining dwelling-room. He is interested in their moral and intellectual welfare, is applied to by the teachers who see anything in their pupils to commend or to blame, and by the parents who wish to hear something about their physical or spiritual health; he gives the allowance of money for buying books, clothes, or whatever they want; briefly, he is the representative of the absent parent, and enjoys usually the respect, confidence, and love of his pupils. They come but occasionally and for a few moments to their room, to get books or something else out of their secretaries, or in stormy days they are allowed to pass a leisure hour there; but the neighboring teacher has no oversight of them, unless he is disturbed in his studies by their noise, and then he gives them to understand, by knocking at the door, that he is at home, which generally suffices to prevent any further interference. The order of the day is exclusively committed to the Inspectors of the day. For every day are two professors entrusted with this responsible office, so that every officer has the ambiguous honor and the tiresome task of sharing with a colleague for one day of the week the command over the whole. On that day he must see that the students rise (at 5 o'clock in the summer, at 6 in the winter), must be present at the first breakfast, superintend the study hours from 5½ A. M. to 8 P. M. (all study in four adjoining class-rooms), lead singing and praying in the chapel, keep order before the lessons begin, ascertain whether all the teachers in the nine classes are present, before he leaves for his recitation or lodging-room, must be in the garden at the time of second breakfast from 9½ to 10½, in stormy days go over the classes and rooms, and so again from 11 or 12 till 3, when the lessons commence again and continue till 4½; and again from 5½ till 8 are study hours, in which he must be everywhere and nowhere, and on Wednesdays and Saturdays he must be the walking or bathing-companion of half the section. At 8 is supper time; at 9, the great mass must go to bed, and only such students of the superior classes as are to be trusted, are permitted to study until 10, when the tired Inspectors take their last round through the bedrooms, to ascertain whether all are asleep or are likely to be in good order, and then, unless something extraordinary has happened during the day, satisfied with themselves and their day's work, they retire to their rooms. Except the day scholars, no pupil is allowed to leave the house to make a social visit without a ticket of permission from his special tutor, signed likewise by the Director, where the time of leaving is mentioned and the statement of the time of arriving and leaving again is expected from the

hand of the visited person.. The Inspector must be shown the notes immediately before leaving and after arriving, that he may know the whereabouts of his subjects, without inquiring any more after the expediency of the permission itself, and ascertain whether the statements of time agree, so that nothing besides the intended visit might have occurred. To be sure, it is hard for a prince or any gentleman of nearly twenty years, to say nothing about the difficulties in the college, to draw out of his pocket a little note and to present it to a gentleman or lady for testifying to his visit and his probity. We confess it is hard. But he who knows the weight of responsibility, does not ask how hard but how necessary it is. The inspectors have an easy work in the Fürstenschulen, which are almost without connection with the small towns, as they never allow any one to leave the college; but in Dresden, where most Blochmann students have either parents or relatives or friends, it is impossible to prevent visiting at least on Sundays, and if allowed, the responsible teachers or friends will gladly submit to the unavoidable arrangement. To infringe this law is scarcely practicable on the part of the students, as the names of all that pass the door are written down by the porter, to be compared with the names of those who went out with the permission of the ruling day-inspector. The history of the cloister-school reports some would-be heroic exploits of such as let themselves down the walls with aid of a rope, to spend an evening in a tea or wine party; but these cases have been, of course, rare, and unallowed exits; may have been even rarer in the Vizthum gymnasium, where the intercourse with the city is made easier. It is, from the special tutors, who have in the little community entrusted to them the right to bind and to loose as far as they think best, that trustworthy students of the higher classes get a dispensation of the above law in particular cases; but the highest disciplinary law, which makes as few exceptions as possible, in order that the rule should appear, not as a kind of moral censure and tyranny, but as the natural precept of general necessity and expediency, is sufficiently respected. — Besides the three or four study hours, under the superintendence of the two inspectors, which are considered sufficient for the necessary preparation and repetition, the students are bound to be in the garden, walking, running, playing, or exercising in some way. It is in this free time, also, that lessons on the piano, in singing, gymnastics, fencing, dancing, and riding, are given. Only the last hour of the evening is allowed to the older students for studying in their rooms. In this respect, the Vizthum gymnasium takes the extreme view, and, for aught we know, the practice of studying in the room, adopted by the other colleges, seems to be generally preferable to that of studying in full classes. But it is the authority of

the older students, on which the practicability and the success of studying in common rooms, without the inspection of quite as many tutors, chiefly depends, and the character of the institution as well as the demand of rational supervision, seem to have been the causes of an arrangement not sufficiently comfortable to make studying the great pleasure of life, as one might experience in the common rooms of the Fürstenschule, or in the private chambers of students in city gymnasia. There is a conference of the twelve chief teachers on Saturdays, the Director being Chairman and the youngest professor Secretary, in which the great events of the week are spoken of and disciplinary measures taken. The private teachers have no access but in cases where they are particularly concerned. Every professor has the right of punishing, and the private teachers may apply for it to the inspector. To make use of that painful right, the teacher as such is but rarely forced, oftener in the quality of inspector, and it will be understood, almost never as special tutor. Corporeal punishment is forbidden. The common penalty is deprivation of one of the meals; the highest is imprisonment. It happens in the Blochmann institution, that to malefactors of inveterate habits flogging is applied, but only to those of the two preparatory classes, and by decree of the conference, and in presence of the Directors. In the common gymnasia, where professors and students meet with each other only in the recitation rooms, there is less chance of transgressing laws, the law of the classroom being but one, and that every moment impressed upon the mind of the would-be-transgressor by the presence of the law-giver and judge, but habitual indolence and laziness will meet with something more than a sermon on diligence, which would be like casting a brilliant pearl before a swine; a few involuntary study-hours for making a Latin ode appeals better and more successfully to the stubborn heart. It is never too late to mend; hence expulsion from the college is and ought to be a rare case, and such a victim has usually gone, before, through the dark hole called *carcer*, which is known to ninety-nine per cent. of the gymnasiasts more by name than by sight. There is, generally speaking, in the German gymnasia, a strict discipline, without any Spartan severity and without Basedow's philanthropical sweetness. Of course, there have been a great many students who never, in their college life, heard a harsh word nor saw a stern look; but others, who are not well prepared, or are inattentive, or noisy, or have written their compositions carelessly, or committed a misdemeanor that comes to the ears of the professors, are generally dealt with in good, plain German, and "without gloves," and a repetition may lead, by a long gradation, or rather degradation, to the hole.—In the common gymnasia, the professors do not interfere

with the private life of the students, unless some charge is brought against them by a citizen, and some of the gymnasiasts enjoy their lives pretty well in their way, quite in contrast with some fellow-students who work hard through half the night, and in contrast also with all the boarding students in Meissen, Grimma and Dresden.

We have mentioned already, that the proper gymnasium comprises four classes, usually with six or eight divisions, and have now to speak of the course preparatory to the reception into the Quarta or fourth class. As to what is required from the little candidate, we might expect perhaps high and full sounding phrases, requiring a thorough knowledge of the Greek and later grammars, just as if a boy were expected to know more when he enters than when he leaves; but, in fact, the claims made upon a new comer are pretty low. A young man that has, besides the common education acquired in the course of six years in all schools, a thorough acquaintance with the declensions and conjugations, and a superficial one with the small number of chief rules of the Latin grammar, some experience in translating easy sentences and some friendly relation to *Μοῦσα* and *τῦπρω*, no doubt will succeed in the examination. But where do they acquire that? Either in a fifth class with two divisions in some gymnasia, or in a progymnasium in others, where a boy may enter without any examination.¹ For such colleges, as have no preparatory classes, boys are prepared in the languages, either in a city-school, where the Latin is taught by one of the teachers in public or private lessons, or, in the country, by a tutor or by the clergyman of the parish. Yet the best of the private teachers do not limit their ambition to getting their pupils into the ranks of the great populace of new-comers, but lower Tertia, or at least Upper Quarta, are the classes to satisfy them, although a clergyman who has successfully prepared his son for the lower Quarta of a Fürstenschule, may feel sufficiently rewarded for his pains. Candidates for higher classes come only from other gymnasia, and are shown their place without much regard to their standing in the school they left, but according to the result of the examination.

The time of a gymnasium life varies with the progress of the student in literary acquirements. There are generally semi-annual transfers from one division to the other, and in very rare cases it might happen that an excellent student would finish his course in four years, remaining in each division but half a year, and on the other hand, a first-

¹ Hegel attended in the fifth year of his age a Latin school in Stuttgart. When seven years old, he went into the gymnasium. But that college had seven classes, and Hegel was eighteen years old when he graduated (1788).

rate idler might stay as long as eight years. Hence, the average number of college years is six. The student, advancing from one class to another, finds there a remaining stock of students superior to himself, if not in talents, at least in acquaintance with the studies and with the professor of the class. After a three months' study and experience the able student may leap over that boundary and put himself on a level with his older companions; and then he will be transferred with them to the next class. It is easier to do so in the inferior classes (lower-gymnasium, IV. and III.), where the order of the students is arranged according to their studies in the class, but in the upper-gymnasium more respect is paid to the time and common order, though some capital scholar will break through, while some sluggard will be left behind. There is, also, a good deal of difference in this respect between the different schools, some having only annual translations, while only a part of the classes are divided; however, the way of advancement is in all the same, except only in the Blochmann gymnasium, where four regular courses of one year and a half each, carry the student in six years through the four undivided classes. This latter arrangement, essentially agreeing with the usage in the American colleges, needs no further explanation, but the common German method of advancing without definite courses is worthy of some consideration.

It seems to me, that this question has both a literary and a moral aspect. In respect to the former, the chief objection will be, that thus the instructors themselves are prevented from taking a regular course in teaching the literary branches, or that one part of the students are always subjected to a tiresome repetition. In regard to the other, the objection is that the spirit of emulation is nourished too much, and will be likely to destroy the good fruits of education. The best and only answer to the first objection, as it seems to me, is that the German colleges are essentially classical institutions. Every one will bear in mind, that classic education is a building up, as it were, of atoms moving in the chaos of the human mind in a centrifugal as well as centripetal manner, and that it is not so much the object to construct in it a splendid palace as to make the active mind a comfortable house for noble ideas and sound learning. Leaning upon the literary products of a great mind, the instructor has the freest scope, in dwelling on new ideas, pointing out the new forms of old ones, construing unknown laws of language, and exhibiting those, which are known already, in a new point of view. It will appear thus far, that the supposed disadvantage vanishes or turns out to be an advantage. The teacher may go on in his author where he left off the last term, or commence a new book, nor will the elder students have a repetition, nor the new comers a

task beyond their reach ; nor is the teacher's mind allowed to stagnate, the desire of making the same food palatable for somewhat different appetites cannot fail to bring forth a greater variety, and this improves the character of the instruction itself.

As to the moral aspect, no answer is likely to satisfy him who does not consider ambition as an honest stimulus to education, nor him who, more indulgent, finds however in the German custom the way paved to the most dangerous emulation. There is a good deal of wisdom in Johnson's defence of the rod, when he says : " I would rather have the rod to be the general terror to all, to make them learn, than tell a child, if you do thus or thus, you will be more esteemed than your brothers and sisters. The rod produces an effect, which terminates in itself ; a child is afraid of being whipped, and gets his task and there is an end on it ; whereas by exciting emulation and comparisons of superiority, you lay the foundation of lasting mischief ; you make brothers and sisters hate each other." But with the same right that Johnson in another passage of his conversation, and Goldsmith also, who call fear the only passion to conquer a child's natural laziness, we find the main spring of the education of the young in hope. Take the best student and ask him what it is that animates him so powerfully in his studies, whether love to his parents, or attachment to his teachers, or his interest in the sciences, he will sincerely answer, no ; there is some influence from each of these sources, uniting with the general feeling of duty, but it is hope, more or less definite, call it even ambition, which gives life and vitality to my moral existence. He hopes for moral and earthly happiness, to flow from his present exertions, and derives from it a good deal of happiness for his present state. But how is he able to measure his exertions and his accomplishments ? Only by comparison with others. If he be behind some of them, shall he not endeavor to equal them ? And how can a few instances of perversion of the principle be an offset to so many instances that lead to love, wisdom, and every kind of virtue ? To take away the entire influence of ambition from the work of education, is neither wise nor practicable. It inverts the natural order of things, regarding those as angels who are growing daily in flesh and blood, and forgetting that without the encouragement of ambition, an entire science or art may degenerate or fade away. Well ; but the ambition must not be too much encouraged. We acquiesce. " The difference is too nice, where ends the virtue and begins the vice." Let us bear in mind, that the pupil is gaining at the same time more and more of moral ground, when he runs the risk of losing it by undue excitement ; secondly, that external arrangements of that kind, to which all more or less willingly submit as to an old custom, exhibit much more of the

beneficial than of the dangerous, the danger coming only from the manner in which the pupil is managed by the teachers; 'thirdly, that some allowance must be made for a few incompetent teachers, while the greater part, if qualified to give their pupils sound instruction, must be looked upon as sensible of the dangers of emulation, and capable of preventing them; lastly, that the school is not only the forerunner of public society, but also its image, the more true and instructive, the better the great features of human society are reflected. And as nobody would condemn society because it forces to emulation, or attack the notion of honor because it leads sometimes to pernicious ambition, so every one understands that the scholar-community has and must have the same elements, not only for immediate use, but to be regulated for after life. Now, since we cannot do without an incentive to nourish the hope on which the diligent student feeds, we believe that it is the most innocent way, after all, to give the students a chance of shortening their college life. It takes off a good deal of that vain ambition, which covets public show and originates from it, while it leads the stream of juvenile desire between its natural banks forward to the wide ocean. The diligent student does not envy his more able comrade for his petty honors before the eyes of the class or a few strangers, satisfied that he cannot stop him in his course; hand in hand they arrive at the great harbor, the University, where they perhaps float around different islands, until they lose sight of each other by mingling with the waves of the world.

But how is it with the sciences, which require a better regulated and more progressive course of teaching? They now fare pretty well, though some of them had rather a rough passage in former times. We allude especially to the mathematics. In some gymnasia the wind blew from two opposite directions; from the students, who were chiefly engaged in their classical studies, and from the teachers who contrived to kindle that blaze of attachment. And the professor of mathematics was not always the best pilot, or, if he was, he became at last exhausted by want of encouragement. The modern age has done a good deal in this respect, not only for erecting technical schools and other institutions of mathematical character for business men, but also for improving generally the study of mathematics in the gymnasia. We should think that the average amount of mathematical learning might not fall short of what Dr. Watts in his treatise on the Mind requires from a young man preparing himself for one of the three learned professions. History flourishes in the German colleges to a high degree, not only the history of ancient Greece and Rome learned by reading the various authors, but also the universal history of the civilized world. The

professor of history may be sure to have an attentive class, eager to hear of old German liberty beside the Roman despotism, of the Teutonic race conquering the Roman Europe, first running wild in their bravery, then grafting Christian civilization on the healthy stems of the great empire under Charles the Great, or Charlemagne, and under the Hohenstaufen, of the Franks and Normanns in Gallia, of the Saxons and Angles in Britain, of the Longobards in Italy, of the sea-power of the Northmen, of the free cities of the Middle Ages, of the Reformation, and of the American Revolution. In history and mathematics generally, the divisions of a class are united. However, we understand that in those gymnasia where semi-annual transfers are in use, the teacher of mathematics may have a good deal of trouble, whereas history may be taught in short periods, and easily made intelligible to any one by brief introductions or some private study. We pass by geography, natural history and philosophy, which have only a short life in the lowest or highest classes.

The circumstance, that mathematics and history are usually taught by one professor each, facilitates somewhat the teaching, as it at least gives free scope to the professor to make his arrangements as he pleases, while the Greek and Latin are mostly taught by class-teachers. The average number of teachers is eight, five or six of them called professors in some gymnasia, upper-teachers in others; or according to their rank Rector or Director, Prorector or Rector, Collega III (Tertius), Collega IV (Quartus), etc., and two or three Adjuncti or Collaboratores. Each one of them has his respective class, with several lessons in the adjoining classes. It will be understood that this matter depends on the agreement of the conference, and that the colleges, therefore, differ from each other in this respect, sometimes considerably. But to a certain degree it exists even in the Blochmann College, where there is no difference of rank among the professors, and the teachers are appointed not for classes but their respective branches. However, there being four teachers of ancient languages, they have each, besides teaching in all, one class in which they have their chief work. What! four and more teachers, only to instruct in the ancient languages? Yes, and all these have their good week's work. And the ancient languages are not only equally taught throughout the whole college, but even to a greater extent in the highest classes. Besides, an American student has only three recitations a day, a German at least five lessons; hence it is obvious that a greater number of teachers is wanted in German than in American schools.

We have arrived now at an important point of difference. It lies in the character of recitations and lessons. In Germany the student

prepares for the lesson ; here the student prepares by learning the lesson. In Germany he receives his entire lesson from the teacher ; here he recites his lesson to the teacher. There he repeats his lesson at home ; here he repeats it before the teacher. Briefly, there he learns almost everything from the teachers ; here he learns the greater part from his books. We hope not to be misunderstood ; it is the construction of the machine, not the managing of it, which we have drawn here in sharp lines ; too sharp, indeed, to be entirely correct, as it is the case with all distinctions of that kind, and yet evidently characteristic. Generally speaking, an American student has for preparing his lesson double the time of the recitation hour ; a German but half the time ; besides that, private study being supposed and required as well there as here. Here the class or lesson-book is the fireman who makes the steam power, and the teacher the engineer who makes it run. There the teacher is both fireman and engineer, and the student needs to do no more than remember his last trip, and bring a supply of fuel for his further progress. Hence the greater number of lessons and teachers. It follows, likewise, that a German student usually has his pen in hand to make notes for recording and repeating, and on the other hand that the professor has the most unlimited liberty in teaching what and how he pleases. There is naturally a great deal of danger in that, but a method prescribed to the teacher in spite of his will, disposition or capacity, would bear even more bitter fruits than a method of his own choice, though it were not the best. Yet he is not free in choosing the author, at least so far as he might interfere with other classes, or transgress the established rule of the college on account of the successive order to be observed. That order, adopted by most of them according to the agreement of the most competent judges, is generally the following :

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| IV. Cornelius Nepos (Phaedrus). | IV Jacob's Reader. |
| III. Caesar. Ovid's <i>Metamorphoses</i> ,
(<i>Tristia</i>). | III. Xenophon. Lucian. <i>Odyssey</i> . |
| II. Cicero's Orations, or Cato and Laelius. Sallust or Livy. Virgil. | II. Herodotus. Plutarch. Plato's <i>Critias</i> or <i>Io</i> . <i>Iliad</i> . |
| I. Cicero's Rhetoric or Philos. Tacitus. Horace. | I. Thucydides. Demosthenes. Plato. (Euripides). Sophocles. |

In establishing this order, not only the respective acquirements in the languages, but also the degree of judgment and taste have been taken into due consideration. It is not impossible to read, instead of Ovid, Horace's *Epistles*, since grammar, lexicon and teacher will make all passages some way or other intelligible, but the difficulties of the

language will trouble the young reader of fifteen or sixteen so much as to make him laugh in hearing of the nice elegancies of diction. And for what all this? to hear a sermon of old Roman wisdom, for which he has neither sense nor ear. Whereas, there is easier access to Ovid, where a world of wonderful gods and heroes is changing before his eyes, and introducing him into the fabulous heaven of the ancients. He enjoys the contents, because he can have them without too great efforts; and he gets interested in the form, because it presents to him a pleasant diorama. Only where this balance is strictly regarded, there is great progress and real success to be hoped for. In case, however, that the balance is disturbed beforehand, and young men are farther advanced in their general knowledge than in the languages, it might seem preferable to read easy language with trifling contents, rather than not to understand in a fine poem the words or thoughts. In the Greek literature there is a good help for every capacity, old Homer, Peter Parley and Milton in one person, and the eternal source of Greek scholarship. In the Latin, Caesar and Cicero, the great masters of style, are likely to satisfy juvenile curiosity and the most scrupulous taste. Yet the choice of the author is something, but not every thing.

We proceed now to speak of the method of teaching the ancient languages. We hope to have removed already the expectation of uniformity in external as well as internal things, concerning the German method, and we shall be allowed to be brief in speaking on a subject, varying in every teacher's mind and mouth perhaps every year. The two different methods of reading the classics, the thorough and the cursory, and the third running between them, are promiscuously used. Let us compare the first with the artillery, the second with the cavalry, and the third with the infantry, as the head, the feet, and the large body of the army. The first is a heavy, cumbersome mass, moving slowly yet reaching far, and the only means to make a fortress surrender. It requires both learning and skill, and, if well directed, it breaks the battle-array of the enemies. So the first method is the chief instrument for making the pupil master of the classical field. It may appear tedious to stay long on the same spot, where the prospect invites to proceed, but the present place must be wholly conquered with all its environs, while the charms of the view around, the safety from an attack of enemies in the rear, and the consciousness of a sure and safe progress, will conquer the worst enemy, the vagrant laziness of mind. No grammatical point, which is not entirely subdued, is to be passed by, no beauty of style to be overlooked, no nicety of thought to be slighted. It is true, not a little learning and taste is required from the

officer, to make it interesting and useful ; for how can he make others at home where he himself is a stranger ? Or how may he avoid the danger of dwelling long on those points with which he has been made acquainted just before, and of caring little about those which did not attract his special attention, as already known to him superficially ? Instances of abuse have not been rare in Germany. Some dictated all the later notes of the best commentators ; perhaps one whole page to explain a single verse, and added at last their own judgment ; others made the foreign wisdom their own, indeed, but it was not well digested, it could not inspire much interest in classical learning. Still, notwithstanding all this, the danger was not so great as one might imagine, there being a variety of classical teachers in every gymnasium, who hold one another in check, or rather who supply the deficiencies of each other. Thus it happens even, that their foibles turn out as so many advantages for the student.

The cursory method we have compared with the cavalry. It is good to reconnoitre the battle-field, to take possession of open places, and to destroy the enemy, when he is put to flight. No one should expect more from cursory reading. On the whole, it is not often used in the German colleges, because it contains not much of educational element, either for character or for learning. However, we think it the best way to let it precede, and follow the first method. It acquaints the pupil somewhat with the language and tone of the writer, and thereby makes the following more thorough reading easier and more interesting. Here the professor must carry the student over the fences and ditches. It should follow not only that the pupil may enjoy the reading of a larger piece of poetry or prose, and excite lasting attachment to the author, but that it may throw light upon the past subjects, make suggestions better understood and confirm the knowledge of language and style by silent repetition. Here the student must carry the professor, who, however, will make a wise use of bridle and spur. Rapidity of mind and elegance of taste are the chief requisites for giving to the third method of reading the right turn and the best success. Everything good lies between extremes. Most teachers are common foot soldiers, neither laden with learning nor rapid in tasteful perception ; neither fond of standing too long, nor of running too quickly, but they go duly on, as they are commanded by learning or custom. In modern times much has been done towards improving the method by uniting the obvious advantages of the thorough and cursory plan, in order to read more of the author without losing the right understanding and the acquisition of the language. So much is certain, that the abuses of the first method have been greatly diminished, and that

a fresher air blows through the schools. It remains only to hope, that what has been and may be accomplished by a judicious application of that method, will never be wholly lost sight of; thorough scholarship, to say nothing of the moral point, is not likely to be acquired by superficial reading and half-way explaining. It is not alone for reading Roman and Greek writers, but for learning the languages themselves, and for becoming acquainted with the moral and public character of the old Greeks and Romans, that the classics are studied, and even the knowledge of all this as such seems a trifle in comparison with the great intellectual and moral education, to be acquired by the very study itself. Still, *manum de tabula!*

For "author-lessons," a student is required to know all the necessary words and be able in some degree to translate the following chapter. Four or five perhaps get parts of it for translating. This being done, the teacher commences explaining by asking whatever the character of the passage and the standing of the students allow. In the lower gymnasium the Latin prose is used for repeating and applying the rules spoken of in the Syntax lessons; in the upper gymnasium grammatical remarks occur seldom, more frequently rhetorical, aesthetical and historical ones. Etymology is never lost sight of, but it is confined to Latin and Greek stems. The students are expected to make notes, to read them over at home, and are sometimes directed to learn the passages that have been read, by heart.

The editions of the classics used in the lessons are commonly without notes, and the use of such, as have all somewhat difficult passages explained is forbidden during the lesson-time. A good teacher keeps the whole class alive chiefly by questioning, and only when nobody has found the right or could find it, he formally begins to instruct. For, although the professor is the only source of instruction, the character of classical teaching is such, that it may be easily interwoven with any kind of examination, and few questions, proposed by an experienced and skilful teacher, will be so difficult as not to find among the many youths of different acquirements and abilities, at least one who could give a satisfactory answer. We mean an answer that gives a part of the point in question, and leads successively to the full explanation, which afterwards the professor in a few words recapitulates. But however correct the single remarks may be, that instruction only deserves to be called skilful and elegant, where every following question seems to originate from the preceding, and the whole series of remarks appears to be more or less internally connected.

In *Prima*, criticism is practised to some extent, and, we believe, not unsuccessfully. To be sure to discern hair-breadth philological nice-

ties, or to judge of the genuineness of a passage or a single word, belongs to the sphere of the professional study of philology; yet not only to give the result with some suggestions about the foregoing researches, but also to lay before the seniors such critical points to be decided as are not beyond the reach of their learning, will undoubtedly strengthen the power and acuteness of judgment in an interesting and profitable manner. But the judgment of the professor himself respecting the choice of the critical point of discussion, and the manner in which it is managed, are in the department of education, where method is everything, the chief point to be inquired after. That young men of about twenty years acquainted with language and literature, are qualified to play sometimes the part of critics, is evident, and they ought to be practised in it.

There will be more doubt about the utility of *speaking Latin* in *Prima* and partly in *Secunda*. Of course, the authors are translated into German, but generally explained in Latin. Besides, there is one hour a week set apart in some colleges for Latin conversation. It is true that the students become more familiar with the language in many respects, but the correctness of language and elegance of style are not always much improved by it. Agreeable as that acquirement is, and even necessary as yet for the students to understand the Latin lectures in the university, it is to be considered as subordinate to the achievement of a correct style, and only when the speaking is well balanced by continual exercises in writing, will it exert a great and wholesome influence, and become an essential part of the classical discipline of mind.

The exercises in *writing Latin* are duly appreciated in the German colleges. In *Quarta* and *Lower Tertia*, where the syntax is accurately reviewed in three or four hours a week, short exercises, suitable to fix the learned rules by application, are made during and between the lessons. A translation-book, not unlike the English Arnold with rules, is often used besides Zampi's grammar, but the right understanding and the best exercises come from the teacher. In *Upper Tertia* and *Lower Secunda* the German text for translation is prepared by the teachers, in which some care is taken of the weekly reading and of the still fluctuating grammatical precepts. But in *Upper Secunda* and *Prima*, at least for two years, the Latin exercises are *free compositions* on a given theme. They are not always weekly, but half-monthly and monthly, in order to allow a longer time to larger compositions of six to ten pages, while the review of the same is going on usually two hours a week. These free exercises are not only an important, but also a pleasant task to the advanced scholar, who is beyond the reach

of a grammatical blunder, in the possession of all the necessary words, and fond of moving freely in imitating what he has read and in expressing what he thinks best. And only to him they are useful to whom they are easy. Another help for writing Latin are the "*Ex-temporalia*," in which the students, as the name indicates, is obliged to write immediately down in Latin what they are told in German. This quiet combination and exchange of the two languages promotes greatly the faculty of thinking in Latin, necessary to speaking and writing. In one gymnasium we noticed the usage of spending in Prima one hour of the week in making a brief composition on a given subject, read in Cicero or spoken of during the week. The short time does not allow deep reflection, still, it is long enough to the eager student, to make a few periods chiefly with regard to the form, and to apply some elegancies of style remembered from the last Cicero-lesson. It is a matter of course, that free compositions in the German are made besides, and that they rank quite as high.

The teaching of the *Greek* reveals naturally a somewhat different character, as no reproduction either for speaking or for writing is intended. There is some writing in and for the grammar-lessons throughout all classes (*Rost and Wüstemann's Exercises* are much used), but it is easily perceived that the writing is by-work, and tends only to make authors and language better understood. Thus it happens that a young man who reads Homer without wanting the aid of a lexicon, is sometimes in some perplexity to find a common Greek word, if asked in German. And the Greek is not the worse for it, provided that on the one hand is gained, what on the other is lost. It may be supposed, however, that the philologist in the university is so well acquainted with the language by reading and explaining Greek writers, that he will be able to write and even to speak Greek tolerably, if compelled to do so.

In order to understand and enjoy poetry, one hour is appointed in every class for prosody and metre. The student of Tertia who commences reading Ovid, is prepared for it by a long practice of the rules of prosody and of the laws of the hexameter disticha. In Secunda it is required of the student to make free verses, hexameters or disticha. Having been introduced into the variegated world of lyrical forms, and enabled to read and appreciate the odes of Horace, the "Primer" makes little poems of whatever metre, heroic, lyric or dramatic. We hold these lessons and exercises to be very useful, not only to get a correct idea of the poetical but also of the general rhythmical laws of the languages, without which a nice understanding of prose as well as of poetry is next to impossible. There is not more talent required

to make a short poem, whatever its poetical worth may be, than to understand good poetry; and after much reading and exercise it will be even an easy task to write, if not in self-made thoughts, at least in the adopted language of poetry. And many a would-be-poet did not more. Hear Schiller's epigram:

Weil ihm ein Vers gelingt in einer gebildeten Sprache,
Die für ihn dichtet und denkt, glaubt er ein Dichter zu sein!

But it is neither necessary to be a poet, nor to have the vain fancy of being one; however, to know the metrical laws and to practise them, is in the same degree desirable to a scholar, as it is the requisite of a well-bred gentleman to understand poetry.

Let us add a few words in regard to private studies. Our readers will have rightly inferred from the large number of lessons, that a German gymnasiast has plenty of work in order to do his public task conscientiously, and very little time left for fancy-studying, provided that he takes a sufficient time for meals, rest and exercise. On the other hand, it is obvious, that not all the authors mentioned above can be read. Yet some acquaintance with all of them is required, and the view is generally taken by the professors, that the reading which cannot be done in the lessons ought to be supplied at home. The student, therefore, must work pretty hard to be well prepared for the lessons, to have his weekly exercises, as German and Latin compositions, Greek, metrical and mathematical lessons, exactly studied, and to give, as it is required in some colleges, every month a good account of his private studies. There he presents extracts of an author with compositions of any kind he pleases, in prose or poetry; and where no such account is given publicly, private studies of the same sort are nevertheless expected. Besides the morning and night hours, the free afternoons of Wednesday and Saturday afford a longer series of study-hours. There are in the whole about eight weeks, vacation. The results of the home-studies are, of course, soon perceived by teacher and pupil, and the loss of time is doubly compensated by the rapid progress and by the ability to make the best exercises in the shortest time. Still, we do not mean merely free and independent reading and working, but chiefly the free spirit of diligence used independently of the necessities of school, yet in doing the school-work. Then the instruction of the professor and his suggestions, as well as his corrections, do safely conduct the student through the classical paradise.

The boy of fourteen is now a young gentleman of twenty years. Having made his lawful run, and having the permission of the professors to graduate, he must bite a sour apple and get examined. This

"examen maturitatis" is somewhat more difficult and more important than the usual semi-annual or annual examinations, for it will declare him prepared for independent and professional studies, and also decide on the degree of his maturity ("imprimis," "omnis," "satis," dignus). Commonly one or two delegates of the country are present to preside, sometimes to examine themselves (in Berlin, Hegel examined the "*Arbiturienten*" in philosophy). Still, if the student has entered upon that last part of the examination, he may be certain of success, since those who have not satisfied by their compositions written previously, are commonly by a friendly hint prevented from exposing themselves to a useless display. To each composition one day is allowed. Sometimes students of other gymnasia come to be examined, in order to get their certificates or diplomas from a college of their State, after they have been educated in another State. Such have a harder work to get through, unless they are prepared like that student, who, being asked what authors he had read particularly, confidently answered, "I have read them all." Of course, he was about to study philology, and thus we hope, he read the remainder afterwards. With some allowance, we hope there are some like him. All however have laid a good foundation for any kind of scholarship, are likely to read with ease the New Testament (such as are to be theologians are taught the Hebrew in *Prima*), the *Corpus Juris* and *Celsus*, can understand a Latin lecture or oration, and retain so much during their professional life in the university, as to be able generally to speak Latin after three years, in the theological, juridical or medical examinations.

Alexander Humboldt in his "*Kosmos*," calls it a judicious remark, "that we in spite of the great telescopes know more about the interior than about the exterior of the stars." Not half so judicious, we know, nor likely to meet with much acknowledgment, will be our remark, that in many respects the same seems to be the case here with the star of German philology. All know its light, weight and productivity, but few know its physical condition and growth. We shall be happy if we have succeeded in acquainting a larger number with the organization of the German colleges or gymnasia.

The classical education, as common to all scholars, is here closed. But for those who intend devoting their lives to classical learning and teaching, the philological training continues in the universities. These professional institutions, especially with regard to philology, will be described in another article.

Table of Lessons in the Blochmann-Vitzthum College (1840) at Dresden.

IV.

	H.		H.		H.
1. Religion	3	C. German	2	5. Natural Hist.	1
2. Languages :		D. French	3	6. Geography	2
A. Greek	6	3. Mathematics :		7. Drawing	2
B. Latin		(a) Algebra	1	8. Singing	2
(a) Cornelius Nep.	4	(b) Arithmetic	1	9. Gymnastics	2
(b) Grammar	3	(c) Geometry	2	10. Dancing	2
(c) Prosody	1	4. History	3		<u>40</u>

III.

1. Religion	2	(c) Grammar	4	5. Natural Hist.	1
2. Languages :		(d) Prosody	1	6. Geography	2
A. Greek,		C. German	2	7. Drawing	1
(a) Homer	2	D. French	3	8. Singing	2
(b) Lucian	2	3. Mathematics :		9. Gymnastics	2
(c) Grammar	2	(a) Algebra	1	10. Dancing	1
B. Latin,		(b) Arithmetic	1		—
(a) Caesar	4	(c) Geometry	2		<u>40</u>
(b) Ovid	2	4. History	3		

II.

1. Religion	2	(b) Cicero	2	(a) Algebra	1
2. Languages :		(c) Sallust	2	(b) Arithmetic	1
A. Greek,		(d) Grammar	3	(c) Trigonometry	2
(a) Iliad	2	(e) Prosody	1	4. History	2
(b) Herodotus	2	C. German	2	5. Natural Hist.	2
(c) Grammar	3	D. French	3	6. Gymnastics	2
B. Latin,		E. English	2	7. Singing	2
(a) Virgil	2	3. Mathematics :		8. Dancing	2
					<u>40</u>

I.

1. Religion	2	B. Latin,		E. English	2
2. Languages :		(a) Tacitus	2	3. Mathematics :	
A. Greek,		(b) Cicero, phil. curs.	1	(a) Stereometry	2
(a) A) Sophocles	} 2	A) Cic. philos.	} 2	(b) Higher proport.	2
B) Euripides		B) Cic. epis.		4. History	2
(b) A) Thucydides	} 2	(c) Horace	2	5. Natural phil.	2
B) Demosthen.		(d) Exercises	2	6. Gymnastics	2
(c) Homer curs.	1	(e) Latin speak.	1	7. Singing	2
(d) Exercises	1	C. German lit.	3	8. Dancing	2
(e) Greek Antiquit.	1	D. French	2		<u>40</u>

<i>Progymnasium.</i>					
	II.	I.		II.	I.
Religion	4	"	Bot., Zool., Min.,	2	"
Latin	6	9	Drawing	2	"
German	3	"	Calligraphy	2	"
French	4	"	Gymnastics	3	2
Arithmetic	3	"		—	Singing 2
Geography	2	"		34	—
					38

ARTICLE VI.

COLLEGE EDUCATION.

By Prof. W. G. T. Shedd, University of Vermont.

THE general and growing interest in the subject of education is one of the most hopeful features of the present age. Throughout the country the popular mind is becoming increasingly awake to the importance of knowledge, and the nation as a body is coming to regard Education as one of the great natural interests. Already is it provided for and protected, as commerce, and manufactures, and agriculture are provided for; and the number is already large who clearly see and feel that it is of more importance and exerts a far greater influence upon the perpetuity of the Republic than any or all of the economical interests united.

There is, however, one characteristic attending this general interest upon the subject of Education which cannot but strike the eye of a thoughtful observer. It is a characteristic which, as history shows, invariably attends the movement of the popular mind in proportion as it becomes more extensive and far-reaching, and one that is deleterious in its influence if it does not find its counterpart and corrective.

We refer to the tendency to *popularize* knowledge in an excessive and injurious degree. By this is not meant the disposition to diffuse knowledge among the greatest number possible, but the disposition to render all knowledge superficial and *in this form* to diffuse it through society. If we mistake not, there are signs of a disposition to destroy the distinction between popular and scientific knowledge, and while en-

gaged in the laudable effort to spread information as widely as possible among all classes, to do it at the expense of that profound and scientific culture which must exist *somewhere*, in *some* portion of the community at least, in order to the perpetuity and vitality of even the common information of society.

There is no surer way of correcting this and kindred errors, than by establishing and diffusing profound and comprehensive views respecting the whole subject and the subject as a whole. It is a defective view of knowledge *as a whole*, an incomplete view of the *system* of education which lies at the bottom of the error in question. It is forgotten that the body of knowledge which is sought to be diffused is an organization with central and superficial parts, and that the complete system of instruction which proposes to impart this knowledge is an *organized system*, of which no better definition can be given than that all its parts are vitally connected and are reciprocally means and ends. Popular knowledge therefore cannot be diffused separated from scientific knowledge, and this latter again requires to pass through the tests of popularization in order that it may be proved to have a real and not imaginary existence, in order that it may be seen to be one with truth and absolute existence, and not the mere figment of the brain.

It will be our object in this article to distinctly mark the difference between scientific and popular knowledge, and to show the necessity and worth of those institutions whose office it is to impart scientific in distinction from popular education.

Knowledge traced to its ultimate is in the form of fundamental truths. These fundamental truths or first principles as applied to particular cases or run out to meet the ordinary wants of mankind lose their scientific and profound appearance, become popular in their character, useful in their results and go to constitute the common every-day knowledge of society. The gold originally in the form of heavy bullion has become, comparatively, light coin and a useful circulating medium.

There is, for example, an amount of information diffused through society which is sufficient for the practical purposes of commerce, manufactures and agriculture, and by virtue of the common intelligence in these departments the ship sails swiftly, the machine works well, and the earth brings forth abundantly. But it is not expected, and under the present arrangements of society perhaps it is not rational to expect, that all who work in these spheres should possess a thorough knowledge of those *principles of natural science* — those first truths of astronomy, and chemistry, and mechanics, and mathematics — which lie under all this action of man and yet this body of principles, the *science* which is

beneath this practice and practical application is essential knowledge sustaining the same relation to all the arts, manufactures, and improvements, all the comforts and elegancies of civilization that the flowers and fruit of the tree sustain to the black root underground. And upon the preservation and further development of these fundamental truths depend the permanence of the present civilization and its progressive improvement.

Again there is in the midst of the people an amount of information with respect to legal and civil affairs sufficient to make them careful of their personal rights and watchful over the acts and intentions of government. No people on the face of the globe are so well informed in all that pertains to judicial and civil matters as the people of the United States. An appeal to reason and law always goes home to the mind of the mass and produces a deep and great movement as it could not if we were an uninformed and barbarous population. Still it will not do to say that this knowledge though adequate for all the wants of common life, is equal in degree and depth to that which is implied in a thorough understanding of the *sciences* of Law and Government. It will not do to say that the great body of us are possessed of such a clear and deep insight into the first principles of legal and political philosophy as characterized the framers of the Constitution of the United States. And we do tacitly (but in a free and man-like way) acknowledge this when, in order to form or revise a code of laws or a constitution, we meet and choose the wisest and most thoughtful of our number to do this important work — a work which requires a more than ordinary and popular acquaintance with law and legislation.

Again in this Christian land there is an amount of knowledge concerning God and the eternal world, the soul of man and its obligations which is enough to bring in every man guilty before his Judge, and enough if rightly improved to bring about right relation between man and God. But besides this common knowledge upon moral and religious subjects there is a *science* of morals and religion for the study and exposition of which we are willing to sustain a particular class of men in the midst of us. It is because we wish to have our ordinary knowledge upon these highest of subjects made still more clear and vivid, and efficacious that we listen every Sabbath to one whose business it is to investigate and expound the *principles* of the word of God.

Thus it is apparent that when we go below the surface and get at knowledge in its solidity and substance we find it in the form of principles — we find it Science. Below all the manifold *uses* and *applications* of knowledge as they appear in the ordinary life of men there lies the great deposit of primary truth — inexhaustible in itself and

ever yielding new treasures to the educated and thoughtful mind. *Now with this lower region of truth mankind must have communication or their course is backward in all respects.* New inventions in the arts soon become old and pass out of use — what at first were striking facts soon lose their novelty — the old modes of presenting those truths which from their very nature are the same yesterday, to-day and forever, become wearisome — in fine the floating information of a community is soon worn out and becomes powerless *unless from the region of principles there is constantly coming off upon it, an invigorating influence* — unless the ingenious mind of a Watt or a Fulton now and then startles society and forms a new era in its civilization by a wonderful application of an old but buried principle of natural philosophy — unless the thoughtful mind of a Newton pours through old science the light and life of a new principle which to the end of time is to influence this domain of knowledge with as steady and extensive power as that of gravitation itself — unless the “mighty and passionate spirit” of a Luther awakens the religious consciousness of all Europe to the recognition of that great *primal truth* of Christianity on which man’s eternal life hangs.

Having said thus much upon knowledge in its scientific and in its practical form and of the right relation of the latter to the former, we proceed to speak of *colleges as the institutions for keeping up this right relation — as the instrumentality whereby science and practice are kept connected and made to interpenetrate each other to their mutual benefit, and to the growth of mankind in knowledge.*

I. One way whereby colleges do this is by not suffering the distinction between scientific and practical knowledge to be lost sight of, and by keeping in existence an education which is based upon the study of first principles.

It is the aim of the higher institutions of learning to give what is called a “liberal” education — i. e. one which is distinguished from that given in common schools by being more extensive and more profound. The lower institutions of learning take the mind in the earlier period of its existence when it is best fitted for the obtainment of all that part of knowledge which is gained by the memory, while the college receives it at the beginning of that period when its powers commence their maturity, and it is prepared to get that knowledge of principles of which we have spoken, which comes from reflection. In the theory of education adopted by our wise forefathers, and (as history shows it) by all wise founders of commonwealths, the future citizen is to be surrendered to the primary school during the years of boyhood when the imagination and memory are active that he may learn to read and write, and

may acquire all that knowledge of geography and arithmetic, and history which is fitted for his years and which will be useful in the transaction of the ordinary business of after life. When the higher faculties begin to dawn and the years of reflection are coming in, he is then to be transferred to an institution which will guide him into the paths of science and introduce him into that world of principles from which he is to derive, if he ever does, high moral and intellectual power, and make himself a strong man among men. Colleges and Common Schools are therefore not to be opposed to each other. Each has its own proper work to do. The one cannot do the work of the other, and even if it could, yet boyhood cannot receive the instruction of opening manhood, and calm and reflective manhood craves a more profound learning than that which satisfies inquisitive and acquisitive boyhood. The two are not independent of each other like two different machines, but are living members of the same body, and therefore the one cannot say to the other, "I have no need of thee," nor can the other say to the one, "I have no need of thee."

Colleges are thus a standing evidence of the validity of the distinction between scientific and practical knowledge. Their aim is to give an education which will develop the *mind itself*, irrespective (for the time being) of the *uses* which may be made of learning, knowing that if there only be produced within the youth the *power* to work, the occasions and the incitements to exercise it will not be wanting in a world that is full of work. And they do this not so much by imparting an amount of separate facts of which immediate use may be made, as by awakening the mind of the young man to the recognition of first truths in the various departments of learning. It cannot be too carefully remembered that a collegiate, or liberal education, differs from what is called a common education by its having more than the latter can, the *powers* of the individual — the *mind itself* in its eye. Its object is not mainly to furnish the mind with enough to meet daily wants, but to fill it with power and to ground it in principles as a reserved fund upon which to draw at any time and during all time. It is a mistake to suppose that that only is useful knowledge of which an immediate and palpable use can be made in the acquisition of wealth, or in providing for the daily wants of the body. This is indeed useful, but it is not enough for all the exigencies of this life even, and it surely is not enough for those of the life to come. When revolutions in human affairs break out, when States are to be founded, when institutions that are to affect the progress of the race are to be established, when laws are to be made — when in short the primary and foundation-work depending upon primary and fundamental truths is to be done, then the liberal education shows itself

to be the useful education. In these trying times the reserved fund of mental power and clear intuition of principles may be drawn upon and its untold worth be seen in the origination of a great instrument like the American Constitution, or in the start of a great idea like that of popular liberty which is to work through masses of men with superhuman power.¹

We say then that if the distinction between the knowledge of principles and the knowledge of facts is an important one, the preservation of the distinction and the foundation of a particular sort of education upon it are still more important. Moreover, unless the current information of society is kept moving and alive by the presence and the power of a system of liberal education, and by those who are yearly coming out fresh from the contact with science and principles, it speedily diminishes in amount, and loses the vitality it once possessed, and society sinks down into barbarism. The reign of barbarism began in Greece when the liberal education of its young men fell into the hands of the sophists who substituted the denial and disputation of first principles for that clear and profound enunciation of them which characterized an elder day. When this class of public teachers appeared there was a great amount of useful knowledge current in Grecian society, but it soon betrayed the lack of that vigor which arises from the diffusion of correct principles in politics and morals and which had kept it fresh and healthy, and not many years elapsed before this whole mass of current and common information was found to be utterly powerless towards the preservation and glory of the State when threatened by Philip, and crumbled away like some noble shaft that has been struck with the sap-rot.

Neither let it be supposed that by making and preserving the distinction between a common and a liberal education any injury is done to useful and practical knowledge. It is only by the maintenance and widest possible diffusion of scientific learning, that this common everyday knowledge arises and is current; for the common information of society is nothing more nor less than the fine and diffusive radiance of a more substantial and profound culture. This light, spreading and penetrating in all directions, is an effluence from a ball of solid fire. All this general and practical information which distinguishes an enlightened from a savage, or (though civilized yet) ignorant state of society —

¹ For some excellent thoughts upon the relation of scientific to popular knowledge, see an article upon Theology by Ullmann in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1849. The truly fruitful effort for the people and popular life, he says, is not merely the direct and immediate effort, but the thorough cultivation also of all those departments of knowledge whose results cannot pass over into common life except at second-hand and by radiation.

which distinguishes England and the United States from Africa and South America, did not grow up spontaneously from the earth; is not the effect of a colder climate or a harder soil. It has been exhaling for centuries from colleges and universities — it has been distilling for ages from the alembic of the scholar's brain.

The condition of society at any one given time, must be looked upon as the total result of past institutions. It is false and absurd to assume that the present form of things started into being in a twinkling, and is totally unconnected with what has gone before. This is true of all that enters into the idea of social existence, but it is emphatically true of the general state of information. And if we would know why there is at this present moment such a great amount of intelligence among the descendants of English colonists, and such an entire absence of intelligence among the descendants of Spanish colonists on this western continent, we have only to remember that the English brought over books and built churches and founded colleges simultaneously, while the Spaniards did no such thing, but attempted to found and perpetuate State governments, and to rear up society upon the current maxims of worldly and selfish policy. If when Hernando Cortez subjugated Mexico to the Spanish crown and provided for the colonization of that region, he had laid such foundations for national existence and growth as were laid by the Puritans, and that population for three centuries had been feeling the vigor of just principles in social intercourse, in legal arrangements, in government and religion, it would not be the ignorant and powerless mass it is. If he had provided for the investigation of the principles of knowledge, and for raising up a body of thoughtful and wise men, leading and powerful spirits, like those who planned and acted in the great emergency in our history, would not have been wanting in her hour of national trial.

II. And this leads us to notice a second way whereby the higher institutions of learning keep scientific and popular knowledge in connection, and thus elevate and improve the whole body of the people in a commonwealth. And this is by constantly sending out into society professional men.

Most of the members of the three professions are college graduates, and the few who have raised themselves to posts of honor and usefulness by their own resolute and private study, are no testimony against the fact that professional influence is based upon scientific knowledge. These few instances only go to show that if there is a fixed determination, a man may overcome all obstacles, and may become an eminent physician, jurist or divine, not *because* of the want of direct aid from the higher institutions of learning, but in *spite* of that want. And even

these do not acquire their knowledge entirely independent of universities. Even these must have access to a library of old books which one, with some degree of truth, has asserted to be the true university, and which at any rate is the expression of the thought and research of universities.

It may be said, therefore, without fear of contradiction, that professional life and influence grows out of collegiate education, and can grow from no other root. And if we would estimate the effect upon society of the decline and fall of the higher literary institutions, we must first estimate the effect of the entire removal from among us of the physician, the lawyer and the clergyman, and of the entire destruction of the three great sciences of medicine, law and theology. It is a forcible saying of Cicero, that the Athenian State could no more be sustained and regulated without that grave and venerable court, the Areopagus, than the world could be sustained and regulated without the Providence of God. With greater truth and force it may be affirmed that modern society might as easily be kept in prosperous existence without the Providence of God, as without the presence and pervading power of those professions whose province it is to investigate and expound natural, civil, judicial and religious truths, for they are themselves one of the most benignant of Divine Providences.

But we shall perhaps be able to form a more correct estimate of the worth of professional men, and consequently of those institutions which train them up, by an examination of the business and influence of each class separately.

1. It is the business of the physician to study the nature and laws of life, especially of animal life, and still more especially of human life, that he may understand the causes of disease and death. It is also his business to study material nature, that he may know the various elements that enter into it, and their relation to the chief practical purposes of his profession, viz. the preservation of health and the cure of disease. Setting aside, therefore, the palpable and immediate benefit which the individual derives from the medical man as he stands by his bed-side, there is an amount of information put in currency by him, which ministers much to that general cheerfulness and absence of anxious apprehensions, which, like fresh breezes and bright sun-shine, contributes much to the physical well-being of society. The investigations and influence of the medical profession, rid community of that superstitious dread with respect to the strange processes of nature and the wonderful functions of animal life, which indeed in its highest intensity is to be found only in savage society, but which in its milder but nevertheless most fearful form, marks the history of ages highly educated in

other branches of knowledge, but ignorant of this because its cultivation had not kept pace with that of the other. For example, whole communities in Europe during the middle ages were often set in a tremor by natural phenomena that would not startle the child of the present day, because the ignorant imagination of the age filled the (mysterious it is true, yet) beautiful and harmless world of vegetable and animal life with malignant powers and horrible spirits. And had there been as much general information regarding the science of medicine, as there was regarding those of law and theology among the early inhabitants of New England, that most strange and awful chapter in its history which records the story of the Salem witchcraft would be wanting. The gloom and horror (a gloom and horror which could not have been thicker and deeper if the world of evil spirits had really been let loose upon men) that hung over that community like a black cloud, could not possibly be made to throw its shadow across the present generation, not surely because it is *morally* better or wiser than its holy fathers, but because the strange marvels of animal organization and nervous excitement have been traced to causes originating in that "God who is light, and in whom there is no darkness at all."

2. It is the business of the jurist to study the principles of law—the science of justice. This science stands beside that of religion, and has very profound and close affinities with it. So very nearly are these two sciences connected, that history shows that where clear and correct views of the one have prevailed, clear and correct views of the other have also prevailed. In proportion as a community is possessed of a deep sense of the sacred nature of justice, it is possessed of a correspondingly profound sense of the solemn nature of religion.

The cause of this lies in the fact that justice, which is the substance and staple of law, is the most fundamental of all fundamentals, whether the being of the Creator or of creation is contemplated. Justice is the deepest of all the "deep things of God," underlying his whole Godhead, and "forming the equilibrium of the Divine character." Even mercy, an attribute which is sometimes supposed to be the very contrary of justice, and in necessary incompatibility with it, derives from it its very essential nature—its mercifulness. Mercy shows its distinguishing quality, its real peculiarity only in the light and flame of law, and no man has ever known and felt the mercy of his God, until he has first known and felt what his God might *in justice* do unto him.

Again the idea of justice is a constituent of man's being, and if, owing to his fall and corruption, the positive sense of justice is often slumbering, the negative side of the idea, the sense of injustice, of being wronged, is one of the quickest and keenest of which he is conscious.

For these reasons the science of law is no trivial or superficial science, but strikes its roots down into that solemn world of holiness and righteousness with which every man by creation is connected, either for weal or woe, according to the relation which his spirit shall be found to sustain to it in the day of judgment. If therefore the spirit of law and the sense of justice are deep and pervading in society, the truths of religion will be more fully apprehended, and its duties will be more likely to be esteemed paramount than would be the case if a lawless and unjust spirit were abroad. By being reverential towards civil law man in so far becomes reverential towards Divine law; for it is a power ordained of God, and the feeling towards that which is ordained transfers itself to Him who ordains. The doctrines of religion make their way far more easily through a law-revering and law-abiding people, than through a disorganized and disorganizing mass, held together by no right sentiment of any sort, by no just tie, civil or political.

Such being the fact, it is evident that the legal profession, if deeply penetrated and pervaded by the spirit of law and justice, is a most important instrument in the arrangements of Providence, for working out the well-being of the State and the improvement of mankind at large. By means of the study of the principles of justice, and the performance of legal business, law is constantly kept before the public mind, and its spirit is more or less permeating society. The mind of the people is made solemn in the process, and better prepared to receive the truths and principles of the Christian religion, to which great *remedial* and *saving* system of truth all other systems should be subservient and preparatory.

3. And this brings us to the third of the three professions whose foundation is laid by collegiate education — the clerical. The worth of this profession cannot be over-estimated if we take into account the importance of the science upon which it rests, the opportunity it has of getting the popular ear, and the perfecting influence which it is capable of exerting upon society.

The science which is the subject matter of the clergyman's investigation and exposition is that of religion. It must necessarily be matter of consciousness because its principles are practical as well as theoretic, and therefore, in order to their thorough apprehension, require entrance as much into the practical heart as into the speculative head. The principles of this science are addressed to the highest faculties of the human soul, and provide for its well being during the infinite portion of its existence. They therefore run deep and reach out wide, and both directly and indirectly affect the whole individual, the whole State, the whole race. Religion either as a power of salvation or con-

demnation seizes every rational being with a grasp never to be shaken off, and having made an entrance to his joy or anguish, is never to be expelled. If his whole being is brought into sweet harmony with its laws and truths, he dwells in heaven; if his whole being is alienate from its purity and holiness, it still remains, because it must (since he is rational), and he dwells in hell.

Religion, as its etymology denotes, is the great bond which is to hold the rational creation together and to God. There is no other bond of such strength and extent. All the other ties that bind finite spirits together derive their permanent power from this great vinculum, and if its Author should suffer it to be broken, the primitive material chaos would be but a faint emblem of the disorder and ruin that would reign in the intelligent universe.

Especially would man be the sufferer in such a tremendous catastrophe; for cut loose from all the restraints which natural and more especially revealed religion impose, the unchecked depravity of a fallen race would bring it into awful dissension and collision with itself.

Religious principles are therefore the most important of all. In the divine idea and plan all other knowledge is to derive its vigor and life from them, and they are intended to run through all the individuals and all the institutions of the human race. Through the arts and through the sciences, through the laws and the legislation, through the manners and the customs, through the thoughts and the opinions, through the individual life, the domestic and social life, the political life—in fine through all the immense material embraced in the whole being and action of mankind, this pure and mighty power is intended to stream.

But not only is the clerical profession important because of the magnitude of the science upon which it is based, it is also important because of the opportunity given to it for getting the attention of man. By divine appointment every seventh day of human life is given to this profession, that it may have a hearing. Wherever the Christian religion goes, be it into civilized or savage nations, the herald of Christianity has a set time to proclaim its doctrines, which is as regular in its coming as the rising of the sun.

This dedication of a seventh part of human life to the hearing of Christian doctrine is one of those many permanent arrangements of Divine Providence that exert mighty influences without observation. We may say what we will of the power of the press, and the rapidity of communication, and all the other engines of modern times for influencing and improving mankind, there is no instrumentality which for the kind and degree of its influence upon society is to be compared with the stated preaching of the Sabbath day. Think of the nature

of the truths preached — the magnitude and solemnity of the consequences connected with their reception or rejection — and then remember that through the length and breadth of this land and of all Protestant lands, in thousands of churches, millions are listening to the preacher — that the principles of religion, even when they do not effect a saving lodgment in the heart, yet give vigor and clearness to the intellect — that from these churches and congregations a strong and restraining influence is continually going off and diffusing itself through that portion of society which does not place itself within hearing of divine truth, and moreover remember that this does not occur once every year, but once every week, and estimate if possible the amount of influence exerted by the clerical profession upon the permanence and progression of society.

We have thus briefly considered the business and influence of the three professions, and it must be evident to every reflecting mind, as we turn back to their connection with scientific in distinction from practical education, and their origin in the higher literary institutions, that such education is invaluable and such institutions are indispensable. The decay and destruction of the higher literary institutions involves the decay and destruction of scientific knowledge, and of professional life, instruction and influence. It must be apparent even to the most superficial observer, that the removal and want of a physician, a lawyer, and a clergyman in a particular town, would work disastrously upon both its temporal and eternal interests. Cut off from all connection with professional life and influence, disease and the still more dreadful fear of disease would ravage it; not having the fear and reverence of law before their eyes because they have not its expounder and representative in the midst of them, a cruel injustice would rule in the breasts of the physically strongest, as unlimited as the selfishness of the human heart, and with no one to preach the truths and offer the consolations of the Christian religion, the population would become more brutal than the brutes, because the wants of *man* would be unsupplied. If all this is apparent to a superficial glance, what will he see who glances wide and deep, over and through a whole commonwealth, destitute not only of the system of liberal learning, but of those institutions and classes of men whose business it is to perpetuate, improve and diffuse it?

The result then to which we arrive is, that only by the maintenance and improvement of scientific education can even the common intelligence of the present age be preserved. This has its root and life in that more profound wisdom which is slowly evolved from age to age by the scientific, the liberally educated mind; which is "the result of

all his considerate diligence, all his midnight watchings, and expense of palladian oil." And those institutions whose proper office it is to impart this education, are not an accidental and unnecessary, but an organic part of State institutions, and should no more be torn off alive and bleeding from the body politic than any other members should be. The whole population has an interest in their preservation, because they have an interest in the preservation of courts of justice, of legislative assemblies, of the pulpit and Church of God. The solid well being of a commonwealth depends upon them. Their first founders on this continent were the Puritans, and they were among the earliest of the rock foundations laid by those wise men. The whole sound growth — the whole healthy development of New England has been directly connected with their existence and influence. Our benevolent and learned physicians, our judicious and calm-eyed jurists, our serious and thoughtful clergy have been trained up in them. And finally, they have ever been great defences against the downward tendencies of human nature when left to itself, by cherishing in the public mind that conservative veneration for law and order and intelligence and morality, which is the best of all preparations for the reception of the saving doctrines of the Christian religion.

ARTICLE VII.

INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOK OF JOB.

Translated from the German of Ludwig Hirzel, by Rev. William C. Duncan, M. A., of New Orleans.¹

1. *Contents of the Book.*

GENERAL VIEW. — Jehovah resolves to test the virtue of the pious Job by misfortune and sufferings, and executes his determination.

[¹ L. Hirzel is professor of theology in the university at Zurich, Switzerland. His Commentary on the book of Job, the Introduction to which is here given, forms the second part of the "Condensed Exegetical Manual to the Old Testament," which has been in the process of publication for several years, at Leipsic. The Introduction is inserted in our pages as the fruits of the studies of an able and experienced critic, and not because we are prepared to accord with all his views. Indeed we decidedly dissent from some of them. But it is not necessary here to

This divine purpose, however, is not discerned upon the earth. For, upon the earth, misfortune and sufferings are regarded as the necessary consequence of sin, in conformity with the ancient doctrine of *Moralism*, that Jehovah rewards according to works, that happiness is the lot of the pious, unhappiness of the wicked. This maxim is, accordingly, brought to bear against Job; misfortune is, in the estimation of his friends, an infallible proof of guilt, and he over whom it has rolled in such a tide, must, in their firm conviction, have committed, either openly or secretly, the most grievous sins; so would indicate that law of divine justice which rules everywhere in the destiny of man. Job, on the other hand, constantly opposes to this argument his consciousness of innocence, and firmly contests the principle adduced and supported by his friends; he finds fault with God, who has permitted him to suffer undeservedly; he knows not how to account for the bitterness of his fate, except on the repeated experience, that the pious are unhappy, the wicked, on the contrary, happy; and he opposes this experience to the assertion of his friends, in order to convince them of the uncertain foundation of their accusations. But this explanation is so ill adapted to illumine the darkness which hangs over the *reason* of his sufferings, that it provokes him so much the more to the most violent complaints and the most preposterous decisions respecting the moral government of the world, to the most intemperate attacks upon the divine justice, — which become the more bitter and the more violent, the more positively he sees his innocence called in question, and the more constantly the strict justice of God, even in his fate, is asserted by his friends.

To this same God, however, of whom the unhappy man complains, and whose justice he impeaches, he, nevertheless, again has recourse, partly because from Him alone can come the explanation of the *enigma* by which he suffers; partly because the world will only then be convinced of his innocence, when God himself bears witness to it — so that Job longs for nothing more anxiously, than that God may appear to him, to give him an opportunity of justifying himself before Him respecting his conduct, and to reveal to him the reasons why he permits him to feel His anger, — partly, in fine, because Job is not yet completely under the influence of unbelief and doubt, but, in his lucid hours, the ancient faith in God again awakes in his soul. Upon his Intercessor in heaven, the witness of his innocence, he rests again his hope

state the grounds of this dissent, as we hope, on a future occasion, to take up the subject, somewhat at large. To the author's objections to the genuineness of the *Elihu-Section*, so called, we have appended some things from the replies of Prof. *Stöckel* of *Jena*. — E.

(16: 19. 18: 7 — 12. 27: 7 — 10); and this hope rises on one occasion (19: 25,) to such a certainty, that he declares in the language of a conviction which nought can destroy, that God will not, God cannot allow him to die, without having, at least, — even though the enigma should not be explained, — borne witness before all the world to his unjustly questioned innocence. — And, even though, after such lucid moments, all may again become as dark as before, in him and around him, and the gloomy forms of doubt and despondency, — nay, though even entire disbelief in a justice that governs the world, — overcome him anew, he is enabled, at last, to struggle forth into freedom; faith finally obtains the mastery, and, in its exercise, he flees to the conception of that higher Wisdom which is inscrutable to man, which has ruled the world from the beginning, but to fathom whose depths is not granted to the human understanding. There, then, in those concealed depths, and not in his guiltiness, should his would-be-wise friends seek for the cause of his misfortune; but be convinced, that they, as little as he, are able to reach the bottom of those depths.

At last Jehovah actually appears, rebuking the presumption and folly of Job for wishing to dispute with Him respecting the government of the world, and to contest the justice therein administered. Two long discourses in which He exposes to the view of Job the entire greatness and majesty of His operations and government in nature, bring him to the mortifying confession of the weakness and folly of all human knowledge in respect to superior things, and of the incomprehensibility of the divine omnipotence and wisdom; to the avowal that he will never again allow himself to contend with God, and to a recantation of the grounds of his complaint. Finally, Jehovah decides between the friends and Job, assigning error to the former and truth to the latter, as well as delivering him from his sufferings, and compensating him richly for all that he had lost in property, domestic happiness, and years of life.

2. Doctrine and Object of the Book.

First of all, it cannot be doubted that *the author would prove, by an ocular demonstration, in the case of Job's undeserved sufferings, the weakness and untenableness of the ancient Mosaic doctrine of retribution* [rather, a misinterpretation of it]. In this view, the book is closely connected with Ps. xxxvii. and lxiii. While these Psalmists [David and Asaph], however, perceiving indeed the impossibility of establishing that doctrine by an appeal to experience, held to it, notwithstanding, as true in itself, our author deprives it of one point of support after another. Should it be represented to him, in order to

account for the misfortune of one esteemed righteous, that he has sinned in secret, so that God alone is aware of his sins (11: 7—12), or should it be said, that his sufferings are meant only to discipline him, and will continue only so long as will suffice to effect their object, the production of repentance and reformation, when so much the greater happiness will ensue as a recompense (5: 17 seq. 11: 13 seq.); then can Job adduce, in opposition to such assertions, as well the witness of his good conscience as the feeling of sorrows daily multiplying and the certain prospect of approaching death, and not less the experience (21: 25 et al.) that righteous men die without having obtained the reward of their righteousness. And, further, he even points to the experience which proves the contrary (for example, 12: 6. 21: 6 seq. ch. xxiv.), when, in order to maintain the position that the wicked are unhappy, it is asserted by his friends, that though many of them do, to be sure, enjoy happiness, it does not endure (8: 11 seq. 18: 5 seq. et al.), or that they are, if indeed outwardly, not inwardly happy, since they tremble continually in dread of punishment (15: 20 seq.) And when, in the end, the frequent occurrence of the very opposite of their assertions cannot be denied by the friends, and they betake themselves to the position, that the divine punishment is at least executed upon the children of the wicked; it is responded, on the other hand, that that is neither justice, nor a punishment of the wicked themselves (21: 19—21).¹

But the poet will not merely overturn an untenable doctrine; he will establish a tenable in its place. If one is compelled to reject that strong doctrine of retribution, there are only two ways open which it is possible to follow: the one, which lies nearer (because with the rejection of the doctrine of retribution, the justice of God is called in question), is the way of unbelief, *indifferentism*; the other, which lies farther off, and, because it leads to no result satisfactory to the understanding, the more difficult and the less trodden, *the way of faith*. To exercise this faith in all cases in which the moral government of the world appears, to human view, to be destroyed, and when the sense of justice feels itself violated, whether by some grievous misfortune which happens to the pious man, or by some undeserved blessing which the godless enjoys; to renounce all claims to that higher wisdom whose works lie before man in the wonders of nature, recognizable also in the moral world, as there so here, by a knowledge of the laws by which it acts, but to be satisfied with the certainty of its existence, and, on the other hand, to refrain from all murmuring against God and his providences,

¹ As to how far 27: 13—23 and Job's indemnification in the epilogue are to be harmonized with the object proposed, see in the sequel.

—this is the positive doctrine which the poet will establish in the room of that negative. It is contained partly in Job's speech in ch. xxviii; partly in the two discourses of Jehovah, xxxviii and 42: 16; expressed nowhere, indeed, formally in set phrase, but it is left to the reader to draw the proper inference from the opposition of the human to the divine wisdom, and from the descriptions of the wonderful works of divine power and wisdom, while the poet only briefly hints (28: 28. 38: 2. 40: 2, 4, 5. 42: 2, 3, 6) what application he desires to have made.

This speech of Job's has been charged with being destructive of the design of the whole, because an anticipation of the discourse of Jehovah, but not justly, for, since Job himself succeeds, at last, after a long wandering in the realm of unbelief and of doubt, in fleeing to that conception of the inscrutable depths of the divine wisdom, there is declared, by that fact, as lying in the will and the power of man, the possibility of a final victory, to be obtained only by hard struggles, over those internal enemies,—in opposition to the delusion that whoever has been once seized by them, is irrecoverably lost, and must become subject to internal compulsion. But the discourses of God have as their object the confirmation of the opinion forced from Job, as alone true and alone fitted for man to believe, and the exhibition of its indispensable necessity to them in the more convincing light. It follows, however, spontaneously, as well from the confutation of the ancient doctrine of retribution as from the declaration of faith in the government of a superior wisdom, that the poet thinks *sufferings without guilt*, possible; and the proving of this possibility, which is also declared by the divine vindication of Job in the Epilogue, is an advance which positive knowledge makes in the book. The author, moreover, discovers in the Prologue what he supposes may possibly be the object of *such* sufferings,—the testing of the firmness of virtue; but he gives this thought no farther development in the poem itself, since it is not his design to open a way for speculation but rather to exclude it, as leading to no good effect.

3. *Unity of the Book.*

Justly in some measure, and in some measure unjustly, have several larger and smaller divisions of the book been considered interpolations. The discourses of Elihu, alone (ch. xxxii and xxxviii), are rightly so considered, the proof of which is given in the Commentary;¹ unjustly,

¹ The proof of the interpolation of Elihu's discourses is stated as follows in the Commentary. It is introduced here to give completeness to the Article. — *Trans.*

1. They destroy the connection between Job's last speech and the discourse of Jehovah, ch. xxxviii. The beginning of Jehovah's discourse necessarily presupposes

on the other hand, 1) the Prologue and the Epilogue, ch. i, ii, 42: 7—17; 2) the Section, 27: 7—23. xxviii; 3) the Description of the hippopotamus and crocodile, 40: 15 and 41: 34.

that Job had spoken immediately before, cf. obs. on 38: 2, and the broken-off conclusion of the discourses of Job 31: 39—40, can only be explained on the supposition that Job, while engaged in the course of his speech, is interrupted by Jehovah. 2. They not only enfeeble the discourse of Jehovah, since they anticipate (ch. xxxvi, xxxvii) the reference (contained in ch. xxxviii and xli) to God's power and wisdom, but they render it almost superfluous, since they give the solution of the proposed enigma by the means of *knowledge*; while the discourse of Jehovah requires unqualified submission to his omnipotence and concealed wisdom. Why this requirement, if man knows that sufferings are the means of moral improvement, as they are here, in ch. xxxiii and xxxvi, represented? "It is," as De Wette on the passage has appropriately remarked, "the same as though one, after giving a clear knowledge of a matter, should then require one not to understand, but to believe." This objection however does not, by any means, apply to the reference to the secrets of the divine wisdom, already anticipated by Job in ch. xxvii and xxviii. 3. There is no mention made of Elihu, either in the Prologue, which is preparatory to the whole drama, and introduces by name the persons who are to appear therein; or in the Epilogue, which announces unto those who have appeared in the drama, Job and his three friends, the divine decision: This latter is the more remarkable since, as Elihu's discourse is founded on the same supposition as those of the three, — that Job suffers on account of his guilt, — the same reproof which was bestowed (42: 7) upon them should be bestowed upon him. 4. A peculiar use of language distinguishes these discourses from the rest of the book, with which whatever that is peculiar may be found in the discourses of the others cannot, in any manner, be compared. Not only has the language (as is admitted by *Umbreit*, who defends the genuineness of these speeches, *Introd.* to his *Com.* p. 2) a strong dramatic coloring, but Elihu uses uniformly certain expressions, forms, and modes of speech, for which, just as uniformly, and without distinction as regards the different speakers, other expressions are found in the rest of the book, which indicate not merely a difference of parts (*Umbreit*), but a difference of authors. Cf. obs. on 32: 3, 6. 33: 18, 19, 25. 34: 13, 19, 25, 32. 35: 9, 14. 36: 2, 19, 31. On other linguistic peculiarities of these discourses, cf. obs. on 32: 8. 33: 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 28, 30. 34: 8, 12, 37. 36: 19, 22. 5) Correspondences in the rest of the book excite the suspicion that parts of them are copied; such is evidently the case as respects the whole division 36: 28 and 37: 18, which is first touched upon in the discourse of Jehovah, ch. xxxviii seq., and also as regards many details in thought and expression, cf. on 33: 7, 15. 34: 3, 7. 36: 25. 37: 4, 10, 22. To these are to be added, 6. various single circumstances, which have weight with the critic chiefly on account of their coincidence with the other arguments; as, a) the isolated situation of these discourses; they receive no reply from Job; the accusations of the three Job had refuted as often as they were repeated, but against Elihu, who does not less accuse him, he does not defend himself, but bears with the accusation. b) In these discourses alone, Job is addressed by name, 33: 1, 31. 37: 4. c) The remarkable contrast which is observable between the prolix and tedious introduction of Elihu, as a character, 32: 2—6, and the simple announcement of the three, 2: 11. The genuineness of these discourses has been disputed by *Eichhorn*, *Introd.* to O. T. Vol. V. § 644. b.; *Stuhlmann*, *Transl.* of the Book of Job, p. 20 seq.; *Bern-*

1. Against the genuineness of the Prologue and Epilogue it is urged (by *Hasse*, *Conjectures on the Book of Job in the Magazine for Oriental Biblical Literature*, 1. 162 ss., *Stuhlmann Translation of the Book of*

stein, in *Keil and Tschirner's Analecta*, Vol. I. pt. 3. p. 133 seq.; *De Wette*, *Introd.* to O. T. § 287, and in the *Encyc. of Ersch and Gruber*, art. *JOB*; *Ewald*, *Commentary*, p. 296 seq.; *defended*, on the other hand, (not, however, against all the objections here adduced, in particular not against 1. and 2.; against 4 very unsatisfactorily); by *Schärier*, *Commentary*, I. p. lx.; *Staudlin*, *Contrib. to the Philos. and Hist. of Religion and Ethics*, II. p. 133 seq.; *Bertholdt*, *Introd. to the Writings of the O. T. and N. T.* p. 2185; *Jahn*, *Introd. to O. T.* p. 776; *Rosenmüller*, *Commentary on ch. xxxii*; *Umbreit*, *Introd. to his Commentary*, p. xxv. *Arnheim*, in his *Commentary*, tacitly takes their genuineness for granted.

[In opposition to Hirzel's objections, the following arguments, among others, seem to be conclusive.

1. All this [Hirzel's first objection] rests at last on an incorrect application to the words 38: 2, of the grammatical remark that the participle denotes the continuance of action, "and in connection with other propositions, a condition continuing during another action." *Ewald* § 350. The מְדַשֵּׁן certainly expresses here the continuous darkening, by Job, of the divine counsel, but the words do not affirm that God interposed and spoke during that darkening process; the interruption begins with ch. xxxviii; if the interruption had taken place while Job was speaking, the sentence would have been וְגַם מְדַשֵּׁן וְגַם יִצְחָקֶיךָ. Since the question, vs. 1, forms a new, independent proposition, consequently the connection of several propositions wherein the contemporaneity of God's speaking and the darkening of the counsel alone could lie, is wanting. The necessity that Job should have spoken immediately before Jehovah, disappears consequently. The conclusion also, 31: 38—40, is by no means abrupt. It is fit that Job should conclude his words with adjurations; but still these could not go on without end. The מְדַשֵּׁן, 38: 2, takes up מְדַשֵּׁן from the close of Elihu's speech, 37: 19, and his last word, 37: 22, 24, is the theme, which Jehovah finally carries through with the full chorus of creation's voices. Thus Jehovah's words accord very well with Elihu's. 2. There is, in the speeches of Elihu and in the words of Jehovah, less in common than has been usually asserted. The contact is only partial. Of the righteousness of the divine government with which Elihu is thoroughly occupied, nothing at all is said in Jehovah's words; these only adduce the infinite distance of human insight and power from the omniscience and omnipotence of God; thus the presumption of a mortal who would find fault with God is presented with such overpowering evidence, that Job is forced to open his lips in confession of his groundless pride. Elihu's aim is to show the real untenableness of the complaint; but the tendency of Jehovah's words is to exhibit the impious temerity which lies even in the first raising of the complaint. 3. It is necessary that the three friends should be mentioned in the prologue, as they were to enter at once into the controversy; but it was not necessary that Elihu should be named. Jehovah, the principal personage, is not named. The silence of Job, after Elihu had spoken, is explained by the fact that Elihu had the better of the argument; and also in the confirmatory words of the Almighty, which only sound in a loftier tone. A condemnation of Elihu would not be possible. The silence of Job is accounted for by the fact *qui tacet consentit*. 4. It is hardly necessary to reply to this and the remaining objections. If the poet has given to

Job, Hamburg, 1804, introduction, p. 23 ss., *Bernstein on the Age, Contents, Object, and present Form of the Book of Job in the Analecta of Keil and Tzschirner* pt. 8. p. 122 ss.): (a) that they stand in opposition to the idea of the Book; for, in the Prologue, the object and signification of the sufferings of Job are revealed, whereas the design of the poet was, on the contrary, to warn against the attempt to fathom the divine Dispensations; and, in the Epilogue, Job obtains as his portion a double recompense for his sufferings, so that, in his fate, the old doctrine of retribution, according to which the pious cannot always be unhappy, but will, at last, again become happy, is confirmed, whereas the poet would prove the weakness and untenableness of this doctrine; (b) that, in the Epilogue v. 7, the right is assigned by God to Job, in opposition to his three friends, while he has, nevertheless, in the poem, accused God of injustice; (c) that, in these two divisions, a high value is assigned to sacrifice, but in the entire poem, as if to shun everything theocratic in general, so, in particular, is there nowhere made mention of such practices; (d) that these parts are written in prose, and the name Jehovah, as an appellation of God occurs therein, whereas, in the poem itself, God is called El or Eloah. Against (a) it is to be observed that neither the Prologue nor the Epilogue are to be considered part of the didactic portion of the book; on which account they differ from the didactic poem itself by being written in prose. That the reader is initiated by the Prologue into the divine secret, but must observe how, in the poem itself, all the attempts of Job and his friends to ascertain the cause of his unhappiness, are frustrated, should be received by him as a hint to attempt the investigation of that which has been determined upon in the counsel of God. By the restoration of Job's happiness in

the three opponents of Job favorite words and forms, as is acknowledged, then it is not strange that Elihu, who in other respects is so unlike the rest, should in this matter have a more marked character. This would be in perfect accordance with the entire structure and with the art of the poet. Besides, every unprejudiced reader must have observed that the words and forms used by Elihu which are peculiar and belong to the Aramæan, are not found equally in all the sections but are assembled in particular places, while other sections are free; the first chapters are most peculiar. This difference would be designed. An interpolator would have made no distinction of this kind. Positive arguments for the genuineness of the passage are not wanting. Words, forms, connections, entirely peculiar to Job, or found but seldom elsewhere, occur in the Elihu section. In both parts the same rare grammatical forms, constructions and anomalies occur, e. g. the connection of the auxiliary with the principal verb without the intervention of a particle, 32: 22. 10: 16. There is a striking analogy between Job and Proverbs in the use of language. This similarity is found in the Elihu-section as well as in the other parts of Job. The structure of the poetry is also the same throughout.]

the Epilogue, the poet performs a duty to the feelings of the reader, as is most clearly evident, if one reflect what would have been his feelings had the advent been different, had the poet reported the endless duration of Job's unhappiness, and consider the impression which such a conclusion would have left upon the mind of the reader. Is Job recompensed for undeserved sufferings and losses, the reader is left reconciled with the divine arrangement of things, and retains with so much the more confidence the belief which the poet would teach him; while, in the opposite case, the book must rather have excited new complaints, new despondency, and new opposition on the part of man to the decrees of God. To (b) it may be replied that Job is justified in the place referred to merely as regards the assertion of his innocence in opposition to the accusations of his friends. This point the poet must treat, if the reader is not to go away from the book dissatisfied; for, respecting the main question of the long contest, Job's guilt or innocence, God had not until now decided, but had only reproved Job for his presumption. To (c) the important part which sacrifices have assigned them, accords with the worship of the patriarchal time, in which the poet allows his heroes to appear. To (d) that in these two divisions יְהוָה is the principal name applied to God depends upon the rule which the poet observes in the use of the name of God. Where he relates, he uses the name יְהוָה; hence this appellation is also found out of the Prologue and Epilogue, 38: 1. 40: 1, 3, 6. 42: 1; besides, in a few places, אֱלֹהִים occurs, 1: 5, 22. 2: 9., and in the combinations בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים 1: 6. 2: 1. וְרֵא אֱלֹהִים 1: 1. אֶשׁ אֱלֹהִים 1: 16. Where, on the other hand, Job and his friends are introduced in conversation, they use, as in the language of the præ-Mosaic time, in which the name יְהוָה was not yet known (Ex. 3: 13 ss.), the common and ancient name אֱל or אֱלֹהִי, also שְׁדֵי. Hence the name יְהוָה can only once, 1: 21, where it occurs in the Prologue, appear strange; but the same exception is found in a few passages of the poem also, 12: 9. 28: 28. The Prologue and Epilogue in their present form are inseparable from the whole; without the one the poem itself would be unintelligible, and without the other the poet would have left the reader in ignorance respecting the two questions, which present themselves at 42: 5, to every one as yet unanswered, respecting the manner in which Jehovah may decide between Job and his friends, and the issue of Job's fate.

2. Against the division 27: 7, 28—xxviii, it is remarked (by *Bernstein*, on the passage, p. 133—135), (a) that Job admits, in the first part of it, 27: 7—23, what his friends had hitherto asserted, but he had constantly denied and contested, that the sinner receives the reward of his deeds; (b) that, in the second part, ch. xxviii., the reference

to the wisdom of God, is just as little suitable in the mouth of Job, since it savors of humility rather than of the overweening confidence, which, even up to this point, must have had the mastery in Job's mind; this reference reminds one of the discourses of Elihu, and the bombastic language of the chapter brings to mind the grandiloquence of his speeches, with which, therefore, it may have the same author. The contradiction noticed under (a), cannot, indeed, be denied; but just as little can it be denied, that, without it, as *Umbreit* (Comment. p. 261.) has correctly remarked, the dispute would have gone on without end. It is not to be overlooked, moreover, that especially with ch. xxvii. commences the change in Job's frame of mind and views, as well as, that, notwithstanding that concession, Job still differs from his friends in this,—he opposes the converse of the conceded point. [As Job has up to this point affirmed his innocence, and adduced *internal* evidence in proof of the error of his opponents, he can now, when they have nothing more to respond, and when his justice is secure against their attacks, grant them, without danger, what is true in *their* representations, and what, notwithstanding the opposition which it has hitherto met from him, is recognized as such by him also. That, namely, the sinner does not remain unpunished in life, is a truth which he cannot contradict, and so little will he do it, that, in the sequel (vs. 13—23), he depicts the unhappy end of the sinner in still stronger colors than his opponents had done. While, however, his opponents perseveringly turned this truth against him, fancying, that, because the sinner is unhappy, every unhappy man must be a sinner, Job was compelled, in order to avoid the inference which his misfortune would seem to authorize respecting his guilt, up to this point, to deny, contrary to his better knowledge, the whole principle; and he could do this, since his opponents made it a rule firmly approved, verifying itself always and everywhere, by a reference to the numerous instances of the contrary, which, inexplicably to the human understanding, the experience of all times afforded. Now, therefore, he proceeds to enlighten his friends by means of this two-fold reference; in the first place, acknowledging to them that they had correctly apprehended the general law according to which the fate of the sinner is decided (v. 12. 1st member), with which is connected as proof the description, vs. 13—23, which agrees with the representations they have so far made; but next, drawing their attention to the fact that they, notwithstanding this correct view, had nevertheless fallen into an error (v. 12. 2nd member), with which is connected ch. xxviii, which, in general has for its object the referring of his opponents to the inscrutable depths of the divine wisdom and the limitations of human knowledge. Thus, it would seem, that the cer-

tainly striking contradiction, which exists between the confession of Job which follows in vs. 23—23, and his earlier discourses, 12: 6. ch. xxi. 24: 22 ss. must be explained, and which has from an early period been an impediment in the way of interpreters. Renouncing the possibility of an explanation, *Kennicott* (Diss. Gen. in V. T. ed. Bruns. p. 539), *Eichhorn* (Conjec. on Passages in Job, Gen. Lib. of Bib. Lit. II. p. 613), have assigned this division to Zophar, who has not yet, as the other two friends, spoken three times, but only twice; so that he would now appear for the third time. *Stuhlmann* (on the Book of Job in Keil and Tzschirner's *Analecta*, I. pt. 3 p. 184.) makes the third speech of Zophar begin with v. 11. But, (1) vs. 11 and 12 cannot have been spoken by Zophar, since the discourse is not, according to the custom of the opponents, addressed to Job, but to several; (2) "Zophar cannot have appeared a third time, since, in that case, Job, by not replying, would, in some measure, have yielded him the field," *De Wette* Hall. Encycl. II. vol. 8. p. 293. It is clear that the poet leaves him, when he does so, with the intention that he shall not speak again: the way is prepared for the silence of this third opponent by the barrenness of *Bildad's* last reply, ch. xxv.; the embarrassment of this latter as regarded matter for the treatment of his subject was so great, that he had to borrow it from the earlier discourses of *Eliphaz*: so Zophar, at best the weakest of three, is entirely silent, because he knows nothing more which he can adduce. Later, *Eichhorn* (Job Trans. Gött. 1824, p. 97.) substituted the following for his former view, that vs. 13—23, belong indeed to Job; he does not, however, speak his opinion therein, but only repeats that of the opponents: *this, say you, is the fate of the sinner*, etc. So also *Böckel*. But this understanding of the passage is opposed to v. 11, which is certainly intended to introduce the description begun at v. 13.]¹ (b) Chap. 28 cannot have proceeded from the author of the discourses of *Elihu*, since such an isolated insertion would have been altogether superfluous and without an object.

3. The refutation of the objections urged by *Ewald* against the description of the hippopotamus and the crocodile, see at the end of chap. xli. [*Ewald* (in the Theol. Stud. and Krit., 1829, p. 766 ss., Comm. on Job, p. 320 ss.) following *De Wette*, who (Introd. to the O. T. § 288) calls the description of these two animals, the hippopotamus and the crocodile, a dragging and bombastic piece, declares this entire division,

¹ The portion of the text included in brackets is taken from the Commentary on 27: 1—10, to which reference is made at the place in the Introduction in which it has been introduced by us, for the sake of giving *Hirzel's* full answer to the objection he is considering. — TRANS.

40: 15—41: 26, not genuine, but composed by the author of Elihu's discourses, mainly on the following grounds: (1) *On account of its position*; because the second discourse of Jehovah, which is incorporated in this division, has as its object, to reply to Job's doubts concerning the *justice* of God. This description of the two animals, however, can only serve to describe Jehovah's *power*, which was the office of the first discourse; and, moreover, not even the loosest and finest internal bond of union connects this piece with 40: 6—14. (2) *On account of the different character existing between these two and the earlier descriptions of animals*, chap. xxxviii. and xxxix. (a) *In object*; in the *earlier* descriptions, to show Job, that man, and therefore he himself, cannot attain to the power and wisdom of God, appears to be, everywhere, the object; *here*, however, this object is wanting, the entire representation being nothing more than a description of the many wonderful peculiarities of the two animals, but nowhere is an inference from it and an application of it brought to bear upon Job. (b) *in the plan, in poetic representation, and even the language*; *there* the several descriptions are short and hasty, the particular wonder merely indicated, the representation powerful, original, the delineations almost entirely arrayed in questions; *here* the description is prolix, long-winded, stiff, the representation feeble, having the character of imitation, narrative, rather than interrogative; as a single peculiarity of language the lengthened query without the interrogative נָּ , 40: 25, is to be noticed, which calls 37: 18 to mind. These grounds, however, so far as they are of a historic kind, are untenable; so far as they are æsthetic, they are not decisive, because they rest upon merely a subjective judgment. For, as to what relates to the historic, (a) the beginning as well as the conclusion of the challenge to Job, 40: 9—14, shows that the poet does not intend the object of Jehovah's second discourse to be seized so sharply as *Ewald* has seized it. Verse 9 passes over from the reference in the speeches of Job which call in question the justice of God, immediately to the challenge to him, to show at once what *he* is able to perform, how great *his* power when compared with God's; and Jehovah declares himself ready, when the proof is adduced, to acknowledge, on his part, Job's *power* (not, as one might have expected, his *justice*). Proceeding on *Ewald's* supposition respecting the subject of this second speech of Jehovah's, we must necessarily declare this challenge, vs. 9—14, also not genuine, because it refers as little to the supposed object; so that only vs. 7 and 8 would be left as the discourse of Jehovah. (b) Moreover, 41: 28, where the poet stops in the midst of his description of the leviathan, and Jehovah draws Job's attention from the creature to the Creator and man's rela-

tion to him, shows that even this description is not destitute of the higher, religious-didactic object; nay, a reference is made just here to the distinctive idea of the second discourse of Jehovah, cf. obs. at the place. (c) The adduced lengthened query without the interrogative הֲ , 40: 25, has its counterpart (even stronger, as in 37: 18.) in the description, 39: 1, 2. But, were it not so, how could a single linguistic peculiarity, and one so entirely unimportant, form the foundation of a critical decision? And how inconsistent, on the other hand, not to give any weight to unusual expressions and forms of words which this description has in common with the earlier portions of the book! cp. $\text{הַיָּמִים הַלֵּלוּ}$, 41: 10, with 3: 9: יָמֵי הַיָּמִים , 41: 26, with 28: 8; וְיָצַק , 41: 15, 16, with קָצַק , 11: 15; the similar change in the second member of 41: 6, and 39: 20; the form וְיָצַק , 41: 25, with וְיָצַק , 15: 22. (d) That the descriptions of the two animals are connected with 40: 14, is indicated by the *course of thought* and by the remark at 40: 15, as well as the reason of the greater particularity of representation. *Ewald's* aesthetic grounds *Umbreit* has properly estimated in the Theol. Stud. and Krit. 1831, p. 833 ss.].¹ On the alleged transposition of 31: 38—40, and 38: 36, see the explanation at the passages.

4. General Plan.

The whole book is divided into four principal parts, of which the first and the last are composed in prose, the two middle, as the proper didactic portion of the work, in poetry. (1) The Prologue, or the history of Job's misfortunes, chap. 1: 2. (2) The conversation respecting his misfortune, or the contest between Job and his friends, chap. iii.—xxxi., beginning (chap. iii.) and ending (chap. xxix.—xxxi.) with a monologue from Job. The poet allows the friends to appear as the defenders of the common doctrine of retribution, and to make a gradual application of it to Job, whence arise progress in the action, and the dialogue is distributed into three acts, chap. iv.—xiv. xv.—xxi. xxii.—xxviii. In the first, the friends admonish to resignation and repentance, since the sinner that reforms may expect with certainty a return of happiness, and only the perverse transgressor is lost without remedy; in the second, since their admonitions appear to be fruitless, they speak no more of a return of happiness, but they place before Job's eyes, as a warning, that fearful end of the transgressor which is grounded on the justice of God; in the third, they accuse him openly of the most odious sins, and declare, at the same time, that his misery is the punishment of his guilt. (3) The appearance of God

¹ What is contained in brackets is introduced from the Commentary. — TRANS.

for Job's instruction, chap. xxxviii—xl. (4) The Epilogue, or the history of the Divine decision of the dispute, and the deliverance of Job, 42: 6—17. Moderns have called the book the *Hebrew Tragedy*, to which name it seems to have a claim, as well on account of its dramatic form, as because the fundamental idea is that of the struggle of virtue with misfortune. Since, however, the object of the poet was purely instructive, the production of a religious-philosophic conviction, this appellation is suited only to a portion, and the book is more correctly called a *didactic poem*.

5. Subject of the Poem.

Whether the historic frame with which the author has encompassed his didactic poem, is his own invention, or borrowed from the traditional history of his people, has been a disputed question from an early to the present time; but it is of no importance to the understanding of the book. The question turns upon the existence of Job's person, since, if this be denied, all that is related of him appertains to a free poetic invention. The Talmud (Baba batra, chap. 1, sec. 15.) first advanced the assertion that Job is only a feigned, not a historic person; of the same opinion among moderns are *Bernstein*, *Augusti*, (Intro. to the O. T. 2. A.), *De Wette* (Encyc. of Ersch and Gruber, art. Job), who, therefore, treat as poetry all the history that forms the basis of the book. Now, it is true, the mention of Job by Ezekiel, 14: 14, 16, 20, Tobit, (Latin text) 2: 12, 15, James 5: 11, proves nothing in favor of his historic existence, since the books in question are all later than our book, and their knowledge of Job is more than probably obtained from it;¹ still less, the spots pointed out in different places in the East as the grave of Job (v. *Winer* Bib. Real. 1. p. 581). But just as little can one, in order to prove that the relation is a fiction, refer to the appellative signification of the name Job,² as containing in itself the

¹ [From the mention of Job, along with Noah and Daniel, Ezek. 14: 14, 20, it would seem to follow that Job's history was as well known as that of the two others. Since these two are historical names, so that of Job would not have been added, if his memory rested on a groundless myth, and not on credible tradition. The mention of Job in Tobit 2: 11, and James 5: 11, show at least that the historical recognition of the person of Job as one who had undergone great sufferings, remained unimpaired. — *Vaihinger*.]

² The derivation and signification of the name אִיּוֹב is not certain. Since the older explanations (v. *J. H. Michaelis*, Adnott. in Hag. iogr. Voll. II. pref. 3.) have been given up as inadmissible, the derivation wavers at present between אִיּוֹב, and

אִיּוֹב, used as the Heb. שָׁבַח to return, tropically, to turn one's self, to be con-

part assigned to him by the poet; since, with equal justice, the names *שָׂאִיָּל*, *שְׁלֵמָה*, and many others might also be used to transform historic personages into feigned; such names were formed in the mouths of the people, possibly even by contemporaries, and supplanted the original personal names; for the memory of a man could be more easily preserved and handed down to posterity, by an appellation expressive of his character or destiny, than by his original personal name. Further reason, however, to cast doubt upon the existence of Job, does not exist. Since, however, the historic truth of all that is related of him is not involved in the historic truth of his personal existence, since, indeed, the free creative hand of the poet is plainly enough discernible in the prologue (cf. obs. at 1: 2, 3, and 1: 2, with 42: 13.) and epilogue, the correct answer to the question spoken of above is that which *Luther* has already generally indicated (Table Talk, p. 318): "I hold that the book of Job is a history, in a poetic form, of what happened to a person, but not in such words as 'those in which it is written.'" The most of modern interpreters, however, have expressed themselves firm in the opinion, that the poet has freely elaborated an historical subject found in the popular traditions, and has inserted what thoughts he desired to utter, within a frame compounded of elements partly his own and partly received.

It may with great probability be inferred that Job's name and residence in particular were given to the poet by the tradition, since the former occurs nowhere else in the Old Testament, and the latter, the land of Uz, was too obscure to render it probable that the poet's choice would have fallen upon it in preference to other countries. The tradition, moreover, appears to have placed Job's existence in remote antiquity, which explains the endeavor of the poet to represent the life

verted, and *אָיַב*, to persecute; consequently, *אָיִב*, either, *who returns* (to God) *is converted*, as Job did, after he had a long time contended against God, or, *the persecuted* (of God), *hostilely persecuted*, chap. 13: 24. 30: 21. The first explanation originated with *Cromaier* and *J. D. Michaelis*, and has been lately adopted by *Ewald*, after the modern interpreters and lexicographers had almost unanimously acceded to the latter, which was proposed by *Augusti* (Introd. to O. T.). The latter lies nearer, and has in its favor the analogy of *יָעִיר*, *natus*, *שָׂכֵר*, *ebrius*, whilst a corresponding noun-formation from a *נָּ* verb is not so natural in Hebrew. When *Ewald* remarks, in opposition, that "the persecuted would be an extremely indefinite, but little significant, appellation," it must, on the other hand, be remembered, that the name which Job received in the mouth of the people, surely connects itself far more readily with the unexampled misfortune which befel him, the guiltless, than with his "conversion after wicked despondency." *Luther* introduced the mode of writing *Hiob*, departing from the LXX. and the Vulgate (*Ἰώβ*, Job), as it seems, in order to distinguish *אָיִב* from *יֹאֵב*, Gen. 46: 13, whose name he writes Job.

and manner of his hero, as well as the relations in which he appears, in conformity with the character of the patriarchal times; we find parallels to Job's wealth in flocks in Gen. 12: 16. 24: 35. 26: 13 s. 30: 43; to his authority 30: [29] 7 ss. 21 ss. in Gen. 23: 6; to his performance of priestly functions 1: 5. 42: 8. in Gen. 22: 13. 31: 54; to the great age which according to 42: 16 s. he attained, in Gen. 25: 7, 8. 35: 28 s. 50: 26 s.; to the immediate appearance of God which, according to 38: 1, cp. with 42: 5, was granted him, in Gen. xviii. 32: 30. 35: 9 ss., as well as to the vision of Eliphaz 5 [4]: 12 ss. in Gen. 15: 1 ss. 28: 10 ss.; here too belongs the mention of the Kesita 42: 11; in the poem itself, although here the poet desires nothing less than to conceal his own era, but rather allows it frequently and evidently enough to appear (cp. 9: 24. 12: 18, 23. 20: 19. 21: 7 ss. 22: 15 ss. 24: 2—17. 27: 16. 20: 24. 39: 21 ss. 23: 10. 28: 1 ss. 31: 11, 28), there are not wanting passages in which the coloring of Job's mode of life and the neighborhood in which he lived are firmly retained, as 29: 6. 30: 1. 31: 26 s. 5: 22 ss. 21: 10 s. Finally, it is manifest in itself that the poet would not have chosen the tradition respecting Job for elaboration, if he had not been represented by it as an innocent man, visited, notwithstanding his especial piety, by the most grievous misfortune; and, since the disease under which Job appears as suffering was, on the one hand, of an unusual kind, and hence lay farther from the poetic fiction, than to many other diseases, and since, on the other, the description given of it in the discourses of Job is carefully and accurately retained, cp. 6: 7. 7: 4, 5. 13: 27. 16: 13 ss. 19: 19. 30: 17, 30. 18: 13, we may admit with *Ewald*, that this feature also in the history of Job was delivered to the poet in the tradition. All the rest, however, that is related of Job in the Prologue and Epilogue, as well as the principal scene itself, the visit of the friends, the dispute between them and Job, and Jehovah's final appearance, must be considered as appertaining to the free elaboration of the poet; in addition to which it may be granted, that the name of the three and their residence, were not invented by the poet himself, but were found by him in another tradition, and adopted on account of the geographic suitableness of the names of the places attached to their personal names to the land of Uz.

6. *Time and place of the composition of the Book.*

The time of the composition of the book can be determined only by internal evidence; but these point with some degree of certainty to the last times of the kingdom of Judah, more precisely, perhaps, to the borders of the 6th and 7th centuries before Christ. That the book

was written at a time when the connection of the Hebrew with the nations of eastern Asia was not only commenced, but when many of the religious conceptions prevalent there had become incorporated with the Hebrew ideas, is widened by the enlargement of the doctrine of spirits in the representations of Satan, occurring here for the first time, and of the interceding angels, whom man addressed in order to obtain their mediation with God, 1: 6. 5: 1. On the other hand the mention of star-worship, 31: 26, does not refer necessarily to the spread of the Zoroastrian doctrine among the Hebrews, since this worship had its home also in Arabia, the theatre of Job's life. The era of the poet is designated 15: 18 s, as a time when foreigners had already penetrated the country, the Hebrews no longer the sole possessors of their fatherland, and when those were seldom found by whom the wisdom of their ancestors had been preserved pure and unmixed. Expressions, as 9: 24. 12: 6, questions, as 21: 7, 16—18. 24: 1, descriptions, as 12: 14—25, bespeak evidently a time of long-continued misfortune, filled with distress and oppression, disheartening the pious and causing them to go astray; and it can scarcely be doubted that his own experience had made the poet acquainted with that power "which binds kings in chains, carries off counsellors and priests as booty, and causes people to go away into captivity." If the appearance of these points to very late times in the history of the kingdom of Judah, the passages Jer. 20: 14—17, (cp. with Job 3: 3—10), Jer. 20: 18, (cp. with Job 10: 18), Jer. 17: 1, (cp. with Job 19: 24), presuppose the existence of the book of Job, since they clearly have the character of imitations, or reminiscences; and similar ones from other books are also to be met with in Jeremiah. The same is made to appear by a comparison of Jer. 31: 29, 30, Ezek. 18: 1, with Job 21: 19; for, upon the assertion which is established by Job by a reference to the divine justice, that the sinner meets personally the reward of his deeds, but that the children do not atone for the sins of their parents, — a thought uttered here for the first time, — Jeremiah founds his promise that it shall proceed still further; and by Ezekiel the doctrine hitherto current is without hesitation declared to be erroneous and antiquated.

If now the book of Job was written in Egypt, as will be shown further on to be probable, it is quite possible that the author was carried away into Egypt at the time of the deportation of king Jehoaiah in the year 611, by Pharaoh Necho; and the composition of the book, which, on account of the varied knowledge of Egypt which it exhibits, pre-supposes a long residence of the author in that country, would have taken place accordingly, at the point of time above designated. The language, indeed, agrees with a late age of the book, but brings it

down not later than the time mentioned; for, by far the greater number of expressions and words belonging to the Aramaic dialect, which have been discovered and adduced in order to prove a post-exile origin of the book (*Bernstein*, in the work quoted, p. 49—79), are rather to be considered peculiarities of the poetic language, which employs foreign modes of expression as ornaments of discourse; and not seldom does the parallelism of ideas render it necessary to encroach upon the linguistic territory of the Aramaic dialect; and, there is no doubt, that the foreign linguistic ingredients in Job would not seem so unusually abundant and striking, if other poems of the same extent had been preserved. As actual Aramaisms, not poetical peculiarities, is to be noticed the manner of writing the following words: מַאִים 8: 8; מַאִים 31: 7, elsewhere only in Dan. 1: 4; גִּירָא 22: 29, (also by Elihu 33: 17), cp. Dan. 4: 34; נִכְאָר 30: 8; רִיחַ 39: 9; חִיץ 41: 4; moreover, the use of ל as a sign of the accusative, 5: 2. 21: 22, עַל for אֶל 22: 2. 31: 5, 9; also, in 2: 10, the occurrence (in prose) of the expression קָבַל; the form שָׁד for שָׁד 24: 9, only again Isa. 60: 16; finally, the peculiar use of the following words: נָרִיב 21: 8, in a bad sense as the synonym of רָשָׁע, a use which pertains to a time when men had become accustomed by experience to consider the ideas of prince and sinner as interchangeable; parallel in (later) Isaiah 13: 2. 14: 5; חֶסֶד 21: 21. 22: 3, in the sense of *affair, business*, elsewhere only in Ecclesiastes and (later) Isaiah; קָדַר 22: 28, in the sense of *to determine, to resolve*, elsewhere only by Daniel and in the Targums; אָרַו 26: 9, in the sense of the Aramaic אָרַד to *shut*, again only in Nehemiah.

Very different opinions have been entertained respecting the age of this book. For, while some, as *Carpzov* among the more ancient, and among the moderns *Eichhorn, Jahn, Stuhlmann, Bertholdt*, assign it to the prae-Mosaic time, transferring erroneously the age of Job to the poet himself (the complete refutation of this view which is now rapidly disappearing, see in *De Wette*, as quoted), *Vatke* (Bib. Theol. Berlin, 1835, Vol. I, p. 563), brings its composition down as low as the fifth century before Christ, independent, however, of any reason derived from the language or the historical framework of the book, but only on account of the internal relation to the Proverbs, which with an appeal to *Hartmann* (Intimate Connection of the Old Testament with the New Testament. Hamburg, 1831. p. 148, and A. K. Z., Theol. Lit. Bl., 1838, No. 89), are referred in the gross to the century above mentioned. The addition (Elihu's discourse) can scarcely be assigned to so low a date; for, although the language of it has a strong Aramaic coloring (cp. obs. at 32: 6. 36: 2, 19, 22. 37: 6), and although the passage 33: 23 shows an advance in the development of the doctrine

respecting angels, yet it ranks in point of literary merit and poetical contents too much above the other writings of the fifth century, with which in particular begins the period of the decline of Hebrew poetry and prose writing. *Ewald* places the composition of the book in the commencement of the seventh century, Elihu's discourse one or two centuries later. The conjecture expressed above, that the author of the book was a Hebrew carried away under Pharaoh Necho, is confirmed by the fact that the most striking signs point to Egypt as the *place of its composition*. The author has at command a knowledge of this country which is founded on something more than mere hearsay in Palestine, respecting Egyptian affairs, but pre-supposes a long personal observation. There certainly proceeded from a personal view, the description of the working of mines (28: 1—11), which in connection with the remaining references point first of all to Egypt, of whose gold mines *Diodorus Siculus* 3, 12, gives an account, cp. also *Josephus*, Bell. Jud. vi. 9, § 2; the same is to be inferred from the description of the hippopotamus and the crocodile, cp. obs. on 41: 11. The Nile is also known to the author; whence the pictures borrowed from it, 9: 26. 8: 11 s. 7: 12; the poet has seen the mausoleum of the Egyptian kings, 3: 14 s; he is acquainted with the Egyptian fable of the phoenix, 29: 18 (cp. *Von Bohlen* Ancient India, ii. p. 238 ss.); the mode of justice practised in Egypt, 31: 35; finally, the description of the war-horse, 39: 19—25, reminds one in particular of Egypt, renowned above other countries for her cavalry (cp. the interpreters on Isaiah 2: 7. 31: 1, et al.) *Hitzig* also places the composition of the book in Egypt; see his Prophet Isaiah, Heidelberg, 1833, p. 285.⁴

[⁴ Hirzel's proofs that the book of Job was written in Egypt do not strike us as very weighty. It would have been perfectly easy for a native of Palestine to have obtained all the knowledge of Egypt, which appears in the book, from commercial intercourse, from the reports of travellers, from a personal visit, etc. Palestine was the centre of a most active traffic between Egypt, Syria, Babylonia, etc. Caravans were in constant motion. The writer's acquaintance with mining, ch. 28, it is thought, presupposes a residence in Egypt, in the upper part of which there were mines. But he could have obtained all his knowledge of the subject by the reports of travellers, and from other countries, where there were mines, e. g., Arabia. In short, there seems no ground to doubt that the book was written by a Hebrew in Palestine. It appears to be genuine in all its parts, complete in itself, forming a beautiful whole. — E.]

ARTICLE VIII.

EXPLANATION OF DIFFICULT TEXTS.

By an Association of Gentlemen.

I. GENESIS, CH. IV. v. 7.

"If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? And if thou doest not well, *sin lieth at the door*: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him."

THIS passage is so closely connected with the preceding context, that it is necessary to turn our attention to that for a moment, before we proceed to its explanation. Cain and Abel brought an offering to God, in accordance with the their respective employments: the former, "of the fruit of the ground," and the latter, "of the firstlings of his flock and the fat thereof." But the Lord did not have the same respect for the offering of Cain that he had for that of his brother, on account of which, he was enraged, and, as a natural consequence, appeared down-cast. The Lord rebuked him by the significant questions: "Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen?" and adds, in the verse now under discussion: If thou doest well, instead of this down-cast expression of countenance, thou wouldst naturally lift up thy head, and have a cheerful countenance as those do, who are conscious of rectitude of purpose and action. But if thou doest not well, but indulgest hatred on account of this distinction made between thyself and thy brother, sin croucheth at thy door, as a wild beast for his prey. Thou art a sure victim of thy sinful passions. Sin (which is here called a *liar-in-wait*) desireth to have possession of thee, but thou hast the power to resist and overcome it. The little heed given to this warning of the Most High, as well as its appropriateness, is but too plainly told in the unnatural and bloody tragedy that soon ensued, as a result of which it is said: The voice of thy brother's blood calleth for vengeance from the ground.

It will readily be seen that some change or explanation of the text, as it stands in our English version, is necessary in order to make out the connected idea given above. The clause, *shalt thou not be accepted*, seems to have been suggested to the translators by referring the phrase, "if thou doest well (אם תעביד)," directly to the offering of sacrifice; that is, according to this interpretation, it was said to Cain: If thou offerest sacrifice rightly, thine offering shalt be accepted; which,

although undoubtedly true, yet does not appear to be the exact sense here. The Hebrew word, which is rendered *shall thou be accepted*, is **נָשָׂא**, a form of the infinitive mode, from **נָשָׂא**, and signifies: a *lifting up, elevation*, and with the ellipsis of **פָּנֶיךָ**, or rather here, **פָּנֶיךָ**, a lifting up of the countenance, a cheerful confidence. It is, accordingly, the opposite of the preceding **נָשָׂא לִי פָנֶיךָ**, for which, as indicative of anger and ill will, Cain is rebuked. These words are also used for the same idea in Job 11: 15, where it is said to Job, that if he will put all iniquity far from him, he shall lift up his face (**וְנָשָׂא פָנֶיךָ**), and be steadfast and not fear; and in 22: 26, "Thou shalt have delight in the Almighty and shalt lift up thy face (**וְנָשָׂא . . . פָּנֶיךָ**) unto God." Ellipsis of a similar kind is so frequent in the Old Testament, that it occasions no difficulty here. Cf. Isa. 42: 2. Job 6: 27 et al saep. Several of the older translators give a different interpretation to this clause, but the one which we have given above, is substantially that of all the modern expositors, as Rosenmüller, Maurer, Tuch, Baumgarten, and others, and seems so apposite to the context, and so much in accordance with the Hebrew idiom, that it is unnecessary to spend much time in confuting them. The Sept. version comes under the same condemnation with our own English, and the inappositeness of the translation of Onkelos and the Vulgate, in which **וְנָשָׂא** is supplied with **וְנָשָׂא**, and the meaning is: it [thy fault] shall be forgiven thee, is sufficiently apparent, since it would be difficult to perceive what need there is of pardon for one who *does well*. Calvin, in his commentary on this passage, says of those who give this interpretation: "Because they imagine a satisfaction which derogates from free pardon, they dissent widely from the meaning of Moses."

The figurative language in the clause: *sin lieth at the door*, needs some explanation. **חַטָּאת**, sin, is impersonated and called a **רֹבֵץ**, a *liar-in-wait*. This word is a participle used as a noun, as the participle frequently is, from the verb **רָבַץ**, *to lie down, recline*, and specif. *to lie in wait, lurk*. So the verb is used of a lion in Gen. 49: 9, and in Arabic **رَبَّاضٍ**, **رَبَّاضٌ**, from a corresponding root, is used as a designation of the same animal. And the sinner himself is frequently represented by the simile of a wild beast. It will not escape the notice of the student that **רֹבֵץ**, in the masculine gender, is joined as predicate with the feminine **חַטָּאת**. For this use of the participle, when it partakes of the nature of a noun, see Stuart's Gesenius's Grammar, § 144, note 2, and Ewald, § 569. b. The language **בְּפֶתַח דְּלֶת**, *at the door*, is accommodated to the person who is laid in wait for, rather than to the liar-in-wait, and the whole phrase vividly represents the danger that will be incurred by the first wrong doing, the indulgence of unjust anger.

In the following clause, אֶל־יְהוָה הַשֹּׁקֵץ, the suffix pronoun י refers to רֹדֵף, the *lier-in-wait*, and the preposition אֶל designates a direction of the mind towards. The figure then is changed from the preceding clause, and the force of the word הַשֹּׁקֵץ is plain if we refer to ch. 3: 16, where it is used in a different connection. The desire of sin is towards thee, that is, it will strive to obtain the mastery over thee, but (י) thou hast dominion over it; it is in your power to refrain from your unjust anger and escape from the dominion of sin. The interpretation which refers the suffix י to Cain, and supposes the last part of the verse to be addressed to Abel, as in our English version, is too harsh and inapposite to need confutation.

In conclusion, two practical truths of great importance lie on the face of this admonition to Cain: 1st. The danger of entering upon a course of wrong doing, which is but too forcibly illustrated in the subsequent history, since the unrestrained anger of Cain led directly to a brother's murder. Secondly, the responsibility of the wrong doer. The evil one lurketh as a lion for his prey, but he has no power over those who are watchful against him. Herder says: "God spake with Cain as with a froward child, and dissuaded him from yielding to that which was sleeping in his heart and lurking at his door like a beast of prey . . . What God did to Cain, he does to every man, if he will but look to his own heart and listen to the voice of God in his conscience."¹

II. GENESIS, CH. IV. vs. 23, 24.

"And Lamech said unto his wives Adah and Zillah, Hear my voice, ye wives of Lamech; hearken unto my speech; for I have slain a man to my wounding, and a young man to my hurt; if Cain shall be avenged seven fold, truly Lamech seventy and seven fold."

This passage is found in connection with the genealogy of Cain. Lamech was the fifth in descent from him, and his son Jubal was the inventor of musical instruments, and Tubal-Cain was the first to fashion metallic weapons. After this last fact was mentioned, the writer immediately adds, in order to distinguish the Lamech here mentioned, and give some idea of his character, what seems to be a quotation from a triumphal song, addressed by him to his wives, probably after the invention by his son, although it is not certain that it has special reference to that. These verses are plainly poetical, both in the use of words, as שָׁמַעְתִּי with הִצַּחְתִּי and in the parallelism, so prominent in all Hebrew poetry. They are properly arranged, according to Lowth, (Lectures on

¹ Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, Vol. I. p. 197.

Hebrew Poetry, transl. by Prof. Stowe, p. 41.) "into three disticha, and the two parallel and as it were corresponding sentiments in each distich." Thus we may translate :

Ye wives of Lamech, hear my voice
And listen to my word :
For a man I slew, because he wounded me ;
A young man, because he assaulted me :
If indeed Cain be seven times avenged,
Then Lamech seventy times seven.

The circumstances commemorated here, seem to be as follows : Lamech appears to have been guilty of manslaughter, and in order to quiet the fears of his wives, he says, that he did it in self-defence ; i. e. for, or on account of, wounds inflicted upon himself, לְחַבְרָתִי and לְחַבְרָתִי ; and if one who slays Cain, a wilful murderer, as it is said in verse 15, shall be avenged seven fold, surely he who is so much less guilty shall receive vengeance seventy and seven fold, especially as the invention of his son gives so much greater facility for its accomplishment. The hero, in his self-confident exultation, forgets that it was by the command of God himself that the life of Cain was thus protected, and for the purpose of making him an example to those among whom he dwelt.

Whether this was merely the beginning of a more extended song, or complete in itself, cannot be determined, as no further traces remain, if it existed. The fact that such popular songs were not unknown among the Hebrews is plain from such passages as Num. 21: 14, Judg. 16: 23, 24, 1 Sam. 18: 7, etc. This insertion in a genealogical record, of something indicative of individual character, is natural, especially when, as here and in ch. 5: 26 seq., two persons of the same name are mentioned.

Several philological peculiarities deserve notice in these verses. The parallelism of the several *stichoi* is so manifest that it cannot escape the notice of the Hebrew scholar. The use of the Praetense חָבַרְתִּי indicates an actual occurrence and not a supposed case. The suffix pronoun ׀ in the words לְחַבְרָתִי and לְחַבְרָתִי, is to be taken objectively, i. e. the wound or stripe *one inflicted upon me*. See Grammar, § 5 and remark, and such passages as Jer. 51: 35. Ex. 20: 20, etc. The preposition לְ here signifies *on account of*, or *because of*, and designates the ground or reason. So it is used in Isa. 14: 9. 15: 5 and often elsewhere.

This passage is not without interest to the Biblical scholar, as being the oldest specimen of Hebrew poetry extant. To be sure, there is much of the sublimity, the true spirit of poetry in the narrative of the

creation, but the precise form of poetical lines, which is so conspicuous here, is not found there. We are almost unavoidably led to the conclusion that poetry was very early not merely invented but cultivated among the Hebrews. For, aside from the poetical spirit which pervades their early records, one passage so perfect in form and finish cannot be supposed to have existed alone.

III. GENESIS, CH. VI. v. 3.

"And the Lord said: My spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh; yet his days shall be an hundred and twenty years."

A more accurate version of the original, would be as follows: My spirit shall not be subject to [dwell in] man forever; on account of his transgression he is flesh, and his days shall be an hundred and twenty years. The general idea is, that the vivifying, life-giving spirit of God shall not remain with man and continue his existence on the earth, as it has previously done; for, by reason of his sinfulness, he shall be weak and his life fleeting, the boundary of his earthly existence shall be the comparatively¹ short space of 120 years. But as this passage is generally misunderstood by the unlettered reader, and often misquoted in popular addresses, it may not be amiss to enter into a somewhat minute examination of the more prominent words upon which its meaning depends.

In the first place, we will inquire, what is to be understood by "my spirit" (רוחי). The original significations of רוּחַ, *breath, breathing, wind*, etc., are of course out of question here; also the kindred meanings, corresponding to נֶפֶשׁ, the Greek ψυχή, the Latin anima, animus, *life, soul, mind*. In Gen. 1: 2, the Spirit of God is represented as brooding over the chaotic elements of the creation so as to bring order out of confusion, and inform with life. By it God garnisheth the heavens (Job 26: 17), and reneweth the face of the earth (Ps. civ.), and giveth life to his servants (Job 27: 3. 33: 4). So this mysterious but unseen agency of God, in creating and upholding life, is indicated in this verse, and רוּחַ is opposed to בָּשָׂר, flesh that soon passes away (Isa. 31: 3), that is like grass that withereth (Isa. 40: 6, 7), a breath, the wind that passeth, but never returneth. Hence the spirit of the Lord here, is the author and supporter of life, that which, according to 2: 7, breathed into the yet lifeless form, composed of the dust of the earth, constitutes man a living soul.

The verb יָדֹנָה next comes under consideration. The ancient ver-

¹ The previous age of men was as follows: Adam, 930 years; Seth, 912; Enos, 905; Canaan, 910; Jared, 965; Methuselah, 969, etc.

sions vary so much as to render it not improbable that there were various readings, as קדים, קדיר, קלין. The Septuagint reads: οὐ μὴ καταμείνη τὸ πνεῦμά μου ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, κ. τ. λ., *shall not remain*, etc. The Vulgate and Persian correspond with it. The Syriac and Saad.: *shall not dwell*, etc. The Targum of Onkelos paraphrases it by: shall not suffer to continue or exist forever. Several of the other Targums, together with our English version, make קדין to correspond in meaning with קדיר: shall not contend with, strive with as before a judge, i. e. shall immediately punish. But it is only in the second form (Hiphil) that this meaning belongs to קדין, whilst this word must be in the first form (Kal), and accordingly would mean with the כ following: will *not judge* among, as in Ps. 110: 6. The inappositeness of this interpretation will be evident to every one without a remark. The explanation of this word given by Maurer, although it expresses the sense of the passage well, seems not to be philologically well authorized. To judge, *judicare*, he considers as = *regnare*, and paraphrases the passage well: My spirit shall not always actuate (agitabit) men, i. e. I will take away from them the head and fountain of life, my vital spirit; not so long a time as their ancestors shall these men continue in life, etc. We arrive at substantially the same meaning more directly and naturally, by supposing that קדין corresponds to the Arabic كَانٍ, *to be inferior, low, subject to*, and hence in this passage, my spirit shall not always be *brought down, subject to* mortals, i. e. descend from heaven to accompany them and preserve them in existence; a shorter term of life shall be theirs, hereafter.

לְעֹלָם, *forever*, is of course used in its limited sense, as in 1 Sam. 1: 22. 20: 15, and has reference to the long period of life previously enjoyed by mortals.

The word קָדַשׁ seems to have been entirely misunderstood by most of the earlier interpreters, who considered it as made up of the preposition ק, the fragment of the relative אֲשֶׁר, ש and the particle גַּם. Thus in our English version it is rendered, *for that also*; in the Sept., διὰ τὸ εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. But the philological objections to this interpretation are insuperable. For, in the first place, גַּם is redundant; then, in case the word were thus compounded, the vowel points would be קָדַשׁ and not קָדַשׁ; and finally, the use of ש for אֲשֶׁר in such a compound, belongs to later Hebrew, or to the Chaldee dialect. There is no passage which could be considered as at all parallel with this in the older Hebrew writers. It is accordingly necessary to look elsewhere for the explanation of this word; and we unquestionably find it as an Infin. in the first form, from קָדַשׁ, with the prefix prep. and suffix pronoun and with the meaning, *on account of their wandering, transgression*.

Cf. the use of derivations from this root in Num. 15: 28, and Lev. 5: 18, et. al. The employment of the plural pronoun, referring to the collective noun *עַמִּי*, is in accordance with an idiom common in almost all languages. For the form of the infinitive *עָמַל* see Grammar § 66, note 3; Ewald § 571, and Jer. 5: 26, *עָמַל*; Ps. 119: 22, *עָמַל*, etc. The consequence of the transgression of man is, that he shall become, as it is indicated in the first clause by a withdrawing of the vivifying influences of the spirit of God, flesh, i. e. frail, weak, perishing, and his life shall be circumscribed to 120 years. Onkelos, Calvin and others refer the 120 years not to individual life, but to the time of repentance to be granted to the whole world. But when we compare chap. 5: 32, with 7: 11, it is difficult to make out the 120 years before the flood, unless we suppose that the designation, 500 years, is used indefinitely in 5: 32, and that Noah was towards 500 years old, that is, about 480.¹ But when we take into account the reduction of the time of life that ensued in connection with the natural meaning of the words as they stand, we do not hesitate to give our assent to the explanation of most of the ancient interpreters, as well as to Josephus,² and to Tuch, Baumgarten and others, among more recent expositors. And in doing this, it is not forgotten that subsequent to this time, the patriarchs exceeded the age of 120 years. For we do not suppose it necessary that this punishment of sin should, from the moment of the declaration, go into rigid execution upon every individual of the race. This is not according to the usual course which God pursues in reference to man. There is generally a gradual development of his purposes. So here we find that the life of man was materially shortened after the flood, and although the patriarchs, in consequence of "walking in the ways and keeping the statutes" of the Most High, were gathered to their fathers in a good old age, yet, they could well say when they looked back to former generations: few and evil have been the days of our pilgrimage, Gen. 47: 9.³ Besides, as we see, the age of man was soon reduced to this specified boundary. Joseph was 110 years old when he died, Gen. 50: 26; Moses attained to the prescribed 120 years, Deut. 34: 7; Joshua died when 110 years old, Josh. 24: 27; Eli was blind by reason of age when 98 years old, 1 Sam. 4: 15, 18. According to 1 Kings 1: 1, David was "old and stricken in years" although not yet seventy, as it appears from 2 Sam. 5: 4. In Ps. 90: 10, four

¹ Compare Calvin's Comm. on Gen., translated by Rev. John Kenly, p. 243, 4.

² Antiquities, I. 3. 2, et al.

³ Abraham died when 175, Gen. 25: 7; Isaac, 180, 35: 28; Jacob, 147, 47: 28. Cf. Tuch's Genesis, S. 130.

score years is spoken of as an age not usually attained by man.¹ Besides it is often intimated in the Old Testament in accordance with the spirit of this passage, that "the fear of the Lord prolongeth days, but the years of the wicked shall be shortened." Cf. also 1 Kings 8: 18, Isa. 38: 17, and many other passages. It is also interesting to notice that there is among almost all nations a tradition of an early age when men, free from diseases, lived far longer than now.²

But another reason for referring this numerical designation to the duration of the life of man, is found in the succeeding narrations. The determination of God to destroy man from the face of the earth and the reason for it, is formally introduced in the following verses as something different from what has gone before: God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, . . . and it repented the Lord that he had made man . . . and he said, I will destroy him from the face of the earth, etc. v. 5—7.

IV. GENESIS CH. IX. VS. 4—6.

VERSE 4. "Only the flesh with its life, its blood, ye shall not eat, v. 5. But your blood, for your lives, I will require; at the hand of every beast I will require it; and at the hand of man, at the hand of man, his brother, I will require the life of man; v. 6. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man his blood shall be shed, for in the image of God, he made man."

"In giving you permission to eat animal flesh, there is one restriction; ye may not eat of its blood. Nevertheless, your blood cannot be poured out on the ground, like that of beasts; "for your lives," i. e. for the preservation of your lives, I will require your blood. Every beast that killeth a man shall make expiation for it; and at the hand of the brother of every man, I will require the life of man. Every murderer stands in the relation of brother to the murdered. Both have a common father, a common Creator. But I will require it at the *hands of man*; I delegate my power in the case to him; the punishment on the murderer shall be executed by man."

¹ Tuch's Genesis. S. 130.

² Cf. Josephus I. 3. 9. where these traditions of a life of a thousand years among the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Phenicians, and others is mentioned; Hesiod Works and Days, line 125 sq.:

"Whilom on earth the sons of men abode,
From evil free and labor's galling load;
Free from diseases that with racking rage
Precipitate the pale decline of age.
How swift the days of manhood haste away,
And misery's pressure turns the temples gray.

And also Tuch's Genesis, S. 131.

v. 4. *וְכָל* is in apposition with *בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל* and defines it more exactly; it is not necessary to repeat the preposition, Ewald § 605, ed. 1835. Not to partake of blood was one of the most stringent prohibitions among the precepts relating to food, comp. Lev. 3: 17. 7: 23. 1 Sam. 14: 32. Acts 15: 20, 29. It was thought that the blood was the seat of life. Lev. 17: 11, "The life of the flesh is in its blood." v. 5. *וְכָל* to require from, to punish bloodshed, to avenge murder, Ps. 9: 13. V. 5, "for your lives," Dative of advantage, in order to preserve life, for your safety; see the parallel passages Deut. 4: 15. Josh. 23: 11. *וְכָל* *אִישׁ* is coördinate with the preceding *וְכָל*, and serves to bring out and define the thought. *אִישׁ*, every one, Ewald § 553, is placed first by emphasis. V. 6. *וְכָל* is emphatic and therefore precedes. "Whoso sheddeth," Part. in the widest sense; the reason too is alike and to the same extent, applicable to all ages. Man is made in the image of God. In the commission of murder, that image is defaced; an insult is, as it were, offered to God's majesty. This injury can be repaired only by the death of the murderer. So the argument founded on the paternal relation of man to man is alike applicable to all ages. For a further exposition of this passage, see B. S. IV. 270.

V. GENESIS CH. XLIX. v. 10.

"The sceptre shall not depart from Judah,
Nor the staff from between his feet,
Until rest shall come,
And unto it shall be the obedience of the nations."

"Judah shall possess an eternal kingdom. In him shall be fulfilled the highest blessings of the Pentateuch; not merely kings and whole nations shall descend from Abraham's race; sorrowfully will Israel for a long time be deprived of kings, Gen. 36: 31; the related tribe of Edomites had kings earlier than Israel; the promises will not be thus limited. As the promises made to Abraham culminated in Jacob, so Jacob's blessings culminate in Judah, yet the crown of all lies in Judah's glorious, eternal kingdom. This is the root of the Messianic idea, the germ of that which subsequently became a personal Messiah. Never shall the sceptre depart from Judah; the royal power for Judah shall never fail, nor the staff, the royal sceptre, from between his feet." *קֶדְשׁ* means, first, a lawgiver, ruler, Deut. 33: 21, Judges 5: 14; second, the instrument which the ruler uses, Num. 21: 18. Ps. 60: 9, the staff of office, the sceptre. Those who interpret it *lawgiver*, ruler, understand it as a euphemism: from his posterity a ruler shall never fail. In support of it, appeal is made to Deut. 28: 57. But there the

expression "between the feet," is used of a woman who brings forth, and is not pertinent here. The meaning *staff*, also, corresponds to *sceptre* in the other clause. With oriental monarchs the sceptre rests between the feet. They are represented sitting or standing with the emblem of authority resting between their feet. Thus king Agamemnon leans on his sceptre, when he utters his decisions, II. II. 100. On the ruins of Persepolis, a Persian king appears sitting on the throne, and at his feet he holds a large royal sceptre, Niebuhr's Travels II. tab. 29. "Till the time of rest, or rest comes." There are three principal explanations of שָׁלוֹם. 1. Many MSS. read שָׁלוֹם without the ו; the word however is written defectively for שָׁלוֹם; but some are thus induced to alter the vowels and read שָׁלוֹם, i. e. אֲשֶׁר לוֹ, for אֲשֶׁר לִי, "until he comes to whom it belongs." But there is no necessity for altering the vowels. Ezek. 21: 32, without doubt refers to this passage, where שָׁלוֹם corresponds to שָׁלוֹם in our passage, for peace will be established through righteousness. The abbreviated form of אֲשֶׁר belongs, too, with few exceptions, to the later books, Ges. § 36, Ewald § 468. 2. Others take the word for a proper name Shiloh, "until he (Judah, or they) comes to Shiloh. Tuch renders: "so long, or so often as, they come to Shiloh, i. e. forever," the author believing that the sanctuary would be permanent in Shiloh. But Shiloh as a place is not mentioned in Genesis; it occurs, indeed, in the later history, in the time of the Judges, but it has little historical importance; there is nothing decisive in the later Hebrew history which would lead one to suppose that here such stress was laid on the possession of Shiloh. Besides, the wholly general character of our prophecy does not accord with the mentioning of such a place as Shiloh and the abode of the sanctuary there; the sacred character of it was rather temporary than permanent. 3. The right explanation is probably that which makes it an appellative noun from שָׁלוֹם to be at rest; it is formed after the analogy of the abstract nouns קִיּוּם and קִיּוּם. It has been taken in a personal sense, referring to the Messiah, as pacificator, prince of peace; but the thought appears to be expressed more in general, abstractly; it thus agrees with the parallelism. We have accordingly the meaning, *rest, condition of peace*, until a peaceful time shall begin. זָר until his dominion shall become one of peace, comp. Ps. 110: 1. יָקָם is an old verb to be obedient, from which comes יָקָם, Const. יָקָם, Daghesh Forte Euphonic, comp. יָקָם v. 17, Ges. § 20. 2. ב. And to it all nations shall be obedient, Ps. 2: 1. The point is that *all* nations shall obey. עַמִּים means, not tribes, but nations in general. In v. 8, Judah is represented as having power over his enemies. See the Commentaries of Tuch 1838, Baumgarten 1843, and Hävernicks Lectures on Theology, etc. 1848, p. 214.

ARTICLE IX.

LIBRARIES IN BOSTON AND ITS VICINITY.

WE have taken some pains to ascertain the number and general character of the Public Libraries in Boston and in the towns within thirty or forty miles. Our general object is to know how far there are facilities in this part of the country for prosecuting studies of a literary, scientific, and theological character. For progress in investigation in any department of knowledge it is necessary to ascertain where the implements and materials may be found, whether there is more than one specimen or set of them, and whether they are accessible to the public or not. It is not enough to be acquainted with the existence or the number of volumes in our libraries. We need to know whether there are duplicates of important works, so that an exchange may be made, whether all our libraries may not be destitute of some works of great cost and of great utility, whether there may not be a mutual understanding in regard to the supply of deficiencies, whether all the libraries may not be safely used by a far greater number of people than are now admitted to them, etc. We cannot undertake to answer these questions, but we may perhaps make a beginning. If our Article shall suggest the importance of a common Catalogue of *the most rare and valuable books* to be found in all the public libraries of New England, as an instance of what a mutual good understanding and co-operation might effect, we shall be satisfied.

LIBRARY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

The library of Harvard college was destroyed by fire in 1764. It was a valuable collection of more than 5000 volumes. A new library was immediately commenced, and, through the liberality of the General Courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, of Thomas Hollis of London, of the Society for Propagating the Gospel, and of other enlightened Societies and individuals, rapidly increased, so that in 1790, when a catalogue was printed, it consisted of about 12,000 volumes. To the noble munificence and fatherly care of Hollis, the library and the college owe a great debt of obligation. His deeds place him among the most honored benefactors of man. Among his benefactions was a splendid, large paper, *loyal* copy of Walton's Polyglott. In Giggeius' Thesaur. Ling. Arab., he mentions that he was particularly industrious in collecting grammars and lexicons,

of the oriental *root* languages, so that he might be the means, with others, "of forming a few *prime* scholars, honors to their country and lights to mankind." In 1772, Thomas Palmer of Boston, afterwards of London, gave to the library *The Antiquities of Herculaneum* and Piranesi's *Views of Rome* in 20 fol. vols. At his death in 1820, he added nearly 1200 "choice and costly" volumes. Through the liberality of Hon. Israel Thorndike of Boston, the library of Prof. Ebeling, of Hamburg, was purchased and given to Harvard college. It contained more than 3200 volumes, consisting chiefly of the most important works on American History, in several languages, with a collection of 10,000 maps, charts, and views, probably unrivalled by any other collection on the same subject. Samuel A. Eliot of Boston made an important addition to the works on America by the donation of Mr. Warden's valuable collection of nearly 1200 vols., besides maps, prints, and charts. His brother, Wm. H. Eliot, gave to the library, the "*Description de l'Egypte*." Among some of the more valuable books now belonging to the library, besides those already named, are the *Transactions of the French Academies*, of St. Petersburg, Madrid, Lisbon, Berlin, Göttingen, Turin, Royal Society of London, Royal Irish, etc.; *The Acta Eruditorum* in 93 vols.; *The Biographie Universelle*; *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*; *The Complutensian*, Paris, and *Walton's Polyglotts* (of the last, both a loyal and a republican copy); *Bibliothek Schönen Wissenschaften*, etc., Leips., 52 vols.; some of the early editions of the English Bible; the *Works of the Greek and Latin Fathers*, some of them in various editions.

The library-building, Gore Hall, was commenced in 1837. It is built of Sienite, or Quincy granite, in the form of a Latin cross, the length of the body being 140 feet, and that of the transepts $81\frac{1}{2}$ feet. The interior is 112 feet long and 35 feet high. The books are placed in the alcoves, which are formed by partitions running from the columns to the walls. These partitions rise from the floor to the ceiling, 35 feet, and this space is divided by a gallery $12\frac{1}{2}$ feet from the floor. The cost is stated to have been \$70,000.

The volumes in the library were counted July 11, 1849, and found to be 55,605. Including the additions since made, the number may be put down at 56,000. This includes the bound manuscripts. The unbound pamphlets and serial works are estimated, exclusive of duplicates, to be 25,000. They probably exceed this number. No enumeration of MSS., separate from the foregoing, has been made. In 1819, seven Greek MSS. were procured in Constantinople, one a fragment of an *Evangelistary*, probably of the 9th century. There are some Latin MSS., and several oriental MSS., in Arabic, Persian, Hindoostanee, Japanese, etc.

Of Roman coins and medals, the library has 671 in copper, 43 in silver, and 1 in gold. Of ancient coins other than Roman, 8. There are about 500 modern coins of all sorts, and 35 modern medals. The annual increase of the library, since 1832, has been as follows: — “ For the years ending

July 13, 1832, 1299 vols. and 255 pamph.'s, includ. 502 vols. and 190 p.'s given.

“ 12, 1833,	602	“	212	“	“	156	“	204	“	“
“ 11, 1834,	815	“	737	“	“	371	“	733	“	“
“ 10, 1835,	227	“	184	“	“	156	“	181	“	“
“ 15, 1836,	1343	“	237	“	“	384	“	153	“	“
“ 14, 1837,	1043	“	205	“	“	310	“	185	“	“
“ 13, 1838,	803	“	200	“	“	317	“	172	“	“
“ 12, 1839,	551	“	532	“	“	238	“	532	“	“
“ 10, 1840,	251	“	249	“	“	161	“	242	“	“
“ 9, 1841,	881	“	1402	“	“	270	“	1119	“	“
“ 11, 1842,	840	“	700	“	“	419	“	700	“	“
“ 11, 1843,	1353	“	1597	“	“	322	“	1421	“	“
“ 9, 1844,	3645	“	1333	“	“	453	“	1318	“	“
“ 15, 1845,	2929	“	3806	“	“	652	“	3122	“	“
“ 14, 1846,	2018	“	3477	“	“	679	“	3319	“	“
“ 13, 1847,	1762	“	3321	“	“	1072	“	3205	“	“
“ 11, 1848,	1523	“	2632	“	“	540	“	2520	“	“
“ 11, 1849,	724	“	1645	“	“	336	“	1580	“	“.”

As the books bought for the last seven years have been procured with the money subscribed in 1842, they are to be considered as donations; so that all the additions since 1842 are strictly gifts. The only permanent fund for the increase of the library yields \$450 per annum. In 1842, the sum of \$22,000 was raised by subscription, to be applied to the purchase of books, but not as a permanent fund. This sum is now reduced to \$5,883, which will probably be entirely expended in the course of two or three years. Among the late additions are works in modern English Literature, German Literature with the Classical and other departments, Scientific Works, etc. T. W. Harris, M. D., librarian.

The Theological library consists of select works, mostly in modern theology, with some of the early Fathers in the original. The Law library contains most of the valuable works in English and American Law, and in the Civil Law.

BOSTON ATHENÆUM.

This library now contains about 50,000 bound volumes, including 1500 or 1600 volumes of pamphlets. It possesses also 20,000 or more of unbound pamphlets, between 400 and 500 volumes of engravings, and the most valuable collection of coins in this part of the country. Three fourths of the income of the Bromfield fund, which amounts to \$25,000, are devoted to the purchase of books, the remaining one fourth is added to the principal. The Athenæum is also in possession of another fund of \$25,000 for the support of the institution. For an American library, it is rich in certain departments, e. g. in the Reports and Transactions of learned scientific Societies, in periodical publications in the English language, in the current English literature, works in Natural Sciences, etc. It has the Transactions complete of the Royal Society of London, of the French Academies and Institute, of the Royal Societies of Berlin, Copenhagen, Göttingen, Lisbon, Madrid, Stockholm, St. Petersburg, Turin, etc., *Encyclopédie Raisonné*, 35 vols. folio; the *Encyclopédie Methodique*, 258 vols. 4to., including 37 of plates; Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle*, by C. S. Sonnini, 127 vols. 8vo.; publications of the Archæological Society of London; the *Moniteur Universelle* in 65 volumes, from 1790 to 1816; the *Gentleman's Magazine* from the beginning in 1732; the *Monthly Review* from its beginning in 1749 to 1825, in 189 vols., *The London Monthly Magazine*, from 1796 to 1825, in 59 vols., *Dodsley's Annual Register* from 1758 to the present time, etc.

In July, 1849, this library was removed to its new home in Beacon Street. The building is an ornament to the city, and its internal arrangements are admirable. The material is of free stone, of the same kind as that used in the construction of Trinity Church in New York. The front is in the Palladian style of architecture, about 100 feet in length by 60 in height. In the basement are to be rooms for packing books, for a bindery, etc. The first floor is for the reading rooms, a room for the trustees, and a sculpture gallery. The library occupies the second story, which is divided into three rooms, one on each side of the staircase, and one large hall, 109 feet in length by 40 in breadth. The western division of the hall is filled with encyclopædias, scientific transactions, magazines, etc. The larger portion is fitted to correspond, and is divided into twenty-six alcoves. The shelving is carried to the height of 18 or 20 feet, and the upper shelves are made accessible by means of a light iron gallery running round the walls of the room and into the alcoves. There are five graceful spiral staircases leading to the gallery. This room contains about 40,000 volumes. The two ante-rooms will accommo-

date 25,000 volumes more. The picture gallery occupies the upper story and is nearly finished. It is divided into six apartments, each of which is lighted by a sky-light, and promises to be all which an exhibition room needs.¹ From \$75,000 to \$100,000 are needed to complete the building and to put the establishment in all respects into a proper state. It is understood that a large portion of this sum is already subscribed. The institution is an honor to Boston and New England. It is to be hoped that its usefulness to the great body of the population will be much enlarged. Charles Folsom, librarian.

MASSACHUSETTS STATE LIBRARY.

This Library was originated by an Act of the Legislature passed March 3, 1826, requiring that "all the books, and manuscripts belonging to the Commonwealth, and now in any of the apartments of the State House, shall be collected, deposited and arranged, in proper cases, in the room in said State House usually called the Land Office." The library is under the direction of a joint standing committee of the legislature, annually appointed, "whose duty it shall be to superintend the Library." It is for the use of the General Court and officers of the government. An annual appropriation of \$300, is made by the Legislature "to procure such books, manuscripts, and charts, works of science and the arts, as tend to illustrate the resources and means of improvement of this Commonwealth or of the United States." Additions are also made annually of the Statutes, Legislative Journals and Documents, and Law Reports of the United States, and of the several States of the Union, received in exchange through the Secretary's Department. Of *such* works it probably contains a more complete collection than any other library. One thousand and eighty duplicate volumes of Laws, Public Documents, and Reports have been deposited in the Law Library of Harvard University by a Resolve of the Legislature.

The Library contains Mr. Audubon's collection of American Birds, in 4 large folio volumes, at an original cost of about six hundred dollars. An addition was recently made of 440 volumes of French, German and Swedish Books of Science, Arts, History and Statistics, some of which are of great value, by international exchanges, through M. Vattemare. Among them are the following works, presented by the Chamber of Deputies:—Collection of Etruscan, Greek, and Roman Antiquities, from the Cabinet of Hon. Wm. Hamilton, Naples, 1766; four large folio volumes, with English and French text, and 520 plates. Presented by the Minister of the Interior:—Monuments of Nineveh, published by order of

¹ Lit. World, Aug. 11, 1849.

the government; Descriptions by P. E. Botta; Designs by E. Flandin; the first 10 numbers, *to be continued*. Presented by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce:—Statistics of France, comprising Territory, Population, External Commerce, etc. from 1837 to 1843; nine large folio volumes. Presented by the National Library of France:—The New Theatre of the World, containing Maps, Tables, Descriptions, etc. of all the Regions of the Globe, 1639; 3 large folio volumes. This, considering its date, is a magnificent work; the Holy Evangelists, in Arabic and Latin: Printed at Rome, in the Typographia of Lorenzo de Medici, 1591, large folio; the works of Euclid, in Arabic: Printed at Rome, in the 16th century: folio; Acta Historica Ecclesiastica Nostri Temporis: Printed at Weimar, 1741 to 1774, *extremely rare*, 43 volumes. Presented by the King of Sweden:—History of the Kingdom of the Moors until their expulsion in 1726, in Arabic and Latin: Edited by Prof. Tornberg, 2 volumes in one; Ancient Sweden, etc. with 3 volumes of Plates of its Provinces, Cities, Buildings, etc., in oblong quarto. The choicest volumes in the State Library to a descendant and admirer of the Puritans, and indeed to any true son of New England, are the ancient General Court Records of Massachusetts. They are copies, in manuscript, of original papers in the archives of the Secretary of State, and make 34 large folio volumes. The Records commence with 1629 and extend to October, 1777, and contain the entire legislative and much of the religious history of Massachusetts between those periods. Each volume has a copious index at its close, containing the names of *persons* and *places*, also a list of subjects spoken of, in separate columns, which facilitates reference, and greatly increases the value of these treasures of our Colonial history. No books in the library are consulted more frequently or with more interest. Since the first volume was transcribed, several pages have been inserted at the beginning containing records of a still earlier date. The first is a letter to Gov. Endicott, and concludes, "The God of Heaven and earth preserve and keepe you from all foreign and inland enimies and bless and prosper his plantation to the enlarging of the kingdom of Jesus Christ, to whose merciful protection I commend you and your associates, here knowne or unknowne. And soe tyll my next, which shall be, God willinge by our shippes, whoe I make account will be readie to sett sayle from here about ye 20th of this next moneth of March, I end and rest.

Your loving friend and cussen,

MATTHEWE CRADOCKE."

*From my house in Swithin's
Lane neere London stone, this
16th of February, 1628, stilo.*

The State Library now contains, including duplicate volumes of Laws and Public Documents, etc. deposited in the Law Library of Harvard

University subject to be recalled by the Legislature, about 7000 bound volumes. Included in this number are 13 bound volumes of pamphlets. Rev. Samuel C. Jackson, librarian.

LIBRARY OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

The number of bound volumes of books is about	7000
Bound volumes of pamphlets	" 2000
Number of unbound pamphlets	" 2000
Number of volumes of MSS. bound	" 450

Among the most valuable treasures belonging to this Society are the MSS. of the historian Hubbard; of the first Gov. Winthrop, 11 vols.; of Gov. Hutchinson; of Gov. Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, 23 vols.; the MS. of Washington's Farewell Address to the officers of the American Army. The Society has also 98 folio vols. of Commercial Statistics of the United States, embracing the years from 1816 to 1842 inclusive, drawn up with care and very complete. There is a copy of Eliot's Indian Bible in the library. Thirty volumes of Collections have been printed, in three series of ten vols. each; the last vol. of each series contains a full index of all the vols. in the series. The portraits of about seventy persons, mostly New England worthies, adorn one of the rooms. Some of these are of special value, e. g. the portraits of Rev. Increase Mather, and of Rev. John Wilson. The Society possesses no funds, not even for the support of a librarian. The current expenses are met by annual assessments on the members. The number of members is limited by the act of incorporation to 60. The library is kept in rooms above the Savings Bank in Tremont Street. Rev. Joseph B. Felt is librarian.

BOSTON LIBRARY.

The Boston Library was incorporated in 1794. It is a proprietors' library, and the books are lent only to proprietors, the number of whom is now about 170. The value of a share is from \$12 to \$15. The number of volumes is 12,000, of which 1,500 are in French, and the remainder in the English language. The books are almost exclusively of a popular or miscellaneous character, embracing works in history, biography, voyages, travels, fiction. The number of volumes added annually is about 250. An assessment is laid on each proprietor of \$3 annually. The price of a share is so reasonable, that the library is more popularly useful than any other in Boston. It is kept in rooms over the Arch in Franklin Street.

LIBRARY OF THE MERCANTILE ASSOCIATION.

The whole number of books belonging to this Association April 18, 1849, was 5819. By subsequent additions it now amounts to about 7000. The number of vols. added in the year 1848-9 was 579. This library is, also, of a popular and miscellaneous character, embracing works suited to the tastes and wants of merchants and merchants' clerks, in the field of general literature. It has a reading room, where 89 newspapers are received and 21 magazines and reviews. The number of members is now 1145. An annual course of lectures is delivered by distinguished gentlemen. The members participate in exercises of debate, declamation and composition. The whole number of tickets for the lectures in 1848-9 was 1300. The invested funds of the Society amount to \$16,100, and one share in the Boston Athenæum. A catalogue of the works in the library was printed in 1848.

LIBRARY OF NATURAL HISTORY.

The Boston Society of Natural History have laid the foundation of a valuable library in the sciences to which their studies are directed. It is expected that the choice library of the late Dr. Amos Binney, formerly president of the Society, will be incorporated with that of the Society. Both will form a fine collection of the most important works in Natural History in the English and French languages.

THE PRINCE LIBRARY.

The Old South Church (Congregational) in Boston possesses a valuable collection of books and MSS. bequeathed to the church by Rev. Thomas Prince, one of its former pastors. Mr. Prince, while in college, in 1703, began a collection of books, and public and private papers relating to the civil and religious history of New England, to which he continued to make valuable additions for more than fifty years. It is a precious collection, containing many standard works in church history and biblical literature and theology, the works of the early divines of New England, and valuable pamphlets and MSS. See Dr. B. B. Wisner's *History of Old South Church*, p. 23.

LIBRARY OF THE AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY AT
WORCESTER.

There are more than 18,000 volumes in this Library, besides a mass of unbound pamphlets and MSS., and other depositories of interest and value. The permanent funds of the society amount to \$29,538.33, divided into three funds, viz: the librarian's \$13,351.78; a fund originally intended in part for researches among the aboriginal tribes in the West, which has accumulated to \$12,056.20; and a residuary fund which may be employed for any of the necessary purposes of the society and which amounts to \$4,130.35. The first volume of the Society's Transactions is on the fortifications, mounds and other antiquities of the West, by Caleb Atwater, with some letters from other sources. The second volume comprises a Dissertation on Indian History and Languages, by Albert Gallatin, and Gookin's History of the Praying Indians. A third volume, now in press, comprises the early records of the Massachusetts Bay company and colony, from the original MSS. The Society have published a catalogue of its library, an expensive and valuable work. This institution will be an enduring monument of the munificence of its founder, the venerable printer, ISAIAH THOMAS. The library is rich in works pertaining to or illustrating American antiquities, history, politics, local history, typography, church history, the condition, character, languages, etc. of the aborigines. Its files of newspapers are very extensive and complete. Samuel F. Haven, librarian.

LIBRARY OF THE ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

This library was commenced in 1808. In 1819, a catalogue of 160 pages was printed; in 1838, an elaborate catalogue was published in a volume of 531 pages, and a supplement was added in 1849, of 67 pages. The whole number of volumes, including some works which have been ordered, but not yet received, amounts to about 17,000. This total embraces some duplicates. Of the works used as text-books and the more important books of reference, there is a considerable number of copies. Six or seven hundred dollars per annum, the income of a fund devoted to this purpose, are expended for the purchase of books. The library is a lending library to all connected with the Seminary, and, on certain conditions, to others. A great part of the books were purchased. The most important gift was that of the theological library of the late Rev. Dr. John Codman of Dorchester, amounting to 1250 volumes. Among the more

important works in the library are the following: Grævius' *Thesaurus Antiquitatum*, etc. 45 vols. in 24, fol.; Gronovius' *Thesaurus Antiquitatum Græcarum*, 18 vols. fol.; Gruter's *Inscriptions*, 2 vols. fol.; Sallengre Nov. *Thesaurus*, 3 vols. fol.; *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio*, Rome, 1825 — 31, 10 vols. quarto; The Benedictine edition of many of the Fathers, folio, in many vols.; Martianay's ed. of Jerome; Martene and Durand's *Vet. Scriptor. et Monument. Collectio*, 9 vols. fol.; Harduin's *Conciliorum Collectio*, 12 vols. fol.; Mansi's *Conciliorum Nova Collectio*, 30 vols. fol.; Odespun's *Concilia Novissima*, 1 vol. fol.; Fleury's *Histoire*, with the continuation, 36 vols. quarto; Schroeckh's *Church History* with the continuation, 45 vols.; the *Magdeburgh Centuries*, 9 vols. fol.; Fabricius' *Bibliotheca Græca*, 10 vols. quarto; *Latina*, 6 vols. quarto; Assemani *Bib. Orientalis*, 4 vols. fol.; Koran ed. Marracci, 2 vols. fol., St. Petersburg ed. 1792, Hamburg ed. 1694; Castell's *Lexicon Heptaglotton*, 1 vol. fol.; Walton's *Polyglott*, 6 vols. fol., 2 copies; the *Paris Polyglott*, 10 vols. fol.; the *Antwerp Polyglott*, 8 vols. fol.; Haye's *Biblia Maxima Versionum*, 19 vols. fol.; *Bibliotheca Frat. Polonorum*, 8 vols. fol.; Moreri's *Dictionaire*, 8 vols. fol.; Bartolucci *Bibliotheca Rabbinica*, 5 vols. fol.; Bayle's *Dictionaire Historique*, etc. 4 vols. fol.; the same in English, 10 vols. fol.; Ducange's *Glossarium*, 3 vols. fol.; *Memoires des Chinois*, 16 vols. quarto, Paris, 1776 — 1814; Du Halde's *Description de la Chine*, 4 vols. fol.; Grossier's *Histoire de la Chine*, 13 vols. quarto; *Works of Venema*, 24 vols.; of Apb. Usher, 13 vols.; H. Stephens' *Thesaurus Ling. Gr.*, 3 vols. fol., 1672, Appendix, Lond. 1745, 2 vols. fol.; ed. Hase, Paris incomplete; R. Stephens' *Thes. Ling. Lat.* 4 vols. fol.; *Works of Erasmus*, 10 vols. fol., Leyden, 1703 — 6; of Luther, ed. Walch, 24 vols.; of Calvin, Amst. 1667 — 71, 9 vols. fol., 2 copies; of Zuingli, 11 vols. quarto, Zurich, 1828 — 42; Halle *Allg. Litt. Zeit.* from 1785 to 1840, 142 vols. quarto; Ersch and Gruber's *Encyclopædie*, 98 vols. quarto; *Paris Journal Asiatique*, 50 vols. 8vo.; *Biographie Universelle*, 1st Series, 52 vols. 8vo.; Oxford Library of the Fathers, 30 vols. 8vo.; complete *Works of Dr. Priestley* in 58 vols.; complete *Works of Hegel*, 1832 — 42, in 20 vols.; do. of Herder, 60 vols. in 30, Stuttgart 1827 — 30; *Byzantine Historians*, ed. Niebuhr, 44 vols. 8vo.; *Codex Ephræmi Syri*, 1 vol.; Fac-Simile of the *Codex Alexandrinus* in Brit. Museum, etc. The library has ordered a collection of between 2000 and 3000 small books and pamphlets relating to or written by the Puritans and published in England in the time of Charles I., the Commonwealth, and Charles II. The department in the library, which is most fully supplied, is that relating to the Christian Fathers and Church history generally. It has also a good collection of works relating to biblical commentary, criticism and antiquities. It possesses also many of the best early editions of

the Greek and Roman Classics and works illustrative of them. It is quite deficient in works on the English language and standard English literature; in the productions of the English and American Puritans; in general works of science, which would be suitable to a theological library; in the best later editions of the Classics, etc. Edward Robie, librarian.

LIBRARY OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

This library, though not among the largest, is among the most select and valuable in the country. A part of it was selected with great pains and with excellent judgment by Professor C. C. Jewett, now librarian of the Smithsonian Institution, who devoted a large part of several years to the purchase of books in several countries of Europe. The library now contains about 23,000 bound volumes. At the time the Catalogue was printed in 1843, the number of books was only 10,000. The library fund yields \$1500 per annum, \$1200 of which are devoted to the purchase of books. A new Catalogue is in the process of formation. Among the more important works are the following: *The Moniteur Universelle*, complete from its commencement, 1789 to 1826, 77 vols. folio; *Description de l'Egypte*, 26 vols. of text, and about 500 folio engravings; a complete set of the new series of the *Memoirs of the five Academies of the French Institute*, in 111 quarto volumes; a collection of *Memoirs relative to the history of France*, edited by Guizot and Petitot, in 162 vols. 8vo.; a complete set of the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*, in 130 vols. 8vo.; the *Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*, now numbering about 140 volumes; *Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopaedie*, now amounting to 100 vols. 4to.; *Canina's work on Architecture*, 9 vols. 8vo. of text and 3 large folio vols. of plates; *Il Vaticano*, in 8 vols. folio; *Museo Borbonico*, 13 vols. folio; the *Musee Francais* and *Musee Royale*, 6 folio vols. of engravings, with letter-press; *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London*, from 1665 to 1848, in 66 vols. 4to.; *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, in 178 vols. 8vo.; a selection from the *Reports of the British Parliament*, in 100 folio vols.; a collection of works relating to *Shakspeare*, in 196 vols.; *Corpus Byzantinae Historiae*, 30 vols. fol.; *Graevius' Thesaurus Antiquitatum et Historiarum Italiae*, 23 vols. fol.; *Dugdale's Monasticon Anglicanum*, 8 vols. 8vo.; *Montfaucon's Antiquité Expliquée*, 15 vols. folio; *Choiseul's Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce*, 3 vols. fol.; *Howell and Corbett's State Trials*, 21 vols. 8vo.; nearly 200 vols. folio of *Works of the Fathers*, e. g. *Chrysostom* 13 vols., *Thomas Aquinas* 10 vols., *Harduinian Collection of Councils* 12 vols., *Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum* 28 vols., etc.: this Patristic Collection was purchased by the churches of various denomi-

nations in the city of Providence, \$1200 being raised for this purpose. The pastors have free access to the library, in virtue of this donation. R. A. Guild, librarian.

The library of the Athenaeum in Providence is very well selected, embracing the most important works in all those departments of English literature which are adapted to the general wants and tastes of an enlightened community. The institution is admirably conducted, and is a model for all similar establishments. It has lately received the liberal donation of \$10,000.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

Cambridge.	Public or College Library,	56,000
	Medical Library,	1,200
	Law Library,	13,000
	Society Libraries of Students,	10,000
Boston.	Athenaeum Library,	50,000
	Boston Library,	12,000
	Historical Society,	9,000
	State Library,	7,000
	Mercantile Library,	7,000
Worcester.	Library of the Antiquarian Society	18,000
Providence, R. I.	College Library,	23,000
	Libraries of Students,	6,000
	Library of the Athenaeum,	17,000
Andover.	Library of the Theol. Seminary,	17,000
	Libraries of Students,	4,000
Newton.	Theol. Institution Library,	6,000
Total,		256,200

The number of valuable private libraries in Boston and its neighborhood is large. We may be permitted to refer to a few of them. Mr. George Ticknor, of Boston, author of the *History of Spanish Literature*, has a very choice collection of works in Spanish literature and in early English literature, amounting to more than 12,000 volumes. His collection of the editions of Shakspeare and Milton and of works illustrative of them, is very large and valuable. It is stated that his Spanish library is unsurpassed out of Spain, and probably by only a very few there. Mr. E. A. Crowninshield of Boston, has a very choice collection in Belles Lettres; many of the volumes are printed on large paper. Mr. Prescott, the historian, has a well selected library, rich in Spanish literature. Mr. Thomas Dowse of Cambridgeport has a library of several thousand volumes, finely selected and of choice editions. Mr. Z. Hosmer of the same place possesses a valuable library in general literature, including some classical works and an admirable collection of early

English poetry. The library of the Rev. Dr. Sears of Newton, Secretary of the Board of Education, contains several thousand volumes, selected with great care. In the department of history, secular and church, especially of the German States, it is extremely valuable, and contains many works not found, probably, in any other library in this vicinity. Mr. Charles Deane of Cambridge has a very good collection of choice books on early American history. The principal feature in the collection of Mr. Brown of Providence is the early books on American history. Of books on American history, prior to 1700, his collection is perhaps the best in the country. He has choice copies of the Complutensian, Antwerp, Paris and Walton's Polyglott, and a nice collection of the Aldine editions of the classics.

Mr. George Livermore of Cambridge has a library of about 3,000 volumes, of rare value, as will be seen in the sequel. It has been his object to collect, first, the works of the best English authors in History, Biography, Poetry, etc.; second, works relating to or illustrating Typographical and Bibliographical Antiquities; third, the varying versions and editions of the Bible. In this rich collection, among others, are the following books and Mss.: In the department of Typographical and Bibliographical Antiquities, 1. "The Catholicon." "A huge folio volume printed at Mentz in 1460 by GUTTENBERG, the inventor of printing. [This is believed to be the oldest printed volume in the country bearing the date, the Psalter of 1457 being the first book ever printed with the date, but no copy of that work is to be found in this country. A copy of the Mazarine Bible, supposed to have been printed about 1455, and to have been the first book ever printed, is now in the library of Mr. James Lenox of New York. It cost in London £500.] 2. "Higden's Polychronicon." A small black letter folio volume, printed in 1482, by CAXTON, the first printer in England. [Mr. L. has also works from the press of Wynken de Worde and Richard Pynron, the successors of Caxton.] — 3. "The Bay Psalm Book." The first book from the New England press; printed at Cambridge by Stephen Daye in 1640. [Mr. L. has also specimens of printing by most of the principal printers of the 17th and 18th centuries in this country. Several by Dr. Franklin and his brother James, etc.] He has also quite a large number of black letter English books, including an early black letter Chaucer, Piers Ploughman, Roger Ascham, etc.

In the class of Biblical Manuscripts, a Hebrew Ms. synagogue roll, being the book of Esther, from the Duke of Sussex's library. The date not ascertained. — 2. The Latin Vulgate, entire. A very beautiful Ms., written during the 12th century on the most delicate vellum, and elaborately illuminated in colors. Also a similar but much smaller copy of

the 13th century. Both of these are from the collection of the late Duke of Sussex, and are described by Dr. Pettigrew in "*The Bibliotheca Sussexiana*." — 3. An English Ms. on paper, being a new metrical version of the book of Job, by George Sandys, about 1620. This manuscript is also from the Sussex collection, and a description of it occupies six pages in Pettigrew's "*Bibliotheca Sussexiana*." Mr. Pettigrew says, "I presume this Ms. to be an original transcript of Sandys's beautiful paraphrase upon the book of Job. I have made diligent search and inquiry to meet with some Ms. or autograph of the author . . . to satisfy myself on this point, but in vain." *Bib. Suss. Vol. I. Part 1. p. CCLII.*

In the department of printed Bibles are, 1. Latin Vulgate, large folio, printed at Basil, 1470. This is believed to be the oldest *printed Bible* in this country, excepting Mr. Lenox's Mazarine Bible. Mr. L. has numerous other copies of the Latin Vulgate printed before the year 1500. — 2. Also Servetus's Bible, being Pagninus' Latin version, with notes by Servetus, 1542. Only a few copies were saved from the flames. *Biblia Germanica*, folio, printed at Augsburg, 1477. This edition is particularly described by Dibdin in his *Bibliotheca Spenceriana*, Vol. I. page 50. Mr. L. has numerous other German Bibles of the fifteenth century, some of them containing very curious, rude and grotesque engravings. — 3. Erasmus' Greek Testament, first edition, and the first Testament ever printed, Basil, 1516; also the first Greek *Bible*, printed by Aldus at Venice, 1518, and the first Greek Testament printed in England, as well as the first one printed in the United States. — 4. Polyglott Psalter, Geneva, 1516, being the first polyglott work ever published, and containing the first Arabic ever printed. This work contains a remarkable note to Psalm 19: 4. Columbus is made to boast that he was the person appointed by God to fulfil the prophetic exclamation of David; also the *Psalterium Quincuplex*, Paris, 1509, and several others.

Of English Bibles, 1. Wicliff's New Testament; four different editions, being all that have ever been printed. — 2. Tyndale's New Testament, an early black letter copy, and various more recent editions. — 3. Coverdale's Bible and Testament. — 4. Matthew's [alias John Rogers] Bible, 1549, and another, 1551. — 5. Cranmer's Bible; several early black letter editions. — 6. The Genevan version; numerous editions. — 7. The Bishop's Bible; first edition 1568, and several others. — 8. The Douay [or Roman Catholic], 1st ed., 1609, and many others. — 9. King James' first edition, and many of the most remarkable subsequent editions including those of 1638 and 1660, containing Bishop Chase's "*Notable Corruption*;" the Vinegar Bible of 1716, etc.

Our view would be quite incomplete were we to omit a notice of the immense and inestimable collection belonging to the well known publishers and booksellers, Messrs. Little and Brown of Boston. During the

year 1849, this firm have published what are equivalent to 65,000 octavo volumes; have imported at least 75,000 volumes, of which 55,000 were English, the remainder French, German, etc.; and have at present a retail stock of about 80,000 volumes, including the law department. In this collection are embraced many works of great value and comparative rarity, e. g. Sylvestre *Palaeographie Universelle*, 4 vols. folio; Piranisi *Oeuvres Complete*, 29 vols. folio; Delphin edition of the classics, 185 vols. 8vo; *Il Vaticano*; an Historical account of St. Peter's Church at Rome, 8 vols. folio; 900 engravings from the Vatican Museum; Macklin's superb edition of the Bible; Gould's *Birds of Europe*; Audubon's *Birds of America*, 4 vols. folio; the Benedictine *Historians of France*, 20 vols. folio; the Byzantine *Historians*, 32 vols. folio; Walton's *Polyglott*, 8 vols. calf, a superb copy; the great French work on Egypt; the collection of Historical works on France in 60 vols. quarto, published by the French government; Didot's edition of Greek authors; Stephens's *Thesaurus*; Lemaire's edn of the classics, 142 vols. fol., etc. We are happy to add that a catalogue of this great collection is soon to be published.

In this connection, we will subjoin a few facts gathered from the

REPORT ON PUBLIC LIBRARIES,

"from the Select Committee on Public Libraries," appointed by the British House of Commons, and printed in August, 1849. It is a folio of 317 pages, and contains copious Minutes, tabular views, etc. The committee were Lord Ebrington, Sir H. Verney, Sir John Walsh, the Lord Advocate, and Messrs. Ewart, Brotherton, Kershaw, Thicknesse, Wyld, M. Milnes, Charteris, G. A. Hamilton, Bunbury, D'Israeli, and Mackinnon. Sixteen sessions were held. Among the gentlemen examined were M. Guizot, M. Van der Weyer, the Belgian Ambassador, Mr. Edward Edwards, one of the librarians of the British Museum, and a most intelligent witness, Mr. Henry Stevens, the well known American bibliographer, Mr. Maitland, solicitor general of Scotland, M. Libri, professor at Pisa, etc. The Report is full of invaluable information concerning the social and literary condition of the people of different countries in Europe and in regard to the various means employed to elevate that condition. We now propose to select a few of the more important facts. We may make further use of this Report hereafter. The principal libraries of the capital cities of Europe are as follows:

Name.	When founded.	Number of volumes.	Average annual addition of vols.
Paris National †	1595	824,000	12,000
Munich Royal †	1550	600,000	10,000
Petersburgh Imperial		446,000	2,000
London, British Museum †	1753	435,000	30,000
Copenhagen Royal †	1550	412,000	1,000

Berlin Royal †	1650	410,000	
Vienna Imperial †	1440	813,000	5,000
Dresden Royal	1556	300,000	
Madrid National †	1712	200,000	
Wolfenbüttel Ducal	1604	200,000	
Stuttgart Royal	1765	187,000	
Paris Arsenal	1781 ?	180,000	
Milan Brera †	1797 ?	170,000	
Paris St. Genevieve	1624	150,000	
Darmstadt Grand Ducal	1760	150,000	
Florence Magliabecchian †	1714	150,000	
Naples Royal †	1765	150,000	
Brussels Royal †	1839	133,500	
Rome Casanate	1700 ?	120,000	
Hague Royal †		100,000	
Paris Mazarine	1661	100,000	
Rome Vatican	465 ?	100,000	
Parma Ducal †	1760	100,000	1,800

The libraries marked thus † are entitled by law to a copy of every book published within the States to which they respectively belong. Of the 435,000 vols. in the British Museum, at least 200,000 have been presented or bequeathed. The rapid increase of the Paris National Library since 1790 is to be mainly attributed to the suppression of convents, and to the confiscation of the property of emigrants and rebels. The oldest of the great libraries of printed books is probably that of Vienna, and is said to have been opened to the public as early as 1575. The town library of Ratisbon dates from 1430; St. Mark's library at Venice from 1468; the town library at Frankfurt from 1484.

The chief university libraries are as follows:

Göttingen,	1736	360,000 vols.
Breslau,	1811	250,000
Oxford, Bodleian,	1597	220,000
Tübingen,	1562	200,000
Munich,		200,000
Heidelberg,	1703	200,000
Cambridge,	1484	166,724
Bologna,	1690	150,000
Prague,	1777 ?	130,000
Vienna,	1777	115,000
Leipsic,	1544	112,000
Copenhagen,	1730 ?	110,000
Turin,	1436	110,000
Louvain,	1639	105,000
Dublin,	1601	104,239
Upsal,	1621	100,000
Erlangen,	1743	100,000
Edinburgh,	1582	90,854

The Göttingen, Prague, Turin and Upsal libraries are lending libraries. Those of Göttingen, Oxford, Prague, Cambridge, Dublin and Turin are legally entitled to copies of all works published within their respective States. The small library of the university of Salamanca is said to have been founded in 1215. The library of Turin dates from 1486, that of Cambridge from 1484, Leipsic 1544, Edinburgh 1582, the Bodleian 1597. The annual expenditure of the Tübingen library is about £760, of Göttingen £730, of Breslau £400, of the Bodleian £4000.

PRINCIPAL PUBLIC LIBRARIES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Aberdeen, King's College,	34,000
Marischal "	12,000
Armagh, Robinson library,	12,000
Cambridge Public "	166,724
Queen's College,	35,000
Trinity "	30,000
Catharine Hall,	20,000
Christ's College,	10,000
Dublin Trinity College,	104,239
Marsh's Library,	17,600
Society "	12,000
Irish Academy,	9,815
King's Inn,	31,000
Edinburgh Advocates,	148,000
University,	90,854
Writers to Signet,	50,000
Glasgow University,	58,096
Hunterian,	12,000
Stirling's	10,000
London Museum,	435,000
Sion College,	35,500
Red Cross,	17,000
Tennison,	3,000
Lambeth,	24,000
Manchester Chetham,	19,900
Oxford Bodleian,	220,000
All Saints' College,	50,000
Christ Church	30,000
Radcliffe,	
Ashmolean,	30,000
Queen's College,	18,000
Oriel,	15,000
Wadham,	10,000
St. Andrew's University,	51,265
Warrington Public,	4,500
Approximate total,	1,771,493

Of volumes of MSS., 60,042 are reported. The number in the Red Cross Library in London, stated above at 17,000, according to the librarian's testimony, is about 30,000 vols., including bound tracts and sermons.

According to the Report of the Committee

France contains	107	Public Libraries.
Belgium	14	"
Prussia	44	"
Austria, with Lombardy and Venice,	48	"
Saxony	6	"
Bavaria	17	"
Denmark	5	"
Tuscany	9	"
Paris	7	"
Brussels	2	"
Berlin	2	"
Vienna	3	"
Milan	2	"
Dresden	4	"
Munich	2	"
Copenhagen	3	"
Florence	6	"

It is stated that there is only one public library in Britain, the Chetham in Manchester, equally accessible with the numerous libraries abroad. The libraries of France, says M. Guizot, "are accessible in every way; the library is open to every person who comes to read, and the books are lent to every one who is a known person in the town."

There are now five libraries in Great Britain,—the British Museum, Bodleian, Cambridge University, Advocates in Edinburgh, and Trinity College, Dublin,—which are entitled to receive a copy of all publications in the kingdom. Six other libraries, formerly entitled to the privilege, now receive in lieu of it, altogether, £2,800 per annum. There are 73 towns in Ireland, containing an average population of 2,300, in which there is no bookseller's shop.

A large part of the statistical facts in the Report of the Committee were communicated by Edward Edwards, Esq., of the British Museum. Their general correctness, so far as relates to Germany, was vouched for by C. Meyer, German Secretary of Prince Albert. We find in the "*Halle Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung*," for July 1849, a communication by Julius Petzholdt, making some corrections of Mr. Edwards's statements in relation to the libraries in the kingdom of Saxony. Mr. E.'s statistics were first published in the *London Statistical Society's Journal*.

The following is Mr. Petzholdt's summary : Population of Saxony, 1,836,483 ; number of libraries exceeding 10,000 vols., 8 ; aggregate population of the cities containing these libraries, 188,666 ; aggregate number of volumes in all the libraries, 554,000 ; average number of vols. in each library, 69,250 ; No. of vols. to every 100 of the pop. of cities containing libraries, 301. Dresden, with 89,327 inhabitants has the Royal Library, 300,000 vols. and 2800 MSS., founded in the middle of the 16th century, and two other libraries of 12,000 and 10,000 vols. Leipsic, with 60,205 pop., has the city library, 80,000 vols. and 2000 MSS., founded 1677, and the university library, 110,000 vols., founded in 1543. The other cities containing libraries are Freiberg, Zittau and Zwickau.

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1. STEWART'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY.¹

" In this treatise Mr. Stewart has rather presented the opinions of others, than come forth *in propria persona* with any sustained pleading of his own ; and, as in most of his other performances, instead of grappling with the question, he presents us with the literature of the question — made of history therefore, rather than of argument, and altogether composing but the outline of what had been said or reasoned by other men, yet accompanied with a very few slight yet elegant touches from his own hand. We by no means agree with those who think of this interesting personage, that, considering the few substantive additions he made to philosophy, he therefore as a philosopher had gained an unfair reputation. It is true, he has not added much to the treasures of science ; yet in virtue of a certain halo which by the glow of his eloquence and the purity and nobleness of his sentiments he threw around the cause, he abundantly sustained the honors of it. It reminds us of what is often realized in the higher walks of society, when certain men vastly inferior to others, both in family and in fortune, do, in virtue of a certain lofty bearing, in which they are upheld by the consciousness of a grace and a dig-

¹ The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man. By Dugald Stewart, F. R. SS. Lond. and Ed. Revised, with Omissions and Additions, by James Walker, D.D., Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in Harvard College.

nity that natively belong to them, not usurp the highest place in fashion, but have that place most readily awarded to them by the spontaneous consent and testimony of all. It was thus with Stewart in the world of letters. His rank and reputation were not owing either to the number or importance of the discoveries achieved by him. But he had what many discoverers have not. He had the sustained and lofty spirit of a high toned Academic, and never did any child, whether of science or poetry, breathe in an atmosphere more purely ethereal. The *je ne sais quoi* of manner does not wield a more fascinating power in the circles of fashion, than did the indescribable charm of his rare and elevated genius over our literary circles; and when we consider the homage of reverence and regard which he drew from general society, we cannot but wish that many successors may arise in his own likeness — who might build up an aristocracy of learning, that shall infuse a finer element into the system of life, than any which has ever been distilled upon it from the vulgar aristocracies of wealth and of power." Chalmers' *Natural Theology*, Book 1, Ch. iv. Note.

So spake the Edinburgh theologian in regard to the Edinburgh philosopher. We think that the merits of Stewart have been undervalued by Chalmers even. It has been fashionable to say, that Stewart entered into the mansion which Reid had left, repainted its walls, and ornamented them with foreign pictures, but erected no edifice of his own. He was so modest that he chose to express his best thoughts in the language of his predecessors, but had he uttered them without this grateful acknowledgment of their previous recognition, he would not have been charged with a defect in originality of genius. If some other philosophers who have escaped this charge, had been equally punctilious with Stewart in quoting the authorities to which they were indebted, and in selecting the choicest expressions of others for the adorning of their own thoughts, they would forfeit their claims to the originality which is now ascribed to them. One distinction between Brown and Stewart is this: the former strives to make the impression that he differs from his predecessors, and the latter that he agrees with them; yet if Brown had been characterized by the grateful temper of Stewart, and if Stewart had possessed the daring and impulsiveness of Brown, he who is now justly extolled as an inventive philosopher would *appear* to be, after all, indebted to others for his *inventions* even, and he who is now unjustly stigmatised as a copyist would be regarded as an acute and discriminating thinker.

We are happy to perceive that a new edition of Stewart's *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers* has been published in this country, and that it has been enriched by its accomplished editor with so many valuable illustrations and notes. By some changes in the rhetorical structure

of the work, especially by the introduction of sub-sections, it is now admirably adapted as a text-book to the use of students in our colleges. Its influence upon the spirit of the youthful scholar cannot fail to be healthful, and it will abundantly repay the oft-repeated study of preachers and politicians.

2. BOWEN'S LOWELL LECTURES.¹

We are glad that these Lectures have been given to the public. We deem them well worthy of a permanent place in the Philosophy and Literature of our country. The subjects of which they treat are among the most interesting and important which can occupy the human mind. Although of an abstract nature, and above the ordinary range of thought and speculation, they are brought, by the clearness and simplicity with which they are unfolded, within the comprehension of a wide class of readers. The language, too, is not only clear, but remarkably free and flexible, adapting itself, with the utmost facility, to all the shades of thought. And the Philosophy which runs through the whole, is everywhere so gracefully allied to the sentiments of our moral and religious natures, and flows on withal amid such an exuberance of charming illustration and beautiful imagery, that we are delighted with the volume and lose all consciousness of fatigue in following its pages. Instead of toiling, with weary limb, along the worn and dusty highways of Scottish metaphysics, or climbing, with uncertain step, the giddy heights of German transcendentalism, we find ourselves floating down a gentle stream whose banks are adorned on either side by cultivated fields, smiling meadows, and the cheerful habitations of men.

But while it is scarcely possible to speak in too high praise of these Lectures, as a clear and graceful exposition of the philosophical system of the author, the system itself is, we think, open to objections. The grand dogma upon which it rests, and which determines throughout its character, is the immediate, unceasing, personal agency of the Deity in every part of the material universe. Matter has no inherent efficiency. It is the mere passive recipient of impressions made upon it by a power without itself. Cohesion, gravity, chemical affinity, electric and magnetic attraction and repulsion are only different modes of the Divine agency. Physical events are not connected with one another by the relation of cause and effect, but simply that of antecedent and consequent. There is a fixed or-

¹ "Lowell Lectures on the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion: delivered before the Lowell Institute in Boston, in the Winters of 1848-49, by Francis Bowen. Boston: Charles C. Little & James Brown 1849." [This Notice is communicated by a Correspondent.—Eds.]

der of succession, and nothing more. The idea of secondary causes in nature, upon which these events depend, and by which the order of their succession is determined, is illusory. They are nowhere to be found. They do not exist. God is the immediate and sole cause of the innumerable changes which are every moment occurring throughout the whole of his physical creation. Nay, each one of these changes is, separately and independently, evolved by a special volition of the Deity. When a lighted coal is applied to gunpowder, it is not the coal or anything conveyed by it, but the immediate agency of God that determines the explosion. Neither is it the gunpowder that explodes. That is mere passive matter, capable of being acted upon, but not of itself acting. The display of power connected with it, is due to the co-existing portion of the Divine substance; for, recognizing apparently the axiom of the old philosophers, that nothing can act except where it is, Mr. Bowen includes in his fundamental hypothesis, not merely the *virtual* but the *substantial* ubiquity of the Almighty. The plant is not produced from the seed; neither is it dependent, at any one stage of its development, upon what it was at a preceding stage; but its condition, each moment, is determined by the immediate and sole agency of the Deity. It is not the food which we take that nourishes and strengthens us: that has no such power; that is merely the antecedent to a higher manifestation of the Divine energy, through the several parts of our corporeal frames. There is no such thing as physical causation. All power has its origin in mind — in the personal agency of spiritual beings. Indeed, our only notion of it is derived from what we are conscious of in our own voluntary acts.

The reasons assigned for adopting this view of the nature of causation and the character of the material universe are, mainly, the following.

1. In no case whatever are we able to perceive any actual connection among physical events. All that our senses make known to us, or that we learn from the investigations of science, is the order of their succession.
2. We cannot predicate attraction and repulsion of matter. They necessarily imply the exercise of power; and this, so far as our knowledge extends, is always personal.
3. The reference of physical events to secondary causes is incompatible with the idea of God's moral government and superintending Providence; nay, when legitimately carried out, the doctrine necessarily leads to materialism, atheism, and Spinozism.

The first of these considerations is, we think, insufficient to justify the inference which is drawn from it. It is true that we do not, in any case, perceive the tie which binds together two successive events, as the contact of the lighted coal and the explosion of the gunpowder. This circumstance, however, affords no reason for doubting the reality of its existence. We do not perceive it, because it is not an object of sense — because we

have no faculties for directly apprehending it. This is true of power in all its forms and under all its manifestations. Even in the case of our own personal acts, from which Mr. Bowen supposes we originally derive the idea of causation, all that we really perceive or have any knowledge of, is order of succession. The motion follows the volition; but how, or why, we know not. The connection between the two is as perfectly hidden from us as in any other case of antecedent and consequent. Until some other reason therefore, besides our inability to perceive it, shall be assigned for denying to material bodies the power of causation, we think men generally will, continue to ascribe it to them — will continue to believe that the plant is actually produced from the seed, and that food is of real efficacy in nourishing and strengthening our bodies.

Neither are we prepared to admit that attraction and repulsion, the two great forces to which all the phenomena of the outward world are immediately referable, cannot be attributes of matter. Why can they not? What do we know of matter inconsistent with such a supposition? Nay, what do we know of it, except through these very manifestations? What other means have we of inferring its existence even? Shall we deny to it the very attributes, the only attributes, by which it makes itself known to us? If we suppose it to exist at all, why should we not ascribe to it powers adequate to the production of the phenomena exhibited? Mr. Bowen would indeed distinguish the geometrical properties of matter, and its *vis inertiae*, or passive resistance to change from rest to motion and from motion to rest, from the active forces which everywhere pervade it, and upon which all its changes are immediately dependent. The former he ascribes to the matter itself; the latter, to the direct agency of the Deity. But the distinction, however just it would at first appear, is without foundation in nature. In the actual constitution of matter, we find the two classes of properties connected with one another in such a manner that it is impossible to separate them. The one class grow out of the other. The form of bodies is immediately dependent upon the attractive and repulsive forces of their component atoms, and varies just as these vary. Their *vis inertiae* is always in exact proportion to their weight or specific gravity; and were the invisible chains which bind them to the earth and to one another to be suddenly dissolved, there can be little doubt that it would wholly disappear.

Nor, lastly, are we able to perceive that the doctrine of secondary causes is less compatible with the idea of the moral government and superintending providence of God, than the reference of all physical events to his immediate agency. So far as we see, the difficulties, if they deserve to be called such, are precisely the same, on either supposition. It is the fixed order of sequence among these events that would seem to impair their

availability for moral purposes, and render them but inflexible instruments in the hands of God for governing his intelligent and accountable creatures ; and this remains unaltered, in whatever manner we conceive the events to be produced. Mr. Bowen, strangely enough, appears to forget that the laws which govern the evolution of the material phenomena are learned from experience, and not deduced from theory — that they are just as invariable, and in all respects precisely the same, whether they rest immediately upon the Divine will, or have their origin in the endowments of the material atoms. That the supposition of inherent powers in matter necessarily leads to materialism, atheism, and Spinozism, as we think all will agree, he entirely fails to show. No such monstrous absurdities are, in fact, involved in the hypothesis.

But while he would push what we believe to be the only just and rational view of the constitution of the universe to consequences so revolting, he is not sufficiently mindful of all the bearings of his own doctrine. In Lecture IX. he presents the usual proofs of an Author of Nature from the manifestations of intelligence and design in the world around us, without apparently being aware that the hypothesis with which he starts, and upon which his whole system is built up, is utterly subversive of the argument. This argument is founded upon the manifold appearances of contrivance and adaptation in the outward universe. But if matter have no efficiency, these are *only* appearances. If there be no power of causation in the material atoms, they cannot be employed as means for the production of ends. On this supposition, the very idea of both means and ends, is necessarily excluded. Every event, every change in the outward world, is produced by the immediate agency of the Deity. The numerous and beautiful contrivances, as we are accustomed to regard them, embodied in the organic structure of man and of the different orders of the lower animals, have no part in the accomplishment of the purposes for which we suppose them intended. It is all illusion. These frames of ours, in reality, embody no contrivances — accomplish no purposes. Innumerable phenomena are indeed every moment occurring within them ; but each one of these phenomena is separately and independently evolved by a special act of the Divine will. The powers revealed in matter are, in our hands, it is true, proper instrumentalities ; and we are continually making use of them as such. But they cannot be so employed by God, for they all resolve themselves into his own agency. The doctrines of efficient and of final causes, in the world around us, must therefore stand or fall together — a truth which we deem worthy of the serious consideration of those who suppose they are advancing the interests of piety, and placing upon a surer foundation the moral government of God, by denying the ministry of the different forms of matter in the accomplishment of his purposes, and thus

obliterating from the face of the universe all marks of an *intelligent and designing* Author.

Mr. Bowen supposes the mind or soul of every human being to be "an indivisible unit," "a monad in technical phrase," a direct and special creation of the Almighty. This view of its constitution he endeavors to support from the facts of consciousness. Throughout the whole argument, however, he confounds two things not only different but in their nature totally dissimilar — unity of person and indivisibility of substance. It is only with the former of these that consciousness has anything to do. Matter, on the other hand, he supposes to be infinitely divisible, and in proof of it, makes use of the old argument of the mathematicians, which in reality applies only to space.

The more practical portions of these Lectures present fewer points for criticism. Mr. Bowen's ethics are better than his metaphysics, and his religion is better than his philosophy. His errors are errors of the head and not of the heart. The obligations to virtue and piety are placed upon their true foundations. They are *made known* but not *created* by God. They rest on the eternal principles of right. These are authoritatively revealed in the conscience. They are still further enforced by that moral government which God visibly exercises over us, and which is so far perfect in this life as "to need no apology," and to afford no just ground for the expectation of another. He does not reject the idea of a future retribution, but makes that like the doctrine of the soul's immortality, rest solely upon the teachings of inspiration. The tone of the volume is throughout elevated, and its spirit loyal to the great interests of virtue, humanity and truth. The just sentiments which everywhere pervade it, will, with most readers, do much towards commending its philosophy. Its literary merit too, as we have already intimated, is of a high order. In this respect, indeed, it is all that we should expect from the pen of the accomplished editor of the first literary periodical in our country.

3. MONUMENTS OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY.¹

This volume is the first ripe fruit of that singular but noble tree of knowledge, sent hither by the munificence of a foreigner, to be nurtured in the soil of freedom for the benefit, not simply of the millions that are

¹ Smithsonian Contributions to Knowledge, Vol. I. Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley; comprising the Results of extensive original Surveys and Explorations. By E. G. Squier, A. M., and E. H. Davis, M. D. Published by the Smithsonian Institution, City of Washington, 1848. 4to pp. 306.

Reports, etc., of the Smithsonian Institution, exhibiting its plans, operations and financial condition up to Jan. 1, 1849; from the third annual report of the Board of Regents. Presented to Congress, Feb. 19, 1849. 8vo. pp. 72.

to crowd our own immense territories, but of the whole world. It is "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." By this comprehensive design, Smithson has evinced a mind as capacious as his bequest was princely.

For so sagacious a philanthropist to commit such a trust to our charge, instead of even leaving it in the hands of his own renowned England, is a compliment to our country, a proof of his confidence in the stability, integrity and enlightened policy of our government, which will be highly appreciated in Europe as well as in this country. Had he left it simply or chiefly for *our* good, to raise us ere long to a literary equality with European nations, however noble and ennobling the charity, it would yet have borne but little of its present commendatory aspect. While treating us as a munificent patron, and reposing a confidence in our wisdom to manage the legacy for ourselves, he would still have regarded us rather as beneficiaries than as the guardians and dispensers of a boon for all mankind. The moral effect of this preference by so shrewd a judge in such matters, must eventually be felt on the mind of Europe, first on her literati, and then on all the descending grades of her population. Especially must this be the result if our nation shall prove itself worthy of the trust. What (the savans of England and of France and of Germany and of Italy may now be saying), what, the American Congress made, not the ward but the guardian of such a trust? these Americans who write no books? What if they do *fight* well, and successfully guard their own boasted liberties, and their commerce floats on every sea, and every woman and child among them can read, and every man can write his own vote, yet what has all this to do with the guardianship of a literary bequest for the whole world? It has much to do with it, replies the gifted seer who made the bequest. These are the people I can safely trust for executing my designs. They love learning, however few of them have as yet had the means and leisure for adding to its stores. Prizing it as they do, they will seek for it as for hid treasure. And with their enterprise, their commerce, their missions, they will diffuse it round the world. Theirs, too, is a government as stable as it is free and enlightened and energetic. To what dynasty of kings on earth could I so safely commit my treasure for enlightening the world? Where will be those dynasties some scores of years hence, and where the institutions committed to their care? America, too, will itself be a world in the lapse of a very few centuries.

Such, from the shade of Smithson, will be the reply to every pondering savan who may now be lost in wonder at the fact that so gifted a mind should select our Congress as its trustee.

But, as touching this last topic, a wise assignment of the funds, why

commit them to the disposal of any national government? and especially of so popular a government, where one party is dominant to-day, and another to-morrow; where the doctrine that "the spoils belong to the victors" is so often the order of the day, and where the leaders of no political party can be presumed fit for the organization and management of anything more literary than a political club? Will not the funds be instantly squandered, or the offices conferred on political favorites, ignorant of their duties, and changed with every change of party, and before they can have time to learn those duties? Or will not the whole be rendered futile in the pursuit of some chimerical project, or wasted on ostentatious buildings? Why not rather commit such a trust to a select body of prudent and literary men, who are the only men capable of managing any literary institution? just as has been judged needful in regard to nearly all our literary institutions.

On this question we must confess we had at first and for a long time the saddest forebodings. And our a-priori scepticism was only increased by a knowledge of the havoc made in some of our institutions of learning by State interference. And even now, we cannot resist the belief that *Smithson* himself must have had either a much deeper or a much shallower insight than most of us into the true genius of our nation, or else he could not thus have embarked his treasure, and with it his reputation for sound judgment, and what was more, his fond hopes for posthumous usefulness to the whole world by the wealth a kind providence had given him. Easily enough, indeed, might he, like any one of us, anticipate the liability, which so speedily proved a reality, of the total loss of the fund by a bad investment. But could he see that, by the very conferment of so princely a trust on *such* a people, done too in the eye of all Europe, and for the good of mankind, he touched a cord in our national pride, which would not allow a moment's delay in replacing the entire sum? *Perhaps*. In either case, whether owing to his knowledge or his ignorance of us, the event has proved the felicity of his selection. But few among the kings of the earth would so cheerfully have assumed an *ex-post facto* guarantee of such a deposit. And one of our largest and most enterprising institutions, some thirty years ago, deliberately declined a munificent donation to its funds, designed for gratuitous instruction to those bearing the donor's name, and coupled with the condition of its guaranteeing to this object five per cent. annually on the amount given. And well was it for Yale College that her sage financier dissuaded her from the tempting boon; for in a short time the favorite bank in which she would probably have invested this, as she did a large portion of her other funds, became a total failure. Nor can we believe that even the richest of our States would have been found ready to meet such an exi-

gency. A deafening clamor would have silenced the proposal. But our whole nation could meet it without inconvenience. And it did meet it, not only without a murmuring word from any faction, but with the proud approbation of all, both high and low.

And where now would have been the Smithsonian fund, if it had been entrusted to some literary corporation, however wise in the management of literary matters, and if they had invested it in some alluring stocks just as evanescent as the Mississippi bonds or the New Haven Eagle Bank? Would even a bankrupt State, when recovering from her bankruptcy, have thought of replacing the funds?

By this act, so honorable to our nation, she has now virtually become the guarantee of this fund forever. It is safe while she is safe. But of what other literary institution beneath the sun can the like be said?

Another question, however, of scarcely less importance, remains. Will the institution be so conducted as to answer its design? Has it adopted a wise plan? And will the plan be executed? *Yes*, we think we may now answer to both of these questions. The same magnanimity which so promptly replaced the lost funds, rose also superior to all grovelling and party considerations in the arrangements to be made for executing the designs of the philanthropic founder. In a word, every man, of whatever political or religious creed, seemed inspired with the same spirit. If we are proud to say this, it is a pride which will rouse no envy, because shared alike by all lovers of our race. For full well did those members of Congress know, that to make a party question of such a trust, would be at once not only the ruin of the design, but the foulest disgrace to the party that should do it. And equally well did they know, that the Congress, as a body, were unfit for devising and executing plans for its accomplishment. And yet they well knew there were honorable men among the different parties, fully competent to the task. It only remained to designate those men, and commit the initiatory work to their hands.

Well is it, for such an exigency, that literature — as well as commerce and manufactures and agriculture and legal science — has its representatives in our halls of legislation. There was no lack of such talent on this occasion. And if parties must exist in a free government, it is often well that they should be relatively too powerful as well as too jealous of each other, and too conscious of the very nature of party spirit, to allow either of them to arrogate the control of such an interest, and convert it into a party engine. And if great infirmities there must needs be in any free body of legislators, well is it when they are so aware of these infirmities as not to attempt what they do not understand.

The men selected to give shape and activity to the new institution,

have indeed been slow in their work, provokingly slow, as we have heretofore thought. But slow as they have been in organizing the institution, yet these men have by no means been dilatory. This is manifest from the novelty, the extent, the difficulties, and the excellence of the work achieved. God himself did not organize his own vast and beautiful world in a day. But when done, it was enough that his own omniscience could pronounce it all very good.

The pamphlet at the head of this article affords a very clear and extended view of what has been done and what is contemplated in the plan of the institution. But we have not space for even a sketch of its contents. Suffice it to say, for those who may yet need the information, that it is no part of the design of this institution to afford an academic training to young men. In strict accordance with the design of its founder, it is shaped for the twofold purpose of increasing and diffusing knowledge among mankind. And this is to be done by stimulating and aiding all sorts of research for useful knowledge, and by diffusing the results as widely as possible. No branch is excluded, in which the boundaries of knowledge can be extended. The walks of art, science, literature, astronomy, geography, ethnology, invention, are all included in its plan. In particular cases, men are to be aided in their investigations by affording them the means and implements. And when discoveries or improvements are made, these are to be published to the world for the general good, and the publications either sold (at cost, we believe), without copy right, or given to colleges and other important institutions, or exchanged with literary and philosophical societies for other publications. .

Public lectures are to be given at Washington, during the sessions of Congress, where is also to be a library of rare books, and an extensive museum.

This first volume of its Contributions is a very happy illustration of the design of the Institution, and a pledge of its future usefulness. We have here the results of great and patient research into a subject of profound interest to us as Americans, and to the whole literary world, — the existing monuments of that almost fabulous race of men who inhabited our country before the present race of Indians. Who were they? Whence did they come? And whither have they gone? These are indeed questions on which our two laborious investigators have hardly touched. They do not indulge themselves much in the formation of theories. But they have done much in bringing to light the mighty works of these aborigines, and have thereby showed us *what* they were — a race, to whom the savages found here by our ancestors cannot be compared. And yet, strange as it may seem, we are almost led to conclude, by a study of these monuments, that either these barbarians vanquished that more civilized race in spite of all their strong fortifications, and drove them south

towards Mexico, or else that the ancient race unaccountably degenerated into such savages as were here found by the Europeans. Either supposition is, *a priori*, alike improbable. The former, however, finds some analogy in the conquests of the northern hordes in Europe and Asia.

A large part of the mounds as yet thoroughly examined, are in the State of Indiana, where they are found in the greatest number. The ancient population of that region must have been much more dense than could be sustained by the chase; and the remains of art found in the mounds, lead to the belief of a considerable degree of civilization, though by no means so great as it was in Mexico and Peru. One portion of the mounds were evidently for fortifications; another, for places of worship; and another, for sepulchral monuments. In the last, the remains of a human body, sometimes nearly an entire skeleton, are found at the bottom. The form, height, and extent of the mounds, in different cases, are very various. The greatest skill is displayed in the structure of the fortifications; and they are on much the largest scale, often enclosing many acres, and fitted, by a provision for water, etc., for sustaining a long siege and sheltering the population resorting to them.

In order well to understand any of these structures, drawings are indispensable. Accordingly, the volume before us contains 48 lithographic plates and 207 wood engravings. They are well executed, and are amply sufficient for the purpose. Indeed the mechanical as well as the far more important part of the whole work, is admirably done. The book cannot fail of proving a lasting honor to the Institution and to our country.

This work would probably not have been published at all, had it not been for this Institution. The expense would have been too great, with the limited sale that could be anticipated, for private adventure or for any of our literary societies. From the permanent fund of this institution, amounting to more than \$650,000, and yielding annually about \$40,000, and if managed, as hitherto, with strict economy, there will be ample means for the like issue of future works; and with the plans already formed for procuring important works, and from the spirit and enterprise already roused, we may well anticipate the preparation of a series of volumes that will meet the expectations that the present is so well fitted to inspire.

More space has already been devoted to this brief article than can ordinarily be afforded to notices of publications which are not more immediately connected with the main design of this journal. But while thus compelled to omit much of what we should gladly say, we cannot close without expressing our grateful and increased confidence in the talent, assiduity, and faithfulness of the two officers on whom is devolved the chief labor of conducting the affairs of the Institution, — the Secretary, Mr. Joseph Henry, and the Assistant Secretary and Librarian, Mr. Charles C. Jewett.

ARTICLE XI.

MISCELLANIES — THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY.

DR. THOLUCK's Exposition of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, in the English translation, of Menzies, is in the Andover press, and will be published in the beginning of the Spring. It is regarded by the author, we believe, as his most finished work, and is one of the finest specimens we have of a full, learned, and Christian Commentary, eminently instructive for theological as well as biblical students — Rev. Joseph B. Felt of Boston, long known as one of our most indefatigable antiquaries, has in preparation an Ecclesiastical History of New England, in two vols. 8vo. The first vol. is in a state of considerable forwardness. — A Translation of the Church History of Prof. Karl Hase of Jena, by Prof. Blumenthal of Dickinson College, and Rev. C. P. Wing of Carlisle, is in press at Philadelphia. In the original it is an octavo of 615 pp. The first edition was printed in 1834; the fifth and last in 1844. For remarks on the value of this work, see B. S. vol. V. 432. On page 611 of our last vol., we alluded to the publication in London of an English translation of Dr. Nitzsch's System of Christian Doctrine. We observe in the Eclectic Review, an article from which it appears that the translation is so inadequate and erroneous as to be nearly worthless.

A valuable Memoir of the late Prof. Fiske of Amherst College, together with a selection from his Sermons and other writings, has been published at Amherst, under the editorial charge of Dr. Humphrey, late president of the College. The volume will be welcomed by the numerous pupils of Prof. Fiske and others as a worthy tribute to the memory of a good man, an able preacher, and an accurate and accomplished scholar.

The 2d vol. of Dr. Davidson's Introduction to the New Testament is published in 8vo. pp. 467, and extends from the Acts to the 2d of Thessalonians inclusive. The remaining vol. will not appear for some time. Tholuck's Anzeiger, July, 1849, remarks of vol. I.: "It can hardly be doubtful that this Introduction to the Gospels, on account of the new matter which it brings before English readers, will have a large circulation in America, as well as in England and Scotland, and will soon reach a new edition." — A Work on the Irregular and Defective Verbs of the Greek Language, their Forms, Meaning and Quantity, by Rev. William Veitch, has been published at Edinburgh, 12mo. 316 pp. A classical friend, who has used the work, informs us that it is prepared with skill

and thorough knowledge of the subject. — Dr. L. Schmitz's 2d ed. of Niebuhr's Roman Lectures is a very welcome book, and is, in part, a new work. The 1st vol., embracing the period from the beginning of Rome to the first Punic war, is wholly new. It was prepared by Dr. Isler of Hamburg, by the collation of a considerable number of MSS. Notes, and then translated into English by Dr. Schmitz, and enlarged from his own notes. In the 2d vol. 100 pages of new matter are inserted previous to the account of the death of Sertorius. At the close of the 3d vol. are eight new Lectures, carrying the history down from the death of Constantine to the overthrow of the Western Empire. — The sum of £3000 has been subscribed in England to found a new College in Oxford to increase the number of well educated clergy and to render a residence there more accessible to persons of moderate means. It is supposed that £30,000 will be needed in order to lay a foundation for the education of 50 scholars.

We regret to hear that the publication of the Halle Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung was to cease with the December No., 1849. It has been in existence sixty-five years, and under the editorial charge of a number of successive professors at Halle in the various departments of knowledge. As a literary and scientific work it has been of great worth, and as the record of the literary history of almost three fourths of a century, it will always have a permanent value. The form of the work and the method of publishing it would be viewed out of Germany as quite inconvenient. — The 10th vol. of the Exegetical Manual to the Old Testament, embracing the exposition of the Books of Kings, by Otto Thenius of Dresden, is in press. The first eight vols. cost in Germany about six dollars, and embrace the books of Judges, Ruth, Samuel, Job, Proverbs and the remainder of the Old Testament except Canticles and Daniel. De Wette's Manual, embracing the whole New Testament in 3 vols., or 11 parts, is worth in Germany, from five to six dollars. — A second enlarged and improved edition of Meyer's Commentary on the first epistle to the Corinthians has just appeared. — Prof. Hermann of Göttingen, has published a small vol. on Law and the Lawgiving Power in Greece. — Dr. Neander is engaged on the vol. of Church History, which embraces the period from 1308 to 1517. He is compelled to use the sight and hands of others in the accomplishment of his work. — Dr. K. F. Becker, the well known German grammarian, died at Offenbach on the Maine, Oct. 4, in his 75th year. His "Organism of the German Language," 1827, and other grammatical works, proceed on the idea that language is a part of man's organic structure. — The number of students in the University of Halle in the summer of 1849, was 693; in 1829, it was 1291, of whom 934 were students of theology.

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APRIL, 1850.

ARTICLE I.

THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST.

By Rev. Enoch Pond, D. D., Prof. of Theol. in Bangor Theol. Seminary.

A THEOLOGICAL inquiry has been revived of late, which had been regarded as long settled, whether the sufferings of Christ were confined to his human nature, or whether the Divine nature also suffered. Did he suffer only as man, or partly, principally, as God?

It is admitted on either side of this question, that our blessed Saviour is both God and man; that he possesses both a Divine and a human nature—a human body and a human soul—mysteriously united so as to constitute but one person. It is also admitted that he suffered the just for the unjust, and by his sufferings and death made a full atonement for sin. But the question is, In which nature did he suffer? In the human only, or also in the Divine? Did he suffer only as a man,—a divinely strengthened and supported man; or did the Divinity also suffer? Were his sufferings partly—and if partly, chiefly—those of God?

This question, though necessarily one of some intricacy, is obviously one of great importance. It respects God,—the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of all things—the only proper object of supreme love and worship. It respects Christ,—the only Saviour of lost men,—the soul and centre of the religion of the Gospel. It respects the atonement,—the most stupendous and astonishing of all Divine works,—the only foundation of mortal hopes. Such a question should never be approached but with reverence and humility, with a deep sense of our own ignorance and weakness, and with the most earnest supplications for the Divine assistance and blessing.

In discussing this question, it is necessary, first of all, to disencumber it, or to separate it from several others which have been confounded with it.

1. The question before us, then, is not, whether the Divine Being is in such sense *immutable*, as to be incapable of anything like a succession of views and exercises. Many excellent Christians have believed that there is, and must be, in the mind of God, something like a succession of views. Not that anything ever presents itself to his infinite mind, which was before unknown or unanticipated. God foresees, because he has purposed, all future contingencies and events. But then a foreseen event is not yet an actual event, nor is foreknowledge, even to the mind of God, precisely the same as present knowledge. Ten thousand things which were but foreseen yesterday, have come into actual existence to-day; and in passing from the foreseen to the actual, there has been, in respect to each, a real change. All these changes God has seen. He must have seen them, if he sees things as they are. And the seeing of them, as they came along, must have constituted a continual succession of views.

And as God is immutably holy, this change of views must have been followed by a corresponding change of holy feelings or affections. As God does not *view* things to-day precisely as he did yesterday (and for the very good reason that things actually *are not* to-day as they were yesterday, and God must view them at all times as they are) so he does not *feel* towards them to-day just as he did yesterday. His feelings, both days, have been unchangeably and perfectly holy; but in order that they might be so, they must have corresponded perfectly, and that too at every instant, to the constantly changing condition of things.

So have thought and reasoned some of our soundest and ablest theologians, both in ancient and modern times. But in so doing they have not conceded, nor have they thought of conceding, that the Divine nature of Christ participated directly in his last sufferings. The two questions are as remote from each other as almost any that can be imagined.

2. The question before us is not, whether God is in such sense *impassible*, as to feel no emotions, under any circumstances, which are in themselves unpleasant, or even painful. The Scriptures represent God as not only the subject of emotions, but of emotions in themselves unpleasant, in view of evil. He hates sin with a perfect hatred. He has no pleasure in iniquity. All sin and suffering are, in themselves, undesirable to him, and of course unpleasant. Such is the uniform representation of Scripture, and it is obviously a just representation. If God

is infinitely and immutably benevolent, it must be so. But the fact of such emotions by no means proves, that God endured, or directly participated in, the sufferings of the cross. The two things have almost no similarity. God may feel emotions in themselves painful in view of existing evils, and not himself bear those evils. He may have sympathized with the suffering Redeemer on the cross, and not himself have endured those sufferings in his own Divine nature.¹

3. Nor is this the question before us, whether Christ suffered as a *mere man*. It is sometimes said that those who confine the sufferings of our Lord to his human nature believe him to have suffered as a mere man. But this is not true. At least, it is not true of Trinitarians. Our Saviour did not suffer as a mere man, for the very good reason that he did not *exist* as a mere man. He was God and man united in one person; and it was this same mysterious, glorious personage who suffered. But did he suffer in his Divine nature? Was the God, as well as the man, crucified? Did the Divinity die?

4. Nor is this the question to be decided, whether the Divine nature of Christ was not *indispensably concerned* in the work of his atonement. We hold that it *was* indispensably concerned — so indispensably, that without it no atonement could possibly have been made.

I pretend not to say how many important purposes the union of the Divine with the human in the person of Christ may have answered, in reference to the atonement. But I can easily conceive of the two following: First, his Divinity was necessary to sustain his humanity *to endure the requisite amount of suffering*. It is a great mistake to suppose that our Saviour, in his last agonies, endured no more than a mere man would have done, in the same time. From the very nature of the case he must have suffered inconceivably more. And then it is perfectly evident, from our Saviour's appearance in the garden, from the shrinking of his human nature in view of the scenes before him, and from all the

¹ It is just at this point that Chalmers and Harris have been misunderstood by some who have discussed this subject. All that Chalmers means to say (and the same is true of Harris in the passage which has been quoted from him) is, that the God of the Bible is not "a Being devoid of all emotion and of all tenderness," "but that in the bosom of the High and Holy One who inhabiteth eternity, there live and move and have their busy operation, all the resentments of perfect virtue against the sinner, and all the regards of perfect love and of infinite compassion towards the righteous who obey, and the penitent who turn to him." It is *God the Father* of whom Chalmers and Harris speak, and they represent him, and that truly, as loving the Son, and deeply sympathizing with him in his sufferings. But the question whether the sufferings of the Son were confined to his human nature, or reached also to the Divine, they do not touch. See Chalmers on Romans, Lect. 62. Harris's Great Teacher, p. 106, 108.

circumstances of the crucifixion, that his sufferings must have been, to the last degree, dreadful.

It has been said that our Lord did not meet his death with as much firmness as some of the martyrs have shown in like circumstances. But there is no comparison between the cases, and it is little better than impious to attempt a comparison. Our Saviour did not die as a mere martyr. The principal causes of his sufferings, their attendant circumstances, the amazing issues depending, the ends to be answered — all were different, and all in his case peculiar. I can conceive that our Saviour suffered more, in a few hours, than any martyr could have suffered in a thousand years. He suffered more, I have no doubt, than mere unassisted human nature could have sustained at all. Without the personal, all-powerful support of the Divine nature, the human must have been crushed in a moment.¹

But there is a second reason why the Divine nature of Christ was indispensably connected with the human in his sufferings. It was to impart *dignity* and *worth* to those sufferings; to give the requisite *value* to the sacrifice. The atonement derives all its efficacy from the fact that it was made by the Eternal Son of God; by a person so ineffably dear to the Father, and sustaining to him such intimate relations. No being less than the Son of God could, in this view, have made expiation for sin. And yet it is not necessary to suppose that the Divinity in Christ directly suffered. The God sustained the man to endure all that eternal justice required. Our Saviour drank the bitter cup to the bottom, and wrung out the dregs. It was the Divinity of his person, too, which gave all its value and efficacy to the sacrifice. Without this, it

¹ I do not here refer to *spiritual* supports and consolations, such as have been enjoyed by martyrs and other Christians in their last extremities; for from the dying Saviour these seem to have been wholly withdrawn. But I refer to that physical, supernatural, omnipotent support, which the God, in personal union with the man, afforded to the immaculate sufferer, and without which, the burthen imposed on him could not have been borne, and the work of our salvation had not been achieved.

Speaking of Christ's sufferings, Pres. Edwards says: "How dreadful was the cup itself! How far beyond all that can be uttered or conceived! Many of the martyrs have endured extreme tortures; but there is reason to think that these all were a mere nothing compared with the last sufferings of Christ on the cross." *Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 167.

Prof. Stuart, after having expressed the idea that the sufferings of Christ were confined to his human nature, and after having recounted the painful circumstances of his dying scene, adds: "all combine to show that the suffering was such as the world had never witnessed, and that it is probably not in the power of language to express, nor of our minds to conceive, the extent of the agony which Jesus endured." *Sermons on the Atonement*, p. 12.

could have had no more efficacy than the sacrifice of a bullock or a lamb.

I have endeavored, in these remarks, to separate the question before us from others with which it has been confounded. We now return to the question itself. Were the vicarious sufferings of our Lord Jesus Christ confined to his human nature, or did they reach also to the Divine nature? Did the God, as well as the man, suffer? Did the Divinity die?

To prove that it did, a class of Scriptures have been adduced, in which it is said, without limitation or qualification, that *Christ suffered*; implying that he suffered in both natures, or in his whole person. "Forasmuch then as *Christ* hath suffered for us in the flesh." "For *Christ* also hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust." 1 Pet. 3: 18. 4: 1. The argument from these and the like passages rests wholly on the assumption, that whatever is affirmed of Christ in the Scriptures, is affirmed of him in both natures, or in his whole person. But is this true? Can such an assumption be sustained? "Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." Heb. 13: 8. "Christ, who is over all, God blessed forever." Rom. 9: 5. "We are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God and eternal life." 1 John 5: 20. In each of these passages, there is something affirmed, and that too without any limitation, of Christ. But is it affirmed of him in both natures, or only in one? Every reader sees that these passages have respect entirely to the Divine nature of Christ. They cannot be applied to his human nature.

Take, then, another class of texts: "Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and with man." "And Jesus began to be about thirty years of age." "Jesus therefore, being weary, sat thus on the well." Luke 2: 52. 3: 23. John 4: 6. In these passages, certain things are, in the most unqualified manner, affirmed of Christ. But are they affirmed of him in both natures? Or are they not obviously and certainly limited to his human nature?

Some have made a distinction between the acts and the sufferings of Christ, and have said that though the former may be ascribed to him in one of his natures, the latter cannot be. His sufferings must belong to both.¹ But when we look into the Scriptures, we perceive, at once, that this position is untenable. In one of the passages just quoted, our Saviour is represented as suffering from *weariness*. But was the almighty God weary? In other places, Christ is said to have suffered from *hunger* and *thirst*. Matt. 4: 2. John 19: 28. But are we to suppose that God ever suffers in this way? Our Saviour also suffered from *tempta-*

¹ Prof. Lewis, in Bib. Repository for July, 1846, p. 397.

tion, and from fear. He "suffered, being tempted." He "was heard in that he feared." Heb. 2: 18. 5: 7. But "God cannot be tempted of evil." James 1: 13. And of what has he to be afraid? Or how is it possible that he should suffer from such a cause?

Perhaps it will be said that the required limitations, in the passages here referred to, need not be expressed in words, flowing as they do from the very nature of the subject. To ascribe hunger, thirst, weariness, fear, and temptations to the Supreme Being, would be inconsistent with all his perfections. And is it not equally inconsistent with his perfections to ascribe to him the sufferings of the cross? We affirm that it is; and if the assertion requires proof, the proof shall be furnished in the proper place.

Other Scriptures are cited to prove that the Divine nature suffered on the cross, which are thought to be even more decisive than those which we have considered. "Ye killed the Prince of Life." Acts 3: 15. "They crucified the Lord of Glory." 1 Cor. 2: 8. "Feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood." Acts 20: 28. But to the sober interpreter of the Bible, these passages present not the slightest difficulty. We hold them to mean just what they say. That mysterious personage, who is properly styled "the Prince of Life" and "the Lord of Glory," the Jews did actually kill and crucify. But to this same personage, all Christians (unless it be Monophysites and Unitarians) believe that there belonged *two distinct natures*, a Divine and a human. In which of his natures, then, was "the Prince of Life" killed, and "the Lord of Glory" crucified? Was the Divinity killed? Was God crucified? The affirmative of these questions the passages before us go not a step towards establishing; and it is well for the credit of the Scriptures that they do not.

Of the other passage quoted, there are several readings; but we incline to the commonly received text. And as it stands in our Bibles, what is the language of it? What does it say? That a certain Divine person — one who with the strictest propriety may be called God — hath purchased the church with his own blood. But this wonderful personage was human, as well as divine — man, as well as God: and did the blood which was shed, and with which the church was purchased, proceed from his Divinity, or his humanity? This question the passage itself does not answer; and hence it fails to prove that the Divine nature of Christ was a partaker, directly, of his sufferings.¹

To our interpretation of these passages it will be objected, that though

¹ It is one thing to affirm that Christ, a Divine *person*, suffered, and quite another to affirm that he suffered in his Divine *nature*. To the former position, all orthodox Christians would assent; to the latter, very few.

the designations of Christ's whole person are sometimes applied to one of his natures, yet not in a way to contradict the designations themselves. Divine names are not used in connection with human properties, nor human names in connection with Divine properties. Hence, when it is said that the Jews crucified "the Lord of Glory," and that the church is purchased with God's own blood, we are to conclude that the Divine nature of Christ did really participate in the sufferings of the cross.

But even this objection, plausible as it may seem, will not stand the test of a critical examination. The truth is, that human properties are not unfrequently ascribed to Christ, in connection with Divine names and titles, and Divine properties in connection with human titles. For example, the phrase "Son of Man," so often applied to Christ, refers properly to his human nature. And yet it is continually used in connection with Divine properties and works. "The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins." Matt. 9: 6. "The Son of Man is Lord even of the Sabbath." Matt. 12: 8. "No man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man, who is in heaven." John 3: 13. "When the Son of Man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory; and before him shall be gathered all nations, Matt. 25: 31.

I may cite another example which is stronger, if possible, than either of these. By the mouth of Zechariah, the Jehovah of Israel is represented as saying: "They shall look on me whom they have pierced;" and this, we are told, was fulfilled upon Christ, when the soldiers pierced his lifeless body with a spear. (Comp. Zech. 12: 10 with John 19: 37.) In doing this, the soldiers, according as words are used in the Scriptures, *pierced Jehovah*. But so far from piercing the Divine nature of Christ, they did not even pierce his entire human nature, but only his dead body. As this was the veritable body, the only visible relic, of a person who, in life, was the Jehovah of Israel, so in piercing this precious body, the soldiers are said to have pierced Jehovah.¹

¹ The principle of interpretation here applied to various passages of Scripture, may help us to understand a class of uninspired men, who have been thought to teach the sufferings of the Divine nature. We occasionally meet with expressions in prose, but more frequently in sacred poetry, which import that God died, that Jehovah was crucified, that the Lord of Life expired on the cross, etc. But what do the venerable men who use such language mean by it? Not that the *Divine nature* of Christ literally died, but that a *Divine person* died: one who united in himself both Divinity and humanity, a nature which *could die*, as well as one which *could not*. And if their writings, in general, were collated, it would be found, in nearly every instance, that they *exclude* the sense which has been put upon them,

In short, we are not Nestorians; nor do those who differ from us, profess to be Monophysites. We hold alike to *two* distinct natures in *one* Divine person. Hence, it need not surprise or perplex us, that we find frequent representations in Scripture which can belong to Christ in only one of his natures, standing in connection with names or terms which apply to his whole person. Thus, the Son of Man, while on earth, was in heaven. The Lord of Glory was crucified in the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth. The Jehovah of Israel was pierced in the piercing of Christ's lifeless body. And the same Jesus, which grew in wisdom and stature, is God over all, blessed forever. Holding fast to the venerable orthodox faith, with regard to the person of our blessed Lord, without swerving to the right hand or the left, it will be easy to interpret all the representations of Scripture with regard to his passion, and yet avoid what seems to us the monstrous supposition, that his Divine nature participated directly in the sufferings of the cross.

Another argument for the sufferings of the Divine nature has been drawn from the doctrine of *atonement*. To confine the sufferings of Christ to his human nature — to represent them as the sufferings only of a man, has been thought to detract from the greatness of the atonement, if not from its efficacy. It is but a creature-atonement, after all. The magnitude of the work is vastly heightened, when considered as accomplished by the sufferings of God. This objection would have more weight, if the Divinity of Christ were not regarded as indispensably concerned in the work of atonement; if his sufferings had been those of a mere man. But his Divinity, we have seen, *was altogether indispensable* in this great work. His sufferings were not those of a mere man. They were the sufferings of a man in whom "dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily;" of a man in personal union with the Deity, and who was sustained by that union to endure what otherwise would have crushed him in a moment. They were sufferings, to which the connection of the Divine with the human in the person of Christ imparted an infinite dignity and efficacy — an efficacy sufficient

as to the crucifixion of the Divine nature. Thus Ignatius, writing to the Romans, and exhorting them not to hinder his martyrdom, says: "Permit me to imitate the passion of my God." But in his Epistle to the Ephesians, Ignatius describes his Saviour as "both fleshly and spiritual, made and not made, God incarnate, true life in death, first passible then *impassible*, even Jesus Christ our Lord." So Bishop Pearson says: "The eternal Son of God, God of God, very God of very God, suffered under Pontius Pilate." But fortunately, Bishop Pearson explains himself, and gives the same explanation with that given above: "The person, which was begotten of the Father before all worlds, and so was really the Lord of Glory, and most truly God, took upon him the nature of man, and IN THAT NATURE, being still the same person that he was before, did suffer." — See Pearson on the Creed.

to constitute them a full expiation for the sins of the world. The Scriptures nowhere determine the precise amount of sufferings endured by our blessed Lord ; but we know that they were enough — considering the infinite dignity and glory of his person, and his ineffable nearness to the Father — enough to satisfy the justice of God, and answer all those purposes in the Divine government, which could have been answered by the destruction of our race. They were enough to declare, most adequately and fully, God's "righteousness for the remission of sins that are past that he might be just and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus," Rom. 3: 25. As much as this all evangelical Christians believe, who hold the sufferings of Christ to have been confined, in the sense explained, to his human nature. And what more than this do others believe, who extend his sufferings to the Divine nature? What more than this need any one believe, in order to a full and complete atonement?

There is a theory of the atonement, indeed, which seems to involve the necessity of the infinite sufferings of God ; — that theory which supposes Christ to have endured as much, in his own person, "pang for pang, spasm for spasm, sigh for sigh, and groan for groan," as all the elect would have suffered in hell forever. On this supposition we admit, that an infinitude of suffering on the part of our Lord was necessary ; and not only so, but "the infinitude must have been multiplied by the whole countless number of the redeemed." But this view of the atonement is commonly rejected by evangelical Christians, even by those who believe that the Divine nature of Christ did actually suffer and die. These, for the most part, are understood to hold the doctrine of the atonement in much the same sense as other Christians ; — an atonement which, for aught that appears, may be as adequately accomplished on our theory of the sufferings of Christ, as on their own.

In proof of the sufferings of the Divine nature in Christ, an appeal has also been made to the common apprehensions of Christians. When Christians read or hear of the sufferings and death of Christ, the impression on their minds is, that the *whole Christ* suffered, the Divine nature as well as the human ; nor is it likely, until they are instructed differently, that they entertain any other thought.

It cannot be expected of Christians in common life, that they should speculate very profoundly on a question such as this, or that their opinions should be regarded as of special importance. They believe that Christ suffered and died, according to the Scriptures, and that by his death he made expiation for sin ; and further than this their inquiries do not ordinarily extend. Still, should even the plainest Christian be asked, whether he really thinks that God agonized in the garden, that

God was crucified, that God bled and died; he would be shocked at the interrogation. He would shrink from a supposition so startling and incredible; and if inclined to pursue the subject at all, would probably adopt substantially the same views of it with those which have been here exhibited. Accordingly those writers who limit the sufferings of Christ to his human nature, appeal as confidently as any others, and perhaps with more reason, to the common apprehensions of Christians, in justification of their views.

Having now examined the arguments commonly adduced to prove the sufferings of the Divine nature in Christ, and shown that they do not establish the point in question, we proceed to the proof of the opposite doctrine. We hope to be able to show, to the satisfaction of all our readers, that the Divine nature of Christ did *not* directly suffer in his last agonies, but that his sufferings pertained to his human nature only. We say the Divine nature of Christ did not *directly* suffer. We deny not that the Divine *sympathized* with the human, or, which is the same, that God *felt* for his Son, as every benevolent nature must, in the hour of his sufferings. But to sympathize with Christ in his sufferings is one thing; directly to endure those sufferings, is quite another. God sympathizes with his people in all their afflictions. "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him." Ps. 103: 13. But God does not directly endure all the afflictions of his people, or any of them. In like manner we hold that the Divine nature of Christ did not directly endure the sufferings of the cross.

On this point, two or three things should be premised, not indeed as essential to the argument, but yet as belonging to it.

In the first place, if God suffered in the person of Christ, then the suffering must have been *universal*. God is an omnipresent spirit. In the possession of all his susceptibilities and powers, he exists everywhere. What he knows in one place, he knows in every place. What he feels here, he feels everywhere. Hence, if the Divine nature of Christ participated directly in the sufferings of the cross, the suffering must have been universal. Wherever God existed, the agony was felt. Every point of space throughout immensity, being pervaded with the presence of God, must have been also pervaded with his sufferings.

Again, if the Divine nature in Christ suffered, I see not but the *whole Divine nature* suffered. The suffering must have extended to the entire Godhead — Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Not only are the persons of the Godhead in some sense distinct, in some other sense they are one. By some mysterious vinculum they are so united, as to constitute but one God. What one knows, they all know. What one feels they all feel. What one does, they all may, in some sense, be said to do.

"What things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." "I am in the Father, and the Father in me." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." "I and my Father are one."

No one who believes in the proper, Scriptural *unity* of the persons of the Godhead, in opposition to tritheism, can persuade himself, that one of these persons could have suffered infinitely — could have been visited with all the agonies of the garden and the cross, and yet the other Divine persons remain unscathed. These sufferings, if they reached the Divine nature at all, must obviously have reached the whole Divine nature, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost must have suffered together. I see not how this conclusion can be avoided, but upon the supposition of three entirely distinct intellects, sensibilities, and wills, which would constitute three separate, independent minds, or (which is the same) three Gods.¹

I scarcely need remark here (what has been hinted already) that if the Divine nature of Christ suffered on the cross, his sufferings must have been *almost entirely* those of the Divine nature. The sufferings of the man must have been swallowed up and lost — must have been as nothing, yea, less than nothing and vanity, compared with the infinitely greater sufferings of the God. And in this view it is pertinent to ask, Why need the Saviour have been a man at all? Why must he take on him the Seed of Abraham? As his sufferings were almost entirely those of God, why could not those of the man have been spared, and the atonement have been accomplished without the incarnation?

In proof that the sufferings of Christ belonged, in the sense explained, to his human nature, I remark, in the first place, that all the *manifestations* of suffering, on his part, were human. The hunger, the thirst, the weariness, the poverty, the fierce temptations, the agony in the garden, the bloody sweat, the fears and the pains of crucifixion, the pangs of death — all this array of continued and most intense suffering was yet, so far as *appears*, the suffering of a man. There were no decisive indications of anything beyond this. The supposition, therefore, that the sufferings of Christ were but in the smallest degree those of a man — that they were almost entirely the sufferings of God, is, to say the least, a

¹ Hence Mr. Harris, in a passage which has been quoted by the advocates of a suffering God, admits, that the sufferings of Christ must have been those also of the Father. "How does it enhance our conceptions of the Divine compassion, when we reflect, that there is a sense in which the sufferings of Christ were the sufferings of the Father also."—GREAT TEACHER, p. 106.

The objection, that our argument equally proves that the *incarnation* of Christ must have involved the *incarnation of the Father*, will be considered in another place; where I shall endeavor to show, that those who urge this objection must have imbibed very gross and unscriptural notions of the incarnation.

gratuitous supposition. There were no outward evidences, no appearances to justify it.

Accordingly, the Scriptures teach, and that too in a variety of ways, that the sufferings of Christ *were those of a man*. We are assured, first of all, that our Saviour became a man *that he might suffer*; importing that he could have had no suffering but for his human nature. He "was made a little lower than the angels" — in other words he was made a man — "*for the suffering of death* that he, by the grace of God, should *taste death for every man*." Heb. 2: 9. "Forasmuch, then, as the children are made partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself took part of the same, *that through death* he might destroy him who has the power of death, that is, the devil." Heb. 2: 14. Christ is also said to have been "made of a woman, made under the law, that" — through his sufferings and blood — "he might redeem them that were under the law." Gal. 4: 5.

The Scriptures also teach, not only that Christ became a man that he might suffer, but that he actually suffered *as a man*. He was "*a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief*." Isa. 53: 3. "Being found in fashion *as a man*, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto *death*, even *the death of the cross*." Phil. 2: 8.

The human character of Christ's sufferings is further indicated, in that he is so often said to have suffered in *his body*. "Who himself bare our sins in *his own body* on the tree." 1 Pet. 2: 24. "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a *body* hast thou prepared me," in which to suffer. "Then I said, Lo! I come, in the volume of the book it is written of me, to do thy will, O God; by which will we are sanctified, through the offering of *the body* of Jesus Christ once for all." Heb. 10: 5—10.

Christ is furthermore said to have suffered *in the flesh*; or, which is the same, in his *human nature*. "Being put to death *in the flesh*, but quickened by the Spirit." 1 Pet. 3: 18. "Forasmuch, then, as Christ hath suffered for us *in the flesh*, arm yourselves, likewise, with the same mind." 1 Pet. 4: 1. "You that were sometime alienated, and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled *in the body of his flesh, through death*." Col. 1: 21.

The Scriptures represent the atonement of Christ as consisting essentially in his *blood*, and his *death*. I need not quote passages, as they must be familiar to every reader. But the blood of Christ belonged exclusively to his human nature. It was that which flowed in human veins. To speak of the blood of God, except as of a *man* "in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," and who had flesh and blood, like other men, is to talk nonsense. And *natural, physical*

death, too, which was the sense in which our Saviour endured it, is altogether a human affair. It is an extinction of the natural, animal life. It is a dissolution of the connection between a human soul and a human body. It was to accomplish the death of Jesus, in *this sense*, that the Jews conspired against him. The means which they used, and which the Romans used, were all adapted to this end. It was in this sense, undoubtedly, that the Saviour died. His human soul left his body. Animal life and motion ceased. His body became a cold and pallid corpse, and was laid in the tomb.

To suppose that our Saviour died in any other and higher sense than this, is to speak against all evidence. Yea more, it is to affirm, in contradiction of the Scripture testimony, that he passed through two different kinds of death, or in other words, *died twice*. That he died, in the ordinary sense of dissolution, there can be no doubt. And now if his Divine nature also died; if he experienced a change which may, with any propriety, be denominated *the death of God*; he must have endured another and an infinitely more dreadful death — a death, compared with which the mere dissolution of the body was as nothing. Why, then, is no mention made of this more dreadful death in the Scriptures? Why is it so expressly said that Christ died *once* — not twice — for all?

The nature of our Saviour's sufferings is clearly indicated in a fact mentioned by one of the evangelists. While agonizing and pleading in the garden, and ready to sink under the weight of his sorrows, "there appeared unto him an angel from heaven, *strengthening him*." Luke 22: 43. Nothing can be more natural than this, or more easy of explanation, on supposition that our Saviour suffered as a man. But on the other supposition, what shall be said of it? What *can* be said? Does the mighty God, under any circumstances, need the aids and supports of a ministering angel? Even if we could suppose the Eternal in that suffering condition, weeping, pleading, and sweating as it were great drops of blood, would he need to be strengthened from such a source?

There is another fact mentioned in the Gospels, which is equally conclusive as to the nature of Christ's sufferings. It seems that when the soldiers led him away to crucify him, they first laid on *him* (as was the custom in such cases) the wood of the cross. John 19: 17. But he had not borne it far, when it was taken from him, and laid upon one Simon, a Cyrenian. Matt. 27: 32. The only reason which has been assigned, or can be, why Jesus was relieved of the burthen of the cross is, that *he was unable to bear it*. Through weakness, distress, long fasting, and loss of blood, he was ready to faint and die under it, and might

not have survived to come to the place of crucifixion. Now all this is what might have been expected, on supposition that Christ suffered as a man. But on the other supposition, it is wholly inexplicable. Was God ready to faint and die under the burthen of the cross? Was not he able to bear it to its appointed place?

I have now briefly exhibited the *Scriptural* argument against the sufferings of the Divine nature in Christ; and to my own mind it is conclusive. It proves, as certainly as words can prove anything, that our Saviour's sufferings (if we except those of mere sympathy) were confined to his human nature.

I have still another argument to urge — one not independent of the Scriptures, but not so directly connected with them — growing out of the *Divine perfections*. If we consider the several kinds of suffering which our Saviour endured, and the causes of it, to suppose that it extended to the Divine nature — to God, is inconsistent with his *acknowledged perfections*.

The causes of our Saviour's sufferings were various. Some were bodily; others, mental. And of those that were mental, some were emotional, and others more purely intellectual and spiritual.

A portion of our Saviour's sufferings had a *bodily origin*. The mind suffered through its connection with the body. Thus we know that he suffered from weariness, from faintness, from hunger, from thirst, and from the thorns, the scourge, the nails, and other inflictions at the time of his crucifixion. But is it likely that *the Deity* suffered in these ways? Was the immensity of the Divine nature hungry or thirsty? Was the almighty God weary?¹ Did the driving of a nail, or the pricking of a thorn, inflict a torture upon the Divinity himself, and thus carry a pang throughout the universe? Who believes as much as this? Who that has any proper sense of the nature of the Divine perfections can believe it?

God is not impassible in such a sense as to feel no pity in view of distress, and no displeasure in view of sin. But he is, we think, in such sense impassible, as not to be liable to suffer from the direct inflictions of his creatures. Was it ever within the power of a man, by a blow of the hand, or the driving of a nail, to torture the Deity himself, and thus fill immensity with distress and anguish? Does not a supposition such as this tend to degrade and dishonor the Divine Being, and make him, in some respects, such an one as ourselves?

¹ "Hast thou not known? Hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary?" Isa. 40: 28.

A part of our Saviour's sufferings arose from *fear*. As his last agonies approached, he seems to have been appalled in view of them, and to have feared that he should not be able to go through them in a proper manner. In the language of the Psalmist, "fearfulness and trembling came upon him, and horror overwhelmed him." Ps. 55: 5. "He offered up prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, unto him that was able to save him from death, and was heard in that he *feared*." Heb. 5: 7. But how is it possible that the Divine nature in Christ should have suffered from fear? Of what could it be afraid? Being omniscient, nothing unanticipated could present itself to the mind of the Saviour to awaken fear—nothing of which he had not had the most perfect knowledge from all eternity. And being almighty and independent, he must have known that nothing could ever injure him, and that he had absolutely nothing of which to be afraid.

Will it be said that he feared as to the sufficiency of his *moral* and *spiritual* strength? But was he not absolutely and unchangeably perfect? And could holiness infinite and immutable ever fail?

That our Saviour suffered from fear is certain. That the Divinity within him could not fear, is equally certain. To suppose it, is to contradict all the Divine perfections. It is demonstrable, therefore, that in this part of his sufferings, the Divine nature did not participate.

Our Saviour also suffered from distressing *temptations*. He was sorely tempted in the wilderness. We read that "he *suffered*, being tempted." He was "tempted in all points like as we are, yet without sin." Heb. 2: 18. 4: 15. But is it possible that his Divine nature suffered in this way? Was God tempted? We read expressly that "God *cannot be tempted* with evil, neither tempteth he any man." James 1: 13.

Undoubtedly, much of our Saviour's suffering was, in its nature, *mental*. It originated in the mind. Nor did it consist in mere nervous delusions and horrors; there was a rational cause for it in the state and exercises of his own soul. The most distressing thoughts were darted in upon him. Views of things the most painful and overwhelming passed before him, and filled him with anguish. To use the language of Edwards: "his soul was in a great and sore conflict with those terrible and amazing apprehensions which he then had." Now all this was perfectly natural, and may be easily accounted for, on supposition that his sufferings were those of his human nature. But suppose we adopt the other supposition, and regard them as the sufferings of God. What possible account can now be given of them? What painful views of things, distressing thoughts, and gloomy, dreadful apprehensions could have come over the Divine mind, just at this time, to overwhelm it, and fill it with anguish? Had not the great God perceived and un-

derstood the same things before? Had he not possessed the most perfect view of them — had they not entered into his purpose and plan, from all eternity?

But the severest sufferings of our blessed Lord — the bitterest ingredients of that dreadful cup which he consented to drink to the very dregs — were undoubtedly of a *spiritual* nature. For a time, God was pleased to shut out his prayer, and to withhold from him those spiritual supports and consolations — those comforting tokens of the Divine favor and love, which he had ever before enjoyed. “I cry in the day time, but thou hearest not; and in the night season, and am not silent. My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me? Why art thou so far from helping me, and from the words of my roaring?” Ps. 22: 1, 2. Now these distresses may be conceived of, and accounted for, supposing them to have fallen upon *the man* Christ Jesus, while suffering in the stead of sinners. But what possible idea can we frame of them, if we say that they were the sufferings of God himself? Did God the Son cry, in his distress, to God the Father? Did he cry to him, and not be heard? Did the first person of the Trinity hide his face from the second, withdraw from him all spiritual support and consolation, and thus fill his infinite heart with distress and anguish? Could one person of the Trinity be thus deserted and afflicted, and the whole Godhead not be afflicted? Could the Divinity of the Son thus sorely suffer, and the Divinity of the Father and the Spirit escape?

But even this is not the worst of it. The sufferings of Christ — of every kind — are represented in Scripture as *the inflictions of God*. “It pleased *the Lord* to bruise him, and put him to grief.” He was “stricken, smitten of *God*, and afflicted.” Isa. 53: 4, 10. Whatever may have been the instrumental cause or causes of his sufferings, God was the prime mover and efficient; and all this was necessary, that so an expiation might be made to God for sin. Now all this is very possible and conceivable, on supposition that Christ suffered for sinners, as a man. But suppose him to have suffered chiefly, almost entirely, in his Divine nature. Suppose the God to have suffered. Suppose one person in the Trinity striking, smiting, afflicting another — bruising him and putting him to grief, and thereby putting himself to grief — visiting the whole Godhead with distress and anguish. Who can conceive of such a thing? Who can reconcile it at all with the Divine perfections? Who can contemplate it but with distress and horror?

We come now to consider the theory in question — that of the sufferings of the Divine nature in Christ — in its bearing on the *immutability* of God, and also on his perfect and unchanging *felicity*. I have said that I do not think God immutable in such sense as to be incapa-

ble of anything like a succession of views and exercises, or to be in such sense impossible, that he cannot feel for the woes of his creatures, or be displeased at their sins. But the theory we are examining goes much farther than this. It supposes the Divine Being at a certain period, some 1816 years ago, to have become, for the time, an infinite sufferer. He was tortured with fear. He was assaulted with manifold temptations. He was overwhelmed with the most distressing thoughts, and the most painful apprehensions. And not only so, he had put himself in such connection with a human body, as to suffer immensely from that source. The driving of a nail carried a pang to the very heart of Omnipotence. The pricking of a thorn, the smart of the scourge, was felt throughout immensity. And worse than all; one Person in the Godhead commenced, at this time, inflicting the most dreadful sufferings on another; — hiding his face from him — shutting out his prayer — striking, smiting, and afflicting him — bruising him, and putting him to grief; as though one of these Divine personages could so torture another, and feel nothing himself; as though the Son and the Father were no longer one.

If these expressions shall seem to any of my readers irreverent and awful, I cannot help it. They are no more irreverent than the theory which I am laboring to expose. But the charge of irreverence is not that with which I have now to do. How do the above representations comport with the idea of God's *unchangeableness*; and not only so, but with that of his unchangeable and perfect *happiness*? That God is unchangeable in every sense which does not imply imperfection, is clearly taught in the Scriptures. That he is perfectly and eternally happy is as fully taught; and the same may be inferred from his very nature, and from his other perfections. He has infinite and exhaustless sources of happiness within himself. But how is it possible to reconcile with these glorious attributes the supposed suffering of the Divine nature of Christ at the time of the crucifixion? According to this theory, there certainly *was* a change in God at this time, a mighty change, a most painful and dreadful change. He did not merely sympathize with the sufferer on Calvary, but *was himself the sufferer*. The agonies of the garden, the tortures of crucifixion, he literally *felt*, in his own Divine nature. It would seem that his happiness, for the time, must have been, not marred, but *destroyed*, and the immensity of his being must have been filled with anguish.¹ On the theory before us, there was, I repeat, a *change* in God at this time; a great, a most painful and dread-

¹ "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, *even unto death*." If Christ is here speaking in his Divine nature, how much happiness was there left in that nature?

ful change; one that never can be reconciled with the plainly revealed doctrine of his perfect, unchangeable, and eternal felicity.

Will it be said here, that the *incarnation* implies a change in God, and perhaps as great a change as that involved in his suffering on the cross? I admit that the incarnation may be so regarded and stated as to involve a change in the Supreme Being. I fear, indeed, that it is so regarded by not a few evangelical Christians. If the second person in the Trinity literally divested himself of any of his Divine perfections and attributes, when he assumed our nature and appeared in our flesh; or if his nature became so commingled with ours as to be subject to human limitations, and in fact to constitute but one nature; or if the hypostatical union was the same in him as the union of soul and body in man; in other words, if, in humbling himself (or emptying himself), our blessed Saviour *ceased to be God*, as he was before; then would the incarnation imply a change in God, and perhaps as great a change as that involved in the pains of crucifixion. But such, I am persuaded, is not the true scriptural idea of the incarnation. If we cannot fully explain (as most certainly we cannot) what Paul describes as "the great mystery of godliness," we may show, to a certain extent, what it is not. And we know that it was not — could not have been — either all, or aught, of what has been stated above. Christ was as much God, and was as truly possessed of all his Divine attributes and perfections, subsequent to the incarnation, as he was before. The Divine nature assumed a personal union with the human, but was not converted into it, or mingled with it. It was as superior to it, and distinct from it, in this connection, as it was before. The incarnation involved *no real, essential change* in the second person of the Trinity, but only a different *relative position*, and consequently a *different manifestation*. The Divinity now *appeared*, it *showed itself*, in a human form. God was "*manifest in the flesh*." In the beautiful language of Mc Cheyne, "The almightiness of God now moved in a human arm. The infinite love of God now beat in a human heart. The compassion of God to sinners now glistened in a human eye. God was love before, but Christ was Divine love covered over with flesh; — just as you have seen the sun shining through a colored window. It is *the same sun*, and *the same sun-light*; and yet it shines with a mellowed lustre. So in Christ dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily. The perfections of the Godhead shone through every pore, through every action, word, and look — *the same perfections*; they were only shining with a mellowed brightness. As the bright light of the Shekinah often shone through the vail of the temple, so did the Godhead of Christ often force itself through the human vail — through the heart and flesh of the man Christ Jesus."

I here close my argument against the strange and, to my apprehension, monstrous idea, that the Divine nature of Christ participated directly in the sufferings of the cross. That the subject is recondite and difficult, and in some of its aspects quite beyond the reach of the human understanding, no one can doubt. I have endeavored to treat it with that modesty, humility, and prayerfulness — with that deference to the teachings of holy Scripture, and of reason only as guided by Scripture, which its nature demands.

I know there are some who are averse to a critical consideration of this subject, and are full of regrets that the discussion has taken place. They believe that Christ died for sinners, and by his death made a full expiation; and that, they say, is enough. With this physiological analysis of the person of Christ — this dividing him off into two distinct natures — and the inquiry whether he suffered in both natures, or but one, and if in but one of his natures, which — with questions such as these, they have no sympathy. The very inquiry is presumptuous — an intermeddling with things unrevealed.

In reply to this objection, I have to say, in the first place, that the doctrine of Christ's peculiar and mysterious person is not a thing unrevealed. That he united in his own person both a divine and a human nature, or in other words, that he was both God and man, is as clearly revealed as any fact of the Bible. And so it has been understood in the church in all ages.

Nor do I regard the question as to *the nature* in which our Lord suffered, as a thing unrevealed. It has been my endeavor, in the foregoing pages, to unfold *the revelations of God* on this awful subject, and not to tread a step beyond them. If I have uttered my own fancies, let them be set at nought; but if what has been said is *the truth of God*, let it not be despised or rejected.

And as to the discussion which has come up within the last few years, certainly, those who take the commonly received view of the subject, are not responsible for that. The discussion was introduced, and has been forced upon them, from the other side.

The history of opinions on this subject, in the Christian church, may be given in few words. Until the fourth century, the question seems to have excited little or no interest. The early Fathers were content to use the language of Scripture, without any labored attempts at explanation.

At the period referred to, some few, we know not who, advanced the idea, that the Divine nature of Christ was passible and suffered on the cross; and the bishop of Rome wrote to Athanasius of Alexandria, requesting from him his opinion on the subject. Athanasius replied at con-

siderable length, sustaining the commonly received doctrine, and condemning that which had been introduced as novel and unreasonable. This decision of Athanasius, based as it was upon the Scriptures, seems to have virtually settled the question for the next fifteen hundred years. With the exception of a small portion of the Monophysites, and possibly a few others, who were regarded as heretics, the sufferings of the Divine nature were universally discarded, almost to the present time. The question was so entirely and quietly at rest, that theologians did not think it worth while to disturb it. With the exception of bishop Pearson, in his Exposition of the Creed, I do not now remember one, who has entered upon a serious consideration of it in modern times.

Thus the matter rested until the year 1845, when George Griffin Esq. of New York, under the signature of "a Layman," published his treatise on "the Sufferings of Christ," controverting what he acknowledged to be the almost unanimous opinion of the Christian church in all ages, and advocating with much zeal and ability the sufferings of the Divine nature. He has since been followed up by several writers on the same side, in the different Religious Quarterlies of the country.¹

I make these statements for the purpose of showing to any who may feel disquieted by this discussion, that the responsibility of it does not rest upon the advocates of the commonly received opinions. They did not commence the discussion, nor are they disposed to continue it, any farther than may be necessary for the vindication of what they — and with them nearly the whole Christian church — have ever considered to be the truth.

As to the results of the error which has been so recently advocated among us, a sufficient time has not yet elapsed for these prominently to appear. But if the doctrine is persisted in and prevails, its appropriate fruits will ere long be manifested, and like all the products of delusion and error, they will be bitter.

Among them, I shall expect to witness, in the first place, *unworthy and dishonorable views of God*. As the doctrine which has been considered is manifestly inconsistent with some of the acknowledged perfections of God, those who hold it will be likely (at least, in their conceptions) to divest him of these perfections. Believing the Deity to have suffered from hunger, thirst, fatigue, fear, temptations, stripes, and other like causes; they will be led to conceive of him as *liable* to suffer in such ways. And this will be to conceive of him as subject to human limitations and infirmities, if not altogether such an one as themselves. It will be, I am sure, to degrade and dishonor him.

¹ An able and satisfactory Reply to "a Layman," by Rev. Dr. Tyler of East Windsor, Conn., was published in 1847.

I see not how this result is to be avoided, but by incurring others even more disastrous. Some, to escape the difficulty, may adopt the opinion (indeed, some *have* adopted and published it already), that in the work of our redemption, the persons of the Trinity, so called, are but *acting a part*. One of them *seems* to guard the honors of the law; while another *seems* to suffer, and to make expiation and intercession; and the third *seems* to carry on and consummate the work. But it is all an *appearance*, to which there is no corresponding reality — a moving, affecting tragedy, designed to melt the hard hearts of men, and bring them into a state of reconciliation with God. Now where this scheme is adopted, it will be not only natural but important to represent the second person of the tragic Trinity as suffering and dying in the sinner's stead; because the greater the suffering and the sufferer, the more moving and impressive will be the scene. And the Absolute, the Infinite, is not in the least affected by it. He sits complacent behind the curtain, and sees the moving farce go on, and rejoices in the blessed results of so blessed a contrivance.

Others may think to run clear of difficulties, by adopting *pantheistic* notions. God is everything, and everything is God. The multiform objects around us in the world, are but so many manifestations of the Supreme. Since God is to be seen flying in the clouds, and roaring in the storm, and crawling in the worm, and singing in the bird of spring, and groaning in all the agonies of a suffering world; why should it be thought incredible that he should himself suffer, in the sufferings of Jesus Christ? How could there have been any suffering in the garden, or on Calvary, in which the Universal Mind did not participate?

I have here hinted at some of the probable, and more than probable results of the error which has been examined, in its bearing upon God. Other effects will be likely to flow from it in other directions.

It can hardly fail to result in erroneous conceptions of the *person of Christ*. Instead of the good old orthodox statement — “two distinct natures in one person forever,” there will be a revival, in some form, of the Monophysite heresies. The two natures will be regarded as so commingled and incorporated, as to constitute, in fact, but one nature. Christ, we hear it said already, is to be conceived of as *a whole, a unit*, so that what he thinks, or feels, or says, or does, or suffers in one nature, he suffers in his whole nature. There are no such distinctions between the Divine nature and the human, as theologians have insisted on.

I only add, that the views I have controverted, should they extensively prevail, will be likely to drive many into simple Unitarianism. The doctrine of a suffering Deity, of a crucified God, is too revolting to obtain currency with thinking minds; and if this shall come to be

insisted on as essential to orthodoxy, not a few will renounce it altogether. The Christ who died for us, they will say, was a man like ourselves, and his death had no more atoning efficacy than that of any other martyr.

It was undoubtedly the design of those who originated this discussion to magnify the atonement, and exalt the grace of God in our redemption. What more likely to have this effect, than to represent God himself as suffering, bleeding, dying for us? But there is reason to fear that the doctrine, if persisted in, will have, with many, directly the opposite effect. It will lead them to reject the atonement altogether, and trust to the work of their own hands for salvation.

It is always safe to follow the Bible, honestly, faithfully, reasonably interpreted; but specious theories and startling novelties are to be suspected and avoided.

ARTICLE II.

THE ANCIENT POETS AND POETRY OF WALES.

By Edward D. Morris, New Haven, Conn.

THE ancient literature of Wales has for a long period been concealed, almost entirely, from the view of men of learning. It would be difficult to find, in the whole range of literary history, so signal an instance of remarkable intellectual treasures, neglected and apparently forgotten. A silence as profound as that which brooded for ages over the buried cities of central Italy, seems to have rested upon these last and only relics of a once great and flourishing people. Time, which has done so much elsewhere to bring the rich Past into light, has only added to that obscurity which has so long enshrouded them. While toil and effort have been lavishly expended in surveying and examining almost every other field of literary or scientific study, the mountain fastnesses of Wales, rich in mental as in natural resources, have been wholly unexplored.

The country within whose borders this intellectual mine is hidden, has for three centuries past figured but slightly in the history of Britain; and is now scarcely known except as a retired province of comparatively little value or importance. From the time of the first assault made by Saxon power upon the liberties of the Welsh nation, to that in which they were finally annexed to the British empire — a period of

nearly seven centuries—the entire principality was a scene of the most terrible confusion and lawlessness. The daring chieftains who inhabited those portions bordering on England, secured both by the inaccessible nature of their mountain homes and by the unflinching loyalty of their vassals, carried on a ceaseless war against the English forces—a war stained, on both sides, by all the brutality and recklessness of that semi-barbarous age. The merciless conflicts of Edward I. of England with the last Llewelyn evince, in a most striking manner, the spirit which actuated both parties during the entire contest. The passage, in 1535, of the celebrated Act of Union, which put an end to this protracted struggle, and secured to the Welsh those privileges for which they had been contending, led both nations into more close and amiable intercourse; and was shortly followed by a gradual and finally intimate connection and commingling of interests and sympathies. Since that memorable period, the inhabitants of Wales have been swept onward in the current of English affairs, losing by degrees their national peculiarities, and gradually blending their private interests with those of their Saxon neighbors, till they are now nearly lost in the overshadowing importance of English interests and English feelings.

These general causes have operated with peculiar effect upon the language and literature of Wales. English laws and English courts of justice have been established throughout the principality. The language of the common schools and of instruction generally, as well as that of nearly all the transactions of commerce and exchange, is the modern Anglo-Saxon. The original language of the people, on the other hand, is retained for the most part only in their private intercourse, in the pulpit, and in a large proportion of their weekly and monthly publications. It is a general law that wherever two nations come into close and lasting contact with each other, whether that contact be peaceable or hostile, the less must ultimately fall and fade away before the greater. In strict accordance with this law has been the result of the intimate connection which the inhabitants of Wales have been compelled by their extensive commercial and mining operations, by the introduction and establishment of the Episcopal church, and by the constant influx of English interests and English customs, to maintain with their more enterprising neighbors. They have been unable to keep pace with the advance of science and of many kinds of learning; and in this particular are falling, year by year, slowly but steadily and surely, behind other nations who are more enlightened and less burdened by oppressive legislation. Comparatively uneducated, they are also without the power of educating themselves in any other way than by abandoning their native language, and employing in its stead the vastly greater resources

of the Anglo-Saxon tongue. To this point very many of their efforts in behalf of education have, of late years, been directed; and with great promise of success.¹

As a natural consequence, however, of this condition of affairs, the ancient literature of Wales has been rapidly passing out of notice. This literature, extending from the sixth to the sixteenth century, and comprising a large variety of published and manuscript volumes, consists almost entirely of poetry. The many intricacies of the language and of the peculiar metrical system according to which most of it is written, prove an effectual barrier to its extensive study among the mass of the community. The language of poetry is always more or less distinct from that of common life, and consequently more or less above the apprehension of the common people. But if there be added to this great source of difficulty, the numberless modifications to which, in a long course of ages, every language is liable, this barrier becomes almost insurmountable. More especially is this the case where the stern and resistless wants of daily life are incessantly driving the people to the more practical studies and pursuits of modern times.

Within the past half century, however, great efforts have been made to disentomb these buried treasures. Most of these efforts have been made by private individuals, who have nobly given themselves to this great work. They have been mostly men of cultivated minds, led on by a feeling of patriotism on the one hand, and on the other by an ardent love for the rich field of study which has opened before them. They have been aided in these laudable efforts by national associations, existing in various portions of the principality, and formed mainly for the purpose of carrying on this important enterprize. Through the unwearied exertion of these combined agencies, a considerable number of volumes, containing the most valuable writings of nearly all the earlier poets, accompanied by translations, and also a complete and definite view of the peculiar system of Bardism, which has existed among the Welsh from the earliest ages to the present day, has been published and circulated both at home and abroad. These volumes, written partly in Welsh and partly in English, have won the attention of many throughout England, France, and Germany; and have thrown around the language and the system they disclose, a strong and constantly increasing interest. In a few of the English universities, the language of Wales has become to some extent a branch of scientific study; and the notice which it has attracted in a philological point of view, has served greatly

¹ Reports of the Commissioners of Inquiry into the State of Education in Wales, appointed by the Committee of Council on Education. 1847.

to heighten the value of its literary treasures. And while philologists have been occupied in tracing out its marked peculiarities, others have been as actively employed in exploring the mine whose rich veins have been, up to a comparatively recent period, covered by the rubbish and ruins of the past.

Those who are for the most part unacquainted with the early history of the Welsh nation, and who notice only their present unimportance, may be led to presume that the ancient literature of Wales must be of comparatively little value. But it should be distinctly kept in view that, although now narrowed down by Saxon power to the scanty limits of their mountain home, the Welsh once occupied by far the greatest portion of the British Isles. Though now obscured and overshadowed by the dominant influence of British interests, they once held supreme sway over the whole of England proper, from the Firth of Solway to the cliffs of Dover, and from Yarmouth Bay to the western limits of Land's End. At that time, everything tended to call out the intellectual spirit of the nation. It was the peculiar age of poetry — the peculiar period in the progress of mankind, when the sober influence of exacter studies, and the stern tendencies of science and philosophy had not, as yet, unfitted men to take delight in the creations of a warm and active imagination. Their princes ruled over wide tracts of country, and extended their influence and power even to the northern seas. The deficiencies of the soil on which they dwelt, compelled the people to devote much of their time to agriculture instead of following those less profitable pursuits in which barbarous tribes are accustomed to engage. Systems of law, the wrecks of which are still visible, soon rose to great perfection, and held a controlling power throughout the land. Druidism — that remarkable institution, of which the Bardic system was merely an offshoot — gave to all, great means of mental as well as moral culture. In every feature essential to making up that nascent state which is the immediate forerunner of civilization, they were probably far superior to their German or Gallic neighbors.

The effect of this state of things upon the poetry of Wales is obvious. The bard held a prominent position in the castle of his lord. He was a leading member of the State, often holding great political as well as social power. His art was one of the three sister arts recognized by the law, and was consequently everywhere established. His life was devoted to the interests of his profession; and all that royal patronage or careful study could effect to render poetry in the highest and largest sense an art, was lavishly expended. Aided by such auspicious influences, poetry grew and flourished everywhere. But in the fearful revolutions brought about at a later day by Saxon inroads, and in the sub-

sequent influx of Saxon principles and feelings, it declined and almost perished. Many of the productions of the preceding ages were unquestionably lost during the confusion and anarchy of that protracted struggle. But happily an ample number still remains to excite the interest and admiration of the literary student, and to give evidence of a state of society and a Bardic system as peculiar in many of its features as any the world has ever seen.

It is a trite saying that some estimate of the general character and customs of any people is essential to an accurate acquaintance with their poetry. And this opinion rests upon the fact, that the poetry of every nation is generally found to be a clear reflector and expositor of its distinctive characteristics. The student is sometimes able to grasp at once these two separate classes of knowledge, and by comparing them in the mutual light which they shed upon each other, to obtain a closer and clearer view of both. Sometimes, however, he is compelled to trace out the one by the often dim and doubtful radiance of the other. This is peculiarly the case in relation to the poetry and national character of the inhabitants of Wales. The general features of Welsh society, from the first inroad of Caesar to the times of Hywel the Good, have been rarely recorded excepting in such fragments of poetry as had their origin during that dark period; and subsequently up to the reign of Queen Elizabeth, they are found to be most vividly and forcibly portrayed in the writings of the bards. These writings are, therefore, doubly valuable both as a source of intellectual gratification, and as the chief means of obtaining acquaintance with a national character in many respects as worthy of study as any in the early history of our race.

It is also a well known fact that poetry and language have a close and important relation to each other. The true poet is necessarily a maker of language. Burning with exalted and exciting thoughts, he must find, or make if he cannot find, a language in which he can give his living fancies utterance. Yet his brightest and noblest thoughts are of necessity moulded and colored by the language which he is compelled by incidental circumstances to employ. Thought and expression are, in this sense, correlative — each necessarily strengthens or weakens the other. It is therefore essential that he who would study with success the works of men of genius, should first become acquainted with the powers and deficiencies of the language which they have, from choice or necessity, employed as a medium of expression.

This is preëminently the case in relation to the poetry and language of Wales. The metrical system adopted by the ancient Welsh bards is so peculiar, and depends so much upon the inherent peculiarities of their language, that any comprehension of its force and value requires a

profound acquaintance with that language. In this fact is found another reason for the almost unprecedented obscurity into which this branch of ancient poetry has fallen. The remarkable language in which it is clothed, seems to have passed its meridian. It resembles, somewhat, the Latin, about the period of the downfall of the Roman Empire. The grace, vigor, and strength of its Augustan era have given way almost entirely to a modern dialect less pure, but more adapted to the growing wants of the race. The influx of English laws and customs has brought with it a corresponding influx of English methods of expression, which have necessarily taken the place of the purer, but more antique and unwieldy language of the natives. It is, perhaps, remarkable that, while the nation have been making continual advances in every department of industry and knowledge, their original language should become less and less efficient as a means of intercourse. It is a primary law of language that it advances toward perfection just in proportion to the advancement of the people who employ it. The language of Wales, however, seems to have remained stationary, while the people have endeavored to supply those deficiencies which naturally arose, from time to time, not by inventing and employing new terms from the original tongue, but rather by the introduction of a foreign terminology better fitted for the various purposes of human life. Under the influence of this process, which has been silently going on for ages, the primary language of the people has gradually fallen, and is still falling more and more, into disuse. So far as theology and many of the themes of poetry, as well as most of the transactions of common life are concerned, it still abounds in apt and forcible expressions; but as far as regards nearly all the sciences and improvements which have arisen within the past two centuries, it is miserably defective.

A remark or two in reference to such peculiarities of the Welsh tongue as have a direct bearing upon its poetry, is essential to a clear understanding of the general topic under consideration. Of its great antiquity there is no question. The accounts given by Caesar in the *Commentarii* and by Tacitus in his *Agricola* would be sufficient, if uncorroborated by any other testimony, to prove the existence in Gaul and Britain of a race closely resembling, in language and in other particulars, the modern Welsh. But this proof is strengthened both by the testimony of other Latin authors and by the internal evidence of the traditions, histories, and poems still extant among the people. Many of these contain such allusions to the invasions of Caesar, and to other incidents of primitive history, as prove beyond a question the existence of the nation and language at a period anterior to the birth of Christ.

Up to a comparatively modern date, the Welsh tongue has been pre-

served uncommonly pure, and undefiled by additions from any foreign sources. It contains, undoubtedly, a large proportion of words whose roots are also found in the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. These words, however, were probably engrafted upon it during some primeval commingling of the races, which now lies beyond the reach of authentic history — probably before the Welsh nation had wandered from the eastern cradle of mankind to the northern and western shores of Europe. The Latin element was also, to some extent, augmented in the days when Roman armies ruled over the British Isles; but from the time when Roman power lost its hold, to the age of Queen Elizabeth — a period of twelve centuries or more — the native language seems to have remained entirely unmingled and distinct. This fact is explained by the utter want of commercial and social intercourse among the European tribes, by the secluded, insular position in which the Welsh were geographically placed, and by the continual watchfulness and care which were exercised by the druidic and bardic orders to preserve this pristine purity. And to it are attributable, in a very great measure, the simplicity and vigor which was so conspicuously displayed in the writings of the ancient bards.

To this fact is also due, in part, the uncommon applicability to the purposes of poetical composition which is a peculiar trait of the ancient British tongue. There is probably no modern language which possesses greater sources of metrical harmony or poetic power. In the multiplicity of its simple and compound words, and in its numberless capacities for the formation of compound from simple words, it is more than equal to the German. In the alternate power and sweetness of its poetic language, and in the natural melody of its metrical system, it is not inferior to the Italian. And probably no language of Europe surpasses it in the power of animated, life-like description, or of expressing the deepest and the loftiest emotions of our nature. It sometimes bursts forth in a torrent of rough, guttural tones inconceivably grand and effective — and again, it glides along in a rippling flow of liquid and labial sounds, which lull and charm the hearer like plaintive music. No one who has ever listened to the choicest eloquence of the Welsh pulpit, can fail to have been impressed with the extraordinary variety, power, and scope of the language. There is probably no class of men in existence who possess such immense power to move and mould the human heart, as the humble and often uncultured ministers who live among the wild and barren mountains of Wales. And this can be attributed only to the fact that they are able to bring to the aid of their natural earnestness and sincerity, the untold resources of their native tongue.

The ancient poetry of Wales possesses some remarkable characteristics which distinguish it, to a very great extent, from all other poetry, ancient or modern. It holds a distinct position in the literary world, having its rise apparently in the peculiar character of the people. It has borrowed nothing from external sources, but is wholly indigenous and native. Its themes are found in the national character — its graces and deficiencies are the deficiencies and graces of the national language — its spirit is the spirit of the nation, embodied in song. Being at the outset the legitimate offspring of the druidic system, it was sedulously preserved from contact with any exterior causes, which might modify or change its character. It dwelt with the consecrated priesthood in the shade and seclusion of their venerable oaks, unpolluted by the touch or gaze of any less august beings. It was the product of their own peculiar genius; and when, in after ages, the office of the poet was set apart from that of the priest, as a distinct profession, it still shared in the fostering care of its original cultivators, and partook largely and deeply of their singular spirit and influence. There is consequently an air of originality in its matter and expression, which is almost unequalled. The reader finds himself suddenly transported into a new country where all about him is strange and striking. New scenery, new customs, a new language, a new state of society and a new nation meet his view. He is astonished by the discovery of a far-extending and thickly populated continent, whose very existence he had never before imagined, and whose beauties and treasures and resources delight and enchant his vision.

It must be admitted, at the outset, that there is nothing in the ancient poetry of Wales which can advantageously be compared with the choicest productions of the Greek, Roman, or English muse. It is the product of a state of society which, although in advance of that of the surrounding nations, was nevertheless far inferior to the brightest ages of Grecian and Roman culture, and still more to the Augustan cycle of English literature. It is vain, therefore, to search in it after those traces of refinement and learning by which civilized society alone is marked. Nor, on the other hand, has it any marked resemblance to the earlier productions of the various nations of central Europe. It occupies a middle ground, over which it has exercised an exclusive control. Nothing in it resembles either the puerile and prolix romances and legendary tales which flourished throughout Europe during the palmy days of the Troubadours, or the loftier and nobler works of Homer, Virgil, or Milton. While the ancient bards of Wales have failed on the one hand to reach that uniform and self-sustained sublimity of thought and diction, which characterize the latter; they have, on the other, avoided the tame,

trivial, sickly spirit of the former. They possess, for the most part, an intermediate cast of mind. They delight in brilliant, pointed, pithy expressions—in nice and delicate shades of thought—in flowing and aptly modulated sentences. Most of their writings, and particularly those of the historic bards, are marked by a sententiousness, brevity, and terseness, which have rarely been equalled. They display far more of the Horatian than of the Virgilian spirit—far more of the genius of Pindar or Collins than of that of Homer or Milton. The historic bards deal mainly in brief, vivid recitals of detached battles and war-like exploits, distinguishing every leader by a thousand apt and striking epithets, and dashing out the picture, as it were, in a single stroke. The pastoral, elegiac, and amatory bards, on the other hand, excel mostly in concise, epigrammatic turns of thought, in harmonious and finely moulded verse, and in brilliant natural descriptions. These prevailing features give to the ancient poetry of Wales a distinct and singular character. And it ought, therefore, to be studied, not because it resembles the poetry of other races, but rather because it differs, in many important particulars, from the poetic literature of all other nations.

Many of these differences had their origin in the peculiar relation which the bardic system of Wales bore to the druidic institution. The term *druid* was originally generic, including three classes of persons: bards, philosophers, and priests. The same individual, however, often held these three sister offices, each of which was recognized and supported by the State. It was, in fact, considered essential to the election of an arch-druid, that he should be qualified and able to perform the duties of the bard and the philosopher as well as those of the priesthood. But occasionally members of the druidic order devoted themselves to the culture of one branch only, leaving the remaining branches to be followed by other individuals. Hence the term *druid* was limited, in process of time, to the priestly order only; while the bards and philosophers became distinct and independent bodies. Prior to this separation, the priesthood were the makers and administrators of the laws, under the supreme sanction of their princes. They were also the sole fosterers and teachers of the scanty knowledge then existing among the people, embodying within their order all the learning and wisdom of the age. They were likewise the only bards and musicians of their times; and were consequently, next to the royal families, the leading power of the nation. When, however, some advance had been made in social and political affairs, their priestly office was set apart from the remainder of their duties, and made a distinct branch of study and pursuit. The priest no longer officiated as instructor in any department of secular learning, or held the station of bard or musician in the palaces of the

chieftains. He acted only as religious teacher, while his other avocations passed into the hands of other bodies of men whose duties, privileges, and position were regulated, like his own, by State authority.

In this way the ancient bards of Wales became a separate order, ranking next to the priesthood, and enjoying peculiar immunities and privileges. Laws were enacted by the sovereign princes, defining their appropriate duties and station, and making provision for their sustenance, and for the regular meeting of bardic assemblies or *Eisteddodau*. The effect of these arrangements on the bardic institution must be obvious. During the three or four centuries immediately preceding the times of Hywel the Good, it gradually increased in influence; and finally became firmly established as one of the primary institutes of the State.

During his reign, however, the bardic order were allowed still greater rights and privileges. In the earlier part of the tenth century, he enacted a code of laws, still extant; in which the original system was nearly perfected.¹ The bards were divided into three distinct classes, according to their skill and understanding — the *derwyddbardd*, sometimes also styled the *pencerdd*, or chief of song — the *privardd*, or licensed bard, who bore also the title of *bardd teulu*, or family minstrel — and the *ovydd*, or philosophic bard, who was already initiated into many of the bardic mysteries, but not yet licensed by an assembly or *Eisteddod*. All who fell below this grade, were styled disciples, and were under the special instruction of teachers, who were usually licensed or family bards.

The *chief of song*, alone, possessed the right to preside in any *Eisteddod*, and to decide all questions relating either to poetry, or to the merits of candidates for the inferior grades; and his decision was, in all cases, to be final. He received his office by direct grant from an authorized session of bards; being, in the language of the laws of Hywel, graduated and warranted as to wisdom and science, and of elocution to demonstrate judgment and reason in respect to sciences. He was also to diffuse instruction respecting wisdom and religion in court, church, and household. He was always to hold his land free, and his property of every kind was to be free from legal seizure. He was to lodge in the royal palace with the heir apparent to the crown, and always to be seated near the king at table. On being appointed *Pencerdd*, he was to receive a harp from the king, which he was never to part with;

¹ A splendid copy of these laws with an English translation has been lately published by the British government, under the supervision of a Welsh gentleman of extensive and accurate knowledge, Mr. Aneurin Owen. One or two other editions have also been published from the original MSS. They are, however, quite rare.

and on every public festival, it was his duty to sing a hymn to the Deity, and a song either to the ruling monarch, or to some other friendly prince. As his compensation, he was to receive, in addition to the donations of his prince, a bridal present of twenty-four pieces of silver from every maiden on the eve of her marriage, and also a third of the salary of all his disciples. When, however, any one of these became a graduate or licensed bard, the Chief of song was bound to give him, in return, a harp.

The Family Bard also was an inmate of the royal palace, lodging with the Chief of the Household, who was usually a son or nephew of the reigning prince. He was to have his land rent-free, and his horse always in attendance; and to receive his linen clothing from the queen, his woollen from the king. At the three principal festivals, which were annually held in every royal palace, he was in duty bound, after the Chief of Song had finished his performances, to sing three songs, usually in reference to the military prowess of his sovereign; and he was at all times to sing, in a low tone, to the queen, if she desired it. On entering upon his office, he was to receive a harp from the king and a gold ring from the queen, which he was at all hazards to preserve. He was also to receive a steer for every hostile capture, at which he was present; and it was part of his duty to sing a standard song entitled *Unbenaeth Prydain*, as the army were entering into battle. It will be noticed that the duties of the family bard were far more miscellaneous and arduous than those of the Chief of Song. He held a lower rank at the royal table, in the bardic assemblies, and on all public occasions. His privileges were also fewer, and his salary less ample. But notwithstanding these differences, the position of the order, added to their large number and comparatively great wealth, gave them an extensive influence over social and political affairs.

The duties, privileges, and position of the philosophic bards were much less distinctly defined. Occupying the lowest among the bardic grades, they probably had but little influence in social life. Their residences were, for the most part, the houses of the inferior chieftains, and even those of the humblest orders of society. It was the most important of their duties to preserve by records the descent and pedigrees of all the noble families of the State. Such records were, mainly through the agency of this class of bards, handed down from age to age; and the remnants of many of them are still scattered throughout the principality.

Regulations were also made in the laws of Hywel with reference to the bardic *Eisteddvodau*, in which they were made one of the three regular assemblies of the nation. The authority of the chiefs of song,

who from their presiding at these assemblies were often titled chaired bards, was established as supreme. None were admitted to these congresses, or recognized as genuine bards, except such as had been admitted and qualified — *yn ol braint a devod beirdd ynys Prydain* — according to the right and privilege of the bards of the British Isle. All other poets, minstrels, or players, who wandered through the country without having obtained permission from a licensed bard, were indiscriminately condemned and persecuted by the bardic order.

In the earlier part of the twelfth century, Gruffydd ab Cynan, prince of Southern Wales, convoked a general congress for the purpose of revising the regulations already laid down by Hywel Dda. To this congress he summoned all the native bards, and also invited foreign poets and musicians, more especially from Ireland, to aid in the debates. On this occasion, celebrated in the annals of Welsh poetry, several important measures were adopted. Of these the most effective, in its influence upon the bardic system, was the complete separation of the bard and the musician, and the restriction of each to the practice of his appropriate calling. Prior to this period, the bard might or might not be a musician, though he usually accompanied the recitation of his poems on the harp. The regulations of Hywel respecting the duties and qualifications of the different orders, were also revised. These orders were increased to four in number, and were entitled the probationary pupil, the disciplined pupil, the master pupil, and the chief minstrel, each of whom must pass a regular examination before entering upon his station. The musicians were also divided in like manner, on the basis of certain established qualifications. Their duties and rewards were strictly defined; and they were constituted a regular and independent order. And it is a striking fact that, notwithstanding the vicissitudes and confusion of the past six centuries, the distinction laid down at that early period, is still retained in many portions of Wales.

Such was the position of the Welsh bard, as defined in the institutes of the tenth and twelfth centuries. But the bardic system, taking strong hold upon the affections of the nation, carried its influence still farther. The Eisteddvodau, established by regal authority, soon began to build up a system of metrical canons, according to which all poetry was to be written and tested. These canons were at first vague and indefinite; but grew, in the progress of ages, more and more strict and rigid in their application. Palpable traces of such a system are discoverable in the earliest writings extant; but it did not reach its height until the middle of the fifteenth century. At that time a celebrated bardic congress was held at Caermarthen, under the supervision of Davydd ab Edmŵnt, a distinguished Welsh bard. In this congress twenty-four

regular metres, having peculiar rules and models for each, were constructed and adopted; and the system which so many hands had helped to frame, was made complete. The measures adopted in this Eisteddvod met with almost universal approbation; and now constitute the only metrical system employed in Wales.¹

The chief characteristics of this system are rhyme and alliteration. Of these the former has been satisfactorily shown to have existed throughout Europe in, and even anterior to, the fourth century. Alliteration also has been found in both the Scandinavian and the Teutonic tongues; but among the Celtic tribes, it seems not to have obtained, except among the Welsh, any very strong foothold. Traces of it are often visible in the Irish, Gaelic, and Armorican dialects; but in all of these it seems to be employed as an incidental, rather than a necessary ornament. Among the Welsh, however, a singular system has arisen, differing in most of its features, and in the extent to which it was employed, from that of any other of the tribes of northern and central Europe. It is a curious anomaly in the history of literature, furnishing in its complexity, perfectness, and artificial cast, indubitable proofs of its peculiar origin.²

The rhyme made use of in the poetry of Wales, is both final and internal. The final rhymes are much more complex in their application than those of the modern English. It is not unfrequently the case that the same terminal word is repeated in ten or twenty successive lines, and even throughout an entire poem. The internal rhyme is extremely varied in its character and use. It was by no means uncommon among the Welsh bards of the sixth and seventh centuries. At that time it constituted, together with the final rhyme, the chief ornament of poetry; but at a later day, both were made subordinate to the more extensive and complex system of alliteration. They were very irregularly employed; and were not, until a comparatively modern period, dependent upon any definite series of rules. The following examples, taken from the earliest writings extant, will serve to illustrate the application of both final and internal rhymes:

Glesynt esgyl lgwawr ;
Esgorynt yn waeuawr. — Faliesim.
Yr atebwys O wainn, ddwyrain fossawd,
Nid dodynt, nid ydynt, nid ynt parawd. — Aneurin.

¹ The transactions of this Eisteddvod, comprising a complete *Ars Poetica*, have been lately published, together with considerable other matter, in an interesting volume entitled *CYFRINACH Y BEIRDD*.

² Introduction to Conybeare's Illustrations of Anglo-Saxon Poetry.

Both of these classes of rhyme are usually found, as in the preceding instances, in connection with alliteration. There are, however, in the more modern Welsh many specimens which omit wholly the alliteration, and employ only the final and internal rhyme; and others are not unfrequently written in strict accordance with the present English method. Of the former class the following hymn is an excellent example, presenting all the peculiar effects of internal in addition to those of final rhyme :

O Dduw, rho im' dy hedd,
A golwg ar dy wedd;
A madden 'n awr vy meian maur,
Cyn'r elwy' lawr i'r bedd.
Ond im' cael hyn, nid ovnai 'r glyn,
Na cholyn angau mwy;
Dov yn dy law, heb vriw na braw,
I'r oehr draw rhiw ddydd a ddaw,
Uwchlaw bob loes a chlwy.

Alliteration depends in all cases upon a repetition, within the limits of a single line or of several successive lines, of the same consonant sound. It is frequently found both in Anglo-Saxon, and in modern English poetry; but, contrary to the canon adopted by the Welsh Eisteddfodau, the consonant sound is usually repeated only at the beginning of a word, and at regular intervals in the verses. The celebrated Rhyming Poem, translated by Mr. Conybeare, abounds in passages which unite internal and final rhyme with a complicated species of alliteration. The following is perhaps the most striking :

Fiah mah fliteth;	Burg sorg viteth;
Fian man hwiteth.	Bald ald thwiteth.

The accompanying example from the "Twa Marriit Wemen," written in the year 1530 by Dunbar, is a beautiful instance of the harmony of regular alliteration :

The morrow mild was, and meek
The mavis did sing,
And away moved the mist,
And the mead smelled;
Silver shouris down shook,
As the sheen crystal;
And birdis shouted in the shaw
With their shrill notis.

In the Welsh metrical system alliteration varies in character and in complexity according to the different kinds of verse, which are nine in

number. Of these the first consists of four syllables, alliterating as follows: *gwaeledd gelyn*. The G and L of the first part of the verse sound in unison with the G and L of the latter. The caesural pause falls in this instance at the end of the second syllable; and in nearly all cases it falls between the primary and secondary series of alliterating letters. There are, however, a few instances in which it comes, according to rule, immediately after the commencement of the secondary series. The second kind of verse consists of five syllables, and alliterates as in the following lines:

Lluniais mewn llanerch. Ballots our Bullets.

The third kind has six syllables, alliterating as follows:

Amodawl ymadwedd. How fallen the felon.

The fourth, having seven syllables, alliterates thus:

Egin a ddwg yn ei ddydd. Overgrown the evergreen.

The fifth consists of eight syllables with the following alliteration:

Cu adardy, coed iedeg. The apostles wrote epistles.

The sixth has nine syllables, alliterating thus:

Lleuer haul awyr lloer oleuwn. Sonorously the snorer sleepeth.

The seventh, having ten syllables, alliterates as in the following lines:

*Y vrwn a oerais dan vaen y gorwedd;
Peraidd ei mynwes, pur oedd ei mwynedd.*

The eighth, consisting of eleven syllables, alliterates thus:

Heb enw gwir heddwch, heb un i'w gyrhaeddwyd.

The ninth, and last of the different kinds of verse, consists of twelve syllables, and alliterates in the following manner:

*Oer wylais gan ddolur, mawr waelais gan dduloes;
A chalon im' erlid, a cholyn y mawrloes.*

There are three distinct species of alliterative verses, differing somewhat in their complexity and strictness. In the first of these, the primary and secondary parts of each verse may be alternated

without injuring either sense, rhyme or alliteration. Thus the lines :

Cydradd â mi cedrwydd Môn,
Du Eryri, dewr wron,

may be alternated without changing the sense, or destroying the structure of the verse, as follows :

Cedrwydd Môn cydradd â mi,
Dewr wron du Eryri.

The second species of alliterating verses is characterized by the fact that the caesural pause is thrown back into the secondary division of the verse. In this species, and occasionally in other instances, the correlative consonants are substituted for each other, as T for D, and P for B, in the following examples :

Dyn a welaiſt yn wylo.
Bun orwemp wen iraidd.

Many other variations both in this and in other kinds of verse, arise out of the numerous affinities and relations which the several classes of consonants bear to each other.

In the third species of verse, a syllable or a number of syllables, is placed between the primary and secondary series of alliterating consonants. This arrangement is evidently designed to obviate the sameness, to which the ordinary method is more or less liable. The following instances will serve to illustrate this peculiarity :

Tyred *vyvrdod* tirion.
Lover the merry dance leaveth,
Gravely, ah, gravely he grieveth.

Another remarkable feature which has great effect upon the harmony of Welsh poetry, is the *Cyrch*, or recurrent sound. It consists sometimes of a single word, sometimes of two or more ; and as a general rule, is the final word in those verses in which use is made of it. It is often employed internally to bind together a single verse ; and in nearly all such instances it follows an internal rhyme, and has also an alliteration with some word preceding it. Thus in the following line :

Mae meillion gwynion ugeiniau,

the recurrent sound is *ugeiniau*, following the internal rhyme, and alliterating with the first part of the word preceding. The *Cyrch* some-

times requires a repetition of its consonant sounds at the beginning of the succeeding verse, as in the accompanying examples :

Bro hardd aroglber yw hi — BRO LLAWNION
 BERLLENYDD a gerddi.
 Clywais adlais odlau cynar,
 Canau odiaeth cywion adar,
 Nodais glasliw glwyslwyn hygar.

These four elements — the final and internal rhyme, the various forms of alliteration, and the cyrch — constitute the bases of the Welsh metrical system. It must not be imagined, however, that any of these elements are uniform in their application. There is, on the other hand, scarcely a single species of alliterative, rhyming or cyrchic verse, which is not subject to very extensive modifications. Such modifications are often made unavoidable both by the nature of the thought to be expressed, and by the peculiarities and deficiencies of the language.

The system of metres formed by the combination of these elements, is composed of twenty-four varieties. These varieties are commonly arranged in three general divisions — the *Englyn*, or stanza — the *Cynydd*, or poem — and the *Awdl*, or ode. Of the Englyn there are five separate species, differing both in the arrangement, and in the length of the verses which compose them. They are alike, however, in having four verses, and either twenty-eight or thirty syllables in each. The most common and most admired form has thirty, which are divided into two divisions — each composing two verses — the first containing sixteen, and the second fourteen syllables. The first verse must be either alliterative or cyrchic; and must also have a cyrch at its termination, alliterating with the first words of the succeeding verse. The remaining verses may be either cyrchic or alliterative. And it is a universal law that all the verses of each stanza shall have the same final rhyme, and that the rhyming syllable of the first verse shall be the one immediately preceding the terminal cyrch.

The following instances will serve to illustrate the general principles just mentioned — both are good examples of the ordinary Englyn, though the latter has a slight imperfection :

SOPOR Mariam cepit — in Luctu
 A Lecto recessit;
 AST tuba hanc citabit,
 Ut Maria salva sit.
 Vellem a carne vili — quâ premor,
 Quam primum dissolvi;
 Et cupio a te capi,
 Salvator amator mi!

In both of these examples, the same final rhyme may be found in all the verses — an internal rhyme may also be found in the last verse of each. The *Cyrch* is introduced at the end of the first and last verses; and the usual alliteration is employed throughout both stanzas.

The following epigram is more valuable as an illustration of the system under consideration, than on account of any intrinsic merit — it represents another variety of the modern Englyn :

David Cule his rule was wrong — his measure
He missed a furlong;
Heedless he hurried headlong,
Got drunk and sunk with his song.

A single example more, illustrative of still another variety of this class of metres, will suffice to convey some clear conception of their peculiar construction.

Agor dy drysor, dôd ran — trwy gallwedd,
Tra gellych, i'r truan;
Gwell ryw awr golli'r arian
Na chadw god, a nychûr gwan.

The *Cywydd* or poem is divided into four distinct species, which differ quite materially from each other. The most common of these is composed of couplets, having seven syllables each; and rhyming with each other in the same manner as the last two lines of the ordinary Englyn. It is a general rule than an unaccented shall rhyme with an accented syllable in each couplet, and that every line shall be either alliterative or cyrchic, as in the following instances :

Attend ! In grace transcendent
God we know His bow has bent.
Si sors vertit retrorsum,
Tunc onustus servus sum.

In these examples the unaccented precedes the accented final syllable — the reverse, however, is frequently the case. The internal rhyme is also introduced in connection with the *Cyrch*, though it is not deemed an essential part of the measure. All of these features, together with the various peculiarities of the accent, are admirably displayed in the following passage from the poems of a distinguished Welsh bard, still living :

Wyllt wênwr hallt ei waneg,
Llawn o dwyll yw ei wên deg;
Llyvnrawn ydyw, heddyw, heb
Arw dôn ar hyd ei roynneb.

The remaining fifteen of the twenty-four primary metres belong exclusively to the *Awdl*, or ode. It will be impossible within the limits of this article to give any explanation, or present any examples of even the most striking among them; although they furnish to the student of metrical science a most ample and interesting field of research. As a general fact, the *Awdl* may be composed of any one or more of them, according to the taste or skill of the bard. On the other hand, there are often employed in it not only the peculiar measures of the *Awdl*, but also any and even all of those which belong appropriately to the *Englyn* and the *Cywydd*. In the more modern days of Welsh bardism, it was deemed the height of bardic skill to compose an ode which brought the whole metrical system into play. Such odes were very frequently written by the bards of the sixteenth century, but prior to that period they appear to have been altogether unknown.

Such is a brief transcript of the bardic system of the ancient Britons — one of the most singular intellectual phenomena in the annals of literature — one which in the manner and time of its rise and development, and in many of its prominent features, is an anomaly in human history. A system so artificial and so complicated, must of necessity have exercised a powerful influence upon the character of Welsh poetry. The difficulties which it throws in the way of the poet, are absolutely insurmountable without great natural ingenuity and extensive practice. No parallel to it can be found in the literature of any other people — no system presenting barriers so formidable, restrictions so severe and galling. A series of canons so minute, so strict, and so burdensome in their requirements, could not be successfully introduced into any other language of the ancient or modern world. And it is no inconclusive evidence of the scope and capacities of the Welsh tongue, as well as of the natural ability and genius of the Welsh people, that in spite of all these embarrassments, there is at the present day hardly a land in Europe so full of poetical productions.

The main design of those who founded and perfected this system, was to preserve the dignity and exclusive character of the bardic order. The Druids were, from the beginning to the close of their strange existence, an exclusive and extraordinary body; and it was natural that they should impress upon their bardic, as upon their religious system, that exclusive character which it was their interest and aim to maintain. The same feeling operated upon the minds of the bardic order, and led them to hedge themselves round and round with barriers which nothing but tested ability and skill could pass. It was this feeling which prompted them to load the bard with fetter after fetter, and to beset him round about with rules and restrictions and embarrassments, till his

strength was gone and his power of motion paralyzed. No human intellect could trample down such formidable impediments, no human fancy soar above them. In the construction and application of such a series of rules, the bardic order committed a great and fatal error. The inimitable system on which they lavishly spent the toil and intellect of ages, is destined to live only among those marvellous and beautiful, but worthless productions of the human mind, which excite at once feelings of admiration for their exquisite loveliness, and of sorrow for the wasted genius which created them !

The Welsh metrical system had no tendency to promote, but rather to prevent the cultivation of that lofty imagination and original power which lie at the bottom of all genuine poetry. It tended to make the bard a man of ingenuity and skill, rather than of fancy and genius. He wasted his entire energy in arranging and displaying words, unconscious that the real and animated poet is a man of deep and earnest thought, and that every rule or system which comes between him and the clear expression of the strong emotions glowing like stars in his soul, is but a cloud to hide their beautiful brilliance. Almost the whole force of public and private criticism was spent upon the external features of poetry, while its interior spirit and sense were hardly heeded. Those luxuriant fancies which scatter such a radiance over the early poetry of other nations, found little room for play. The cropt genius of the bard, bound and chained to earth by these wearisome fetters, had no power to break them and soar away into its own free, airy element.

It must be admitted, on the other hand, that this system, being universally recognized, and practised by all the graduated bards of the nation, was calculated to perfect, in a very high degree, the metrical character of poetry. On this point the bardic canons were uncommonly explicit and rigid in their requirements. The strict and searching criticism of the Eisteddvodau was sure to detect and expose each error. Those who disregarded their requisitions, were compelled to gain a scanty subsistence by strolling from place to place to gratify the less refined and less scrupulous tastes of the lowest classes of society. The following passage from one of the poems of Taliesin, is strongly expressive of the contempt in which these vagrant minstrels were held by the bardic order :

Birds fly ; bees collect honey ;
Fishes swim ; reptiles creep ;
Everything labors for its subsistence,
Except vagrant, worthless minstrels.

Blaspheme not among you
Teaching, nor the art of song.
Be silent, ye rhymers,
Unprosperous false ones !

It will also be admitted that the extensive license allowed in the employment of any measure or combination of measures, which the fancy or caprice of any member of the order might suggest, gave fine opportunity for the cultivation and display of both skill and taste. As a natural consequence, it created great diversity among the productions which were, from time to time, presented for inspection in the bardic assemblies. It likewise tended greatly to impress upon Welsh poetry generally those striking characteristics of the Latin, and especially of the English ode, by which nearly all of it is so strongly marked.

The bardic system was also calculated to give poetry great prominence in the sight of the common people. The existence of such a system in the midst of the nation could not fail, in such an imaginative age, to stir up in their hearts feelings of love and veneration. The sweet strains of the bard were ever echoing among them. The solemn assemblies and rude pageantry of the bardic order were yearly brought before their eyes. They beheld poetry everywhere established as a science, by legal enactments, and cultivated by the choicest talent of the land — and, as a natural result, their awakened minds, endowed by nature with deep poetic fervor and earnest feeling, gladly embraced and rejoiced in its pleasant and humanizing influences. The same principle led them also to give great prominence to the bardic order. The position of the bards in the palaces of their princes and chieftains, caused their influence to be felt throughout the nation. They often, by their instructions and advice, contributed largely to the advancement of science and learning. After the downfall of Druidism and the introduction of Christianity, they not unfrequently performed the duties of religious, as well as secular teachers. And consequently they received, everywhere, that esteem and reverence which the sanctity of their persons, and the comparatively great knowledge they possessed, were calculated to inspire.

The dependent circumstances of the bards made the generosity of the nobles a frequent theme of song. Taliesin thus alludes to their careless and happy condition :

The learned in the mystery of song
Find a safe refuge with Callovydd,
Who bestows on me splendid garments ;
In the stormy time of winter,
When the chief appears ascending from the gate,
They commence the voice of melody.

Owain Glyndwr, whose efforts in behalf of Welsh freedom are well known to the readers of English history, was an especial patron of the

poets of his age. Among the writings of one of them is found an Invitation Poem, in which Lycharth, the palace of Glyndwr, is titled the congregation-place of the bards. The following lines, from this poem, give evidence of the generous hospitality of that noted chief:

Hard is it for us to see
There either latch or lock,
Or want or hunger or neglect
Or thirstiness in Lycharth.

The same fact led the bards also to praise the valor and military prowess of their chieftains. This was especially the custom during the earliest eras of Welsh poetry, when war constituted the chief employment of the nation; but at a later day, and particularly after the introduction and spread of Christianity, they devoted their talents mostly to other themes. The Welsh are possessed of uncommonly strong religious and social feelings. These characteristics have always been prominently displayed in their national poetry, a large proportion of it being religious, elegiac, and amatory.

A brief sketch of the history of the ancient poetry of Wales, will close this already protracted article. It is commonly divided into three cycles, corresponding to three successive eras in Welsh history. The chief among the bards of the first cycle, which includes the sixth and seventh centuries, are Taliesin, Aneurin, and Llywarch Hên.¹ They appear, however, to have been the followers of a still more original and singular class of poets, who flourished in the ages anterior to the Roman and Saxon invasions. Allusions to such a body of men are not unfrequently found in the writings of the later bards. And there are strong evidences in the poems of Taliesin, Aneurin and Llywarch Hên, which go to show that they were not the original inventors of the metrical system employed in their productions, but rather the improvers of one which had been handed down to them from a more remote and primitive age.

Taliesin stands at the head of the ancient bards of Wales. A large number of poems ascribed to him are still in existence, most of them commemorative of the warlike exploits and generous character of Urien, his patron prince. Others are elegies composed in memory of several princely heroes, who had fallen in the fierce contests carried on at that period against the Saxon invaders. His descriptions of battles are often uncommonly animated and picturesque.

¹ The question respecting the genuineness of the poems ascribed to these authors, appears to be settled, so far as such a question can be settled, by the Essay of Sharon Turner on this topic. The nature and extent of the proof preclude the admission of any part of it into this article.

Courageous men I saw embattled,
 Their war-shout piercing the elements
 Like the sound of raging waves.
 After the dire morn of conflict,
 I saw the mangled flesh.
 The fierce contending tumult I beheld,
 Where raged the wild destruction,
 And ran, amid the half-surviving ranks,
 The swiftly flowing streams of blood.

I beheld gore-bespattered heroes
 In the gray, curling wave dropping
 Their blunted arms. Mangled with wounds,
 With hands across, they sank to peaceful rest —
 Most pitifully sank, with their pale cheeks
 On the cold earth !

Covered with fearful rage I saw
 The brow of Urien, when with torment
 He encompassed his foes
 At the white rock of Calysten.
 Till I fail with age —
 Till by the hand of fate I die,
 Let me not smile with joy
 If I sing not the praise of Urien !

Some of his poems are adorned with passages of uncommon beauty and vigor. The following examples are singularly wild and striking :

I saw the dread warriors
 Rushing together at the war-sound.
 I saw blood on the ground
 From the assault of swords.

With blue they tinged the wings of the
 morn,
 When they flung forth their ashen
 lances !

Havoc, havoc raged around ;
 Many a carcass strewed the ground ;
 Ravens drank the purple flood ;
 Raven plumes were dyed in blood :

Frighted crowds from place to place,
 Eager, hurrying, breathless, pale,
 Spread the news of their disgrace,
 Trembling as they told the tale.

Of the poems of Aneurin, only one or two are still extant. His fame rests entirely upon the *Gododin*, which, although mutilated, is the longest ancient poem in the language. It is a description of the disastrous battle of *Cottraeth*, in which the poet was himself engaged. It is marked by great conciseness and strength of expression, and often by great beauty of thought and imagery. Its beginning is bold and vigorous :

I saw a youth,
 Vigorous in the tumult.

A swift, thick-maned steed
 Was under him.

A shield, light and broad,	It is not for me, alas !
Hung on the slender, fleet courser.	To envy thee ;
His sword was blue and shining ;	I will do nobler to thee —
Golden spurs and ermine adorned him.	In song will I praise thee !

The following episode is a fine tribute to one of the princes, who fell in the midst of the combat :

None made the social hall so free from care
 As gentle Cynou, Clinion's sovereign lord ;
 For highest rank he never proudly strove,
 And whom he once had known he ne'er would slight ;
 Yet was his spear keen-pointed, and well knew
 To pierce with truest aim the' embattled line.
 Swift flew his steed to meet the hostile storm,
 And death sat on his lance, as with the dawn
 He rushed to war in glory's brilliant day.

Llywarch Hên — at once a prince and bard — differs materially from both Taliesin and Aneurin. His mind was, by nature, reflective, and often led him to turn away from exterior topics to the contemplation of his own character and condition. Many of his poems are elegiac — many others are descriptive of his private afflictions and sorrows, and are extremely beautiful and touching. The following lines, from an elegy on Cyddylau, evince great poetic power :

The hall of Cyddylau is silent to-night,
 After having lost its lord —
 God of mercy, what shall I do ?
 The hall of Cyddylau, bereft of its wonted appearance ;
 Its shield is in the grave :
 Whilst he lived there was no broken roof.
 The hall of Cyddylau is without love to-night,
 Since he that owned it is no more —
 Ah, Death ! but shortly shall he leave me !
 The hall of Cyddylau is gloomy to-night,
 Without fire, without a family —
 My overflowing tears gush out,
 The hall of Cyddylau — it pierces me to see it,
 Without a covering, without a fire :
 My chieftain is no more, and I am still alive !

There is something truly pathetic and melting in the following allusions to his forlorn and helpless condition in old age :

Brethren I have had who were free from evil,
 Who grew up like the saplings of the hazel —
 One by one they are all departed !

This leaf, is it not blown about by the wind ?
 Woe to it for its fate,
 Alas, it is old !
 Old age is scoffing at me,
 From the hair to the teeth ;
 And the eye which the young ones loved.
 Maidens love me not — I am visited by none ;
 I cannot move myself along —
 Ah, Death, wilt not thou befriend me !

My wooden crook ! be thou a branch contented
 To support a mourning old man ;
 Llywarch — noted for sorrowing.
 My wooden crook ! be thou steady,
 And support me better ;
 Llywarch — remote from any !

The second cycle of Welsh poetry includes the period from the middle of the eleventh to the middle of the thirteenth century. The laws of Hywel Dda give ample evidence that, during the interval between the first and second eras, the bardic order maintained, in some degree, their pristine vigor ; but that period appears, nevertheless, to have been one of comparative intellectual inactivity. About the middle of the eleventh century, poetry became again ascendant. Cynddelw, Gwalchmai, Einion, Owain Cyveiliog, and a host of others, contributed to raise its waning spirit, and to spread its influence anew over the land. The productions of this era are too numerous to receive even a passing notice — two or three examples will suffice to illustrate their general character. The touching elegy of which the following is an extract, was composed about the year 1240, by Einion ab Gwalchmai, on the occasion of the death of Mest, the daughter of his patron prince. For deep pathos, beautiful and appropriate imagery, and forcible expressions, the original can hardly be surpassed.

Returneth the spring —
 The trees in bloom —
 The forest in its beauty,
 And the birds warbling.
 Smooth the sea and still the wind ;
 Hollow soundeth the softly-rising tide.
 I cannot hide my grief,
 I cannot be still and silent.
 The sea floweth with force,
 And beareth a hoarse, plaintive noise,
 Lamenting a gentle maiden.
 Ere she died, I sang the praises

Of Mest — now I compose
 With pensive heart her elegy.
 Arrayed in silk, how beautiful
 Shone the bright star of Cadvan.
 How great her simplicity —
 Her innocence how great !
 Sharp as a hawk's her eye,
 The child of noble ancestry,
 The ornament of Venedotia
 And the pride. Generously
 Rewarded she her bard.
 In silence now the earth

Her corse covereth.
 O, generous Mest, thou liest
 In thy safe retreat!
 Ever before me is the veil,
 Lonesome, dreary, dark,
 That covereth thy face —
 Thy face that shone
 Like the pearly dew on Eryri!
 To the great Creator

Of heaven and earth I pray —
 He will not refuse my prayer:
 May this beautiful maiden,
 Glittering like pearls,
 To His mercy be received,
 To hold converse with the prophets
 In the great inheritance
 Of the all-wise God,
 With Mary and the martyrs!

The following ode to Llewelyn, the great defender of Welsh liberties, is a fine example of the class of heroic poems, to which it belongs. It was written about the middle of the thirteenth century, by Einion ab Gwgawn, on the occasion of a victory gained by Llewelyn over the English forces.

Llewelyn, terror of thine enemy,
 In the south, death issued from thy hand!
 An anchor in the time of storm
 Art thou to us;
 May the shield of God protect thee,
 Protector of our country!
 Britain, fearless of her enemies,
 Glorieth in being ruled by thee —
 By Llewelyn who defies
 His enemy from shore to shore.
 A lion in danger,
 He is the joy of armies,
 The sovereign of sea and land.
 A warrior like a deluge —
 Like a surge upon the beach —
 His shout is like the roaring wave
 That rusheth to the shore,
 Unconquerable!
 The numerous armies of his enemy
 Putteth he to flight,
 Like a mighty wind!

About him gather warriors,
 Zealous to defend his cause —
 Brightly shine their shields.
 His bards with his praises
 Make the vales resound.
 His valor is of every tongue
 The theme — in distant climes
 The glory of his victories is heard.
 No danger in the day of battle
 Him from his purpose can turn.
 Above the rest he is conspicuous
 With a lance, large, strong, and crimson.
 Great is his generosity:
 No suit is made to him in vain;
 A tender hearted prince is Llewelyn.
 Nobly can he spread the feast,
 Yet is not enervated by luxuries.
 May He who permitted us
 Of his heavenly revelation to share,
 Grant him the blessed habitation
 Of the saints above the stars!

Among the brightest ornaments of this era were Owain Cyveiliog and Cynddelw. The former was a prince of Southern Wales; and was actively engaged, during the most of his life, in the warlike contests of that period. As a bard he is entitled to a high rank among his contemporaries. His most celebrated production is the *Hir-Lâs*, which is an ode in commemoration of a victory gained by him over the Saxon invaders. This poem is one of great power and beauty, abounding in striking imagery and vivid thought — a few passages will be sufficient to convey some general conception of the whole:

This hour is given up to joy !
 Then fill the Hir-lâs horn, my boy,
 That shineth like the sea ;
 Whose azure handles, tipped with gold,
 Invite the grasp of Britons bold,
 The sons of liberty.

As thou wilt thy life prolong
 Fill it with metheglin strong ;
 Gruffydd thirsts — to Gruffydd fill,
 Whose bloody lance is used to kill ;
 Matchless in the field of strife,
 His glory ends not with his life.

Let the brimming goblet smile,
 And Envyed's cares beguile :
 Like a hurricane is he,
 Bursting on a troubled sea.
 See their spears distained with gore !
 Hear the din of battle roar !
 Bucklers, swords together clashing ;
 Sparkles from their helmets flashing !

Fill the horn with rosy wine —
 Brave Moreiddig claims it now,
 Chieftain of an ancient line,
 Dauntless heart and open brow ;
 To the warrior it belongs,
 Prince of battles, chief of songs !

Now a due libation pour
 To the spirits of the dead
 Who that memorable hour
 Made the hostile plain their bed.
 There the glittering steel was seen,
 There the twanging bow was heard ;
 There the mighty pressed the green,
 Recorded by their faithful bard.

Cease, my boy, thy task is o'er ;
 Thou shalt fill the horn no more !
 Long may the King of kings protect
 And crown with bliss my friends elect,
 Where liberty and truth reside,
 And virtue, truth's immortal bride !

The poems of Cynddelw are also remarkable for great liveliness of thought and expression. One of the most spirited and beautiful is a hymn in praise of his patron, Rhys ab Gruffydd, the last sovereign of Southern Wales. The following passages are somewhat indicative of its general character :

A blessing on thy warriors,
 Thou eagle of battles ;
 And on thy land,
 Thou skilful sovereign !
 To the Maker of heaven and earth,
 I offer an earnest prayer
 To be defended from thy wrath,
 Thou friend of bards !
 A lasting blessing I beseech —
 For a beseecher am I called —
 Upon thy golden, ornamented doors,
 And upon thy treasures,

Thou light of the pleasant land !
 A blessing on thy warriors,
 Men of the Southern shore —
 On thy movements and thy spearmen —
 On thy hosts, and on thy kingly sons,
 Thou able supporter of minstrels !
 A blessing on thee, generous guardian :
 Kings shall not withstand thee !
 A blessing on thy army,
 Thou centre of battles ;
 And on thy household,
 Thou worthy of praises !

The third era of Welsh poetry embraces a period commencing in the earlier part of the fourteenth century, and terminating at the final coalition of Wales and England. In the turbulence and anarchy of those troublous times which preceded the Conquest, the bardic order lost most of their foothold in the nation. The continual incursions of the English forces made self-preservation the most prominent object of

thought and solicitude; and poetry and its sister arts were consequently neglected, and almost forgotten. Towards the middle of the fourteenth century, however, it began to reassume its wonted lustre; and when the nation had begun to recover from the effects of their severe and protracted contest, it again burst forth with as pure and clear a light as ever. Although the bards of this era failed to retain their original position in the palaces of the nobles, they were far more numerous than those of any preceding age; and the great activity which they displayed in perfecting their metrical system, and in the many productions of that period, furnishes ample evidence that the spirit of the bards of other and better days still glowed in their bosoms.

Among the poets of this era, Davydd ab Gwilym is confessedly the chief.¹ Notwithstanding the great diversity in point of time and circumstances, he strongly resembles in the cast of his mind the poet Burns. His productions are often marked by an exquisite beauty of thought and expression, but more especially by a ceaseless flow of deep and tender feeling. Far the greater portion of his poems are amatory, more than a hundred songs dedicated to Marvudd, a fair favorite of the poet, being still extant. His remaining writings are much more miscellaneous in their topics and general character, than those of any other bard of his age. He also excelled every other poet of his times in the extraordinary finish and taste of his productions. The following beautiful poem to a lark, written about the year 1375, admirably displays some of his peculiar characteristics:

Sentinel of the morning light!
 Reveller of the spring.
 How noble and how wild thy flight—
 Th' boundless journeying
 Far from thy brethren of the woods alone,
 A hermit bent at thy Creator's throne.

Oh, wilt thou climb the heavens for me—
 Yon rampart's starry height—
 Thou interlude of melody
 'Twixt darkness and the light;

¹ The poems of this bard were first published about the beginning of the present century. At the same time nearly all of the more valuable specimens of ancient Welsh poetry were issued in several volumes of a work, entitled *ARCHAEOLOGY OF WALES*. To this work those who are desirous of examining these productions in the original, are referred. It is impossible to preserve in any English translation the peculiar sweep and melody of the original tongue. The singular effects of the rhythmic and alliterative system, as well as much of the spirit and force of the poetry itself, must of course be lost in the *emasculating process of translation*.

And seek with day's first dawn upon thy crest
My lady-love — the moonbeam of the west !

No woodland denizen art thou ;
Far from the archer's eye,
Thy course is o'er the mountain's brow —
Thy music in the sky ;
Then fearless float thy path of cloud along,
Thou earthly caroller of angel song !

The limits of this article forbid any further notice of the numerous other bards, who flourished in and about the times of Davydd ab Gwilym. From that period to the present hour, poetry has continued, with a few brief intervals, to be a prominent source of enjoyment among the Welsh people. Their poetic spirit has survived the destructive tendencies of five centuries of change and revolution ; and in spite of the failing condition of their language, and of the fetters of their metrical system, it still lives and flourishes in the heart of the nation. Bardic sessions, after the ancient models, have been frequently held — particularly within the last half century ; and many efforts are continually making to keep alive the poetic feelings of the people. In every village and hamlet, in every valley and on every hill-side, the voice of harmony is ever swelling upward over land and sea, as if it were an echo of the wonderful melodies breathed forth by the inspired bards of other and happier ages.

ARTICLE III.

THEOLOGY OF DR. EMMONS.

By Rev. E. Smalley, D. D., Worcester, Mass.

OF some men the highest eulogy is their works. They live to bless their race ; and when they 'rest from their labors, their works do follow them.' They can afford to dispense with the praises of men, for they are sure of the honor which cometh from God, and which is imperishable. If misrepresented and even maligned while living, they possess their souls in patience, and calmly 'bide their time.' As the sun appears brighter when the clouds that obscured it have passed away, so character becomes more beautiful when the prejudices which had clung to it have disappeared.

These remarks indicate the estimation in which we hold him, whose name is placed at the head of this article. He claimed for himself, and advocated for others 'the right of private judgment.' In the fearless exercise of this right he carefully examined whatever was proposed to his belief, and accepted no statements which evidently contradicted his own reason. Believing that it is hard to make valuable discoveries by following others, he was fond of pursuing independent investigations in untravelled paths. Like all original thinkers, he sometimes reached conclusions that startled by their boldness; but if they harmonized with his first principles and with the teachings of inspiration, it sufficed for his free spirit, whether others assented or demurred. Not unfrequently misrepresented, he could afford to be patient, for he had no doubt that the great principles of his system accorded with both reason and Scripture. As he approached the grave, this faith sustained and cheered him. Thus attended, 'he feared no evil' when called to pass 'through the valley of the shadow of death.' Now that he is gone, he needs not praise from men; for his best eulogy is the statement and defence of his views.

The following synopsis of Dr. Emmons's theological teachings may be instructive to the student, and not uninteresting to the general reader. The points on which his opinions were in precise accordance with those of other evangelical divines, may be lightly passed over; while those which he made prominent in his system and on which his views are thought to be peculiar, will require a more minute statement and a fuller elucidation. That he had his peculiarities and attached great importance to them, need not be denied. That he loved independent investigation and is entitled to the merit of a true originality, must be conceded. At the same time, it is remarkable to what an extent his theological speculations agree with those of the divines who lived before him, whose praise is in all the churches. Let the following condensed view of them verify the truth of this assertion.

§ 1. *Existence and Attributes of God.*

These he argued, not indeed with mathematical demonstration, but with logical certainty, from the works of creation. Because a man is without the Bible, it did not seem to him that he must necessarily be without a knowledge of God. It appeared to him that there is so much of God in the heavens above and the earth beneath, in the utterance of 'day unto day' and of 'night unto night,' that every one who has an eye and an ear with a soul behind them, must see his hand and hear his voice, and tremble at the greatness of his power. From

the text, 'For every house is builded by some man; but he that built all things is 'God;'" (Heb. 3: 4.) he exhibits in his own way evidence of the divine being and perfections. There is nothing absurd in the proposition, that this world might have begun to exist. Everything we see around us is full of change. Immutability is the attribute of no object with which we are acquainted in the material universe. The world, not necessarily existing in any certain mode or form, might not have existed at all in some former period of duration. It follows, therefore, that it might have begun to exist.¹

This admitted, it must also be conceded that the world might have been produced by a cause. It is natural to reason from effect to cause. The child and the man, the illiterate laborer and the deep-thinking philosopher 'clearly perceive that every particular effect may have a particular cause;' and, therefore, there may have been a cause for the existence of this world.²

From these premises, it demonstrably follows that the world '*must have had a cause.*' Some have affected to deny this, as 'Lord Kaimes and Mr. Hume;' but that denial must virtually involve an absurdity. From the necessities of the case, the admission of the possibility of a cause, carries with it the certainty of a cause.³ On this point we give a specimen of our author's reasoning, in his own words.

"Whatever we can conceive to be capable of existing by a cause, we can as clearly conceive to be incapable of existing without a cause. For that which renders anything capable of existing by a cause, renders it equally incapable of existing without a cause. — But Mr. Hume does not pretend to deny that the world is *capable* of having had a cause. And if this be true, then it is certain to a demonstration, that there *was* some cause which actually produced it. That is demonstrably false which cannot be conceived to be true; and that is demonstrably true which cannot be conceived to be false. — It is demonstrably true that all the parts are equal to the whole; for it is not in the power of the mind to conceive that all the parts should be more or less than the whole. And in the same manner it is demonstrably true that the world must have had a cause of its existence. We can clearly conceive that the world is capable of having had a cause of its existence, and therefore we cannot conceive that it was capable of coming into existence without a cause. The possibility of its having had a cause, destroys the possibility of its having come into existence without a cause; just as the possibility of a body's moving one way at once, destroys the possibility of its moving two ways at once."⁴

The cause must be at least equal to the effect. To suppose the contrary, implies a contradiction. For in whatever respect anything which

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 17.

² Ib. p. 18.

³ Ib. p. 19.

⁴ Ib. pp. 20, 21.

we call an effect exceeds the cause producing it, in that respect it is not an effect at all, but self-existent. The cause of all things which have begun to exist, itself uncaused, necessary, self-existent, is God. It is his prerogative to create 'something out of nothing.' 'He speaks, and it is done; commands, and it stands fast.' The things which he has made declare his perfections. He is *omnipotent*.¹ 'In the eye of reason, whatever the Supreme Power can do, he can do with equal ease.' The highest conceivable exertion of power is that of creation—that which produces something out of nothing. The creation of a world like this, therefore, argues a power in the Creator, equal to the production of anything within the limits of possibility. In other words, the work of creation is an irrefragable proof that almighty power is an attribute of the great first Cause.

It is equally clear, that the Creator is *infinitely wise*.² Evidences of design meet us everywhere. Such a wonderful system of adaptations in the effect, demonstrates consummate wisdom in the cause. The order, usefulness and intelligence of the things that are made, as conclusively prove the manifold wisdom, as they do the eternal power, of the Godhead.

He is also *omnipresent*.³ That a cause can operate where it does not exist, is utterly inconceivable; and, therefore, the presence of the Creator, must be coëxtensive with his works. It is no less a conclusion of reason than a dictate of revelation, that God 'fills heaven and earth.'

Nor is there any limit to his *knowledge*.⁴ Necessarily knowing himself, he knows whatever is possible, or all that omnipotence can accomplish. Knowing his own mind, he cannot but know all things which lie within the limits of his determination, or whatever has existed, does now, or will hereafter exist. All things past, present, and to come, are perfectly comprehended by the infinite Intelligence.

It is moreover certain that the great first cause is *eternal*.⁵ A cause before the first cause, is a contradiction in terms. To suppose that the Deity caused his own existence, is the absurdity of supposing that he exerted his power before he had any existence. Hence we are bound to admit that he exists by a necessity of his own nature, and must be absolutely eternal. Nor is it a valid objection to this view, that the human intellect cannot explain the ground of this necessity. For reason decides that the ground and manner of the divine existence must surpass the comprehension of finite minds.

But the crowning attribute of the Deity is his perfect *moral recti-*

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 21. ² Ib. p. 22. ³ Ib. p. 23. ⁴ Ib. ⁵ Ib. p. 24.

tude.¹ This too may be conclusively proved from his works. Had he not loved righteousness and hated sin, would he have endowed his intelligent creatures with a moral nature, by which they intuitively perceive what is right and what is wrong, and approve the former while they condemn the latter? Would he have so formed them that they might perceive the nature of his own character, had he not been 'holy and just and good?' The more it is examined the more obvious will it appear, 'that the moral faculty of man carries in it a clear demonstration of the moral rectitude of his Maker.' The human conscience is a standing proof of God's righteousness, justice and benevolence. Sophistry may question, but cannot invalidate it. Skepticism may assail, but cannot overthrow it. Atheism may hate, but cannot harm it.

Such in brief is our author's argument from the light of nature for the being and perfections of God. That it was perfectly satisfactory to his own mind, and that it has carried conviction to many other minds, may not be doubted. Some indeed have acknowledged its ingenuity, but questioned its conclusiveness. It has recently been characterized as 'a *variation* of the original theme,' presented by Dr. Clarke — a new form of that learned author's argument *a priori*, for the existence of God. It is spoken of as 'sprightly and pleasing, but embodying the same essential idea.'² We shall not now stop to show whether there is more of truth or error in this representation; of that each one must decide for himself after an impartial comparison of the two. Nor will we say whether our author's reasoning for the *begin* existence of the world is more or less conclusive than that which starts with chaos, and finds a period far back in the geological ages when created life was not. It must suffice our present purpose to have given this succinct account of the argument from nature relied upon by Dr. Emmons. We only add, that while this reasoning brought the clearest conviction to his own mind, he was fully aware that it had met, and would again meet with plausible objections. To compel belief by mere argument, was what he never attempted. He made a distinction between strong conviction and certain knowledge. If he could compass 'a reasonable faith,' he was content, even although the certainty of mathematical demonstration was beyond his reach. His argument for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence — depends on a principle which, whatever may be its metaphysical history or origin, is one which man perpetually recognizes, which every act of his own consciousness verifies, which he applies fearlessly to every phenome-

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 24.

² Bib. Sac. Vol. VI. p. 624.

non, known or unknown; and it is this,—That every effect has a cause (though he knows nothing of their connection,) and that effects which bear marks of design have a designing cause. This principle is so familiar that if he were to affect to doubt it in any *practical* case in human life, he would only be laughed at as a fool, or pitied as insane.”¹

While, however, Dr. Emmons believed with the Psalmist, that ‘the heavens declare the glory of God,’ and with the Apostle, that ‘the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen—even his eternal power and Godhead,’ he by no means so exalted the deductions of natural theology as to supersede the necessity of a written revelation of God’s will. Of reason in man he thought highly, and would allow no interference with her just claims; but no one bowed more implicitly than he to the clearly ascertained teachings of the Bible. Having honored reason, therefore, by acknowledging her adequacy to deduce from ‘the things that are made’ the existence and attributes of the Creator, his earnest inquiry was, Has the Maker of all things given his intelligent creatures an express revelation of his will? This leads us to a consideration of his belief respecting the

§ 2. *Holy Scriptures.*

He had not a doubt, then, that mankind are in perishing need of a divine revelation, nor that the book which claims to be such a revelation has all the evidences requisite to substantiate that claim. What are termed the external evidences of the Bible he admitted as valid and conclusive;² but he insisted with special earnestness and satisfaction on the internal.³ From the miracles which were wrought in attestation of the divine mission of prophets and apostles; from the prophecies which were evidently uttered antecedently to their fulfilment, and fulfilled in all essential particulars according to the pre-announcement; from the resurrection of Christ; from the sublimity of its doctrines; from the purity of its morals; from the harmony subsisting between its several portions, though they were written by men living centuries and centuries apart; from its obvious adaptation to the wants of man as a moral being, fallen, yet capable of rising to noble resolve, and high endeavor; from its truth to nature, providence, and history; from its effects on human character and human society, when received into the heart and permitted to govern the life; from its miraculous preservation amid opposition enough to have annihilated

¹ Edinburgh Review, Vol. XXXI. p. 168, (Republication by Scott.)

² Works, Vol. IV. pp. 52—57.

³ Ib. pp. 94—96.

any merely human production; and from the fact that its prophecies are even now in process of fulfilment, and thus furnish a sort of cumulative proof that they were uttered by Him who 'declareth the end from the beginning;' ¹—from all these sources, he drew arguments for the divinity of the Bible so luminous and irrefragable that it is not easy for sophistry to obscure or infidelity to invalidate them. Nor was he a kind of half-and-half believer in the inspiration of the Scriptures. It was his firm conviction that the Bible, and the whole Bible, is the word of God; that the sacred writers 'spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;' that the very words in which they expressed themselves were suggested to their minds by the same Divine Agent that would reveal to man the things that belong to his eternal peace. ² He was not satisfied with 'the inspiration of Superintendency,' nor 'the inspiration of Elevation,' but felt the necessity of 'the inspiration of Suggestion.' By this he meant, 'that God spoke directly to the minds of the sacred penmen, making such discoveries to them as they could not otherwise have obtained, and dictating the very words in which such discoveries were to be communicated.' He could not conceive how it was possible for such a book as the Bible to be written without this plenary inspiration. So firm was his belief in this, that he reverently admitted any truth which that book obviously teaches, even although his own reason could neither explain nor comprehend it. ³

If anything excited him easily to what may perhaps be termed a righteous impatience, it was that any man should claim to be a believer and a Christian, and yet doubt whether certain parts of the Holy Scriptures are inspired. Nor was it easy for him to be perfectly quiet when a professed believer doubted that the whole Bible was written under the influence of a plenary inspiration.

He knew that specious objections might be urged against his view of the subject; but he felt that they could all be successfully met and removed. 'This doctrine of plenary inspiration is inconsistent with the diversity of style which appears in the different parts of the Bible;' 'it does not allow for the mistakes and contradictions which are found;' 'it is opposed to the acknowledgment of some of the writers themselves, that they did not always write by immediate inspiration.' How he treated objections like these, may be inferred from the following extract, in his answer to the first-named:—

"It is true, indeed, we plainly discover some variety in the manner

¹ Works, Vol. IV. pp. 32—100, *passim*. See also Vol. VI. pp. 43, 44.

² Works, Vol. IV. pp. 75—83.

³ *Ib.* p. 85.

and style of the sacred writers. Isaiah and Paul, as well as Moses, David and Solomon, who were men of education and refinement, write in a more pure and elevated style than the Prophet Amos, who lived among the herdmen of Tekoa, and the Apostle John, who lived among the fishermen of Galilee. But this is easy to be accounted for, by only supposing that God dictated to each sacred penman a manner and style corresponding to his own peculiar genius, education, and manner of living. Were a parent to dictate a letter for a child, would he not dictate it in a manner and style somewhat agreeable to the age, genius, and attainments of the child? And is there not as much reason why God should dictate a different manner and style to the different authors of the Old and New Testament, as why he should employ so many men of such different degrees of knowledge and refinement to write the sacred Scriptures? We do not discover, therefore, any greater diversity in the manner and style of the sacred penmen, than we might reasonably expect to find, in case they wrote exactly as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

The ease and ingenuousness with which he meets and disposes of objections, show that he had carefully studied the subject, not from one only, but from many points of view. He sought for the strongest arguments of his opponents on this, as on other topics, and, after stating them fairly and allowing them all the force which he thought they were entitled to, he aimed to detect and expose their divergence from the line of truth, and thus annul their power to impair the conclusiveness of his own reasoning. Sure of his own ground, he could afford to be even generous to his antagonist. That there are no difficulties connected with Christianity, as a revelation from heaven, he would have been among the last to affirm. But with all its difficulties, he had mastered the sound proofs of its truth, and infinitely preferred the faith which accepts it, to the credulity involved in its rejection.

Entertaining no doubt, then, that the Bible is what it purports to be — the revelation of God's will to man, Dr. Emmons made this his counsellor and guide respecting particular doctrines and duties. To ascertain what is 'the mind of the Spirit,' was the great study of his life. We pass on to consider his views of what the word of God teaches respecting the

§ 3. *Mode of the Divine Existence.*

This topic engaged his earnest attention, and required, as it rewarded, laborious research. Unwilling to accept the results of another's investigations on trust, he instituted for himself the inquiry, 'What do the Scriptures teach respecting the manner of God's existence.' The practical answer which he returned to this question is this — he

was a decided Trinitarian. Believing in the perfect unity of the Supreme Being, he yet accepted it as the obvious teaching of Scripture, that the one God exists in three persons — the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. These three persons are so distinct, that they are designated by the use of the personal pronouns, I, thou, and he; they perform distinct offices in the work of redemption; to each, divine perfections are ascribed; and yet they are the one, living and true God. The results of his investigations on the subject may thus be summed up in his own words:¹

“The Scripture leads us to conceive of God, the first and Supreme Being, as existing in three distinct persons.” “The Scripture represents the three persons in the sacred Trinity as absolutely equal in every divine perfection.” “The Scripture represents the three equally divine persons in the Trinity as acting in a certain order in the work of redemption. Though they are absolutely equal in *nature*, yet in *office* the first person is superior to the second, and the second is superior to the third.” “The Scripture teaches us, that each of the divine persons takes his peculiar *name* from the peculiar *office* which he sustains in the economy of redemption.” Finally, “the Scripture represents these three divine persons as one God. The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are three in respect to their personality, and but one in respect to their nature and essence.”

To this doctrine of the Trinity in unity, our author was accustomed to attach the highest importance. An intelligent belief of it he regarded as essential to a correct understanding of the system of Christianity. The denial of it virtually subverts the Gospel; for the whole Gospel is founded on it. The ingenuity that can refute and the boldness that can discard it, will also reduce Christianity to a system of cold morality, and take from the sinner his last hope of pardon.²

That it involves a mystery which human reason is incompetent fully to explain, he was ever ready to admit. For the attempts which are sometimes made to illustrate the doctrine by analogies drawn from material objects or from created intelligences, he had no great respect. What the Bible teaches concerning it, taken in its plain and obvious import, he would receive with the simplicity and confidence of a child listening to the instruction of a father, without cavil or misgiving. Inquisitive, discriminating as he was, it contented him to hold this truth as a sublime mystery, plainly and positively taught in the revelation from heaven, sustaining and illuminating the grand system of revealed religion, and yet, in its nature, inexplicable by the feeble powers of the human mind. At the same time, so clearly defined

¹ Works, Vol. IV. pp. 106—110.

² *Ib.* pp. 115 and 124.

were his own views respecting its relation to the other doctrines of Christianity; and so exalted his conceptions of its relative importance, that it was exceedingly difficult for him to see how a man can be a Christian at all, in the strict sense of that term, or how he can render to the true God, as revealed in the Scriptures, acceptable worship, unless he understand and believe the doctrine of the Trinity. Mystery though it be, he was convinced that it is a solemn reality.

In his mind there was a wide difference between a mystery and an absurdity. He would not admit that 'the doctrine of the Trinity, as represented in Scripture, is any more repugnant to the dictates of sound reason, than many other truths which all Christians believe concerning God.' He averred that we can no more explain the essential idea of self-existence, or omnipresence, or creative power, than that of the Trinity. To say that God exists by a necessity in his own nature, or that the ground of his existence is wholly within himself; that God's presence fills the whole created universe; and that God by an act of his power spoke the world into being, or produced something from nothing; is to say what involves as great a mystery as the Trinity in unity.¹ That it is incomprehensible, therefore, was not a sufficient reason for his disbelieving it; that it involves a contradiction, he denied, and for his denial assigned reasons.²

Passing from these views of the mode of God's existence, we will consider, in the next place, the opinions of our author respecting the

§ 4. *Character of God.*

On this topic he dwelt with an interest and frequency surpassed by no writer of our acquaintance. Correct views of the revealed character of God were, in his opinion, essential to the very existence of right feelings in the human heart, and one of the most effectual preventives of a false religious experience. If 'Godliness has the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come,' then what can be of greater moment than the knowledge of God in his true character. Hence the earnest endeavor with which Dr. Emmons sought, and the fulness with which he communicated, this knowledge.

From the text, "God is love," he has left an instructive discourse, designed to illustrate the proposition 'that God is possessed of affections.' In opposition to the sentiments of the heathen philosopher, Epicurus, and some eminent divines who have agreed with him, that 'the Deity could neither be influenced by favor, nor resentment, because such a being must be weak and frail; and also, that all fear of

¹ Works, Vol. IV. pp. 112, 113.

² *Ib.* p. 111.

³ *Ib.* p. 202.

the power and anger of God should be banished, because anger and affection are inconsistent with the nature of a happy and immortal being; he taught distinctly 'that God has real and proper affections; that he is pleased with some objects and displeased with others; that he feels and exercises love, pity, compassion, and every affection which can flow from perfect benevolence.'¹ In order to guard against misapprehension and prevent his reasonings from ministering to low or unworthy views of the Deity, he was careful to affirm that God 'is infinitely above all instincts, passions, or affections, which proceed from either natural or moral imperfection.'

Aware that exceptions would be taken to these statements, he promptly meets the most imposing of them, and aims to show their fallacy. To the objections, that 'the passages which ascribe affections to God are figurative;' that 'affections are painful, and consequently cannot belong to God, who is perfectly happy;' and that his position 'is inconsistent with the divine immutability';² he gives such replies as candor delights in, though prejudice may not be convinced by them. We quote but one of them, and that the shortest. 'Affections are painful, and therefore cannot be predicated of God.'

"It is true, affections are always painful when they cannot be gratified; and this is often the case among mankind. Sometimes their affections give them pain because they want the power to attain the objects of their desire; and sometimes because their desires are so selfish and inconsistent, that if they gratify one of their affections, they must necessarily mortify another. But since all the affections of the Deity are only different modifications of pure, disinterested benevolence, they admit of a constant and perfect gratification; and since he is able with infinite ease to attain every desirable object, his affections are always gratified, and always afford him a source of complete and permanent felicity."

Some have imagined that Dr. Emmons inculcated opinions inconsistent with the perfect moral rectitude of God. But if there be, in the whole catalogue of theological writers, one who had more exalted conceptions of the benevolence and holiness of the Supreme Being, we have yet to learn his name and read his writings. He ascribed to God a goodness 'absolutely pure, and free from everything of a selfish or sinful nature;' 'not only pure, but permanent;' 'universal;' and 'perfect in degree, as well as in purity, permanency, and universality.'³ He believed that His infinite goodness forms the supreme excellence of Jehovah, adds glory to all the attributes of His being, the works of His hand, the course of His providence, and the revealings of His

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 202.

² Ib. p. 204—206.

³ Ib. pp. 210, 211.

word.¹ He taught that this goodness of God is seen in His doing all things right, or treating all his creatures according to the dictates of perfect moral rectitude; that when he punishes the wicked and rewards the good, 'the Judge of all the earth does right';² that even his 'vindictive' or punitive justice is a constituent element in his pure and universal benevolence;³ and that 'in displaying all his goodness,' he 'necessarily displays all his glory.'⁴ On these thoughts he delighted to dwell. He opened his mind spontaneously for their incoming. He gave them room for occupancy and growth in his inmost spirit. It was these which, to his eye, invested the name of Jehovah with such inexpressible grandeur, and gave such earnestness to his tone when he called upon man to adore with profoundest reverence, and enthrone on his best affections, the all perfect and infinite God.⁵

In close connection with our author's views of the divine character, it is natural to inquire what he believed respecting the

§ 5. Decrees of God.

Indeed he could not complete his idea of what the Deity is, without the inquiry, 'What has He purposed to do?' From this inquiry he did not shrink. To a mind trained like his, it could not but have extraordinary attractions. It was both instructive and entertaining to him, to investigate any subject which brings men near to God, and God near to men. Hence, he could not endure any theory of God's purposes which seems even to take men out of the control of God's sovereignty. It appeared to him contrary alike to reason and Scripture, to deny that the decrees of God comprehend all worlds, with all the individuals and events in each. He accepted the definition given by the assembly of divines at Westminster, as the best 'that ever has been, and perhaps the best that can be given.' "The decrees of God are his eternal purpose according to the counsel of his own will, whereby, for his own glory, he hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." He affirmed that the divine foreknowledge is founded on the divine purposes, and that it was not possible in the nature of things that God should 'declare the end from the beginning,' unless he had determined what the end should be.⁶ He ascribed to this the dignity and importance of being a '*fundamental doctrine of the Gospel*.' It was a favorite idea of his, that 'the other essential truths of Christianity are based upon the divine decrees, and are supported by them. To deny or disprove this doctrine, would be to deny or disprove the whole Gospel.'⁷

¹ Works, Vol. VI. pp. 16—18.

² Ib. Vol. IV. p. 222.

³ Ib. p. 242.

⁴ Ib. p. 248.

⁵ Ib. p. 260.

⁶ Ib. p. 268.

⁷ Ib. p. 277.

This bold statement he illustrates by adducing for special remark, several of the more important truths of revelation. It is interesting to see how he connects the doctrine of Christ crucified for the sins of men, with this deeper and more comprehensive truth, and shows its relation of dependence.

"It is an essential doctrine of the Gospel, that Christ died on the cross to make an atonement for sin. But there is no truth in this doctrine, unless God decreed to save sinners. For Christ professed to come in the name of his Father, to obey his Father, and to die at the express command of his Father. But if his Father never decreed the salvation of sinners, it is certain that his Father never sent him, and never commanded him to die in the room of sinners; so that Christ is found a false witness. And then, though he died on the cross, his death could make no atonement, and be of no avail to the salvation of sinners. But if he died according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God; if he was obedient to his Father, even unto the death of the cross; then his dying, the just for the unjust, may avail to bring sinners unto God. The truth of Christ's mission, and the value of his death, depend upon the doctrine of divine decrees. And the denial of this doctrine is virtually and necessarily the denial of the atonement of Christ, and the whole glory of the Gospel."¹

By a similar train of thought, he exhibits the relation of this, to several other truths of Christianity. The doctrine of God's perfect holiness, of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures, of the world's conversion to Christ, of the perseverance and eternal happiness of the saints, of the certain and everlasting destruction of the wicked, of the general resurrection, and of all things working together so as to subserve the glory of God and the highest good of the universe, he proves, in his own decisive manner, to be indissolubly connected with the doctrine of divine decrees. This is to those fundamental. This rejected, those cannot be maintained. This obscured, dimness covers the whole scheme of salvation.

Impressed with these views, it is not wonderful that he labored so diligently and studied so profoundly that he might elucidate and defend this truth. He could not do less than insist with uncompromising earnestness on the duty of all who preach the Gospel, to declare the 'whole counsel of God' on this subject. Believing as he did, that God's purposes, rightly apprehended, impart 'strength and glory to the entire system of religious truth,'—that, as luminous points they 'radiate a light clear and beautiful on all the works and ways of God,'² it was not in his nature to refrain from untiring effort that other eyes

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 278.

² Ib. pp. 281, 282.

might behold their unveiled beauty, and other hearts be affected by their elevating power.

Nor was he satisfied with 'preaching up' this doctrine, unless it were so presented as to 'preach down' its opposing error. He thought it the office of light so to shine as to disperse darkness. To him the true was so true, that necessity was laid upon him to expose the falseness of the false. By a law of mental association, whenever he considered any important portion of theology, its antagonistic error was almost sure to be suggested to his mind. The hostile relation of one to the other, he was quick to detect and prompt to declare. Respecting the point now before us, in particular, he neither asked nor gave quarter. He had taken his position, and would fortify it by every means at his command. If attacked, whether by an open enemy or a covert foe, his defence was spirited and courageous; and very often, changing positions with his assailant, his part of the contest became boldly aggressive. The man who felt that a blow was aimed at the foundation of all his hope, was not likely to be passive until it had been delivered. He who believed that 'every scheme of doctrine which ignores the decrees of God, subverts the whole Gospel, and strikes at the basis of rational and revealed religion,'¹ must have been a traitor to his faith not to oppose every such scheme with something of the spirit which impelled 'Michael and his angels against the dragon.'

It will have been already understood, that our author so conceived and presented this subject as to make it eminently practical. He made it fruitful of test questions respecting Christian character. It was difficult for him to see how any valid evidence of likeness to God can exist in a human heart, which has no lively satisfaction in view of the decrees of God. That a person can be indifferent respecting a subject which brings God so near to us, and places our interests for time and eternity under his sovereign control;² that one can fail to be conscious of a pure joy while reflecting that God will deal with us and ours, with all creatures and things, according to the 'counsel whereby he purposeth all things for his own glory,' and yet be a child of God and an heir of heaven; — this was to him more than a mystery. It was an impossibility. Thus he made his most elaborate discussions of abstract truth subservient of the highest practical results.

There are but few preachers who expatiate so largely on the doctrine of God's purposes as did Dr. Emmons; and some have suggested that he gave it undue prominence. They imagine that, on this account, his system lacks symmetry and exhibits distortion. But it would be difficult to point to an author who insisted more frequently

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 284.

² *Ib.*

on the importance of studying truth in its connections. No one thought more highly of presenting each part of the Gospel so that it should harmonize with every other. Whatever may have been suggested to the contrary, he was the last man to isolate the doctrine of decrees, and exalt that at the expense of any other revealed truth. While, however, he illustrated it in connection with other points and rejoiced in the light which they mutually reflect, he dwelt with peculiar interest on the relation subsisting between the decrees and the

§ 6. Agency of God.

He saw in this relation, a high order of moral beauty. That God 'has foreordained whatsoever comes to pass,' is a truth which exercised and gratified his best powers; but to contemplate this by itself alone, met the demands of neither his intellect nor his heart. He required that this should be associated with its kindred doctrine of the divine agency. Disjoined, each lacks completeness and efficiency. Reciprocally complementary, they dislike separation as nature abhors a vacuum. It is only when the utterances of each are harmoniously responded to by the other, that their real grandeur and power can be appreciated.

On the nature of God's agency, Dr. Emmons bestowed intense and prolonged thought. Dissatisfied with the various, not to say contradictory speculations of others upon the subject, he strove to compass a view of it which should commend itself alike to consciousness, reason and Scripture. Believing that it had often been so presented as to be 'a source of grave errors respecting the doctrines of the Gospel,'¹ and that a clear exposition of its nature and sphere of operation would throw light on the entire system of revealed truth, he devoted himself to its study with all the enthusiasm of his ardent nature. The results of his investigation can be succinctly stated, and easily apprehended. Whether we agree with him or not, we can hardly mistake his meaning.

First of all, he distinguishes between the knowledge and agency of God. To know, is not to do. God's omniscience is one thing; his action, another. *Knowledge, whether of duty or of power, is essentially distinct from the performance of the one, or the use of the other.* He next discriminates between wisdom and agency. God, unerring in wisdom, forms the best possible designs and adopts the best means for their accomplishment; but this is very different from actually carrying his plans into effect. Nor are agency and power synonymous. Power to

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 378.

do and actual performance, though the latter presupposes and necessitates the former, are yet by no means one and the same.

"He [God] had power to create the world before he created it. Power may exist without any exercise or exertion. The agency of God, therefore, does not consist in his power to act, or in his omnipotence."¹ "None of his natural perfections can produce any effect without his willing it; and after he has willed it, his agency is no farther concerned in its production. His agency consists in nothing before his choice, nor after his choice, nor beside his choice. — His willing or choosing a thing to exist, is all that he does in causing it to exist."²

The agency of God is perfectly free. To act of choice, is to act with entire freedom. An agent is free just so far as he is voluntary; and God being perfectly voluntary in all his action, is also perfectly free.³

But agency may be perfectly free and voluntary, and yet have no moral character. A mere animal may act of choice, in view of motives adapted to influence his will; but having no power to distinguish right from wrong nor to appreciate the nature of either, he cannot be a moral agent. Man, having this power, acts so as to be worthy of praise, or deserving of blame. God, having the most perfect discernment of the difference between moral good and moral evil, acts voluntarily, freely, and morally. 'The righteous Lord loveth righteousness.' His volitions are all holy. His choice ever has been, is, and ever will be, to do what is wisest and best. To suppose that he can choose otherwise, is to suppose what involves an absurdity. On a point of so much interest, however, Dr. Emmons should be allowed to speak his own thoughts in his own words.

"God always acts not only voluntarily and freely, but benevolently. All his volitions are virtuous and holy. He always chooses to act perfectly right. — It is morally impossible for him to have a selfish or sinful volition. — There is no more difficulty in forming clear and just conceptions of the free, voluntary and moral agency of God, than in forming clear and just conceptions of his power, wisdom and goodness. Nor is there any more difficulty in forming clear and just conceptions of his power, wisdom, goodness and agency, than in forming clear and just conceptions of human power, wisdom, goodness and agency. Power in God is of the same nature as power in man. Wisdom in God is of the same nature as wisdom in man. Goodness in God is of the same nature as goodness in man. And free, voluntary, moral agency in God is of the same nature as free, voluntary, moral agency in man. If this be not true, we can form no right conceptions of our Creator, and can never know that

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 379.² *Ib.*³ *Ib.* 380.

he is a wise, powerful, benevolent and active being; for we derive all our ideas of God from our ideas of ourselves. To say, therefore, that God's agency is different in nature from our own, is as absurd as to say that his knowledge, his power, or his moral rectitude is different from our own. And to say this, is to say that we have not and cannot have any true knowledge of God. We may then rest satisfied that God is a perfectly free, voluntary, moral agent; and that his free, voluntary, moral agency solely consists in the mere exercise of his will. I have dwelt the longer on this point, because it is a point of great importance to be understood, in order to have just conceptions of God, who is the first, the greatest and best of Beings, of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things."¹

The agency of God is universal. Proof; God has made all things. He upholds all things by the word of his power. He has made all things for himself; and therefore his agency must extend to all created objects in the universe. Possessing both a right and a power to do what he pleases with his own, and to govern them so that they shall subserve the purposes of his own glory, we cannot conceive it to be possible even for God himself to do this, without exercising a constant powerful agency over all his creatures and all his works, throughout his dominions."²

It should be observed, however, that while Dr. Emmons strenuously insisted on the universality of divine agency, he was particularly careful to foreclose the inference that God is the only free moral agent in the universe. He had no pantheistic tendencies. High as he exalted God, he would give man his true place. As we shall see, when we reach his teachings respecting man, he fully believed in the voluntariness and entire freedom of human agency. Denying the doctrine of man's independence, he yet taught with earnestness and power that of his freedom and responsibility. God is the only independent moral agent in the universe; but there are as many free moral agents, as there are individuals possessing reason and conscience. God indeed, does all things after the counsel of his own will; but his will is that man should evermore act of choice in view of motives. 'Men are as much free, voluntary, moral agents, while dependent on God and under his universal agency, as if they were self-existent, and independent of all other beings. Their dependence on God, and his controlling power over them, are perfectly consistent with their enjoying the same free moral agency that God himself enjoys.'³ Other divines have taught substantially the same doctrine; but we have yet to learn who of them has explained it with so much precision, or made so ex-

¹ Works, Vol. IV. pp. 381, 382.

² *Ib.* p. 388.

³ *Ib.* p. 385.

tensive an application of it as Dr. Emmons. Yet the principles that some of them have adopted and the statements they have made necessarily involve the very ideas which have sometimes subjected him to severe animadversion. Passing by Calvin, the Westminster divines, Edwards, Smalley, Bellamy, and Hopkins, consider the following passages from Dr. Dwight's Theology. From the text, "What his soul desireth, even that he doeth," he deduces the doctrine, 'That all things, both beings and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or what is commonly called the Decrees, of God.'¹ Amongst other proofs of this, he adduces these two: 'That God cannot but have chosen the existence of all those things, whose existence was on the whole desirable, and of no others;' and 'This choice of God, that things should exist, is the only divine energy, and the only cause of existence.' In illustrating the last proposition, he declares that 'the energy of mind is *its will*; and this is synonymous with *its choice, generally understood*; each act of the will, being no other than an act of choice. What is thus true of every *finite* mind, is eminently true of the *Infinite Mind*.' He adds, that 'it is metaphysically proper to say, *that God wills all things into existence*; or that they are produced by his choice; in the full sense, in which any effect is said to be produced by its efficient cause.'² This would seem to be as decisive as anything which Dr. Emmons has said. Both as to the nature and the extent of divine agency, it is definite and positive. One sees not how it can be construed to mean anything less than the boldest assertions of our author on this subject. It includes not only '*events*,' but '*particularly those, which are called the actions of moral or voluntary creatures*.'³ This author, too, meets the objection that God's universal agency excludes the idea of man's freedom, very much in the same manner with Dr. Emmons. An elaborate train of thought conducts him to the conclusion, 'That God can create a free agent, whose actions shall all be foreknown by him, and shall exactly accomplish what is, upon the whole, his pleasure.'⁴

It were no difficult task to quote from other standard authors similar opinions. But let it now suffice to state, that Dr. Emmons advocated no views of divine agency which interfere in the least degree, as he believed, with man's free moral agency. 'He believed that God exercises a real, a universal and a constant agency over all his intelligent creatures, and that at the same time they enjoy the most perfect freedom conceivable. He never made the agency of God limit the freedom of the creature, nor the freedom of the creature counteract the

¹ Dwight's Theology, Harper's edition, Vol. I. p. 238. ² *Ib.* p. 244. ³ *Ib.*

⁴ *Ib.* p. 259.

will of God. In all his addresses to God, and descriptions of his character, he speaks to and of him, as doing all his pleasure in heaven above, and on earth beneath. In all his addresses to man, he speaks to and of him, as a free moral agent, capable of doing or not doing the whole will of God, and as accountable for the manner in which he improves the powers which God has given him.¹

We have dwelt more at length on this point, because we believe that in regard to it Dr. Emmons has not always been fairly dealt with. Inferences have been charged upon him, which he viewed with as earnest an abhorrence as any other man. It has been affirmed that he was guilty of blasphemy in charging God with being the author of sin. He has been represented as making man a machine, freeing him from all responsibility and even destroying his personality. A number of such inferences have been drawn by others from what he has taught, and then paraded before the religious community, if not as sentiments actually inculcated by himself, yet as legitimate conclusions from his premises. Those who knew him require not to be assured that he was among the first to deny the truth of all such deductions. Divine agency, in his mind, involved no such consequences — was attended by no such terrible incumbrances. No writer was more prompt than he to assert and maintain the unimpaired moral freedom of man, while he delighted to view the wise and holy God as ‘working all things after the counsel of his own will.’ It was no paradox to him, any more than it seemed to be to the Apostle Paul, that man can ‘work out his own salvation with fear and trembling, while it is God that worketh in him both to will and to do of his own good pleasure.’ In other words, he believed that ‘men can act freely under a divine agency.’² Taking this principle with him, he was prepared, on the one hand, to assert the absolute supremacy of God, and, on the other, to predicate of man entire freedom of moral action. Reason and Scripture unite in placing the former truth on an immovable basis; consciousness and the first principles of intuition assure us of the latter. Both demonstrably true, they cannot clash.³

In connection with our author’s opinions of God’s decrees and agency, we may examine his belief respecting

§ 7. *Election and Reprobation.*

These are both included in the more comprehensive doctrine of the divine purposes; but, on account of their practical relation to the happiness of the saved and the misery of the lost, they require particular

¹ Works, Vol. I. p. 79. (Memoir.)

² Ib. p. 77.

³ Ib. Vol. IV. p. 384.

consideration. In the system of theology elaborated by Dr. Emmons, the 'election of grace' occupied no obscure or inferior position. It mattered not to him, that it was a truth very much 'spoken against.' We would not be too sure that it was not even more interesting to him, on that very account. At any rate, he was the man to give its claims a fair hearing, and to express his opinions of it without disguise. He believed, then, that God 'chose his people in Christ, before the foundation of the world, that they should be holy, and without blame before him in love.' That Christ should see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied, was, in his estimation, more than a mere figure of rhetoric. The elect were given to Christ 'in the covenant of redemption, as a reward for his mediatorial services and sufferings.'¹ They were so given to Christ that there is no uncertainty about their conversion and salvation. The decree of election was such, that Christ could say with the fullest assurance, "All that the Father giveth me, shall come to me." The election was from eternity—a purpose of mercy in Christ Jesus, before the world began, to save sinners. It was not simply a decree to save sinners, provided they should repent and believe; though it is certain that all who do believe shall be saved. But it was a purpose, fixed as the eternal hills, that multitudes of the human family ruined by sin, should have their attention directed to the "Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world," be renewed in the spirit and temper of their minds, and rendered "meet for the inheritance of the saints in light."² In that glorious purpose, the 'foreknown were predestinated to be conformed to the image of Christ, the predestinated were called by the Spirit, the called were justified, and the justified were glorified.' There was more than a poetical beauty, according to our author, in Paul's rapturous exclamation: "We are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." 'All Christ's people are elected to eternal life, and to regeneration and sanctification, as the necessary means to qualify them for it.'³

From this statement of Dr. Emmons's views of Election, it will be seen that he gave no countenance whatever to the slander, that 'if a man is to be saved he will be, do what he may, and if not, he will not be, do what he can.' He regarded a sentiment like that with mingled contempt and abhorrence. Nor did his opinions of this doctrine render means unnecessary. He made much of means. In God's decree that such and such results should take place, he saw that second causes were as important as the ends were necessary. It is just as certain

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 310.² *Ib.* p. 311.³ *Ib.*

that the elect will repent and believe the Gospel, as it is that they will be justified and glorified.¹ He had no views of Election which hindered him from calling upon all men with earnest sincerity to accept the offers of mercy through a crucified Redeemer. He knew that the provisions of God's grace are abundant for all, and that whosoever will, may come and take the water of life freely. With solemn appeals to the conscience and heart, he was wont to call upon both hearers and readers to make their 'calling and election sure.' Clearly he taught that every sinner can do this by exercising 'repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ.' 'Grace is the only certain evidence of grace; and, therefore, the Apostle exhorts Christians to live in the exercise of grace in order to gain assurance that they are chosen to salvation. Let them grow in grace, and they will grow in assurance of their calling and election to eternal life.'²

Still he knew well that no sinner would come to Christ, unless drawn by the Father. Such were his views of man's depravity by nature, that he had no hope of the salvation of a single soul aside from the electing love of God. The fact that God has given to Christ a seed to serve him—that He has chosen from eternity a great multitude that no man can number to be holy before him in love—that He has determined of his own good pleasure to form a people for his praise; this glorious doctrine of the '*election of grace*,' illuminated to his eye the whole horizon of truth, and gave him hope and courage while he entreated sinners to become reconciled to God. The inveterate depravity of the human heart and the terrible influence of the god of this world over the great mass of mind, did not intimidate or dishearten him. For he believed the promise without the shadow of a doubt, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Beyond the clouds that obscure our heaven with gloom, he saw a God of matchless wisdom and infinite resources, pledged to his Son and to the universe, to prepare unnumbered millions of the human family for the bliss of his heavenly kingdom.

"The few friends Christ now has in the world, may look forward by an eye of faith, and joyfully anticipate the day when multitudes which no man can number, shall rise from spiritual death to spiritual life, and reign in righteousness from the rising to the setting sun, and there shall be none to hurt or destroy in all God's holy mountain. This is a most animating motive to pray to the Father, 'Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.'"³

Thus he made the 'electing love of God' beautiful to contemplate,

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 317.

² Ib. p. 322.

³ Ib.

and gave it the energy of a mighty moral force to urge ministers' and Christians to fidelity in the use of means.

Singular as it may appear, he also held such opinions respecting the doctrine of Reprobation, as, on the whole, encouraged him to effort, by inspiring him with the most animating hope. He firmly believed that God has a purpose, fixed from eternity, concerning all who will finally be lost. To suppose that the existence, actions, characters, and destiny of such are not all contemplated in the divine purpose and are not a part of that comprehensive agency which worketh all in all, would, in his view, be to suppose not only what is untrue, but also what is absurd. His opinions of this doctrine are developed in his discourse on the conduct and doom of Pharaoh.¹ He there fearlessly carries out his conceptions of the decrees and agency of God, to their practical bearings on the characters and final condition of men. Many have objected to some of his statements in this discourse, as derogatory to the benevolence and justice of God. They have said 'that he makes God directly the author of sin; that, if this doctrine be true, Pharaoh was irresponsible, and, of course, deserved no punishment for his acts; and that God is infinitely cruel, because he makes men sinners, and then inflicts upon them the penalty of eternal damnation for what they could not help.' Now all who knew Dr. Emmons, need not be assured that his whole soul would have revolted in earnest detestation at such statements as these. He may have used language in some instances, which would seem to imply force or compulsion, and of course inconsistent with the moral freedom of man. For example, when he declares that 'when Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse,'² the words are those which literally express outward action and physical impulse. But he is well known to have employed the language for embodying his idea of a totally different kind of agency. He believed that God had a fixed purpose in regard to Pharaoh, and all the events and circumstances concerned in the formation of his character. He believed also that God's purpose, in no case, infringed, or was inconsistent with the moral freedom of Pharaoh. The result of Pharaoh's hardness of heart and final overthrow was certain; but certain only as the impenitence and destruction of every unregenerate sinner are certain; certain, but yet in perfect consistency with the full exercise of reason and liberty of the will. The idea that God exercised any agency upon Pharaoh which absolutely necessitated his sinning, or hardened his heart in any such sense as to destroy his responsibility for hardening his own heart, would have been as repugnant to the sentiments of our author as to

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 323.

² Ib. p. 327.

those of any one who has attempted to fasten these conclusions to his premises. He inculcated, in every variety of form, the ability of the sinner to do all that God requires of him, and thus make it certain that he is not one of the reprobate, but one of the elect. Yes; he taught explicitly that man has 'a natural power to frustrate the decrees of God.'¹ Surely, then, he could not have intended to imply, in any form of speech which he has employed, that Pharaoh was a subject of such compulsory agency on the part of God, that either his freedom of will or his power to do right was destroyed or impaired. To no one would he have thought the command, 'Repent and do works meet for repentance,' more applicable, than to this same rebellious monarch of Egypt.

What, then, did he mean by the strong language above quoted? The answer is very obvious, if we recur to his definition of divine agency. It is not physical force. It is not compulsion. It is not the decree of fate, by which human actions are absolutely necessitated. No, no; it is something more consonant with the spirituality of the Divine Mind and the claims of a sound philosophy. God's will, or choice, is his agency. Not his knowledge, or his wisdom, or his power; but his volition. His purpose from eternity and his choice at the time, contemplated Pharaoh as acting freely in view of all the motives concentrated in his solemn position. By causing him thus to act, is meant his will that, on the whole, he should act for himself, or on his own responsibility, under the pressure of all the facts in his case. Thus, the creature acted freely under the influence of the Creator, and his actions were his own.² Our author's views of this point are fairly stated by the editor of his Works. "According to the definition of divine agency given by Dr. Emmons, all that God did to harden the heart of Pharaoh, or to move him to let the people go, was to *will* or *choose*, all things considered, that he should voluntarily or freely refuse to let them go. But was the exertion of such an agency as this upon him, in the least degree inconsistent with his own free moral agency? Could not Pharaoh himself refuse to let the people go when God chose he should do it, as well as though God had made no such choice? Could not Pharaoh act as *freely* in refusing to let the people go, under the influence of the divine will that he should do so, as he could have done, if God had formed no choice respecting it? Or, in other words, did the will of God that Pharaoh should do this thing freely of his own accord, and in a manner perfectly consistent with his accountability, have any tendency to prevent his doing it?"³ The writer of this article from oft-repeated conversations with Dr. Emmons, knows that

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 304.² *Ib.* p. 350.³ Memoir, pp. 72, 80.

these were the views which he entertained respecting the agency of God in hardening Pharaoh's heart and in 'forming all the vessels of wrath for destruction.' From eternity the Infinite Mind saw that the plan of creation which he adopted would be the best possible, all things considered. Therefore, he adopted it. He works all things after the counsel of his own will respecting the salvation of the elect, and they 'work out their salvation with fear and trembling.' They are chosen, called, justified, glorified. He works all things after the counsel of his own will respecting the destruction of the wicked, and they abuse their privileges, neglect the great salvation, and perish in their sins. God wills that they should freely and responsibly pursue their own chosen way. It is not consistent with his plans, *all things taken into view*, to put forth an agency that shall turn them from sin to holiness. They will persist in sin and go away into everlasting destruction from his presence, and become monuments of his justice to all eternity.

Such, in brief, were the views of Dr. Emmons respecting the doctrines of Election and Reprobation. And whatever deductions the ingenuity of criticism may make from them, and with whatever forms of terror an opposite theory may array them, they lay in the mind of their author side by side, perfectly harmonizing with those attributes of God which constitute his highest glory, and with those inherent elements of freedom and responsibility in man which show that he was originally created in the divine image. That plausible objections would be urged against his views, he was well aware; nor was he the man to shrink from meeting them. He was deeply convinced that his reasonings from the Scriptures and from the nature of things had conducted him to the essential truth on these points, and he was ready to follow wherever these should lead the way. If any objected that he was conflicting with man's freedom, or with God's impartiality, he boldly joined issue with them, asking no favor, and giving no indulgence. By the truth, he would be condemned or justified. If he was accused of ascribing tyranny to God or involving Him in the authorship or guilt of sin; if the objector averred that he left no place for the use of means or the intervention of second causes; he made it manifest with admirable promptness that he had studied his subjects in these several bearings and had made preparation to show the fallacy of all such objections.¹ Taking with him the truths, 'that God has *for his own glory* foreordained whatsoever comes to pass,' and 'that men act freely and responsibly while acted upon,' he felt himself armed for any and every encounter with opponents. Though he loved not controversy for its own sake, yet he was glad to find a 'foeman worthy of

¹ Works, Vol. IV. pp. 331—334.

his steel,' and even his antagonists acknowledged that he wielded his weapons with adroitness and effect.

The following specimen will show his manner of treatment when pressed with objections. He had just been disposing of the assumption, that his view of reprobation was inconsistent with free and responsible action on the part of the sinner. He is now met with the objection that he leaves no room for the use of means. The 'decree that any shall be lost, renders absurd the employment of means for their salvation.'¹

"This objection is founded upon the preceding, and if there is no foundation for that, there is none for this. If the decree of reprobation does not destroy free agency, then it does not destroy the use of means. If reprobates remain free agents, then there is a great propriety in treating them as such, and in exhibiting before them all the motives of the Gospel, to lead them to repentance. But it is sufficient to say, that God used means with Pharaoh, to bring him to good, though he had determined to destroy him. He admonished him of his duty and of his danger; he visited him with mercies and judgments; he employed Moses and Aaron, and even his own subjects, to persuade him to submission; and he delayed to cut him off from the earth, until it clearly appeared that all means and motives served to harden his heart and increase his obstinacy. This instance of the divine conduct towards a reprobate, demonstrates the propriety of using all the means of grace with reprobates. God addressed the understanding, the conscience, and the heart of Pharaoh, and used every method proper to be used, to bring any obstinate sinner to repentance. Reprobates are as capable of feeling the force of moral motives as any other men in the world; and therefore it is as proper to use the means of grace with the non-elect, as with the elect. So God teaches, by his word and by his conduct."

Whatever some of the language employed by Dr. Emmons may seem to imply, or whatever inferences others may deduce from his premises, it is perfectly obvious that he entertained no view of divine efficiency, of election or reprobation, which appeared to him to curtail in the least the moral freedom of man, or absolutely necessitate the destruction of a sinner. Certainly it is but common justice, that he should be judged in the light of his own definitions and explanations.

The statements already submitted, indicate with sufficient clearness what were our author's views of the

§ 8. *Sovereignty of God.*

He who exists by a necessity in his own nature, uncaused and eter-

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 333.

nal; who 'foreordained whatsoever comes to pass;' who has 'made all things for himself,' and for 'whose pleasure they are and were created,' must be 'King of kings, and Lord of lords.' Possessed of every conceivable perfection, the Maker and Preserver of all, it is his right to challenge the homage of every heart, and the supreme devotion of every created intelligence. Our author was in no wise reluctant to ascribe to Jehovah the power, dominion and rights of an absolute and universal Sovereign. God 'giveth not account of any of his matters.' He 'openeth, and no man shutteth; shutteth, and no man openeth.' 'Clothed with majesty and girded with strength, he taketh up the isles as a very little thing.' God over all, he 'borrows no leave to be,' or to plan, or to act. Whatsoever seems good unto him, that he doeth in heaven, and earth, and through all parts of his grand empire.¹ In the exercise of his adorable sovereignty, he had a perfect right to form his own designs respecting angels and men, and he has the same right to exercise his agency in fixing the bounds of their habitation and determining their destiny for all eternity. Our author saw the amiable and awful sovereignty of God in the fall and punishment of the angels who kept not their first estate, and in the confirmation of those who resisted the tempter, in everlasting holiness and bliss. He saw it in the creation of man with powers to obey or disobey his Maker, in the test of loyalty which God prescribed, in the fall, in the provisions of mercy, in the ordaining of multitudes to eternal life and leaving others to their choice of destruction, in the diverse operations of God's Spirit, and in all the discriminations of providence and of grace. It seemed to him that this truth is admirably fitted to prostrate the soul in reverence and fill the heart with a sublime joy. Sad is the moral condition of that man on whom it produces no such effect. And what made God's sovereignty so amiable and so transcendently glorious in his sight was, that it is the sovereignty of wisdom, truth and righteousness, no less than the sovereignty of power.² No creature in the universe will have just cause to complain of God, during any portion of his existence, because 'the Judge of all the earth will do right.' Though God 'has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and hardeneth whom he will,' he is to be adored for this diverse agency because every part of it is in harmony with combined wisdom and benevolence, and intended to exhibit his glory to an intelligent universe.

"It is just matter of rejoicing to the whole intelligent creation, that God always acts as a Sovereign, without the least control from any other being in the universe. His own blessedness, and the highest felicity of

¹ Works, Vol. III. pp. 247, 248.

² Ib. p. 247.

all his holy creatures, entirely depends upon his being and acting as a Sovereign. For by acting in a sovereign and irresistible manner, he will infallibly overrule all things for his own glory; which will necessarily secure the highest good of all his benevolent and dutiful servants."¹

From the view now taken, it will be seen that Dr. Emmons was accustomed to cherish exalted conceptions of the character of God. As was once suggested respecting Dr. Bellamy, he 'made God very great.' The sentiment of reverence was largely developed in him. If he dwelt frequently on the divine perfections and government, it was because of their intrinsic grandeur and importance, and of his conviction that a correct knowledge of these is essential to true religion. In *his* light, he was ever looking for light. The eye on him, all was clear; off, and all was dark. He knew that to be strong, one must rest in God; to be happy, one must be blest in God. Therefore he studied God with intense affection and profound veneration; and the sublime conclusions which he matured in his own mind, he was ever ready to communicate for the illumination of other minds. He knew, indeed, that 'none by searching can find out the Almighty unto perfection;' yet he was assured that there 'are parts of his ways' which may be investigated and comprehended. Though the great ocean 'cannot be sounded by plummet and line,' nevertheless the fathoms which that line does measure may be accurately numbered. Though a humorous hearer might now and then have asked, half in earnest and half in irony, 'When does Dr. Emmons expect to be able to tell us all about God?' yet his people were never more solemn or more benefitted than when he carried them up to that spiritual Shechinah, where the presence and majesty of Jehovah were shadowed forth.

Unwilling to protract this survey to the point of tediousness, we omit a synopsis of our author's belief respecting angels² and evil spirits.³ We do this the more readily because he taught nothing concerning these peculiarly new or important, and because it will afford us larger opportunity to consider his teachings in regard to man, his duties and his destiny. It animated him to feel that saints are always attended by good angels, and, in a sense, are under their guardianship. If, in a moment of deep perplexity, some thought was suddenly suggested to him which scattered light in his path, he was very ready to receive it as from his guardian angels. Believing also, that man is ever subject to temptations from spirits of evil, he warned both saints and sinners to 'resist the devil and draw nigh to God.'

[To be concluded.]

¹ Works, Vol. VI. pp. 490, 491. See also Vol. IV. pp. 390—401.

² Works, Vol. IV. pp. 415—429.

³ *Ib.* pp. 432—435.

ARTICLE IV.

EXEGETICAL AND THEOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF JOHN
1: 1—18.

By M. Stuart, late Prof. of Sac. Lit. in the Theol. Sem. at Andover.

[Continued from No. XXV. p. 55.]

IN the preceding number of this Miscellany, a somewhat extended view was given of what may be said in the way of illustrating the first verse, in this portion of the Gospel of John. The importance and difficulty of the subject required, in order to accomplish my design, a much more copious discussion than is necessary in regard to any particular portion of the remainder of the prologue. The *exegetical* demands of the text will now be the leading object of our attention; although I do not, in the present case, prescribe to myself the limits which a mere exegesis would impose.

V. 2. *Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.*

The same was in the beginning with God.

The demonstrative *οὗτος* here refers, of course, to the subject immediately preceding, viz. *ὁ λόγος*. It was perhaps for the sake of such a reference, that the writer put *ὁ λόγος* at the close of the preceding verse, and not before *ἦν*. The reason why John adopted the demonstrative pronoun here rather than to repeat the noun which it represents, seems to have been to save the too frequent repetition of *ὁ λόγος*. As the text stands, *οὗτος* represents the *λόγος* who was *θεός*, and so, in this way, it virtually comprises a repetition of the last clause of v. 1. As to the reason of the repetition itself which is contained in v. 2, I have already stated my views, p. 38 seq. of the preceding Number. The manifest intensity which is indicated by the repetition, denotes earnest opposition to false sentiment. A progress in the development of facts or truths by the addition of new matter, is not made in v. 2. But the intensity of the writer's convictions is represented with additional impetus, in consequence of this verse; and on this account, the declaration which it makes cannot well be viewed as useless, nor as mere tautology.

V. 3. *Πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν, ὃ γέγονεν.*

All things were made by him, and without him was no one thing made which was made.

Πάντα, all things, i. e. the universe. Paul employs the word with the article, *τὰ πάντα*. The usual philosophic expression is *τὸ πᾶν*. But *πάντα* (without the article) is sometimes employed, as here, by the heathen writers; e. g. Anton. ad se ipsum, 4. 23. What is here designated by *πάντα*, is named *ὁ κόσμος* in v. 10 below. *Τὰ πάντα* has more the aspect of designating the universe, as made up of various constituent parts; while *πάντα* has the aspect of unity as a generic whole. It is no wonder that John exchanges it for *ὁ κόσμος* below. The Hebrews often made *אֶרֶץ* (*the earth*) the representative of the universe, because in their view, it was the grand constituent of the whole. Thus we have such expressions as "the God of the whole earth;" "the Creator of the ends of the earth," etc. So John, in repeating the sentiment of this verse (in v. 10), says, in accordance with this idiom, that 'the world (*ὁ κόσμος*) was made by the Logos.' Not, as the Socinians explain it, the *spiritual world*, i. e. the Christian church; for the world which the Logos made, and in which he was, was a world that *knew him not*, (v. 10). This of course excludes the idea of its being the new spiritual world, whose characteristic is, to know God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent.

Ἀ' αὐτοῦ, by him. The allegation that *διὰ* before the Gen. designates only an *instrumental* cause, is not correct. That this is its most frequent usage, is readily conceded. But in Rom. 11: 36, *δι' αὐτοῦ* refers to God himself; and the like in 1 Cor. 1: 9. So in Xen. Mem. I. 2. 14. Cyrop. 1. 4, *διὰ* stands before the principal cause. — *Ἐγένετο*, were made; more literally, *came into existence*, which has the same meaning. For the same sense of *ἐγένετο*, comp. 1 Cor. 15: 45. Heb. 4: 3. 11: 3. No other meaning is admissible here. The verb singular with the *neuter plural*, is the usual construction in Greek.

In like manner as John has repeated v. 1 in the next following verse, so here the second clause of v. 3 repeats the sentiment of the first clause in a negative form, and in such a way as to give much intensity to the expression. *Χωρὶς αὐτοῦ*, without him, lit. *separately or apart from him*. — *Ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἓν*, lit. (as translated above) *no one thing*. Some copies read *οὐδὲν*, *nothing*; but the better reading is *οὐδὲ ἓν*. This has a sense more specific and emphatic. With this, some authorities conclude the verse, and join *ὁ γέγονεν* with what follows. But what tolerable sense would there be in saying: "That which was in him was life?" The internal evidence in favor of the present division of the verse, is sufficiently strong to vouch for its correctness.

With John, the repetition of a sentiment in a negative form is of frequent occurrence, see v. 20 below, 1 John 1: 5, 8, 2: 4, 11, al. In the present case, the *force* of the repetition is so manifest, that every considerate reader is spontaneously inclined to ask: 'To whom does the writer oppose himself?' That he has a polemical design, in part, one can hardly refrain from believing. And if so, whose sentiments were in view? A portion of the Gnostics of that time, it is well known, maintained the eternity of *ὑλη*, *matter*, as being an original chaotic substance. If now we suppose that John's *no one thing* refers to this exception or limitation which the Gnostics made to the extent of creation, then is the earnestness of the writer's expression natural and easily accounted for. John had before denied the Gnostic views respecting the *nature* of the Logos, and now he stands again in opposition to them, in respect to what the Logos had *done* or *accomplished*. Has not Paul a like reference, in what he says of the creation by Christ in Col. 1: 16? His method of expression certainly appears to favor this supposition.

Such are the generic views which John has given us respecting the condition and nature of the Logos, and of the manner in which he first developed himself. He is eternal; he was with God; he was God; and he created all things without the exception of even one thing in the creation.

V. 4. Ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

In him was life, and the life was the light of men.

In him, ἐν αὐτῷ, not *through him* or *by him*. As has already been remarked, this expression designates the Logos as the source, the immanent fountain, of life. More fully is this same idea explained, in 5: 26, and 1 John 5: 11. — Ζωή, *life*, without the article and generic. The writer means to designate a *life-giving power*, which extends to the production of all life whether physical or spiritual. The reader should note the progress of thought. First, we are told what the Logos is; next the highest exhibition of his power, in the creation of the universe, is brought to view. Then follows the mention of some particular, special, and notable developments of his attributes. All *life* or *animation*, the highest and noblest quality of created things, is the gift of the Logos. Such is also the course of thought in Gen. 1: 1 seq., where the chaotic material is the result of the first creation, and the forming of living creatures comes in the sequel. Doubtless John had his eye upon this. The interpretation which assigns to ζωὴ here the meaning of *happiness*, or *author of happiness* or *of spiritual life*, does not reach the full force of the author's meaning. He does indeed com-

prehend these in his view, but he also comprehends much more. Hence ζωή without the article. Had merely the specific idea of *happiness* or *spiritual life* been designated, we should of course have expected ἡ ζωή.

Before the second clause, however, we have ζωή with the article prefixed. But this is merely the normal construction, which demands the article when a noun is immediately repeated. In this form the word is equivalent in meaning to *this life*, viz. the one just mentioned. — *Was the light of men.* There is some difficulty here which does not arise, when Christ says that he himself is the light of the world, 8: 12. 9: 5. The meaning of this is plain. But in the present case, *the life* is said to be *the light of men*. The design of the writer seems plainly to be, further to characterize or unfold the nature of the *life* that was in the Logos. Not only was it the source of all life in general, whether physical or moral, but one of its special attributes was, that it was the source of all *spiritual light*. In calling this light *the light of men*, the writer gives us sufficient intimation, that he does not mean to have φῶς taken as designating *the natural light*, as in 11: 9. But as natural light is essential to all natural life and well-being, so, in like manner, spiritual light is essential to the existence and well-being of spiritual life. John means to say, that the *life* which was in the Logos, was the source of all divine and spiritual *light*, of all real wisdom and saving truth. Such is the view which our text presents. From the general idea expressed by ζωή, he descends to a special but deeply interesting particular fact, viz. that life, in its highest and best sense, is bestowed through the medium of light, i. e. of truth. This accords well with views elsewhere disclosed by him: "This is life eternal, to *know* thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." "Sanctify them by thy *truth*; thy word is truth." "The *truth* shall make you free." In other words, all that is truly wise and excellent and good in the world, is to be traced to the *light-giving* source of *life*, the Logos who became incarnate.

That the writer still employs the Imperf. tense (ἦν) in this verse, must be attributed to the fact, that he is still speaking of the Logos as he was before the incarnation. It is in v. 6, that he is first brought upon the visible scene of action or of historical development. The Imperfect is therefore appropriately used; for what the Logos was in himself and before the incarnation, is still the subject-matter of the discourse. From this he partially digresses, when he proceeds, in v. 5, to show how the light, which the life-giving source diffused in ancient times, was exhibited, and how it was received by the darkened world into which it then came. I regard it as clear, that v. 5 is to be

understood of the world of mankind previous to the incarnation of the Logos; for it is in v. 6 that the first intimations are given of the preparation for the coming of the Logos among men, and of development in his earthly stage of action.

Ἦ. 5. καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει, καὶ ἡ σκοτία αὐτὸ οὐ κατέλαβεν.

And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not.

That *the light of men* designates divine instruction or truth imparted to them, i. e. that the word *light* has here a *moral* or *spiritual* sense, is clear and plain. Of course the word *σκοτία*, *darkness*, being the opposite of this, indicates a darkened, sinful, and miserable condition. It is men in such a state, that the abstract word *darkness* characterizes. It should be noted here, that light not only designates *truth* or *knowledge*, but also things or beings which are of a spiritual and holy nature. Thus 1 John 1: 5, "God is light, and in him is no darkness." Christians are called "sons of light," both from their knowledge and holiness. In like manner Eph. 5: 8, "ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord." John 3: 19, "Men have loved darkness rather than light." Rom. 13: 12, "To turn from darkness unto light." When God is said to clothe himself with light as with a garment, and to 'dwell in light inaccessible and full of glory,' it is the *moral splendor* of his perfections which is designated by these figurative expressions. In the case before us, it is plain that truth and holiness, or holy truth, is presented as struggling with culpable ignorance and sin. — *Ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει*, *shineth in or among the darkness*. The use of the present tense, in this case, deserves some note. This tense is employed in propositions which are universal, and always true; as "the sun *φαίνει*, *shineth*," i. e. has shone, shineth, and will shine. But this case does not fully reach our present difficulty, for the proposition or assertion before us is a limited one, having reference to the past, as the subsequent Aor. *κατέλαβεν* clearly indicates. We must refer it then to the *historic Present*, which is employed when a writer brings before his mind the past, and speaks of it as now present before him. This often takes place, as here, even where it is preceded or followed by Præterite tenses; as any one may see in a New Testament Grammar. Even classical usage frequently adopts the historic Present, in like cases.

The light of divine truth, then, shone on the world before the incarnation of the Logos; and shone in and through himself, for his *life-giving* power was also a *light-giving* power. All then in the works of creation or of Providence, all that had been given to patriarchs and

prophets and holy men of old by inspiration—in a word, all that taught men their relation to God, their duty, and the way of holiness and happiness—was a part of that light which came from the life-giving Logos. The tenor of the text before us clearly evinces this. It was not then without some good reason, that the Christian Fathers taught the doctrine, that all the communications spoken of or made in the Old Testament, were through the medium of the Logos. Does not John authorize us to make the like conclusion? And has he not authorized us to do thus, in respect to many Old Testament narrations, where God or Jehovah simply seems to be brought to view? In John 12: 38—40, he represents the words of Isaiah (in chapter vi.) as applicable to the Jews of his time, and then adds: “These things said Isaiah, when he beheld his [Christ’s] glory, and spake concerning him,” v. 41. Now of all the sublime and awe-inspiring representations of the Godhead, which are made in the Old Testament, the one in the passage of Isaiah just named is entitled to the preëminence. Jehovah is seated on his lofty throne of glory. Adoring Seraphim stand before him, veiling their faces, and crying aloud in holy response: “Holy! holy! holy! Lord God of hosts! The whole earth is full of his glory!” Yet John tells us that the glory of this magnificent and awful scene was *the glory of Christ*. If so, who then is Christ? And if such glory belonged to him, in the revelation of himself in ancient times, what praise should those render to him, who have been redeemed out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation by his leaving the bosom of the Father, becoming incarnate, and pouring out his precious blood for them? Nor can the passage in Heb. 1: 1, be fairly adduced in order to gainsay the view that has now been taken. It is not the object of Paul to deny, in that passage, that the Logos had ever made communications to men before he appeared incarnate. His object is to show, that God, in ancient times, spake to his people in various ways by the prophets, but that of late he had spoken to them specially and peculiarly by his Son. He intends to compare this recent messenger, who had appeared among them and addressed them, with all who had done the like before, and to show his high preëminence above them all. What had been done by the Logos before the incarnation, was not the subject of contemplation before the writer’s mind, when Heb. 1: 1 was written. The writer had respect, in his comparison, only to visible and commissioned messengers.

I do not say, that the affirmation of John, in regard to the theophany in Isaiah vi. viz. that it was *the glory of Christ* which was then displayed, will authorize us to extend the like conclusion to all the other exhibitions of the Godhead which are related in the Old Testament.

But this can be truly said, that none of them can be fairly made to exclude the idea of the intervention of the Logos, any more than Isa. vi. can be made to exclude it. It is only such disclosures of the Godhead as the Logos made after his incarnation, which could enable and authorize us to apply such passages as that in Isaiah to the higher nature of Christ. The simple text of the prophet does not seem to suggest such an application. And yet this application is so plainly and palpably made by John, that it may serve as a key to other passages in the Old Testament of a similar nature. I am not partial, indeed, to the extension of this method of reasoning, beyond specific cases that are brought to view in the New Testament. There may be danger in a partiality for mystic interpretation; and in fact experience shows how greatly such a method of interpreting and reasoning has been abused. But still, after what John has said, it is plain that we cannot disprove the intervention of the Logos, in any, or in all, of the cases where God is represented in the Old Testament as having revealed himself. All that there was of light among the Hebrews of old, all which unfolded their duty, and pointed to the way of acceptance with God, and of peace and final happiness — all this came from light imparted by the life-giving Logos.

Nor need we confine this to the Jews. The apostle Paul assures us, that "*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ*, i. e. that which was knowable respecting God, was manifest to them, for God had made it manifest," Rom. 1: 19. He does not mean that God was in all respects fully revealed to them; for he proceeds to declare, that from or by the creation of the world, *the eternal power and Godhead* of the supreme Being were disclosed to the heathen. Hence he argues their guilt, because that "when they knew God (*γινώσκοντες τὸν θεόν*), they did not glorify him as God," v. 20, 21. Afterwards he declares, that the demands of the law were written in the hearts of the heathen, so that alternately their consciences accuse and excuse them, Rom. 2: 15. It follows, then, if I have rightly comprehended the generic meaning of our text, that all disclosures of the nature of God and of duty, which were made among the heathen world, are the consequences of that light which shines amid the darkness, and which proceeds from the great Luminary of the world, the Logos. So John expressly asserts, in the sequel: "That true Light which enlighteneth every man (i. e. all men), came into the world," v. 9. Plainly therefore the tenor of the verse before us is an assertion that all which is morally or spiritually true and right and holy, has for its source the creating and life-giving Logos.

The *extent* of *σὺν ᾧ* has been, and still is, a question with many. Does it embrace all men without exception? or only all, when con-

sidered as being in their natural condition? Or does it mean, that only a part or portion of them, in this state, are *darkness*? We must resort to the sequel, in order to answer these questions. V. 12 seq. speak of such as have received Christ, and believe on his name, and therefore have the privileges of children. These, moreover, are described as being *born of God*, and in consequence of this, as sustaining a new and endearing relation to him. These of course belong not to the *darkness*; for they receive Christ, and believe on him, and walk in the light, while the *darkness* persists in excluding the Light of the world.

But what of all those who are not *born of God*. The inference of course is, that they belong to the *darkness*. Again and again has John intimated and fully declared this. He speaks of the world, i. e. the mass of mankind, as not knowing the Light of the world when he came among them, v. 10. When the Saviour is represented as conversing with Nicodemus, John tells us that he declared the absolute necessity of being *born again, born of the Spirit*; and that the reason which he gave for this was, that "whatever is born of the flesh is flesh," i. e. is carnal, while that "which is born of the Spirit is spirit," i. e. is spiritual. In John 8: 19, men are said "to love darkness rather than light, because their deeds are evil." Christ, in his last supplications, declares that his disciples are not of the world, that the world hates them, and also that the world has not known the Father, John 17: 14, 25. John when speaking of true Christians, says, that "they are of God, and that the whole world lieth in wickedness," 1 John 5: 19. How entirely these, and many more of the like declarations in John, accord with the views of other New Testament writers, is very plain. Paul says, that "all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." Rom. 3: 23. He declares, that the "carnal [i. e. fleshly, natural] mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to his law, nor indeed can be," Rom. 8: 7; and again, "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The same apostle says of the regenerate, that "they were once dead in trespasses and sins" Eph. 2: 1. He adds, moreover, that "by nature they were formerly the children of wrath, even as others," v. 3. Like John he describes the natural state of man as being *darkness*: "Ye were sometimes *darkness*, but now are ye light in the Lord," Eph. 5: 8.

Such then is the nature of the case before us. The *darkness*, which did not receive or comprehend the light, are the benighted and sinful men of all classes and all conditions, of all times and ages, who are not born of God (comp. v. 13), and who have not been endowed with a filial spirit, nor sustained the relation of spiritual children. The

special reference indeed of the text is, to those who preceded the coming of Christ; but the declarations made in it are applicable to other and subsequent periods, as is evident from vs. 10, 11.

Only one thing more needs remark. What is meant by *κατέλαβον*? This word sometimes means to *grasp hold of* suddenly, or in the way of assault. Hence some interpreters of ancient and modern times have given the meaning thus: 'The light shineth in the darkness with such power, that the darkness cannot overcome it.' But to *overcome* or *suppress* is never a meaning of *καταλαμβάνω*. To interpret *κατέλαβον* here in such a way as to preserve the shade of meaning in question, would be to make the sentence speak what is plainly incorrect; for how could it be said, that darkness has made no assault upon light, when these words are understood in a *moral* sense, which is their only true meaning here? We must resort of course to the tropical sense, viz. to *seize*, or *take hold of*, by the mind, i. e. to comprehend, as we express it, to *perceive* and *understand* the true nature or condition of a thing. So in Acts 4: 13. 10: 34. 25: 25. Eph. 3: 18. It is equivalent here to *ἔγνων* in v. 10, "The world *knew* him not;" and also to *παρέλαβον* in v. 11, "His own *received* him not." In our text, *οὐ κατέλαβον* expresses the idea that the darkness, i. e. benighted and sinful men, did not admit the light into their minds, so as to comprehend and appropriate it to their own benefit. It designates not a physiological inability to comprehend the truth, but a *moral* disinclination and inability, which, instead of excusing them, rendered them criminal.

Thus much respecting the nature of the Logos, and the manifestation of his attributes during the period which preceded the incarnation. The writer now brings to our view the formal and solemn preparation which was made for the entrance of the Logos into the world, by taking upon him the nature of man, and appearing among men for the sake of manifesting to them his light and his love. John, the Baptist, was the herald of his approach — "the messenger that was sent before his face."

V. 6. Ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννης.

There was a man sent from God, his name was John.

Chrysostom joins *ἔγένετο* with *ἀπεσταλμένος*, so that both — *ἀπεστάλη*. It is better to take it here as absolute — our English *there was*. So in Luke 1: 5, *ἔγένετο . . . ἱερεὺς τις*. In case we take it so, we have *ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ* as a qualification of *ἄνθρωπος*, which of course distinguishes the personage in question from common men.

—παρὰ θεοῦ, *from God*, as we translate it, hardly expresses the full and exact meaning of the phrase. In designating a *space-relation*, παρὰ means *from the nearness* of any thing or person, like the French *de chez* quelqu'un. Its secondary meaning is that of *causal* relation. *Sent by God* would give substantially the meaning, inasmuch as God was the efficient *cause* of his being sent. Our word *from* may imply this, but this is not its ordinary meaning. In respect to being *sent by God*, we should compare Mal. 3: 1 and 4: 4—6. John, the Baptist, was the Elijah of Malachi, see Matt. 11: 14. 17: 12.

Ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, the Dat., αὐτοῦ, is the usual one of appurtenance. The more common construction is ᾧ ὄνομα, Luke 1: 27. 2: 25. Still other forms of expression in such cases are employed, e. g. ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, or like ὀνόματι Ἰωάννης, Luke 1: 5.

V. 7. Οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσι δι' αὐτοῦ.

The same came for a witness, that he might bear witness respecting the Light, that through him all might believe.

The word ἦλθεν here means more than *simple coming*, in relation to arrival by passing from one place to another. It is very well expressed by the German *aufstreten*, i. e. to come forth or come out to public view, to make an entrance on the stage of action. It is to John's appearance in public, as the herald of the Messiah, to which the writer has respect.

Εἰς μαρτυρίαν, lit. *for testimony, for the purpose of witness-bearing*. I have rendered it (with our common version) *a witness*; thus substituting the concrete for the abstract, the person for his action. No serious error arises from this; and the old version has become so familiar, that it is hardly expedient to exchange it for *testimony*. The meaning is equivalent to μαρτυρεῖν, or to εἰς τὸ μαρτυρῆσαι. Such an idiom is very frequent in John, i. e. the abstract noun with εἰς is substituted for the Inf. mode.

Ἰνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός is epexegetical of the preceding clause, the latter clause defining the object respecting which testimony was to be given. The word ἦλθεν is to be mentally repeated before this clause. Μαρτυρήσῃ denotes not merely the giving of public and solemn testimony, but the bearing witness to that which one knows to be true, or which he firmly believes to be true, in consequence of his own observation and experience; comp. v. 33 below.

Ἰνα πάντες πιστεύσωσι δι' αὐτοῦ. Here ἵνα, *so that, in order that*, is connected with the preceding clause, in order to indicate the purpose for which the testimony was given. The word πιστεύσωσι is left

without a complement to designate what is to be believed. But the reader spontaneously supplies it, viz. εἰς τὸ φῶς, i. e. believe *on* or *in that Light* concerning which John had testified. — Δι' αὐτοῦ means *through John*. The sentiment of the verse is, that John bore testimony respecting the Messiah, in order that through his annunciation men might be led to give heed to him and to believe on him.

V. 8. Οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ' ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ περὶ τοῦ φωτός.

He was not the Light, but — that he might bear witness respecting the Light.

The construction of the last clause here is elliptical. Before ἵνα we must supply either ἦλθεν from the preceding verse, or ἦν from the preceding clause in v. 8. Constructions of the like kind are not unfrequent in John.

But what is the object of the verse? When the writer had said, that John came to bear testimony respecting him who was the Light of the world, is it not sufficiently evident, that John himself was not the Light concerning which he was to give testimony? So it would seem to an ordinary reader. I cannot but believe, therefore, that the apostle, in repeating as it were the idea in v. 7, must have had in view such persons as held John himself to be the Light in question. That such a party existed, seems to be intimated in Matt. xi., where it is related, that John sent some of his disciples to inquire of Jesus, whether he were the ὁ ἐρχόμενος, i. e. the Messiah that was to come. I do not understand this narrative as intimating that John himself doubted, but that some of his disciples were in a doubting state, and that he sent them on a mission which would solve their doubts. In Acts 19: 1—5, we find a society of men described, who were organized under the *baptism of John*. And down to the present day, the *Sabians* or *Mendaites* of the East form a separate and somewhat numerous sect, professing to be the disciples of John the Baptist. Their history we know but little about; but that our text was aimed at an opinion like theirs, seems to be not at all improbable. Viewed in this light, v. 8 acquires a special significancy, like the repetitions in vs. 2, 3 above. The next verse gives still more emphasis to the one now before us.

V. 9. Ἦν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

The true Light, which enlighteneth every man, came into the world.

The *true Light* distinguishes the φῶς in question, respecting which John testified, from all false and all imperfect lights. John himself was a light, John 5: 35; but not one in the preëminent sense here meant. John did not enlighten *every man* or *all men*. Christ only

was the *Light of the world*. His life-giving power was a *light-giving* power; and it was therefore very different from anything that could be predicated of John, or of any other man. John often employs *ἀληθινός* in the sense of *genuine*; see 4: 23. 6: 32. 15: 1. But something more than simply this is meant by *ἀληθινόν* in the passage before us. A *preëminence* is designated; a *luminary* that scatters its beams over all the benighted earth, is designated as pure, clear, and an unfailing source of radiance.

In respect to the *enlightening of all men*, the reader may be referred to what has already been said under v. 5 above. It is not to be understood, that φωτίζει designates the effect of φῶς, namely, *the being enlightened*, i. e. it does not express the idea here, that men actually receive and cherish the light proffered. We have seen, under v. 5, that the *shining of the light* designates its own action, and not the reception which men give it. It is the same here. The light is proffered to all; in a certain sense it actually comes to all; but the darkness does not comprehend it. The *present* tense of φωτίζει here, indicates what is constant and habitual, like ὁ ἥλιος φαίνει. The light that came into the world, was designed for all the world; and hence the repeated declarations of Jesus, that he is *the Light of the world*.

In my translation above, I have joined ἦν with ἐρχόμενον, as a helping verb united to a participle, and thus (in accordance with a somewhat frequent usage in Greek) an equivalent for a definite verb in some of the praeterite tenses. In this case, we are to construe τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν as the Nom. to the verb. If the reader doubts whether the helping verb and the participle can be separated, in such cases, let him consult Mark 2: 18. 10: 32. 5: 11 (a striking example of more interposed matter than in the case before us, yet quite a clear one), 1: 4. 2: 6. Luke 2: 8. 24: 53. John 1: 28, al. That ἦν . . . ἐρχόμενον here designates the relative Imperf. (and not the Aor. as Lücke holds), seems plain from the consideration, that what the verse designated took place in the past, while John was giving his testimony. See an example of the same nature in Luke 24: 32. The course of thought I understand to be this: From the general action of the Logos as the light of men, before his incarnation (v. 5), the writer proceeds to the appearance of the Messiah on the stage of human action. John prepares the way by antecedent proclamation of his approach. While John was doing this, Jesus *came into the world*. The meaning is not, of course, that he was *born* during this period; but that he made his entrance upon the stage of action, (like ἦλθεν in v. 7). That v. 9 has no connecting particle of transition, by which its relation to v. 8 might be pointed out, results from the aphoristic style of John, and is, as has

already been remarked, an idiom that is frequent in this writer; see vs. 3, 4, 6, above.

The common method, in ancient and even in modern times, has been to join *ἐρχόμενον* with *ἄνθρωπον*, and to interpret *coming into the world* as = *being born*. In this case, the verse merely affirms, that Christ was the true light and the universal one. As I have construed it, it designates not only these ideas, but makes also an affirmation, that Christ entered upon his official course of action during the time when John was proclaiming his approach. As to the making of *ἐρχόμενον* κ. τ. λ. an appendage to *ἄνθρωπον*, it seems to have originated from the Rabbinical usage of the phrase *כָּל בָּרָא עָלָא*, lit. *all world-enterers*, equivalent to *all men*. In the case before us, however, the phraseology is different. We have in our text the word *ἄνθρωπον*, which is wanting in the Hebrew phrase. An exact Greek imitation of the Hebrew would be, *πάντα ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον*. To justify the junction of *ἄνθρωπον* with *ἐρχόμενον* appeal is made also to John 18: 37, where Jesus says: "For this was I born, and for this *I have come into the world*." But even here the latter clause is not a mere synonymous parallelism of the former, but a definite expression by itself which designates Christ's appearance in the world of action. If any doubt remains as to this interpretation, the reader may remove it, by comparing John 3: 19. 6: 14. 9: 39. 11: 27. 12: 46. 16: 28. In all these cases, entrance on the stage of public action is designated, and not birth. The *usus loquendi*, then, is wanting, to justify the application of *ἐρχόμενον* κ. τ. λ. to *ἄνθρωπον*. In 16: 21, *εἰς τὸν κόσμον* is applied to men in common; but here it is preceded by *ἐγεννήθη*, which entirely changes the complexion of the case.

But besides all this, what significant addition is made to the sentiment, in case we join *coming into the world* with *every man*? Does the writer design to tell us, that men, in order to be men and to have light shine upon them, must be born into the world? This, although true, would hardly claim to be a truth weighty and apposite enough to demand insertion in this prologue. At most it would be an unprogressive and quite unimportant element of the verse, if indeed we must view the verse in this light. Or if any one says that it cannot mean what has just now been suggested, then what does it mean? These considerations and questions may well lead us to doubt, whether the common method of translating and interpreting this verse is correct.

On the other hand, when translated as above, it makes progress in the narrative. In v. 7 we are told that John *ἦλθεν*, *came*, in order to bear testimony. Here we are assured, that he who was proclaimed by this testimony did actually come, and enter upon the stage of public

action. He came, who enlightens all men, or who is the light of the world. The beginning of v. 10 renders this meaning nearly certain, viz. "He was in the world," etc. All is natural, when interpreted in this way. First his coming is announced; then his continuance or abiding in the world is declared, and lastly the treatment which he received is described. The world in general rejected him; even his own peculiar family and people did not receive him, with the exception of those who were born of God.

There is then, in case we refer *ἐρχόμενον* to *φῶς*, no need of giving it a *future* sense. As a name of Christ (*ὁ ἐρχόμενος*), it always means *he who is to come*. But it must have the article, in order to distinguish this personage from other comers. If *φῶς* be (as it is) a symbol of the Messiah, and *ἐρχόμενον* κ. τ. λ. be only an attributive addition to it, or explication, then the article would be quite necessary; and with this the meaning would be, 'that light which was expected or promised to come.' But there is nothing in the context, which leads us to suppose, that the *promises* respecting the Messiah are here the particular subject of contemplation or discussion. We must conclude, therefore, that *ἐρχόμενον* constitutes a part of the compound verb, which is made by a union of the participle with *ἦν*; and that the Imperf. tense, thus designated, retains its proper significancy, i. e. the designation of action that took place, while other action was going on. It is in this way, and in this only, that all the demands of grammar and of continuous narrative can be answered. In that which satisfies both these, we may safely acquiesce.

V. 10. Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, καὶ ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω.

He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and yet the world knew him not.

Most interpreters, and among them even Lücke and De Wette, represent *ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* as meaning simply: 'He made his appearance in the world.' Yet Lücke acknowledges that *κόσμος*, both here and in the third clause, means *the world of men*. If so, then *ἐν* means *among*; a meaning which it conveys in cases too numerous to need confirmation here, as the Lexicon will show. *He was among men* seems, then, to be the sentiment of the clause. I have retained the common version, because *among the world* sounds as unusual to our ears. Understanding this clause in the way just proposed, we have an advance upon the preceding verse. That designates the general fact of Christ's entrance on the stage of action. This goes on to show more specially in what sphere he acted. That *world*, in the clause *the world knew*

him not, means the mass of sinful men, there can be no room to doubt. That *world* has the same meaning here, in the first clause, seems altogether probable; for in this case there is an advance in the writer's assertions, and there is a good reason assigned for the criminality (which is implied) of the men who did not acknowledge him. He was conversant with them, was among them, so that they might have known him and acknowledged him.

That this verse has no particle connecting it with the preceding, is to be attributed to the Hebraizing and aphoristic style of John, as has been above remarked.

The world was made by him is a virtual repetition of v. 3, and *κόσμος* here means the same as *πάντα* there. The reason for adopting this extended sense of the word *κόσμος* here, may be found in the wider extent which it gives to the idea, that men were bound to receive the Messiah. He was not only the Creator of men, but of the world and all which it contains. If the reader has any difficulty about the employing of the same word in different senses, when in such close connection, let him compare such phrases as "Let the dead bury their dead," and many others of a similar tenor. In all such instances, the nature of the case and of the context indicates the true meaning. So here; a comparison with v. 3, gives us the meaning of the clause before us.

In the use of *δι' αὐτοῦ* and of *αὐτόν* in the next clause, where the Logos is referred to by the *masculine* pronoun, may be found a reason for the translation of *ἦν* by *HE was*, instead of *IT was*. The latter would refer to *φῶς*.

No time need be spent on the exegesis, which makes *world* in this clause mean *the moral reformed world* of Christians. In what sense can it be true, that this world *did not know Christ*? And above all we may urge this consideration, since it is the distinguishing trait of Christians, that they "know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent," John 17: 3.

And yet the world knew him not. Here I have ventured to translate *καί* by *and yet*. That the sense is *adversative*, or at least that the last clause has such a relation to the preceding one, is plain, as nearly all acknowledge. If indeed we were to clothe the sentiment of the verse altogether in an English costume, we should construct it thus: He was among the world of mankind, and although the world was made by him, yet the world knew him not. John in fact omits *although* and *yet*, because he writes in his simple, Hebraic, aphoristic way. We may imitate his manner; yet our usual idiom would seem to demand the particles, that indicate the relations of the different parts of the

verse. In supplying these particles, we do not change the meaning of John; we merely clothe the whole in our own costume.

Οὐκ ἔγνω, know not. It is not a mere knowledge of the intellect which is here spoken of. The word *ἔγνω* is used after the manner of the Hebrew *יָדַע*, i. e. *to know and approve of*; much like our word *acknowledge*. This meaning is not unfrequent in the New Testament; see John 10: 14. 15: 29. 2 Tim. 2: 19, and also Hebrew examples in the lexicon. The meaning is, that the world did not take knowledge of Christ in his proper character, so as duly to receive him and regard him.

V. 11. *Εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθε, καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον.*

He came to his own, and his own received him not.

He came to his own, in Greek *εἰς τὰ ἴδια*, neuter plural. Many interpreters, and even Kuinoel and Tholuck, refer this to *the earth*, because the earth is the Lord's; and then they make *ἴδιοι*, in the next clause, to designate *mankind*. But so interpreted, this verse would be nearly a downright tautology. Verse 10 has already asserted the same thing. Why repeat it again here? Verse 3 also implies the like idea. Instead of this, it seems to me that we here have plainly a *progress* in the course of thought. Verse 5 exhibits the action of the Logos before his incarnation. Verses 6—9 present the forerunner of Christ in his real character, as distinguished from the true light of the world. Verse 10 announces the appearance of the Messiah among men, in general terms. Verse 11 particularizes a part of what is comprehended under this general idea; a method of writing which is very common with John, and not unusual elsewhere. The particular in question is, that the Messiah came to his own peculiar heritage or home, and that the members of his own household refused to receive him. In such a sense, very plainly, does John employ *ἴδια* in his Gospel; see 16: 32 and 19: 27, where it designates the private home of an individual. In the same way have the Sept. (Esth. 5: 10) translated the Hebrew *בֵּיתוֹ* בֵּיתָא, lit. *to his house*. Of course, from the nature of the case before us, the word *home* is used in the more extensive sense. As the land of Judea was the dwelling place of God's peculiar people, who were selected from all the nations of the earth as the family with whom he would in a special manner dwell; and moreover, since his temple was in the midst of them, and his presence there (in a certain sense) visibly manifested in the glory over the mercy seat; John might well speak of Judea as the *home* of the Logos, who, according to this Apostle's views (v. 5) made such manifestations. In its appropriate sense, *ἴδια* means *all which belongs to any one as properly his own*. The plural

number and neuter gender indicates a generic and comprehensive sense, and this is appropriate to the meaning required. The verb ἦλθεν here, as in v. 7, signifies making a public appearance, coming upon the stage of action.

Οἱ ἱδίοι, *his own* [family], viz. those who dwelt in the *house*, the Jews. In other words, the Jews in general, or as a people, rejected him. — Οὐ παρέλαβον *did not receive*; differing in shade from οὐ κατέλαβον (v. 5), but substantially the same in sense. It is usually stronger than ἔλαβον, by reason of the prefix preposition. Yet here it seems equivalent to ἔλαβον in the next verse. In English, we might give nearly the shade of it, if taken in its augmented sense, by translating, *did not heartily receive*.

It appears then, that while the writer descends in his course of thought from generals to particulars, his meaning becomes more intense. In v. 5 we have a view of the treatment of the Logos, in respect to his influences, before his appearance on earth. In v. 11 is a general statement of his reception, after his coming in the flesh. But the consummation of wickedness in those who reject him, is made apparent by the treatment which he received from the *Jews*, among whom and of whom he was born and educated, and with whom the whole period of his ministry was spent. One needs but to compare the sentiment of John 15: 22 with the verse before us, in order to see what design the apostle had in view, by thus particularizing the case of the Jews in v. 11. There Jesus says: "If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin; but now, they have no cloak for their sin."

The declaration that *his own received him not* seems, at first view, to be a universal one. And so indeed it must be deemed to be, did not the context come to our aid in the interpretation of it. Vs. 12, 13 disclose to us, that a portion of the Jews *did receive* the Messiah, and believe on his name. The language in which this declaration is couched, is that which belongs to the New Testament dispensation, and not to that of the Old. From the manner in which v. 12 is connected with v. 11 (by δέ), it becomes plain, that v. 11 is to be regarded as pertaining to the new dispensation, and not to ancient times, as many have interpreted it.

V. 12. Ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ.

But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the children of God, [even] to them who believed on his name.

By ἐξουσίαν in this case is not meant *privilege* or *dignity*, as some maintain, but an ability external and internal of sustaining a filial re-

lation. By the interposition of Christ, the anger of God against sin is appeased, the curse of the law is removed, and the fact that the *τέκνα θεοῦ* have once been sinners, no longer debars them from claiming the relation of children. Then, moreover, a new spiritual life is given to them, through him who has a life-giving power (v. 4); new light is imparted to them by him who has a light-giving power (ib.); and they have the spirit of filiation (*υἱοθεσίας*) bestowed upon them, comp. Rom. 8: 15. For all these reasons, they may claim to be the children of God, and may approach him, saying: "Abba! Father!" (ib.) Hence we may say, that *ἔξουσίαν* implies an *external and internal ability*; the external hinderances are all removed, and the internal temper of the mind has become filial and obedient.

Γενέσθαι is rendered *to become*, and rightly so here, for in passing from a state of enmity to God to that of loving him, from darkness unto light, they *become* what they were not before. Lücke refers *γενέσθαι*, however, to the *gradual* transformation of Christians into conformity with Christ. I must doubt of this shade of meaning here. *Believing on his name* and *being born of God* constitute them *sons*; and these are both predicated of them in this place. As *children* they may be more or less dutiful; but there is no point where *filiation* begins, except the one described in v. 13. The writer is not treating of gradual sanctification, but of the commencement of it, and the power or ability which is conferred upon believers from that period. I say *conferred on them*, for *ἔξουσίαν* implies this. A native power or faculty would be designated by *δύναμις*.

What is meant by *receiving* (*ἔλαβον*), he next proceeds specifically to designate. It implies two things of essential importance; (1) That the sons of God *believe* on the Messiah, or (as it is here expressed) *on his name*. (2) That, in order to become such children of God as receive the Messiah, they must be *born again*, that is, be the subjects of a new and spiritual birth, here expressed by *born of God*. In the clause before us, viz. *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ*, which brings to our view the first of these two things, what is the meaning of *his name*? Does it differ from *believing on him*? And if so, how?

We must go back to the Hebrew idiom in order to get a satisfactory view of the expression before us. In cases too numerous to mention, *name* is employed to designate God himself, or rather, that Being who has the exclusive and incommunicable name, or who is what that awful name imports. So "the *name* of the God of Jacob defend thee! The name of the Lord is a strong tower. To praise — bless — exalt — honor — love — speak of — extol — spread abroad — the *name* of God," are phrases that often occur. "His name is glorious — holy — reverend

—enduring forever—excellent,” and the like. *Name* thus employed, has reference, as it seems to me, in all cases to *ὄνομα*, that most sacred and significant of all names, and being thus employed it becomes intensive in its meaning. When applied to *Christ*, as in the case before us, it retains a like significance. John frequently employs it in this way; e. g. 2: 23. 3: 18. 1 John 5: 13. 3: 23, al. It often occurs throughout most of the N. Test., in connection with some of the appellations of the Messiah; as ‘the name of Christ, the name of Jesus, the name of Jesus Christ, the name of the Lord Jesus,’ etc. In our text, to *believe on his name* indicates the idea of *receiving Christ with a confiding and affectionate temper of mind, and heartily acknowledging him to be all which his name imports*, viz. the Lord’s Anointed and the Saviour of sinners. It is a stronger mode of expression, than the simple *πιστεύειν εἰς τὸν Χριστόν*. That at least this would appear to a Hebrew to be so, seems to be plain from the manner in which *name* is employed in the Old Testament. The great mass of mere English readers cannot well understand the true and full import of this idiomatic Hebraistic phraseology.

That *believing* (*πιστεύουσιν*) is something more than a mere *intellectual* conviction that Jesus is the Christ, is quite plain. “He that *believeth* shall be saved; and he that *believeth not* shall be damned.” Intellectual conviction or belief may exist, where the affections of the heart are not regulated by it, and where, of course, the subject of it is not prepared to be saved. To be acknowledged as a *child* of God implies, from the very nature of the case, love, confidence, and obedience, in respect to him “whose name is the only one under heaven, given among men, whereby we can be saved.” If we truly believe on the name of Christ, we must believe that he is the only and all-sufficient Saviour of sinners. We must come to him as such, feeling our need of him. We must look to him as “the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world,” John 1: 29. We must believe that “his blood cleanseth from all sin;” that he is “the propitiation for our sins;” that “he hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, by being made a curse for us;” that “he himself, in his own body, bore our sins upon the tree;” that “we are redeemed by the precious blood of Christ;” that “he was offered to bear the sins of many;” that “his blood purifies the conscience from dead works;” that “he gave his life as a ransom for many;” that “he was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities;” that “by his stripes we are healed;” that when “he was made an offering for sin, the Lord laid on him the iniquity of us all;” and that by such offering, “he has procured eternal redemption for us.” It is in this way, and in this only, that we can

believe in all that his name imports, and with affectionate confidence receive him. We must go to him with the spirit of that apostle, who, in reference to his preaching the Gospel to the Corinthians, says: "I determined to know nothing among you, save Jesus Christ and *him crucified*," 1 Cor. 2: 2; and who, when addressing the Galatians, from his inmost soul exclaimed: "God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of Christ!" The sequel of John's Gospel, and his Epistles and Apocalypse, abundantly illustrate and confirm all this. In heaven the redeemed sing: "Thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God *by thy blood*!"

V. 13. Οἱ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός, ἀλλ' ἐκ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.

Who are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man; but of God.

The second particular above mentioned, viz. *spiritual birth*, is here brought to view, and described, first by *negatives* declaring what the birth in question is not; and then by the *positive* declaration, that this same birth is of divine origin. It was common among the heathen to ascribe the generation of distinguished men to some of the gods. But still there was nothing *spiritual* in this, but all took place, in their view, *more humano*. It is not probable, however, that John had them directly in his mind, in writing the verse before us. The Jews of his day had a rooted belief, that because they were descended from Abraham, they were the children of God in such a sense as to be entitled to the benefit of all the promises made to the father of the faithful. Both John the Baptist and Christ bring this false notion into view, and condemn it; see Matt. 3: 9. John 8. 33, 41, and comp. Rom. 2: 28, 29. Gal. 3: 8—14, 29. The apostle means to deny that such an opinion as the Jews held, viz. that natural descent from Abraham constituted them the children of God, had any foundation in truth. The sum of the negative part of the verse before us is, that no filiation of mere natural and human origin could constitute the relation of which he speaks, or entitle them to its privileges. All this lies on the face of the verse. The explanation of its particular and peculiar phraseology, however, is a task of a difficult nature, and one that has hardly been performed, as yet, to the entire satisfaction of critical inquirers.

Not of blood, in Greek οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, lit. *not of bloods*, which however our idiom will not well bear. But why the *plural*? Probably, it is said, because both parents are referred to as contributing to the conception of an infant. It is plain that the *blood* was considered by the Hebrews as the essential principle of natural life; "Thou shalt

not eat flesh with the life thereof, which is the *blood* thereof, Gen. 9: 4. The same in Lev. 17: 14. Deut. 12: 23. In Acts 17: 26 Paul declares, that God "bath made of *one blood* all nations of men." In other words, the material, whence springs the living principle of animal life, is the same in all, and this is *blood*. Lücke adduces a passage from Euripides (Ion. 605), which exhibits the like view among the Greeks: ὁ παῖς . . . ἄλλων τροφῆς ἀπ' αἱμάτων, *a child . . . nourished from different bloods*. But in the Wisdom of Solomon, there is a passage more to our purpose, still, which I have not seen adduced. The writer is speaking of his own formation in the womb, and says: παρῆς ἐν αἵματι ἐκ σπέρματος ἀνδρός, i. e. *formed by blood of the seed of man*. All this shows what the Heb. idiom was, in relation to the seminal or formative vital principle. As both parents were regarded as contributors, so the plural (in our text) may have sprung from this. Or it may be, that in speaking of the Jewish world *en masse*, the apostle may have employed the plural in relation to the multitude of parents. If John's view of the case was like that in the book of Wisdom, where only the male parent seems to be regarded, then this latter solution of the *plural* is the more probable one. Or the plural *bloods*, may perhaps have relation to a series of successive ancestors. In either case, the meaning is substantially the same.

But what of the two particulars which follow? Are they mere subdivisions under the general idea of οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, i. e. *subordinate* to it, or are they *coördinate*, designating different things although connected, each of which may stand by the side of the first clause, and be of the like rank, while at the same time they help to explain and to limit it? In pursuing this inquiry, the use of the *particles* must be consulted. John here employs οὐκ . . . οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ, . . . and not οὐκ . . . οὔτε . . . οὔτε. Now δέ, even in composition (as here), still retains its meaning of *separation* or *diversity*; while τε in such cases also retains its usual meaning, viz. that of *connection*. The first case is strikingly illustrated by Matt. 6: 26. 12: 19; the latter, by Matt. 12: 32. 6: 20. Acts 24: 12. 25: 8, specially in Rom. 8: 38 seq. Particulars under a genus take οὔτε . . . οὔτε; particulars standing each by itself take οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ. See Win. Gramm. § 59. 6. Of course we must consider the second and third clauses here (which have οὐδέ), as standing in a measure by themselves, although connected in sense with the first clause, and serving the purpose of unfolding or defining the general idea, viz. birth, physical or natural, in opposition to, or in distinction from, a spiritual birth.

The succession of particles, then, in the present case, bids us to reject that exegesis, which makes ἐξ αἱμάτων generic, and the other

two clauses to designate species under this, i. e. parts which comprise or constitute the genus. That interpretation which refers ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς to the female, and ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός to the male, as specific and constituent agents in the act of generation, must on this ground be rejected. But not merely on this ground; for that σὰρξ anywhere designates *woman*, in reference to her sex, cannot be shown. The word *flesh* often means (like to the generic word *man*) frail, physical human beings, and so comprehends woman. But as a distinctive appellation of the female sex, it nowhere occurs. Equally remote from any philological probability is the distinction, which has sometimes been made, between θέλημα in the first case and the second, by supposing the first to mean unconscious sexual desire, and the second that which is conscious. What *unconscious* desire means, it would be difficult to say. At any rate, the distinction has no foundation in the language here.

I have sometimes been inclined to believe, that the passage refers to the *three* modes of filiation among the Jews, viz. by lawful marriage, by concubinage, and by adoption. All three were common. Then, moreover, οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ may retain its ordinary meaning, for here would be three separate and coördinate particulars. But this would make θέλημα, in the last case, so different in sense from that in the preceding case, and so unlike to it, that probability seems to be against this solution, although the sense which this mode of interpreting would give, would be altogether apposite. The whole, thus regarded, would be as much as to say: No human method of filiation can constitute any one a child of God.

What then, if we lay this aside, is the meaning of the second and third clauses? That θέλημα may mean the same as ἐπιθυμία, i. e. sexual desire, seems to be certain here, from the nature of the case and from the connection. Elsewhere in the N. Test., in such a sense, I take it θέλημα cannot be found. But supposing it to mean *sexual will* or *desire*, then how are the two clauses to be distinguished? The answer to this question is not easy. In the first case, *will of the flesh* is, according to the Heb. idiom, a generic expression designating *sexual desire*; comp. Eph. 2: 3. What is here designated, differs from what is expressed by ἐξ αἱμάτων, and refers to the *agent* in the γέννησις, and not to the material source of the embryo. I have called this phrase an idiom of the Hebrews, as plainly it is, in both the O. Test. and the New. The Greeks did not express the idea in question by the employment of such phraseology. How then is the next phrase to be regarded? Does οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρός mean anything diverse from this? It seems plain, here, that ἀνδρός is not designed to dis-

tinguish the male from the female, but is to be taken in a sense in which it is contradistinguished from *θεός* which immediately follows; as in the Greek: *πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*. Like the Hebrew *אֵל*, it is generic. What else then can we make of it, than that it is a repetition in the proper Greek idiom of what was said, in the preceding clause, after the manner of the Hebrews? Nor is analogy wanting here. Thus Rom. 8: 15, *ἀββᾶ, ὁ πατήρ*! Many repetitions in the New Testament, at least many that are apparently repetitions, are made in this way, viz. by explaining in the Greek idiom what had already been said in the Hebrew one. The consideration that both Greeks and Hebrews are almost everywhere addressed in the N. Test., may easily serve to explain this. If this view, however, be not admitted in the present case, then I should, on the whole, prefer the solution last presented above, notwithstanding an apparent philological difficulty as to the diverse use of *ἐλεγμα*.

Were born . . . of God, ἐκ θεοῦ. That *ἐκ* often designates the *efficient cause*, is plain; see Rom. 9: 12. Gal. 5: 8. 1 Cor. 8: 6. Matt. 1: 18, 20, al. — *Ἐγεννήθησαν*, lit. *were begotten*; but as *born* agrees somewhat better with the first clause in the verse, I have retained it in the version above, inasmuch as the sense is not obscured by it. De Wette says, that this last clause “is *tautologous*, because it is impossible to define that which is divine.” If *tautologous*, it must be because *τέκνα θεοῦ*, in the preceding verse, had already expressed the same idea. Here, however, contrast between what is divine and human moved the writer to repeat that idea, by the words *ἐκ θεοῦ*. If these were omitted, it would detract much from the strength of the verse. But that it is *tautologous* “because it is impossible to define what is divine,” is a ground or reason which I do not understand, and which at least seems to me unmeaning and inapposite.

But what is the meaning of being *born of God*, or *being begotten of God*? All that is fleshy, physical, or carnal is out of question here. It is so from the nature of the agent concerned, and from the contrast with natural birth. Whatever is designated by the phrase must be of a *spiritual* or *moral nature*. Happily we are not left in the dark, on this great subject, notwithstanding the doubt and uncertainty of De Wette and many others. We will resort, first of all, to John himself for further explanation.

The most explicit and important disclosure, that is made in the writings of John, is that in the third chapter of his Gospel. Our Lord declares to Nicodemus, that “a man must be *born again*, in order to see the kingdom of God,” John 3: 3. In v. 5 this is explained by the declaration, that “a man must be born of water and of the spirit, in

order to enter into the kingdom of God." To *see* that kingdom (v. 3), and to *enter into* it (v. 5), are for substance one and the same thing, and both words designate the idea we should express, by saying *to become a partaker of that kingdom, or to enjoy its privileges and blessings*. Dismissing the clause in v. 5 which respects being *born of water*, it is plain that *to be born of the Spirit* is the same as *being born again*. Here we learn, moreover, that the Holy Spirit of God is the special divine agent in the new birth. That the change here insisted upon is altogether of a *spiritual* nature, and entirely distinct from all that is conferred upon men by natural birth, lies upon the very face of the whole conversation with Nicodemus. In all the Scriptures there is not a declaration so express, so significant, so intense and all-comprising, in regard to the corruption of the natural man and the necessity of his regeneration, as the Saviour uttered on this occasion. Nicodemus is told that he need not wonder when it is said, that the natural man must be born of the Spirit, in order to be admitted into Christ's spiritual kingdom. "That," says the Saviour, "which is born of the flesh, is flesh," i. e. is *carnal* or *carnality*; "and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit," i. e. is *spiritual* or *spirituality*. In other words, all that is produced by, or is the result of, natural birth, the entire natural man with all his powers and faculties, is still nothing more than a *carnal* man; and to be "carnally minded is death." The Saviour excepts none of the human race. All partake of the same vicious and depraved nature, for *that which is born of the flesh*, viz. whatever or all that is naturally born, *is flesh*. All are without his spiritual kingdom; and to enter it, they must pass through a great and most important change.

How deeply these declarations were engraved on the mind of John, is evident from the frequency with which he recurs to them in his first epistle. "Every one that doeth righteousness is born of him," i. e. of God, 1 John 2: 29. "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin," 3: 9. "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God," 5: 1. "Whoever is born of God overcometh the world," 5: 4. "Whosoever is born of God sinneth not," 5: 18. "Every one that loveth is born of God," 4: 7. Many other passages, with a different phraseology, have their basis in the idea here conveyed.

There is then, according to the view of John, a great spiritual change, which is essential to the future welfare and happiness of mankind—of all men without exception. Natural birth fits us for action in the world of nature only; a spiritual change must come over us, before we are fitted to be agents and to be happy in a spiritual world. I have said that this change is a *great* one. This might easily be illus-

trated and confirmed here; but as this topic will again come up in the sequel, I shall refrain from further remarks on it at present.

In consideration of the importance of the main subject before us, viz. regeneration, and inasmuch as I have reserved to myself the liberty of sometimes *theologizing*, let us, for a few moments, turn our attention to the modes in which other New Testament writers have presented this deeply interesting and important matter.

John almost alone has described the great change in question, by calling it *regeneration*, i. e. the being born again, or born of God. Two other apostles speak indeed of God as begetting his spiritual children; but both of them in connection with the instrumentality of his word or gospel. In James 1: 18 it is said: "He [God] hath begotten us by the word of truth." In 1 Pet. 1: 23, Christians are described as "begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible—by the word of the living and eternal God." All this harmonizes with the declarations of John; with the exception that an efficient instrumentality is indicated, which serves to distinguish the new birth from the natural one.

Paul has adopted quite a different phraseology, but not less expressive. By him the change in question is named a CREATION. "If any man be in Christ, he is a *new creature*," *καὶνὴ κτίσις*, lit. a *new creation*, 2 Cor. 5: 17. "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but a *new creation*," (*κτίσις*), Gal. 6: 15. "Created in Christ Jesus unto good works," Eph. 2: 10. "After God, *created* in righteousness and true holiness," Eph. 4: 24. Many other passages, more or less expressly, recognize the same idea, and have their basis in this mode of expression.

Again, Paul calls it a RESURRECTION, i. e. a communication of new spiritual life to those who were dead in sin. "You hath he *quickened*, who were dead in trespasses and sins," Eph. 2: 1. "When we were dead in sins, [God] hath *quickened* us together with Christ . . . and hath raised us up together," Eph. 2: 5, 6. "And you being dead in your sins . . . hath he *quickened* together with him," Col. 2: 13. "Reckon yourselves to be dead unto sin, but *alive* unto God through Jesus Christ," Rom. 6: 11.

I abstain purposely from any effort to adduce all the texts which are substantially of the same import. From those adduced, however, the subject is now fairly before us; and in respect to it as now presented, I must crave the liberty of making a few remarks.

(1) According to all the New Testament writers, (with whom however the Old Testament substantially agrees), *the change in question must be a very great one*. To be born, to be created, to be quickened,

i. e. made alive from the dead, are the three highest natural changes that occur, or can take place, in the present world. When this language, then, is transferred to the designation of a moral or spiritual change, it cannot reasonably be supposed to express less than a *very great change*. A mere reformation of the outward conduct, a mere persuasion that a virtuous life is our duty and would be our happiness, does not reach the point in question. Paul seems to have foreclosed all attempts to reduce and weaken the strength of such declarations as those before us. "That ye may know what is the *exceeding greatness* of his power towards us who believe, according to the working of his *mighty power* which he wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead, and set him on his own right hand," Eph. 1: 18—20. In substance this is repeated in Eph. 4: 16. Col. 1: 29, and elsewhere. Now if there be any propriety in the language chosen by John and his fellow-laborers, to designate the spiritual change which Christianity demands, that change must be a *great* one; and if Paul is in the right, in saying that this change is wrought by a *mighty power*, such as that exerted when Christ was raised from the dead, how can we escape the conclusion, that the change is *very great*?

(2) The change is *moral* or *spiritual*, not material or physical. So the contrast in which John places the new birth decides. So the nature of the case. If a new physical or physiological change takes place, then which of the three changes is it? Is it the *new birth*, or the *new creation*, or a *resurrection* from literal death? It is neither; for if we assume that either of these three is to be *literally* understood, we are altogether unable to tell which to choose; and either of them, so understood, would indicate something contrary to experience and to the tenor of the Scriptures. Paul has told us what the nature of the change is, by saying: "*Be renewed in the spirit of your mind*," Eph. 4: 23. And again: "*Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind*," Rom. 12: 2. The faculties of man are not substantially new modelled; no new faculty or power is created; but his mind is renewed, i. e. it is brought to a state in which it exercises new affections. It loves what God loves, and hates what God hates. Before this change it was *enmity* against God, now it is *love* and *obedience*.

(8) The author and efficient cause of regeneration is God, i. e. specially considered, the Spirit of God. So all the texts cited virtually declare. Whatever secondary causes or instrumentalities there may be, (and often and usually there are many), yet the *causa causans*, the source from which all these come is God; for the appointment and adaptation of them to certain ends is of him, and it is to him that we

are ultimately to ascribe the influence of divine truth, or of divine providences, yea, all the powers and faculties of man himself.

It would be out of place for me to enter into any controversial and protracted view of the subject last named, viz. the regenerating influences of the Spirit of God. I can only express, in the briefest manner, a few things in order to prevent my being misunderstood.

Does the Holy Spirit operate by giving special power to the word of his truth, or to the influence of his providential discipline? Or does he operate directly on the heart and mind, and thus prepare them to be duly impressed? Questions still and always disputed, and not likely to be fully settled to the satisfaction of all. From anxiously seeking after a specific answer to these and the like questions, it seems to me the Saviour has intentionally excluded us, by the declaration, that as we cannot tell whence the wind cometh, nor whither it goeth, although we hear the sound thereof, so we cannot describe the *modus in quo* of the new birth. Its effects are palpable and certain; but of the manner in which these are brought about in the soul of man, we can give no certain account. The fact of a spiritual change is certain and cognoscible; but *how* the mysterious and transforming power of the Spirit is exerted, none of the sacred writers have definitely told us.

At all events, however, experience and the nature of the case assure us, that the free agency of man is not infringed upon, in the production of such a change. He is as much a voluntary agent, in the exercise of his first holy affection, as he ever was in the commission of any sin. God makes his children *willing*, in the day of his power. It is God that worketh in them both to *will* and to *do*. But still, they are not mere passive recipients; they are active free agents. Nor is there anything in this position which is more incredible, than in the declaration, that "in God we live, and move, and have our being," while we are still free and accountable agents. Is it incredible, that he, who created the soul of man, and endowed it with all its powers and faculties, can move and mould it as he will, without destroying its freedom, or reducing it to such a state that it is merely a passive subject of impressions made by an irresistible omnipotence? Whatever the influences of the Holy Spirit are, they are not irresistible. "Ye do always *resist* the Holy Ghost," said Stephen to his murderers, "as your fathers did, so do ye," Acts 7: 51. And Paul says to Christians: "Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God," Eph. 4: 30; and again: "Quench not the Spirit," 1 Thess. 5: 19. The Spirit of God, then, may be *resisted*. Whether he can eventually be *overcome*, i. e. in other words, whether he is *vincible*, is another and very different question, and one which

those who believe in the doctrine of election must, I think, unitedly answer in the negative. When God works, who shall, in the end, defeat his design? When he makes *willing*, who can abide steadfast in his unwillingness?

My limits absolutely forbid me to say but one thing more; which however is of importance to my design. This is, that we cannot truly say of the natural man, that he has not powers and faculties which are sufficient, if he were properly disposed, to produce the change in question. Every such man has reason, a conscience, or moral sense of right and wrong, a power to feel obligation and the pressure of duty upon him; for without these he would not be an accountable being. Every such man is sinning by his delay to repent; which he would not be, if he had no powers or faculties adequate to perform the duty of repentance. To sum up all in a word; "God commands all men, everywhere, to repent," Acts 17: 30; God commands all men, moreover, "*to make to themselves a new heart and a new spirit*," lest they should die, Ezek. 18: 31. Now it is not compatible with any view that we can take of divine justice or compassion, to "command all men to repent, and to make to themselves a new heart and a new spirit," if they have no power, no faculty, no ability, adequate to do this. It is impossible to vindicate the dealings of God with men, if we give up the position, that they have powers and faculties to repent and make a new heart. And great as the work of God is, (as we have already seen above), in bringing men to a state of filial love and obedience, yet that power is not strictly speaking of a *miraculous* nature. If we say it is so, then we come at once to the position, that God has commanded all sinners to repent and make a new heart, on pain of everlasting death, while this work at the same time is nothing less than a miracle wrought only by omnipotence. In other words, we should maintain, that God has commanded sinners to do what his omnipotence only can do. How can we reconcile such a view of this subject, either with his justice or his mercy? Allowing, on the other hand, that sinners have power or ability to repent, then they are the proper subjects of command, and may be justly blamed for disobedience. The fact that *the carnal mind is enmity against God*, and enmity deeply rooted, is the reason why his interposition becomes absolutely necessary to bring about the new birth. It is the strength of that enmity, and its deeply rooted nature, which sufficiently account for it, that the *working of his mighty power* must supervene, in order that the enemies of God may become his friends and children. There may be a mighty *moral* or *spiritual* working, as well and as truly as a mighty exertion of *physiological* omnipotence; and it is to the first of these that the declarations

above quoted have respect, and not to the last. When God is said to have wrought in the regenerate, "according to the working of his mighty power, when Christ was raised from the dead," the meaning is not that the former act is the same in *kind* as the latter. The latter raised Christ from the death of his body; the former quickens those who are in a state of *moral* death, "dead in sins." The comparison, then, does not respect the *kind* of power displayed; it has respect only to the *greatness* or *degree* of power.

It is then quite clear, that whatever may be the powers and faculties of the natural man, whatever efficacy may be attributed to instrumentalities, however numerous these may be, and however well adapted, — it is clear that the Scriptures assert the necessity of divine interposition, in an extraordinary degree, when any one is born of God. It is equally clear, that all men without exception are by nature children of wrath and disobedience, that "whatever is born of the flesh is flesh," and that the enmity of the carnal mind is such, that God alone can be looked to as the adequate source of deliverance from such a state. With all this fully conceded and maintained, we must not deny the free agency of men, even in the change of heart itself; we must not regard them as destitute of powers and faculties to repent, nor in any way exempt them from accountability for impenitence. The great truth in respect to the whole matter of regeneration is, that the natural man needs a change of disposition or heart to fit him for the happiness of heaven. The nature of the case when viewed in the light where Christ has placed it in his colloquy with Nicodemus, the present state of man, the holiness and purity of heaven, unitedly compel reason and sound philosophy to acknowledge, as well as the Scriptures, that except a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God. No man can enjoy a happiness for which he is not fitted.

V. 14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας.

And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

Became flesh, i. e. assumed a *human nature*. We are not for a moment to suppose the meaning to be, that the essential nature itself of the Logos was changed into flesh, i. e. into a human nature, but that, as expressed above, a human nature was assumed in conjunction with his higher nature. We may adduce other declarations of Scripture respecting this, in the way of explanation and confirmation. Thus 1 John 4: 2, "Jesus Christ has come in the flesh;" 1 Tim. 3: 16, "He

was manifested in the flesh;" Rom. 1: 8, "Born of the seed of David, according to the flesh;" Phil. 2: 7, 8, "Born [or made] in the likeness of men, and found in fashion as man;" Heb. 2: 14, "He became partaker of flesh and blood." The meaning in all these passages is the same in substance. The idiom is purely Hebrew; for in cases almost numberless we find *flesh* (ִּשָּׁרָא) used in the Heb. Scriptures as an appellative of man. The adsignification of a frail and perishable body is doubtless coupled with this word, and is to be taken into the account. *Σῶμα*, *body*, would indicate something very different here from *σὰρξ*; for *σῶμα* means a corporeal organism, in which many parts are compacted into a unity of system. The simple idea is plainly, that the Logos appeared in human form, with human attributes, and a human personality. Unnumbered passages of the N. Test. speak of the incarnate Logos as having all the qualities of a perfect human, although sinless, nature.

How this incarnation was accomplished; whether it was by the mere indwelling of the higher nature with the man Jesus; or whether it was by some principle of union between the divine and human, utterly beyond our power of discovery or even comprehension; are questions that we cannot definitely answer, and need not attempt to answer, since the whole matter is beyond the present circle of human knowledge. "*Great is the mystery of godliness, God manifest in the flesh,*" remains enstamped upon the whole of this sacred and awful subject. We should not even attempt to lift up the veil which hangs before this most holy place, in the temple of divine truth, unless the sacred writers have led the way. Have they so done?

I know of but two or three passages, which wear the appearance of approach to any explanation of the matter before us. The first of these is in Col. 2: 9, "In him dwelleth the fulness of the Godhead *bodily*, *σωματικῶς*." This seems to import for substance nearly the same as our text, "became flesh," only that the mode of expression and shade of meaning varies. 'That the fulness of the Godhead dwells in the human, corporeal, physical body of Christ,' is the sentiment. The word *dwells* (*κατοικεῖ*), in the present tense, designates the permanent habitual dwelling of divine fulness in the man Jesus. The whole expression looks like a designed opposition to the Gnostic notion, that only an Aeon dwelt in the apparent (not real) body of Christ, and that this immanence was only from his baptism down to his crucifixion. Paul asserts that the fulness of Godhead dwelt habitually and permanently in a real and proper body. But *how*? Not a word in answer to this last question.

Again, in Phil. 2: 6, 7, Paul, after adverting to the fact that Christ

did not tenaciously retain his *τὸ εἶναι ἰσα θεῷ*, i. e. his equality with God, or (in other words) his glorious majesty and divine honors, goes on to say, that "*ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, lit. *he emptied himself*, taking the form of a servant," etc. I must regard the three particulars that follow *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, as showing the consequences of the *κένωσις*, or the way and manner in which it exhibited itself, and not as descriptive of the nature itself of the *κένωσις*. This, so far as any disclosure is made respecting it, can be discovered only by looking at the contrast between being in a state of equality with God, and being in that condition which was assumed as necessary to the incarnation. Christ did not tenaciously retain the first, but *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*, i. e. he divested himself of his divine honors and majesty, in order that he might become incarnate, and humble himself by becoming a servant, and being obedient even unto the death of the cross. But when we express his *κένωσις* by saying that he divested himself of divine honors and majesty, we of course cannot rationally mean, that he put off, or freed himself from, his proper, essential, divine, and immutable attributes; for such he must have possessed if he were equal with God. All we can suppose is, that the *manifestation* of his majesty and glory were suspended in their development or exhibition. So much the nature of the case seems to demand, and so much we may interpret the text as meaning. But *how*? This question again meets us, and meets us in a position of utter inability to answer it. But there is one text in John 17: 5, which may aid us in confirming the views here given. The Saviour there prays for the restoration, after his death and resurrection, of that "glory which he had with the Father before the world was," i. e. from eternity. This presupposes that he had laid aside, in some important sense, his original glory, during the period when he became flesh and dwelt among us. In his glorification, then near at hand, he was to receive again what he had for a time relinquished, when *ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσε*.

These are all the texts which seem to have any direct bearing on the subject before us. But these at most lift up only the border of the veil which covers the "great mystery." We must wait until we shall no longer see through a glass darkly, but face to face, for a full and satisfactory disclosure.

Καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, and *dwelt or tabernacled among us*. The word *ἐσκήνωσεν* appears to be designedly chosen, for the sake of special significance. In the *tabernacle* (*σκηνή*) God of old dwelt, *ἐσκήνωσεν*. Hence the later Heb. idiom employed the word *שָׁכַן* (from *שָׁכַן* to dwell) *Shechinah*, as significant of the *abiding divine glory* over the *mercy seat*, a symbol of God's presence among his people. But now,

"God was manifest in the flesh," "his fulness dwelt in Christ *σῶματι-
κῶς*," bodily, for the body of Jesus was the tabernacle of the Logos.
In this he appeared among men, and became, so to speak, the *Shechinah*
of the new dispensation. Viewed in this light, the language of John is
very expressive.

What follows, moreover, shows that there is good reason to suppose
his language to have the special reference and significance that has
been attributed to it. *And we beheld his glory, τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ.* The
Hebrews called the "light inaccessible" which surrounds Jehovah, his
קְבוֹד, i. e. *splendor, glory*. It was, with them, the symbol and emblem of
his awful majesty and excellence. What the Logos incarnate exhibited,
while he *tabernacled* among men, is, in allusion to this, called his *δόξα*,
i. e. his קְבוֹד. The glory of which John here speaks, is different, in
some important respects, from that glory which originally belonged to
him simply as Logos. Of this John 12: 41 says, that Isaiah beheld it, viz.
in the theophany described in Isa. vi. Again Christ speaks of it as
what "he possessed with the Father before the world was," John 17: 5.
But in John 2: 11, the working of a miracle, i. e. changing water to
wine, is ascribed to Christ as a manifestation of his *glory*; and in John
17: 22, Christ speaks of a glory *given* to him, which he also gave to
his disciples; and this glory was probably like that mentioned in the
preceding passage, viz. miraculous power. In 17: 24 there appears
to be a different shade of meaning or rather an enlarged sense of the
word *glory*, when viewed as belonging to the risen and glorified
Saviour. Christ prays that his disciples may be with him in the hea-
venly world, that they may behold the glory there, which the Father
will *give* him, viz. as the mediator, and give it to him in all the excel-
lency and plenitude of what belongs to that high character and office.
This glory is what belongs to Christ as "being highly exalted by God,
and having a name given to him above every name," Phil. 2: 9.
These texts may serve to give us the lead, in our exegesis of the
verse before us. The context goes to show that Christ, the incarnate
Logos, was "full of grace and truth." He was still "life-giving and
light-giving." And the manifestation of these attributes constituted the
glory which the disciples beheld, and of which Jesus speaks. It was
such as became the only begotten of the Father.

In the clause *δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός*, occurs an appella-
tion of Christ which is peculiar to John. He alone names him *only
begotten*. The full phrase is *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*; and so it occurs in v.
18 below, and also in 3: 16, 18. 1 John 4: 9. The original and
proper meaning of the word is *an only child, sole progeny*, (see Luke
7: 12. 8: 42. 9: 38), as its etymology indicates. Applied to the Logos

incarnate, (for it was *his* glory which the apostles saw), of course it cannot be taken in a literal sense, for this would imply a natural physical generation. The word cannot mean begotten in a *spiritual* sense, as believers (for example) are said to be begotten or regenerated. Lücke and De Wette understand it as contrasted with the *τέκνα θεοῦ* of v. 12. Ordinary men, they say, become children of God by believing on Christ, and obtaining *ἐξουσίαν* from him to be sons; but Christ has his filiation, in its highest sense and with all its privileges and pre-eminence, by nature, i. e. by the constitution of his being. It is in this sense that they believe he is the *only begotten*, i. e. because no others have a like filiation. With this exposition, however, I am not satisfied. I concede fully, that *only begotten* is not, as some have understood it, a mere appellation of endearment, like *ἀγαπητός*. Nor does it designate simply what is peculiar in its kind. This does not reach the deep meaning of the appellation. The true source of explanation, as I apprehend it, may be found in Luke 1: 35, "A holy spirit [not the Holy Spirit] shall come upon thee, and a power of the Most High shall overshadow thee, *therefore the holy progeny shall be called the Son of God.*" That *πνεῦμα ἁγίων* lacks the article, is sufficient indication here of the meaning I have given to it. Besides, if the Holy Ghost as the *third* person in the Trinity is supposed to produce this Son, in what special sense is the first person of the Godhead to be called *Father*? Here then we have an express reason given for the appellation *Son of God*. This is the basis. There are other reasons why Christ is called *Son*; but this lies at the foundation. And a birth, a filiation, thus produced, is without a parallel. Sarah bore her son Isaac, and Elizabeth bore her son John the Baptist, after the power of conception had ceased in the course of nature. They were supernaturally aided in their maternity; but all else was in the natural course of things. In the case before us (Luke 1: 35), no natural father intervenes. Divine influence, and that alone, causes the conception. No other conception was ever like it; and therefore "the holy Progeny is not only Son of God," but *the only begotten Son*.

I am aware that many have believed and maintained, that Christ is Son in his divine nature; and of course, that the Logos before the incarnation was Son. That he was the person in the Godhead whom we now designate Son, I am fully persuaded, and have already maintained. But of *eternal generation* I can form no definite conception. Be it that the *manner* of this is mysterious, and beyond our comprehension. I readily concede that it may be so, and if the thing is true it must be so. But this does not relieve the difficulty. *Generation imports at least derivation*. If not, then it has no assignable meaning.

Let it be as is affirmed, that it is *eternal*. The difficulty is not at all met. *Derivation*, whether commencing in time or not, implies of necessity *dependence*. Derivation stands opposed to *self-existence*. To say that the Logos is begotten, i. e. *derived* from the Father, in time or from eternity, is saying, if language has any definite meaning, that he is *dependent*, and is *not self-existent*. How then can he be God, as John asserts? Of all the attributes of proper Godhead, *independence* and *self-existence* are the most essential and the most conspicuous. They are indispensable to our idea of true divinity. If any being has not these attributes, and still is called *God*, he must be a *θεὸς δέυρετος*, and nothing more. The *pneumatology* of the present day puts us beyond the reach of supposing supreme and proper Godhead to exist, where there is neither self-existence nor independence.

Not so the Nicene Fathers. "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God," is their creed in respect to the Son. In other words, he is a God *derived*, and not self-existent. *Very God* they assert him to be, and so they meant to show that they believed in his true divinity. Doubtless they did believe it. But how difficult it was for them, surrounded by and mixed with the Greeks and Romans, to attain to the highest and most accurate pneumatic conceptions, must be evident. The heathen of the West in general believed in the boundless propagation of gods or an endless theogony. In the East, the *emanation-system* spread over a boundless extent of country. All the *Aeons* of the Gnostics were *emanations*, like to those of Zoroaster. Between the emanation-theosophy on the one hand, and the theogony of the western heathen on the other, there was no little difficulty in divesting one's self at the period of the Nicene Council, of tendencies toward a grosser system of pneumatology. *Spirit*, with most of the church fathers, was but sublimated transcendental matter. No wonder, then, that when the Nicene Creed was formed, it was not regarded by its authors as being inconsistent with true Godhead, that the Son was begotten or derived in his higher nature. Their Creed was in substance right; their pneumatic philosophy plainly inadmissible.

A very common defence of eternal generation has been made by an appeal to the natural sun. "*Light*," say its advocates, "proceeds from the sun. There has been no moment since the sun existed, when light did not exist. So of the Father and the Son." Such is the argument, or illustration; and that light is *coetaneous* with the sun, I would readily grant. But is it not *dependent* on the sun? Does it exist in, of, and by itself? These questions are sufficient to show, that nothing of this kind can remove the difficulty in question.

Let the reader note well, that John never calls the Logos Son, when

he speaks of him in his separate nature. It is only after he *becomes flesh*, that he is named *the only begotten*.

The main reason, probably, why so many distinguished men in the church have concurred in the doctrine of *eternal generation*, is grounded in the circumstance, that the *Son* is spoken of in Scripture as having created the worlds, Heb. 1: 2; and the like in regard to other things attributed to him, or (with variation of phraseology) to Jesus Christ, before the incarnation. But this mode of speaking when well examined, will hardly authorize us to maintain that the Logos is, in his essential nature, a derived being. Christ is sometimes called *Son* in the way of anticipative prediction, e. g. in Ps. ii. When he is called *Son* in the N. Test., while he is represented as the Creator of the world, it is because the appellation *Son* had then obtained all the force of a proper name, and as such designated the entire person in all stages of his being. In like manner we speak of what *Abraham* did, before he obtained this name (which was given when he was ninety-nine years old, Gen. 17: 1—5), and do not stop to distinguish between *Abram* and *Abraham*. In like manner, the most familiar name is preferred to other names, in our every day's conversation. We speak of what the *Emperor* of France did, long before he was emperor. And so in the case before us. *Son* is the incarnate Logos; and it is he who is the life and centre and soul of all that is called gospel. We easily and naturally extend the name *Son*, therefore, to him in all stages of his being and development. But this by no means shows, that John applied the epithet *only begotten* to his divine nature, as a word ontologically descriptive of it. A high and holy sense the appellation has, when viewed in the light which Luke 1: 35 casts upon it. I cannot satisfy my own mind with reasons for this appellation such as Lücke and De Wette have proffered. Nor can I possibly bring my mind to see, how the *language* of the Nicene Creed can be fairly reconciled with the position, that "Christ is the true God, the great God, and God over all." Such a Being cannot be *dependent*; he must be self-existent. That the Nicene fathers acknowledged the Son as true God in their own hearts and minds, I have already conceded. But in their spiritual metaphysics, is plainly discernible a spice of that *emanation-philosophy*, which from remote antiquity had overspread the East, and which still continues dominant there.

Δόξαν, without the article in the second instance, might be translated *a glory* without prejudice to the sense here. It is one of those cases in which the omission of the article is indifferent. It might be inserted, and would be normal. But it is not necessary. *Μορφοῦς* is also without the article. The very nature of the word, in its connection, is

so specific and definite, that it comes within the general principle which permits omission of the article, in cases where no obscurity can arise from the absence of it.

The *ὡς* before *μορφοειῶς* has made some difficulty for the critics. Clearly the clause does not mean, that the glory of the incarnate Logos was merely like that of the *Only Begotten*; for the glory of both was one and the same. Chrysostom seems to have expounded *ὡς* rightly; "A glory such as was becoming and proper to the Only Begotten." In this case, we refer the comparison implied by *ὡς* to the *ideal*, i. e. to the perfect model, of glory. In other words, the glory was such as properly belonged to the Only Begotten; and this could be only of the highest and purest kind. — *Παρά πατρός*, of the Father, says our English version — perhaps *ad sensum*, although this is not quite certain. *Παρά* means *with*, *from with*, and so is not unfrequently employed to designate the *original cause* or *author* of anything. If we translate *from the Father*, the shade of meaning would be somewhat diverse. In John 16: 27, 28, Christ says twice of himself, that "he came *out from God*," *παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ*. But this refers to his official mission into the world. In our text, the same turn might be given to the expression, since the incarnation of the Logos, or his coming in the flesh, is the topic of discourse. It is only by conjunction with *μορφοειῶς* that *παρά* seems to be here modified, so that it may express the relation between the Son and the Father. Thus viewed, the words of our version, *of the Father*, may be permitted to stand. As to the omission of the article before *πατρός*, see Win. Gramm. § 18. p. 189. It is one of those nouns (and so *μήτηρ*), which sometimes dispense with the article where it would normally be inserted.

Full of grace and truth. So our version, but hardly in accordance, perhaps, with the exact meaning here. *Grace* has come to mean *special favor*, and in religious matters *pardon*, or *the bestowment of the influences of the Holy Spirit*. The Greek *πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας* is plainly modelled after the Hebrew *רַחֵם וְאֱמֵן*, which means *kindness and faithfulness*. The word *kindness*, *χάρις*, designates the love and goodness displayed by the author of all the privileges and blessings of the gospel dispensation. The word *ἀλήθεια* is not to be restricted here to the Heb. *רַחֵם*, *faithfulness*, but to be extended to all the disclosures made by the gospel, respecting God and his will and also our duty. In other words, Christ was filled with that kindness or love which procures all spiritual blessings for man; and Christ was also *the Light of men* — the Light of the world — the source of all *saving truth*. That *πλήρης* refers to the Logos incarnate, is beyond a doubt. The clause, however, is constructed in John's aphoristic manner. There is

also an ellipsis of ἦν. If we were to fill out the construction, we should say: καὶ ἦν πλήρης κ. τ. λ.

The καὶ at the beginning of the verse is merely a *continuative* of the narration, being connected in sense with the preceding v. 9; like the ἵ continuative of the Hebrew. We might translate it *moreover*.

V. 15. Ἰωάννης μαρτυρεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ κέκραγε λέγων· οὗτος ἦν, ὃν εἶπον· ὁ ὀπίσω μου ἐρχόμενος ἔμπροσθέν μου γέγονεν, ὅτι πρῶτός μου ἦν.

John beareth witness concerning him and crieth, saying: He was the same of whom I said: He who cometh after me is before me, for he was before me.

But why this apparent interruption of the discourse, which is again resumed in the next verse? If the reader will turn back to vs. 5, 6, he will see the like. V. 5 represents the Logos as shedding light on the benighted world. John's testimony respecting him as the *Light of men* is then appealed to—apparently, in the way of confirming the statement of the Evangelist; really, not for this purpose only, but also as an *argumentum ad hominem* addressed to the disciples of John, and to all those Jews (and they were many), who admitted John to be “a burning and a shining light,” John 5: 35. Vs. 5—8, then, present a course of thought like the present. Here the evangelist has just said, that *the Logos became incarnate*, in order to display the fulness of his grace and truth, or (in other words) his lifegiving and light-giving attributes. This is a new and most extraordinary circumstance, one which, to a carnal mind, would appear the most mysterious and incredible of all the facts that are related. The writer, therefore, again appeals to the testimony of John, and for purposes of the same nature as before. In strictness of grammatical speaking, v. 15 is *parenthetic*.

This parenthesis, however, is introduced in John's usual *aphoristic* way; i. e. it has no particle designating either connection or dependence. The present tense, μαρτυρεῖ is an example of the *historic present*. The writer speaks, as though the events of the past were taking place before his eyes; a method of narration peculiarly frequent in John. The same is true of κέκραγε. It is indeed a Perfect in point of form, but it is one of those Perfects which are employed as the Present. Of these there is a considerable number; see my N. Test. Gramm. § 136. 3. c. Win. Gramm. § 41. n. 4. The earnestness of John's declaration is designated by employing the verb κέκραγε, *to cry out, openly to cry aloud*. — Ἀέγων is subjoined as introductory to the quotation of the words of the Baptist.

Οὗτος ἦν ὃν εἶπον I have translated, *he was the same of whom I said*. I take οὗτος to be the predicate after ἦν, in point of meaning; and ἦν

may either imply the pronoun *he*, or be used in a kind of absolute way and be translated *it was*. — *ὅν εἶπον* is not a usual construction in the N. Test., and the verb *εἶπον* is not properly transitive. According, however, to classic Greek usage, words of *speaking* may take the Acc. of the person spoken of, as well as of the things said concerning him in the way of praise or blame; Kühner Ausführ. Gramm. § 551. 2. The whole clause that follows *εἶπον*, is of course of the nature of an Acc. after this verb, although the verb is not properly transitive. In the Greek language, constructions of this kind are of a wide extent; as any one may see in Kühner on the Syntax of the Accusative. Or the Acc. of *ὅν* may be solved in another way, viz. as the Acc. of a thing or person *in respect to* whom anything is said or done.

The tenor of the verse shows, that the evangelist here introduces the Baptist as repeating, on some public and solemn occasion, the testimony which he had formerly given to Jesus. So *ὅν εἶπον of whom I spake*, naturally indicates. In the later testimony, the Baptist declares that what he had formerly said of Jesus, he still adheres to. To this implied *continuation* of the testimony, it is probable that the use of the Present tense in the first two verbs is in part to be attributed; for the Present often denotes continued or habitual action. We may also account without any difficulty for the Imperf. *ἦν*, instead of *ἴσεν* (as it is in v. 30); for the speaker is represented as describing occurrences in the past time, and also the person of Jesus as it then was.

He who cometh after me is before me. Both the words, *ὀπίσω* and *ἔμπροσθεν*, may refer to *place* or to *time*. I take them both to have reference here to *place*. Jesus came *after* the Baptist, indeed, as to *time*; but if we affix to *ὀπίσω* this sense, then we must regard *ἔμπροσθεν* as having relation to *time* also. I take the meaning of the passage to be founded on the usual fact, that the superior *precedes* as to place, and the inferior *follows*. Here, however, the reverse of what is common is declared to have happened. Although Jesus *followed* John, yet he was the *superior*. That *ἔμπροσθεν* has reference here to superiority of place or rank, there can be no good reason to doubt. The transition from *before* in a local sense to *before* in an official one or in point of rank, is easy and natural. So Sept., Gen. 48: 20, "He [Jacob] put Ephraim *ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ Μανασσῆ*, *before Manassah*," i. e. he gave him the first rank. If now (as some have done) we make *ὀπίσω* to refer merely to *time*, then it would be difficult to make out the antithesis here with *ἔμπροσθεν*. As I understand it, the sentiment is: 'My follower has become my leader.' Hence the word *γέγονε*, *has become*. It was after Jesus had entered on his public office, that John said this; and it was then, and not before, that he took the lead of

John. He had repaired to the baptism of John, among the multitude who flocked to Enon in order to become his disciples. He was baptized by John. The word *ἐπισὼ* is the common word, in the Gospels, to denote following after a master, as a disciple; see Lex. When the Baptist speaks then of Jesus as *coming after him*, he seems plainly to advert to his having come to him in the attitude of a disciple. But he who thus at first *came after him*, from the time when he was baptized and thus initiated into office, *became* John's master — *ἰσχυρότερός μου ἐστίς*, Matt. 3: 11. All is plain when viewed in this light. The verb *γέγρε*, *has become*, is also explained. Jesus, who *was a follower*, has now *become a leader*. In other words: He is now what he was not before, viz. the leader; and so *γέγρε* is employed. *Ὁ ἰρχόμενος*, lit. *he who cometh* is — *a comer*, at least so far so, that the adsignification of *time* is dropped.

For he was before me — *πρῶτός*, by Greek usage is often equivalent to *πρότερος*, and so we may translate *before me*. But is reference made to *time*, or *rank*? *Πρῶτος* may refer to either, and the sense will be good. In either way, the reason is given in this clause (to which *ὅτι* is prefixed), why the *disciple* has become the *leader* or *master*. If then the meaning be made out by reference to *rank*, it would stand thus: 'My disciple has become my master, *because he was aforetime of higher rank than myself*.' Observe that *ἦν* is here employed, viz. *he was* of this rank in time past. So *ἦν ὁ λόγος . . . θεὸς ἦν . . . ἦν τὸ φῶς*. De Wette thinks that John the Baptist did not know enough of Christ, to enable him to utter such a sentiment, and that the writer must have imparted to the alleged words of the Baptist somewhat of his own more extended views. But if the Baptist were a commissioned and inspired messenger and herald of the Messiah, and knew him to be "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world," is it probable that he did not know something of his *preëxistence*? — On the other hand; if we refer *πρῶτος* to *time*, the meaning is obvious, viz. he has preëminence now, because he existed before me; in other and familiar language: Seniority gives him the preference, or, as senior he is entitled to a higher place. I incline to this last mode of interpretation for two reasons; (1) Because the Evangelist elsewhere employs such a form as *πρῶτος μου*, i. e. *πρῶτος* with a Gen. after it, to designate *before* in point of time, John 15: 18, *πρῶτον ἐμῶν*, [the world hated me] *before you*. As to *πρῶτος* in the adverbial sense, viz. as signifying *first* in point of time, see John 1: 42. 5: 4. 8: 7. 19: 32. 20: 4. (2) The evangelist had already said in the preceding context, that the Logos *was* in the beginning — *was* God — *was* Life and Light; and by now employing *ἦν*, he means it shall refer to

the past period as there designated by ἦν. He was *πρῶτος*, i. e. existed *before* he became a follower of the Baptist; and from being a follower he became the leader or master, because *he was in the beginning*.

The form of speech here is what the rhetoricians call *ὀξύμωρον* (*oxymoron*), viz. one in which contrary things are so joined, that if literally taken they would be contradictory or absurd, but which have a pointed sententious significance, when apprehended according to their true meaning. This applies well to the case before us. The literal sense would be no sense. But when understood as explained above, the words of the Baptist must have appeared very significant to his hearers. The *oxymoron* is extended even to the *πρῶτος*, which is employed in contrast with *ὀπίσω*.

V. 16. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πληρώματος αὐτοῦ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν καὶ χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος.

And of his fulness have we all received, even grace for grace.

The substitution here of *ὅτι* for *καί*, at the beginning of the verse, which Lachmann, Griesbach, and several Codices have made, and which Lücke approves, is unnecessary. V. 16 connects, beyond all doubt, with v. 14 above. Many have supposed vs. 16—18 to be the words of the Baptist. But the case seems clear, that *ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐλάβομεν* x. τ. λ., viz. *we* [the disciples of Christ] *have received* etc., naturally, if not even necessarily, refers to the apostle and his fellow Christians. But the evangelist connects his own commentary (as it were) on vs. 14, 15, by employing *καί* (in v. 16.) in a *continuative* sense, equivalent to our *moreover*. The connection of sentiment seems to be thus: 'The glory of the Logos incarnate was seen by us, even his fulness of grace and truth; the Baptist bore witness to his exalted rank; *moreover*, [i. e. in addition to all this testimony], we have actually experienced his abundant goodness.' In this way all is plain.

The word *πληρώματος* is at once explained, by *πλήρης* x. τ. λ. in v. 14. — *We all have received* means, of course, all who are the *children of God* by being *born of God*, vs. 12, 13. John the Baptist cannot appropriately be supposed to have said this, because Christ had not exhibited his *glory* (v. 14) when he spake of him as related in v. 15. — *Grace for grace* is hardly intelligible, in a specific definite sense, to an English reader. Even the Greek *χάριν ἀντὶ χάριτος* was misunderstood by most of the Christian fathers, and has been by many in modern times. The substance of their exegesis is: "The New Testament for the Old." But the very next verses show, that the Old Testament is not put in competition here with the New, or placed by the

side of it. *Grace and truth* came by *Jesus Christ*, not by *Moses*. Of course the evangelist could not call the Old Testament χάρις, in a passage which ascribes χάρις to the Messiah. The true meaning of the phrase is somewhat obscure, perhaps, so far as mere idiom is concerned, for ἀντί usually means *in the room of, instead of*. But this meaning does not fit well here. This particle, however, in the later Greek writers, is sometimes used to denote an *unbroken succession* or *continuance* of a thing. Not exactly (as some paraphrase it) “*grace upon grace*,” but *one grace after another* in constant succession. So Chrysostom ἐπέφω ἀντ’ ἐπέφω φερουσίδα, De Sacerdot. 6. 13. So Theognis ἀντ’ ἀνιῶν ἀνίας, v. 344. It should be noted, also, that *grace* has here the same sense as in v. 14, i. e. *kindness, goodness*; such as bestows favours gratuitously and in abundance. The generic idea of the word rendered it unnecessary, in the view of the writer, to repeat the ἀληθείας of v. 14. Grace exhibited itself in the way of communicating *light* or *truth*, for this was an exercise of love or kindness. — The καί before this last clause is the so named καί *exegetical*, i. e. καί placed before a clause which is of an exegetical nature; a meaning of γ, in the Hebrew which is very common, and also of καί in the New Testament which is not uncommon. I have translated it *even*, which corresponds well with its meaning here.

V. 17. Ὅτι ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωϋσέως ἐδόθη, ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγένετο.

For the law was given by Moses; grace and truth were by Jesus Christ.

Here it becomes clear that χάρις does not mean the Old Testament, in the preceding verse. Christ alone gave *grace*, in the sense here intended. Moses did indeed give the Law, or rather, it was given by him as the leading instrument. But the law is a dispensation very different from the gospel. The language of the first is: “Obey perfectly, and live; the soul that sinneth shall die.” The second declares, that the penitent shall be forgiven, and all needed grace and glory bestowed. John assumes here, in regard to the law of Moses, the like position with Paul, who says that “the *wrath* of God is revealed from heaven” by the law, Rom. 1: 18; that it denounces a curse on all who fail of perfect obedience, Gal. 3: 10; that the law could not give life, Gal. 3: 21; that it is the ministration of condemnation and of death, and has no glory in comparison with gospel, 2 Cor. 3: 6 — 11; that it is only the shadow of good things to come, Heb. 10: 1; that it was not faultless, Heb. 8: 7; that it was a wall of partition between Jews and Gentiles, Eph. 2: 14; that by its commandments and ordinances it was the occasion of enmity, ib. vs. 15, 16, comp. Rom. 7:

7—10; that, compared with the gospel, it contains weak and beggarly elements, Gal. 4: 9; and many things are said in his epistles of the like tenor. It is in vs. 17, 18, of our text, that John virtually assumes the same ground. Hence he declares that *grace and truth*, in the high sense which he assigns to them, came or were introduced (*ἔγενετο*) only by Jesus Christ. The whole tenor of his gospel manifests how deeply this sentiment was engraven upon his heart.

But why should the evangelist here introduce such a sentiment? Plainly in order that he might exalt the glory of the only begotten, full of grace and truth, and might show the Jews what abundant reason they had, to lay hold upon the hope set before them in and through him. He does not indeed bring any direct accusations against the law; but by the force of comparison he points out the great deficiency and inability of the law, as a remedy for our present maladies. All men are sinners; and it is only the grace and truth that Christ has exhibited, which can save them from the curse of the law. The *ὅτι*, at the beginning of the verse, indicates that some proof is to be given, or ground alleged, for the assertion which precedes. The matter stands thus. We have received of *his fulness*, for he only has such a fulness, i. e. he only is the true source of gospel grace and truth. No other source was adequate to bestow upon us a constant succession of favors. — The verb *ἔγενετο* is here in the *singular*, in conformity with its next preceding subject, *ἀλήθεια*; a principle of syntax common in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and even English.

V. 18. Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε · ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ἐκείνος ἐξηγήσατο.

No one hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath revealed him.

Although this verse assigns a fundamental reason, why grace and truth could be exhibited only by the incarnate Logos, yet it has neither a *γάρ* nor a *ὅτι* to introduce it. This, as before remarked, is altogether in conformity with the prevailing *aphoristic* style of John, and specially of this Prologue. — *Οὐδεὶς*, *no one*, is designed to extend the denial to all other Old Testament prophets or writers, as well as to Moses. — *ἑώρακε*, *hath seen*, expresses with *intensity* the action of seeing. It doubtless has a *tropical* sense here; for merely to say, that no one had seen God corporeally or physically, would amount to very little. The impossibility of this was fully believed by the Jews; for Ex. 33: 20 asserts it, as also do Deut. 5: 24. Judg. 13: 22. 1 Tim. 6: 16, al. The *theophanies* of the Old Testament, or of the New, are no contradiction of this; for in all these cases, only the *הֵיחָל הַקֹּדֶשׁ*, the *Shechinah*, or *δόξα Κυρίου*, is exhibited. Besides, mere corporeal

vision would not confer the power of revealing divine truth or mysteries. The vision, in the case before us, is a *mental perception* of God in the highest sense, so as to comprehend and understand his designs and purposes. It implies an intuitive knowledge. The Logos alone possessed this. *He was with God, and in him was life and light.* He therefore understood the divine will and counsel, in a manner entirely discrepant from, and superior to, the perception of any merely human being, whether Moses himself or his successors.

Ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός is here employed, in the way of contrast with any son who is born of the flesh in a natural way. The incarnate Logos enjoys privileges and advantages to which no merely human being can possibly lay claim; comp. John 6: 46. 14: 7. — *Ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, who is in (or on?) the bosom of the Father.* Is the phrase here, *εἰς τὸν κόλπον*, equivalent to *ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ*? Somewhat numerous are the cases in which *εἰς* with the Acc. is employed to designate *resting* or *dwelling in* a place, even where the Dative with *ἐν* is more usual; see Rob. Lex. *εἰς*, 4. But conceding this, what is the meaning of *being in his bosom*? Among the Latins, the phrases in *gremio patris positum esse* — in *sinu getari* — in *gremio matris sedens* — in *sinu esse*, and the like, designate the most internal and hearty friendship and community of feeling. This sense is appropriate in the case before us. By such a union (*πρὸς τὸν θεόν*), the Son becomes entirely cognisant of all that (so to speak) passes in the Father's mind, and therefore able to make all his revelations of grace and truth. But perhaps there lies at the basis of the form of expression, the idea of *leaning on* the bosom of another, in the way of affectionate friendship and confidence, as John leaned on the bosom of Jesus at supper, John 21: 20. Our English expressions, *bosom-friend*, *bosom-confident*, well express the substance of what is intended in our text. — As to the *ὁ ὢν*, in the *Pres. tense*, it is plainly intended to designate what is habitual, constant, and unlimited — a very common meaning of this tense. Some have referred the Participle to the Imperfect; and this, no doubt, the *form* of the *Pres. participle* is capable of expressing; see my N. Test. Gramm. § 173. 2. If so rendered here, the meaning would be, that before the Logos became flesh he was in the Father's bosom, i. e. *πρὸς τὸν θεόν*. The sense would be sufficiently appropriate, but not near so energetic and expressive as the *Pres. tense* makes it. In 3: 13, Jesus speaks of himself in like manner, as *ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ*, i. e. as dwelling habitually in heaven, and knowing all that is disclosed or determined there. His *omnipresence* is hardly deducible from either of these texts, because a *local* presence (so to speak) is not the direct object of assertion in either. But still, he who is *in the bosom of the*

Father and is in *heaven*, at the same time that he is the incarnate *Logos* dwelling among men, must at least be a wonderful being (Isa. 9: 6), and cognisant of all things, John 17: 30.

The word *ἀποκάλυψαι* was used by the Greeks to designate the explaining and unfolding of holy things. This is altogether appropriate here. But what is it that the Son *reveals* or *declares*? The verb has no Acc. after it, which is expressed. But the context seems plainly to imply *τὸν θεόν*; not God as to his mere metaphysical nature, but God as the author of grace and truth. It is the Son, and he only, who has placed the character and designs of God in the light that the gospel affords. God was indeed revealed in many respects, in the O. Test.; but God as Father, and Christ as Son and Redeemer, and the Holy Spirit as Sanctifier, were, to say the most, only foreshadowed in the Jewish Scriptures. It is Christ, who has "brought life and immortality to light;" Christ who has revealed the new and living way of access to the throne of mercy; and Christ, who has given the clearest views of God, of the way of duty, and of the way of happiness. It is sometimes the case, no doubt, that preachers and theologians inculcate views of the O. Test. revelations, which are quite incompatible with the sentiment of our text, and of other kindred passages in the New Testament. Since all Scripture is of God, they seem to conclude that all is, even now, equally profitable and instructive; a conclusion which full surely neither Paul nor John admits. *Grace and truth came*, in the highest and most holy sense, *only by Jesus Christ*. This is the sheet-anchor of all who are embarked on a *Christian voyage*. The glory of the Mosaic dispensation was indeed true and real. But it was only as the day-star to the rising sun. If then it be only a star, and nothing more, we should not regard it as rivalling the true Sun in all its majesty and glory.

So much room has been occupied already, with the explanation of the text and with remarks on some of the doctrines which it inculcates, that dilation on several topics of interest which the prologue suggests, is precluded. I shall, therefore, close the present part of my undertaking, by a summary or synoptical view of the course of thought or connection of sentiment, in the prologue through which our examination has been extended.

The original state or condition of the *Logos*, and his essential nature, are first described. He is eternal; was with God; was God. As such, he was the Creator of all things without exception. In particular, he was the source of all life; and as the author of spiritual life, he was the source also of all true spiritual light. His light shone on the darkness of all the ages which preceded his coming; but this darkness

was so gross, that little impression was made upon it. To prepare the way for the coming of the Logos to act personally and visibly among men, in order to save the world from its ruinous state, his herald or forerunner, John, was sent from God, in order that he might bear such testimony concerning the Messiah, as would persuade men to believe. Those greatly mistake the real character of John, who suppose him to be the *Light of the world*. The true light, the only personage entitled to this high character, was he who made the world, and who came into it, although the world in general rejected him. He came in a special manner to his own peculiar heritage and people, yet even they did not receive him. In this last case, however, there were exceptions. Some did receive him, and believe on his name. On them he bestowed the power of claiming and enjoying all the rights and privileges of the children of God, — his children, not in any way of mere natural generation, but by a *regeneration* spiritual and divine. In the accomplishment of his last great work among his people, the Logos became flesh, i. e. took on him the human form and nature, and thus dwelt among men, and manifested his glory, which was truly that of the Only Begotten of God. John himself bore witness also to this wonderful truth — the consummation of the great plan of salvation. Nor does the account of this mysterious transaction depend, for its confirmation, on the testimony of John only; for of the fulness of grace and truth, which abounded in the incarnate Logos, did all his true disciples abundantly partake. He only could dispense such blessings. The law was given by Moses; but through the perversity of men, it became the occasion of their condemnation and ruin. Neither Moses, nor any other prophet, ever understood and disclosed the character and designs of God, in such a way as was adequate to accomplish the plan of our redemption. He only, who is in the bosom of the Father, and knows all the secrets of that bosom, could show grace and reveal truth in such a way as fully to satisfy our wants and alleviate our woes. This he has done; and therefore he is deserving of our highest confidence, love, and obedience.

Such is the course of thought in this remarkable poem to the gospel of John. The composition is singular in its kind, there being nothing elsewhere in all the N. Test. that resembles it. It brings before us the Logos first in his simple original nature; and then in the developments of himself which had been made, either in the way of creation or of redemption. His incarnation, his dwelling among men, and the reception which he met with from them, are also constituent parts of the picture. Twice does the evangelist refer to the rejection of him who was the light of the world; in the first instance, by the ungodly

world before the incarnation, when Christ spake to them by patriarchs and prophets, by the voice of conscience and the works of nature; in the second, by the ungodly in general, but specially by his own peculiar people whom he addressed in person. The design of this repetition plainly is, to give an intensity of coloring to the picture which the evangelist draws of the aggravated guilt of the Jews in rejecting him.

The touches of John are very brief and few; but still, they are exceedingly significant. The nature of the Logos, the creative displays of his power, his moral and spiritual operations on the minds of men, and the reception which they gave him, and his exclusive competence and claim to be their Saviour — are all presented within the compass of one short paragraph. We might naturally expect that such brevity would be the occasion of some obscurity. And so it is. But a diligent and patient enucleation of all the particulars, and then a comparison of them with each other, will enable any one to perceive the true order, the method, and the intimate relation and connection of the whole discourse. It is very far from being a mere succession of apothegmatic sentences. The bands which unite the whole in one compact unity, are some of them indeed of so fine a texture, that they require careful inspection in order to perceive and appreciate them. But when once developed, the reader is struck with the relation and the harmony of the whole. Well might John suppose, that such an introduction to his Gospel would excite in the reader a strong curiosity to proceed in the perusal of his work, and see what had been the developments of that mysterious and wonderful personage, who is thus introduced and commended to his notice.

One question however remains, and it is one of rather serious import. How comes it that the *sufferings* and *death* of Christ, the all atoning sacrifice for sin, which throughout the New Testament, with the exception of the historical narratives, is everywhere the predominating theme — how comes it, that no account of these is introduced into John's prologue? The first view that is taken of this matter, probably awakens in most persons some degree of surprise. Very naturally will it produce such an effect, whenever the course of further development, on the part of the evangelist, is not examined with care. A close scrutiny, however, of the prologue and of the succeeding contents of the book, will lead the inquirer to see, that John has not attempted the completion of his whole picture, in the sketch that he has drawn at the beginning. It is merely an *introductory* sketch. In this, he gives us only what took place antecedent to the close of the ministry of Jesus. But of all the writers in the N. Test., John is one of the last who can be charged with having overlooked, or given only a secondary place to, the value of the sufferings and death of Christ. In

the sequel to his prologue, and without delay, he introduces this theme. He commences so far back as the anticipative testimony of the Baptist. That personage, immediately after baptizing Jesus, directed the attention of the multitudes around him, to his acknowledged Lord and Master, and exclaimed: "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sins of the world!" 1: 27. This declaration he repeats on another occasion, 1: 36. At the outset of the Saviour's public ministry, Jesus declared to Nicodemus, that "the Son of man must be *lifted up*, in order that they who believe in him may not perish," John 3: 14, 15. And again, "God so loved the world that he *gave up* (*ἔδωκε*) his only begotten Son, (i. e. gave him up to death), that believers might be saved," 3: 16. To the Jews, who disputed against him, Jesus declared, that "they must eat the flesh, and drink the blood of the Son of man, that they might have life," John 6: 53. Again he declares, that "he lays down his life for the sheep," John 10: 11. The high priest Caiaphas is represented by John as declaring, under a constraining divine influence, that "Jesus should die for that nation [the Jews], and for all the people of God scattered abroad," John 11: 51, 52. John's epistles are replete with the doctrine, that "the blood of Christ cleanseth from all sin," 1 John 1: 7. 2: 2. 3: 16. 4: 10. 5: 6, al. The Apocalypse above all other books places the blood of Christ on the highest ground of preëminence. To quote is unnecessary. The fact alleged lies on the face of the whole production.

It is not then because John overlooked or under-estimated the great, the all important subject of the *atonement*, that he has not introduced it into his preface. It was because his plan of writing remitted the consideration of this subject to what follows the preface; for in the sequel he makes it occupy the highest place in the testimony of John the Baptist. It is indeed very natural to raise a question respecting the *omission* of any mention of atonement in the preface to John's Gospel. But the answer to this question may, with good reason, be regarded as sufficient and satisfactory. John's prologue was not designed to include an account of the *end* of Christ's work on earth, but only to touch on what preceded the incarnation, and what took place afterwards in the most general sense, while the Saviour was employed in the execution of his mission to our world. That which respects the close of his great mediatorial and saving work, is related elsewhere in John's Gospel (chap. xiii.—xxi.); and related more fully than by any other Evangelist.

[It now remains to redeem the promise made to my readers, to lay before them the discussion of Dörner respecting the *Logos of Philo of Alexandria*, with some remarks on the subject. But the space which I have already occupied, renders it inconvenient to insert it in the present number of this Review.]

ARTICLE V.

OF THE EXISTENCE AND NATURAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE
DIVINE BEING.

By George I. Chace, Prof. of Chemistry and Geology in Brown University.

THE innumerable forms of matter which everywhere reveal themselves to the senses, may be contemplated under several distinct points of view. In the first place we may regard them as separate and detached bodies, having no common relations, and sustaining no common dependencies. We may examine each one of them individually. We may observe its form, we may ascertain its structure, we may learn its dimensions, and may make ourselves acquainted with its various mechanical and sensible properties. Having done this, we may further compare these bodies with one another, marking their resemblances and noting their differences, and may finally arrange them in classes, orders, and families according to their observed affinities. It is by pursuing such a course that the portion of knowledge has been created which constitutes the Science of Natural History.

Or, secondly, we may direct our attention to the relations which these several bodies sustain to one another. We may observe their modes of action and reaction under all the different circumstances in which they naturally occur, or in which for the purposes of experiment, we may place them. We may note and compare the results of our observations, and may pass thence by induction to those general laws by which all matter is alike governed, and upon the ceaseless operation of which, its larger and more sensible phenomena are immediately dependent. The facts and principles of which we should thus gain possession, reduced to their proper order and connections, would constitute that part of the science of nature which has been denominated Natural or Mechanical Philosophy.

Or, thirdly, we may direct our inquiries to the elementary particles or atoms, of which the material masses are composed. We may examine these atoms, and see whether they all present the same characters, or whether there be not different kinds of matter. And having ascertained the truth of the latter supposition, we may take each one of the different elements whose existence has been determined, and bringing it into relation successively with every other element, we may

thus develop its several properties. But, before we have proceeded far in our investigation, we cannot fail to discover in nearly all the different elements or kinds of matter, a disposition more or less strong to enter into union with one another. In truth, when these elements are brought together under favorable circumstances, such union is found in almost every instance actually to take place. We have now a new subject for study. We have a class of compound bodies differing in their properties widely from the elements of which they are composed—in themselves extremely numerous, and moreover entering in turn into new combinations, and thereby giving rise to all the endless variety of substances found in the mineral, vegetable and animal worlds. The phenomena which come under our review in these inquiries belong more immediately to the Science of Chemistry.

Or, fourthly, we may contemplate matter neither in its masses nor yet in its atoms, but in those complex organic forms which it assumes on entering the structure of plants and animals. Here a new set of phenomena present themselves, as unlike those which arise from the mere chemical properties of matter, as these latter are unlike those dependent upon the mechanical properties—phenomena of a much higher order and of a more varied character—phenomena termed vital, because they are exhibited only during the continuance of those mysterious and complex relationships which constitute life, or upon which life is immediately dependent. These phenomena, however, are as entirely due to matter under the peculiar forms in which it is combined and aggregated, and in the peculiar relations in which it is placed, as any of its simplest and most familiar manifestations. They grow as directly out of the inherent constitutional endowments of the original atoms, which required only to be placed under the proper conditions in order to their exhibition. The study of these phenomena and of the laws which regulate and determine them, so essential to the forming of any just ideas of the vegetable and animal functions, is the especial business of the physiologist.

Or, lastly, we may consider matter not in the relations which the different portions of it, whether larger or smaller, whether organic or inorganic, sustain to one another, but in that higher relation which all matter sustains to a power without and beyond itself. From the principles of our mental constitution, we are necessarily led to infer from what we see in the world around us, the existence of such a power. It is a part of that great primary law of human belief, that every effect must have a cause—a cause in its nature adequate to produce it. Wherever we turn our eyes we behold the evidences not only of power but of intelligence and design. The universe itself is but a vast sys-

tem of means wisely adapted to the production of ends. Whether we look at it as a whole, or view it in the detail of its parts, this great fact equally forces itself upon our observation. The development of life — intelligent and conscious life — is the sublime object to which all its provisions look, and in the accomplishment of which all its agents find their appropriate and intended office. The celestial mechanism lies back of the terrestrial, which it regulates and to a great extent even determines. This in turn furnishes the conditions of existence to the innumerable animal and vegetable tribes with which the surface of our globe is covered. Arrest the earth in its course round the sun, or change in any manner its relations to that luminary so that light, heat, and electricity should no longer flow from it in the same measured quantities, and the disturbing influence would be felt through every link of the entire chain of physical causes which binds together the terrestrial phenomena. All the conditions of organic existence would be changed, and disorder, desolation and death would quickly pervade regions which are now teeming with an exuberance of life and clothed in perennial beauty. So many and so mighty are the agencies employed in maintaining the life of the feeblest plant! So vast and so complicated is the system of means made tributary to the sustenance and well-being of the humblest animal!

It is not, however, in the general constitution of the universe, or even in the physical arrangements of our own planet, that we discover the clearest and most unequivocal evidence of contrivance and design. The assemblage of instrumentalities employed here is so vast, and the objects to which they are directed are so remote, that we cannot in all cases perceive the relation between them, and even when we are able to trace it, it is in parts of a system every way so far surpassing our powers of comprehension, that we do not feel quite certain whether the connection may not be simply accidental. Moreover, the effort of imagination necessary for taking in even the parts of a scheme of such vast magnitude, as well as the emotion awakened by their contemplation, is unfavorable to that clear perception and that calm and logical deduction which can alone inspire the mind with full confidence in its own decisions.

For the clearest evidence of adaptation, the strongest and most overwhelming proofs of intelligence and design, we must look to the structure of organic beings. Each one of these, which crowd upon our view in countless myriads wherever we turn our eyes, is as complete in itself, forms a whole as perfect in all its parts, and as perfectly adapted to the ends intended to be accomplished by it, as the world to which it belongs or the universe itself, of which that world forms a

insignificant a portion. Here too we find ourselves comparatively at home. The relations involved in the structure of these beings come for the most part within the sphere of our comprehension. By careful study we may understand the objects for which each one is designed and may trace the connection between the several parts of its organization and these objects. If we regard the physical conditions under which an animal is to pass its existence as already determined, the mode of life must be conformed to these. But this mode of life, whatever it may be, necessarily implies certain functions. Indeed the generic idea of life includes little else than an assemblage of functions — its character being dependent upon their nature, variety and number. Now as these functions whether of perception or of motion must be in strict relation to the external circumstances of the animal, so must the several parts of its bodily structure be in strict relation to these functions. For each one there must be a special organ, possessing all the endowments and capabilities necessary to fit it for the performance of that function. These endowments and capabilities must further be provided for in the constitution of the organ. The parts of which this is composed must be of such a character and so related to one another as to confer upon it these endowments and these capabilities. Between the most elementary portions of the structure of every animal and the external conditions under which it is designed to exist, there extends, therefore, one unbroken line of connections — one continued series of adaptations, every part — every step of which may be traced. All this is well understood by the comparative anatomist, and it is in consequence of it, that he is able from the mere fragment of a fossil skeleton, from a tooth or a toe bone which has lain for countless ages buried in the earth's crust, not only to restore the entire animal to which it belonged — to place it before us in all its living proportions, but also to infer many things concerning the climate and physical condition of the earth at the time when the animal constituted one of its inhabitants.

Here then is a field wide enough for every imaginable form of contrivance — every conceivable variety of adaptation. At the same time the ends proposed are so definite and come so entirely within our comprehension, and the means employed for the attainment of each are so direct and lie within so narrow a compass that every part of it is fully open to our investigation. It is not however the design, nor would it be compatible with the limits of the present article to enter upon the examination of this field or even to present in detail the results of such an examination. Two or three facts gathered from a general survey of it will be sufficient for our purpose.

The first which we would mention is, that throughout the whole range of animated nature from man down to the humblest thing that lives and breathes, the functions provided for in the organization of each one of the countless beings presented to our view, however numerous and however diversified, are so conceived as to be in perfect harmony with one another and at the same time subservient to the general purpose designed to be accomplished in its existence. In not a single instance has the most profound study of the constitution of these beings revealed any defect or suggested any improvement in either of these respects. On the contrary, whoever has engaged in such study has risen from it with enlarged ideas of the comprehensive regard to the conditions of existence by which each function has been determined, and with more exalted conceptions of the wisdom and skill with which they have all been combined in the life of the animal.

Still more striking and impressive are the evidences of intelligence and design displayed in the assemblage of instrumentalities provided for the maintenance of these functions. Upon the innumerable contrivances and adaptations included in this, we see expended all the combinations of a mechanism, of which we have but lately become masters, and all the resources of a chemistry the depths of whose lore we have hardly yet begun to fathom. So complete as a whole, so perfect in all its parts is the organization of even the lowest and most insignificant animal, that it is impossible to add to or to take from, to alter or in the slightest degree modify, without marring the proportions and beauty of the structure and diminishing its subserviency to the ends for which it was specially intended.

Another fact worthy of notice as showing the transcendent skill as well as exhaustless power of contrivance evinced in the constitution of animals is, that in the distribution of the functions, the same organ is frequently made to perform several distinct, and as it would at first seem, incompatible offices. In such cases, we find the organ so constituted, the parts entering into it of such a character and so combined, that it is enabled to perform each one of these offices as perfectly as if that alone were the sole purpose for which it was formed. A good illustration of this is presented in the human spine — the most admirable piece of simple mechanism to be found in the whole frame. This at the same time supports the head and upper portion of the trunk, lodges and protects the spinal marrow, forms the bond of union between the other parts of the skeleton, constitutes the axis upon which the body and limbs turn, and by its numerous processes furnishes attachment to most of the muscles employed in moving them. And for all of these offices it is so perfectly fitted by its skilful structure that he who looks

at it in connection with any one of them will perceive nothing superfluous and nothing wanting.

Or again, we frequently observe the converse of this. We observe several different organs ministering to the same function. When this is the case, we find these organs, in consequence of relations established between them through physical ties, performing their respective offices with a consentaneousness of action that gives as perfect unity to the function as if it depended upon a single organ. A large number of the more complex motions of the body and limbs are capable of being executed only by the due and harmonious contraction of many different muscles, each having the proper connections with the more solid portions of the frame, and yet, these motions are executed at once and by a single act of the will. Life itself is the result of the combined action of a great number of organs and these organs are made up of many parts and these parts, composed of innumerable atoms, and yet its unity is as perfect as if it were evolved from a single molecule.

Now these wonderful assemblages of adaptations included in the structure of organic beings, involving relations so numerous and so delicate, and repeated with greater or less variation in the different classes and orders of the animal kingdom, not by hundreds but by thousands and hundreds of thousands, necessarily suppose contrivance and design. We can no more conceive them to have originated without these, than we can conceive of an effect without a cause. Their production just as much implies the exercise of intelligence as it does the exercise of power. The former must have been as absolutely necessary to it as the latter. But there is no ground for supposing that intelligence is an attribute of matter. On the contrary every ontological consideration is opposed to such an idea. Being of a totally different nature from any of the known properties of material bodies, it cannot without violation of the plainest dictates of reason and common sense, be referred to the same essence or substratum. Intelligence necessarily implies mind or person. We cannot conceive of it without this. Besides the different forms of matter therefore, there must exist in the universe some being or beings by whom these forms have been arranged and combined and rendered subservient to the wise and beneficent ends to which they are constantly ministering.

Moreover, if we examine the different races of organic beings, we find that they are all constituted in accordance with the same general plan. This is equally apparent whether we consider the functions provided for in their several organizations or the instrumentalities employed in maintaining them. The peculiarities belonging to each are only superficial. They do not extend to the type upon which it is

formed. The same essential idea, the same radical conception, is recognized in all the different classes and orders of animals, however varied their forms and however diversified their organs. Nay more, besides being constituted on the same general principles, these different classes and orders of animals, extinct as well as living, are further related as integral parts of the same whole. They together make up, as naturalists believe, one grand scheme of life, characterized throughout by as perfect unity of plan and purpose as the structure of an individual animal. The same is true of inorganic matter. This does not present itself in detached and isolated masses, but the different portions of it are brought together and formed into worlds. These worlds are framed into systems. These systems are combined together in larger systems and these in still larger, until at length the universe itself arises before us, complete in all its parts, pervaded throughout by the same mysterious force and bathed in the same subtle fluid. From this character of unity so visibly inscribed upon the several portions of inorganic as well as organic nature, we are led to infer the existence of one great Being, possessing the attributes of wisdom and power in a degree far beyond what we are able to conceive or think ; who, if he have not created matter, has formed and moulded it and impressed upon it the marks of intelligence and design which it everywhere exhibits.

Such is the argument in which the science of natural theology has its foundation—a science which lies back of the other sciences, and in its most comprehensive sense includes them all. Like mechanical philosophy, chemistry and physiology, it takes for granted that the phenomena coming within its range are produced by some cause, and like them it seeks to discover the attributes of that cause, and the laws by which their manifestation is governed. There is no more of hypothesis in the one case than in the other. All our inferences concerning matter proceed upon this primary law of human belief. Without it indeed we could not extend our knowledge beyond the merely phenomenal. Caloric, light and electricity, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and the numerous other elements having part in the evolution of the terrestrial changes can no more be seen, are no more objects of sense, than the great Being who has arranged and combined these agents in such a manner as to render their ceaseless activity everywhere tributary to the accomplishment of his own wise and good purposes. They lie equally beyond the reach of our perceptive faculties, and for the assurance of their existence we must, in like manner, fall back upon this fundamental principle of the human intelligence.

We have thus endeavored briefly to point out the nature of the argument by which the existence and natural attributes of the divine Being

are established, and to show that it assumes nothing beyond what is necessarily involved in that process of reasoning by which we, in any case, pass from material phenomena to material existences; namely, that for every effect there must be a cause in character and efficiency adequate to its production. The argument itself is so simple and has, moreover, been so frequently and so fully set forth, that any attempt to impart to it additional force by new or more extended illustrations would prove but a vain endeavor. Indeed, we have long been of the opinion that in establishing the existence of an intelligent Author of nature from the manifestations of design in the natural world, little is gained by the multiplication of instances. He who should see no indication of contrivance, no proof of adaptation in the structure and appurtenances of the human eye, would fail to perceive the evidences of them in any part of the Creator's works. In this argument, moreover, the reasoning process is so short, the conclusion lies so near to the premises, that there is little room for enforcement — little need of illustration. Indeed, as most persons are constituted, we are inclined to believe that the simple phenomena of external nature presented to the understanding through the senses, affect the mind more deeply and awaken in it a stronger assurance of the Divine existence and perfections, than the most labored demonstration. It was apparently under the influence of impressions derived from this source that the Psalmist penned those memorable lines, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy-work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard." And again, in the same strain of exquisite beauty and unaffected piety, "O Lord! how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches; so is this great and wide sea, wherein are things creeping innumerable, both small and great beasts. These wait all upon thee, that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thy hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled; thou takest away their breath, they die and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created; and thou renewest the face of the earth." So also the sublime bard, who in 'his adventurous song' asserts 'eternal Providence' and 'justifies the ways of God to man':

"These are thy glorious works, Parent of good!
Almighty! thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair: Thyself how wondrous then!
Unspeakable, who sittest above these heavens,
To us invisible, or dimly seen

In these thy lowest works ; yet these declare
Thy goodness beyond thought, and power divine."

But while most men are so constituted as to be immediately impressed with the conviction of an Author of nature from the simple observation of her phenomena, there are some — and those, too, possessing minds by no means deficient in either the philosophical or the logical element — with whom the most cogent arguments, drawn from the evidences of contrivance and design so visible not only in the structure of our own frames, but in the arrangement and order of every part of the outward world, fail to produce such conviction. These regard the existence of an all-wise and omnipotent Creator as only one of two hypotheses, either of which will sufficiently account for the sublime manifestations of intelligence and power which everywhere reveal themselves to the senses. Not that they suppose the universe may be the work of chance — the mere accidental result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms — or that any cause or causes, acting blindly, without end or aim, can have produced it. The class of persons to whom we refer are by far too keen-sighted to admit for a moment propositions involving so monstrous an absurdity. They believe the great problem of material and spiritual existences may be as satisfactorily solved by supposing these existences themselves to be eternal, as by supposing an eternal Being endowed with attributes enabling him to create them. All the varied appearances in nature being immediately referable to such existences and solely dependent upon them, Why, they ask, should we look for anything further? Why should we attempt to trace these existences back to a cause, in which they have originated, when that cause must remain equally unaccounted for? Having created one hypothesis — the hypothesis of matter and spirit — for explaining the phenomena which we observe around us, and of which we are conscious within us; why should we form another and further hypothesis for explaining that? Or if we adopt such a mode of philosophizing, why should we stop here? Why not, as in the Egyptian and Hindoo systems of cosmogony, trace the existing order of things back through a long line of causes successively producing one another? Nay, why not suppose an infinite series of such causes? In the structure of the different animal tribes we see much, it is true, that would seem to imply contrivance and design. Each one is made up of a greater or less number of parts precisely fitted, in all respects, for the performance of certain definite functions, which functions are in strict relation to the physical conditions under which it lives. Whether we examine the internal organs upon which the vital processes are more immediately dependent, or the limbs and senses which put the animal in communication with the sur-

rounding world, we find all perfect beyond the possibility of improvement. But then we also behold such beings, in countless myriads, daily and hourly coming into existence under the influence of laws which are themselves unconscious, and through the instrumentality of agents which are destitute of intelligence. Why may they not always have come into existence under the influence of the same laws, and through the instrumentality of the same agents? Why ascribe to any of them a different mode of origin — a mode of origin wholly unlike anything which we ourselves have witnessed — anything that has come within the experience of mankind? Why not suppose an endless series of generations of each of these different races of animals, dependent for their production upon the same agencies which at present minister to it? In a word, why not regard the vast system of things with which we find ourselves connected, and of which we form an integral part, as without beginning and without end, as itself eternal, forever evolving, in sublime unconsciousness, the same mighty assemblage of phenomena, organic and inorganic, spiritual and material, which we at present witness? Is such an idea more difficult of conception, or does it involve more that is incomprehensible, than the doctrines of theism?

With considerations of this character there mingle in the minds of these persons, other reflections tending towards the same result. If the universe be in reality the work of an infinitely wise and all-powerful Being, and if that Being continually preside over it, why, they ask, does He not reveal Himself by signs which cannot be mistaken, to us his intelligent creatures? Why does he remain forever concealed behind the thick drapery of physical agents and physical laws, everywhere shut out from our view by the deep folds of his own material creations? Having formed us in his own image, and made us capable of understanding him and his works, why should he thus hold himself from us? Why should no oracle speak, no voice be heard from out the thick darkness, in answer to our most passionate yearnings for a knowledge of his being and for communion with him? Why should not the dense curtain of material forms, by which he is so profoundly hidden from us, be occasionally at least drawn aside, and our eyes permitted to behold him as a present and sensible reality? Why have even the most pious of the sons of men, from the time of the patriarch Job down to the present hour, been forced to exclaim in their earnest search after him: "Behold! I go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him; on the left hand, where he doth work, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him."

As there is reason to believe that considerations like these not unfre-

quently obtrude themselves upon inquiring and thoughtful minds in which the moral sentiments however, are too largely developed to admit of their exerting any permanent and controlling influence, and as they lie at the foundation of the only rational form of atheism which it is possible to conceive — the only form indeed, which has the slightest claim to be regarded as in any degree rational — we have deemed it proper to state them somewhat at length, and shall devote the remaining part of our Article to their examination. The other forms of this spiritual malady, from whatever source they may arise, whether from a mind so imbruted by sensuality that it is no longer able to follow any process of reasoning, or even admit the idea of a great First Cause of all things, or from an insane determination to believe in nothing but what is made known through the senses, or from vague notions of the originating power of chance, are not of a nature to be reached by logic. The only remedy for these must be sought in the quickening and transforming influence of moral causes.

This theory, which proposes to explain all the phenomena of the universe without having recourse to the idea of an intelligent Author, involves, it will be perceived, the following suppositions: 1. that matter is eternal; 2. that the earth has always existed with the same form, the same complex arrangement of parts, and the same exhaustless provisions for the production and support of organic life, which at present characterize it; and 3. that it has always been tenanted by the same animal and vegetable tribes which now occupy it. In addition to this, we must further suppose the eternal existence of certain spiritual elements associated with the material and giving rise, in connection with them, to the manifestations of sensibility, intelligence, and will, accompanying the higher organic developments.

The first of these suppositions, the eternal existence of matter, is, we think, distinctly conceivable. It is not self-contradictory; nor does it involve any inherent absurdity. On the contrary, it is quite as readily admitted by the mind as the eternal existence of a being capable of creating matter. There are therefore no objections to it on the ground of its being impossible, or in any respect at variance with the dictates of our rational nature. Neither are there any facts, coming within the sphere of human observation, at all inconsistent with the supposition. Matter, so far as we are able to trace back its history, has always been precisely what it now is. The bodies composed of it are indeed constantly changing. They do not continue, in all respects, the same through any two successive moments. This is true not only of the organic forms and combinations of matter, but also of the inorganic. Even the solid crust of the globe itself is not exempt from this

great law of all terrestrial existences. "The mountain falling cometh to nought. The rock is removed out of his place. The waters wear the stones."

But while the bodies around us are thus constantly undergoing changes, the elements which enter into their composition change not. *They* are always and everywhere the same. Circumstances have no power over them; time does not waste them; action does not exhaust them. After having passed through ten thousand combinations and decompositions — "in each new form varying to their Maker still new praise" — they reappear with their properties unaltered, their activity undiminished, and their force unabated, ready to enter into yet new unions, and to run through yet new cycles of changes. There is nothing in any of their manifestations — in anything which we know of them, to indicate that they ever *were* or ever *will be* at all different from what we now see them; nothing which points back to a time when they began to exist, or which looks forward to one when their existence will terminate. On the contrary, they present the most perfect type of the exhaustless, the unchanging, the eternal, which it is possible for the mind to contemplate. Aside from the teachings of inspiration, therefore, we do not see that any substantial objections can be urged against the first supposition included in the theory which we are now considering.

The second hypothesis is also, we think, distinctly conceivable. We find no difficulty in supposing the constitution of our planet — including in this the entire system of causes having part in the maintenance of its interior and exterior mechanisms, and through these of the endlessly diversified conditions of animal and vegetable existence presented at its surface — to have always been what it now is; no difficulty in supposing the cycles of the terrestrial phenomena, such as we at present behold them, to be again and again repeated through all coming time; no difficulty in supposing these same cycles to have been again and again repeated through all past time; in a word, no difficulty in supposing our globe, like the elements composing it, to be eternal. There are no impossibilities, we say, no inconsistencies, no inherent absurdities, so far as we are able to perceive, involved in such a supposition.

But if the question be put as one of fact, whether the earth *actually* has always existed with the same form, the same complex arrangement of parts, and the same exhaustless provisions for the production and support of organic life, by which it is at present characterized, a very different answer must be given to it; for the discoveries of modern geology show, beyond all question, that such is *not* the case. Already, by the aid of this noble science, we are able to trace the history of our planet back to a time when its physical condition was very unlike

what it is at present; when its oceans and continents were different; when its plains, mountains and valleys were different; when the climates of its several zones were different and their productions different; when the accommodations and provisions afforded by it to the various forms of animal and vegetable life were different. The supposition, therefore, however plausible in itself, is wholly inconsistent with the facts brought to light by investigations into the former states of our globe, and cannot on this account be admitted.

The third hypothesis included in the foregoing theory, namely, that the earth has always been tenanted by the same animal and vegetable tribes which now occupy it, involves that, which if it be not absolutely impossible, is at least exceedingly difficult for beings like us to conceive. It supposes in the case of every plant and animal an endless series of generations, each springing from that which immediately preceded it, without any first term in which the series had its origin. That such a supposition is very different from that of the eternal existence of the same individual, and that it is admitted with far greater difficulty, we think every one must allow. Whether indeed it be at all admissible, we leave for those to decide who are more versed in subtleties of this nature. We simply say that for ourselves we feel by no means certain that such a series is possible.

But whatever answer may be given to this merely metaphysical question, that the different races of organic beings at present occupying the earth, *have not* always existed upon it, is capable of being demonstrated beyond all doubt. The comparatively recent origin of our own species may be gathered not only from all the earliest histories and traditions which have come down to us, but also from its present attainments in knowledge and power, in the mechanical arts, and the sciences which minister to them, and in all the means and conditions of a higher and better life, viewed in connection with the progress that has been made in these during the last few centuries. It is moreover incredible that man should have always lived upon the earth, and left no proofs of his existence at epochs more remote than that to which we are able to trace back his history.

For the most conclusive evidence on this point, however, we must look to the more extended records of organic life upon our globe, inscribed by the hand of nature herself on the rocky tables of its crust. From these we learn that not only man, but also by far the greater part of the animal tribes contemporary with him, were first introduced to the earth long after it had assumed the spherical form and entered upon its annual and diurnal motions; long after the development at its surface of the physical conditions necessary to constitute it a fit resi-

dence for living, sentient beings, long after it had actually become the abode of such beings. The animals which were first placed upon our globe, belonged for the most part to families but remotely akin to those at present inhabiting it. These primitive tribes adapted in their constitution to the state of the elements which at that time prevailed, were gradually succeeded by other and different races, holding the same constant relation in their organization to the circumstances under which they lived. In progress of time these new races in turn gave place to others, and these again to still others, until at length in the long line of geological succession its present inhabitants made their appearance, one after another, upon our planet. Each one of all these different races, therefore, the extinct as well as the living, may be traced back to the time when it was first introduced; when the Almighty Creator visibly appearing in our world, and embracing in one comprehensive survey the entire assemblage of physical conditions, constituted that race, and sped it on the career of life and action for which it was intended. Hence, whatever may be thought of the abstract possibility of an eternal series of generations of the same animal, such a supposition in the case before us is contradicted by the most overwhelming accumulation of facts. Instead of the earth having always been peopled by the same tribes, these show that the time was, when not a single one of the species or even genera existed which now occupy it. All of them have had an origin — have been called into existence, formed, and organized by an omniscient and all-powerful Creator. In the constitution of each, we see what has been especially demanded, we see the curtain of material forms withdrawn, the drapery of physical agents and physical laws cast aside, and the Divine Being appearing as it were in person, and with his own hands forming out of the dust of the earth one of the innumerable beings conceived by him from the beginning, but for whose destined existence the requisite conditions had not till now arisen. And this we see not once or twice but again and again, as often as in the almost endless succession of types each new species makes its appearance upon our planet.

But may not the hypothesis under examination be generalized so as to include these facts, and at the same time meet the other demands which are made upon it? May we not suppose these different races of animals to have sprung each from that which preceded it, the first and lowest term in the series having its origin in a mere accidental concurrence of molecules? Most of the larger and more highly endowed species, it is well known, are capable of undergoing important changes in form, size and character, from the long continued influence of circumstances. This fact is especially striking in the case of those

animals which have been taken into alliance by man. The several varieties of the dog, although distinguished by peculiarities so strongly marked that they might at first be supposed to belong to different species, are nevertheless believed to have sprung from a common progenitor. The same is true of the horse, ox, sheep and hog. All of these accompanying their master and companion in his wanderings, from the diversity of climate and condition under which they have existed, have come like him to exhibit a wide variety of character. Now if so great differences in form, size and color, in physical qualities and mental endowments have resulted from the influence of circumstances, why may we not suppose the wider differences which separate species from one another to have had their origin in the longer continued influence of these same circumstances? Why may we not suppose the lower orders of the animal kingdom in this way to have gradually passed up into the higher, as the states of the earth favoring the transition have one after another developed themselves?

As such an idea has lately been put forth by the author of the "Vestiges of Creation" with much array of learning, and supported by many apparent analogies, it may be worth while to pause a moment for its examination. In this work, it should be remarked however, the doctrine is not presented in its relation to the question of an author of the universe, but simply as a general theory designed to connect and explain the otherwise isolated facts of the organic creation. Although having a manifest bearing upon that question, and, if admitted, in reality undermining the whole argument for the Divine existence, it is only in the latter connection that the writer considers it.

The inadequacy of the causes proposed by this theory to account for the production of the different tribes of organic beings, might be inferred from the fact, that in no instance have these causes been known to originate a single new animal. However numerous the varieties which have been produced in this way, or however greatly they may differ from one another, they all come within the not easily described indeed, but nevertheless, well defined limits which mark the boundaries of species. This is apparent from an examination and comparison of their anatomical structures. It is further shown by the fact that these varieties, even those which are separated most widely, mingle as freely and give rise to an offspring as permanent as individuals of the same variety; while such unions between different species take place with extreme rareness, and even then never result in a lasting progeny. The comparatively slight and superficial character of the modifications occasioned by the mere influence of circumstances, is also seen from the readiness with which they disappear when the causes producing

them have ceased to operate. The horses and oxen which escaped from the first colonists of South America, and spread themselves over the pampas of that continent, lost all their distinctive peculiarities, exhibiting after a few years, that uniformity of color, size and proportions by which animals of the same species in their undomesticated state are always characterized. The former of these are at the present time in no way to be distinguished from their brethren of the original stock which still wander over the steppes of Tartary.

But yet stronger objections to this theory present themselves, if we turn our attention to the remains of the various extinct races, which preceded in the order of creation the existing families. Had the lower types of organic existence been gradually changed into the higher, through the continued influence of modifying circumstances, we should expect to meet with the evidences of it in these remains. Commencing with the oldest fossil-bearing rocks, and ascending through the strata which lie above them, we should expect to observe the successive forms passing into one another by insensible gradations. There should be no break, none of those strong lines of demarcation, which bound on all sides the existing orders, families and genera, but from the most ancient to the most recent species there should be one continued series of intermediate forms, separated from one another by differences scarcely perceptible. Such, however, is not the case. On the contrary, the very reverse of all this is true. In the oldest divisions of the fossiliferous strata we indeed find the remains of only the humblest animals. But these tribes so long as they last, undergo no change. What they are at the time of their first appearance, they continue to be until that of their replacement by other and in general more highly endowed races. These in like manner preserve their identity in all respects during the period of their allotted existence, when they in turn give place to still others; and so on through the entire series. Instead of one genus gradually passing into another, or one species into another, the lines of separation between both genera and species are as broadly drawn and as absolutely unchanging as those observed between the corresponding groups of living animals. The new races, therefore, successively making their appearance among the inhabitants of our globe, were not gradually developed through the continued action of new physical conditions upon the races which preceded them, but at once created with organizations and instincts suited to these new conditions. The theory referring their origin to the former source, is not only without support from the changes which are observed to take place in existing species of animals, but directly at variance with all that is known of the extinct races. This generalized form of the hypothesis designed to ex-

plain the phenomena of the universe, without having recourse to the idea of an intelligent author, cannot therefore be admitted. Like the supposition first considered, it is contradicted by every page of the entire history of organic life upon our planet, as we find it written in no doubtful characters on the rocky strata of the earth's crust.

But may we not conceive a still more generalized form of the atheistic hypothesis which shall comprehend and harmonize all the phenomena to be explained, the past as well as the present, the facts relating to the extinct as well as those pertaining to the existing orders of creation? May we not suppose the spiritual and the material throughout the universe to be so blended together and to have such relations to each other that their successive developments are constantly in harmony; that portions of each, either spontaneously or through the influence of external causes forming a part of the general system, enter into new combinations, and give rise to new forms of organic life as fast as provision is made for them by the unfolding of new physical conditions upon the surface of our globe? Back of those laws of matter and of spirit which we see governing their ordinary manifestations, may there not be a higher law by virtue of which the production, at the proper time and place, of new genera and new species of plants and animals is as naturally determined, as subsequently that of their successive generations? That we have never witnessed its actual operation is no argument against the supposition, as the circumstance may be sufficiently accounted for by the very brief period over which our observations have extended. Numerous instances might be adduced of an analogous character, of laws manifesting themselves at certain epochs, or on the arising of certain conditions, while during the intervals between these there is nothing to indicate their existence.

This theory of the constitution of the world and of the consequent origin and development of organic life, is set forth with great clearness in a volume published a few years since by Charles Babbage, Esq., under the title of the "Ninth Bridgewater Treatise." The work, which is fragmentary in its character, is evidently the production of a mind to which the highest generalizations of science are as familiar as household words. It presents throughout, the most sublime conceptions of the material and spiritual phenomena of the universe, clothed in language of unsurpassed clearness and beauty. The design of that part of the work to which we especially refer is not atheistic. On the contrary, it aims to awaken in the mind more exalted ideas of the wisdom and power of the Almighty, by placing before it the universe as one complete whole, including from the beginning all the provisions necessary for enabling it to accomplish the various objects of its creation without any subse-

quent interposition of the Divine agency. This view of its constitution he illustrates by the operation of his own wonderful calculating engine. "Let the reader imagine that he sits down before this engine and observes a wheel, which moves through a small angle round its axis, at short intervals, presenting to his eye successively, a series of numbers engraved on its divided circumference. Let the figures thus seen be the series of natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., each of which exceeds its immediate antecedent by unity. Now, reader, let me ask how long you will have counted before you are firmly convinced that the engine, supposing its adjustments to remain unaltered, will continue whilst its motion is maintained, to produce the same series of natural numbers? Some minds perhaps, are so constituted, that after passing the first hundred terms, they will be satisfied that they are acquainted with the law. After seeing five hundred terms, few will doubt; and after the fifty-thousandth term, the propensity to believe that the succeeding term will be fifty thousand and one, will be almost irresistible. That term *will* be fifty thousand and one; the same regular succession will continue; the five millionth and the fifty millionth term will still appear in their expected order; and one unbroken chain of natural numbers will pass before your eyes, from *one* up to *one hundred million*.

True to the vast induction which has thus been made, the next succeeding term will be one hundred million and one; but after that the next number presented by the rim of the wheel, instead of being one hundred million and two, is one hundred million *ten thousand* and two." "The law which *seemed* at first to govern this series fails at the hundred million and second term. That term is larger than we expected by 10,000. The next term is larger than was anticipated by 30,000, and the excess of each term above what we had expected forms the series of triangular numbers, 1, 3, 6, 10, etc. each multiplied by 10,000.

If we still continue to observe the numbers presented by the wheel, we shall find that for a hundred or even for a thousand terms, they continue to follow the new law relating to the triangular numbers; but after watching them for 2761 terms, we find that *this* law fails in the case of the 2762nd term.

If we continue to observe, we shall discover another law then coming into action, which also is dependent, but in a different manner, on triangular numbers. This will continue through about 1430 terms, when a new law is again introduced, which extends over about 950 terms; and this too, like all its predecessors, fails and gives place to other laws, which appear at different intervals.

Now, it must be remarked, *that each number presented by the engine is greater by unity than the preceding number*, which law the observer

has deduced from *an induction of a hundred million instances*, was not the true law that regulated its action ; and that the occurrence of the number 100,010,002 at the 100,000,002nd term, was *as necessary a consequence* of the original adjustment, and might have been as fully foreknown at the commencement, as was the regular succession of any one of the intermediate numbers to its immediate antecedent. The same remark applies to the next *apparent* deviation from the new law, which was founded on an induction of 2761 terms, and to all the succeeding laws ; with this limitation only — that whilst their consecutive introduction at various definite intervals is a necessary consequence of the mechanical structure of the engine, our knowledge of analysis does not yet enable us to predict the periods at which the more distant laws will be introduced.”

“The engine we have been considering is but a very small portion (about fifteen figures) of a much larger one which was preparing, and is partly executed ; it was intended, when completed, that it should have presented at once to the eye about one hundred and thirty figures. In that more extended form which recent simplifications have enabled me to give to machinery constructed for the purpose of making calculations, it will be possible, by certain adjustments, to set the engine so that it shall produce the series of natural numbers in regular order, from unity up to a number expressed by more than a thousand places of figures. At the end of that term, another and a different law shall regulate the succeeding terms ; this law shall continue in operation perhaps for a number of terms, expressed perhaps by unity, followed by a thousand zeros, or 10^{1000} ; at which period a third law shall be introduced, and, like its predecessors, govern the figures produced by the engine during a third of those enormous periods. This change of laws might continue without limit ; each individual law being destined to govern for millions of ages the calculations of the engine, and then give way to its successor, to pursue a like career.”

The application of this is obvious. As the calculating engine is constructed in such a way as to cause these different series of numbers to be presented one after another, without the alteration or readjustment even of any of its parts ; in like manner, that larger and more complex machine which men call the earth, is so contrived that the different organic races make their appearance upon it, in due order and time, without the interposition of any higher agency in the formation of new species.

But if we are at liberty to make a supposition of this kind with reference to the world considered as the work of an all-powerful Creator, why may we not further suppose it to have always existed with the

same constitutional endowments, and thus avoid all necessity of having recourse to the idea of an intelligent author? It is this highest and most generalized form of materialism — this last defence behind which a philosophical atheism can entrench itself — that we have to consider. In examining it, we shall confine our attention to the new element involved; to this great law of succession among races by which all the phenomena of life upon our globe are supposed to be satisfactorily explained.

That the actual operation of such a law has never been observed is not of itself, as we have already said, a sufficient reason for denying its existence. Indeed, unless there be other objections to it, this cannot be urged with any considerable force. But are there not other objections? Does not the law involve that which is impossible or contrary to reason or at variance with universally admitted facts or in conflict with great and wide-spreading analogies? These are questions that must be considered before we can decide upon the admissibility of the supposition.

In the first place, then, we remark that the above law supposes the *actual production* of organized beings adapted to the circumstances under which they come into existence. Now we behold nothing in nature analogous to this. Her powers are only reproductive. She is continually repeating her own forms. She originates nothing. This is substantially true even of inorganic nature, but it is more especially so of organic. Here we behold reproduction constantly going forward in every variety of mode and under ever changing circumstances; but we see no production. The organic types already in existence are repeated over and over again through hundreds and thousands of generations, but no new types come into being. The supposition, therefore, that the different living and extinct races of animals and vegetables, have had their origin in the simple powers of nature, is contrary to all that we know of those powers and consequently in the highest degree improbable.

Neither is the case of the calculating engine designed to illustrate the supposed law, in all respects parallel. In that, each of the successive terms of the different series of numbers, is presented independently of those which precede it, by the direct working of the engine. The several terms are related to one another only through their common relation to the mechanism by which they are evolved. The successive generations of the different species of plants and animals on the contrary, have no immediate dependence upon the structure of the earth or any of the physical arrangements connected with it. These latter furnish the conditions necessary to their continued existence, but have no direct

agency in their production. This is provided for in the constitution of the plants and animals themselves. Each generation derives its being from that immediately preceding it, without which it could not have birth. The phenomena of the calculating engine find their true parallel in the successive phases presented by our globe during the progress of its physical development, all of which were provided for in the composition of the original mass. Beyond this, all resemblance fails. No light is thrown by this wonderful achievement of ingenuity and skill upon the probable origin of the different organic races.

Having premised these general observations we proceed to a more particular examination of this last and most subtle form of atheism. By a law growing out of the essential constitution of things, each of the several tribes of plants and animals, it is said, come into being whenever there is developed at any point of the earth's surface, the assemblage of physical conditions necessary to its existence. What, we would ask, are the instrumentalities by which this law is carried into effect? It cannot execute itself; and all external influence is from the nature of the case excluded. How then shall we suppose the different plants and animals to have originated? In what manner shall we imagine the first oak, pine or elm, the first horse, ox, elephant or man to have been organized? Did the necessary elements, come together of their own accord, at the proper time and place, and spontaneously assume these several organic forms? Do oxygen, hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen possess powers enabling them to do this? Is there aught in their manifestations that affords evidence of it, or would in any manner indicate it? Is not such an idea, on the contrary, at variance with all that we know of the properties of these bodies? Is it not especially inconsistent — wholly irreconcilable with that '*vis inertiae*, that character of passivity which is a universal attribute of matter? Or if we suppose the elements at certain epochs or on the arising of certain conditions to take on these powers — a supposition which no sane mind can for a moment entertain — why should they not, at such times or on such occasions, all enter into organic combinations and assume organic forms? Why should not the whole exterior of our globe under the influence of this new impulse, be suddenly transmuted into trees, horses, elephants and men? No one we think, will be disposed to contend for the production of the first individuals of the different species of animals and vegetables by the spontaneous coming together of their constituent molecules. Such a doctrine would be but one remove in absurdity from that of the fortuitous concurrence of atoms to which we adverted in the earlier part of our essay.

To what other mode of development shall we then look? Shall

we suppose that each new species is an advance upon that which immediately preceded it, in the same way as the chrysalis is an advance upon the caterpillar, and the butterfly upon the chrysalis; that the different plants and animals, extinct as well as living, have been successively evolved from one another by virtue of an organic law embodied in the constitution of the first individuals of each? That in consequence of this law, after a certain number of generations — a hundred or thousand or million it may be — the pine turns into the oak, the fish into the frog, the horse into the elephant, the monkey into the man? Shall we explain in this manner the origin of the innumerable organic beings which everywhere surround us, or whose fossil remains are so thickly scattered through the outer portions of our globe?

But even allowing this to be a satisfactory account of the multiplication of orders, genera and species, how shall we suppose the primitive forms to which they are thus traced back, to have originated? In what manner did those first and simple structures which furnished the starting point to this mighty series of developments come into existence? Between the humblest animal or even plant, and the most complex inorganic body, there is a chasm, not so wide or deep perhaps, but as absolutely impassable as that which separates man himself from the brute matter around him; and as well might we suppose the latter with all his wonderful corporeal and spiritual endowments, to have been formed through the mere operation of natural laws, as attribute the former to a like origin. From what source then did these first organic beings, these original progenitors of all the different families and tribes of such beings, derive their existence?

But passing over this difficulty, we say that the explanation which is given of the subsequent multiplication of genera and species is by no means satisfactory. Nay, it would be hardly possible to conceive of one less so. It is in itself wild and extravagant to the very borders of absurdity. It is moreover in direct violation of the great law of reproduction — the law by which throughout the organic world like everywhere produces like — from which not a single departure has been known from the epoch of the earliest observation down to the present time. Nor is the explanation supported by any real analogies. The illustration drawn from the calculating engine, as we have already seen, fails to meet the case. Neither are the metamorphoses which many insects undergo in arriving at their perfect state, at all more in point. Within the envelopes of the caterpillar may already be detected the germs of both the chrysalis and the butterfly. And even in those more remarkable families, such as the aphides and the cercaria where the cycle of existence is completed only in many successive

generations, several of these generations may be seen inclosed within the same general covering. When animals of different species, instead of individuals of the same species, in different stages of their development, shall be found thus wrapped up within one another ; when the embryo of the frog shall be discovered in the fish, of the elephant in the horse, and of the man in the monkey ; then, and not till then, can the transformations of insects be adduced in support of the remarkable theory which we are now considering.

Nor is this all. Besides the extravagant character of the supposition, besides its incompatibility with one of the best established laws of nature and its entire want of support from any known facts or even analogies, we say it is, further, not in harmony with discoveries made concerning the extinct races which have peopled our globe. The transformation of the caterpillar into the chrysalis is attended by the disappearance of the caterpillar, and the transformation of the chrysalis into the butterfly is attended by the disappearance of the chrysalis. In the same way, when in accordance with this theory one species, after a certain number of generations, is converted into another, the former of these species should no longer be seen ; or in other words, the introduction of every new plant or animal should be accompanied by the disappearance of one of those which had previously existed. Now such is by no means the case. As we ascend from the deeper to the more superficial layers of the earth's crust, new species on the one hand make their appearance while the old still remain ; and old species, on the other, cease to occur, without their place being supplied by new ones. There is no such correspondence between the two classes of phenomena as to afford ground for the belief, or leave room for the supposition even, that they are in any manner dependent upon one another. That the same changes in the physical condition of our planet which caused the destruction of the extinct races, prepared the way for their living successors, is undoubtedly true ; but beyond this, there are no indications of any connection whatever between them. The theory of the transmutation of species cannot therefore be maintained. It is directly at variance with the universal experience of mankind ; and even were it ever so perfectly in accordance with that experience, it fails to account for the facts which it is specially designed to explain.

In what other way, then, may we suppose the different organic races to have originated, without having recourse to the idea of an intelligent and designing Creator ? One other, and so far as we can see only one other, can be conceived. It is the existence somewhere in connection with our planet, in air, earth, or water, of a special organism fitted for elaborating the different forms of animal and vegetable life, and send-

ing them forth as fast as the earth becomes prepared for their reception. But where is this wonderful organism, this literal womb of nature? Who has ever seen it? If it really exist, why has it not been discovered? Why has the geologist, in all his varied explorations, never fallen upon it? Or if it be situated in the interior of the earth, or in mid air, or mid ocean, how, at each successive birth of nature, do her progeny find their way to the several places which they are destined to occupy? For here, be it remembered, we cannot evoke miracles; all such aid is necessarily excluded by the very supposition upon which we are proceeding. How then, we ask, are the beings formed in this unknown recess of the earth, conveyed to their respective stations upon its surface? The whole idea is grotesque and absurd in the extreme. It is altogether too preposterous for serious consideration. No man in his sober senses can, for a moment, entertain it.

And thus it is with all the different modes of explaining the origin and development of life in our world, independently of an intelligent Author. It is only in the shape of vague generalities that such explanations seem plausible. The moment they are made to assume any definite and precise form, their verisimilitude vanishes. We then detect in each, as it passes before us, some element of absurdity which causes the mind to reject it. There is but one adequate hypothesis—one which will, at the same time explain and harmonize all the facts of the universe, and satisfy the requirements of our intellectual and moral natures—that of an eternal, self-existent, all-wise and omnipotent Creator. To this, everything around and everything within us points; in this, the great problem of material and spiritual existences, with all their diversities of form and endowment, finds a simple and satisfactory solution. God has made the world, and his attributes are written upon every portion of it. Wherever we turn our eyes, we behold the evidences of his wisdom and his power—the proofs of his handiwork. The little and the great, the minute and the comprehensive; the tiny insect, sporting in the sunbeam, and the mighty orb of day, enthroned in the centre of our system, and dispensing light and heat to its uttermost borders, alike tell of him. The physical arrangements of our planet, its oceans and its continents, its mountains and its valleys, its rain and its sunshine, the alternation of day and night, the vicissitude of the seasons, all of these, together with the ever-varied and yet ever-adapted forms of life, to whose support they continually minister, speak the same language. These complex frames of ours, so elaborately and so curiously wrought; each organ, limb, and member, with all the wonderful provisions of structure and properties by which they are fitted for their several offices, utter the same voice: a voice

which is not only echoed and reëchoed by all external nature, but finds a still deeper response in every faculty and power of the soul — nay, in that consciousness of derived being which lies behind these powers and faculties — that voice is God.

ARTICLE VI.

TRANSLATION AND EXPOSITION OF THE SECOND PSALM.

By Prof. C. E. Stowe, D. D., Cincinnati.

I. MESSIANIC APPLICATION OF THE PSALM.

1) *Testimony of the New Testament.* Acts 4: 24—27. The whole company of the apostles ascribe this psalm to David, quote the first two verses, and affirm that they are a prophecy of the Messiah. Acts 13: 33. The apostle Paul, in a discourse at Antioch quotes the 7th verse as a proof of the resurrection of Christ. Heb. 1: 5. The author of the epistle to the Hebrews quotes the 7th verse to prove that Christ had a nature superior to the angels; and again, Heb. 5: 5, the same author cites this verse to prove that the Messiah was appointed to his work by God.

The idea of *accommodation*, in this application of these passages, is out of the question, for the sacred writers do not adduce them as mere illustrations, but as direct proofs; and if the psalm were not originally intended to predict the Messiah, the passages quoted are nothing to their purpose. This is sufficient to prove the Messianic character of the psalm, with those who acknowledge the divine authority of the New Testament. Just before our Lord's ascension to heaven, he pointed out to his disciples those passages of the Old Testament, and particularly of the Psalms, which referred directly to himself (Luke 24: 27, 28, 44, 46); and immediately after his ascension we find them applying this psalm to him, undoubtedly on his own authority.

2) *Jewish testimony.* The older Hebrews always regarded this psalm as a prophecy of the Messiah, and never thought of giving it any other application, till they were brought into difficulty by the use which Christians made of it to prove the messiahship of Jesus of Nazareth. This is frankly acknowledged by one of the most eminent of their commentators, Rabbi Solomon Jarchi, in the following remarkable passage: "Our rabbis have always interpreted this psalm of the king

Messiah; but according to the literal sense, and *that it may resist the heretics* (that is, the Christians), *it is expedient that we interpret it of David himself.*" David Kimchi also makes a similar acknowledgment: "There are those (says he) who interpret this psalm of Gog and Magog, and the anointed king is the Messiah; and so our rabbis, of blessed memory, understood it; and the psalm, explained in this manner, is very perspicuous. But it seems more probable that David composed it respecting himself, and so we interpret it."

3) *Internal evidence.* The internal evidence for the messianic application of this psalm, and against its application to David or Solomon or any Israelitish king, is perfectly conclusive, and was so acknowledged by Eichhorn (Biblioth. der Bibl. Lit. I. 584). Rosenmüller, in the first edition of his Commentary, applied it to Solomon; but in the subsequent editions he abandons this ground, and proves very clearly that it must be applied to the Messiah and to him only. Still he contends that it is an *ideal* Messiah, and not the *historical* Christ of the New Testament who is here spoken of; for the Messiah of this psalm is represented (vs. 9 and 12) as much too severe and cruel for the Christ of the New Testament. Any one who reads the New Testament will see at once the groundlessness of this objection. The coming of Christ to execute judgment on his enemies is, in the New Testament, represented in the same manner, and often in language even more terrific. As, for example, by the apostle Paul (2 Thess. 1: 7—11) *when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, with his mighty angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God and obey not the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ; who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power, etc.* With this agree perfectly the representations which Christ gives of himself in Matthew xxiv. and xxv. See also Rev. 2: 29. 12: 5. 19: 15, where the very language of this psalm itself is used in reference to the *historical Christ of the New Testament.* The same idea is given of Christ, also, in the other prophecies of the Old Testament concerning him. Comp. Num. 24: 17—19. Isa. 11: 4. Ps. 92: 4. 110: 6, and other parallel passages.

We will indicate a few of the internal marks of the applicability of this psalm to the Messiah and the Messiah only.

Ver. 7th, the subject of this psalm is declared to be the *Son of God* in the highest sense, in the sense of partaking of the nature of God, which is applicable to no earthly king whatever. So the text is explained in the New Testament. Heb. 1: 5.

Vs. 8 and 9. The dominion of this king is to be coëxtensive with the earth itself, which applies to no earthly monarch. In the other

messianic prophecies, the same extent is given to his dominion. Compare Isa. 2: 2. Micah 4: 1. Zech. 9: 10.

V. 12. They are pronounced *blessed* who trust in this king; but the Old Testament pronounces those accursed who trust in any man, or in any being but God or the divine Messiah. So says the prophet Jeremiah (17: 5, 7) *Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. Blessed is the man that trusteth in Jehovah.* Compare also Micah 7: 5. Ps. 118: 9. 156: 13.

The attempt of Rosenmüller to make the pronoun in this verse refer back to *Jehovah* in v. 11, instead of *the Son*, which is its immediate antecedent, is entirely unsuccessful. It does open violence to the grammatical structure of the sentence; there is nothing in the context to justify it; and it is, in every respect, purely arbitrary.

In verse 7, the phrase, *this day have I begotten thee*, is referred by Paul to the day of the resurrection of Jesus (Acts 13: 33); inasmuch as the resurrection was the event which proved, beyond all contradiction, the messiahship, the sonship of Jesus. To the same idea Paul recurs in Rom. 1: 3, 4, the sense of which may be given thus: *Jesus Christ our Lord, who was a descendant of David as to his human nature; but as to his spiritual, divine nature, was, by the resurrection from the dead, powerfully demonstrated to be the Son of God.* The verb *begotten*, therefore, is used, in the place quoted, in the *declarative* sense so frequent in Hebrew; as may be illustrated by such examples as the following: Ezek. 43: 3. "The vision that I saw when I came to *destroy the city*." Ezekiel never came to *destroy the city*, but to *prophecy, to declare* its destruction. See 9: 4, 5. Also Jer. 1: 10, God says to the prophet: "See! I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to root out and to pull down, and to destroy and to throw down, to build and to plant." Jeremiah never either *rooted out* or *planted* nations or kingdoms, but he was appointed to *prophecy, to declare* these things. Again, Lev. 13: 3, 8, 13, 17, are instances of the same use of the verbs *בָּרַח* and *בָּרַח*.

II. STRUCTURE OF THE PSALM.

In this psalm, as in most of the prophetic writings of the Bible, the prophet is not told by the Holy Spirit, in words, what events are to take place, nor does he write an account of them in the way of narrative; but in prophetic ecstasy he beholds the events actually occurring before his eyes, he sees the multitudes tumultuously assembling, he hears what they say, he sees God quietly seated on his throne, he hears him speak; and he writes down the whole scene, precisely as it met his eye and ear, without circumlocution or explanatory remarks. The psalm, therefore, in its form and spirit, is strictly dramatic; and it has

all the peculiar liveliness, vigor, and conciseness of expression, which belong to this species of composition. The persons who speak, are, 1st, the psalmist, vs. 1, 2; 2d, the rebels, v. 3; 3d, the psalmist, vs. 4, 5; 4th, Jehovah, v. 6; 5th, Messiah, vs. 7—9; 6th, the psalmist, vs. 10—12.

When these dramatic psalms were sung in the temple-worship, the different persons were easily represented by different parts of the choir, responding to each other. For information respecting the method of chanting in responsive choirs, see the following passages; Exod. 15: 20, 21. 1 Sam. 18: 7. Ezra 3: 11. Neh. 12: 24, 31, 38, 40. Compare also Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew poetry, Andover edition, p. 156 ff. and p. 390 f.

Ps. cxxxvi. is an instance in point, where the choir of priests chanted the first line of each verse, and the whole congregation responded in the constantly recurring chorus, *כִּי לְעוֹלָם חַסְדּוֹ*, *for to eternity is his mercy.*

In the 2d psalm, the whole choir might chant the part of the psalmist; a particular portion of it that of the rebels; a single voice, in one place, the part of Jehovah; a single voice, in another place, that of the Messiah; and then the whole choir, that of the psalmist again. Let this be borne in mind while reading the following

III. TRANSLATION.

The Psalmist.

(*He sees the nations tumultuously assembling.*)

- 1 Why do the heathen rage,
And the people imagine vanity,
- 2 The kings of the earth stand up,
And the rulers set themselves
Against Jehovah and against his Messiah?

The Rebels.

(*The Psalmist hears them speak.*)

- 3 Let us burst asunder their bands,
And cast away from us their cords.

The Psalmist.

(*He sees God quietly seated on his throne in the heavens, with looks of derision at these rebellious and imbecile movements.*)

- 4 He that sitteth in the heavens doth laugh,
The Lord doth deride them;
- 5 Then doth he speak to them in his wrath,
And in his burning wrath doth he confound them.

Jehovah.

(*The psalmist hears him say*)

- 6 Yet have I anointed my king
On Zion the mount of my holiness.

The Messiah.

(*The Psalmist hears him say*)

- 7 I will publish the decree,
Jehovah hath said to me : My Son art thou,
I thi sday have begotten thee.
8 Ask of me,
And I will give thee the nations thine inheritance,
And thy possession the ends of the earth.
9 Thou shalt rule them with a rod of iron,
As a potter's vessel shalt thou break them in pieces.

The Psalmist.

- 10 And now ye kings be wise,
Be instructed, ye judges of the earth ;
11 Serve Jehovah with fear,
And rejoice with trembling,
12 Do homage to the Son lest he be angry,
And ye perish on the way,
For his wrath is suddenly kindled.
Blessed are all they who trust in him.

IV. NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION.

Vs. 1 and 2. These verses make one stanza of five lines, namely, two pairs of parallels, and a fifth line which belongs equally to all the four, and may be repeated after each one of them, thus ;

Why do the heathens rage
Against Jehovah and against his Messiah,
And the people imagine vanity
Against Jehovah and against his Messiah,
The kings of the earth stand up
Against Jehovah and against his Messiah,
And the rulers take counsel together
Against Jehovah and against his Messiah ?

I can see no good reason for punctuating the first verse as an interrogative, and not the second. The two are most intimately blended together in the same stanza, and form, in fact, but one sentence, which is clearly interrogative.

V. 6. The verb *מָשַׁח*, in this verse, is not the word usually employed in Hebrew to signify *anoint*, and Hengstenberg, no mean authority, translates it in this place by the German word *bilden*; but Gesenius, De Wette, Ewald, and others, agree with our common English translation, which I have retained.

V. 7. Literally, *I will speak to the sense*, just like our common English idiom, *I will speak to that point*, etc. The time *this day* has before been shown, on the authority of the New Testament, to be the day of Christ's resurrection, that being the crowning proof of his sonship, and the verb *יָדַר* being here used in the *declarative* sense, so common in Hebrew.

V. 12. Literally, *kiss the son*, the kiss being the sign of homage. The Septuagint and Vulgate give a peculiar translation of the first line of this verse, thus:

“Take hold on instruction, lest the Lord be angry,
And ye perish from the righteous way.”

The similarity of the Greek words *παῖς*, *son* (in the accusative, *παῖδα*), and *παῖδεία*, *instruction*, some critics have supposed may have led to this translation; but as the Chaldee gives the same rendering, it is more probable that they understood the Hebrew word *יָדַר* to mean *instruction*. Ewald gives the word a similar meaning; but the learned notes of Rosenmüller and Hengstenberg on this verse, together with the authority of Gesenius, De Wette, Winer, and Hitzig, sufficiently refute him.

V. FULFILMENT OF THE PROPHECY.

In regard to the time when the prophecies of this psalm are to be fulfilled, the whole psalm evidently belongs to that class of predictions, of which lord Bacon speaks as “having a latitude agreeable and familiar with divine prophecies, which, being of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousand years are as one day, are not fulfilled punctually at once, but *have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages*, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age.” (Advancement of Learning, Bk. II.)

The first two verses, the whole company of the apostles refer to the period when Herod and Pontius Pilate, the Jew and the Gentile, combined to put the Saviour to death; and the 7th verse the apostle Paul assigns to the resurrection. Acts 5: 25—27. 13: 33. The 8th, 9th, and 10th verses still remain unfulfilled.

But it is mainly whole classes of events, occurring through all time,

between the incarnation of Christ and the triumph of his religion over all mankind, and not particular historical circumstances, that take place at a definite point of time, which are indicated in this prophecy. *It hath springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of it may refer to some one age.* It began to be accomplished when Herod and Pontius Pilate agreed together to destroy the Messiah; it received still further accomplishment when Julian the apostate waged war on the "Galilean;" it had a *πλήρωσις* when the Jewish legislature publicly renounced the Christian religion; it was again fulfilled when, in the days of rationalism, the literature of Europe was almost all employed to undermine the divine authority of the Bible, — whenever, and wherever, and however, men combine against Christ and his religion, this prophecy is in part accomplished; and will continue to be thus gradually fulfilled, *till He whose right it is, shall come and reign on the earth.* When that age comes, when the last great battle is fought (Rev. 20: 7, 10), then *the height or fulness of this prophecy will be accomplished.*

Very many of the Biblical prophecies are of the same character, and the attempt to limit the predictions, each one to some one particular historical occurrence, at a definite point of time, has been a fruitful source of perplexity and error in the interpretation of prophecy. Prophecy generally is not *history anticipated*, in the dry and literal sense; but rather a series of magnificent hieroglyphics, each one infolding and giving expression to a whole class of ideas. The whole book of Revelation is filled with prophecies of this kind; and the perverse endeavors to limit its far-reaching symbols to individual occurrences, has led to endless mistakes and blunders. The Book gives neither the civil nor the ecclesiastical history of particular countries or periods, but rather the *philosophy of history* for the whole world, through all time; the *philosophy of history* considered with reference to its religious influences. The 2d Psalm is a fair and remarkably plain specimen of the prophecies of this sort, and may give much assistance in the interpretation of others more recondite, complex, and ornate.

VI. PRACTICAL USES OF THIS PROPHECY.

1. This prophecy shows what is the kind of encouragement, and hope, and comfort, which the enlightened Christian may derive from prophecy generally.

It is the object of the Bible to establish certain great principles in religion and morals. These principles it enforces and illustrates in the most graphic and striking manner, and by a great variety of methods:

by aphorisms, by parables, by narratives, by showing the workings of these principles and the effects of their violations in individuals and in nations. It also foretells the vicissitudes which await these principles in their conflicts with human depravity, their struggles, their successes, their temporary defeats, their final and complete triumph. (Compare Rom. 8: 19—28.) This is most generally the subject of prophecy. There are some prophecies strictly and minutely historical, such as those concerning the Jewish captivity, the destruction of Babylon, the ruin of Jerusalem, etc. But these are few in comparison with the whole number. It is not generally the object of prophecy to anticipate history, to give names and dates; and the attempts to interpret the great mass of the prophecies as if they were written with that object, have been most miserable failures. It is an attempt to treat the Holy Spirit as the oriental story-tellers treat their genii when they shut them up in little bottles. The triumph of principles over all opposition; the nature and power and varying phases of the oppositions: these form the great staple of prophecy — and such questions as, “Lord! what shall this man do?” generally remain unanswered. True, certain sayings often “go abroad among the brethren,” as interpretations of divine prophecy, but they are not authorized by anything which Jesus has said.

2. The psalm teaches us the hopelessness of all opposition, however formidable it may appear, to the progress of the gospel.

The opposition to Christ, in this world, often appears very formidable. *The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together, against Jehovah and against his Messiah* — and there is the still more chilling hostility of indifference and neglect. But the most powerful and active enmity — at that, *He who sitteth in the heavens shall laugh* — the most immovable and stolid indifference, even that shall be aroused when *God shall speak in his wrath*. As Martin Luther somewhere says: “He that would blow out God’s fires, does but blow the coals and the ashes in his own face.”

3. This psalm illustrates the quietness and confidence with which the true Christian, even in the darkest times, should await the developments of God’s providence.

Perfect love casteth out fear, and where there is faith with love, there can be no ground for agitation or alarm or long anxiety. God is never agitated or excited; he is never hurried or impatient, though this world has so long been lying in wickedness before his eyes; and those who have learned of God and can sympathize with him, should remember that the Scripture says directly: *Fret not thyself because of evil doers*. In nothing do some professedly religious movements

more distinctly betray their unheavenly origin, than in the impatience, the fretfulness, the want of calmness and self-possession, manifested in them. Activity without restlessness, power without noise, earnestness without impatience, vigor without harshness, *steadfast, unmovable, always abounding*, with a quiet assurance of ultimate and complete success — these are the characteristics of a soul imbued with the spirit of the 2d Psalm, which is the Spirit of God.

ARTICLE VII.

THE GERMAN UNIVERSITIES.

By Dr. Hermann Wimmer, late Professor in the Blochmann College, Dresden, Saxony.

AN American university and a German "universität," differ very much from each other. The fact is, that the name is here applied to colleges for general education, preparatory to professional studies (gymnasias or gelehrtschulen), whereas it means in Germany an institution for theological, juridical, medical, and philosophical learning. Consequently, the latter can be only compared with the divinity, law, medical and scientific schools of Cambridge or Yale college. There exists, however, a good deal of difference; and to give, beforehand, some idea of the peculiar organization of the German universities, we may be allowed to anticipate the following remarks. Each State or province has one university, where the graduates of all gymnasias (eleven in Saxony) meet together; whereas in Cambridge, the students of the four professional schools are mostly graduates of the one chief college. The university consists of four faculties, but is one complete institution, and the difference of the faculties does not exist for the student. He can attend theological and physical or philosophical lectures, according to his liking. There are no classes. The instruction is given by lectures, not by recitations. Several professors lecture generally on the same subject, or on similar subjects of the same branch. The student chooses the lectures which he will attend. The professor knows not his audience. Some professors have ninety hearers; others, nine. The "philosophical" faculty comprises all the philological, mathematical, physical and philosophical branches, and is destined as well for the students of the three professions as for those who prepare themselves for professorships in the same branches. Only practical exercises,

as chemical in the laboratory, surgical in the hospital, theological or philological in societies, etc., bring the professor into immediate relation to a smaller number of students. After a study time of three years or more, the student is, on his own application, examined; and if found sufficiently instructed, dismissed as a candidate. The students of medicine remain generally longer than others, and have, after the examination, to defend a printed dissertation in a public disputation, for their degree.

The oldest university of the German empire is that in Prague. It was founded in 1348, by the emperor Charles IV, in his favorite residence; and began soon to flourish, like her sisters in Paris, Oxford, and Bologna. At the end of the century, it is said to have numbered more than twenty thousand students (10,000 in Bologna, in A.D. 1260). They were divided into four "nations," Bohemians (with Moravians and Hungarians), Saxons (with Danes and Swedes), Bavarians (with Austrians, Suabians, Franks, and Rhinelanders), and Polish. But this splendor lasted only a short time; for, in 1409, after some quarrel with the Bohemians, the Saxons, together with the Bavarians and Poles, quitted Prague and founded the high school (*hohe schule, hochschule*) or university in Leipzig.

In 1365, the Latin school of Vienna, founded 1237 by the emperor Frederick II. of Hohenstaufen, in which also philosophy and the fine arts were taught, was changed into a university by the foundation of some professorships for law and medicine, and afterwards for theology (1384). The four nations here were the Austrians, Hungarians, Saxons and Rhinelanders. Vienna was soon followed by Heidelberg, 1387, Cologne, 1388, Erfurt, 1392, Würzburg, 1403, etc. The universities are now Königsberg for Prussia, Berlin for Brandenburg, Breslau for Silesia, Greifswalde for Pomerania, Rostock for Mecklenburg, Bonn for the Rhineland, Kiel for Schleswig-Holstein, Leipzig for Saxony, Halle (Wittenberg, 1502—1815) for the province of Saxony, Jena for the Saxon duchies, Göttingen for Hanover, etc., Tübingen for Würtemberg, Heidelberg (and the catholic Freiburg) for Baden, Marburg and Giessen for the two Hesses, Erlangen for Franconia, Munich for Bavaria, Vienna, Prague, etc. for Austria. As to the Austrian universities, however, it must be mentioned, that they have a different organization from those in other German States, and that they, except Vienna and Prague, which have, in spite of the prejudice of non-Austrian Germans, a celebrated name throughout the States for their physical and medical learning, have no just claim to rank with the universities out of Austria.

A university has four faculties. Each faculty has three kinds of

teachers, called *professores publici ordinarii*, p. p. o., *prof. extraordinarii*, p. e., and *privatdocenten*. Only the ordinary professors are members of the faculty, and of the senate consisting nearly of all the p. p. o. The senate of Leipzig numbers 40 members and upwards. At the head of the senate and of the whole institution stands the Rector, elected for one year by and out of the senate, or Prorector in those States where the prince himself is the permanent rector. On the 31st of October, the anniversary day of the Reformation, yearly celebrated in Saxony, the rector in Leipzig abdicates in the "aula" of the "augusteum," after having given a short account of the last year. Then the professor of eloquence and poetry (formerly Hermann) speaks a Latin oration, and "his magnificence," the new rector, is installed for the next year. He is the highest administrative and judicial officer, without having, of course, the manual labor of it. He presides in the senate and court, but every branch has its particular functionaries. There is a royal judge appointed with two secretaries, a treasurer with several clerks for the administration of the university estates and capital, and plenty of other officers down to the prison keeper, who has about thirty "carcers" under his care, sometimes full, often containing but one or two chief malefactors, who are confined to their solitary residences perhaps for half a year and more. The wealth of the university in Leipzig is immense. Besides the large foundations for the professors, there are nearly a thousand "stipendia" for students belonging to certain families or towns etc., and most of them paying a yearly rent of thirty dollars.

The larger universities have from 50 to 107 professors (in Leipzig 69), for each important branch of science one *prof. publ. ord.*, who is bound to teach it, yet at the same time he is allowed to lecture on whatever he pleases (some time ago the government prevented certain political lectures). The number of p. p. o. in Leipzig is at least forty; that of the p. extraor., who have generally small salaries, and of the *privatdocenten*, who have none at all, is varying and unlimited. Most professors give one lecture "publicly," as it is called, meaning gratis (a p. publicus o. is bound to do it), and another "privately" i. e. for pay. The expenses of the student in this respect are not large. To become a *privatdocent*, the scholar must receive the permission of "habilitation" from the faculty, and then, like any p. p. o., present a dissertation and defend it against the attacks of those professors, who are willing and able to censure him. Any vacant ord. professorship is filled by the election of one by the government, out of three nominated by the faculty. At the head of the faculty stands a dean, "decanus."

The new student, when he has made up his mind what course to pursue, looks into the lecture catalogue, *index lectionum*, or on the

blackboard (posted at some conspicuous place in the buildings, and containing the notices of the professors), to choose four or six lectures to his liking. Some experienced friends advise him, and he acts accordingly. A student of theology, for instance, used to hear in Leipzig (in the first term of five months), historical introduction to the Scriptures by Winzer, Matthew or Luke by Theile, the psalms by Fleischer or Brockhaus, logic by Drobisch, anthropology by Heinroth, a Greek author by Hermann; in the following terms the Romans or Hebrews by Winer, history of the church by Niedner, dogmatic by Winer or Grossmann, pastoral theology by Krehl, moral philosophy by Hartenstein, etc. Others may have attended the lectures of other professors on the same subjects, but all generally hear in the first year exegetical lessons on the Gospel besides philosophical and philological lectures, in the second year on church-history and on the epistles, in the third year on dogmatic and pastoral theology. When they apply for the theological examination, they must show a list of the most necessary lectures attested by the respective professors as having been attended. But this might require only a few hours' attendance and the subscribing of the name on the circulating sheet, since the professor is unable to control his hearers, whom he does not know, or to convict them of non-attendance. The subscription, or the payment, is what he testifies by his name. However, the examination will show the scholar. Many a first rate gentleman, accomplished in all the worldly wisdom, which the university life imparts, has been transferred to another year or to another business, after he had received a zero in Hebrew or in any other of the five or six theological branches. Many a first rate talker in his mother tongue, who could not express distinctly his feelings and meaning in a dead or outlandish jargon, sounding almost "like Dutch," (as the proverb runs, though there is probably no language on earth coming nearer the English than that same Dutch) "fell through," as it is called, in distinction from "came through." A favorable result of the examination in Leipzig, which makes the student candidate of theology, is a good recommendation to the second or State-examination, two years afterwards, which is to declare him candidate for the ministry, by Ammon, Wahl, Käuffer, Lange in Dresden. This gives him the undoubted right, — to wait ten years more for a ministry, if he is not so lucky as to come in before by the favor of some private "collator" i. e. country nobleman or city senate. There are two such examinations, also, for the lawyer, the former being theoretical, the latter practical. Only the physician, when he has made his examination, and for his degree the disputation, may go and practise, wherever he pleases.

The philosophical faculty has a nearer relation to the three sister-

faculties, than they have to each other. To be sure the theologian may attend a lecture on anatomy, or the lawyer and physician may hear Wiener on Protestantism and Catholicism; however, either of the three has a more intimate intercourse with the philosophical branches, i. e. with logic, psychology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, history, Greek, Latin, Hebrew, mathematics, astronomy, natural philosophy, natural history, etc. than the three have with each other. There have been five professors lecturing on philosophy proper (the most popular, Drobisch and Hartenstein, are disciples of Herbart); seven on classical philology, four on history and polity, Wachsmuth, Pöhlitz, Bülow, Flath, one on astronomy, Möbius, one on zoölogy, Schwägrichen, one on mineralogy, Naumann, one on botany, one on chemistry, one on natural philosophy, Fechner, one on mathematics, Drobisch, two on pedagogy, two for Hebrew and Arabic, one on old German literature, Haupt, and several on the modern languages.

There being in Leipzig about three hundred students of each of the three professions, the chief lectures in those faculties are always attended by a large audience, but those in the philosophical faculty, however excellent they may be, have sometimes but a few hearers, (Hegel had in the first term at Heidelberg only four students, and was comforted by the theologian, Paulus, the leader of the "Rationalists," that he himself had sometimes lectured for not more than five. Several lectures are discontinued in the first week. The number of students exclusively devoted to theoretical, i. e. philosophical, philological, etc. learning is of course small, because rich estates or poor professorships are but rare articles after all, in common life, and it would be still smaller if it did not contain a good many non-Saxons or non-Germans. Of the twenty or twenty-five philologists in Leipzig ten years ago, there were scarcely more than ten born in the kingdom of Saxony. But, as it has been mentioned already, the philosophical faculty is not only intended for the few who prepare themselves for the chairs of their teachers, but also for the great mass of professional students, who, however, as it has been always complained of, avail themselves too little of the advantage to improve more and more in the liberal and *humanistic* learning, which they acquired in the gymnasia. Scarcely two come from those quarters, it is true, to hear lectures on the Integral Calculus, on archaeology or syntax, etc.; but there are generally enough to make a considerable audience in logic, psychology, history, etc., especially new-comers or *fichse* (foxes) as they are nicknamed by their older fellows.

The importance of a university depends partly on the size and wealth of the State, and partly on the temporary excellence of most or several

of the professors. About fifty years ago, the little Jena had Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Schlegel, Hegel and other distinguished men. The university at Giessen, in the grand-duchy of Hesse, is one of the smallest, but Liebig has given her a new lustre, and the government, anxious to detain him, has gracefully vouchsafed to make him baron. Of course, Giessen is now the resort of many students of chemistry from all parts of Germany and from other countries. Students of law went to Heidelberg, to hear Thibaut and Mittermaier, physicians to Vienna, Prague or Würzburg (Julius Hospital), philosophers to Berlin (Hegel † 1831, etc.) or Munich (Schelling, now in Berlin), or Göttingen (Herbart †), theologians to Halle (Tholuck, etc.) or to Leipzig (Wiener and Niedner), or to Berlin (Schleiermacher†, Neander). But most of the professional students remain in their respective State universities. And even the smallest universities, Rostock, Kiel, Marburg, Giessen, Jena, Erlangen, have at any time a number of stars, either shining in the modest dress of privatdocenten, or with the splendor of titles. But when the light has reached the eyes of richer universities, it is soon transferred to a larger sphere, sometimes in an ungenial region or after the fire of genius has gone out. Berlin (since 1810) and Munich are new universities, transferred from Frankfort on the Oder and Landshut, but in consequence of their being situated in capitals and near the heart of the "Landsväter," they have the greatest number of students. Berlin has about 1600. Jena about 375. The university in Vienna was closed last year, the "academic legion" having been the chief corporation of the revolution, and the "Aula," Vienna's Faneuil Hall. Göttingen was once great under Münchhausen's curatorship, having Michaelis, Heyne, Heeren, Herbart, Gauss, Otfried Müller, etc., but a good deal of her renown since the Duke of Cumberland became king of Hanover, 1837, has disappeared. Seven celebrated professors protested against his arbitrary changes, and were compelled to resign. They were Ewald the orientalist, Albrecht, Weber, now in Leipzig, Gervinus, now in Heidelberg, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, now in Berlin, and Dahlmann, now in Bonn. Ewald has lately returned to Göttingen.

For the students of philology Leipzig has been for fifty years a favorite resort. The lately deceased Hermann was the magnet. His fame had been on the increase since the beginning of the century, and when it had spread farthest, his vitality had not decreased. The ministers of education in Russia and France, Uwaroff and Cousin, were seen sitting on the old benches in his lecture-room, and the former numbered even among his friends. Also the present Secretary of the Board of Education in Massachusetts, Dr. Sears, has listened to the

eloquent wisdom of the great master, and has, together with the Professors, Edwards of Andover, and Felton of Cambridge, laid down in the "Classical Studies" a noble gift on the altar of learning and education. In 1840, when Hermann had been doctor of philosophy for fifty years, all the universities of Europe vied with each other in presenting their homage by deputies, diplomas or poems. Scholars of all kinds had held back their new books for the great day, to dedicate them to him; others had written literary dissertations only for that occasion. The government, which had created him long before "Comthur" of the "order of merit," presented his son, Conrad Hermann, with a "stipendium" for three years, to study in some other universities in Germany. The Greek Society gave him a *tabula votiva* of silver, with an inscription on one side, and the names of the "Sodales" on the other.

Gottf. Hermann was born in Leipzig, and spent nearly all his life in the same city. The classical air of the gymnasium could not but inspire the highly gifted youth with love for ancient literature, and excite the desire of continual communion with the favorite studies. At that time very few devoted themselves exclusively to philology, and only such as purposed to pursue the "academical career," and to become university professors of classical literature. The professorships in the gymnasia were commonly filled by such candidates of theology, as in addition to their *required* studies (*das Brodstudium*) had, while at the university, most successfully continued their classical studies. G. Hermann, when entering the high school, chose, like his father, the study of law, and had almost finished his course, when he exchanged the *corpus juris* for the *corpus poetarum graecorum*. Classical learning is much indebted to Prof. Reiz (*Plauti Rudens*, 1784. *Herodotus*, etc.) whose learning, taste and teaching talent were able to win the young Hermann for a field in which his genius had a larger scope than in the dull and mouldy pages of *Tribonian*. Hermann remembered him always with respect and gratitude. The notes to Viger, inserted in Hermann's edition, will carry his name with that of his celebrated disciple down to classical scholars of coming ages. With 1790 Hermann's academical and literary career commenced. The "*Elementa artis metricae*," "*Epitome*" and "*Handbuch*" showed him soon to the world as a scholar of the first order. With philosophical sagacity he analyzed the metrical laws of the ancients, and though there may be in the introduction too much of Kant's categories, his attachment to Kantianism, like that of Schiller, could not but bear fine fruits of independent research. His grammatical writings, "*de Emen-dandâ Rat. Graec. Grammaticae* I. 1801; *Adnot. ad Vigerum*; de

Particula, &c.,” etc., showing a thorough acquaintance with authors and grammarians, and an unusual acuteness of judgment, made him the first authority in grammatical learning. His editions of Aristotle *de Arte Poet.* 1802, Eurip. *Hecuba*, 1800, *Homeri hymni*, 1806, *Orphica*, 1806, Sophocles after Erfurdt, 1809, Euripides, etc. completed his renown. It is true, he has published no popular grammar like Buttman or Kühner, but he gave new principles and new materials to others for writing common books in systematical arrangement. It is not less true, that his editions never have been nor will be favorite school books, because they contain very little matter suited to the wants and tastes of younger students. He intended to emend the text, not to explain it. He purposed to show the right way to other critics, and to prepare the field for teachers or editors who sow the classical seed by books or recitations. According to the different character of the university and gymnasium, the professors of the former have to promote learning as such by new theories and new researches, whereas those of the latter have to make it popular by a new method or the skillful application of an old one. Hence popular school editions are, generally speaking, written by gymnasium professors, as Krüger, *Anabasis* and *Thucydides*, Kühner, *Tusculan Questions*, Stallbaum, *Plato*, Matthiae, *Cic. Orat. Select.*, etc., Wunder, *Sophocles*, Wagner, *Virgil*, Herzog, *Caesar*, Doering, *Horace*, Goeller, *Thucydides*, Rüdiger, *Demosthenes Olynth.*, Jacobs, *Lucian*, Fabri, *Sallust*, *Livy*, etc. Besides the above named books, we have a treasure of classical learning in the many treatises on various subjects, published in “Programms” or reviews. The former we owe to his function as professor of eloquence and poetry, which obliged him to write at all public occasions the university-programme, i. e. a dissertation, followed on the last page by the invitation or other communications in the name of the university. (The gymnasium professors write them by turns.) They are all, together with prefaces, poems and letters, collected in the six volumes of his *Opuscula*. They contain “*De mythologia Graecorum antiquissima*, 1817, “*De historiae graecae primordiis*, 1818, a number of researches on *Aeschylus’* tragedies, and the great review of *Aeschyli Eumenides*, ed. by C. O. Müller in Göttingen, 1833, almost a complete commentary and as valuable as Müller’s edition itself. In length it is only surpassed by Ed. Wunder’s “recension” of Lobeck’s *Ajax*, and by Hermann’s “über Herrn Prof. Böeckh’s *Behandlung der griech. Inschriften*, 1826, 8. vs. Böeckh’s *corpus inscriptionum graecarum*, 2 vols. 1825.” The “*Incredibilia*” were directed vs. Schaefer, with whom a dispute had arisen on account of some remark in the preface to *Viger*. If his literary disputes were to be judged by the most rigid mo-

ralist, he might perhaps receive some little censure for his quarrel with Schaefer, but certainly would be acquitted on any other account. His disputes with Böckh and O. Müller may by a phrenologist be traced to large combativeness; but by others they are considered as the necessary results of opposite positions in the field of science, and hallowed by many useful and interesting results. We remember well, that in the lecture on mythology, the views of "Professor Müller" (*Prolegomena zu einer wissenschaftlichen Mythologie*, 1825) were sharply, sometimes even scornfully contradicted, and that in the Pindar-lecture many Böckhiana were unpardonably rejected, but Hermann was critic by profession, and the students wanted not to hear a school-like genealogy of the gods, with a chronological account of their exploits, etc., but the principles of the science in general, and the peculiar views of Hermann in opposition to other chief masters. The amiability of his character blunted generally the sharp point of his criticism. Hence he was feared, not hated by his opponents, respected by all, and loved, sincerely and warmly loved, by his disciples. The scholar Hermann was only surpassed by the teacher Hermann. The most elegant Latin was flowing from his lips, while all eyes of the audience were rivetted upon him with unbroken attention. The most tasteful combination of critical and explanatory matter, laid the author open in all his beauty and strength. When the passage was rugged, a conjecture smoothed the way, and each hearer was gliding along convinced, that if the proposed reading was not the genuine one, it was the better one. The hour passed rapidly, but the thinking hearer had enough to reflect upon for a whole day. Hermann gave always six lectures a week, from 11 till 12 every day; on a Greek author, rarely on a play of Plautus or Terence, four times; and on mythology, metre, Greek syntax, and similar subjects, twice, i. e. on Wednesdays and Saturdays. The latter were given in German. In the first days of a new term, the "Auditorium" was always crowded, many "hospites" being there to see and hear, once at least, the great man of whom they had heard so much; and throughout the term we seldom found, on the four days ("public") less than fifty hearers. The "wissenschaftlichen" lectures were attended by scarcely any others than philologists; yet, since nearly all of these were present, the audience numbered at least twenty.

Hermann's colleagues were formerly Chr. Daniel Beck, the polyhistor, author of an history of the world, 1787, remarkable for the completeness of the literature, of a "Grundriss der archaeologie," 1816; of "de philologia saeculi Ptolem." 1818; *Observ. critt. histor.* 1821, etc. and editor of Plato, 1813, of the "Commentarii in Aristophenem, etc.;" Carl Beier, the editor of Cicero de Officiis, 1820, Caelius, 1828, and

Benj. Weiske, the editor of Xenophon, 1798, Longinus, etc.; G. H. Schaefer, the editor of the apparatus ad Demosthenem, Gregory of Corinth, of the *Corpus Poetarum Graecorum*, Tauchn. 1810, etc. They were succeeded afterwards by A. Westermann, who lectured exclusively on Greek authors, and particularly on the orators; also on the Greek inscriptions, on Greek literature, etc. His history of Greek and Roman eloquence is his greatest work and highly thought of. — Reinhold Klotz is the representative of Roman learning in Leipzig. As Beier was bold, so prudent and circumspect is Klotz in the use of the Codices (*diplomatische kritik*), and his editions of Cicero's Orationes, 8 vol., Tuscul. Disp., Laelius and Cato, show his critical taste and Roman scholarship in the most favorable light. A critical edition of all of Cicero's Works has been expected for a long time by all the friends of the great statesman and philosopher. Klotz is still young, about forty-three, but his active mind has been very productive. He has published Clemens Alexandrinus, Terentii Comœdiae, with the emended commentaries of Donat and Eugraphius, Devarius, a translation of Cicero's philosophical works, etc., and edited with the celebrated corrector of the Thomas-school, J. Ch. Jahn, the *Philologischen Jahrbücher*, and has been, since Jahn's death, its chief editor, with the assistance of Prof. Dietsch of Grimma. The last works of the greatest importance, but not yet finished, are his *Römische Literaturgeschichte*, and his Latin-German lexicon. They bid fair to leave Bähr's *Röm. Literatur*, 1828, and Freund's *Lexicon*, behind. May the publisher of the lexicon, in Brunswick, not be prevented by the present unfavorable circumstances, from continuing it! W. A. Becker, who died in 1846, was, previously to his appointment, professor in Meissen, and labored in the university about ten years. His "Gallus," "Charicles," and "Roman Antiquities," are the popular monuments of his archaeological learning, perhaps less various and universal, but more exact and systematical than that of the celebrated Böttiger of Dresden (*Sabina, Amalthea, Andeutungen zu Vorträgen über Archaeologie*, 1806, *Vasengemälde*, etc.). Mor. Haupt, Hermann's son-in-law, now P. O. of old German literature, used to lecture as privatdocent on Catullus and other Latin poets with much success. The two rectors of the gymnasia in Leipzig, Stallbaum the celebrated Platonist, and Nobbe the editor of Cicero's fragments, are also professors of the university; yet, being sufficiently occupied with their important chief business, make very little use of their academical professorship. Wilhelm and Ludwig Dindorf, formerly connected with the university, retired a long time since and devoted themselves entirely to writing and publishing. To these philological professors must be added

the P. P. O. of history, Wilhelm Wachsmuth, the far renowned author of the "*Hellenische Alterthumskunde*," etc. His Lectures on Greek and Roman Antiquities, and on ancient history, are well attended by the philologists, as they deserve to be.

This description may have given a fair idea of the opportunities which the universities generally, and that in Leipzig particularly, afford to a classical student. Yet, the character of philological studies being such as to require much reading and personal research, the student, the more he advances, loses the more interest in lectures. He needs particular exercises, in order to bring out his discoveries and to be corrected or encouraged. After passive hearing and solitary study, he needs some social activity, to consolidate and to enlarge his learning. And these wants were admirably provided for, at least for those who were able to testify sufficient scholarship. Having been, for three or four terms, an attentive listener to the best teachers, the student contrived to be admitted into the philological seminary. For that end he presented a Latin composition, on a Greek or Roman author, to the two leaders, Hermann, director, and Klotz, adjunct, and if approved by them, he could expect to be accepted in the course of the year; if not, he tried a second time and then gave it up. The number of members was, according to the statutes, limited to twelve, but almost never exceeded nine. Some of them belonged to it for three and more years. They assembled on Wednesdays and Saturdays, at 5 o'clock, around a broad table in Hermann's lecture-room. Hermann conducted the Greek exercises, and Klotz the Latin. Euripides' *Medea*, and Cicero's four orations against Verres, were the two pieces explained in the winter term of 1838. Both professors were regularly present. A member lectured for nearly one hour, on twenty or more verses of Euripides, or on a chapter of Cicero, beginning where his predecessor had left off the last time. After he had finished, the other members, from the oldest down to the youngest, reviewed the lecture and criticised with sharp Latin tongues. The professor of the respective branch was judge, and condemned or acquitted the defendant in doubtful cases. When the youngest member had spoken, in case something was left to him by his more fortunate superiors, the professor was the last opponent, and reviewed those passages on which he had not decided before. All the members will agree with us, that these exercises were as interesting as useful, and will always with joy and gratitude recollect the seminary-meetings of their university life.

Of different character and standing was the Greek Society. If the candidate had been successful with his request and critical essay, the new member had to defend his composition against some opponent, who

had studied it through. The other members were silent listeners ; and, since they knew not more of the matter in dispute than what they heard from the mouth of the opponent, were not always much interested. Hermann had the last word. The Society assembled on Fridays, at five, around the same table, as above. The compositions were all critical. Each member, by turns, laid down the fruits of eight or more months' studies before the eyes of his adversary, who labored generally in the same or a neighboring field, and of the president. In the course of the disputation, he soon became convinced of his fallibility, how brilliant soever the general results of his researches might have been. Many discoveries respecting Greek authors, grammar, history, philosophy, antiquities, etc., were here spoken of for the first time.

Hermann is dead. The society is closed. But the grateful remembrance of the living members and the literary productions of the deceased ones, will never cease to make known Hermann's amiability and scholarship to the coming generations. To speak further of the extent and importance of Hermann's school seems to be superfluous. It will be understood, that the number of all his pupils, who studied philology under him without becoming members of his society, is more than twenty times larger, to say nothing of such as attended his lectures for one or two terms.

In Berlin, the philological department is represented by illustrious names, and Böckh's "school" is often mentioned not next, but beside and in opposition to Hermann's school. And, indeed, who does not admire the learning of the editor of Pindar, *Corpus inscriptionum Gr.*, Philolaos, 1819, Plat. Min. 1806, of the author of *Staatshaushalt. d. Ath.*, de Trag. Graec. Principibus, 1808, and of the many excellent essays in the "*Abhandlungen der Berl. Akademie*," etc. His antiquarian learning and historical sagacity, combined with a profound knowledge of the Greek language and literature, make him a worthy successor of the celebrated founder of the "*Alterthumswissenschaft*" (science of antiquity), F. A. Wolf (prof. first in Halle ; then in Berlin, 1824. "*Darst. der Alterthumsw. nach Begriff, Umfang, Zweck und Werth*" im *Museum der Alterthumsw.* Berl. 1847. Vorl. über *Encyclopädie der A.*, her. 1831.). And in this respect he is perfectly equal to Hermann, in whom the most thorough acquaintance with all the grammatical, metrical, critical, and aesthetical niceties was combined with a profound knowledge of Greek antiquities. That he has been considered inferior to Hermann as teacher, may lie, therefore, not in the measure of learning or talent, but in the very differences which made them separate leaders. Right understanding and tasteful explanation of the classics is the chief thing, to which all the future professors of philology aspire,

and in the same degree as the systematical book on antiquities may be a treasure for students of all countries and time, the variegated lecture on an author will be the best teacher of an audience eager to learn method and skill not to be acquired out of books. Böckh and Hermann were obliged to make the reading of classics their principal business as professors; and though Böckh certainly is an excellent expounder, plain, clear, and exact, Hermann had the advantage of being in his proper sphere, and thus could not be either surpassed or reached. And as to antiquities of all kinds, though he never attained the systematical accuracy of Böckh, O. Müller, or Wachsmuth, the sporadical flashes of lightning which, here and there, penetrated the darkness of antiquity, sufficed to the hearer who was either acquainted already with the common materials, or could supply at home the deficiencies by reading the respective standard books. What Hermann has been for the classical studies, is Böckh for the studies of antiquity; yet it is natural, that they continually crossed each other's ways, so however, that Hermann used the antiquities, and Böckh the classics merely as instruments. Hence as Hermann's school has been productive of excellent classical teachers and critics, so Böckh's disciples have enriched the historical and antiquarian literature by valuable books and monographies. But many philologists of the Berlin school are distinguished by peculiar excellences. The following members of the Greek Society at Leipzig, Leopold Ranke, the great historian, W. A. Becker†, Ed. Platner, "der griech. Process," "Stadt Rom."† C. F. Hermann, P. O. in Göttingen, author of "Staatsalterthümer," Westermann, etc., are well known for their historical or archaeological learning. But it will not be forgotten, that this branch was represented in Leipzig formerly by Ch. D. Beck,† and afterwards by W. Wachsmuth and W. A. Becker, while in Berlin C. Tim. Zumpt, Immanuel Bekker, Lachmann, Trerdelenberg, and Franz, are renowned as grammarians and critics; beside the archaeologists Ed. Gerhard, co-editor of "Beschreibung Rom's," etc., Panofka, "res Samiorum," Curtius and others. Böckh had one great rival, who bade fair to surpass the fame of his friend — O. Müller in Göttingen, who died a few years ago during his travels in Greece. Hermann had none, yet he had the satisfaction to see himself overtaken by the body of his disciples. The chief professors, in short, of the universities are members of his Society: in Königsberg, the veteran Lobeck; in Göttingen, C. F. Hermann; in Breslau, Passow,† C. E. Ch. Schneider; in Munich, Thiersch, the author of a Greek grammar with special regard to the Homeric dialect, of many essays in the *Acta philolog. Monac.*, etc., and the great champion of classical learning in Bavaria, also a zealous member

of the Philological Associations in Germany ; in Jena, Hand ; in Marburg, Th. Bergk ; in Leipzig, Westermann and Klotz ; in Berlin, Franz and Trendelenberg ; in gymn. in Berlin, Meineke and Bonitz ; in Rostock, Fritzsche ; in Bonn, Näke,† Ritschl ; in Petersburg, Graefe ; in Dorpat, Stephani, etc. Besides, as it will be seen in the list of the members of the Greek Society, the *Hermannists* are to be found as professors and presidents of the colleges (gymnasias) throughout all Germany. Of course, there have been and are besides Hermann and Hermann's school, many classical scholars of the first order, as Fr. Jacobs in Gotha,† the great Hellenist, Creuzer and Bähr in Heidelberg, Osann in Giessen, Eichstädt† and Götting in Jena, Doederlein in Erlangen, Bernhardt in Halle, Schömann in Griefswalde, Nitzsch in Kiel, Welcker in Bonn, Walz in Tübingen, Bachmann, Tafel, Schneidewin, Forchhammer, Lehrs, Nägelbach, Spitzner, Kreissig, Alschefski, Weissenborn, Wagner, Ellendt, etc., and more, whose names will be found in the following collection of philological choice books.

We hope that a selection of books will not be unwelcome to such as are not well acquainted with the philological literature. We have enumerated only books of established fame, or useful editions, in order to make it not only practical but also trustworthy as far as our authority is concerned, by excluding nearly all the productions of the last few years. These can be easily supplied out of the philological literature of the day, yet are not likely to make these celebrated works or editions superfluous.

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In looking back on the whole educational system in Germany, we find in many respects quite the reverse of what prevails in this country. Which is the better? How preferable soever to the American his system may appear, one want seems to be evident, namely, that of an institution for future professors of ancient literature. Physicians, lawyers and ministers are expected to have gone through a professional course, but the professor of Latin or Greek has little opportunity, out of his study, to prepare himself for his difficult task, unless he goes to Germany, and goes there so well prepared that he is enabled to understand the German and Latin lectures. In the latter case, Germany affords so many and so great advantages, that it will be for a long time the resort for all friends of antiquity, but a philological seminary in this country would not only prepare the student who intends going there for making the studies in that country in the shortest time most available, but afford to him after his return the opportunity of continuing

his studies in a philological community. And the chief point is, that such as could not avail themselves of a long residence in a transatlantic country, would find here a place where they could, by means of theoretical and practical exercises, improve the classical learning acquired in the colleges. Study and the recitation room alone may raise to excellence the one who is sincerely and cordially attached to classical studies, and this has been the case here, though it must be allowed that such remarkable men are at any place or time only exceptions. On the other hand, it is obvious, that a circle of students preëminently devoted to philology, and of professors bound to promote the learning as such, and not to teach it as an instrument of liberal school education, would soon become the hearth, from which the flame of classical studies, once kindled and continually fed, would be likely to light and to warm the whole country.

ARTICLE VIII.

COMMENTARIES ON THE SCRIPTURES.

It is our principal object, in the following Article, to communicate some information in regard to a few of the more important and recent commentaries on the Scriptures. It will not be necessary to refer to expositions by English and American authors, e. g. Henderson and Alexander on Isaiah, Henderson on the Minor Prophets, Stuart on Romans, Hebrews, and the Apocalypse, etc., which are well known and highly esteemed. We shall confine ourselves, for the most part, to commentaries written in Germany, and in the Latin and German languages. Of these in respect to size, there are three classes, 1. The commentaries which are compressed into a narrow compass, by rejecting all superfluous words, by using many abbreviations, and by giving only the substance of the thought, an example of which is De Wette's work on the New Testament; 2d. The exhaustive commentaries, in which all important topics and sometimes those which are not, are handled at length, and with all fulness of learning, of which Tholuck upon the Sermon on the Mount, Hengstenberg on the Psalms, Baur on Amos, and Delitzsch on Habakkuk, are instances; 3d. Commentaries of an intermediate size, where no special effort is made to compress the materials on the one hand, or to exhaust every topic on the other. Meyer's Commentary on the New

Test. hits perhaps this happy medium. The first and second classes are the most useful to the experienced critic and scholar, the last to the general reader.

I. OLD TESTAMENT.

Extended Commentaries.

1. The Compend of E. F. C. Rosenmüller. The full title is, *Scholia in Vetus Testamentum in Compendium redacta*, Vol. I.—VI. 8, Lipsiae, 1828—36, published by Barth. Vol. I. contains the Pentateuch, II. Isaiah, III. the Psalms, IV. Job, V. Ezekiel, VI. the twelve Minor Prophets. The author was born Dec. 10, 1768, and died in Leipsic, Sept. 17, 1835. He was professor in the university of Leipsic from 1795 till his death. He was the author of numerous writings in relation to the Old Testament and the eastern world generally. His larger *Scholia*, from which the Compend was made, consist of eleven parts or twenty-three volumes, 1788—1835. The portions not embraced in the Compend are Jeremiah, the writings of Solomon, Daniel, Joshua and Judges. It is presumed that there will be no further effort to abridge the larger work. The retail price of the six volumes of the Compend in Germany is about \$16. A deduction, however, of twenty-five per cent is made from this sum. It can sometimes be found at the antiquarian bookshops at a still cheaper rate. We procured a copy of the volume on Job, well bound, at eighty cents. The characteristics of this author are so well known that it is hardly necessary to refer to them. The commentary may be regarded as a valuable compilation from the earlier interpreters, both ancient and modern, made in general with sound judgment. How much he is indebted to other authors does not appear from his pages. It has been stated that a considerable part of his comments on the Minor Prophets are a translation from Jerome. His extensive knowledge of eastern antiquities enabled him greatly to enrich his works from this source. These illustrations well expressed and pertinent, constitute one of its most valuable features. In power of combination and happy arrangement, he has been excelled by few. The principal defects of the work are these. Since 1836, when the last volume was published, an immense amount of light has been thrown upon scriptural topography, antiquities, etc., and any commentary printed before 1836, especially on the Old Testament, must be quite deficient. The work is also wanting in thorough analysis of the contents of the books, in the comprehension of them as a whole, in the exhibition of the mutual relations of the parts. The author exhibits no profound insight into the great questions which are constantly occurring,

e. g. the Hebrew idea of the soul, the nature of God's moral government as exhibited to the Hebrews, the nature of prophecy, etc. In other words, the theological element is nearly wanting in his writings. Consequently, the exposition of the profounder and more spiritual portions of the Old Testament are superficial and unsatisfactory. He is, indeed, more sober and evangelical, e. g. in his Messianic interpretations, than many of his countrymen; yet, it is to be feared, that he had but little congeniality of spirit with the truths which he attempted to illustrate. Still, his Compend will doubtless, for a long time, retain much of its value. It contains an excellent summary or condensed report of a vast amount of reading. The style of the work is worthy of high commendation. For further remarks on Rosenmüller, see *Bibl. Repos.* III. p. 151, and *Bib. Sacra*, I. p. 361.

2. *Commentary of Maurer.* This commentary, as that of Rosenmüller, is in Latin. The full title is: "*Commentarius grammaticus criticus in Vetus Testamentum in usum maxime Gymnasiorum et Academicarum, Lips. F. Volckmar.*" Vol. I. contains all the historical books from Genesis to Job, and also Isaiah, Jeremiah and Lamentations, 8vo. 708, and was published in 1833. Vol. II., including the remainder of the prophets, Ezekiel—Malachi, was published in 1838—40, pp. 745. Vol. III., embracing the Psalms and Proverbs, pp. 530, was published in 1838—41. Vol. IV. Section I., containing Job, pp. 288, was published in 1847. Section II., completing the Old Testament, i. e. Ecclesiastes and Canticles, was printed in 1848. Maurer is a Leipsic scholar, and is known by his "*Practischer Cursus über die Formenlehre d. Hebräisch-Sprache*," 1837. The last volume of the commentary is by Augustus Hilgstedt, a pupil of Profs. Tuch and Fleischer of Leipsic, Maurer having been unable to complete the work, on account of some private reasons. The fourth volume, if it does not exhibit equal tact and ability, is constructed on the same plan, and carried through in the same spirit with the volumes by Maurer. This commentary has the advantage over Rosenmüller's Compend in the following particulars; 1st. It embraces the entire Old Testament; 2d. The latter part is brought down almost to the present time, and avails itself of recent investigations; 3d. In exact grammatical knowledge. Perhaps this is its most marked characteristic, and it greatly adds to its utility, not only for the beginner, but for the advanced student. All true interpretation is founded on grammar, and the genuine scholar delights to see these numerous syntactical references to Gesenius and Ewald; 4th. greater independence of judgment, less reliance on his predecessors, and more exact weighing of evidence, adducing the results rather than the process of inquiry. In this last particular, he followed the rule of G. Hermann: "*Quid prodest enim enu-*

merare quae tu quidem pervestigare debueris, sed pervestigata cognoveris ad propositum inutilia esse;" 5th in price. The whole sett costs in Germany from five to six dollars. Unhappily the book is less evangelical than that of Rosenmüller. We oftener meet with statements, which we are compelled to reject. No one would look to Maurer for exposition in its practical and profounder sense. Baur on Amos, p. 162, commends Maurer, as having exhibited in his comments on that prophet, grammatical accuracy and clear exhibition of the sense of the words, though he neglects the critical element, and sometime makes the explication of difficult passages too easy. It should also be said that the commentary on the historical books from Genesis to Esther, is far too brief to be satisfactory, the whole being embraced in 250 pages.

3. The Condensed Commentary. This is in German, and the full title is "*Kurzgefasste Exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament.*" The following have appeared; vol. I, containing the Twelve Minor Prophets, 1838, by F. Hitzig, professor in Zurich; II. Job, 1839, by L. Hirzel, formerly professor in Zurich; II. Jeremiah by Hitzig, 1841; IV. Books of Samuel 1842, by Otto Thenius, Diaconus in Dresden; V. Isaiah, 1843, by A. Knobel, professor in Giessen; VI. Judges and Ruth, 1845, by E. Bertheau, professor in Göttingen; VII. Proverbs by Bertheau, Ecclesiastes by Hitzig, 1847; VIII, Ezekiel by Hitzig, 1847; IX. Books of Kings by Thenius, now in press. The retail price in Germany is about 11 Thaler for the nine volumes. The customary discount being deducted, the cost in Germany would be about \$7. Five or six additional volumes will probably complete the Old Testament. Coming from a variety of sources, this work is of course characterized by various degrees of merit. Knobel's Isaiah, so far as philology is concerned, is probably the most thorough and satisfactory of the many works which we have on that prophet. Hitzig remarks that he has earnestly sought to give an objective exposition. To that end he has kept his eye, before all things else, on the usage of the language, without becoming a slave to it, and has consulted etymology only when without its aid he could not expound the meaning. The main characteristics of this series may be stated as follows; 1, Exact historical knowledge or a reproduction of preceding scenes and events bearing on the topics in hand. "I have taken earnest pains," says Hitzig, "to make myself at home in the circumstances and views of a world lying far back and from these, in accordance with a moral analogy, to seize on the author's mode of thinking, and then to search out, exhibit and estimate the value of his words." Of the same tenor are the remarks of Bertheau, Knobel and Thenius. 2. A careful attention to the state of the text; this is particularly true of that of Jeremiah and of the books of Samuel. Thenius speaks of having compared the Masoretic text of Samuel four

times, word for word, with that of the Seventy. 3. A careful exhibition of the argument or general course of thought, the mutual relations of the parts, etc. This is a marked characteristic of Knobel. 4. Sound lexicographic and grammatical knowledge. Special pains are taken to investigate the meaning of particular difficult words and phrases. The authors were thoroughly trained in the best critical schools of Germany. There is, however, so much effort at condensation that we are sometimes left in doubt in regard to the author's meaning. This exceeding brevity tends also to make the style hard and repulsive. If the compressing process is carried too far, the book becomes a dry skeleton, fit only for a syllabus or text-book for the teacher. We think too, that none but Germans would print the details of various readings, and discussions on text-criticism in the body of a commentary. They would be reserved for a special work or for an appendix. We need hardly say that these commentators, though professing independence, are more or less infected with the critical tastes and opinions which characterize many of their countrymen. They are advocates, more or less, of the theories in regard to the origin of the sacred books, their inspiration, etc., which, we think, all men of sober views and of true science will regard as rather specious than solid. Sometimes, however, they allow the spiritual and Messianic element, and even vindicate it with ability; e. g. Hitzig on Micah 5: 1, remarks, "Though Micah gives expression to obscure, and mysterious matters, yet by 'She that is to bear,' he can only mean the mother of the Messiah."

4. The Commentaries of Ewald. *Die Poetischen Bücher des Alten Bundes*, are in four volumes, Göttingen, 1836—40. Vol. I. embraces a treatise on Hebrew Poetry, and remarks on the Psalms; II. a translation of the Psalms with notes; III, the book of Job; IV. Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. *Die Propheten des Alten Bundes*, are in two volumes, and include the Minor Prophets, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel.

It is hardly necessary to characterize the works of Ewald, as they are ill fitted for popular use, having had but a small sale even in Germany. No one will deny that he has a profound acquaintance with the Hebrew language, large stores of oriental knowledge, much experience as a biblical critic, power of original investigation, a better taste and a more appreciating imagination than many of his countrymen. He is less skeptical too, than some of the recent critics. Baur on Amos, p. 162, commends Ewald for his "vivid representation of the prophets in their entire, manifold nature and works and by the clear exhibition of the whole *organism* of their writings." We must, however, add that, to a foreigner at least his style is very involved and difficult. Many of his theories are more remarkable for acuteness than solid judgment; his method of dislocating and rearranging many portions of the Old Testament seem to us to be

violent and eminently unscientific. His self-reliance and contemptuous treatment of almost all other biblical philologists are proverbial.

Commentaries on single books.

1. Tuch on Genesis. The author is professor of theology in the university of Leipsic, and has the reputation, as we learn from a friend who attended his instructions, of being a very accurate and accomplished Hebrew scholar. Ewald speaks of him as "possessing learning in the Old Testament sciences in the highest degree fundamental and independent." His commentary on Genesis, so far as philology, antiquities, etc., are concerned, is perhaps the best which we have on the book. His theology, general principles of criticism, etc. would find few advocates in this country.

2. Hengstenberg's Contributions. Beiträge zur Einleitung ins A. Test., Vol. I. on the Genuineness of Daniel and the Integrity of Zechariah; II. and III. on the Authenticity of the Pent. This work is one of the ablest and most important which has ever appeared on the authenticity of parts of the Old Test. They are about to be translated and printed at Edinburgh, in Clark's Foreign Theological Library. The substance of his treatise on the Prophecies of Balaam, may be found in the B. Sacra III. pp. 347, 669. These works are largely of an apologetic and polemic character, a vigorous protest against rationalism and, for the most part, successful vindication of the divine authority of the portions of Scripture in question. Hengstenberg has not that candor and fairness towards opponents which the reader desires. His arguments sometimes have more of acuteness and a lawyer-like dexterity than of solidity and force.

3. Keil on Joshua. Commentar über das Buch Josua, von K. F. Keil, Erlangen, 1847, 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 411. The author is professor of Exegesis and Oriental Languages at the imperial university at Dorpat in Finland. His general principles may be learned from the following extract from his Preface: "The historical books of the Old Test. in general have been unhappily too much neglected, so that every effort in this field must first and specially contend with false and perverted views, which are directly at variance with the spirit of the biblical revelation, must clear away the many errors widely spread in consequence of the spiritless handling of the Old Test. history; and hence can but pave the way for a theological and practical interpretation, rather than furnish a complete one. With the rejection of the revelation of the Old Test., rationalism has been compelled also to reject its history, since this history is, and declares itself to be, nothing else than the narrative of the Divine Revelation unfolding itself in the course of ages. To the rationalist, the historical books of the Old Test., as writings which lay claim to historical truth, have lost all value, all signifi-

cance, so that now only criticism can busy itself with them and resolve their historical contents into myths and *sagas*. In this process, a small residuum of inorganic historical material remains as a muddy sediment, which cannot be removed, but defies all attempts to construe from it a connected history of the Israelites, and at best allows only of a fancy picture, without truth and life, as the last of these attempts, undertaken by Ewald, strikingly shows." "To break up the reign of rationalism in the Old Test., to confute the wide-extended prejudices which have become formal articles of faith, and to help to promote the true understanding — quickened by faith — of the Old Test. is, accordingly, the aim and design of this commentary, as it was of my earlier one on the Books of the Kings, which shall be followed, God willing, by a similar work on the remaining historical books of the Old Test." The commentary on Joshua is prepared with much care, and with the advantage of the latest geographical and other helps on Palestine, and is highly commended by competent judges, as an able and satisfactory book.

4. Hengstenberg on the Psalms. This work is contained in five volumes, in the original German; price for the whole, about \$7.00; and in three thick octavo volumes in the English translation, published in Clark's Foreign Theological Library, price about \$8. The characteristics of this writer are well known to our readers. His commentary on the Psalms is one of the latest, and is doubtless the best which has ever appeared on this portion of the Bible. If any proof of this were needed, it may be found in the fact that Lengerke of Königsberg, a distinguished rationalist scholar, in his Commentary on the Psalms, is largely indebted to, and in not a few places has almost servilely copied, Hengstenberg. The greatest fault of the author is his prolixity. The commentary might have been included in two, or at the most in three volumes. Much of this copiousness is caused by large quotations from Luther, Calvin, and other well known authors. We understand that it is the intention of two American scholars to condense the substance of Hengstenberg's commentary and publish it in one volume, adding such philological and exegetical notes as may be desirable. In making this abridgement, they will use the new German edition, the first volume of which has just appeared. Thus the results of the latest philological inquiries on this most interesting part of the Bible will be laid before the public in connection with a commentary which is eminently in keeping with the spirit of the original.

5. Hävernick on Ezekiel. This is in German, and comprised in one volume, pp. 757, price, \$2. Prof. Tholuck mentioned to the writer that he considered it the best commentary which we have on this difficult prophet. Hävernick was one of the most eminent men of the evangelical school in Germany, and spent many years in an earnest and successful

study of the Old Testament, some of the fruits of which have appeared in his Introduction to the Old Testament, his Commentaries on Ezekiel, Daniel, etc. In connection with his exposition of Ezekiel, that of Hitzig, before mentioned, may be profitably used.

6. Stuart on Daniel. The long promised commentary of Prof. Stuart on Daniel is passing rapidly through the press. It will be comprised in one volume, and will be anticipated with much satisfaction by the student of the prophecies.

7. Baur on Amos. "Der Prophet Amos, erklärt von Dr. Gustav Baur, Giessen, 1847, pp. 452," is one of the most copious and exhaustive expositions which we possess. The author is now, we believe, professor of theology at Giessen, and is not to be confounded with the famous Dr. von Baur of Tübingen. An Introduction of 162 pages discusses the nature of prophecy, its historical development, the personal relations of Amos, his times and contemporaries, style, state and history of the text, commentaries upon the prophet, etc. Then succeed a translation, the commentary, and two indexes. The author speaks of having been employed on his labor half of Horace's nine years, and of having several times handled the prophet, in various aspects, in exegetical lectures. He also speaks of having paid particular attention to the Rabbinical commentators. "In this labor," he says, "the conviction has fastened itself on me anew, that to the dividing and perplexing question, which at present is often propounded with great confidence: "Free science or firm Christian faith?" the only true answer is: "Free science and firm Christian faith." "The severest historical investigation, even in apparently external and small matters, shows ever more clearly, how all things must serve to prepare the way of the Lord." The author appears to have performed his work with great conscientiousness and ability. It will be found eminently useful for the discussion of the difficult passages in this prophet, and for the care with which many words and phrases are historically and philologically investigated. At the same time, on some of the less difficult passages, it is unnecessarily prolux.

8. Delitzsch on Habakkuk. "Der prophet Habakkuk. Ausgelegt von Franz Delitzsch, Leipzig, K. Tauchnitz, 1833, pp. 208." This belongs to an "Exegetical Manual of the Prophets of the Old Testament," by Delitzsch, now professor in the university of Rostock, and Paul Caspari, professor in the university at Christiania. The only volumes yet published are this by Delitzsch, and one on Obadiah, 2d edition, and part of an Introduction to Isaiah, both by Caspari. These commentators are Leipzig scholars and decidedly evangelical. Delitzsch has written a History of Hebrew Poetry, and Caspari an Arabic Grammar. The Commentary on Habakkuk is beautifully printed in a thin octavo, crowded with matter. The price is about \$1. An Introduction considers at length the

following topics : name of the prophet, biographical relations, times of the prophet, and list of commentators. Then follow the translation, a copious commentary, and an appendix. The author, we believe, is of Hebrew descent. He has made extensive and often very happy use of the Jewish expositors. As a specimen of a thoroughly philological, historical, exhaustive, and evangelical commentary, it is worthy of the highest commendation.

We may subjoin in our next No. some remarks on the New Testament commentators.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

I. THE GORGIAS OF PLATO.¹

It is a fortunate circumstance for the influence of classical education in our country, that such a book as Plato's *Gorgias* should be introduced into our college courses. It is well in our teachers to deviate from the beaten path of the English schools and universities, and to choose from the abounding treasures of ancient wisdom, such portions as are best suited to our own peculiar condition and our educational wants. For instance, in our country, as in the republics of Greece, our young men need to be guarded against the specious sophistries of expediency in politics, of pleasure in morals, and of skepticism in religion. We have among us treacherous guides in the conduct of national affairs, false teachers in philosophy and morals, who tempt the passions, as did the Sophists of old, by proclaiming the sovereignty of the instincts, and doubters and deniers, who are doing their best, under cover of a deceptive theological science, to undermine the foundations of Christian faith. The two former are exactly analogous to the political and sophistical lecturers of ancient Greece ; and the latter are strikingly like them in the leading features of their character, and in the general principles upon which they proceed.

The *Gorgias* of Plato meets all these assailants, except the special foes of Christianity, better perhaps than any other ancient or modern work. Nothing in antiquity rises to an elevation so nearly approaching that of Christianity. In the reasoning of Socrates on justice, temperance, and judgment to come, we almost seem to hear an apostle preach ; and we cannot help imagining to ourselves, with what joy so earnest a soul would

¹ The *Gorgias* of Plato : chiefly according to Stallbaum's text ; with notes. By T. D. Woolsey. Cambridge : James Munroe & Co. New edition. 1848.

have listened, had he been so permitted, to the sanctions and completions which Revelation would have given to the great truths he had partially grappled by the force of reason exalted by a rational faith and made clear by purity of life.

Mr. Woolsey's new edition of this noble work, we have no hesitation in saying, has no superior. The text is critically prepared, and the commentary, in which he has combined the results of his own study with those of the ablest European critics, is extremely well suited to develop the spirit and meaning of the author. The Introduction is a valuable and able analysis of the work. It was not our intention to enter into any critical discussion, but merely to call attention to the new edition.

II. THE PROMETHEUS AND AGAMEMNON OF AESCHYLUS.¹

Of late years the study of Aeschylus has made great progress among scholars. Notwithstanding the imperfect condition of the text in most of his remaining pieces, the labors of classical critics have been so far successful that his poetical character stands as clearly unfolded as that of any of his great contemporaries or successors. Its majestic outlines have been carefully and ingeniously traced; its lofty spirit has, in a great measure, been freed from the obscurities which once surrounded it; and now, one at least of the grand dramas of the hero-poet of Marathon, forms a part of every good classical course of study in our colleges.

Not only has the Greek text been the subject of indefatigable study, but translations have been repeatedly made of all his principal pieces into the modern languages. The *Prometheus Bound* and the *Agamemnon* have been more frequently attempted than any others, particularly by English scholars, probably not only on account of their superior merits in conception and execution — the unsurpassed grandeur of their poetry, and the wonderful power of their style, but also on account of a peculiar relation they sustain to English poetry — the *Prometheus* bearing a strong resemblance to Milton's *Satan*, and the character of *Clytemnestra* in the *Agamemnon* suggesting many interesting analogies with Shakspeare's *Lady Macbeth*.

The illustrative literature of these two plays forms, at present, no inconsiderable library. To say nothing of the numerous works which have come from the German press, the number of editions and translations, both of the *Prometheus* and the *Agamemnon*, especially of the latter, is very considerable. Within the last few years, some eight or ten attempts have been made, by English writers, to transfer these great master works of Attic genius to the mother tongue. These have been attended with vari-

¹ The *Prometheus and Agamemnon of Aeschylus*: Translated into English Verse: By Henry William Herbert, Cambridge, 1849.

ous degrees of success, all respectable and some of distinguished excellence. Of the Prometheus, the most distinguished is perhaps that by the poetess Miss Barrett. Of the Agamemnon, by far the best, previously we mean to that placed at the head of this notice, is the poetical translation by Mr. Symmons. In our country, these two plays have also been much studied. Both have been published in the original, with English commentaries, and both have been translated — the Prometheus twice and the Agamemnon once. Of all the translations which have yet appeared in English, Mr. Herbert's, recently published from the university press in our American Cambridge, is by far the best. Mr. Herbert is a gentleman of thorough classical education, known for many years as an able writer, long practised both in prose and poetry. Among his most distinguished productions, showing at once his genius and his learning, we may mention his classical romance, entitled the Roman Traitor, in which a bold, and we think a successful attempt is made to paint the times in which the gigantic plot of Catiline was formed, and the noble character of Cicero is the chief figure in the foreground. Mr Herbert, therefore, addressed himself to the task of rendering the lofty spirit of Aeschylus into English, thoroughly prepared for the difficulty of the work. How great that difficulty is, need not be said to any classical scholar; how admirably this difficulty has been overmatched in the volume before us, will be seen by any one who will take the trouble to compare a page or two with the original text. Mr. Herbert is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the elder English writers. His style is uncorrupted by any of the meretricious neologians of the day. No man of his age has written more for the periodical journals, and for the daily consumption of an omnivorous reading public — that many-headed *helluo librorum* — for whose insatiable appetite so many geese are plucked, and so many iron pens are busily at work. But his style has come out from all these perverting influences as chaste as the Lady passed amidst the rabble rout of Comus. Milton, Shakespeare, and the English Bible are the triple fountain from which the clear stream of his poetic language flows. Hence the unapproached felicity with which the solemn grandeur of Aeschylus is reproduced; the wonderful aptness with which each shade of Aeschylean thought is painted in the copy. We seem to read, not a translation, but an original work of some mighty master of the elder ages: and yet the English runs as closely with the words of the Greek as the version of the most toilsome interpreter in a College lecture room. In the poetic forms which Mr. Herbert has adopted, he shows the nice taste and tact of an artist. The iambic trimeters are rendered into the English ten-syllable blank-verse — not only the rhythm of epic poetry, but fixed forever by the great masters of the drama, as the form for tragic dialogue. The anapaestic measures are given

in corresponding English anapaests, and the more complicated lyrical movements, whose rhythmical effect, in the original, depended upon a certain musical adaptation which we have forever lost, and which without that, are but faintly appreciable, he has wisely given in recognized English lyrical measures. In this respect, we think Mr. Herbert has been truer to the antique spirit than any of the German translators, who have undertaken the Sisyphean toil, as Menzel calls it, of rolling the rough rune-stone of German poetry up the Grecian Parnassus, by reproducing the original, syllable by syllable and beat by beat.

We do not always agree with Mr. Herbert, in his interpretation of doubtful passages, as for instance where, (l. 444 of his version, l. 382 in Klausen's text) he renders *Φάσμα δόξει δόμων ἀνίστασθαι*, *Ghostlike through his house he stalks*. We think the words refer to Helen, and we should translate them, *her phantom shall seem to rule the house*. To our minds this is more poetical, and more in harmony with the exquisite lines, which follow immediately after, describing the "dream-appearing visions, bringing an empty joy," and contrasting, as it were while introducing the haunting imagination of her being present still by day. We readily admit, however, Sir Roger de Coverley's formula that "a great deal may be said on both sides."

We trust Mr. Herbert will go on and finish the task he has so ably begun. If he does, he will make a permanent contribution to our literature, and erect a monument of his own learning and genius, which will stand the test of criticism and time.

III. BAHR ON SOLOMON'S TEMPLE.¹

This book is a sequel to an earlier work of the same author on the symbolic character of the Mosaic ritual. (*Symbolik des Mosaischen Cultus*. 2Bde. 1837. 9.) Its design is to show the religious significancy of Solomon's temple, in its architectural plan and various furniture. The description which is given in the Bible of the outward appearance of the temple is too meagre to allow of any attempt to present a drawing of it. On the contrary the description of the interior is very minute and leaves scarcely anything to be desired. — The outward form, however, a precise knowledge of which is indispensable to the artist who would give us a picture of the temple, is of comparatively little importance as it respects its religious significancy. The house was simply rectilinear in its form,

¹ *Der Salomonische Tempel mit Berücksichtigung seines verhältnisses zur heiligen Architectur überhaupt*. (The Solomon's Temple considered in its relation to sacred Architecture generally). Von Dr. Carl. Chr. W. F. Bähr. 8vo. Carlsruhe 1843 pp. 352.

60 cubits in length, 20 cubits in breadth, and the height thereof was 30 cubits. But in 6: 20, the height of the Holy of Holies is said to be 20 cubits. The author enters into a long examination of the various attempts made to account for this difference. He thinks there is no sufficient evidence that there was a chamber over the oracle. It is only in 1 Kings 6: 2 that the height of the house is stated to be 30 cubits. In the parallel passage 2 Chron. 3: 2 the length and breadth of the house are given as in 1 Kings 6: 2, but the height is not mentioned. This omission was hardly to be expected, if the height were really 30 cubits, for this would be a change from the proportions of the tabernacle, while in every other respect the proportions of the temple were analogous to those of the tabernacle. In the temple of Zerubbabel, the height and breadth were equal, and the description in 1 Kings vi. subsequent to v. 2, implies that the height of the temple was but 20 cubits. For there we read that Solomon measured off 20 cubits upon the sides of the house for the oracle, so that 40 cubits remained for the holy place, and the oracle or most holy place was 20 cubits in length and 20 cubits in breadth and 20 cubits in the height thereof. Probably in the original manuscripts numerals were designated by letters and not written out in words, and in this way a mistake may have been made by copyists in 1 Kings 6: 2 respecting the height of the temple. — The porch was probably no higher than the main body of the house (the number 120 in 2 Chron. 3: 4 incorrect); it was 20 cubits in breadth, covering therefore the entire front of the temple, and was 10 cubits deep. Its front was entirely open. Before it and quite near were the two pillars Jachin and Boaz, and the lily work upon the top of the pillars extended to the roof of the porch.

The fundamental idea of the temple is, that it is a house of God, the dwelling place of Jehovah. 1 Kings 8: 13. 2 Chron. 6: 2. At the first glance this seems to rest upon an anthropopathic conception of the nature of God, as if God like a man needed a house to dwell in. That however Solomon was free from any such conception, appears from his subsequent declaration, 1 Kings 8: 27. 2 Chron. 6: 18. What then did Solomon mean by God's dwelling in a house while at the same time he confesses the infinity of God? The answer is plain if we review the history of the Israelitish people. They had been chosen by God from among the other nations of the earth to be his peculiar people, and on the conclusion of the covenant made upon Sinai followed the command of Jehovah. Ex. 25: 8 — Let them make me a sanctuary, that I may dwell in the midst of them. This dwelling in the midst of them was a sign and pledge of the covenant made with them. Cf. Lev. 26: 11. Ez. 37: 26, 27. Rev. 21: 3.

The temple is called the dwelling of the *name* of the Lord. 1 Kings 8: 16, 20, 29. 2 Chron. 6: 5, 6. This implies that the temple was a place

where God would reveal himself, for the name of a person is that by which he is known, the name of God is God so far as he reveals himself. The rectangular form of the temple with its front towards the east was typical of heaven, as appears from the well known expression "four ends of heaven." The length is thrice the breadth. Three is the number of true and complete totality. The length, breadth, and height are in their dimensions divisible by ten. Ten appears as a determining number in the measurements of whatever belongs to the temple. In the Holiest, the cherubim were ten cubits high, and from the uttermost part of one wing to the uttermost part of the other wing were ten cubits. In the temple were ten candlesticks, and ten tables; in the court ten lavers. The altar was ten cubits in height and twice ten cubits in breadth and length. The brazen sea was ten cubits in diameter, and of the flowers which adorned its brim there were ten to every cubit. The brazen pillars bear on their capitals two rows of pomegranates, each of which consists of ten times ten. The porch is ten cubits in breadth and twice ten in length. The chambers on the side of the temple in their breadth and height show the ten broken, the half ten, and are thereby denoted as subordinate parts of the building. If it be asked, why is ten the determining number, the answer is plain, viz. that the decalogue is the fundamental constitution of the nation, and ten is therefore the number of the covenant, and the various parts of the temple are to point to this, like radii to a centre.

The walls of the house within were not smooth and plain, but presented in relief the forms of cherubim, palm trees and flowers. The cherubim signify the entire creation as revealing the perfections of the Creator. The palm tree is one of the noblest trees of the East, and moreover was a symbol of the land of Palestine. On the medals struck in commemoration of the overthrow of Jerusalem by Titus, there was a palm tree with the inscription, *Judaea capta*. The meaning of the flowers is the same that they have among all people. They denote a condition of joy and prosperity, which condition in all languages is denoted as a flourishing one.

The ark of the covenant is to be regarded as the heart of the entire sanctuary, and because of it, the apartment in which it was kept, was called the most holy place. The mercy seat upon it was the throne of Jehovah, and the thick darkness in which Jehovah dwelt was a significant symbol of the mysterious nature of his being.

The vessels of the temple were essentially the same as those of the tabernacle, and the reader is referred to the author's earlier work for a fuller exhibition of their symbolic meaning. The significancy of the two brazen pillars, Jachin and Boaz, is determined from the etymology of the words. *יָכִין* from *בָּן*, to make firm, and *בּוֹז*, compounded of *בּוֹ* and *זוֹ*,

in it is strength. Both names are grounded in one idea, that of firmness or durability, and mark the contrast between the temple and the tabernacle.

The subject last treated of in this volume is the relation of Solomon's temple to the sacred buildings of other religions. It was not made in imitation of any other temple of antiquity. Its plan grew out of the religious idea which it was to express, and was as different from that of any heathen temple as the Jewish religion was different from that of any other nation of the earth. Its essential principle was also different from that of Christian architecture. Solomon built God a house, and the mercy seat in the Holy of Holies was a local throne of Jehovah. But the early Christians rejected the idea that a building erected by human hands could be regarded as a dwelling place of God. Yet as Christianity was no mere negation of Judaism, but its fulfilment, it did not entirely destroy the temple of the former theocracy, but in its place erected a new and living temple. *Ye, says the apostle to the Christian church, ye are the temple of God, ye are God's building.* Only indirectly, therefore, through the medium of the church could the building in which a Christian congregation met together to worship God, be called a *Domus Dei*.

IV. THE JORDAN AND THE DEAD SEA.

We have condensed some of the more material facts in relation to the Jordan and the Dead Sea from Lieut. Lynch's explorations. We are not surprised to learn that the work has a rapid sale, six editions, with an aggregate of 11,000 copies, having been published. The proceeds are most laudably devoted to the orphan children of Lieut. Dale.

Lieut. Lynch commenced his passage down the Jordan on the 10th of April 1848, at 3. 40 P. M., and on the 18th at 3. 25 P. M., entered the Dead Sea. In a space of sixty miles of latitude and four or five of longitude, the Jordan was found to traverse at least 200 miles. The river was then in the latter stage of a freshet. Twenty-seven threatening rapids were passed besides many of lesser magnitude. The course on the first day, April 10th, after leaving the lake of Galilee, varied from S. to N. W. by N., the general inclination west. The current was two and a half knots, the water clear and sweet. The lake was concealed, though very near. The soil of the banks is a dark rich loam, luxuriantly covered with flowers. Large boulders of sandstone and trap are scattered over the surface. The party stopped just below the ruins of an old bridge, *el-Jisr Semakh*. These ruins consist of two entire and six partial abutments, and the ruins of another on each shore. The scenery, as they left the lake and advanced into the Ghor, which was here about three

fourths of a mile broad, was rather of a tame than savage character. On the second night, April 11th, the party stopped near the falls and whirlpool of el-Bukah. The ruins of the village ed-Delhemiye are near, on the right bank. At 5. 40 P. M., where the river was about sixty yards wide, the village el-Abbadiyeh was passed, a miserable collection of mud huts. The average width of the river was forty yards; depth from two and a half to six feet. General course E. S. E. Nine rapids were passed, three of them terrific ones. The route of the accompanying land party, under the charge of Lieut. Dale, lay through an extensive plain, luxuriant in vegetation, and presenting in spots a rich alluvial soil. The night was a bright moonlight, the dew fell heavily and the air was chill.

On the night of April 12th, the stopping place was about 200 yards below el-Jisr Mejâmia, the bridge which is on the road from Nâbulus, through Beisân, the Bethshean of 1 Sam. 31: 10, to Damascus. The main course of the stream was S. S. W., but it was very serpentine. The party descended three very threatening and four less difficult rapids. The only tributary passed was the Yarmûk (Hieromax), coming in from the east, nearly as wide and deep as the Jordan. The current of the latter averaged eight miles an hour. The banks were fringed with the laurestinas, the oleander, the willow and the tamarisk; on the slope of the second terrace, a small species of oak and the cedar grew. From the banks to the elevated ridges on both sides, the grass and flowers were very luxuriant and beautiful. The trap continued on both sides, with occasional interruptions of limestone, sandstone and conglomerate. Dr. Anderson visited Umkeis, near the ancient Gadara, a ride of three hours and eleven minutes. The remains of Gadara occupy an eminence, with an inconsiderable valley on the west side, and a steep descent on the north, determined by the Wady el-Yarmûk. The ruins comprise a spacious area, covered with many broken columns, a large theatre, a smaller enclosure and a necropolis. The walls may be traced very distinctly on the west, less obviously on the East. Lieut. Dale visited Beisân (Scythopolis). "There were acres of building-stone, old walls, a theatre, etc. in good preservation. A few columns still stood in the valleys. Most of the present buildings seemed to be Saracenic, mills and khans." April 13th. The general course was S. by E. Three large and seven small rapids were passed. There were four islands, and one stream came in from the S. E. The river averaged forty-five yards in width, four feet deep and five knots current. "There are evidently two terraces to the Jordan, and through the lowest one the river runs its labyrinthine course. From the stream, above the immediate banks, there is, on each side, a single terrace of low hills, like truncated cones, which is but the bluff terminus of an extended table land, reaching quite to the

base of the mountains of Haurān on the east, and the high hills on the western side." At 3. 16. P. M., Lieut. Lynch passed a long reach in the river, the first straight line in its entire course from the lake of Galilee thus far. The land company passed patches of wheat and barley, nearly ripe. On Friday night, April 14th, the boats were anchored near Wady Yābes, leading up to the ancient Jabesh Gilead. Twelve islands were passed, all but three small. Fourteen tributary streams were noted, all but four trickling rivulets. The lower plain was covered with a luxuriant growth of wild oats, and patches of wild mustard in full flower. The hills forming the banks of the upper terrace, assumed a conical form, with scarped and angular faces. In the latter part of the day, rock was less abundant, and alluvion began to prevail. Many fish and birds were seen; among the latter, hawks, herons, pigeons, ducks, storks, bulbuls, swallows, etc. On the following night, April 15th, the party encamped a little below where Wady Rājib or 'Ajlūn enters from the east. A considerable stream was running down it. The party descended ten moderate and six bad rapids; three tributaries were noted, two of them quite small, also four large and seventeen small islands. The prevailing direction of the river was south and west. The velocity of the current ranged from two to eight knots; the average was about three and a half knots. The average width was fifty-six yards, and the average depth a little more than four feet. In the narrower parts the river flowed between high hills. In the morning the temperature of the air was 78°, and of the water twelve inches below the surface, 71°. The heat and the dazzling glare of the light were very oppressive. April 16th. The encampment at night was near an old Roman bridge, the ford of Damleh, where the road from Nābulus to es-Salt crosses the river. In the afternoon, a bush, lodged fifteen feet up in the branches of an overhanging tree was seen. It was deciduous, and the green leaves of the early season were upon it. It must have been lodged by a recent freshet. On the borders of the stream the vegetation became more luxuriant, and of a brighter tint; on either side, back of the river, it was more parched and dull. The banks were of semi-indurated clay. The lower plain evidently became narrower, and the river often swept alternately against the hills. April 17th. The party reached the Pilgrims' ford, or the bathing-place of the Christian pilgrims, after having been fifteen hours in the boats. At 1. 20 P. M., the mouth of the Jabok (ez-Zurka) was passed; it flows in from E. N. E., a small stream, trickling down a deep and wide torrent bed. The water was sweet, but the stones upon the bare exposed bank were coated with salt. There was another bed, then dry, showing that in times of freshet, there are two outlets to this tributary. April 18th, at 1. 45 P. M., the party proceeded, and at 3. 25 entered the Dead Sea.

At 3. 12, the course was S. a long stretch, river seventy yards wide, left bank very low, covered with tamarisk, willow and cane; the right bank, was from fifteen to eighteen feet high, red clay with weeds and shrubs. At 3. 16, water brackish, but no unpleasant smell; banks red clay and mud, gradually becoming lower and lower; river eighty yards wide, and fast increasing in breadth, seven feet deep, muddy bottom, current three knots; one large and two small islands at the mouth of the river. Where it enters the sea, the river was 180 yards wide and three feet deep. The camp was pitched at night at the fountain 'Ain el-Feshkhah.

Twenty-two days' close examination was expended upon the sea and its shores, i. e. from April 19th to May 10th. We can only advert to a few of the interesting facts. The sea and shores were accurately examined in all directions. The distance in a straight line from the fountain 'Ain el-Feshkhah directly across to the eastern shore was nearly eight statute miles. The soundings gave 696 feet as the greatest depth. Another line was run diagonally from the same point to the S. E. to a chasm, forming the outlet of the hot springs of Callirrhoe. The bottom of the sea was found to be a level plain, extending nearly to each shore, with an average depth of 1020 feet all across. The bottom was blue mud and sand; and a number of rectangular crystals of salt were drawn up, some of them perfect cubes. In a line from the springs of Callirrhoe to 'Ain Turabah, at a depth of 1044 feet, the temperature of the water was 62°; at the surface immediately above it 76°. From 'Ain Jidy directly across to the mouth of the Arnon, the distance was about nine statute miles, the greatest depth 1128 feet. On the eastern side of Kashim, Udsam (Salt Mountain) one third of the distance from its north extremity, a pillar of solid salt was discovered, capped with carbonate of lime, cylindrical in front and pyramidal behind. The upper or rounded part is about forty feet high, resting on a kind of oval pedestal, from forty to sixty feet above the level of the sea. It crumbles at the top and is one entire mass of crystallization. On the sea the tendency to drowsiness was nearly irresistible. The sensation, amounting almost to stupor, was greatest in the heat of the day, but did not disappear at night. A horse and a donkey, swimming in the sea, turned a little on one side, but did not lose their balance. A muscular man floated nearly breast high, without the least exertion. The Arnon (el-Mojeb) where it flows into the sea, was eighty-two feet wide and four feet deep. It runs through a chasm ninety-seven feet wide, formed by high, perpendicular cliffs of red, brown and yellow sandstone, mixed red and yellow on the southern side, and on the north a soft rich red. The chasm runs up in a direct line 150 yards, then curves gracefully to the S. E. A little north of the entrance of the

Arnon, on a beautiful little stream, were twenty-nine date palm trees. Wherever there was a rivulet, lines of green cane, tamarisk and an occasional date-palm marked its course. Zürka Main forms the outlet of the hot springs of Callirrhoë. The stream, twelve feet wide and ten inches deep, rushes with great velocity into the sea. Temperature of the air 77°, of the sea 78°, of the stream 94°. The chasm is 122 feet wide at the mouth and for a mile up. The sides are eighty feet high. Among the plants found on the western shore, between 'Ain el-Feshkhah and 'Ain Jidy, were the lily, the yellow henbane, the lamb's quarter (used in the manufacture of barilla), a species of kale, a single pistachia tree, and many tamarisks in blossom. In sailing round the southern part of the sea, many fatigues were encountered. On one occasion, at 8 P. M., the thermometer was 106°, five feet from the ground. It was more like the blast of a furnace, than living air.

V. BOHRINGER'S BIOGRAPHICAL CHURCH HISTORY.¹

The entire volume, of which this is the closing section, contains 3074 pages. The plan of the work, as indicated by its title, is to give the history of the church in the form of biography. To this plan the author strictly adheres, giving us but little in the form of general remarks, and interspersing these remarks, as the occasions occur, in the lives he portrays.

The plan itself, though not strictly novel, is, we believe new in its application to the entire history of the church. We have had many separate works on the lives and times of distinguished individuals. We have also Cave's *Lives of the Christian Fathers of the first three centuries*; and likewise his *Literary History*, containing an extended notice of all the writers for or against Christianity, to the fourteenth century. Such writers also as the two Milners, have infused a vivid interest into their works by their extensive biographical sketches. But in none of these do we find an entire history of the church in the form of biography.

Böhringer, however, does not undertake to give us the lives of even all the great men in the church, but selects from the most distinguished such as had the greatest influence in shaping the life, doctrine, and polity of the church, or the most vividly reflected her image for the time.

This first volume, commencing with the age succeeding the Apostles, extends to the beginning of the seventh century; and embraces the following personages, which we give in their order: Ignatius, Polycarp, Perpetua, Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Irenaeus, Tertullian,

¹ Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen, oder die Kirchengeschichte in Biographien, durch Friedrich Böhringer. Ersten Bandes vierte und letzte Abtheilung. Zürich. 8vo. 496. 8vo.

Cyprian, Athanasius, Anthony, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose, Augustine, Chrysostom, Olympia, Leo, and Gregory the Great.

The spaces allotted to the different characters are very unequal. To Augustine, including his doctrines and those of his opponents, 675 pages; to Irenaeus, 166; to Origen, 100; to Perpetua (a martyr in Africa), as a representative of her sex in the first three centuries, 10 pages; to Olympia (a rich widow at Constantinople, about the age of nineteen, devoted her life and fortune to monastic piety, in the fifth century), 9 pages.

History in this form, if even tolerably well executed, cannot fail of possessing an interest for most minds, which it is impossible for even a Neander to infuse into it when presented in the abstract and philosophic form. And from the greater and more sympathetic interest it kindles, it will be all the better remembered and the more efficient by way of example, just as we find the fragments of sacred history. But, from its very nature, it can be neither so complete, nor so well balanced, nor perhaps so impartial. If the best characters be selected, we shall have too favorable a view of the church, if not also of the individuals themselves, the strong sympathies of both writer and reader embarking in the cause of the moral hero before us.

Such, to a large extent, should we think is the case with this history from the portions we have examined. This writer, like Milner, presents to us the fairest aspects of the early church; being also, like him and many others, disposed too implicitly to credit the stories of miracles in periods subsequent to the apostles. He writes, however, like a pious and fair-minded man, and as much disposed to benefit the future as to rejoice in the past. Should his work be translated into English, it will be extensively read if it do not prove too voluminous. In research and philosophical acumen, he is not to be compared with Neander or Gieseler. He writes, however, not like a recluse, but like a pious, practical Christian, familiar with the common mind, just as might well be expected from his vocation as the pastor of a country parish in the canton of Zurich. The language and the structure of the sentences, unlike much of the German of the present age, are perfectly simple and lucid.

This volume embraces what the author regards as the period of the "ancient church," closing with the death of Gregory the Great, in 604. The next volume, as he informs us, will embrace the Middle Ages, beginning with the missionaries to Germany.

The author presents very extended analyses of the principal works of the authors whose lives are here given, and consisting extensively of quotations from those works. Hence the vast space allowed to the life of

Augustine. The author is particularly minute on matters of doctrine. But though the quotations are so numerous, we are never informed of either the page or the volume whence they are taken. The toil of a translator or of a critical reviewer, will of course be greatly increased by this omission; but the mass of readers, for whom the work is chiefly designed, may prefer to have the pages unencumbered by citations, being satisfied with simply knowing from what work a quotation is made.

VI. EGYPTIAN ANTIQUITIES.

In Gersdorf's *Leipsc Repertorium*, No. 7, 1849, there is a review of a number of late works on Egyptian antiquities. The reviewer, Prof. Seyffarth of the university of Leipzig, is a well known writer on hieroglyphics. We condense some notices of these productions from his review. The first is the work of Prof. Lepsius, published in 1848, pp. 240, entitled, "On the Preliminary Conditions for the Origination of a Chronology among the Egyptians, and the Possibility of their Reproduction, as an Introduction to the Chronology of the Egyptians." It may be premised that Seyffarth is no admirer of Lepsius, and his statements are accordingly to be received with some allowance. "The hieroglyphics in Lepsius' book are printed with the text, which is very praiseworthy, so that the reader has no occasion to resort to special tables. They are, yet with many exceptions, well designed and cut." "In the deciphering of the hieroglyphics, the author has made no important advance. At least one half of the hieroglyphic groups, which are copied, whose signification is obvious, remain untranslated, while almost as many more are translated incorrectly; the decipherings which will maintain their place in a future hieroglyphical dictionary are very few." Many instances in proof are then quoted.

J. B. C. Lesueur, "architect of the Hotel de Ville at Paris," published in 1848, a "Chronology of the kings of Egypt," pp. 384, a work which received the prize from the Academy of Inscriptions. He holds the 36,000 years, which Manetho's Sothis embraces, to be solar years, rejects the historical works of the Tablet of Abydos, of Eratosthenes, of the *Vetus Chronicon*, and builds especially on the original fragment of Manetho found by Seyffarth at Turin in 1826, without understanding it. The astronomical truths connected with many events of Egyptian history, are silently passed by, and so the result is reached that the Egyptian history extends back to B. C. 11,504, that the first king, Menes, reigned 5773 B. C., consequently before the creation, and 2327 before the flood, etc. Had the architect built on firmer ground, his building would have been more durable.

Although the Aegypto-Hebrew chronology of Prof. Hofmann (*Letter to Prof. Böckh on the Aegyptian and Israelitish Chronology*, 1847, pp. 70) is correct on some points, e. g. in the supposition that the Hyksos and Israelites were not different, that Amosis and Chebron at the beginning of the 18th dynasty embrace the same government, still the whole will satisfy no carefully examining reader, since the author builds on unfounded hypotheses, and passes unused the mathematical truths connected with many historical events. He proceeds on the hypothesis that the sum of the years of most of the Manetho dynasties properly contain the sum of the years of the several preceding dynasties. Thus Menes, though the Abydos Tablet, Eratosthenes and the Old Chronicle place him B. C. 2782, is put down at 2182; the Exodus, though according to astronomical facts and sure biblical notices, it belongs to B. C. 1867, is brought down to the year 1474, and there are reckoned from the Exodus, to the building of Solomon's temple, in spite of the book of Judges and in spite of the genealogies, 480 years instead of 880.

Three of the works noticed are by H. Brugsch, member of one of the gymnasia at Berlin, viz. "Demotic Writing of the Egyptians explained from the papyri and inscriptions, 1848, pp. 70 and three tables;" "Doctrine of Demotic Numbers among the Ancient Egyptians, now first illustrated from the papyri and inscriptions, 1848, pp. 36, with five tables;" and "Agreement of a hieroglyphic inscription of Philae with the Greek and Demotic initial text of the Decree of Rosetta, 1849, pp. 19 with one table." In respect to the first of these treatises, the reviewer remarks, "there is so much of the true and the good in the book that no one will mistake the talent and industry of the author. We should not forget, also, that in such difficult palaeographic and linguistic researches, mistakes are unavoidable, and abundantly met with as in all Egyptologists hitherto."

VII. TISCHENDORF'S GREEK TESTAMENT.

The author, who is professor of theology at Leipsic, published an edition of the Greek Testament in 1841; in 1842, he published three editions in Paris, two dedicated to the archbishop of Paris, and one to M. Guizot. Several of the following years he spent in collating different MSS. He states that he has himself copied or collated almost all the ancient MSS. which are known to exist. He has published the Codex Ephraemi at Paris, the Codex L of the Gospels with B of the Apocalypses and some important fragments, and the Latin Codex Palatinus. The MS. B in the Vatican remains yet without a thorough collation and examination. Tischendorf was permitted to examine some passages, and

Cardinal Mai gave him by letter information in regard to others. Tischendorf's second Leipzig edition was printed in 1849, in 12mo. pp. 768. The Prolegomena and Preface, occupying 104 pages, describe the editor's labors in the collation, the critical principles on which he proceeds, the New Testament dialect, recensions of the Greek text, order of the books, forms of proper names, editions of the sacred text, list of MSS., versions, etc. An able review of this work by Mr. S. P. Tregelles is found in Dr. Kitto's *Journal of Sacred Literature*, Oct. 1849. Mr. T. has been engaged in the same pursuit, see B. S. VI. 404, more than eleven years, and has personally collated most of the MSS. While he accords high commendation to Tischendorf's labors, he finds occasion to dissent from some of his rules for weighing evidence, and from some of his conclusions in regard to important texts. His observations seem to us to be characterized by candor and sound judgment, and to display a thorough knowledge of the subject.

VIII. THE CHINESE REPOSITORY.

Eighteen volumes of this work are now completed. It is published monthly in Canton, China, by Mr. S. W. Williams, himself an able Chinese scholar, and edited by Rev. E. C. Bridgman, D. D. Each volume contains about 700 pages. To those acquainted with the work it is a matter of supererogation to commend it. It will be an enduring monument of the diligence and ability of its editor and of his learned contributors, an indispensable work for all who would attain accurate information in regard, not only to China, but Japan, Corea, Tartary, Siam, Cochin China, and the whole of the eastern part of Asia with its islands. More copious and interesting information may be found in it in regard to Japan than in any other work accessible to the English reader. Each number contains a journal of events and occurrences invaluable to the future historian of eastern Asia. We earnestly recommend to all our public libraries and institutions to purchase a set of this periodical. It can be procured of Mr. Williams of Canton at a considerable deduction from the current price. Any patronage extended to the Chinese Repository will help to sustain a most important literary enterprise, and the higher interests of religion and missions.

IX. THE BIRDS OF ARISTOPHANES.

Professor Felton of Cambridge has given us an edition of this celebrated drama in a most beautiful form. The paper, the Greek type, the English of the notes, are, we had almost said, perfect. One can hardly

fail of falling in love with the witty dramatist from the beauty and splendor of the plumage in which the Birds appear. The notes bear full testimony to the skill and taste of the accomplished editor. A peculiar value is given to this edition from the pains which the editor has taken, with the aid of Professor Agassiz, to determine the species and describe the habits of the birds introduced into the play. The results show that Aristophanes was "a most careful observer, as well as a consummate poet." We may add, though it is hardly necessary, that the book is published by Mr. Bartlett, the university bookseller.

ARTICLE X.

PUBLIC LIBRARIES IN NEW ENGLAND.

In our last No., p. 173, seq., we furnished some account of the Libraries in Boston, Cambridge, Andover, Newton and Worcester, Ms. and in Providence, R. I. We now subjoin some facts in regard to the remaining Public Libraries in New England.

LIBRARIES IN NEW HAVEN, CONN.

The number of Vols. in the general Library of Yale College, Jan. 1, 1850, was 21,000, not including a few hundred duplicates. The number of pamphlets is estimated at 3500 or 4000. The library has two MSS. probably of the 14th century, a few modern MSS. and a collection of about 40 vols. of MSS., left by the late Pres. Stiles. No catalogue has been published since 1823, which contains the titles of somewhat less than half of the present number of books. The annual increase for ten years past has been between 900 and 1000 vols. The funds devoted to the increase of the library amount to \$28,437. Among the more important books in the library are the following. A collection of American newspapers of 1765-6, gathered by Dr. Stiles with reference to the Stamp Act. 4 vols. folio. [This is a unique collection, of great historical value, and not to be replaced.] Silvestre's *Palaeographie Universelle*, 4 vols. fol.; *Description de l' Egypte*. (an early copy) Paris 1809, etc. 22 vols. fol.; Piranesi: *Collection of Roman Antiquities*, 27 vols. fol.; Graevius, Gronovius, etc.: *Thesaurus Antiquitatum*, etc. 87 vols. fol.; Muratori *Scriptores Italici*, 24 vols. fol.; Anelli dell. *Istituto di Corrispondenza*

Archaeologica, 1829-45. 16 vols. 8vo; Bullettino dell. Instituto di Corrispondenza Archaeologica, 1829-44. 8vo; Maii Scriptorum Veterum Vaticana Collectio, 10 vols. fol; Maii Spicilegium Romanum, Collectio, 10 vols. 8vo; The Milan edition of the Italian Classics, uniform. 400 vols. 8vo; Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de France, 65 vols. 4to; (in progress) Ersch and Grüber: Encyclopedia, 4to, in prog. 100 vols. Halle Literatur-zeitung, complete, 1785-1849, 141 vols. 4to; Berliner Jahrbücher, complete 1827-1845, 33 vols. 4to; Fundgruben des Orients, 6 vols. fol.; Zahn: Antiqs. of Pompeii, Herculaneum and Stabia. Berlin folio. Pertz: Monumenta Germaniæ Historica, fol. 8 vols. received (in progress); Calvini Opera Omnia. Amstel. 9 vols. folio. Taylor's Engl. Transl. of Plato and Aristotle, 19 vols. 4to. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, complete to 1844. 137 vols. 8vo; Kingsborough's Mexican Antiquities 9 vols. fol.; Purchas his Pilgrimes. 5 vols. fol.; (a fine copy) Catesby's Natural History of Carolina. fol.; Lond. 1781. Ternaux-Compans: Collection of Voyages, etc. relative to discovery of America, 20 vols. 8vo. Paris. Byzantine Historians, Venice ed. 23 vols. fol.; Collection of Original Pamphlets concerning English affairs from Charles I. to Jas. II. The Documents given by the British Government, (Statutes, Rolls, etc.) fol. and less. 74 vols. E. L. Herrick, Librarian.

A handsome and commodious library building of stone has been recently erected. In the wings of this edifice are three libraries belonging to societies of students, as follows:

No. of Vols.	Aver. add. of vols.		date of last Catl.
	Jan. 1, 1849.	pr. yr. for last 10 yrs.	
Linonian Society	10646	440	Nov. 1846, pp. 274 (of 10103 vols.)
Brothers in Unity	10500	430	Apr. 1846, pp. 224 (of 9140 vols.)
Calliopean Society	6020	170	Feb. 1846, pp. 94 (of 6000 vols.)

The Library of the Young Men's Institute, New Haven, contains 3800 volumes;—open to its members. There is a Library belonging to the Medical Department of Yale College, and kept in the Med. Coll. Building; No. of vols. 900. There is also in the Law Building a Library of Law books belonging to the College, and containing 1900 volumes.

The Trumbull Gallery consists of two rooms, each 30 ft. square, 24 ft. high. The North room, or Trumbull Gallery proper, contains 50 paintings by Col. Trumbull. The South room contains a collection of portraits of the past and present officers and benefactors of the College, etc. (45 in number) also seven pieces of sculpture, many ancient coins, medallions and other memorials of antiquity.

LIBRARIES IN MIDDLETOWN, CONN.

The library of the Wesleyan university has more than 6000 vols. Two Society libraries of the students (3000 each), 6000. The Missionary Ly-

ceum has a library of several hundred vols. The university has no library fund. An annual appropriation is made for this object of \$200 to \$250. No catalogue has been recently published. Prof. J. W. Lindsay, librarian. Rev. Samuel F. Jarvis, D. D. LL. D. of Middletown, has one of the most valuable private libraries in the United States, amounting to about 10,000 vols. It is particularly rich in editions of the Fathers of the Greek and Latin church, in the Byzantine historians, and in works on modern church history.

LIBRARIES IN HARTFORD, CONN.

Library of Trinity College, together with lib. of Students,	11,000 vols.
“ Connecticut Historical Society,	7,000
“ Y. Men's Institute (in the Wadsworth Athenaeum),	9,400

Of the library belonging to the Historical Society, about 5000 vols. belong to the venerable librarian, Rev. Thomas Robbins, D. D. This includes the most valuable part, comprehending many folios. It has a considerable number of works, printed in the fifteenth century, some of special value. It has the first journal which, it is thought, was published in the French language, in 380 vols. There are 430 vols. of bound pamphlets, containing from twelve to fourteen in each volume, with copious indexes. There is also a large number of unbound pamphlets and newspapers, including a complete set of the Connecticut Courant, a weekly newspaper published in Hartford from 1764, still in progress, and which is said to be the oldest in the United States, except the Newport (R. I.) Mercury.

In the Wadsworth Athenaeum is a collection of 150 paintings, some of them of special value.

LIBRARIES OF WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

College Library,	6,348 vols.
Societies of Students (Philologian 2416, Philotechnian 2150)	4,566
Mills Theol. Society 400, Nat. Hist. Soc. 125	525
	<hr/>
	10,434

The college possesses no fund for its increase, except what is charged for the use of it.

LIBRARY OF AMHERST COLLEGE.

College Library,	5,500 vols.
Two Society Libraries, each about 3,600,	7,200
	<hr/>
	12,700

The college library possesses the series of vols. (charters, rolls, etc.) given a few years since by the British government. It has also some

valuable books purchased in Europe by the late Professor Hovey. An effort is now making, which we trust will be fully successful, greatly to enlarge this library. Prof. E. S. Snell, librarian.

LIBRARIES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

College Library, about	6,400 vols.
United Fraternity, College Society, about	6,500
Social Friends, about	6,500
Medical Library, about	700
Library of North. Academy of Arts and Sciences, about	1,300
	<hr/>
	21,400

The college library has two copies of Eliot's Indian Bible. One is perfect except the title-page of the Old Testament. At the end is a versification of the Psalms, as far as to the 4th verse of the 137th. The library has also some fine folio editions of the Fathers, Athanasius, Eusebius, etc.; Kircher's *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*, Montfaucon's *Antiquities*, and *Palaographia*, Vossius, Hippocrates, Cerda's *Virgil*, etc. The library possesses 17 portraits. Of these there are, a full-length portrait of the Earl of Dartmouth, (a copy of the original by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and a donation of the present earl); of Daniel Webster; Jeremiah Smith; Jeremiah Mason; Francis Hopkinson; a full-length portrait of Eleazar Wheelock, the first president of the college; of John Phillips (of Exeter, also full-length); of Samuel Appleton; Charles Marsh, etc. Prof. Charles B. Hadduck, librarian. The libraries of the two College Societies are well selected, and contain very valuable works both for reference and miscellaneous reading. Both possess some costly illustrated works. Among the portraits are one of Prof. Chamberlain, Pres. Brown, Prof. Adams, etc. The Northern Academy has 800 unbound vols., of pamphlets, etc., partially arranged; also 700 unbound vols. of newspapers. This collection also contains some valuable private papers, among which are a meteorological journal kept by Mr. John Farmer, of Concord, N. H., from 1818 to 1880, Gov. Bartlet's Correspondence from 1774 to 1794, etc.

LIBRARIES IN MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE.

College Library, about	4,500 vols.
Three Society Libraries (2,200; 785; 432),	3,417
	<hr/>
	7,917

It is expected that valuable additions will soon be made to the college library.

LIBRARIES IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT, BURLINGTON.

Library of the University of Vermont, . . .	10,000 vols.
Library of three Coll. Societies (2000; 2000; 1250),	5,250
	<hr/> 15,250

There are two small funds for the support of the university library, amounting to \$1250. This library, though not among the largest, is among the best selected in New England. Somewhat less than two thirds of the books are in the English language. The collections of Greek and Latin authors are nearly complete, and of the best editions. Among the valuable and comparatively rare, might be mentioned Stuart's Athens, 3 vols. fol.; Visconti's Iconographie, 5 vols. quarto, and 2 vols. fol. of plates; Montfaucon's Antiquit' expliquée and Palæographie; Catesby's Carolina, 2 vols. fol.; Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, in about 60 vols. quarto; Memoires de l'Academie des Inscriptions, 50 vols. quarto; Hansard's State Trials, several vols. in fol.; Cuvier et Valenciennes Hist. naturelle des Poissons, with the colored plates, some 15 vols. quarto. Among the single volumes, not often to be met with, are Fuller's Church History of England, fol.; Baxter's Life, by himself, fol.; John Scotus de Divisione Naturæ, fol., etc.

The books of the Hon. George P. Marsh, minister of the United States at Constantinople, amounting to between 3000 and 4000 vols., are deposited in this library. Nearly all these works are in foreign languages, principally in the Spanish and Scandinavian. There are, however, some very rare books in the English language.

LIBRARIES IN MAINE.

Library of Bangor Theol. Seminary, nearly . . .	8,000 vols.
Library of Bowdoin College,	11,900
Libraries of two College Societies, Bowd. Coll. (5000; 4000)	9,000
Medical Library in Bowd. Coll.	3,300
Library of the Theological Society in Bowd. Coll. .	1,500
Library of Waterville College,	5,300
Two Society Libraries in W. C., 1500 each, . . .	3,000
Boardman Miss. Soc. Library in Wat. Coll. . . .	500
	<hr/> 34,500

Bowdoin College has no fund specifically devoted to the purchase of books. An annual appropriation of \$200 is made from the college funds for that purpose. The two Students' libraries are increased annually each by about 200 vols. The Medical Library contains a remarkably good collection of books. The college library has been lately removed to

a fine apartment, and arranged in systematic order. Waterville college has a subscription of \$10,000 in process of collection for the purchase of books and philosophical apparatus.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

Whole No. of books in the New England Libraries, in our last No.,	256,200
“ “ in present No.,	196,367
Total,	452,567

	Pop. in 1840.	No. of Vols. in Pub. Lib.
Massachusetts,	737,699	233,334
Connecticut,	309,978	94,166
Rhode Island,	108,830	46,000
Vermont,	291,948	23,167
New Hampshire,	284,574	21,400
Maine,	501,793	34,500

Some general remarks on the subject of libraries we are compelled to postpone till another opportunity.

ARTICLE XI.

MISCELLANIES, THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY.

A NEW edition of Dr. Kühner's School or Middle Grammar of the Greek Language is about to be published by the Messrs. Appleton of New York. A very large edition has been sold within a few years. There are numerous references to it in most of the editions of the Greek classics published within four or five years in this country. In the recent commentaries on the New Testament published in Germany, e. g. Meyer, the grammatical works of Kühner are largely referred to. In England too they are winning much favor, notwithstanding the rigid adherence of English scholars to long-established methods and text-books.

We stated in our last No. p. 203, that an edition of Menzies' translation of Tholuck's Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount, was about to be printed in Andover. Since that time, it has been concluded to have the work translated anew from the third and last edition. The Edinburgh version was made from the first German edition. The work in its present form has many and decided improvements over the first edition. It is in the process of translation by Mr. E. Rohie, Hebrew Instructor in the Seminary, and Mr. J. B. Bittinger, Principal of the Female Academy, Andover.

The edition of the Works of Horace, by Prof. Lincoln of Brown University, is passing through the press. We have seen a copy of the Odes, which has a remarkably fair appearance, and very a *kindly* look for the eyes. The type is large and very distinct. The various readings, at the bottom of the page, are a valuable feature, and new in American editions of Horace. The book will contain illustrations by neat outline cuts of various objects, e. g. lyra, tibia, etc. There will be full notes, illustrating Roman literature, life, etc., a Life of Horace, account of the Metres, chronological tables, copious indices, etc. Prof. Lincoln has enjoyed excellent facilities for the preparation of this work by study in Germany, a residence in Rome, etc. — The "Greek Prose Composition" of Prof. Boies of Brown University, is a carefully prepared book, and a valuable addition to our helps for classical study. — Prof. Stuart's Commentary on Daniel is passing rapidly through the press in Andover. It will be in one vol. 8vo. and published by Crocker & Brewster of Boston. — The 3d vol. of Dr. Woods's Works has been published, and another is now in the press. — A new Life of Martin Luther, especially of the earlier portion, by Dr. Sears, Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, is soon to be published in Philadelphia and London.

Sir James Stephens has been appointed professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, England, in the place of Mr. Smyth deceased.

Among the recent publications in Germany, are the following: — A 3d ed. of Julius Müller's Treatise on the Doctrine of Sin, pp. 1218; 3d of Harless' Christian Ethics, pp. 331; 2d of Hagenbach's Church History of the 18th and 19th centuries, pp. 475; Exegetical and Critical "Ahrenlese zum Alten Test." by Dr. F. Böttcher, pp. 112; The Epistle to the Philippians vindicated against Baur, a theological prize essay by Brückner of Leipsic, pp. 93; Life of F. Perthes of Hamburg, by his son C. T. Perthes, professor of law at Bonn, Vol. I. pp. 368 (Perthes was the eminent bookseller, born at Rudolstadt, Apr. 21, 1772); Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum ex materia collecta ab A. Böckh, ed. J. Franz, 2d fascic. Vol. III. part 29 inscrip. Aegypt., part 30 inscrip. Aethiop. super Aegypt., part 31 insc. Cyrena., part 32 insc. Sicil. cum Melita et Lipara, pp. 387, (said to be more interesting than the preceding); Das Buch Job übersetzt u. erklärt von Dr. B. Welte, Freiberg, 1849, pp. 424; Corpus Reformatorum ed Bretschneider, Vol. XV. of the Works of Phil. Melancthon, pp. 698; Opera Horatii for Schools, by Henry Düntzer, in 1 vol., author of the Kritik u. Erklärung of the Horatian poetry, in 5 vols.; a Practical Commentary on the Epistle of James, by Dr. Neander; the 1st vol. of the Church History of Jacobi, a pupil of Neander, said to be characterized by a "very exact style and scientific precision."

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA
AND
THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

NO. XXVII.

JULY, 1850.

ARTICLE I.

MAN THE IMAGE OF GOD.

By Rev. Edward Beecher, D. D., Boston.

It is a fundamental question in all theology, and in all religious experience, are the relations of the divine and the human mind such that it is possible to have a true knowledge of God?

It is commonly assumed that such is the fact, and systems of theology are constructed, and the reality of an intelligible and rational religious experience is defended on the assumption that it is possible to know God, and to commune with him. And yet there is a form of scepticism which at the present time is extensively prevalent, which denies the possibility of any such knowledge, and thus strikes a blow at the root of all such theology, and all such religious experience. Moreover in the writings even of some of the most orthodox divines, there are the germs of a scepticism concerning the reality of our knowledge of God, in some respects, which when fully developed lead to similar results — results which they above all others on reflection would repudiate. And yet, vitally important as this question is, it has rarely if ever been directly, fully and formally considered, as its importance demands.

It is our purpose to invite the attention of thinking minds to this subject, by a few remarks on some of the prominent points which it involves.

We shall first inquire how that knowledge of God is obtained, which is at the basis of all our common systems of theology, and of religious experience, and then pass in review some of the modes in which the reality of that knowledge is assailed.

Such knowledge of God as has been adverted to is obtained by the assumption that God designedly made the human mind in his own image, in order that every man might have in himself the means of knowing God and thus the power of communing with him. By assuming that the mind is made in the image of God it is meant that God and man alike have rational powers, that is, the powers requisite for the perception of truth, for the comparison of objects, and for judging of the value of results; that they have the power of choosing ends, and of forming plans to gain those ends; that they have the power of benevolent emotion or love; — that they have the power to perceive and to feel, what is honorable and right, so that they are capable of pleasant or painful emotions as they are conscious of regarding or disregarding truth and right in their conduct, and that in these respects the divine and human mind so far correspond that by knowing the human mind, we can know the divine.

That our current systems of theology are in fact based upon this assumption is too obvious to need a labored proof. It is enough to advert to a few illustrations of the fact. Take then any of the doctrinal treatises of the elder President Edwards, for example that on the End for which God created the World, and it is obvious at a glance that the idea of God which pervades that treatise, the only idea which could render such a discussion possible, is taken from the human mind. If man had not the power to consider the nature and relations of things, to select an end for which he will act, and to put in operation a system of means to gain that end, and if he did not assume the existence of similar powers in God, he could neither raise, discuss or understand the question considered in that profound and fundamental dissertation. The whole of the introduction, containing explanations of terms and general positions, discriminating between chief and inferior ends, and ultimate and subordinate ends, in relation to God, consists entirely of illustrations taken from the actions of men with reference to such ends, in choosing them and forming plans to obtain them. In like manner, in his treatise on the Will, he argues that a determination of the will may be virtuous and praiseworthy, though necessary, thus: "God is necessarily holy, and *his will* is necessarily determined to what is good." He also argues against the Arminians on the ground that they concede the truth of this position. Here is a most manifest assumption on both sides that man, so far at least as the will is concerned, is truly in the image of God, — so as to authorize reasoning from the divine to the human mind. Indeed in one instance in his work on the will, Edwards thus explicitly states this assumption as the basis of his reasoning:¹

¹ Part II. § 5.

"The essential qualities of a moral agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man (Gen. 1: 26, 27 and 9: 6), by which God distinguished man from beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature whereby he is capable of moral agency. In like manner in Calvin's Institutes, in his discussion of election, predestination and decrees,¹ a similar use of language constantly occurs, and the whole discussion would in a moment become utterly unintelligible if it were to be denied that election, predestination and decrees in the actions of man, are in kind the same as election, predestination and decrees in God, although put forth on a much smaller scale by man than by God. But it is needless to multiply such illustrations. All ideas of moral government, law, authority, love, providence, justice, grace, mercy with reference to God — which are the staple of all theological systems, fall away the moment that we deny the assumption now under consideration.

Equally true is it that the prevalent doctrines concerning religious experience rest upon the same assumption. A God is always assumed and described as the object of love, whose intellect, affections, will, and moral nature, are in kind, although not in degree, like those found in the human mind. The very idea of communion with God implies such a similarity of nature and faculties, that common views, ends and interests are possible between God and man, that man can so understand the ends of God as to adopt them as his own, and the interests of God, as to identify his own with them, and the feelings of God as to respond to them in devoted and intelligent love. But universal as is this assumption, no efforts are commonly made to evince its truth. Indeed it is an assumption so natural and necessary, that it seems rarely if ever to occur to those who make it, that its correctness can be called in question. This, however, is by no means the case. It not only can be, but is called in question, and that extensively.

In the first place, the system of Pantheism, known in all ages, but of late extensively revived even in Christendom, is in its essential nature, an explicit denial of its truth. The fundamental element of that system is a denial of the personality of the Deity. But the central

¹ Book III. Chap. 21.

element of personality is the will. This, as essential in selecting ends and forming plans, together with the intellect to guide the emotions to influence it, and with power in its turn to affect or control them, is absolutely essential to any conception of a person. All this Pantheism renounces, and instead of a personal God with intellect, affections, will, ends and plans, introduces one great self-existent substance, including in itself the whole universe, but without self-consciousness, intellect, affections, ends or plans. It has simply an inward tendency or power, to unfold itself in various evolutions, now of matter, and now of mind. Man is the highest development of this deity; in him alone he becomes self-conscious. Of course under such a system all ideas of law, responsibility, and a moral government administered by a personal God disappear.

The bolder and more consistent forms of Pantheism readily admit, avow, and defend these results, and treat all ideas of a personal God derived from the personal attributes of the human mind as merely the delusions of anthropopathy or anthropomorphism. But there are others who refuse to be classed with these, who yet call in question, or it may be deny, the conformity of our ideas of God as a personal God to the reality of his being, and thus virtually reduce him to the condition of a God unknown at least to us. In this class we may without injustice place the distinguished scholar Schleiermacher. Indeed, the charge of Pantheism has been brought against him without hesitation. Although his admirers strenuously defend him against this charge,¹ yet thus much at least is true; he maintains that a great degree of piety can exist among such as deny the truth of our common conceptions of a personal God. Moreover he asserts in his own person that "when the idea of God is derived in too great a degree from human relations, and God is conceived of as *personally exercising thought and volition*, it is brought down into the sphere of opposition and controversy." By reaction from such a view of a personal God, there arises according to him, a view "in which the Supreme Being is represented not as personally exercising thought and volition, but as the universal necessity, *exalted above all personal attributes*, and producing and combining every mode of thought and existence." Here then we seem to have placed before us in contrast a personal God, and the God of Pantheism. In view of this contrast, Schleiermacher remarks, "Nothing seems more unwarrantable than for the adherents of the one conception, to charge those with a godless spirit, who repelled by the force of anthropomorphism, have taken refuge in the other; or, for those on the other hand, to accuse their opponents of adopting an idolatrous service, and

¹ See especially the Letters of George Ripley to Andrews Norton.

to regard their piety as without value, on account of the human character of their conceptions of God. A man may be truly religious, whether he incline to one of these conceptions or the other; but his religious spirit, the consciousness of God in his inward feeling, must be better than the conception which he has formed; and the more he identifies this with the essence of religion, the less does he understand himself.¹ Subsequently to this he remarks that both views are "defective" and that "neither corresponds to its object." He also says: "It cannot be maintained that the admission of one or the other of these conceptions in and for itself can be taken as the sign of a more or less perfect religion." His object in these statements is to show that all "are not despisers of religion who cannot reconcile themselves with the personality of the Supreme Being, as it is commonly represented." He concedes, indeed, that there is an "almost inevitable necessity of admitting it," and disavows all purpose to weaken the conviction of it in any mind that holds it. Yet he is of opinion that the origin of this necessity can be explained, and that the truth of the conception is so questionable, that "among truly religious men there have never been zealots, enthusiasts or fanatics for this notion." With reference to the charge of atheism often brought against the advocates of Pantheistic views, he thus remarks: "So far, as indeed has often been the case, as atheism has been understood to mean nothing but hesitation and uncertainty in regard to this conception, the sincerely pious will view the existence of this around them with great composure; and there has always been something which they deem far more irreligious, as indeed it is, namely, the want of an immediate consciousness of the Godhead in the feelings of the soul. They will be the slowest to believe that any man in fact can be entirely destitute of religion; for before such a person can exist, they know, that he must be totally deprived of feeling, and degraded with the peculiar attributes of his being, into a mere animal; since he only in their opinion, who is so deeply degraded, can lose the consciousness of God in the universe and in ourselves, — of the Divine Life and Energy by which all things subsist."

Of the ideas here presented of the nature of religion it is not our purpose at this time fully to speak. It is enough to say that these views directly tend, as we have previously remarked, to produce a scepticism which strikes a blow at the root of all our current systems of theology, and common views of religious experience. The idea that the human mind was designedly made in the image of God in order that we may be enabled to understand him, is rejected; and all communion with

¹ Ripley's third Letter to Andrews Norton, pp. 39, 40.

God which implies the choice of common ends, coöperation in common plans, and the interchange and reciprocation of intelligent affection is excluded as no essential part of religion ; and in its place is introduced as its essence a mere consciousness of an inward vital power in ourselves and in the universe around us on which we are entirely dependent and which consciousness is common to all men — unless perhaps it may cease in a few cases of extreme degradation. The manner in which, according to him, we are “conscious of God in the universe” as well as in ourselves may be explained by another passage, in which he says: “How then can any one assert that I have described a religion without God, when I have in fact portrayed nothing else than the immediate and original being of God in ourselves through the elementary feelings which I have pointed out? Or is not God the supreme and only unity? Is it not God alone before whom, and in whom all that is individual disappears? And when you look upon the universe as a whole, as a comprehensive totality, can you do this otherwise than as in God?” * * * “In no other way than through those emotions which the universe awakens within us, do we pretend to attain to a consciousness of God in immediate feeling, and hence it is in this way only that we have spoken of him. Would you therefore call in question the claims of this feeling to be a consciousness of God, *a possession of the divine being*; I can then impart to you no further instruction or explanation.” That all suspicion of any unfair dealing with Schleiermacher may be removed, it is enough to note that we have taken the preceding extracts from the works of a defender, and that they are a part of an argument designed to prove that he is not justly liable to the charge of being a Pantheist. Without considering at large the success of the defence, it is sufficient to remark, that if the assertions of the preceding extracts are true, all our common views of theology and religious experience must fall away and disappear. We have been wont to entertain entirely different views of the unity of the universe. The fundamental idea of our view has ever been that of a personal God forming a plan, and disclosing it to minds created in his own image. He is the omnipresent illuminator of intelligent minds. When they choose him as their portion, and his plans as theirs, and thus sympathize with the central ruling mind in holy love, their innumerable minds become morally and socially one, and the central mind is over all and in all and through all. But this is not a unity of essence or being, but of ends, plans, thoughts, affections, sympathies and joys, in those who are essentially distinct; and the peculiar joy of the union arises from the fact that it is not necessary, but is the voluntary and free act of distinct minds. Hence the moment that the unity of affection and will

in the truth ceases, no other unity remains, but an entire separation takes place between God and alienated minds.

But if the foundation of these views falls away, if all ideas of God derived from human personality are to be rejected, then it is impossible in thinking and speaking of God to rise above the idea of a mere vital force or power, clothed with no moral attributes, and giving rise to no moral laws, no sanctions, no plans, and no system of moral government. Of course all possibility of theology or religious experience, as we have before said, ceases, at least in the common understanding of those terms.

Besides this complete and all pervading scepticism, there are partial tendencies to similar results even in the writings of the most orthodox divines. It is not denied by them that in some respects the human mind is a true image of the divine, but that it is so in other important respects they do deny. The effect of this denial is to produce such a dissimilarity between the divine and the human mind, that the latter ceases truly to represent God to us and the ascription of some of its ideas and modes of action to God is regarded as virtually anthropopathy.

Those which we shall proceed to consider do not relate so directly to personality as the preceding, but rather to the conformity of some of our fundamental and necessary ideas to those of the divine mind.

It appears to us reasonable, and probable, that if God desired to commune with us, he would not confer on us original and necessary laws of thought and belief, such that we must of necessity view things as they are not, and of course as he does not view them. In the strong language of Sir William Hamilton, to suppose this "is to suppose that we are created capable of intelligence in order to be made the victims of delusion; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a lie."¹

Out of many illustrations we will at the present time consider the assertions of many that God does not or may not agree with the necessary ideas of the human mind as to time, space, and the immutable principles of morals.

We will begin with our conception of TIME. Whatever may be the true nature of time, it cannot be denied that it is a fundamental and necessary conception of our minds. It is impossible for us to conceive of events except as succeeding one another in time, and the distinctions of time as *past*, *present* and *future*, we cannot, if we ever so much desire it, regard as unreal and not corresponding to the true state of things as seen by God. Moreover, if they are unreal, just so far it is impos-

¹ Note A. on Reid, § L. p. 743.

sible for any communion to exist between us and God, for we cannot throw off our conceptions of time, and God cannot coincide with our finite minds in their delusive modes of mental action. The moment then that we deny that time appears to God as past, present, and future, just as it does to us, God becomes to us in a very important respect an unknown and inconceivable God. Yet President Edwards, and in this he represents a large class of theorists, does not hesitate to call our conceptions of time as past, present, and future a delusion of the imagination. With reference to the supposition of an infinite length of time before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so; or a succession of limited and measurable¹ periods of time, following one another in an infinitely long series;" he says "it must needs be a groundless imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once: '*Vita interminabilis, tota simul, et perfecta possessio.*' Which is so generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it."² In the margin he quotes from an anonymous author an argument to sustain his position. In it occurs the following assertion: "If once we allow an all-perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite comprehension of things always, (and allow it we must), the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind." It is not our purpose to go into a consideration of the arguments by which any reach such results. It is enough here to say that such is the nature of the human mind that it is utterly impossible that the authors of such statements should have any conception of a God such as they describe. The very language that they use is unintelligible to us except on the assumption that time is in reality — as it seems to us. What is meant by "the immediate possession of the whole of his life together and at once?" Can any sense be attached to these words except on the assumption of a contrast to something not immediate, not together, not at once? There is in like manner a constant use of the language of time in all such arguments, against the reality of time, nor is it possible for the human mind to frame or to express an idea on the subject that shall be at all intelligible, except on the assumption that our ideas of time are real and true. And in fact as soon as the metaphysical crisis is over, those who thus reason go on to speak of time as alike a reality to God and to man. It would be a fair test of this question to call upon those who assert that there is to God no distinction of past or

¹ We regard the common reading unmeasurable as a misprint.

² Freedom of the Will, Part IV. Sec. 8.

future, to interpret their own arguments against the future restoration of the lost, to holiness, and to explain how God views what we are wont to call the future eternal punishment of the wicked, or the future and eternal blessedness of the righteous. To him it would seem that they are neither past or future. They neither have been, in his view, nor are they to be. What then? Are they to him in existence now? Nay, *our now* is but a point of time, and will not contain an eternity of joy or wo. But what is *God's now*. Is it to him now true that the wicked have suffered forever in hell? Have the redeemed yet unborn been forever with him in heaven? If not, what is meant by their assertion that there is to God no distinction of past or future? In truth so long as the mind of man remains as it is, such an assertion can have no effect except to render the Divine mind in this respect totally unintelligible, while the human mind will go on to conceive of time just as the laws of its nature compel it to do. This is the least that can be said of such speculations. It would not however be going to an excess to say that they involve palpable absurdities. When reading them, we cannot help thinking of attempting to aid the vision of the eye by filling the house with the dense smoke of a blinding and stifling combustion. If our minds were not made to delude us, time past and future are as truly realities to God as to us, and it is but doing violence to the mind to attempt to think otherwise, or to express in words any idea of a God to whom it is not so.

In the following passage, at the close of his treatise on God's Last End in Creation, Edwards speaks as other men do as to time.

"It is no solid objection against God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of the creature with himself, that *the particular time will never come* when it can be said, the union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at satisfying justice in the eternal damnation of sinners; which will be satisfied no otherwise than with regard to its *eternal duration*. But yet *there never will come that particular moment*, when it can be said that now justice is satisfied." Suppose now that Edwards had attempted to translate this passage into the language of his metaphysical theory, that the idea of a succession of periods of time following one another in an infinitely long series is a groundless imagination, and that to God there is no distinction of past and future; could he have done anything except to unsay what he had just said, by stating that although he had spoken of particular future times in an endless series, after the manner of men, yet it was in fact a mere illusion? Would he not be obliged to say the same of all his arguments against the restoration of the wicked to holiness and heaven at any future period of their existence? And if he had attempted to put any real and true

idea in the place of what he had dismissed as a groundless imagination, could he have said anything that did not do violence to his own mind and that of his readers by vain efforts to express in words or to understand that which is totally inexpressible, unintelligible and inconceivable, and which is so because it is absurd?

The conception of SPACE is no less necessary to us as our minds have been constituted. It is indeed true that its theological relations are not so direct and obvious as those of time. Still however it is of necessity true that if God regards our notions of space as a mere illusion, and as not at all corresponding to the reality of things, then there is another point of entire dissimilarity between our minds and that of God, so that our faculties and modes of intellectual action do not at all represent him to us. Yet President Edwards when called to answer an objection to his views of the will, does not hesitate not only as we have seen, to regard as illusive our necessary conceptions of time, but also to place those of space in the same category.

"This objection (he says) supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration." — "A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case, as the other; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us." — "I think we know not what we mean if we say the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity."¹ By a reference to his notes on the mind we find that he held the preceding views of space as a consistent part of a system of idealism, and that he resolved the whole material universe into the constant manifestation of God's ideas to the mind by a constant exercise of his will. On this point Sir William Hamilton well observes, "It is evident that if *extension* be not *immediately perceived* as externally existing, extended objects cannot be immediately perceived as realities out of and independent of the percipient subject." Hence Edwards was consistent in saying, "There can be nothing like those things we call by the name of bodies, out of the mind, unless it be in some other mind or minds."

Now without going into any formal examination of this theory, it is enough to say that it is contrary to the natural, universal and necessary

¹ On the Will, Part IV. Chap. 8.

ry action of our minds as God has made them. All men of necessity think, speak and write as if space were an external reality. Who, for example, in studying the solar system, and the starry worlds separated by infinite spaces, thinks of calling it in question? Sir William Hamilton accordingly holds that our perception of external space itself is immediate and direct as well as of objects in it, and that the idea of space is not merely suggested by the processes of sensation, as Reid maintained. In a note on this view of Reid,¹ he first proves that it leads to idealism, and then says, "The philosophers who have most loudly appealed to the veracity of God, and the natural conviction of mankind in refutation of certain obnoxious conclusions, have too often silently contradicted that veracity and those convictions, when opposed to certain favorite opinions. But it is evident that such authority is either good for all, or good for nothing. Our natural consciousness assures us, (and the fact of that assurance is admitted by philosophers of all opinions), that we have an immediate knowledge of the very things themselves of an *external* and *extended* world, and on the ground of this knowledge alone, is the belief of mankind founded that such a world really exists."² Hence he applies to our direct perception of external space and our belief of its reality, the same language that Reid does to our belief of the existence of external objects. "It is not a deduction of reason, but a natural principle. The belief of it, and the very conception of it, are equally parts of our constitution. If we are deceived by it, we are deceived by him that made us, and there is no remedy." Of this statement the truth is undeniable.

Now if these things are so, then it must be true as we have asserted, that if God regards our notions of space as a mere illusion of the imagination, as Edwards suggests, if they do not at all correspond with the reality of things, then so far God is to us an unknown, and an unknowable God. Our minds do not at all represent him to us. When we think and speak of him as creating worlds in the boundless regions of space, it is all an illusion. And yet if we reject our natural ideas of space and attempt to translate our language into the philosophical sense, it becomes perfectly unintelligible, and to attempt to understand it, just as in the case of time, does violence to the mind itself. God never made it to understand, or to conceive of, the philosophical verbiage on this subject.

Our illustrations of the mode of destroying the power of the human mind to represent God with reference to the principles of morals we will take from the celebrated Romish divines and philosophers, Pascal

¹ Inquiry into the Human Mind, Chap. 5, Sec. 7.

² Hamilton's Reid, pp. 128—130.

and Abelard. They believed that it was revealed in the word of God, that even infants were justly liable to eternal punishment for the sin of Adam, which was committed before they were born or existed, and that therefore it would be just for God actually to consign them to eternal misery in hell. Listen now to Pascal. "What can be more contrary to the rules of *our wretched justice*, than to damn eternally an infant incapable of volition, for an offence wherein he seems to have had no share, and which was committed six thousand years before he was born? Certainly nothing shocks us more rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the most incomprehensible of all, we are incomprehensible to ourselves."¹ Here, under the influence of supposed revealed facts, Pascal ascribes to God acts which directly shock and violate all possible ideas of justice or honor which the mind of man can form. And in order to defend them he is obliged to assail the conformity of our ideas of justice to the reality of things as seen by God. Our justice it seems, which condemns such things in God, is *wretched justice*, but God, who does such acts, forms nobler and more elevated ideas of justice than we can attain unto. No doubt if the acts alleged are in fact *just*, all our ideas of justice are wretched, and our confidence in them must be utterly shaken. Yet so long as we have them, we cannot but feel that we are still more wretched if the God under whose government we live can do such things, and not be wretched himself. In order to conceive of such a God, we are obliged to renounce all ideas of honor or right of which the human mind can form a conception, and then what but utter darkness can remain? That God is a diabolical being we cannot, we will not admit, and yet formed as we are, we can see nothing else in such acts. God therefore in the most important part of his character becomes to us an unknown God.

The same facts were believed by Abelard, and he too felt their utter incompatibility with our ideas of justice and honor. How then does he defend them? Hear his words: "Would it not be deemed the summit of injustice among men, if any one should cast an innocent son for the sin of the father into the flames, even if they endured but for a short time? How much more so if eternal? Truly, I confess that this would be unjust in men, because they are forbidden to avenge even their own real injuries. But it is not so in God, who says, vengeance is mine, I will repay, and again, I will kill, and I will make alive. For God commits no injustice towards his creature *in whatever way he treats him*, whether he assigns him to punishment or to life."² Again he says: "In whatever way God may wish to treat his creatures, he

¹ Hallam Hist. Lit. Vol. IV. p. 94, Paris ed.

² Opera, p. 395. Paris, 1616.

can be accused of no injustice, nor can anything be called evil in any way if it is done according to his will. Nor can we in any other way distinguish good from evil, except by noticing what is agreeable to his will."¹ No doubt the will of God in fact is always conformed to what is just and right. But Abelard here explicitly denies that there are any immutable principles of honor and right, to which the will of God can be conformed. Of course our natural and necessary ideas of immutable morality are a delusion. No one has set forth the absurdity, and ruinous consequences of these views, more vividly than Bellamy.² The general scope of his argument is this. It destroys all essential difference between God and the devil, for it implies that if God did but will to feel and act as the devil now does, it would be right, and his present character wrong. Certainly it follows, from the view of Abelard, that there is in fact no standard by which his creatures can judge of the character of God, and that it would be absurd to ask, shall not the judge of all the earth do right, for certainly he will always do what he does in fact do, and this according to Abelard is the only standard of right. Just as if there were no necessary and immutable difference between benevolence and malevolence,—between a purpose to produce a happy universe, and a purpose to produce a miserable one. Just as if God could make it right to treat the innocent and the guilty as if there was no difference in their character; to enact the law of love, and then to inflict eternal misery on all who keep it, and to confer eternal rewards on all who break it;—to hate all who love and honor him, and to honor all who hate him! But enough; nothing but the supposed necessity of defending acts of gross and palpable injustice, falsely ascribed to God, could ever have driven a mind like that of Abelard, one of the most independent thinkers of his age, to do such violence to those principles of immutable justice and honor which God has implanted in the mind and in virtue of which it is in that particular his own image. Yet such views are not repudiated even at this late day so decidedly as they ought to be. Even Dr. Chalmers has said, that it may be "the real truth of the case" that an individual is "justly culpable, for an iniquitous deed—done not by himself, but by another who lived nearly 6000 years ago," although he admits that "his own moral sense is altogether unable to apprehend it."³

But if the natural and necessary ideas of the human mind, as to justice and honor, do not truly represent the ideas of justice and honor in the divine mind, then all thought of communion with God is absurd. Communion implies something in common between two minds. But

¹ Op. p. 395.² Works, Vol. I. p. 81.³ Lect. 25 on Romans, p. 129. New York edition.

if our necessary ideas of honor and right are unlike those of God, then there is an essential discord between us on a vital point, and in following his ideas of justice, honor and right, he must of course shock ours, and we must either violate our moral natures, or revolt from his acts, and be repelled from him. Plainly, the convictions of the human mind as to honor and dishonor, right and wrong, are the most important in the universe. On them all just views of God depend. How great then the calamity to have the confidence of man in them, as truly representing the ideas of God, so shaken that he can for a moment even suppose that to punish an innocent individual for a deed done thousands of years before he was in existence, can be honorable or just.

We have thus, as we proposed, considered how that knowledge of God is obtained which is at the basis of our common systems of theology, and of Christian experience, and reviewed some of the modes in which the reality of that knowledge is assailed. It will naturally be expected that we should next consider the reasons for believing that this knowledge is real and trustworthy.

These are derived chiefly from two sources, the necessity of the case, and the uniform usage of the word of God.

It is perfectly plain that to us the only alternative is between knowledge of God thus obtained and no knowledge at all. We are indeed aware that the doctrine has been recently defended that God cannot be revealed as the infinite, the absolute, the one; but only through finite media, such as sounds, colors, forms, works, definite objects and signs. Besides this we are told he can be represented by such human modes of action as imply limitation and imperfection, as deliberating, reasoning, remembering and the like.

But we are constrained to ask, of what use would all this be, and what knowledge of God would it communicate to one who had not the image of God in his own mind in the powers of will, intellect, affection, and of discerning and feeling moral good and evil? But to one who has them, God cannot be revealed except as an intelligent moral person. There is nothing in the material world which can give a knowledge of God to a being who has within himself no intellectual image of God. The manifold forms, colors, motions, sounds, combinations, systems and arrangements of the material world do not reveal God to the irrational animals that surround us. They have not the image of God within. To us they reveal him only because being intelligent and rational, capable of forming and executing plans to gain ends, we are thereby rendered capable of understanding in the works of an infinite being the manifestation of powers similar to our own, and hence of inferring his being, and attributes. And if because God is infinite and

we finite we assume that no faculty, act, feeling or passion that exists in man can be truly predicated of God, for fear of anthropopathism, then all possibility of gaining any knowledge of God is destroyed. Love, joy, exultation and various other passions implying happy emotions are by all without hesitation ascribed to God. Yet of these we know absolutely nothing except what is derived from the human mind. What do we know of knowledge, intuition, choice or purpose, except from our knowledge of such phenomena in the human mind? Nay, what do we know of mental action of any kind except what we derive from the same source? Shall we then through fear of anthropopathy refuse to ascribe any kind of mental action to God? For all practical purposes, we might as well turn atheists at once; for if God be totally unintelligible, of what use is the barren truth that an unknown God exists? But the end is not here. Pursuing the same course of reasoning, some hesitate to ascribe even existence to God. A late writer¹ says, "Some have been unwilling to attribute *being* to the deity, since we have no conception or knowledge of *being in itself*, still less of *infinite being*. Our knowledge of being, is only of being this and that, a conditional being, which is not predicable of God." Surely such results are a *reductio ad absurdum*. Can truth conduct to such an issue?

Hence Neander, distinguishes between anthropomorphism, as denoting the ascription of a material form to God, and anthropopathism or the ascription of the emotions, and acts of the human mind to God. "At the root of the latter (he says) lies *an inner, and undeniable necessity*; since man being created in the image of God, being a spirit in affinity with the Father of spirits, is *constrained and warranted* to frame to himself the idea of God after this analogy. There is, therefore, a true as well as a false anthropopathism; and a correct as well as an erroneous avoidance of it, according as this analogy is rightly or improperly used."²

But still clearer is the evidence derived from the word of God. In the first place it most distinctly asserts that God may be known. "The knowledge of God" is a result assured to all who rightly seek it;³ not merely theoretical knowledge, but that of soul satisfying communion. It was the special design of our Saviour to assure his disciples in his interview with them before his death, that such a knowledge of God was possible, sure, and infallible. God the Father should come unto them, and manifest himself unto them, and dwell in them and they should know him certainly and be assured that he was in them. This knowledge of God he calls eternal life. John the apostle thus express-

¹ Theodore Parker. Discourse of Religion, p. 163, Note.

² Ch. Hist. Torrey's translation, Vol. I. p. 561.

³ Prov. 2: 5.

es his convictions on this point. "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true."¹ The marriage supper of the Lamb, in the nineteenth chapter of the Apocalypse,² is but a prophecy of that full and joyful knowledge of God, and communion with him which the church is destined yet to reveal on earth, when all those causes of ignorance of God that sin has introduced shall be removed.

It being then the fundamental doctrine of the Bible that God may be known, and its avowed end to give a knowledge of God, and to bring man into a state of communion with him, we are authorized to conclude that the mode adopted therein to effect these results is based on the truth. But it is a fact too notorious to need proof, that the same assumption pervades the Bible which, as we have shown, pervades all our common systems of theology, that man is the image of God in his fundamental constitution, as an intelligent, voluntary, affectionate, and moral person. Throughout, God is described in language taken from the human mind. Nor is there in the Bible any intimation that in the use of such language there is a necessity, or even a danger of delusion. It nowhere stigmatizes it as anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy. Nor does it even call in question the accuracy of the fundamental and necessary conceptions of the human mind concerning time and space, and justice, honor, and rectitude. It always uses the common language of men concerning time and space, with reference to God and to man, and never intimates that as God views things they are illusive. God also appeals to common principles of right between him and his creatures, as for example when he refers to them as requiring the death of the soul that sins, for its own sins, and those only, and repudiating the idea of treating the righteous and the wicked alike, as a procedure undeniably and necessarily unjust.³ Moreover when Abraham in his plea for Sodom said to the Lord, be it far from thee to slay the righteous with the wicked, shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? God admitted the binding force of the plea.⁴

It must indeed be admitted that one or two rhetorical representations of the enlarged scale on which God plans, and views the events of successive ages, have been pressed into the service of a delusive philosophy, and forced to utter the theory of God's eternal now; and we have accordingly been reminded that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.⁵ But that the idea is not philosophical and scientific, but that it is a rhetorical presentation of the relative brevity of human periods compared with eter-

¹ 1 John 5: 20.² Rev. 19: 7—9.³ Ezek. 18: 19—32.⁴ Gen. 19: 25.⁵ 2 Pet. 3: 8.

nity is too plain to admit of denial. So it is said, a thousand years, are in thy sight, as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night.¹ God's scale is eternity. Compared with this, one day, or a thousand years, are like infinitesimal quantities in mathematics, when connected with an infinite quantity — differing it may be among themselves — but all so relatively minute as to be alike disregarded and dropped. Excepting one or two such passages, the main current of the Bible all runs one way. Time appears to God as it does to us. The basis therefore of the whole Bible is the great principle that man in his fundamental mental constitution, is the image of God, and that his fundamental conceptions as to time, space, and moral rectitude, agree with the reality of things as seen by God, and that on these grounds alone is a knowledge of God or communion with him possible.

No book on earth is so entirely free from the taint of a spurious and delusive philosophy as the Bible. None tends so powerfully to retain the mind in the domains of a sound and healthy common sense, and to establish it in that abiding assurance of a real knowledge and heartfelt love of God, which is the essential element of eternal life.

It now remains that we consider the bearings of the principles thus far discussed and illustrated upon the promises of a more full knowledge of God, and perfect communion with him than has hitherto been enjoyed by his church on earth. This inquiry will have reference in part to the effects of a restoration to the mind of God's moral image to increase its power of truly representing him to us. It will also consider the question at present exciting some interest, whether the divine Being is as truly the subject of painful emotions as of those that are pleasant, or whether those portions of Scripture that ascribe such emotions to God are to be regarded in such a sense anthropopathic, as to require us to interpret them as they have hitherto been interpreted by most divines. But this subject is one of such importance that the limits imposed upon us by the circumstances of the case will not allow us at this time to enter upon the inquiry.

¹ Ps. 90: 4.

ARTICLE II.

REVIEW OF CHAMPLIN'S *ÆSCHINES*.

The Oration of Æschines against Ctesiphon, with notes by J. T. Champlin, Professor of Greek and Latin in Waterville College. Cambridge: John Bartlett, 1850.

Two editions of the oration of *Æschines* on the Crown have been presented to the American public. Of the first, prepared by Mr. Negris, a Greek then domiciliated in this country, it will not be thought harsh to affirm that the editor was very inadequate to his task; that his principles of criticism led him into the most rash alterations of the text; that he betrays great ignorance of Greek history and antiquities; and that he has either misinterpreted or passed over in silence the few difficult passages which interrupt the easy flow of this oration. Mr. Champlin, on the other hand, has adopted a reputable text; he has explained all the difficulties which demanded an explanation from his hands; and is usually *au courant* of Grecian antiquities. In one particular, to say nothing of others, he has improved upon his edition of the rival oration of *Demosthenes*, by more mastery over the English language in his translations, which in his earlier work are sometimes not a little awkward.

Mr. Negris published the orations of *Æschines* and *Demosthenes* together, but with no preface calculated to make known to the student how and why the suit was brought. Mr. Champlin's edition of the oration of *Æschines* being apparently an afterthought, he has not been able to pursue a well ordered plan, including both the orations. This is to be regretted, and it is greatly to be desired, that at some future day Mr. C. should publish the two together, with a common introduction embracing the most important historical, and archaeological topics; to which reference might continually be made throughout the notes. There are no remains of antiquity where the allusions to the events and institutions of the day are more frequent than in these very orations; and without some such introduction, even when supplied with books of reference, the student will be apt to grope in the dark. Thus the first thing that an intelligent student will say is, "how could such a suit be brought, and why could not the Athenian people do as they pleased, in respect to passing a resolution to crown *Demosthenes*?" Here then at the outset, he needs to have an idea of

the difference between a *psephisma* and a law; of the different methods observed in passing them, and of the *γραφὴ παρορόμων*, by which illegal resolutions were rendered perilous to their proposer. The way in which this process suspended further proceedings in the Senate or before the people upon a resolution, and the course of the trial, until the time of pleading, will also need explanation. Again the cause was delayed a number of years. Can any reason be given for this? What had been the relations of the parties anterior to the trial to which Æschines subjected Ctesiphon, and what was his political aim in instituting the trial? Here a compressed chronological table might be embodied in the introduction, in which all the events referred to by either orator, occurring during their age, could be found under their appropriate dates, and we should like to see exhibited in the same way, but in a different type, so as not to be confounded with the truth, the various attempts which Boeckh, Böhneke and others have made to assign the documents inserted in the oration of Demosthenes to their historical position.

The remainder of our remarks will be occupied in following Mr. Champlin through his notes, and in discussing certain topics to which he there calls attention. This we shall attempt to do in a spirit of impartial criticism, being convinced that it is only in such a way that American scholarship can be honored or be improved. We must lay in an apology beforehand for the length of some of our remarks, which may seem to some of our readers to lose sight of the book which is under examination, and to wander off into perplexed questions of history. May we say then that having at a former period studied these orations with care, having begun to lay up materials for editing them before Mr. Champlin's edition of Demosthenes on the Crown appeared in 1843, and having felt an interest in the progress of investigation into them since that time, we have cherished the fond, although perhaps the groundless hope that we might offer a contribution to the criticism of these orations which would not be regarded as entirely without value.

We follow Mr. C. according to the sections of Bekker, which accompany his text.

§ 4. At the close of this section, Æschines says that the orators had become so disorderly, that neither the *prytanes* nor the *proedri*, nor the tribe enjoying the precedency and constituting a tenth of the whole people were found sufficient to preserve the assemblies of the people from confusion. This passage affords very clear proof that the *prytanes* still had something to do with the preservation of order at public meetings; although Mr. Champlin assigns this duty entirely

to the proedri and the epistates. As for the proedri, it is known that some antiquaries, as Boeckh and Schömann,¹ following the authority of one class of grammarians, hold that there were two sorts of them, those from the tribe which had the prytany and those from the nine other tribes; while K. F. Hermann² regards the existence of the former class of proedri as extremely improbable. All agree that the proedri here named were those who have been termed *non contribules*. And this Mr. C. has correctly stated. And an argument in favor of this view may be derived from § 3, where the orator speaks of proedri fraudulently chosen by lot to fill their office. If there were proedri from the presiding tribe in the senate, that is, if the prytanes were divided into five decades, each of which presided about seven days, as this allotment must have happened at the commencement of their prytany, it is not easy to see what collusion could have taken place. But it is very easy to see how the epistates of the senate on the day of a public assembly may have made a fraudulent election by lot of proedri out of the nine other tribes.

That the epistates of the day was one of the presidents of the assembly, as Mr. C. asserts, is denied, probably without good reason, by Hermann, who confines that duty to the nine proedri *non contribules*. But this passage shows that Hermann goes too far when he says that the prytanes had nothing to do with the assemblies of the citizens at all except to summon them.

ἡ προεδρεύουσα φυλή. What was that? We are not sure that Mr. C. has explained the usage correctly, for while in his note on § 2, he speaks of "a tribe selected for this purpose," [for the purpose of presiding or keeping order]; he explains these same words, in his note on § 4, as referring to the representatives of one of the ten tribes. The usage is alluded to only in three passages, in the present passage; in the first oration against Aristogiton, § 90,³ Bekker, where the same phrase occurs; and also in the oration of Æschines against Timarchus, where an explanation is given of its origin. Æschines there says, (§ 33 Bekker,) that after some gross proceedings of Timarchus, a new

¹ Boeckh, C. I. No. 1. Vol. 1, p. 180. Schöm. Antiq. Juris. publ. Græc. p. 216 etc.

² Lehr. 6. d. Gr. Alt. § 127.

³ As the spuriousness of this oration is probable, the reference to this usage is a proof of nothing more than that the author had read the orations of Æschines. His words οὐ πρύτανις, οὐ κήρυξ, οὐκ ἐπιστάτης, οὐκ ἡ προεδρεύουσα φυλὴ τοῦτον κρατεῖν δύναται afford some proof that he read, in the orators whom he imitates, of prytanes and epistatæ as concerned in keeping order; but is it not rather singular that he omits the most important officers of the assembly, the proedri? Does he jumble together what he has found in several passages of ancient authors without a definite idea of the meaning of the words?

law was passed ἀποκληροῦν φυλὴν ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἥτις προσδρεύου. How long this singular custom continued we do not know, but we see from this passage, that it arose but a few years before the Oration on the Crown was delivered.¹

§ 7. μηδὲνα . . . ἐξαιρεῖσθαι. "Depends upon ἡγεῖσθαι taken (by zeugma) in the sense of φυλάττεσθαι." But such a zeugma is quite out of the question. Zeugma is allowed, we believe, only when one notion of the same genus supplies the place of another, specifically different, as an affirmative in the place of a negative notion of the same kind, a notion of sense pertaining to the sight, the place of one pertaining to the hearing. But what communion of meaning has ἡγεῖσθαι with φυλάττεσθαι. Reiske from one Codex supplied εἶναι, 'you ought to allow no man to take away,' etc. On which Bremi observes that εἶναι is unnecessary. 'Concedendi enim et prohibendi notionem antiqui supprimunt quum ea ex contextu sponte in animum influat.'² And of this seeming ellipsis there are frequent examples. If this be so, the clause does not depend on ἡγεῖσθαι, and the same is true, if we content ourselves with the expedient of simply supplying χρή.

§ 12. 'The decree was proposed by Ctesiphon in the autumn of B. C. 338.' See our remarks on Mr. C's note on § 27.

§ 13. 'The Thesmothetae, i. e. the six inferior archons.' We know of no inferiority, either in rank or importance of attributes. The archon indeed, (thence called by writers below the Attic age *eponymers* but known by no such official title,) gave name to the year; but the board of nine stood we believe on the same level.—Again, ἀρχαιρεῖαις, "assemblies for electing magistrates, probably held at stated times." We are not able to perceive what need there is of qualifying these words by *probably*; although we are not able to say when the elections were held. No settled community which annually chose a vast number of officers by lot would fail of having a stated time when the elections were held. For conjectures as to the exact time, see K. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch, 3rd edition, § 152, note 2, and Petersen in Bergk and Caesar's Zeitschrift, Vol. IV. No. 7, who tries to show that it was near the close of Thargelion, the eleventh month of the Attic year.

§ 14. τεichoποιός. 'This appears to have been a regular magistracy, filled annually by the choice of one from each of the ten tribes.' In the instance mentioned § 27, it is created by special vote, and not a

¹ How Boeckh speaking of this φυλὴ προσδρεύουσα can say (u. s.) "quae et ipsa alia est atque ea ex qua prytanes sunt," we do not see. The word ἀποκληροῦν shows that the lot respected all the tribes.

² Bremi's Aeschinis Opera. Zurich, 1824. The same remarks repeated for substance in his Lysiae et Aeschinis Orat. Select. Gotha, 1836, containing of Aeschines this oration only.

stated magistracy. We doubt not however that some stated functionaries had the ordinary oversight of the walls; probably the *ὀδοποροί*. See § 25.

§ 18. It might be added here for the student, who would not guess out the matter, that by *κηρῶνας* — which we think ought to be printed with a capital — is intended the *gens*, out of which were selected the *sacred crier* and the *daduchus* at the Eleusinia, and to which the wealthy family of the Calliæ and Hipponici belonged. The Eumolpidae held the dignity of hierophant at the same mystical feast besides other honors. Consult, 'si tanti est,' M. H. E. Meier de gentilitate Attica, p. 41—44. (Halle, 1835.)

§ 19. "They fitted them out [the galleys] at their own expense." It would perhaps be advisable to state on Boeckh's authority, of which Mr. C. often makes good use, just what was expected of the trierarchs at this time of Athenian history.

§ 20. *τεροφῶσι*. "Shall not then the council of Areopagus be crowned? (i. e. since their office was for life.)" The parenthesis seems to us not to be to the point. The author had said nothing of the lifelong tenure, but had spoken only of the gravity and important duties of the council. As for the rest, the note of Mr. C. on this context, which is one of the few places where the clear and easy style of *Æschines* leaves room for doubt, will compare most advantageously with the failure of Mr. Negris to see into the drift of the passage.

§ 24. "And thus generally *ῥῆν* is now, in some way out of season, i. e. too early or too late, like the Latin *jam*." We think that Mr. C. on consideration will be inclined to recal this remark. If at any time the notion of *too soon* or *too late* is found in *ῥῆν*, it is due to the context. Aristotle gives the following definition of this word, (*Phys. auscult.* 4. 13.) "*ῥῆν* is the portion of future time which is nigh the present moment. When do you walk? *ῥῆν*: [i. e. at once:] because the time is near in which he is to walk. And of past time it is the portion which is not far off from now. When do you walk? *ῥῆν βεβῆκα*, [i. e. I have walked already.] But we do not say that Troy is (*ῥῆν*) *already* taken, because it is very far from now." From this simple and natural definition all the uses of *ῥῆν* can be without much difficulty evolved.

§ 25. For Eubulus the foe of Demosthenes for a long period previous to the battle of Chaeronea, the patron of *Æschylus*, and one of the leaders of the peace-party at Athens, consult Ruhnken Crit. Hist. Orat. Graec. (Opusc. 1. 338); and for Hegemon the same work, p. 354. It is uncertain when Hegemon's law was passed. Böhneke (*Forschungen*, p. 574) assigns it to some time between Olymp. 111. 2 and 112. 2, that is, at all events, after the accession of Alexander.

§ 27. ἐπιβολὰς ἐπέβαλλε, "inflicted penalties." Rather *imposed fines*, for the most part of trifling amount. Comp. Platner, *Process u. Klagen der Attiker*, I. 309. Æschines de fals. leg. says that Demosthenes incurred an epibole from the Areopagus for dropping the prosecution of his cousin Demomeles. (§ 93. Comp. § 51 of the present oration).

§ 27. Mr. Champlin here proposes a solution of certain chronological problems which have occupied much attention. We are tempted to enter into this matter somewhat at length, although we are far from hoping to clear the subject from all its perplexities, and are well aware that a thorough discussion of the subject would demand a large treatise. The words of Æschines on which the discussion hangs are, when literally translated, as follows. "In the archonship of Chaerondas on the last day but one of Thargelion, at an assembly of the people Demosthenes proposed a resolution to hold a meeting of the tribes [i. e. of each separate tribe] on the second and third days of Skirrphorion," (i. e. on the third and fourth days after the passage of the resolution, which had respect to the appointment of inspectors of the walls, of whom Demosthenes was chosen one.) It will be convenient now to insert certain dates, that the whole subject may lie in a brief form before the eyes of our readers.

In Olymp. 110. 2 — summer of 339 B. C. Lysimachides archon.

Olymp. 110. 3 — summer of 338 B. C. Chaerondas archon.

Metageitnion 7 — August 4, 338. Battle of Chaeronea.

Elaphebolion 6 — March 26, 339. Date of the *γραφὴ παρομόμων* brought by Æschines, according to record in Demosth. de cor. § 119.

Thargelion 29 — June 16, 339. Date of resolution of Demosthenes to appoint inspectors of the walls.

Skirrphorion 2 or 3 — June 19 or 20, 339. Demosthenes appointed inspector of the walls. For conduct during that office a crown is proposed to be given him by Ctesiphon. This proposition is attacked by Æschines as illegal *three months before Demosthenes was invested with the office.*¹

This glaring absurdity of bringing an action several months before the illegality on which it was grounded could have been committed is removed in several different ways. And first, attempts have been made to remove it *on the supposition that the record in Demosthenes is genuine, and has the true date.* We know of three such attempts, Mr. Clinton's, Mr. Champlin's and Boeckh's. Mr. Clinton's solution (*Fas-*

¹ We have reduced the dates according to Ideler's tables (*Handbuch d. Chronol.* I. 383 et seq.)

ti Hellenici, p. 363, note f.) is that the reference in *Æschines* is merely to the fact that Demosthenes was in office, and not to the time of his appointment. This solution is justly rejected by Mr. Champlin, and indeed is unworthy of mention: how it fell from its author is wonderful. Mr. Champlin's solution is that *Æschines* suffered a lapse of memory: the appointment took place the month and day named in the year before, and the phrase *ἐνὶ Χαιρώνδου* instead of *ἐνὶ Λύσιμαχίδου*, "was used unconsciously by way of anticipation, with reference to the time of his *holding* his office, and not to the time of his appointment." That *Æschines* might forget dates cannot indeed be pronounced impossible. And yet he certainly knew when the battle of Chaeronea took place if he knew any thing, and must have had a distinct recollection of the time, relative to that event, when his foe received his appointment. Nor is it credible that such a blunder, if he had fallen into it, could have failed of being discovered by him or his friends before he gave the last touches to his oration. We cannot think, therefore, that Mr. Champlin will be thought to have solved the riddle successfully. Finally Boeckh's solution, at the close of his treatise de Archontibus Atticis Pseudonymis, (Berlin Transactions for 1827,) is none other than that the text of *Æschines* is corrupt. The orator wrote *πρὸ Χαιρώνδου* meaning in the year before that archon; and used that form because every body knew what important events fell within that year, while the mention of his predecessor Lysimachides would have awakened no definite recollection of the times. But this being an unusual form of speech was altered by a scribe into *ἐνὶ Χαιρώνδου*. This conjecture of so very eminent a man carries great weight with it, and has been to some extent adopted. It derived its strength no doubt in the author's mind, from a conviction, that the repairs of the walls must have been undertaken before the battle of Chaeronea and in preparation for a possible attack of Philip during the war. But when it is considered that that persuasion may be shown to be not well founded, that the solution is a violent surgical process, and that the phrase *πρὸ τινος ἀρχοντος*, with the sense in the year before, is a phrase of questionable authority, it will not be thought strange if this theory be entirely discarded.

Another theory framed with a view to explain this chronological discrepancy proceeds on the supposition that the decree in Demosthenes is a genuine document, but the name of the archon incorrectly given. It is well known that Boeckh's theory in which he is followed by Winiewski and others, is that these documents were inserted into the oration on the Crown by a later editor; that he extracted them from some collection of public acts derived from marbles and from the

records of the Metroum; that these records, arranged in pigeon-holes according to the series of archons, had in the course of time lost the names of these magistrates; and that the name of the scribe, (the *γραμματεὺς κατὰ πρυτανείαν*) which was attached to the decrees was by some great blunder supposed to be the name of the archon Eponymus.¹ The editor who inserted these documents into the first half of the oration committed a still greater blunder: he put them into the wrong place, and thus entirely falsified history, so as to involve in a perfect fog all the older enquirers from Corsini down to Clinton, and to force Boeckh and succeeding writers, particularly Böhneke to the most laborious researches as to the true historical niche which the records are to fill. If such a date could be satisfactorily assigned, if history opened its arms to receive these documents or even did not reject them, it would be strong testimony in favor of their genuineness that they even conformed to known events. But this is not the case. Thus Boeckh and Winiewski assume a peace between the Athenians and Philip in Olymp. 110. 2. B. C. 339., to which the documents in §§ 29, 37, of the oration on the Crown is supposed to relate. But Böhneke has shown to our satisfaction that no such peace existed.² And the same diversity of opinion extends to several other documents. The most skilful historical enquirers find no hole where they exactly fit.

The decree for crowning Demosthenes (§119 or. de cor.) has confessedly a wrong date, as there was no archon Euthycles. The copy of the *graphe* in § 54, Böeckh thinks to have a correct date: but Böhneke, with reason, dissents from him, and shows by arguments, which our limits will not allow us to detail, that the whole affair from its very commencement was posterior to the fight at Chaeronea; that the date in Æschines, the passage before us, is right; and that for the archonship of Chaerondas we must read the archonship of Phrynichus, his next successor. And surely, if no urgent reasons required us to adhere to the date of this record as a true one, the lie or mistake which so many of its brethren carry on their faces, is a strong presumption against it.

A third theory still disposes more summarily of this whole tribe of records, as being forgeries; or at least as a mixed mass of true copies of letters picked out of Theopompus (or some other historian) in company with documents wholly or in part false. We must confess that

¹ The document in § 54 of the or. de cor. Boeckh regards as the only one having the name of a true archon affixed to it.

² These documents are inserted in the oration on the Crown, as relating to the peace of Philocrates in B. C. 346. Böhneke refers them to a peace which he assigns to B. C. 336, just before Philip's death.

after no little study formerly given to this difficult matter, we incline to this view, and we find ourselves in the honorable company of one of the first Greek scholars now living, not to mention others, K. F. Hermann, who in his work on the political antiquities of Greece, (Third ed. § 138, note 5.) thus expresses himself, "am wahrscheinlichsten bleibt mir die gänzliche unächtheit der urkunden bei Demosth. de Corona."

The forgery in the particular case of the document in §.118, the decree to crown Demosthenes, comes out to the light, unless something can be said in its favor. For while *Æschines* jeers in his oration at the *ἀνδραγαθία* of Demosthenes, there we find mention of his *καλοκαγαθία*; while *Æschines* quotes *διατελεῖ πρᾶττων καὶ λέγων ὅτι ἂν δύνηται ἀγαθόν*, of all this there is not a word in the decree; and while *Æschines* mentions as in the said document the good will which Demosthenes continually showed towards the Greeks, this too has given way in favor of a new expression *ἀρετῆς ἐνέκα καὶ καλοκαγαθίας ἧς ἔχων διατελεῖ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ εἰς τὸν δῆμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων*. But for all these differences Winiewski and Böhneke have a ready answer. The document is not as Ctesiphon originally wrote it, but was altered after the cause was tried; because the question on the decree could be carried in a modified shape to suit the times the better. But as Demosthenes, on this supposition, had just gained a brilliant victory in the court, which assured him of a large majority in the assembly on his side, how can he be supposed to have consented to such an alteration of the decree as *καλοκαγαθία* for *ἀνδραγαθία*, which looks like a tacit admission of his cowardice, or to modifications which decidedly lower the tone of eulogy. The supposition seems to us a very unnatural one.¹

¹ The ditches too may have been mentioned in the genuine decree, as they are in the indictment, § 54. If it be said that a forger having the knowledge of Attic usages which these records show, would have done his work better than to be guilty of such an inconsistency with *Æschines*, we need only reply, that one, who by the confession of all scholars made such gross historical blunders as he makes, could have been guilty of another piece of carelessness not grosser.

Speaking of carelessness let us be allowed this opportunity of rebuking the author of the article *Æschines* in the Dictionary of Mythology and Biography. After mentioning the first embassy to Philip on which both *Æschines* and Demosthenes went, he goes on to say that another embassy was sent to Philip to receive his oaths, consisting of five persons, one of whom was *Æschines*, while Demosthenes staid at home. And the authority for this is the document in § 29 de corona. Surely the author ought to have been aware that the orations of the two orators, especially those de falsa legatione, make known to us, beyond the possibility of question, that there were ten ambassadors in the second embassy, as well as in the first, and that Demosthenes was a member of both. He tells why he went the second time, and we have the names of all or nearly all his ten colleagues.

§ 30. "There were twelve *τριπύες*, founded probably upon the four original tribes at Athens, [in Attica.] This division was for financial purposes." Rather this division, about which next to nothing is known, was probably retained for financial and administrative purposes.

§ 31. "The Great Dionysia in March." Rather in March or April. When the Attic year began at the earliest date possible, that is on the 25th of June, the first of Elaphebolion answered to the 17th of March. In this case the Great Dionysia, which fell about the middle of that month, ended just about the beginning of our April. In all other cases, in fifteen years out of the cycle of nineteen, they must have been included within our April.

§ 39. *ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας*, "having inscribed upon the call (i. e. assigned) nomothetae. That is the interpretation of F. A. Wolf, which seems to me much better than that of Schömann (assemb. Ath., p. 249,) which makes these words merely indicate the general subject to be attended to at the meeting ('having added': i. e. as the subject of the meeting, '*nomothetae*'). The nomothetae seem to have been appointed by the prytanes, (see Dem. contr. Timoc., § 27)." Wolf's words are "*ἐπιγράφειν*, ut *ἀποδιδόναι* est *attribuere designare, constituere*, quod populi fuit proprie, non Prytanum, sed his, tanquam ecclesiam habentibus, id commodè tribui potest." (Proleg. to Dem. or. Leptin. ad fin.) That is, Æschines speaks of the Prytanes as appointing the nomothetae, because they presided over the meeting where that business was performed by the people. To which Schömann replies with reason, that the word *ἐπιγράφειν* can have no such meaning, and, if it could, that the participle should be in the future and not in the aorist. Mr. Champlin seems to have supposed Wolf to mean that 'the prytanes were to hold an assembly' [viz. of a special kind at which only the nomothetae were present,] "having previously inscribed upon the whitened board of advertisement the persons who should be nomothetae." It is evident that Wolf can have had no such assembly in his view. Still if, as Mr. C. seems to suppose, — for we do not entirely get possession of his opinion, — *ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν* denotes to hold an assembly of the nomothetae, so called because they were a large committee of the people; and if, as he thinks, the same body is afterwards spoken of as the *δῆμος*; some difficulties which attend the interpretation of this passage will be removed. As for the appointment of the nomothetae coming from the prytanes, it is not to be thought of, as will presently appear.

We beg leave to trespass upon the patience of our readers, with some further remarks upon this place, of which we can say with

Wolf "*Saepe haec me torserunt.*" The first question then is, whether the annual revision of the laws here spoken of is the same with the *ἐπιχειροτονία νόμων* which is described in Dem. C. Timocr. § 20 et seq. This Wolf affirms to be probable, and Schömann (*de Comitibus Athen.* p. 260.) denies. But as Schömann in a later work has retracted this opinion, (*Antiq. juris. publ. Graec.* p. 227, note 7.), it may, without going into the subject farther, be assumed that at the beginning of each year either the retiring thesmothets, as Schömann thinks, or the new officers of that name reported to the people on the state of the laws, at the same time that the people itself took measures with regard to projects of new laws.

Our next enquiry concerns the meaning of the passage before us. A simple translation is like this: If the thesmothets find that there are inconsistent or abrogated laws, or more than one relating to the same subject, the lawgiver "bids that having inscribed them on [whitened] boards, they publish them in front of the statues of the heroes from whom the tribes are named, and that the prytanes cause an ecclesia to be held, having written upon the programme these words "*Nomothetae*: (1) and that the president of the proedri put the question between the laws to the people, (2) and that they, [the people?] annul some and leave in force others, that there may be one law, and not more than one, applying to each subject matter." And immediately afterwards the orator says that if there had been two such clashing laws, when it was discovered by the thesmothets, and the prytanes had handed (3) the business over to the nomothetae, one or the other of the laws would have been abrogated! The whole passage is clear and easy, but the brevity of the orator is perplexing as to the customs of his country: the points of doubt are indicated in our translation by Arabic numerals.

In the oration against Timocrates the following account is given of this annual revision of the Athenian code, during the first prytany of the year, and on the eleventh of the first month the people voted concerning the laws; and if any were voted against, the prytanes for the time being were to cause the third of the three assemblies, which occurred during their prytany, to be held in relation to these rejected laws. And the proedri for the day were required, as the first business to be done, to consult the people concerning the nomothetae, alterations, was to publish his proposed amendments daily before the *καθ' ὅ τι καθέδονται* [i. e. under what regulations they should sit] and how they should be paid. Meanwhile every citizen who wished statues of the eponymi, that the people might judge in view of the number of new projects of laws how long the nomothetae should sit.

The nomothetae should be taken from the sworn jurymen of the year. Advocates, five in number, should be chosen by the people to defend the old laws before the nomothetae. At the meeting of this body the law ordered (c. Timocr. § 38) *διαχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τοὺς προέδρους περὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων*, etc. To recur now to the points of doubt in the order in which they are marked: (1) According to Schömann *ἐπιγράφειν* "hoc loco dictum est pro eo quod alias solemne est: — *προγράφειν* et *νομοθέτας ἐπιγράφειν* breviter dictum pro: ecclesiam de nomothetis habendam esse, in Programmata scribere. H. Schelling (de Solon. leg. apud orat. att. dissert. p. 51¹) interprets the passage thus: postquam nomothetas (nomina nomothetarum in tabulis inscripserunt," scilicet ut populus suffragium ferret num illa nomina sibi placerent necne. If Schelling means by the names of the nomothetae the names of individual persons to the number of a thousand and one, or it may be of three thousand and one, it is utterly incredible that the prytanes could have taken this trouble. If he or any one else should conjecture that the prytanes assigned this business to one or another detachment of the sworn judges for the year, that certainly is quite possible.² At the same time since we learn from the oration against Timocrates that the people determined the rules according to which this body should sit, and how long they should sit, and how they should be paid, it is quite probable, if not almost certain, that they determined also their number. Now this being fixed, the natural course would be for the thesmothets to make a draft by lot out of the annual jurymen, just as they did for the ordinary courts. The nomothetae were merely a court sitting on the laws, and hearing them defended and attacked, instead of a court hearing complaints arising under the laws.

We conclude, therefore, that Schömann has understood this passage correctly; and that *ἐπιγράφειν* is the same nearly as *προγράφειν*, (spoken of with reference to a *subsequent* meeting of the people,) or *ἀναγράφειν ἐπὶ λευκώμασι* or *σανίσι*, which seems to denote inscribing, and putting in some public place where the inscription can be consulted.³

There is still an enquiry remaining. -Does *ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν* mean

¹ A prize essay published at Berlin in 1842.

² In one instance by a psephisma, and therefore by vote of the people, the number of nomothetae was fixed at 1001, and the council of 500 was added to the number. Here is specific appointment of a portion of the body by the people. Dem. c. Timocr.

³ Comp. Platner II. 31.

what all seem to have taken for granted that it means; to have an ordinary assembly of the people convened according to the usual formalities; or can ἐκκλησία here be used of the meeting of this large committee of nomothetae acting in lieu of the people? If the latter, we must suppose that Æschines leaves out of sight all those intermediate steps which are described in the or. c. Timocr., and hurries forward to the conclusion of the whole matter, to the meeting of the nomothetae, which alone to him was of any importance. This last view will relieve the subject of difficulties; and yet so very marked was the difference between a true ecclesia, and a meeting of the nomothetae, in which all the people, excepting a fractional detachment, would be interlopers, that we can hardly conceive of an Attic orator calling the two by the same name. In § 27 we have an instance of the nice use of terms, where the meeting of each tribe apart is called an ἀγορά. The convention of the people when called in an unusual way might be called either σύγκλητος ἐκκλησία or σύλλογος, (see Thucyd. 2. 59,) but conversely it would be an incorrect use of language to extend the sense of ἐκκλησία to other assemblies of a part of the people. (Comp. Plat. Gorg. 456 c.)

(2.) "And that the president of the proedri" διαχειροτονίαν διδόναι τῷ δήμῳ. Platner¹ interprets this as if the assembly decided which of two inconsistent laws was to be abrogated. Schelling's view would require him to understand διαχειροτονίαν of a vote of the people between two different sets of candidates for the office of nomothetae. We are not acquainted with any other attempts to explain this clause made by writers on Attic law or polity. Both attempts must be regarded as failures; Platner's, because the people only passed a provisory vote as to whether the old laws satisfied them. It is to this that the words of Demosthenes apply c. Timocr. § 25, Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποίησαν διαχειροτονίαν, πότερον εἰσοιστέος ἐστὶ νόμος καινός, ἢ δοκοῦσιν ἀρκεῖν οἱ κείμενοι. But the words of Æschines cannot refer to this first measure of the people's admitting or preventing all change in the laws, for he immediately adds; "and that they annul these laws and leave in force the others" which the people had nothing to do with. The view which Schelling is forced to take cannot be admitted for reasons already given. Granting that the people decided between detachment A and detachment B of the sworn judges, as the body to compose the nomothetae, so very small a matter would not be deemed worthy of mention by the orator.

There remains to explain this passage, Mr. Champlin's suggestion,

¹ Platner vs. II. 31. It should be added that he supposes subsequent action of the nomothetae.

which long ago occurred to ourselves : that by *δῆμος* here, the nomothetae themselves are to be understood. This view is supported by the fact that *ἀναιρεῖν* can have no other subject but what we find in *δῆμος* unless the orator expresses himself very enigmatically. Schelling indeed supposed that *τούτους* has fallen out of the text before *ἀναιρεῖν*, while Schömann, feeling the same difficulty, merely observes that the clause following *δῆμος* must be separated by a colon from the preceding text. He says, "Neque enim ad ecclesiam neque ad Epistatam pertinent, sed ad Nomothetas, populi jussu, post illam ecclesiam, constituendos." It is not against usage for the orators sometimes to ascribe the doings of the courts to the Athenian people. And such, we think, must be the case here, unless *τῷ δῆμῳ* be an interpolation or a gloss instead of *τούτοις*, referring to the nomothetae. The procedure here spoken of is that described in nearly the same words in the or. c. Timocr. § 33, *Διαχειροτονίαν ποιεῖν τοὺς προέδρους περὶ τούτων τῶν νόμων. Ὅπότερον δ' ἂν χειροτονήσωσιν οἱ νομοθέται, τούτων κύριον εἶναι.* Here we find the proedri presiding over the assembled nomothetae just as over an ordinary ecclesia, and this circumstance may be used to show how easy it might be to transfer the name of the demus to this body.

(3) What is to be understood by *πρυτανέων ἀποδόντων*? It has appeared already that when the nomothetae convened, the proedri (with their epistates of course,) were the presiding officers. Of course the agency of the prytanes must be restricted to the time before the meeting. There may be a doubt as to what this agency consisted in. If it consisted in preparing business for this body, as the prytanes would for an assembly and in summoning them to their sitting, then *ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπιγράφοντας νομοθέτας* will refer very likely to these same acts of the prytanes, and *ἐκκλησίαν* must denote the meeting of the nomothetae, which we have decided against. If it consisted merely in the fact that the prytanes took the initiative in the appointment of the nomothetae, this will be consistent indeed with other facts, but the meaning of *ἀποδόντων* which implies a reference of a subject by a preparing or presiding magistrate to an assembly, will not be exhausted. It may also be conjectured that *πρυτανέων* here is loosely used for *προέδρων*, but that does not seem probable.

§ 40. *ἤτοι... ἤ.* "Hoc ordine semper leguntur hae particulae, non vice versa ἤ... ἤτοι." quoted from Bremi. The single known exception to this remark, occurring Pindar, Nem. VI. 5 is noticed by Hartung, and by the lexicographers. This rule recalls to our minds the similar rule that in hypothetical propositions where *εἴτε... εἴτε* occur, *οὐν* is found with that clause which is regarded as true. See

Passow, and Liddell and Scott, voce *οὗν*. The rule is shown to be wholly erroneous by such passages as Soph. Electr. 560.

εἰτ' οὖν δικαίως [ἐκτείνας] εἰτε μή · λέξω δέ σοι
ὥς οὐ δίκη γ' ἐκτείνας,

where the clause, the truth of which is denied, contains the *οὗν*.

§ 41. *γίγνομένων τῶν ἐν ᾧσται τραγωδῶν*. Mr. C. after calling attention to the position of *ἐν ᾧσται* which determines it to be an attribute of *τραγωδῶν*, adds: "this view of the case relieves the passage from all appearance of being a solecism on account of the use of *γίγνομένων*." It is rather the sense of *τραγωδῶν tragedians* for *tragedies*, as in many other passages, which has this effect.

§ 42. *προξενίας εὐρημένοι*, "having obtained the rights of a proxenus or friendships." The last word must be condemned as inaccurate, since the *proxenia* had a very definite idea.

§ 52. "Demosthenes prosecuted [*Midias*] for impiety" etc. Rather he brought the public action called a *proboule* against him, which was based upon a judgment of the people favorable to the plaintiff. The *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* was a different process.

§ 62. *ὁ χρόνος*. "That is the time for making the peace." Would not *καιρός* rather be used in this sense? We believe that *ὁ χρόνος* is here used as often, of time in its widest generic sense, *duration*.

§ 64. *ἐπράττετο*, "it was effected," "brought about." *πρός*, "out of regard to," "by means of," "on the part of." *πράττειν πρὸς* must mean *to bring about by management with, to enter into negotiations with, and so effect*.

§ 65. *προσέχουσιν . . ὑμετέρῳ* "should think of joining your democratic ranks." Rather should feel favorably inclined towards the cause of you Athenians."

§ 67. It might be added here that the *Æsculapia* are called a *προαγών* as being a sort of introduction or prelude to the great feast of the Dionysia immediately following.

§ 68. "Besides this festival to Dionysus there were also the lesser Dionysia and the Lenaea." It has been a very general opinion, although not universally received, since Boeckh's treatise on the Dionysia, (Trans. of Berl. Acad. for 1816,) that there were four Attic festivals in honor of Bacchus; the Dionysia *ἐν ᾧσται*, the Dionysia *ἐν ἀγροῦς*, the Lenaea and Anthesteria. Before Boeckh wrote, the Lenaea were identified by some with the country Dionysia, and by others with the Anthesteria.

§ 69. *ἐπειδὴ* etc. Mr. C. follows Bremi in pronouncing this sentence to be without an apodosis, and in finding the proper apodosis in § 71. We are not able to see any natural apodosis in that place-

We suspect that *δὲ* here accompanies the apodosis as in Thucyd. 2. 65 *ἐπεὶ τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη ὁ δὲ φαίνεται*, etc. Comp. Thucyd. 3. 98. For such sentences see Jacobs on *Ælian* præf. p. XXVII, and Hartung 6 partikellehre 1, 185, who, however, while he allows that *δὲ* is found in the apodosis, knows of no place in Attic writers where the protasis contains *ἐπεὶ*. He therefore wishes to read in the place of Thucyd. cited above *ἐπεὶ δέ*, and regards the second *δὲ* as a mere repetition.

§ 70. *τρυφῶν*. "An adjective agreeing with *περίοδον* understood." And so Bremi. But as *χρόνος περίοδον* is awkward, *προθεσμία*, a *limitation*, a *time within which something must be done*, were better. This is also a word well known to the Attic orators.

§ 76. It might be added here, that the ambassadors of Philip were, according to the argument of the oration of Dem. de fals. leg., Antipater, Parmenio and Eurylochus. Hereby the *τρία ζεύγη ὀρκία* is explained. *Ἀμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ*. "For the purpose of securing the best seats." And so Bremi. But as Demosthenes had invited the ambassadors to the *proedria*, or seat of honor, to which, by vote of the Senate (*Æsch.* de fals. leg. § 55,) he had authority to escort them, he probably intended by calling so early to show the greater attention.

§ 87. *ὁ τ'* . . . *διαβίβασας*, "and what his brother Taurosthenes . . . had collected, having transported the Phocian mercenaries." We do not see where Mr. C. finds the words which he translates what — had collected. It would seem as if he had considered *ὁ τ'* as being equal to *καὶ τοῦτο ὁ* and had supplied in thought *συνήγειρε*. But this is impossible. *ὁ* is the article. The construction is easy. "Callias having collected an army from Euboea, and his brother Taurosthenes having transported mercenaries came upon us."

§ 91. *τὸν δολιχοδρομήσαντα*, the *δολιχος* "runner," "the redoubtable." The word can have no such general sense, as is implied in this last rendering. The man was well known to some of the audience as a runner in the long race.

§ 99. *ἄνθρωπος*. Whether this or *ἄνθρωπος* the reading of Bekker and others is the true one it is not so very easy to decide. See Hermann on Soph. Philoct. 40, and Bernhardt's Grammar, p. 317, with the references there made. It may be added that *ἄνθρωπος* can be contemptuous—the fellow.

§ 107. "On the Corinthian Gulf, around the ancient city of Cirrha or Crissa." These two places have been confounded by others, but were undoubtedly distinct. Cirrha lay near the sea, while Crissa was situated at the distance of an hour and a half of travelling time from it, near the modern village Chryso, to which it has given its name,

and on the way towards Delphi. Crissa was a Homeric town, and probably sank as Delphi on the one hand, and Cirrha before its sack on the other, rose into importance. See for the topography of this region an admirable little volume by the late Prof. Ulrichs of the University of Athens: *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*. It appears that there were properly two plains, one of greater fertility than the other, and also of greater extent, and still renowned for its olive-trees, called the plain of Crissa; while the other, which is here referred to, lay nearer to the sea and was uncultivated until it was encroached upon by the citizens of Amphissa. It is now used for pasturage, and until the liberation of Greece, "supplied a considerable part of Peloponnesus and of continental Greece with tiles for roofing."

§ 112. This oracle, if we may judge from our experience needs an interpreter. Perhaps a version like this: (Apollo loquitur) "*annex the land down to the sea to my temple domains, and I will help you take the town*" will be intelligible to American boys. As for the rest there are no peculiar suspicions lying against the genuineness of this oracle. If inserted, as Wolf suspects, by a later hand, it is likely to be the oracle which *Æschines* actually pronounced.

§ 116. *εἰσέγεγον δόγμα*. "Demosthenes denies this," etc. What is said is not inconsistent with what Demosthenes affirms, for *εἰσέγεγον* only means *were introducing*, were ready to introduce, were thinking of introducing.

§ 116. "The crime for which they were to be fined was for dedicating certain shields in an unfinished chapel at Delphi." In this Mr. C. follows Bishop Thirlwall, but no one pretends to say what new chapel can be intended. The scholiast has an exceedingly valuable remark here that *Æschines* refers to the new temple of Apollo, constructed upon the burning of the old one, in Olympiad 58. 1, and not fully finished until Nero's time. Of this new temple we know, from other sources that the Alcmaeonids of Athens, during their exile, constructed it, but that it was incomplete in the time of Mark Antony.¹ (Plut. vit. Anton. § 23.) A reading here *ἱζαράσασθαι* (before the completion of the prayers usual at the foundation of new temples,) instead of *ἱξερύσασθαι*, is preserved by Harpocration, and by some MSS.: and is perhaps to be preferred. From all this it appears quite possible that the temple of Apollo is intended, and that an old affair of more than 200 years standing was raked up, much after the same fashion as the Lacedaemonians rake up their charge of pollution upon Pericles, (Thucyd. 1. 126).

¹ Herodot. V. 62, however speaks of the Alcmaeonids as completing their contract, *τὸν νότον ἱξερύσαντο*, etc.

§ 117. *μεθεσχημέτων*, "having taken sides with me." This is Bremi's explanation, which however is not capable of the slightest defence. Bremi says that it is to be understood thus: "*Senatores Æschinis oratione permotos sententiam commutasse.*" But unfortunately Æschines says *ἀρχομένου δε μου λέγουν*, as *I was beginning to speak*, so that the effect must have preceded the cause. Besides, when did *μεθέσχηκα* ever mean *I change my opinion*, without something added to show that it was taken in a transferred sense. The sense no doubt is, "and as I was beginning to speak and had entered somehow with more than usual earnestness into the session-room, owing to the fact that the other pylagoræ had withdrawn." For the perfect understanding of this last clause it is necessary to determine two things: first, who are intended by the other Pylagoræ? Does the orator intend the other Athenian pylagoræ, or the others of that name in general. He cannot mean the Athenian, only because one of the two others Midia, being ill of a fever cannot have been at the meeting; and *μεθέσχηκα* implies not only *absence* but *previous presence*. We must suppose then that all the pylagori had retired, unless the deputy from Amphissa was of their number. In the second place what is the connection of this clause? It may be joined *causally* with what precedes it. The other pylagori had retired; it was time for the hieromnemons to hold a session by themselves, either as having the sole right of legislating or as deliberating about religious matters, which were perhaps their exclusive province. To anticipate the close of the session when the pylagoræ were heard before the council, Æschines came in with more than usual haste.¹ Or the haste and *empressement* of the orator may be ascribed to the errand on which he was bound, and to his anger against the men of Amphissa. Then this clause will be a mere incidental circumstance giving life to the narrative. "While I was beginning to speak, — all the pylagori having retired, — a man from Amphissa" etc. It may be observed that Æschines also, as soon as he had finished his business with the council retired, § 122, and then the body passed their resolution.

§ 117. *ἀρχήν*, "at the beginning." This is taken with *οὐδέ*, and is the usual *ἀρχήν* of negative sentences, which is nearly equivalent to *omnino*.

§ 118. *αὐτόθεν*. "That is *from their place of victory*," "on the spot." — *ἑστηκώς*, "having taken my stand," "fearlessly." Bremi had led the way for Mr. C. in this mistranslation. The simple

¹ Bremi translates *εἰς ἐληλυθότος* with *προθυμότερόν πως* most unaccountably '*quam studiosius instarem, rem urgerem.*' It is a marvel that *εἰς συνέδριον* did not deter him from offering this singular translation.

sense of ἀντόθεν ἑστηκώς is: *from the very spot where I stood*, that is, from his place in the council house, which may have been open to the day. This building is afterwards called an *ιερόν*, as being a temple proper, or a consecrated place. With regard to the position of the building Ulrichs observes that there exists a chapel of St. Elias opposite to some threshing floors and near a quarter of a mile below the ruins of Apollo's temple. Above this spot the view of the plain is cut off. From it there is just such a view as *Æschines* describes. The ancient remains here indicate a building, the position of which determines it to be the Synedrium.

§ 124. "As it was the spring session that was just closing, the next regular one was in the autumn." See the remark on § 254.

§ 132. It might be well to remark here that the Persian king is spoken of as a *perpetua persona*. The first two participles in the aorist refer to Xerxes. The third and fourth refer perhaps to what several kings had done; ("who used to demand earth and water from the Greeks and used to dare to write, etc.") while the verb διαγωνίζεται points to Darius Codomannus. For the use which Boeckh has made of this passage see our remark on § 254.

§ 133, line 14. "now about to become hostages . . . are on the point of being sent to Alexander." We believe that ὀμμεύω here means, I give a hostage; and that ἀναπέμπομαι is middle in form and not passive. The sense is "the Lacedaemonians are now about to send their envoys up to Alexander, with a view to offer to give hostages and to make an exposition of their misfortune."

§ 138. It might be desirable to collect what little information remains with regard to these public men. See Ruhnken's essay, before cited.

§ 142, line 11. "Thebes was but the capital of Boeotia, to which the other towns owed a sort of allegiance." It is true that Thebes gradually encroached upon the liberties and independence of the Boeotian towns, but the primitive relation was one, we believe, of entire independence.

§ 145. ἄρδην ὑφελόμενος. "wholly unconsciously removed." *Æschines* never intended that Demosthenes did this without being aware of it. The sense is "without being perceived he completely stole away the senate-house (or else the meeting of the senate), and the popular government," i. e. by the joint council convened at Thebes he slyly took away the power of the senate and people of Athens to decide on questions of public policy.

§ 155. ἀλλὰ τὰναντία . . . φθέγγεσθαι, "but the opposite of the words of the crier will seem to be spoken." But when was φθέγγεσθαι

out of the perfect, passive? The sense is, "but it will seem to utter the opposite of what the crier shall proclaim." The subject of δόξει is ἡ ἀληθεία, or else τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αἰσχροῦν.

§ 158. αὐτοσχιδιάζῃ, "may practise upon, make experiments upon, endanger." Rather "may without previous practice act rashly." We may remark here, in passing, that the ferry spoken of by Æschines seems to have lain between the town of Salamis and the nearest adjoining mainland, where the strait is less than two miles wide; between which place under Mt. Aegaleos and Athens along the coast there are traces of an ancient road.

§ 159. These are indeed instances of attraction well worth noticing. It would have been well to notice also the more remarkable use of prepositions in § 97, τὴν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου πρεσβείαν ἣν ἐπρέσβευσε, καὶ τὴν ἐξ Ἀκαρνανίας, that is, the embassies into Peloponnesus and Acarnania from which he had returned.

§ 162. πάραλοι. "That is, ambassadors conveyed in a [the] παράλος or sacred galley." This word denotes the crew of the Paralus; who perhaps conveyed the ambassadors next spoken of to some port on their way to Alexander.

§ 164. The oracle of which Mr. C. makes mention as given to Alexander was not given to him but to his father Philip, whose death according to Diod. Sic. XVI. 91. it predicted. We cannot unite with Mr. C. in perceiving any allusion to this oracle in the word χρευσόμενον, which, if it implies any more than preparation for speedy sacrifice, i. e. in this case the speedy and condign punishment of Æschines, can only refer to the golden bribes which he was charged by his foes with receiving.

§ 166. The expression τινὲς πρῶτον ὥσπερ τ.ς βελόνους διείρουσι we confess ourselves unable to explain. It is commonly regarded as a locus depravatus.

§ 167. ὁμολογῶ, etc. "I acknowledge that I united the Lacedæmonian powers." Rather, "that I arranged the Spartan movements," referring perhaps to the affairs preceding the death of king Agis III, who was slain in battle against Antipater towards the end of B. C. 331.

§ 171. τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο. "That is the Tauric Chersonese, where Nymphaeum was situated." Not so, but Nymphaeum itself. The Athenians never were masters of the Tauris peninsula.

§ 172. παριδὼν τοὺς τῆς πόλεως νόμους. It may be remarked here that in all probability this is a misstatement of Æschines. Before the archonship of Euclid in B. C. 403, the issue of an Athenian man and a

foreign woman had the rights of citizenship.¹ Now as Demosthenes was born in or before B. C. 381, his grandfather Gylon most probably allied himself to the Scythia lady before 403, so that her children must have been legitimate Athenians. Æschines here and elsewhere carries the effect of a law of his own time further back than the time of its enactment.

§ 172. *τὴν πονηρίαν*, "in his vicious pronunciation." We wonder at this singular translation, particularly when the plain sense that the rascality of Demosthenes is not of native growth so readily strikes the eye.

§ 173. *τοὺς λόγους . . . ἀντιδίκους*, "producing the speeches for the opposing parties i. e. for both the parties in a suit, as in the case of Phormio, and Apollodorus. See Plutarch's life of Demosthenes." We think that *ἐκφέρειν* will not take the sense of *producing*, or *composing*, as a literary composition. It can only mean *publishing*, *disclosing*. The orator wishes to say that Demosthenes, being thought to be unworthy of confidence in this trade of writing speeches, (*περὶ ταῦτα*) and being used to make known the contents of the speeches to the opposite party in suits, pushed himself all at once into politics. The phrase *ἐκφέρειν λόγους* is used in the same sense in the oration of Demosthenes against Nicostratus § 14: *ἔπειτ' ἀγώγων μοι συνεστηκότων πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς τε λόγους ἐκφέρει εὖ εἰδώς*, κ. τ. λ. It is quite probable that the plurals which Æschines uses,—*λόγους* and *ἀντιδίκους*—loosely refer to one particular affair; and that affair without doubt must be the same to which Æschines alludes in the or. de fals. leg. § 165. He there says "wherein shall we perceive the innate traitor? Shall we not in his using as you have done those who have intercourse with him and have trusted him;—in his writing speeches for pay to be delivered in the courts, and then divulging them to the opposite party. (*λόγους γράφοντα μισθοῦ τούτους ἐκφέρειν τοῖς ἀντιδίκους*.) You wrote a speech for Phormio the banker and took money for it. This speech you divulged (communicated *ἐξήνεγκας*.) to Apollodorus who was plaintiff in a capital suit against Phormio." (*τῷ περὶ τοῦ σώματος κρίνοντι Φορμίωνα*, i. e. in a suit affecting the civil status of Phormio.) It is quite probable that this charge is entirely unfounded. Plutarch, who refers twice to the transaction, (in the life of Demosthenes, and in the parallel between him and Cicero,) in all probability knows nothing of it which we do not learn from Æschines and from the orations themselves which have come down to us; and also blunders in saying what Æschines does not affirm, that the orator wrote for both parties to a suit. The facts, as far as we can gather them

¹ Comp. K. F. Hermann u. s. § 118. 10.

from the orations for Phormio and against Stephanus are these, that in the first instance Demosthenes wrote a speech for Phormio when sued by Apollodorus for capital lying in his hands. The speech is a plea against the admissibility of the action, as being already decided by selected arbitrators. The speech for Apollodorus on the other hand was written for a subsequent plea, on an action of false witness (which was a private action at Athens,) against one Stephanus a witness for Phormio. It is indeed possible that in the first action what Æschines mentions may have occurred; and it is possible also that some other quarrel arose between these men of which we know nothing; but in the general looseness of the Attic orators as to facts, it is pretty safe to conclude that Æschines had no more ground for his charge than that Demosthenes wrote a speech first for Phormio and then in a new suit arising out of the same affair for his adversary.¹ We have dwelt the longer on this passage because we have found little help for the understanding of it in the commentators whom we have consulted.

§ 211. *κάθαρμα ζηλοτυποῦν ἀρετὴν*, "wretch hating virtue." We prefer the other meaning which can be assigned to *ζηλοτυποῦν*, *affecting, pretending to*. This, which Bremi rejects, is almost required by the contrast. 'Such things would a man say who had really lived virtuously; but what you will say, a wretch would say who pretended to (wished the reputation of) virtue.'

§ 214. *ἐμπληξίαν*. "Dicitur de iis qui tonitru tanguntur. Hinc tropice de iis qui non sunt sanæ mentis." Bremi. Like *ἐμπληκτος* in many passages the word here has the specific sense of *fickleness, changeableness*. This indeed is shown by the sense, and derives some support from the circumstance that one article suffices for this word and for *δειλίαν*. As fickleness and cowardice are closely connected qualities, the orator binds them together by one article. Another abstract noun of unlike nature he would have been apt to keep more distinct by using two articles.

§ 240. "Did not the mercenary soldiers deliver up the citadel to the Thebans for five talents?" The sense is just the reverse. The first *οὐ*, affecting the whole interrogative sentence, requires an affirmative answer; while the second *οὐ* denies *παρέδοσαν*. *Did not the merce-*

¹ If the words *περὶ τοῦ σώματος κρίνονται* be not a gross exaggeration, and really refer to the suit against Stephanus, to which Phormio was no immediate party, they must be understood of the danger which Phormio would incur, if his witness should be convicted of falsehood. There would then lie a suit of *κακοτεχνιών* against him which probably, like a *δίκη ψευδομαρτυρίας* was an *ἄγων τιμητός*, so that the damages could involve even loss of life, at the pleasure of the plaintiff and of the judges.

naries fail of delivering up the Cadmea? The events here referred to are dwelt on more at large by another enemy of Demosthenes, Dinarchus, (or. in Demosth. § 18 Bekker) and derive illustration from Arrian. (Anab. I. 7, and I. 10.) While the citadel of Thebes was occupied by a garrison in the Macedonian pay, the city revolted, and the Arcadians who had started from home for the aid of Thebes, on learning that it was taken and sacked by Alexander, turned back and punished the instigators of their expedition with death. Dinarchus says that Astylus, their general, demanded ten talents, as his price for aiding Thebes; and that ambassadors came in vain to implore Demosthenes to furnish that sum of money; while an agent of the opposite party paid the Arcadians the same sum for going back.

§ 242. The date here assigned by Mr. Champlin to the death of Alexander king of Epirus is, we believe, the correct one. It excites some surprise, when we find in the Dictionary of Biog. and Mythol., under Alexander I. of Epirus, another date for his death, viz., the year 326. The authorities to which the author of that article refers suffice for his confutation. Livy (VIII. 24) says that Alexandria was founded and this Alexander slain in the same year; and although the Roman year to which these events are assigned, does not synchronize with the veritable Olympian year, yet this is too common a thing in earlier Roman history to trouble any one, while the concurrence of two such events, as the abovementioned, upon the same year, is likely to be a positive fact; and may serve to rectify chronology. Now the time of the foundation of Alexandria is well ascertained to belong to the end of 332 B. C., or to the beginning of 331. And again Justin says, that about the time of the death of Darius (dum haec aguntur XII. 1.) Alexander received letters from Antipater informing him of the defeat and death of Agis III, king of Sparta in Greece, and of the death of his own brother-in-law, Alexander of Epirus, in Italy, (cognitis mortibus duorum aemulorum regum. *ibid.*) Now the date of no event of antiquity is more certain than that of the death of Darius. It occurred according to one of the most cautious of ancient historians — Arrian — in the first Attic month of the archon Aristophon, which month commenced July 1, 330 B. C. If now we would allow for the time necessary to transmit news from Italy and to forward messengers to Alexander, we must assign the death of Alexander of Epirus to the end of 331 or the beginning of 330.

§ 243. *διὰ τὸν περίπλου τὸν εἰς Κέρκυραν*. "On account of the circuitous voyage to Corcyra. He went first to Thrace after vessels and then south round the Peloponnesus to Corcyra, etc." But the word *περίπλους* denotes not a *circuitous voyage*, but a *voyage around*

any point or peninsula. The necessary circumnavigation of peninsular Greece gave rise to the word, and not that Timotheus did not take the direct route.

§ 254. *Æschines* here says that, in a few days the Pythian games were to be held, and the Amphictyonic council was to meet. On this passage Mr. C. quotes from Bremi that these games were not celebrated in the same month of different years, but that for the most part they took place in the month Elaphebolion or March. We believe that this information is erroneous in more than one respect, and beg leave to make a few remarks upon the point on account of its historical importance.

The death of Darius then as we have seen occurred in July 330, during the first month of the archon Aristophon at Athens, and the rival orations of *Æschines* and Demosthenes are assigned on the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to the same year. Alexander would without fail send speedy news to Greece of the death of the Persian king. But he is spoken of as alive by *Æschines* in § 132, where he says "Is not the king of the Persians . . . now contending not for mastery over others but for the safety of his person?" These orations then were delivered during that archonship before the news of the death of Darius could reach Greece; that is—we may say, without being venturesome—before the first three months of the year had run out. The Pythia and the meeting of the council then fell upon the early part of the autumn.

The force of this argument—which in the words of *Æschines* we may call an *ἀντικτος λόγος*¹—is sought to be turned aside in a very strange and unsatisfactory way by Boeckh in his notes on the Amphictyonic marble. (Corp. Inscr. Vol. I. No. 1688.) He says: this could have been said even if the death of Darius were known. Nay, were it so known, so much the more weight does the sentence have, in which *Æschines* lays before the minds of the Athenians a very sad event lately announced, and in gentle words expresses his pity. All that *Æschines* says could be retained although something relating to the death of Darius be added. He might have written after this manner: *νῦν οὐ περὶ τοῦ κύριος ἐτέρων εἶναι διαγωνίζεται, ἀλλ' ἤδη περὶ τῆς τοῦ σώματος σωτηρίας· ὃν ἐναγχος ἠκούσατε ἀπεσφάχθαι*: but he does not add this last clause, because all knew of the fact." Moreover, continues Boeckh, the passage where *Æschines* (§ 165) speaks of Alexander, as (*εἰς τῆς ἀρκτου* etc.) beyond the north and almost

¹ This is only one argument out of many in favor of assigning the Pythia to the autumn.

outside of the world, must refer to his northern expedition after the death of Darius. With regard to the first of these arguments, it is enough to say that if *Æschines* had written, as this eminent scholar says he might have done, he would have written absurdly even if Darius had left a successor; how much more when his empire fell with him. With regard to the second, we affirm that the words of *Æschines* are hyperbolic, and what renders it certain that they cannot have the reference which Boeckh seeks in them is, that they are connected in time by the orator with the warlike movements in Peloponnesus, on the part of the Lacedaemonians and others, in 331 B. C. "The Lacedaemonians and mercenaries met in battle and crushed the troops with Corragus — and all Arcadia had gone over except Megalopolis, and that was under siege and daily its capture expected, while Alexander had retired beyond the north, etc. — and Antipater was a long time collecting an army, and the issue was uncertain." Can anything be clearer than that none of these circumstances is of later date than the death of Darius, unless they all are?

Boeckh entertained the opinion that the Pythia were held in the spring; but nearly everybody who has expressed himself on this subject of late has looked for them on the opposite side of the year, in the autumn, although the exact time cannot be ascertained. The important marble, to which reference was made above, informs us that they were to be celebrated in the Delphic month Bucatius. Without entering into the question in what part of the year that month fell, we can only say here, that K. F. Hermann regards it as made out and settled that it fell within the autumn, and he synchronizes it with the Attic month Baedromion. The evidence as to the time of the Pythia may be found in Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix I., and in Böhmke's *Forschungen*, Vol. I. p. 307. See also K. F. Hermann *de anno Delphico*, (Götting. 1844), his *Griechische monatskunde* (Götting. 1844.), p. 50, and his *Religious Antiquities of Greece*, § 49, note 12.

As the Amphictyonic Council met at Delphi in the autumn, their spring session was at Thermopylae. Hence the Documents in Demosthenes *de Cor.* (§§ 154, 155), which speak of a spring session at Delphi, on the occasion of which *Æschines* discourses at length (§ 115 — 125), are likely to prove forgeries. We know that their character has been defended by Schömann (*Antiq. jur. publ. Graec.* p. 391), who accepts an hypothesis once started by Heeren, that the deputies always met spring and autumn, first at Thermopylae, and then, after some sacred rites were performed, adjourned to Delphi. But *Æschines* again oversets this theory; for the only meeting at the former place, of which we know anything, was, according to his statement (§ 128),

full of very important business. Meanwhile, five marbles have become known, dug up at Delphi, by the lamented Ottfried Müller, and published by his fellow-traveller, Ernest Curtius (*Anecdota Delphica*, Berl. 1843), which contain Amphictyonic decrees: on three of these marbles it is said that the decrees were passed at the autumnal session; while the others are without date. We have then evidence of a session in the autumn at Delphi; and of a meeting for business at the Straits: we have, on the other hand, no evidence of a meeting in the spring at Delphi, except that furnished by the documents in Demosthenes. These documents are defended by Böhneke on the plea that they belong to the actual spring session, not to that where Æschines made his speech, (which Böhneke also places in the fall), nor to the extraordinary one of which Æschines speaks § 128, 129; but to a regular one in the spring. One of the documents, however, refuses to have these screws put upon it; for it requires the deputies of the Council to go to the sacred land and set up boundaries and tell the Amphissians not to commit encroachment; whereas, even at the extraordinary session, before this supposed meeting, the council, so far from being thus mild, decreed a military expedition against the invaders of the sacred soil, and appointed a general. And the subsequent complaints against the Amphissians were not for using that ground for pasturage and arable land, but for not paying their fine and restoring the exiles whom the council had required them to banish.

To sum up all in a word, the Pythia were held in autumn; the Amphictyonic council convened at Delphi in the autumn, and as far as anything is known only there; and the events in which Æschines was an actor at Delphi, were therefore in the autumn of B. C. 340, soon after his election probably to the office of pylagoras.

§ 258. *παρ' οὐδὲν μὲν ἦλθον ἀποκτεῖναι.* "By nothing did they come from killing him, like the Latin *minimum aberat quin interficerent*; i. e. his punishment was equal to death." We were surprised at reading these words; nor was our surprize lessened when we found that Bremi led Mr. C. into his interpretation by saying, 'poena qua multabant eum mortis poenam aequiparabat.' As the Athenians only warned Arthmius out of their territory, one would think that this fact, if nothing else, would be seen to be adverse to this rendering. Is it necessary to say that the meaning is, 'they came within next to nothing of killing him.' Not that they touched him even with one of their fingers, but their feelings were such, that a very little more and they would have put him to death. — T. D. W.

ARTICLE III.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF CHRIST, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE DISCOURSE IN MATT. XXIV. AND XXV.

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INTRODUCTION.

It will be admitted, I presume, by every intelligent reader of the Bible and the commentaries upon it, that there is often very great vagueness, uncertainty, and inconsistency in the interpretation of its language. It will also be admitted, I believe, that these faulty interpretations cannot fairly be attributed to the language itself; for most readers are convinced that there is scarcely a mode of speech in the whole compass of literature more simple, direct, and intelligible than is the language of the Bible as to much the greater portion of it. There must be some other cause, and the following, I suppose, will generally be received as the true cause, namely: Men who profess to be Christians usually feel obliged to believe what the Bible affirms; if any passage of the Bible, therefore, understood in its obvious and true sense, states a sentiment which they are strongly disinclined to believe, there is a powerful temptation to reconcile the words to some other meaning more agreeable to the interpreter. Hence has arisen a very general practice of interpreting meanings derived from other sources *into* the words of the Bible, instead of simply explaining the words themselves according to grammatical usage, the context, and the nature of the subject. The art of interpretation, instead of being a simple hydrant by which the waters of life may be drawn out of their receptacles for our use, has too often been made a sort of forcing-pump, by which other waters, not of life, have been driven into the Scriptural reservoirs. Some interpreters are in this respect much more guilty than others, but almost all have participated in the sin more or less. There is scarcely one who does not find some passage somewhere in the Bible, in respect to which he would like a little more latitude than the strictest rules of grammatical interpretation, faithfully carried out, will allow him; and if he himself takes this latitude, he cannot be very severe on others when they take the same. Hence the very great prevalence of the practice in all parties.

ESCHATOLOGICAL TEXTS.

In view of these remarks, I propose to examine, by the strictest rules of grammatical interpretation, some of the more important eschatological texts contained in the record of our Lord's discourses, particularly MATTHEW XXIV. 29—31, and its parallels MARK XIII. 24—27 and LUKE XXI. 25—27, and see what they really import when thus examined.

The reader, that we may enter upon the subject understandingly, is earnestly requested, before we proceed any further with these remarks, to take the Greek Testament and carefully examine for himself the following eschatological passages from the discourses of Christ recorded in the Gospels :

MATTHEW.

v. 29, 30.	x. 33.
xii. 31, 32.	xiii. 41—43, 49, 50.
xvi. 24—27.	xviii. 6—9.
xxv. 31—46.	xxvi. 64.

MARK.

iii. 28—30.	viii. 34—38.
ix. 42—50.	xiv. 62.

LUKE.

ix. 24—26.	xii. 9, 10.
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JOHN.

v. 25—29.	vi. 39, 40, 44.
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It is the purpose of the following pages to point out and illustrate the right interpretation of these and similar texts. In respect to all which are cited in the above paragraphs, there is but little difference of opinion among interpreters of any authority or note. They are generally understood in their obvious sense, as being really eschatological, as pertaining to the final judgment and a future state of rewards and punishments in the eternal world. The passage in MATTHEW XXIV. 29—31, however, though in all respects similar to these, on account of the connection in which it stands, and some difficulties which are supposed to arise from the context, has not been so unanimously agreed upon. To this text, therefore, our attention will be principally directed; for if it can be shown that this must be understood eschatologically, must be interpreted as referring to the final judgment, there

will be but little difficulty in applying all the others to the future state; while, if the eschatological interpretation of this text be given up, if this text is regarded as referring to the Jewish-Roman war, the destruction of Jerusalem, or any other temporal event, it will not be easy to prove philologically that any of the other passages, usually considered eschatological, necessarily have reference to an eternal condition of rewards and punishments in the world to come. The importance of the subject justifies and requires a careful, patient, and minute investigation; and in order to such an inquiry, we will first make a brief statement of what we regard as the right

PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

IN RESPECT TO ALL TOPICS OF THIS KIND.

These principles of interpretation, (and in regard to them I suppose there will be no dispute,) are the two following:

I. We are never to depart from the obvious meaning of language without a necessity created by the context or by the nature of the subject.

I say *a necessity created by the context or by the nature of the subject*; because, if we admit necessities which are created by the theories, the opinions, or the feelings of the interpreter, interpretation at once becomes arbitrary, and we are all afloat on a sea of conjecture. Interpretation then, is the art of forcing meanings into language, and not the art of eliciting meaning from it.

II. Inasmuch as the use of language is always modified by the opinions, feelings, and circumstances of those who use it, in the interpretation of any document, its contemporary history is an indispensable auxiliary.

These two principles give three things, and three only, which are ever allowed to modify the literal meaning of words, namely: 1) the nature of the subject; 2) the context; and 3) the contemporary history. When we say of a man that "he *flies* into a passion," and of a bird that "she *flies* into her nest," the nature of the subject at once indicates which of two very different meanings the word *flies* bears in each of these sentences.

In strict accordance with these principles I now propose to examine the passage in Matt. xxiv. 29—31; and its parallels in Mark and Luke, and I earnestly request the reader to keep a strict watch over me, and see if in any instance I swerve in the least degree from the principles I have stated.

TEXTS TO BE EXAMINED.

MATT. XXIV. 29—31.

29 Εἰθὺς δὲ μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐκείνων ὁ ἥλιος σκοτισθεῖται, καὶ ἡ σελήνη οὐ δώσει τὸ φέγγος αὐτῆς καὶ οἱ ἀστέρες πεισύνται ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν σφαιρῶν σαλευθήσονται.

30 Καὶ τότε φανήσεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ· καὶ τότε κόψονται πᾶσαι αἱ φυλαὶ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ὀφνύται τὸν νύκτον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐρχόμενον ἐπὶ τῶν νεφελῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης πολλῆς.

31 Καὶ ἀποστελεῖ τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ μετὰ σαλπίγγος φωνῆς μεγάλης, καὶ ἐπισυνάξουσιν τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἀνέμων, ἀπ' ἄκρων οὐρανῶν ἕως ἄκρων αὐτῶν.

MARK XIII. 24—27.

24 Ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις, μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν ἐκείνην, ὁ ἥλιος σκοτισθήσεται, καὶ ἡ σελήνη οὐ δώσει τὸ φέγγος αὐτῆς·

25 Καὶ οἱ ἀστέρες τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἔσονται ἐκπίπτοντες, καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αἱ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς σαλευθήσονται.

26 Καὶ τότε ὀφνύται τὸν νύκτον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐρχόμενον ἐν νεφέλαις μετὰ δυνάμεως πολλῆς καὶ δόξης.

27 Καὶ τότε ἀπέστέλει τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπισυνάξει τοὺς ἐκλεκτοὺς αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων ἀνέμων, ἀπ' ἄκρου γῆς ἕως ἄκρου οὐρανοῦ.

LUKE XXI. 26—27.

25 Καὶ ἔσται σημεῖα ἐν ἡλίῳ, καὶ σελήνῃ, καὶ ἀστροῖς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς συνοχὴ ἔθνων ἐν ἀπορίᾳ, ἠχοῦσης θαλάσσης καὶ σάλου,

26 Ἀποσπῶντων ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ φόβου καὶ προσδοκίας τῶν ἐπέρχοντων τῇ οἰκουμένῃ· αἱ γὰρ δυνάμεις τῶν οὐρανῶν σαλευθήσονται.

27 Καὶ τότε ὀφνύται τὸν νύκτον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐρχόμενον ἐν νεφέλῃ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ δόξης πολλῆς.

In regard to these passages it must be observed, that the nature of the subject is the very thing in dispute respecting them. If the subject be the day of judgment, the words may be understood in their literal and most obvious sense; if the subject be the destruction of Jerusalem, the literal and most obvious sense of the words must be entirely abandoned, given up, and put far away; and for it a metaphorical meaning must be substituted, so far below the literal, so infinitely inferior to it, (even more unlike it than a picture of Niagara made of paint and canvas is unlike the roaring, thundering, rushing cataract itself,) that the very statement of the fact, after a careful reading of the words, is almost enough of itself to settle the whole question of criticism.

Conceding, however, this whole ground, I admit in the outset, for the argument's sake, that the subject being the very thing in dispute, the nature of it cannot come in to modify our interpretation, till we have ascertained what it is; and accordingly, the only sources left to enable us to ascertain the meaning of the passages are: 1) the literal import of the language, 2) the context, and 3) the contemporary history.

THE LITERAL IMPORT OF THE LANGUAGE.

What is the literal import of the language, as it stands in the pages of the Bible, and without any other source of information respecting its

meaning than what the words themselves give? Read the passage in Matt. 24: 29—31, read it either in the Greek original or in any competent translation, and see what kind of an impression the language, considered by itself, most obviously and most naturally makes. Here it is:

(29) Immediately (*εὐθέως* in the Greek) after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken. (30) And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven: and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory. (31) And he shall send his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other.

We must remember that our Saviour did not utter his speech in the same language in which the report of his remarks is given. He probably spake in the conversational Hebrew, the Syro-Chaldaic or Aramaean dialect, (as it is sometimes called), of his time; and the report of his remarks is made in Greek. The passage in Matthew, therefore, is a Greek translation of what Jesus spoke in Hebrew. Matthew, therefore, is a translator of what Christ said, and not a reporter merely. There are two other reporters and translators of what our Saviour said on this occasion, and their report and translation is as important as that of Matthew, for all three were divinely inspired to give the ideas with perfect accuracy. Let us then read their report and translation, as well as that of Matthew. Here they are:

Mark. 13: (24) But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light. (25) And the stars of heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in heaven shall be shaken. (26) And then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds, with great power and glory. (27) And then he shall send his angels, and shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven.

Luke 21: (25) And there shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars; and upon the earth distress of nations, with perplexity; the sea and the waves roaring. (26) Men's hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth; for the powers of heaven shall be shaken. (27) And then shall they see the Son of man coming in a cloud, with power and great glory.

Observe, in the 29th verse of Matthew, the great changes in nature, the darkening of the sun and moon, the falling of the stars, the tossing of the hosts of heaven; in the 30th verse the *sign* (*σημεῖον* or *visible appearance* of Christ in the *clouds of heaven* and compare this verse with Matt. 16: 27, Mark 8: 38, Luke 9: 26; in the 31st verse compare the *angels*, the *trumpets*, the *gathering together of the*

elect for the whole habitable world (ἐν τῶν τεσσάρων ἀνέμων ἀπ' ἀκρῶν οὐρανοῦ εἰς ἀκρῶν αὐτῶν) (no translation scarcely can do justice to the force of the original), and compare this verse with Matt. 18: 41, 42. 1 Cor. 15: 51, 52. 1 Thess. 4: 15—17. 2 Thess. 1: 7—10. Rev. 20: 11—14. How in all the world were the elect *gathered together*, with a *great sound of trumpets*, from the *very extremities of the heavens*, at any time during the Roman-Jewish war? So far from being *gathered* then, they were every where *scattered*, literally, spiritually, and in every way. Compare also Matt. 18: 41—43, 49, 50. 25: 31—46. Certainly, according to the *literal import of the language*, here is as plain and as fearful a description of the great day of judgment as can be put into human speech. All its expressions, all its figures, all its imagery, taken in their obvious import, must belong to that event, and cannot without extreme violence be made to refer to any other. Any one who can read these 29th, 30th, and 31st verses carefully and thoughtfully, and then *spiritualize* or *allegorize* them into a description of any thing which took place during the siege and overthrow of Jerusalem, need never be disturbed by any of the most extravagant allegorizing interpretations of the church-fathers or the mediæval mystics; nor can such an interpreter find much difficulty in making any conceivable description of the day of judgment, that can possibly be expressed in human language, to refer to the destruction of Jerusalem. With such latitude of interpretation there is an end of all *eschatology*, and interpretation itself becomes wholly *subjective*. The thing needs only to be *looked at*; and it must be a blind eye which cannot see through it.

Thus much for the language taken in its literal and obvious sense.

It is alleged, however, that the *usus loquendi* of the prophetic writings justifies the application of such language as the above to such events as the siege and destruction of Jerusalem; that the darkening of the sun and moon, the shaking and falling of the heavenly bodies, etc., are prophetic symbols of the overthrow of nations, governments, etc. All this may be true, or partly true, and yet not reach the point for which the assertion is made. Let us examine the texts adduced on this point, and see how they compare with the descriptions in our Lord's discourse. They are such as these. Amos 8: 9; "I will cause the sun to go down at noon, I will darken the earth in the clear day." Micah 3: 6; "Night shall be unto you . . . it shall be dark unto you . . . the sun shall go down over the prophets, and the day shall be dark over them." Ezek. 32: 7; "I will cover the heavens and make the stars thereof dark, I will cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give her light. All the bright lights of heaven

will I make dark over thee." Jer. 15: 9; "Her sun is gone down while it was yet day." Isa. 13: 10; "For the stars of heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light; the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine." Compare also Psalm 18: 7—14. Here indeed we see strong, poetic description, highly wrought metaphor; but how immeasurably different from the language of our Lord in his discourse! The only really strong passage, the only one which fairly admits of comparison with the expressions in the discourse of our Lord, is in Isa. 34: 4, and in regard to this prophecy, I accord fully with the following judicious remarks of Bishop Lowth in his commentary upon it. (Lowth's *Isaiah*, p. 297); "By a figure very common in the prophetic writings, any city or people, remarkably distinguished as enemies of the people and kingdom of God, is put for these enemies in general. This seems here to be the case with Edom and Botzra. It seems, therefore, reasonable to suppose, with many learned expositors, that this prophecy has a further view to events still future; to some great revolutions to be effected in later times, antecedent to that more perfect state of the kingdom of God upon earth, which the Holy Scriptures warrant us to expect."

The passage in Rev. 6: 12—17 is supposed by some to indicate merely the temporal calamities of the Jews in the Roman war; but I suppose the chapter is intended as a picture of the *kind of calamities*, (foreign conquest, war, famine, pestilence, etc.), by which the Jews, as the enemies of God's kingdom, would be swept away; and that the picture is *not confined* to the Roman war, but takes in all time till the final judgment. To this view the next chapter as a picture of the deliverance of the elect, exactly corresponds. The principle of the remarks quoted from Lowth is applicable to both these chapters.

THE CONTEXT.

Let us now come to our second source of information respecting the meaning of the text, namely *the context*. For the present I shall consider only that part of the context which precedes the text. The context following the text, and the word *ἐνθὺς* in Matt. 24: 29, can be more appropriately investigated hereafter under the head of *objections*. In the first place let us read Matt. 24: 21 and Mark 13: 19.

(21) For then shall be great tribulation, (*θλίψιν*) such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no, nor ever shall be.

(19) For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be.

The affliction (*θλίψις*) here spoken of, all will admit to be the siege and destruction of Jerusalem, for that, all acknowledge, is the subject of discourse before and after; and no other affliction can answer to this description, for that was the very climax and acme of all human suffering, and it is remarkable that Josephus describes it in almost the same form of expression, namely: "It appears to me that the misfortunes of all men from the beginning of the world, if they be compared to those of the Jews, are not so considerable as they were." (*Jewish War*, Pref. 4.)

And this melancholy testimony is abundantly confirmed by the narrative which Josephus has himself given of the facts, of which he was an eye-witness, and by the statements of Tacitus and other historians.

Now Matthew in our text (24: 29), refers to that affliction when he says, or, more properly, reports Christ as saying, *μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐκείνων*, *after the affliction of those days*, and Mark also (13: 24), in the words *ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν ἐκείνην*, *in those days AFTER that affliction*; and then they proceed to describe the events under consideration. Thus they both affirm that the words of our text refer to something which was to take place **AFTER that affliction**, **AFTER the siege and destruction of Jerusalem**, and of course, according to the testimony of both these evangelists, the words of our text must refer, not to the destruction of Jerusalem, but to something which was to take place *afterwards*; *how long afterwards* we shall consider by and by.

The context thus far, then, decides the point that the verses under consideration must refer to some event which was to take place *subsequent* to the destruction of Jerusalem; and to what other event has any one ever thought of referring them but to the great day of Judgment?

Two, then, of the only three sources of information to which we can appeal, the literal import of the language, and the context (*preceding it*) refer the passage under consideration, necessarily, to the great day of judgment.

How is it with the third?

THE CONTEMPORARY HISTORY.

We come here to our third and only remaining source of information respecting the meaning of the language under consideration, namely, the contemporary history, or the opinions, feelings, and circumstances of the apostles and their Master at the time of the delivery of this

discourse. Our first remark under this head must be made up of two elements, namely, the context in connection with the contemporary history.

The disciples (Matt. 24: 8) had asked our Lord two questions; (1) when the destruction of the city and temple of Jerusalem, which had just before been predicted (Matt. 23: 32—39), would take place? and (2) what would be the sign of his coming and of the end of the world? (*συντελείας τοῦ αἰῶνος*).

Whatever others may understand by this second question, the disciples unquestionably understood by it the great consummation, the final judgment. This I believe is not often questioned. The Jews and early Christians, generally, supposed that the final consummation would immediately follow the destruction of Jerusalem. No fact of contemporary history, I think, is better attested or more generally credited than this. This opinion was very prevalent, and nearly if not quite universal, and some expressions in 1 Thess. 4: 15—18 (*then we* which are *alive and remain*, etc.) tended to establish the idea that the great consummation would take place during the existence of the generation then living. This misunderstanding produced so much perturbation, that the apostles felt themselves called upon to utter solemn warnings against it 2 Thess. 2: 1—8. 2 Pet. 3: 3—14. *Now we beseech you* (says Paul in reference to the misunderstanding of his first epistle) *by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ and our gathering together unto him, that ye be not soon SHAKEN IN MIND, or be TROUBLED, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by OUR EPISTLE, AS THAT THE DAY OF CHRIST IS AT HAND.* He then proceeds to show that so many and such important events were to take place before the final consummation, that this could not reasonably be supposed to be immediately impending; but neither he nor Peter undertake to show how distant the day was, for *neither of them knew*; — *that had never been revealed to them.* For aught that they could tell, it might be sooner or later, and they undoubtedly expected that it would occur at no very distant date. On points not revealed to them by inspiration, they did not presume to decide, for on such points their judgment was as fallible as that of other men.

Christ assured the apostles in this very discourse, that he should not tell them the time in regard to their questions generally (Matt. 24: 36. Mark 13: 32); and he afterwards solemnly assured them that the time was not to be made matter of revelation at all. (Acts 1: 7). How, then, could the apostles know anything about the time, any more than we?

In the verses preceding our text, Christ has answered their first

question as definitely as he intends to answer it, impressing the certainty of the event without defining the time; and then, from the 29th verse he proceeds to answer the second question proposed. He then proceeds, from Matt. 24: 37 to 25: 30, to give various warnings and instructions and practical exhortations equally applicable to both events, — the destruction of Jerusalem and the day of judgment — and finally closes the whole with a solemn and impressive description of the principal scenes of the last great day. Matt. 25: 31—46. In all this he says not one word to determine whether those two events would be contemporaneous or not; he studiously avoids giving any hint either to correct or confirm their error on that topic; on the contrary he emphatically assures them that they knew nothing about the time, that he should tell them nothing about the time; nay, that if he should undertake to tell them the time, he would be altogether exceeding his commission and his powers as the Messiah, the Son of God. Mark 13: 32. How, then, I ask again, were the disciples to know anything about the time? How could they know that the day of Judgment would *not* immediately follow the destruction of Jerusalem? How could they know anything at all about the matter, except this, that *they knew nothing?*

The light of contemporary history is necessary for the understanding of these and the other eschatological passages of the New Testament, because some contend that the Hebrews and early Christians had no idea of a future state of retribution, and no word even to indicate a place of future punishment. If this were truly so, some of the expressions of Jesus in this discourse, and in other places, must have sounded very strangely to them; but as they could not imagine him to be speaking of things which had no existence and of which they had no conception, they would probably endeavor to give his words some exposition which would make them apply to circumstances destined to take place in this world. But if, on the contrary, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, of eternal retributions, were as fully established among them as it has been among Christians since, if they had definite and well known expressions to indicate the place of future punishment, — then, most unquestionably, they must have understood our Saviour's discourses, which we have quoted as eschatological, as referring to a future state; and he, knowing the attitude of their minds on this subject, must have intended, in these words, to convey to them ideas of the future state. Of this, certainly, there can be no reasonable doubt on the mind of any one who examines these discourses of our Lord as they are recorded in the Gospels.

Let us then examine the statements of the proper writers on this

subject ; and first, of Josephus, a Hebrew, a Pharisee, and for some portion of his life a contemporary of the apostles. The passages which I shall quote from this writer may be found in his *Antiquities* XVIII. 1. 3, and the *Jewish War* II. 8. 11, 14. III. 8. 5. In giving an account of the opinions of his own sect, the Pharisees, Josephus says : "They also believe that souls have an immortal vigor in them, and that under the earth there will be *rewards and punishments*, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life ; and the latter are to be detained in an *everlasting prison*, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again." They also say "that the souls of bad men are subject to *eternal punishment*"—while the Sadducees "take away the belief of the immortal duration of the soul, and the punishments and the rewards of Hades." On this subject we know that the followers of Christ took ground with the Pharisees and against the Sadducees. See Acts 23: 6—9.

Josephus also expresses it as his own opinion that "for bad souls there is a dark and tempestuous den full of *never-ceasing punishments*." He says : "The vehement inclinations of bad men to vice are restrained by the fear and expectation they are in, that though they should lie concealed in this life, they would suffer *immortal punishment* after their death." Again, "the soul is ever immortal." "The souls of those whose hands have acted madly against themselves, are reserved in the darkest place in Hades." In these extracts I have used the old translation of Whiston as being the one in general use, and though clumsy, faithful and accurate. Let any one who chooses consult the original. Human language cannot be stronger, more perfectly unequivocal as to the opinions of the Hebrews in the time of Christ and the apostles. The Sadducees were but a small sect, they were the infidels, the freethinkers of the time ; and their opinions never greatly influenced the popular belief ; and in respect to the point we are now discussing, their existence is of no importance whatever.

The other Jewish writers fully corroborate the testimony of Josephus in this regard ; as is well known to all who are familiar with the Talmud. Paulus (Comment. III. 499) gives us the following extract from the Tanchuma. "Thy righteousness is as the mountains of the Lord, Ps. 36: 7. Why are the mountains compared to it ? Answer : They have no end ; and so also the retribution of the rewards of the just in the future time will have no end. Thy judgments are a great deep. Why is the great deep compared to them ? Answer : Because no one is able to search it through ; and so also no one is able to search through the punishment of the wicked in the future time." Here the reward of the righteous and the punishment of the wicked in the future state

are placed on precisely the same ground as to intensity and duration, just as they are in our Saviour's discourse, according to the obvious, literal import of the words in Matt. 25: 46.

Such being the prevailing impression on the public mind at the time of the delivery of our Saviour's discourses, his language on this subject could not possibly have been otherwise understood by his hearers than in its plain, obvious, literal sense. Precisely the same ideas on this subject we accordingly find prevalent among all the early Christians. Clement, the companion of Paul (Phil. 4: 3), in an epistle to the Corinthians (2 Cor. 3: 12—16) expresses himself as follows:

"Thus speaks the prophet concerning those who keep not their seal (Isa. 66: 24); 'their worm shall not die and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be for a spectacle unto all flesh.' Let us therefore repent while we are yet upon the earth; for we are as clay in the hands of the artificer. For as the potter, if he make a vessel and it be turned amiss in his hands, or broken, again he forms it anew; but if he have gone so far as to throw it into the furnace of fire, he can no more bring any remedy to it; so we, while we are in this world, should repent with our whole heart for whatsoever evil we have done in the flesh, while we have yet the time of repentance, that we may be saved by the Lord. For after we shall have departed out of this world, we shall no longer be able either to confess our sins or to repent in the other."

Language cannot be made to express more clearly the idea of eternal punishment in a future world, than it is done in this passage of Clement. It is true the N. Testament expresses the same sentiment in language equally plain; but we are required by some to modify the meaning of the language of the N. Testament, to turn it aside from its plain literal import on account of what they allege to be contemporary adverse opinions! But how is it when we show that the contemporary opinions are precisely the same as those expressed by the language of the N. Testament understood in its obvious, literal sense? Certainly we have double proof that Christ and his apostles clearly taught the doctrine of endless retribution in a future state.

But it is said the N. Testament has no word to indicate the place of future punishment, (and if it had not, would that prove there is no future punishment?) that the word *Gehenna*, for example, the term most frequently used, is derived from the Hebrew *Geh-kinnom*, and means the same thing, namely, a valley on the south side of Jerusalem, where children were once offered in sacrifice to Moloch, and which subsequently became the receptacle for burning the offal and sweepings of the city. 2 Kings 23: 10, 16: 3, 4. 1 Kings 2: 7. Critics of the highest

eminence, and on this subject entirely disinterested, have denied this etymology altogether, and assigned to the word a very different origin, as for example Paulus in his *Commentar* I. 678.

But allowing that the Greek word *γέεννα* is derived from the Hebrew words גֵּהֶנְנוֹם; does that prove that the two phrases denote the same thing? that *Gehenna* is the *vale of Hinnom*? Is the etymology of a word always a sure guide to its meaning? Does a derived word always indicate the same idea as its primitive? Very far from it—often just the reverse, as every student of languages knows. Our English word *constable* comes from the Latin *comes stabuli*, *count or superintendent of the stable*; but does that prove that all our *constables* are necessarily *hostlers*? Our English *esquire* is from the French *escuyer*, and that again from the Latin *scutum*, *a shield*, and that from the Greek σκῦρος *a hide*, of which shields were originally made; but does that prove that our *justices of the peace* are all *tanners*? The English word *lady* is from the Saxon *hlafdig*, which comes from a word meaning *a loaf of bread*; but does that prove that *ladies* are *loaves of bread*? The argument in all these cases is the same, and as good in any one of the cases as in any of the others.

It is *use* which determines the meaning of a word, and not etymology; and contemporary history gives ample testimony to the usage, in the times of Christ and the apostles, in respect to the word *Gehenna*, as also *Τάραχος*, and other words employed to express the same idea. And first, as to Jewish usage: "Says Rabbi Eliezer, seven things were created before the world was created; these are, the law (Prov. 8: 22), *Gehenna*, (Isa. 30: 33), paradise (Gen. 2: 8), the throne of glory, the (heavenly) temple, penitence, and the name of the Messiah" (Paulus, *Comment.* III. 495). If the Jews meant by *Gehenna* a valley in the neighborhood of Jerusalem, we may well ask, how would that be created before the world was created?

The testimony as to Christian usage is no less explicit. Justin Martyr, a native of Palestine, and born not far from the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, says expressly: "*Gehenna* is the place where those who have lived unjustly shall be punished." (*Apol. ad Anton.* p. 66.) Bretschneider's N. T. Lexicon, art. *γέεννα*.

For numerous examples of the same kind, examine the copious collections made by Wetstein in his *Nov. Test.* I. 513, 514; and also Kuinoel's *Comment.* I. 683.

RESULT.

According, then, to all the sources of information which we have or can have, for the determining of the meaning of the words, namely,

their literal import, the context, and the contemporary history, our Saviour everywhere, in his eschatological discourses, speaks of the day of judgment and the eternal retribution in the future world, and not of the destruction of Jerusalem in this world; and this is very emphatically true in respect to the passage more immediately under consideration, Matt. 24: 29—31.

This *destruction of Jerusalem* is a very convenient resort, a kind of universal *tertium quid* to a certain class of expositors. Whatever in the New Testament would make them afraid, if properly understood, they call it *destruction of Jerusalem*, and so let it pass.

The interpretation of the passages in question, it seems to me, is settled, if positive proof can settle anything.

OBJECTIONS.

We will now proceed to consider the objections which are urged with most plausibility against our interpretation of Matt. 24: 29—31. They are the three following:

1. Christ speaks to the disciples as if they themselves would witness the transactions which he describes, Matt. 24: 33. Lk. 21: 28.

2. He places the judgment in immediate proximity to the destruction of Jerusalem, Matt. 24: 29.

3. He says that generation should not pass away till the accomplishment of his predictions, Matt. 24: 34.

Objection 1st. Christ speaks to the disciples as if they themselves would witness the transactions which he describes. Matt. 24: 33. Lk. 21: 28.

Throughout this address, and in his eschatological discourses generally, Christ so selects his phraseology as to give his hearers no means of inferring anything in regard to the time of the judgment. On this point he intended to keep them ignorant, and he made repeated and open declarations of this intention. Whether it would be in their own day, or some subsequent period, they knew not; though they rather supposed it might be in their own day, and Christ said nothing either to confirm or correct this impression. That the disciples were fully aware of their own ignorance in this respect is manifest from the fact that they repeated their question to him just before his ascension (Acts 1: 7), but with no better satisfaction than before, for his reply was: *It is not for you to know the times or the seasons*—thus peremptorily cutting them off from all hope of knowing.

In view of all these facts, can any one suppose that Jesus intended to intimate in Matt. 24: 33 and Lk. 21: 28, that his twelve apostles would

live to see the destruction of Jerusalem? If he did, he made a great mistake, for not one of them lived to see the destruction of Jerusalem. They were all dead before it took place except John; and he was then at Ephesus, a great way off, and saw nothing of it. But every one who heard Christ's discourse, and every one who has read it or who may hereafter read it, since its delivery, will see the day of judgment and witness the signs of its approach. The objection, so far from weakening, confirms our interpretation.

Objection 2d. He places the judgment in immediate proximity to the destruction of Jerusalem. Matt. 24: 29.

This is true, and it is in exact accordance with the genius, the universal idiom of prophecy. A local temporal event is taken as the sign and pledge of a universal spiritual transaction; and the two things ever so remote in time, and whatever important events may have intervened between them, are represented in immediate succession. Thus every considerable temporal deliverance in the Old Testament prophecies, is followed immediately by predictions of the coming of the Messiah and the millenium, as if these three events were all to occur in immediate succession. Thus Isaiah connects the coming of the Messiah and the millennium immediately with the Jewish deliverance from the Assyrian oppression (Isaiah ix—xi. compared with Matt. 4: 15, 16), as if they were to occur in immediate succession. Again in other places the same prophet connects these same events with the deliverance from the Babylonian captivity, as if they were to occur immediately after that. See Isaiah xl. and the following chapters. The deliverance from Assyria was to take place more than two centuries earlier than the deliverance from Babylonia; and the prophet certainly knew that the coming of the Messiah and the millennium could not succeed immediately to both the Assyrian and the Babylonian deliverances; yet in different passages he connects these events with both the others, in accordance with the genius and constant custom of prophecy, in which generally the succession of events only is regarded, and exact chronology studiously avoided. The prophets themselves, for the most part, knew not the chronology of the events which they foretold, but only the succession. The apostle Peter expressly informs us (1 Pet. 1: 10—12) that the prophets who predicted the Messiah, diligently sought to know the time when he would appear, but could not ascertain it; the most that they could learn being that he would not appear in their day.

There is another important principle here, which must not be overlooked. In 2 Sam. vii. (compare Heb. 1: 5) Solomon, (the son and successor of David) and the Messiah — the Hebrew temple and the Christian church — are blended together in prophetic vision, so that it

is impossible satisfactorily to separate the two elements linguistically. Compare also Ps. viii. with Heb. ii., Ps. xvi. with Acts 2: 25—31, and 18: 35, Ps. xxii. with Matt. 27: 35—50. This principle is carried so far and so clearly recognized in the Bible, that sometimes the proper names are actually interchanged. Thus John the Baptist is called Elijah, (Mal. 4: 5 compared with Matt. 11: 14), and Christ is called David (Ezek. 24: 23, 24). There is in this way often a *two-fold reference* in prophecy, both in prediction of events and of persons. Compare Isaiah 7: 14—17 with Matt. 1: 22, 23. No one who admits that the writers of the New Testament are inspired and divinely authorized interpreters of the Old, can consistently deny the existence of this two-fold view in at least several of the scriptural prophecies. I am sorry to see that such critics as Neander, Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, rather than admit this principle, have concluded, though reluctantly, (especially the last), to give up the authority of the New Testament as a correct interpreter of the Old. Everywhere you find proof of this in the Commentaries on the Psalms by Hengstenberg and Tholuck, and in the Life of Christ and History of the Apostles by Neander. And so it must needs be: there is neither logical nor critical consistency without it.

It is to this principle mainly that Lord Bacon refers (*Advancement of Learning*, B. II.), when he speaks of a "latitude which is agreeable and familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the nature of their author, to whom a thousand years are but as one day; therefore they are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age." In reference to this principle also we find the following significant remarks of Herder (*Werke* XII. 261 ff.) written in vindication of his method of interpreting the Apocalypse. "The more I compared the imagery of the whole book (the Apocalypse), with the prophecy of Christ in Matthew xxiv. and xxv. and its frightful fulfilment according to Josephus, the more there seemed to me a *resemblance*, an *analogy*, a *solution* of the vision and its imagery." "The whole destruction of Jerusalem I viewed as Christ viewed it, as the *sign*, the *pledge*, the *type*, of the last great issue of things. "With that Jesus connected the end of the world itself, and prefigured his final coming in that first coming." "The higher prospect came to John in the same connection; but no figure now applies to Jerusalem alone; every thing acquires gigantic proportions; the view pertains to a higher, a final, a universal future, yet still in images borrowed from the first one." "This whole frightful history is only the *pledge*, the *symbol*, the *sign*, of still another fulfil-

ment." Compare here the remarks of Lowth quoted on a preceding page. (*supra* p. 458.)

This idea I feel compelled to retain so long as I hold the New Testament to be an authoritative interpreter of the Old; and while we retain this idea there is no difficulty in Christ's placing the great day of judgment in direct proximity with the destruction of Jerusalem; it is just what he ought to do; it is just what the prophets always do in all predictions of this kind; it is one of the most uniform, most constantly occurring idioms of scriptural prophecy.

But there is another peculiarity of prophecy, which will of itself abundantly account for and justify the proximity in question, even without recurring at all to the important principle just stated.

Events of the same class are often represented in successive series without allusion in any one series to events which belong to another class, however important these events in themselves may be. In this respect prophecy may be compared to a series of historical pictures suspended in a gallery, in the order of the occurrence of the transactions, but without any record of the dates. Imagine such a picture-gallery in reference to the history of our own country, in two departments, one for the peaceful, the other for the warlike events. The first picture in the peaceful series might be the landing at Jamestown, the second the landing at Plymouth, the third the first harvest, the fourth the first legislative assembly, the fifth the Congress at Philadelphia, the sixth the declaration of independence, the seventh the inauguration of Washington, the eighth the settlement of Cincinnati, the ninth the commencement of steam navigation, the tenth the opening of the first canal, the eleventh the laying of the first railroad. Here we have succession but not chronology; you know the order but not the dates, the intervals of time between the events as they actually occurred were widely variant, but their proximity in place as they hang in the gallery is all the same, however different the absolute intervals of time; and there is no picture in this series of any warlike event, though very numerous and important occurrences of this kind were actually all along intermingled with the peaceful events.

There may be another series in the gallery representing only warlike events, and these may be the Indian massacre in Virginia; Philip's war in New England; capture of Montreal under Wolf; battle of Lexington; surrender of Burgoyne; capture of Cornwallis; the taking of Washington city; the battle of Baltimore; the battle of New Orleans, etc. Here also the same remarks are applicable as in the former case, as to succession without chronology, order without dates, proximity in place without proximity in time. The superim-

endent of the gallery hangs the pictures along close together, without leaving spaces between the frames corresponding to the intervals of time which intervened between the transactions represented in the several pictures.

Now just so is prophecy constructed — just such a picture gallery do we have in the prophets — succession without chronology, order without dates, proximity in place, without proximity in time. For illustration take Zechariah ix. 1—10. This was written 200 years before Alexander the Great, 500 before Christ, and probably at least 2500 before the millennium. Here are four pictures, namely, (1) the victories of Alexander, vs. 1—5; (2) humiliation and eventual conversion of the Philistine cities, vs. 6, 7; (3) safety of the Jewish nation during the progress of Alexander, v. 8; (4) advent of the Messiah, his universal reign, and the means by which it is to be accomplished, vs. 9, 10. Compare Matt. 21: 5.

The destruction of Jerusalem was the first of a long series of Judgments, which Christ is to execute on his enemies, and which is to terminate in the great day of judgment. Christ in this discourse (Matt. xxiv. xxv.) holds up only two pictures, the first and the last of the series; and in accordance with the universal rule of prophecy, brings them into immediate proximity of place, though they were widely separated in time, yet not so widely as some of the events of the first 10 verses of the ix. of Zechariah, which yet are placed in the same immediate proximity.

Remember — prophecy is not anticipated history, nor is it written according to the rules of history — it has rules of its own, which (like every thing else) must be learned by a laborious process of induction — by a careful study of the prophetic writers themselves.

We have said enough to vindicate our interpretation of this verse even were we to admit that the word *εὐθέως* here is properly translated by the word *immediately*. On this point, however, we offer a few remarks.

Matthew says *εὐθέως δὲ μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν τῶν ἡμερῶν ἐκείνων*, and Mark, *ἐν ἐκείναις ταῖς ἡμέραις μετὰ τὴν θλίψιν ἐκείνην*, *in those days, after that affliction* — an expression entirely indefinite as to time, and indicating only the latter days, or days of the Messiah, as in all the prophets. Jesus, as before observed, did not speak in Greek but in the Aramaean. Matthew and Mark are both (as we believe) divinely inspired translators of what he did say, and therefore both correct. Our Saviour, then, must have used some term which was indefinite in its meaning, and admitting of both translations. Certainly he could not have used a term which was definite as to time, because he had assured

his disciples that he should not tell them the time. It would be *after* the destruction of Jerusalem, but whether early or late, during their life or after their death, he never informed them. Paulus, Schott, and others conjecture that he might have used the word $\epsilon\kappa\tau\eta\varsigma$, which is found in Job 5: 8 in the sense of *suddenly*, and is there translated in the Septuagint by the Greek word $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$. See Schleusner's Sept. Lexicon on this word. The $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ and the $\mu\epsilon\tau\grave{\alpha}$ extend over the whole period of conflict and trial to the final triumphant decision.

Nothing is more certain, as a philological fact, than that $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ is *not* universally, always and everywhere to be translated by the English word *immediately*. Every Greek lexicographer will teach us that. Schleusner gives, as his second definition of the word, *subito, suddenly*; and the most recent and most esteemed of the Greek lexicographers among the Germans. Passow, Rost, and Schmidt, give as one definition of $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ the German word *plötzlich suddenly*. So Liddell and Scott, in their new Greek-English Lexicon, under $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ give *suddenly* in the second class of definitions. Bretschneider, in his N. T. Lexicon, gives the sense of $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ in some connections by *ex improviso, unexpectedly*. In the New Testament there are many places where this is evidently the meaning of the word. For example Mark 9: 15 $\kappa\alpha\iota \epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma \pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \acute{o} \acute{o}\chi\lambda\omicron\varsigma \iota\delta\acute{\omega}\nu \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu \iota\zeta\epsilon\theta\alpha\mu\beta\eta\theta\eta$, and the whole multitude *SUDDENLY seeing him were astonished*. Says Kuinoel on the passage, "*subitaneus et inopinatus, sed peropportunus Christi adventus, erat causa stuporis* — the *sudden* and *unexpected* but very opportune arrival of Christ, was the cause of astonishment." Compare also Lk. 6: 49. Acts 12: 10. Rev. 4: 2. Now this is the meaning of the word which belongs to it in Matt. 24: 29. He always represents his coming to judgment as a *sudden*, an *unexpected* coming. Matt. 24: 27, 42, 44, 50. Rev. 3: 3. Compare also 1 Thess. 5: 2, 3. 2 Pet. 3: 10. According to all usage and all analogy, then, we are authorized and required to translate the verse in question, *Suddenly, or unexpectedly, after the affliction of those days, etc.* The context plainly requires this, vs. 27, 42, 44, 50. I know not why it is that so many have supposed themselves, in this case, tied down to the word *immediately*. The word $\epsilon\nu\theta\acute{\epsilon}\omega\varsigma$ has quite a latitude of definitions. In classic Greek it is often used in the exact sense of our English phrases *for instance, for example*.

Objection 3d. But Christ says, that generation should not pass till the accomplishment of these predictions. Matt. 24: 34 $\acute{\alpha}\nu \pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\tau\alpha \tau\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\alpha \gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\eta\tau\alpha\iota$.

If in this verse Christ meant to tell the time, it is exceedingly strange that in the verse immediately following he should so solemnly declare, that no one, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Fa-

ther only, knew anything about the time. Matt. 24: 34, 35. Mark 13: 30, 31. Our English translation here makes a glaring inconsistency between these two declarations, which the Greek entirely avoids. In the original there is no word which means *fulfilled*, or which can in this place, with any propriety, be so translated. The word here in the original, the word used by all three of the evangelists, though they very seldom in other passages use the same word when repeating the same sentiment, the word here used by all three of the evangelists, is *γίνεται*, the subjunctive present, third person singular, of *γίνομαι*. Now what is the meaning of *γίνομαι*? Hedericus and Schleusner give, as the first definition, *orior*, which Lyttleton defines, *to arise, to begin, to have a beginning*. The modern German lexicographers, as Schmidt, Rost, Wahl, Passow, and Bretschneider, define *γίνομαι* by the German word *entstehen*, almost without exception, making this the very first definition; and *entstehen*, according to Rabenhorst, Noehden, Adler, etc., means *to begin, to originate, to arise*. Take the definition of *entstehen*, as given in Weber's *Kritisch erklärendes Handwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache*, and you have the exact meaning of the Greek word *γίνομαι* in the passage under consideration. It is this: *Entstehen seinen Anfang nehmen* = *to take its beginning*. The proper definition of *γίνομαι* is *to begin to be, to take a beginning*. Dr. Robinson, in his Greek Lexicon of the New Testament, art. *γίνομαι*, says: "This verb is Mid. dep. intrans. with the primary signification, *to begin to be*." And again, in the definitions: "I. *To begin to be*," etc. This, as the appropriate sense of the word, can be established, not only by the authority of all the best lexicographers, but also by numberless examples from the classical Greek, the Septuagint, and the New Testament. John 8: 58, Jesus says, *πρὶν Ἀβραάμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμί*, which Kuinoel very properly translates: *antequam Abraham ESSE COEPISSET, me extitisse*. For a like use of the word in the N. Test. compare Matt. 8: 16. John 6: 16, 17, 19 — in the Sept. 1 Chron. 20: 4 (*ἐγένετο ἔτι πόλεμος ἐν Γαζέρ, there began yet a war in Gerar* — very well translated in the Vulgate, *initum est bellum*), Ps. 89 (90): 2. Tob. 3: 8. Among the classics, Herodotus (II. 11.) says, *πρότερον ἢ ἐμὲ γενέσθαι*, *before that I began to be*, and he also uses the word in the same sense in I. 198. III. 85. So Xenophon in his *Cyropaedia* (I. IV. 17) says: *ἡδὴ δὲ ἑσπέρας γενομένης*, *but when it began to be evening* — and also, I. VI. 42. *ἐπειδὴν ἡμέρα γίνεται*, *when the day begins to be*, and *Memorab. IV. VII. 19. ἐπεὶ ἑσπέρα ἐγενέτο*, *after it began to be evening*. The very common use of the word *γίνομαι* in the sense of *to be born*, depends entirely on its meaning, *begin to be*.

What, then, philologically considered, is the proper translation of the text? Clearly this: *this generation shall not pass, TILL ALL THESE*

THINGS BEGIN TO BE, or, *till all these things TAKE THEIR BEGINNING.* So Luther interprets it, in his note on the passage : *Es wird solches alles anfangen zu geschehen noch bey dieser zeit, weil ihr lebet : All this will begin to take place in the present time, while you are yet alive.* Let there be no quibbling, as if *γίνομαι* must *always* be so translated. Every word, besides its original, *primitive* meaning, has also *derived* meanings, which are in frequent use. No word, especially no verb of such extensive use as the Greek *γίνομαι*, can ever be translated into another language, in all its variety of meanings, by the use of one unvarying synonym. Try the experiment with the English verbs *take*, *make*, *put*, and see what infinite absurdities you would fall into.

The destruction of Jerusalem was the first occasion on which Christ appeared as a judge, taking vengeance on his enemies. Before, he had appeared as a suffering Redeemer, an atoning sacrifice. The destruction of Jerusalem was the first in that series of judgments which terminates and is consummated in the great final judgment, which in the preceding verses had been so vividly and so terribly described. The three judgments *began*, now are they going on, and at length they will be completed, on

“ That day of wrath, that dreadful day,
When heaven and earth shall pass away.”

That generation which saw Jesus, the meek, the uncomplaining, the suffering, victim, should not pass till it had seen him assume the character of the mighty, the inexorable, the avenging judge, *taking vengeance on them that know not God and obey not his truth.* Compare also Matt. 16: 28. Mark 9: 1. Lk. 9: 27.

The three evangelists, though they use different words in translating every other part of this discourse, all use the same word here, in the same person, number, mode, and tense, — they all say *γένηται*, thus showing that they use the word in its peculiar and appropriate sense of BEGIN TO BE. We will place them side by side, that the identity may be seen.

MATT. 24: 34.

Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, οὐ μὴ
παρέλθῃ ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη. ἕως
ὧν πάντα ταῦτα γένηται.

MARK 13: 30.

Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐ
μὴ παρέλθῃ ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη,
μέχρις οὐ πάντα ταῦτα γέ-
νηται.

LUKE 21: 32.

Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐ
μὴ παρέλθῃ ἡ γενεὰ αὕτη,
ἕως ὧν πάντα γένηται.

According, then, to all the rules of critical judgment, which can be applied to a case of this kind, and in full view of all the objections which can be urged against our interpretation, we decide unhesitatingly that these solemn words of the gospels under consideration are, that

they were by the disciples understood to be, that they were by our Saviour intended for a fearful description of the great day of final judgment, when the dead, small and great, shall stand before God, and the books shall be opened, and another book will be opened which is the book of life: and the dead will be judged out of those things which are written in the books, according to their works. And the sea will give up the dead which are in it, and death and hell will deliver up the dead which are in them; and they will be judged, every man according to his works. And whoever is not found written in the book of life, will be cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. See Rev. 20: 12—15.

In conclusion, I would say, that even if *γίνουαι* had not the meaning which all the best lexicographers and the best usage give it, if it were, as it is often erroneously supposed to be, synonymous with *εἶναι*, if it might properly be rendered *be fulfilled* instead of *begin to be*; even in this case, the common usage of the prophetic writers, the style, structure, and custom of the prophetic speech, would fully justify the interpretation we have adopted. What more common in the prophecies than to speak of a thing already *determined upon* in the divine counsels as *already done*? than to speak of a fulfilment as *completed* when it has decidedly *commenced*? In prophetic style, when the first of a series is done, the whole is done. (See Rev. 11: 15. Compare also Nahum, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, on Nineveh, Babylon, Tyre, Edom, etc.) And in the prediction of an event fully resolved upon in the divine mind, it is very often spoken of as already past, inasmuch that one of the common rules given for the interpretation of prophecy is, that *the past tense indicates certainty of fulfilment*. (See Horne's Introduction, vol. ii. p. 640.)

AUTHORITIES.

I am aware that many of the best scholars, many of the most judicious, learned and reliable critics, both in our own country and in Europe, have entertained and with great ability defended the opinion that the whole of Matt. xxiv. which precedes verse 35 must refer exclusively to the judgments on the Jews in connection with their wars with the Romans from Vespasian to Hadrian. They suppose that in no other way can a consistent interpretation be made out for verse 34. Were it not for this verse, and the *ἐνθὺς* in verse 29, they would be very glad to interpret vs. 29—31 otherwise. Are these difficulties really insurmountable? Is not the interpretation proposed in the preceding pages fairly and philologically sustained?

I know not that I should have ventured publicly to defend a view so different from that of many whom I so highly esteem, to whose judgment I so gladly defer, were it not for the long list of names, no less venerable, no less worthy of confidence, of those who, in one way and another, confidently affirm that Matt. 24: 29—31 must of necessity be referred to the great day of final judgment, and who maintain that view by reasons which seem to me unanswerable. These writers are found in all generations and of all sorts, from the beginning of Christian literature to the present hour, church-fathers and reformers, philologists and preachers, Catholics and Protestant, orthodox and rationalist, of every shade of belief and unbelief, of every variety of zeal and indifference.

An enumeration of a few of the names alluded to will fully justify my statement. In defence of this view we have Chrysostom, Augustine, Jerome, and the church-fathers generally; Bede, Luther, Calvin, Gerhard, Hammond, Bengel; Paulus, Schott, D. Schultz, Olshausen, Fritzsche, Neander, Meyer, De Wette, Von Gerlach, Allio-li, and many others. From some of the more recent of these I now propose to make a few extracts, to show how the matter is viewed by the most eminent New Testament scholars of the present day. They shall be of entirely different schools and different modes of thinking, and the date shall be given of each work from which the extract is made.

(1) *Neander*, (pious, supernaturalist, but hardly orthodox) *Leben Jesu*, 1st ed. 1837, 4th ed. 1847, pp. 561, 562. Speaking of the 24th of Matthew, he says, that Christ represented therein "partly his triumph in the overthrow of the hitherto sensuous form of the theocracy and thereby advanced more free and effective diffusion of his kingdom, partly his last return for the perfecting of this kingdom—the judgment over the degenerated theocracy, and that last judgment—the final more free and mighty development of the kingdom of God, and that last completion of the same—elements corresponding to each other, the last of which is prefigured in the first." "In regard to a prophet we might with probability say, that in his conception the image of a glorious development of the future, which disclosed itself before his prophetic look in moments of religious inspiration, were unconsciously mingled with the perceptions of the present; that things separated by long intervals of time presented themselves to him as contemporaneous." "In Christ we can suppose no such commingling, no error." "But it is easy to see how it might happen, that in the apprehending and reporting of such discourses from the position of the hearers, the elements which Christ himself kept separate (though He

presented them in a certain correspondence with each other and made no definite limits as to time) might become intermingled." "It has already been noted as a peculiarity of the editor of our Greek Matthew, that he collects into one discourse the related ideas which Christ spoke at different times and in varying circumstances." "Therefore it is not at all surprising that a clear separation of the different elements cannot here be made out, and we should not, in order to effect this, resort to forced interpretations, which are injurious both to the truth and the love of truth. There is far less of such intermingling, — the different elements of the judgment on Jerusalem and the last coming of Christ are much more clearly separated, in the representation of this last as given by Luke, chapter xxi.; though even here all difficulties cannot be avoided." "We may say, perhaps, that Luke here, as in other places, gives the more original, the truer, the purer representation of Christ's discourse." Any one accustomed to Neander will know very well what he means to say here: Christ was all right. He kept the two subjects sufficiently distinct, but the editor of our Greek Matthew has rather confused and blended them.

(2) Meyer, (rationalist, clear and strong.) *Kritisch exegetischen Kommentar u. d. N. T.* 2d. ed. 1844, Vol. I. p. 403 — 5.

First remark on the 24th of Matthew. "Exegetically it stands fast that from the 29th verse onward, Jesus speaks of his *παρουσία*, after he had spoken thus far of the destruction of Jerusalem, and, indeed, as the immediate antecedent of his *παρουσία*. All attempts to fix in any other place the transition point, where the discourse goes on to the *παρουσία* (*Chrys.* v. 24. *Kuinoel*, v. 43. *Lightf. Wetst. Flatt, Jahn* and others 25: 31,) are the products, not of exegesis, but of history, and lead to the grossest violation of exegesis."

"The attempt to explain this whole discourse of the Destruction of Jerusalem (*Michaelis, Bahrdt, Ekkerm.* and others,) are worthy of notice only as a sign of their times."

"In respect to the difficulty, that Jesus placed his *παρουσία* directly after the Destruction of Jerusalem, which was not confirmed by the result, the following things are to be remarked: (1) Jesus spoke of his *παρουσία* in a three-fold sense; for he designated as his coming, (a) the communication of the Holy Ghost, which was to come shortly (*John* 16: 16 et al.) and did come; (b) the historical revelation of his dominion and power in the triumph of his work on earth to be experienced forthwith on his ascension to the Father, of which we have an evident example preserved in *Matt.* 26: 64. (c) his *παρουσία* in the literal sense for the awakening of the dead, the holding of the

judgment, and the establishing of his kingdom. This is distinctly set forth in several passages of John, 5: 28. 6: 40, 54. and it is remarkable that in John the ἀναστήσω αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ contains no trace of the proximity of this act, but presupposes the death of the believers who were living."

"Unconsciously the form of the *expectation* passed over to the form of a *promise*; the ideal *παρουσία* and establishment of the kingdom became identified with the real, so that the first disappeared in conception and tradition, and the last only remained as the object of expectation, not merely surrounded with all the splendid colors of the prophetic delineation, but also perplexed with that reference to the destruction of Jerusalem, in which the promised ideal *παρουσία* had originally stood in the picture-language of prophecy."

3) *De Wette* (rationalist, sharp-sighted, fully informed, and consistent), *Kurze Erklärung des Evang. Matth.*, 3d edition, 1845, p. 259. "It is undeniable, and is at the present day acknowledged by all unprejudiced interpreters (*Paul., Schu., Fr., Zech., Ols., Mey.*), that in vs. 29—31 (of Matt. xxiv.), the discourse is of the coming of the Messiah to his kingdom; and that this, according to Matthew, follows directly after the destruction of Jerusalem. This idea of the near coming of Christ, is also distinctly expressed in other places (16: 28), and the apostle Paul likewise cherished it. Only Luke, who probably wrote after the destruction of Jerusalem, appears to defer it some; for he limits to the Romans a certain time for the possession of Jerusalem (21: 24), and introduces the last great decision with an indefinite καὶ."

"The distorted interpretations by which all thus far (that is, to v.31) is understood of the destruction of Jerusalem, are scarcely worth noticing." — "Some find in chapters xxiv. and xxv. a double coming of Christ, one invisible at the destruction of Jerusalem, and the other visible at the judgment of the world, but they can separate only arbitrarily. *Light., Wetst., Flut., Jahn*, explain of the last 25: 31 ff only. *Eichh.*, 25: 14 ff. *Kuin.* finds the transition 24: 43 ff. Also *Chrys.* separates arbitrarily, and applies 24: 1—23 to the destruction of Jerusalem, and 24: 24. 25: 46 to the coming of Christ, when plainly this comes in at 24: 29."

4) *Von Gerlach* (pious and strictly orthodox) *Das Neue Test. mit Anmerk.*, 3d edition, 1843. Vol. I. p. 147, 148, 150. "In this prophecy of Jesus, everything arranges itself about the 28th verse. The necessary destruction of the external kingdom of God on account of its corruption, is particularly the chief subject of this prophetic speech, in which primarily only Jerusalem and the Jewish State are spoken of.

Yet this stands in the most intimate typical connection with the last judgment, and Christ himself designates both as his coming." (Matt. 10: 23. 16: 28. Lk. 17: 22 ff.)

"In this picture everything tends to the nearest future (the destruction of Jerusalem), except that certain features, by their strength, point particularly to the end of the world; likewise it all tends to the most distant future (the last judgment), of which the former is but the image, so that that which was accomplished but imperfectly and weakly in the destruction of Jerusalem, will be thoroughly and powerfully fulfilled at the entrance of the final judgment. On the whole, three divisions may be recognized (in Matt. 24: 1—31); 1) a general view of the whole subject (vs. 4—14); 2) a more particular detail of the destruction of Jerusalem (vs. 15—28; 3) the stronger reference to the end of the world (vs. 29—31). When we thus view the whole, it is easily comprehended how v. 34 can follow upon what precedes, and how the exhortations to watchfulness can be so closely connected with the parables and figures which relate to the last judgment in ch. xxv."

Again, in the introductory remark to vs. 29 ff. "Now follows the more definite reference to the last times, though even here the destruction of Jerusalem is still primarily referred to, yet it is chiefly as a type" (a prefiguring of the other).

5) *Allioli* (a pious, learned, and candid Roman Catholic) *Die Heilige Schrift übersetzt und erläutert*, 5th edition, 1842, p. 972, Note on Matt. 24: 4. "Christ in the reply now following, gives explanations respecting both events, as the holy fathers unanimously declare, though as to the separation of the different passages which refer to the one and the other event, they are of various opinions." — "Augustine, Jerome, Bede, and most of the fathers and interpreters are of opinion, that Christ in his divine intuition, in which a thousand years are as one day (Ps. 89: 4), represented both events together and in each other. This view seems to have the best foundation, whether we consider the nature of the events referred to, or the letter of the prophecy. Both events, the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world, are but parts of the one great God's-deed, the judgment of God over men. Now since, in the prophetic intuition, such events as, gradually taking place in time, together form but one divine act, are represented under one point of view with and in each other (compare Isa. xxiv. xxvi. etc.), so it is altogether according to the nature of the case, that Christ should so announce these events, that the one is communicated in the other and by the other. This intimate connection of the two is also confirmed by the latter. In vs. 29, 30, and 31, the prophetic intuition of the end of the world distinctly and expressly comes forth," etc.

“The view of some moderns, that Christ here predicts only the destruction of Jerusalem, has against it not only the united voice of antiquity, but also the letter of the prophecy itself.”

These extracts are brought together for the purpose of showing how the most eminent Biblical scholars of the present day, of the most diverse habits of thought, and in relations the most widely separated, and amid all the light of the most recent investigations and discoveries in Biblical science, have at last come to view the much disputed passage in Matt. 24: 29—31. It seems to be agreed on all hands, that these verses must be referred to the great day of final judgment, that they cannot, without the utmost violence to the text and to the idiom of Holy Writ, be limited to the events connected with the destruction of Jerusalem. Rather than admit an idea apparently so incredible, Meyer and De Wette at once and boldly deny the inspiration and accuracy of the sacred record; the pious, learned, and amiable Neander meets them more than half way on the same ground; while the orthodox Protestant Von Gerlach, and the orthodox Catholic Allioli, still retain the old idea, the patristic idea, of a twofold reference in prophecy. And this idea of a twofold reference they all, Neander, Meyer, De Wette, as well as Von Gerlach and Allioli, admit to be a *New Testament idea*; and so also does Tholuck, Hengstenberg, Ewald, Rosenmueller, and the whole host of continental critics, orthodox and rationalist, pious and not pious, whether they themselves believe in it or not. How can any one, who reads the N. Testament, help admitting it?

The interpretation of Matt. 24: 29—31, which I have advanced in the preceding pages, does not depend on the idea of a twofold reference in prophecy; it stands firmly on other grounds. Yet I believe fully that this principle of typical interpretation is clearly recognized and acted upon as entirely correct by the writers of the New Testament, and that no one can reject it without at the same time repudiating the authority of the New Testament writers as divinely inspired interpreters of the Old.

ARTICLE IV.

THEOLOGY OF DR. EMMONS.

By Rev. E. Smalley, D. D., Worcester, Mass.

[Concluded from No. XXVI. p. 280.]

With this simple indication of his opinions on these topics, we proceed to a condensed statement of his views respecting

§ 9. *Man.*

What was his original state? "God made man upright." This, according to Dr. Emmons, means more than that God formed his body and gave him power to walk erect. It has special reference to the mind and heart. Nor does it comprehend the whole idea to say that God gave Adam all the powers of a free moral agent and thus qualified him to become holy. He entirely disagreed with Dr. Taylor of England, who affirmed, 'That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence. To say that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the nature of righteousness.'¹ By no means, replies Dr. Emmons; for all that is meant by God's making man upright is, that he willed him to exercise his powers of moral agency aright. God chose that Adam should come into existence a perfect man in respect of bodily organization and mental endowment, and that he should commence his being by loving his Creator with his whole heart and soul. This is what is meant by predicating uprightness of him at his creation.

"Uprightness belongs to the heart, and gives a man his moral character.² Man is the living image of the living God, in whom is displayed more of the divine nature and glory, than in all the works and creatures of God upon earth."³

Dr. Emmons had no doubt that God *might* have made Adam upright, in this exalted sense. He believed that he *must* have created him so; because, —

¹ Taylor, as quoted by Emmons, Vol. IV. p. 448.

² Works, Vol. IV. p. 448.

³ Ib. Vol. II. p. 24.

"To suppose that God implanted in his mind the principles of moral agency, without making him a moral agent, is extremely absurd. For, if God gave him the powers of perception, reason, and conscience, he must have been immediately under moral obligation, which he must have immediately either fulfilled or violated, and so have immediately become either holy or sinful."¹

From the account which Moses gives of the creation of Adam, and from the history of him who was created in the image of God, up to the time of his eating the forbidden fruit, it was perfectly clear to our author that God made man upright in the sense of holy.²

Of the original nobility and happiness of man, Dr. Emmons had the most exalted conceptions. His chastened imagination endowed our first parent with all those qualities that can beautify the body, adorn the mind, and exalt the heart. Lord of the whole creation, the fit representative to higher orders of a new race of intelligent beings, he was of noble mein and majestic bearing, with countenance radiating

"Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure."

When discoursing on the original purity and bliss of our common progenitor, Dr. Emmons appears to forget the lapse of ages and the ruins of the fall. Unmindful of centuries and distance, he enters the garden of the Lord and gazes with rapt vision on one of the most beautiful of God's creations. The spirit of the scene transfused through his own spirit, he thus embodies his conceptions:

"He was a noble and excellent Creature, as he came from the forming hand of his Maker. — His affections towards his Creator, and every inferior object, were perfectly right. He possessed more holiness than any of his descendants ever possessed in this imperfect state. Yea, he was in this respect but a little lower than the angels of light. — No man since the fall has ever displayed so much greatness of mind and goodness of heart as Adam displayed, while he resided in Paradise, and enjoyed the favor of his Maker.

How happy was Adam in his original state of moral rectitude and perfect innocence! His body was full of vigor and free from pain. His mind was full of light, and free from error. His heart was full of holiness, and free from moral impurity. His eyes and ears were feasted with a vast profusion of new, beautiful, grand, and delightful objects. His inheritance was rich and large, comprehending the world and the fulness thereof. He sensibly enjoyed the love and approbation of his Creator. He was permitted a free and unrestrained access to the fountain of holiness and happiness. Heaven and earth appeared unitedly engaged to raise him as high in knowledge, holiness and felicity, as his nature would permit him to rise."³

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 451.

² *Ib.* pp. 448—454.

³ *Ib.* p. 455.

The fall of man. Adam, endowed with reason and conscience, capable of loving God supremely and thereby securing forever that favor divine which is life, was put upon probation. A free, moral and accountable agent, God treated him as such by placing him under law. The law was that which the Creator had a perfect right to ordain, and which the creature had power to obey. It was a law in distinction from a covenant or constitution. Its words addressed to Adam personally; containing a precise prohibition, sanctioned by a precise penalty; Adam the very person prohibited; the thing prohibited his eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; and the penalty annexed death;¹—it had all the characteristics of a proper law. Strange that it should ever have been mistaken for a covenant.² It differs from other divine laws in but a single particular. That is, in duration. It was intended for the time being to answer a specific purpose. That purpose answered, the law was no longer in force.³ In its nature, its extent—applicable to those and those only who are specified in it, and its power to condemn—exercised only against those who disobey, its resemblance to all other divine laws is perfect.⁴ The penalty by which this law was sanctioned is eternal death. Temporal death is no fit penalty for sin against a holy God. Spiritual death is neither more nor less than sin itself; and to suppose that sin itself was threatened as a punishment for sin, is absurd. It robs the threatening of all significance.⁵

This law Adam broke. Of the forbidden fruit the woman gave to him, and he did eat. Eve, previously beguiled by Satan, had already partaken of the interdicted tree. In the most favorable circumstances possible for persevering obedience, with unimpaired natural ability to maintain his integrity, with the express prohibition of God sanctioned by the threat of death, directly before him, he yet put forth his rash hand and ate of the forbidden fruit. The deed was done, the penalty incurred, and he died to holiness and peace apparently forever. The frown of God was upon him, and he already began to have an earnest of eternal death.

This sin of Adam was *original sin*.⁶ No one else can be guilty of it. It is named thus, not because it was the first transgression in the world, for Eve was before Adam in sin; nor simply because it was the first offence of the first man; but because, by a divine constitution, this was the particular sin which should so remarkably affect the moral condition of all mankind. In the divine purpose it was so arranged, that all the subsequent sinfulness of the first parents and their

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 464.² Ib. p. 465.³ Ib. p. 468.⁴ Ib. pp. 466, 467.⁵ Ib. p. 470.⁶ Ib. p. 493.

whole posterity should be seen to have been *occasioned* by this one sin.¹ 'By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.' So intimately connected was Adam with his children, that his lapse had a most disastrous influence upon their state and prospects. Not that his posterity committed his first sin; not that he transferred to them the guilt of that offence; not that he conveyed to them a morally corrupt nature; but that God appointed Adam to be the public head of his race, and determined to treat them according to his conduct.'²

The great reason why God devised and adopted this mode of treatment, was his regard for his own glory. Some particular reasons may also be assigned. There was fitness in placing human nature, uncorrupted and unimpaired, on trial. This trial, in the circumstances, was equivalent to a trial of each individual of the race.³ Its repetition in every other case, then, would have been neither wise nor benevolent. Resulting as it did, this trial prepared the way for the promise of a Saviour. If Adam, surrounded with such safeguards and appliances that his fall has been a marvel to the universe, nevertheless fell before the tempter and was in perishing need of one mighty to save, it was quite certain that every man would have the same need.⁴ Be it remembered, however, that the fall of Adam placed his posterity under no absolute necessity of sinning. A certainty that we shall, is not a necessity that we must sin. Sin, in its own nature, is voluntary, not necessitated. Adam 'must answer for his own sins, and we must answer for ours.'⁵ God has done no injustice, therefore, to the race in making 'Adam the public head of his posterity. No one has the least right to complain of this arrangement, because there is no imputation of Adam's sin to his descendants, nor transfer of his guilt to them, nor punishment inflicted on them for his sake.⁶ In the exercise of his sovereignty, God had a perfect right to bring man into being, and appoint the bounds of his habitation, or place him under any constitution which infinite wisdom saw to be best.

"If he had a right to bring us into existence, he had an equal right to determine how he would bring us into existence, whether as single detached individuals, like the angels, or as naturally and constitutionally connected with our first and great progenitor."⁷

Man's present condition. Though fallen he has still all the powers of a moral and responsible agent. His mind is immaterial and indivisible, yet it has many faculties and susceptibilities. In perceiving,

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 493. ² Ib. pp. 487—491. ³ Ib. p. 492. ⁴ Ib. p. 493.

⁵ Ib. p. 497.

⁶ Ib. p. 496..

⁷ Ib.

remembering, reasoning, judging, and willing, it is the same man, working all in all. The power to perform these operations constitutes him a moral agent. This is his natural ability to do whatsoever God requires of him.¹ That which specially distinguishes man from the lower orders of creation is conscience. He has indeed far higher capacity for progress in knowledge and happiness than they²; but his peculiar characteristic is the faculty of moral discernment.³ With this power, he sees the essential difference between virtue and vice; is conscious of moral obligation; is self-approved when he does right, and self-condemned when he does wrong; and feels that he deserves reward or punishment according to his works.⁴ Such are his powers now, although he has lost that moral image of God in which he was created. He can make indefinite advancement in knowledge and holiness, and is under the most imperative obligation to love God with all his heart and soul.

What he might and ought to do, however, he utterly fails to do. From the commencement of his moral agency, he begins to sin. Making self his god, he withholds his supreme affections from the true God. Observation and experience render it probable, and the Scriptures make it quite certain, that, as soon as a human being has the powers of a moral agent, he exercises unholy affections. In other words he sins as soon as he becomes capable of sinning.⁵ How early this is, may not perhaps be known with absolute certainty, but probably it is sooner than he can utter his thoughts;⁶ nay, it is very natural to conclude that infants are *moral* agents as soon as they are *agents*.⁷ All by nature, are 'dead in trespasses and in sins.' The race is sinful. 'All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God.' Why is this? Not because they have not power to exercise holy affections, as well as sinful ones. They have this power. Not because a sinful nature was transmitted to them from the first sinner, by which all their sinful exercises are caused. 'For it is impossible to conceive of a corrupt and sinful nature prior to, and distinct from corrupt and sinful exercises.'⁸ Nor is it through the force of a self-determining, self-sufficient, independent power,⁹ by which they set themselves in opposition to God. But the ultimate reason is to be found in the eternal purpose of God that, if the first man, tried in circumstances the most auspicious should disobey and fall, his de-

¹ Works, IV. p. 503. ² Vol. II. pp. 26, 28.

³ Vol. IV. p. 162.

⁴ Ib. pp. 158, 159.

⁵ Ib. p. 505.

⁶ Ib. p. 504.

⁷ Vol. II. p. 163.

⁸ Vol. IV. p. 508. Dr. Emmons did not, as some have imagined he did, believe in the annihilation of infants. See Note, Vol. IV. p. 510.

⁹ Ib.

scendants, should begin their responsible agency as sinners.¹ This purpose, however, contemplated and made certain the entire moral freedom of each individual sinner. His native depravity furnishes no excuse for past transgression, and is no insurmountable obstacle to repentance and a holy life.²

Dr. Emmons believed that entire depravity both of heart and act, may be predicated of sinners.³ This depravity consists entirely in moral exercises, and as the moral exercises of a sinner are all wrong, he is entirely depraved. But it is the moral feeling which gives character to the outward act; and if sinners always act from the heart, and if the heart from which they act be totally depraved, then total depravity must be affirmed of all their actions.⁴ Not that there is nothing in them which may be called good. They may feed the hungry, clothe the naked, visit the sick, relieve the oppressed, cherish kindly affections, and perform many deeds of apparent benevolence.⁵ But, as they do all these things under the influence of a selfish spirit, God who weighs the motives of all, must condemn them. Even when they engage in religious services, their hearts are not right with God, and therefore their apparent 'sacrifice is an abomination in his sight.' God, 'viewing the best actions of sinners as flowing from a totally corrupt heart, abhors and condemns them as altogether criminal.'⁶ It is perfectly easy to account for all the kind offices and amiable natural affections of sinners, without supposing that God, 'who looketh upon the heart,' sees in them the least particle of moral goodness.⁷

The essence of all moral evil, is selfishness. In this consists the depravity of every sinner. Not in some deranged or vitiated state of the natural powers or the constitutional susceptibilities: not in some evil taste, whether inherited or implanted by the Creator; but in the constant and supreme preference of self to God. It would be proper for sinners to love themselves as a part of God's intelligent creation, or according to their real worth as designed to glorify the Creator;⁸ but they love themselves selfishly, or because they are themselves. This makes them supremely selfish; and in this selfishness is the essence of all their depravity. This is the carnal mind — enmity against God.

"It seeks a personal interest, which is diametrically opposite to the glory of God, and the general interest of his kingdom. It tends to spread misery and destruction through the universe. Can there be any thing virtuous, or amiable, or praiseworthy in such a totally selfish love,

¹ Works Vol. IV. p. 508.

² *Ib.* p. 513.

³ *Ib.* p. 517.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 523.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 527.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 526.

⁷ *Ib.* p. 547.

⁸ *Ib.* p. 543.

which is disconformity to God, disobedience to his law, and in its nature and tendency destructive of all the good of his holy kingdom ? ”¹

Man's need of a Saviour. Having broken the law of God, man is exposed to suffer its penalty. He cannot save himself from everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power. He must forever perish unless something can be done to honor the law which he has violated, vindicate the justice and veracity of God, and as fully secure the great interests of the universe as would the direct execution of the penalty against him. It would have been just for God to let the law take its course on every transgressor. But it was his purpose from eternity to save multitudes of the human family. That he might do this consistently with the integrity of his own character, he gave his only begotten Son to die for the sins of men. ‘That he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus, God hath set forth his Son to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins.’ ‘The atonement was necessary entirely on God’s account.’² Not on account of sinners ; for he might have destroyed them all, or he might, in the exercise of his mere sovereignty have saved them all, without doing injustice to them, or any of his creatures. But he could not have been true to his word, nor just to his law, and yet save sinners without an atonement. The great problem to be solved in the government of God was, How can God be just, and yet merciful towards offenders ? This question no finite intelligence could answer. Infinite Wisdom devised and infinite Benevolence adopted a plan which met all the exigencies of the case. The death of Christ on the cross was adapted to show God’s hatred of sin, his regard for his law, and to answer most gloriously all those purposes which the execution of the penalty would have done. ‘Knowing that he could effect these ends by the vicarious sufferings of a proper substitute, God accepted the offer of his own Son — the only substitute in the universe, who was competent to the great work of making a complete atonement for sin.’ The importance of the subject, then, acquires a definite statement of our author’s views respecting the

§ 10. *Person and Atonement of Christ.*

Foretold by prophets, typified by various rites and trusted in by thousands before he made his appearance in the world ; taking upon him our nature, embodying the God in the man, living to be a pattern

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 547.

² Ib. Vol. V. p. 18.

to his disciples to the end of the world, and dying that man might live for ever; rising from the dead by his own power, ascending to the throne of his Father, there to reign until he shall have subjected all things to his own dominion; he is the most wonderful being in the universe. First of all, he is truly and properly a man.¹ He has a human body and a human soul. Born of woman, increasing in favor with God and with men, placed under law, his condition on earth comprising the essential elements of a state of probation, no stronger proof could be given, than is found in these facts, of his true and proper humanity.² Then, he was really, and in the highest sense, divine. This is perfectly obvious from his testimony concerning himself. Being a man, he made himself God. Calling himself the 'Son of God,' declaring again and again his oneness with the Father, as it would be blasphemous for a mere man to do, appropriating the attributes, performing the works and receiving the homage of God, the evidence would seem to be complete, that he is really a divine being.³ Thirdly, the true divinity and proper humanity are united in the one person Christ Jesus. We may not suppose that his human nature was made divine, or that his divine nature was made human. It is impossible to conceive how this could be done; and if we were to suppose it accomplished, then Christ would be an essentially different being from what he is represented to be in the Scriptures. The union of the human with the divine is such that Jesus could with propriety affirm, 'I am man, I am God, and I am both God and man.' One and the self-same person suffered as man and acted as God.⁴ Should any allege that such a statement involves mystery; it is granted. But here, as elsewhere, a distinction must be taken between mystery and absurdity. To understand everything about Christ, were not possible for finite minds; but the point now under consideration is a fact plainly revealed. As such, it may be understood and believed; while the mystery attending it, incomprehensible by us, may be left with those 'secret things which belong to God.' To admit our own insufficiency and ignorance may be humiliating, yet it is not unbecoming; but to deny the great doctrine of the divine and human united in the person of Christ, is to exalt human reason at the expense of revelation.⁵ You could not have met the views of Dr. Emmons on this subject with the full admission of the divinity, unless you also acknowledged the proper humanity of the Lord Jesus. Again, if you had recognized the man Christ Jesus in your discourse, he would

¹ Works, Vol. IV, p. 584.² *Ib.* pp. 596—600.³ *Ib.* pp. 585—588.⁴ *Ib.* p. 591.⁵ *Ib.* p. 592.

have anticipated the complement of his unique and glorious character, by hearing you ascribe to him the works and award to him the worship of the true God. His conceptions of the person, offices and works of the Saviour were so exalted and peculiar, that no system could realize, no representation embody them, which did not invest him with all the milder attributes of man and make him the centre of all divine perfections. Results of the highest moment are connected with the admission that he is a man; an essential part of his great work becomes an utter failure, unless he be seen as the true God and eternal life; then only is his whole nature shadowed forth and his sublime work complete, when the divine and human meet in one person Christ Jesus. With a single extract to show how important Dr. Emmons regarded a belief in Christ's divinity, we pass on to the atonement. Having affirmed that a denial of this truth is a virtual impeachment of the Saviour's veracity, while it at the same time sets reason in conflict with revelation,¹ he remarks

"That the establishment of Christ's divinity establishes the beauty and consistency of his whole character and conduct. It is this which demonstrates the rectitude of his moral character; and so renders him worthy of respect and imitation of the Socinians themselves. It is this which gives value to his death, and so renders him a complete and all-sufficient Saviour. It is this which reconciles all the great things ascribed to him by the prophets and the apostles. It is this which renders him worthy of the humble homage and praises of all the hosts of heaven. It is this which establishes the truth and importance of the Gospel. It is this which ratifies the truth of those great and precious promises that remain to be fulfilled, and assures us that religion shall have a long and universal reign. It is this which affords permanent light and consolation to all good men, while passing through the dark and dreary journey of life. In a word, it is the Divinity of Christ which spreads a lustre over the face of the world, and calls upon Zion to rejoice that her God reigneth."²

The *Atonement*, necessary to illustrate the veracity and vindicate the justice of God,³ was made by the sufferings, and not by the obedience of Christ.⁴ His perfect obedience qualified him to perform his great work; but, strictly speaking, was no part of the work itself. The lamb must be 'without blemish,' indeed; but it was the *death* of the immaculate lamb which constituted the real efficacy, the life of the sacrifice. Something was to be done to display the unimpaired integrity of God's character, while he should proclaim pardon to the offender. This, mere obedience, how perfect soever, could not do. It was need-

¹ Vol. IV. p. 592, 593.² *Ib.* p. 594.³ Vol. V. pp. 18—22.⁴ *Ib.* pp. 27, 33

ful, as a qualification for him who was to make the sacrifice; but the sufferings were indispensable that the great Lawgiver and Sovereign might vindicate his righteousness and yet forgive the sinner. True, he was 'obedient unto death;' but the death was what the exigencies of the case demanded, and herein is to be sought the whole virtue of his atonement.

The death of Christ is not to be understood as a price paid for the redemption of a sinner. He paid neither 'our debt of punishment, nor our debt of obedience.' He neither sinned, nor was punished. It would be absurd to suppose, therefore, that he literally paid our debt of punishment. Equally unreasonable would it be to imagine that his obedience answered all the requisitions which God's law makes upon us. His obedience was on his own account, and not ours. It cannot literally be transferred to us. It merits nothing for us.¹ What, then, is meant by sinners 'being redeemed with the precious blood of Christ,' and the church's being 'purchased with his own blood?' Simply this: 'Christ has made, by his sufferings and death, an adequate atonement for sin, on account of which God can consistently offer salvation to all, and actually bestow it on every penitent, believing sinner.' The 'blood of Christ cannot literally pay a debt of guilt, but it can and did *atone* for that guilt, and procure the offer of pardon from a merciful God.'² In the resemblance of this forgiveness of sin to a discharge from a pecuniary obligation, lies the force of the representation that we are 'purchased by the blood of Christ.'

Such being the nature of the atonement and its efficacy in procuring the pardon of sin under a perfect moral government, it becomes a question of intense interest, How shall the sinner avail himself of this provision of mercy? Are all who have sinned forgiven of course, now that an atonement has been made; or are there certain conditions to be complied with, before a single offender can be absolved from his terrible liability? We are thus brought to the doctrine of

§ 11. *Justification by Faith.*

To be justified, according to Dr. Emmons, is to be pardoned, to be forgiven, or to have the punishment due to sin remitted.³ The term justification, though borrowed from the practice of civil courts, has this peculiarity of meaning: that they whom God justifies for Christ's sake, while treated as just, so far as the *suffering* of punishment is concerned, are not regarded as just in respect of the *desert* of punishment. The

¹ Works, Vol. V. pp. 82, 33.

² *Ib.* p. 35.

Ib. p. 44.

Sovereign views them actually guilty of transgression and deserving to suffer that penalty by which his law is sanctioned; still, on account of the blood shed by their Substitute, he glorifies his own mercy in delivering them from condemnation. This is justification — complete forgiveness, nothing more, nothing less.¹ This is granted to sinners solely for Christ's sake, on account of the atonement which he has made; and it is the great thing of which every sinner stands in perishing need. Without it, not a ray of hope can reach him from heaven or earth. With it, he is prepared to be rewarded for all good deeds, as though he had never sinned, and will at last be glorified in heaven. This is *all* that God bestows upon the offender on account of the atonement.² Whatever else he gives, is given on other grounds, for other reasons. Dr. Emmons did not deny that other blessings may be vouchsafed to us indirectly through Christ. He freely admitted this.³ But he saw no discrepancy between this and the position which he defined so clearly, and so earnestly defended, that 'forgiveness of sin is the only thing which comes to us directly on account of his death.' This especially and only, was what rendered that death necessary.

The condition on which any are justified for Christ's sake, is *faith*. 'Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God.' It is only to them that believe, that the promise of pardon is ever verified. This faith is speculative, historical, and practical. It involves correct apprehensions of Christ, a belief that he is the divinely-appointed Saviour, affectionate reliance upon him, and supreme devotion to his service. 'With the heart man believeth unto righteousness.' 'The very essence of that faith which secures salvation, is love to Christ.'⁴ Correct theory respecting his offices and work, is not enough. An historical belief that he entered our world at the time, and lived and died in the manner which the Scriptures declare he did, is not enough. The clear perception that his death was necessary, that he fully met all the exigencies of the case, and that if the sinner does not believe in him he must perish, is not the essential element of true faith. There must be the utter renunciation of self-righteousness, and the hearty reception of Jesus Christ as a personal and all-sufficient Saviour.⁵

This faith in Christ presupposes love to God and repentance for sin. 'That holy, disinterested love which fulfils the law, is the first fruit of the Spirit.'⁶ In the order of Christian graces, this takes precedence; and it is also an important element in each of the excellences that adorn the child of God. It is impossible that a sinner should mourn over his sins in a godly manner, until he truly loves the God whose law he has

¹ Works, Vol. V. p. 63.² Ib. pp. 55—68.³ Ib. pp. 60, 61 et 71.⁴ Ib. Vol. I. p. 140.⁵ Ib. Vol. V. p. 44.⁶ Ib. p. 159.

broken.¹ 'This love, in its very nature, is virtual hatred and practical abandonment of sin. Enthroning God on his affections, the offender abhors himself, and repents as in dust and ashes.' His heart fixed on God in supreme love and turned towards sin with mingled sorrow and hatred, he is prepared to welcome Christ in his character of Saviour. Seeing the glory of the divine perfections and the holiness of God's law and condemning himself on account of his transgressions, he looks for help and cries out for mercy. The 'Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,' is presented to his despairing heart, and he is assured that God can through him be just and yet forgive the offender. He looks, believes, and is saved. Thus faith in Christ presupposes, in the order of nature, repentance for sin; and repentance presupposes love to God. From the necessities of the case, this order cannot be reversed.² We are thus led to inquire as to our author's opinions of

§ 12. *Regeneration.*

Dissatisfied with much that had been taught on this subject, he investigated it for himself, and endeavored to give it that character and place in his theological system, which the Scriptures and a reasonable faith alike approve. The results of his investigation may be briefly stated. Regeneration in a human soul is the commencement of supreme love to God. It is the beginning of a new moral life. Mere awakening, or alarm on account of danger, or conviction of sin, though antecedent to, is no essential part of the new birth. Nor is it the mere reformation of external deportment, though this usually follows it. It is not the production of any new natural powers, or the implantation of a new taste or dormant principle, lying back of the will and, not by action but simply by being there, giving character to its acts.³ Such a principle is a figment of fancy; and, even if you admit its existence, it can serve no valuable purpose. You cannot predicate of it either volition, or reason, or activity. Its supposititious existence is as needless as it is unphilosophical. Sinners already have the powers, and the whole powers of a free moral agent. What others do they require? The creation of new faculties is not what they need, but a disposition to use aright the faculties they have. The word of truth is not, 'Thy people shall be *able*,' but 'Thy people shall be *willing* in the day of thy power.' 'To make a new heart and a new spirit,' is to turn from the supreme love of self to the supreme love of God. As soon as a sinner yields the homage of his heart to his Maker, he is 'born of God,' 'created anew,' or regenerated. 'The special work of the Spirit in

¹ Works, Vol. V. p. 159.

² Ib. p. 160.

³ Ib. p. 123.

regeneration is to change the hearts of sinners from sin to holiness, or from hatred to love.¹

This great change is imperatively *needed* by every sinner. The ground of this necessity is the fact, that each one is 'dead in trespasses and sins.' The carnal mind, 'not subject to the law of God,' has no fitness for a holy heaven² — *could* not be happy, provided it were to be admitted there. It *must* be renewed in its spirit, or it can never see the kingdom of God. That this necessity is absolute in the case of every one in his natural (unregenerate) condition, is perfectly obvious to all who believe the doctrine of human depravity. 'And every one may be convinced of total depravity, who will properly consult the Bible, or the exercises of his own heart.'³

Regeneration is an *instantaneous* change. Denied by many, it is nevertheless agreeable to the reason of the thing, and made certain by fact. The preliminary steps that usually lead to it may be gradual; but the actual beginning of the new life cannot be. It is a new creation, and all God's creative acts are instantaneous.' 'God always acts instantaneously in taking away the old, and in giving a new heart.'⁴

In this spiritual renovation, man is not *passive* but *active*. He turns from self to God. He is as really active in regeneration, as in conversion, or sanctification.⁵ Under the impulse of a divine agency, he freely renounces sin and chooses holiness. Universally admitted that men are active in exercising love to God and their fellow-men, how can it be contended that they are passive in regeneration, when this is neither more nor less than the very beginning of love to God? Dr. Emmons here brought his 'Exercise Scheme' into full play, and so applied it as to concentrate the strongest pressure of moral obligation upon the conscience of the unrenewed man. He regarded the doctrine of passivity in this transformation of the inner man, as fraught with exceeding danger. 'It is in conflict with every command in the Bible.'⁶

Regeneration is not *supernatural*. It suspends no law of nature, and involves no exertion of miraculous power. It is indeed a *special* work of the Holy Spirit, 'because he renews some and not others, and because in regeneration and sanctification he produces those gracious affections which are not common to mankind.' It is not therefore supernatural. It is in perfect agreement with the laws of his action on human minds, and with the unimpaired freedom and unabbreviated responsibility of each subject of the change. To represent it otherwise, is to invite the dangerous inference, that sinners are literally unable to love God, and repent of sin, or obey any of the divine commands. It is im-

¹ Works, Vol. V. pp. 113, 115.

² Ib. p. 144.

³ Ib. p. 155.

⁴ Ib. Vol. VI. p. 429.

⁵ Ib. Vol. V. p. 117.

⁶ Ib. p. 119.

possible to preach a supernatural regeneration without ministering a fatal opiate to the conscience of the sinner, or at least furnishing him with an excuse for his impenitence which he will be likely to use so as to facilitate his destruction.' ¹

That holy love which is the beginning of this new life, continued and exhibited in its appropriate forms, becomes *sanctification*. Lying at the foundation, it is also essential to the whole superstructure of Christian character. The pure spring, it imparts its qualities to all the streams that issue from it. 'Everything which the law requires and which enters into the idea of perfect obedience, is the product of benevolent love.' ² 'Joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,' are to love, as the branches to the trunk. There can be no such thing as sanctification where love does not fill the heart and prompt the actions of the life.

This great work once begun in the heart, will be 'carried on unto perfection in the day of Christ.' 'The law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus will make the renewed spirit free from the law of sin and death,' and render it 'meet for the inheritance of the saints in light. This is made certain, not by any strength of holy purpose on the part of the Christian, but by the promise of God in Christ. 'None shall pluck them out of my hand.' The doctrine of the *final perseverance of the saints*, is indeed encouraging and radiant of spiritual beauty to the imperfect Christian; but it holds out no license to sin. The two things have nothing in common. They look altogether in different directions; and are not to be named at the same time, except to repudiate all supposititious connection between them. The very idea of final perseverance involves the denial of sin and a life of godliness. It demands sleepless vigilance, abounding prayer, and earnest endeavor to 'grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.' The promise of eternal life on condition of saving faith, by no means renders unnecessary the exhortation to strive so as 'to make one's calling and election sure.' 'The first exercise of faith renders the salvation of the believer sure, in a certain way; that is, the way of perseverance in holiness.' ³

The *means* of that great change in the sinner which, continued, becomes sanctification and perseverance to eternal life, is divine truth. To have grace, one must have some knowledge of God; to grow in grace, he must grow in knowledge. Sinners may know the truth and hate it; but they cannot love it without knowing it. The basis of all true love to God, is correct knowledge of God; ⁴ and the more a Christian knows of the doctrines of Christianity, the more is his heart enlarged and his character exalted. ⁵ 'Beholding, as in a glass, the glory

¹ Works, Vol. V. pp. 120, 121.

² Ib. p. 114.

³ Ib. pp. 349—351.

⁴ Ib. Vol. VI. pp. 52, 53.

⁵ Ib. Vol. V. pp. 373—375.

of God as it shines in the face of Christ, he is transformed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.'

We cannot complete the view of regeneration, without turning our attention to its *efficient cause*. Man is its subject, sin its necessity, love its nature, and truth its means. An inquiry as to its author, conducts us to the belief of Dr. Emmons respecting the

§ 13. *Holy Spirit.*

He thought that there is no satisfactory reason for the hypothesis 'of the eternal generation of the Son, and of the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost.'¹ The foundation of the Trinity is in the divine nature, not in the divine will. This utterly forbids the idea that 'the Son, with respect to his Deity, was begotten of the Father, and that the Holy Ghost proceeded from the concurrence of the Father and the Son.' The eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost, are 'such mysteries as it is difficult to separate from absurdities,' and such doctrines as cannot be made to harmonize with the true idea of three equally divine persons in one God.' The Holy Spirit is the third person in the Trinity, inferior in office to the Father and the Son, but equal in every divine perfection. As the 'Father is by nature God, and by office, Creator, Lawgiver, and Governor; and as 'the Son is by nature God, and by office, Redeemer, Mediator or Saviour; so 'the Holy Ghost is by nature God, and by office, Sanctifier and Comforter of the heirs of salvation.' Officially, his work is subordinate to that of the Son as well as that of the Father. The atonement which Christ made, the Spirit applies to those who were ordained to eternal life. It is his prerogative to convince of sin, of righteousness, and of a judgment to come. It is under his mighty agency, that the sinner makes him a new heart and a new spirit. God's people become willing in the day of his power, because 'born of the Spirit.' By the 'washing of regeneration,' even 'the renewing of the Holy Ghost,' do they become sons and daughters of the Lord Almighty. And not only does the Spirit begin this work in the heart of the Christian, but he perpetuates it. 'He carries on that work of grace within him,'² until he qualifies him to engage in the employments and share the bliss of heaven. Means and second causes are utterly powerless to effect that change which introduces the sinner into the kingdom of holiness, or to continue that process by which the soul is purified from the dross of sin and fitted to dwell with God and the Lamb. 'Sanctification is the *work* of God's Spirit; it is also

¹ Works, Vol. IV. p. 114.

² *Ib.* p. 134.

the act of the believer. It is no part of our philosophy or our theology, to deny that God begins the work of grace in the heart; and we have the same evidence that he carries it on, as that he begins it. In regeneration God produces the first active principles of grace in the soul; in sanctification he continues and sustains them.¹ The Holy Spirit, possessed of the attributes and performing the works of God, should receive divine worship. We 'should pray to him for his sanctifying, guiding and comforting influences.' His nature and office are such as to justify and encourage immediate and distinct supplications to him.² The peculiar work of the Spirit is of transcendent importance, because it is essential to the salvation of every sinner who reaches heaven. Without it, notwithstanding the amazing love of God in giving his Son to die, and the unequalled sacrifice which Christ has made; not a rebel would be reclaimed to his allegiance to God — not a transgressor forgiven and saved.³ The unrenewed heart deliberately rejects the Saviour — will not have him to reign over its affections and purposes, till, under the mighty agency of the Spirit, it is created anew in Christ Jesus.

In connection with what Dr. Emmons inculcated respecting the Holy Spirit, we may collate his teachings concerning the doctrine of

§ 14. *Perfection.*

By some it has been contended, that the premises which he claimed to have established in this division of his theological system, necessarily involve the conclusions of 'Modern Perfectionism.' But he is known to have had as little sympathy with this theory, as any man who has palpably exposed its unsoundness. By direct assertion and various incidental allusion, he taught the imperfection of believers — of all believers in this state of probation. That all Christians *should* be holy, constantly, perfectly, in thought, word and deed, he believed and preached. Not that they can cherish affections 'as vigorous, strong and fervent as those of Christ, or the angels of light, or the spirits of just men made perfect;' but they can and ought to be habitually and constantly devoted to the service of God. In the constancy of their holy exercises, must consist their perfection of holiness.⁴ Should they but uniformly cherish the love of God in their hearts, and never indulge a selfish affection, they would be perfectly holy. Their moral exercises are not partly holy and partly sinful, but either

¹ Theol. Review, Vol. I. pp. 112, 113.

² Ib. p. 123.

³ Works, Vol. IV. p. 138.

⁴ Ib. Vol. V. p. 360.

sinful or holy without intermixture.¹ They are under the strongest possible obligations to be uninterruptedly in the fear and love of God. This is within the compass of their ability. God's law unequivocally demands it. This law is unabated in its strictness under the Gospel. The new Dispensation offers no palliation, contains no justifying plea for moral imperfection. True, it provides for the pardon of transgressors; but it imperatively demands the perfecting of holiness in the fear of God.² Obligation is commensurate with natural ability; and though the influence of past evil habit and vicious example is hostile to their growth in grace and in knowledge, yet Christians have power to be holy as God demands.

This, however, does not prove that they are, in fact perfectly holy. It is the plain teaching of Scripture, confirmed by experience and observation, that believers in this world are exceedingly imperfect.³ Their life is a constant struggle against sin, in which they are not always victorious. The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and they often break their best resolutions by not 'doing the things they would.' Not that the holiness they do have is not holy; not that their right exercises are weaker than those of glorified spirits; not that in the same affections there is a mixture of holiness and sin; but they cherish far too many affections that have nothing morally good in them.⁴ Believers every where are conscious of having such exercises; and in these consists this imperfection.

This idea of entire holiness or sin being predicated of every feeling of the heart, has been animadverted upon by some with no little severity. Others have pronounced the reasoning of our author on this point as logically sound, but experimentally fallacious. They cannot invalidate his arguments, because his premises commend themselves to right reason and his conclusions are legitimately drawn; but they feel that he must be wrong, and claim that their spontaneous intuitions are more reliable than his logical sequences. Aware that his teachings on this subject were somewhat peculiar, our author anticipated many of the objections which would be urged against him, and so disposed of them as to convince many a mind that his premises are strong, if not impregnable, and his conclusions logical, if not irresistible. Straitened for space, we must forbear to make quotations, and content ourselves with indicating to the reader the pages which he will be richly rewarded for studying.⁵

The next topic which claims our attention is what Dr. Emmons taught respecting

¹ Works, Vol. V. p. 201.

² Ib. pp. 361—364.

³ Ib. p. 198.

⁴ Ib. p. 202.

⁵ Ib. pp. 205—208.

§ 15. *Unconditional Submission.*

Various changes have been rung upon the phrase, 'willing to be damned.' As though our author insisted upon such willingness as essential to any well founded hope of salvation, it has been antithetically replied by others, 'all God requires is that men should be willing to be saved.' To this he would cordially have assented, with the simple qualification, that they must be willing to be saved on the terms of the Gospel. He neither believed nor assented, that any must be unconditionally willing to be lost. Submission to the will of God without stipulation or reserve, is by no means synonymous with an unconditional willingness to be banished forever from the presence of God. Nor does the former imply the latter. 'Father, thy will be done,' is the natural and comprehensive form in which genuine submission ever utters itself. 'A willingness to suffer any evil which the divine benevolence inflicts, and that not from love of the evil, but from love to God whose benevolence is thus expressed,' is both rational and scriptural. The will bowed in perfect submission to the great Sovereign, receives the severest chastisement as uncomplainingly as the slightest, because, in the one case and in the other, that sovereign is infinitely wise and superlatively amiable.¹ He that cannot say from the heart, 'Not my will, but thine, O God, be done,' lacks the essential element of submission, and can have no satisfactory evidence that he is a Christian. 'No truth is of greater practical importance than this, that every person, in order to be saved, must be conditionally willing that God should dispose of him, for time and eternity, as shall contribute in the highest degree to his glory and the good of the universe.'² 'The sovereignty of God, resulting from his absolute supremacy, admits of no limitations.'³ In dispensing evil, as in dispensing good, he is guided by his own wisdom and prompted by his own justice and goodness. To his will therefore, the submission of intelligent creatures must be without reserve. It must altogether approve of that sovereignty which is absolute and unlimited. The Judge of all the earth will do right and right only in all the diversities of his creative power, the allotments of his providence, and the discriminations of his grace. Therefore, every one should bow submissively before his throne, and cheerfully acquiesce in all the varieties of his agency. As God's sovereignty displays the concentrated glory of all his natural and moral perfections, it demands and should receive the cordial and unreserved submission of every being capable of knowing him.⁴

¹ Works, Vol. I. (Memoir) p. 83.² Ib. Vol. V. p. 288.³ Ib. Vol. III. p. 123.⁴ Ib. p. 120.

You may not be willing to accept all the statements which Dr. Emmons has made in some of his peculiar applications of this truth. You may affirm that he has in some instances gone to extremes, carrying the doctrine where it never was intended to be taken, and gathering around it a cluster of test questions which seem to intrude into the deep things of God and involve a willingness forever to suffer under the inflictions of his wrath. But who can deny his fundamental idea of submission, without involving himself in inextricable difficulties? The writer recollects often to have heard him say, 'If a man can sincerely adopt the prayer, *Thy will be done*, he exercises unconditional submission to the full extent I have taught it.'

We pass several points of interest, and come next to the constitutions, officers and ordinances of the

§ 16. *Christian Church.*

This is both visible and invisible; the former importing a society of visible saints, the latter comprehending all real saints. Visible saints are 'those who profess to be real saints, and such as Christian charity judges to be sincere and true.' That which constitutes a number of visible saints a proper church, is a *mutual covenant*.¹ Where there is not a voluntary and reciprocal engagement between Christians to walk together in the commandments and ordinances of the Gospel, there is no church. Other things may be desirable; this is essential. A body of believers thus bound together by covenant engagements, is recognized by Christ as a visible church and is empowered by him to do all that is necessary for the order, harmony and prosperity of the whole body. It does not derive authority or power from the church universal, or from other churches, or from the clergy; but directly from Christ himself.² From him it has the right of admission, watchfulness and reproof, and discipline both by admonition and excision.³ The right to choose and install its own officers, without dictation from either ministers or other churches, is clearly, its own. A church thus formed and organized is in a condition to exercise every act of ecclesiastical power, according to the directions which Christ has given.⁴ Other ecclesiastical bodies are of human device. They may, or may not be invited, at the option of the church, to give advice in any emergency,⁵ but 'their advice is only advisory,' having no binding author-

¹ Works' Vol. V. p. 445.

² Ib. p. 446.

³ Ib. pp. 447, 448.

⁴ Ib. p. 450.

⁵ Dr. Emmons was far from being opposed to Councils, whether for the ordination and dismission of ministers, or for giving advice in cases of difficulty. He only objected to their action being considered as authoritative.

ity. This is the scriptural platform of church discipline, and admirably fitted to answer the ends of its ordainment. It is directly opposed to the Papacy, Episcopacy, and also to Presbyterianism. It makes every church the equal sister of every other church, and guarantees to every individual member his freedom and his rights. It recognizes no tribunal higher than the judgment of the church, when that judgment has been once fairly and definitely pronounced. There is no appeal to Presbytery, or Synod, or General Assembly, or House of Bishops, or to his holiness the Pope.¹

The *Officers of the Church* are Ministers and Deacons. These are chosen by the brethren, and ordained according to their will. The authority that elects and installs, can also set aside.² The ministers of the churches may neither 'lord it over God's heritage,' nor claim official superiority over one another. They are brethren all one in Christ, and He their common head.

The *Ordinances of the Church*, are Baptism and the Lord's Supper. Baptism by affusion, or sprinkling is the only scriptural mode;³ believers and their households are the proper subjects.⁴ 'The ordinance of the Lord's Supper is a standing memorial of Christ's death.'⁵ As such it is to be observed to the end of the world, or until he comes the second time without sin unto salvation. There were important reasons why the *death* of Christ in particular should be thus commemorated. It was the most striking scene ever witnessed in the universe; it was the strongest expression ever given of God's love to a sinful world; this alone made that great atonement whereby God can be just and yet justify the believer.⁶ It should be observed by all who love our Lord Jesus Christ, with reverence, humility, and the spirit of entire consecration to him who gave himself a ransom for them. It demands the most grateful affections towards the Father and the Son, and the renewal of that pledge by which the soul was first freely dedicated to the divine service.⁷

§ 17. *Future Retribution.*

The characters of men are formed in this life; rewards and punishments are to be justly meted out in the future. 'The souls of the righteous survive their bodies, and go directly to heaven.'⁸ Those are in great error who believe that the soul sleeps in the intermediate

¹ Works, Vol. V. p. 453. ² Ib. p. 450. ³ Ib. p. 482 ⁴ Ib. pp. 482—495.

⁵ Ib. p. 504 ⁶ Ib. pp. 504—507. ⁷ Ib. p. 508. ⁸ Ib. pp. 532—537.

state between the death and resurrection of the body.¹ It lives, thinks, feels, enjoys or suffers. Departed saints are happy, and departed sinners unhappy. God has appointed a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained, whereof he hath given assurance in that he raised him from the dead. Previous to this there will be a literal and general resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust.² All things are preparing for that great day as fast as possible.³ The transactions of that day will be of the most solemn character; ⁴ its decisions will be definitive and universal.⁵ The punishment of the wicked will be eternal, as well as the happiness of the righteous.⁶ God will glorify himself in the final destruction of all his incorrigible enemies, and in the confirmed and ever increasing happiness of all who repent, and believe the Gospel of his Son.

The above is, at best, but a brief synopsis of Dr. Emmons's theological opinions. As far as it goes, however, it is believed to be impartial and correct. The more carefully it is examined, the more clearly will it be seen to correspond, in all its essential parts, with the grand system of revealed truth which has been taught in the evangelical churches by their ablest and most revered divines. The greatness of Dr. Emmons does not consist solely, or mainly, in his peculiarities. That he was an advocate for the utmost freedom and independence of thought; that he fearlessly followed his first principles to all their legitimate conclusions, no matter how bold or startling they were; in a word, that he had his mental idiosyncrasies, and stood before the world in the freedom and strength of his own individuality; there is no disposition, as there is no occasion to deny.

Some of his speculations indeed, have been considered as contradictory to sound philosophy and the spirit of revelation. But it has been found much easier to make an assertion to this effect, than to prove it. They who have studied him sufficiently to master the first principles of his reasoning, have been deeply interested to see these principles carried through all his discussions, and gratified to observe the symmetry and beauty they have imparted to his whole system of theology. He was accustomed to say to young clergymen, 'Be careful not to cross your own track. To avoid this, take first principles as guides.' He had this 'criterion of a consistent and consecutive reasoner, that the mutual harmony of his theories becomes the more apparent whenever we examine the processes by which he

¹ Works, Vol. V. p. 539.⁴ Ib. p. 623.² Vol. IV, pp. 71, 280.⁵ Ib. p. 624.³ Ib. p. 619.⁶ Ib. p. 559.

arrived at them, and the peculiar relations which subsisted between them in his own mind.¹

By some it has been questioned whether he made any discoveries of value in theological science, or has any just claim to originality. It would seem as though such questioners could not have made themselves acquainted with his works. A man may be original in two ways; first in the discovery of new truths, and secondly, in harmonizing old truths by presenting them in new relations. One of the most distinguished divines of our day has said, that 'it is glory enough for one man to have presented and applied the "Exercise scheme" as Dr. Emmons has done.' The Editor of his works truly remarks,

"By common consent, the 'Exercise Scheme' is his. He not only believed with others, that much of the sin and holiness of men consists in their voluntary affections, but that all of it does; and this principle he carried out in all its bearings upon the subject of human depravity, the connection of Adam with his posterity, the doctrine of regeneration, the free agency and accountability of man, and the government of God."²

It is not so much, however, in the discovery of new truths, that Dr. Emmons exhibits originality as in more clearly elucidating and more harmoniously arranging the old. From many an old process of reasoning he has eliminated the illogical and unsound, and given us a result at once clear and reliable. Points which were obscure before, he has made plain; and propositions which involved apparent contradiction, as previously stated and defended, have been freed by him from so heavy an incumbrance, and made to lie side by side in loving harmony.³ He always had an eye upon what he called the 'joints' of a discussion. 'From what does this come?' 'To what will this lead?' were questions which he asked and answered with great care, at every step of his progress in a train of reasoning. His estimate of a theologian was always graduated by the greater or less readiness and precision with which he could 'hit the joint' of a controversy.

This article may be unsatisfactory to some, because it does not give sufficient prominence to those points in which Dr. Emmons differed from others. They had formed the opinion that he was a sort of theological monster; that he made every thing of a few of the sterner doctrines of Christianity, and left those of a more practical bearing

¹ Works, Vol. I. p. 153. (Reflections of a visitor). ²Ib. p. 78. (Memoir.)

³Ib. p. 82.

almost entirely in the shade ; that he dwelt with avidity on the abstract and metaphysical, while he made few appeals to the conscience or the heart ; and that hence it was important, if he were presented at all, to hold him up in such a way that his teaching should have an aspect of repulsion rather than attraction. But it would be unpardonable injustice to the memory of the man, and a gross perversion of facts thus to represent one whose best affections clustered about the truth as it is in Jesus, and whose best energies were expended in elucidating that truth so that others might perceive its beautiful harmony, and enforcing it so that others, feeling its constraining and sanctifying power, might rejoice in its freedom and experience its salvation. The stranger who visited him while living, in 'order to see the bear,' found him a man of bright thoughts, genial sympathies, and remarkably fascinating and companionable. He left him with kind wishes and deep veneration, carrying with him remembrances which ever after made that visit an era in his life — a green and hallowed spot in his pilgrimage. So may he who commenced reading this article, expecting to see metaphysical speculations and theological abstractions projected in bold relief, and to behold their author as a rash, stern, one-sided, unpractical teacher, to be gazed at as a monster and then turned away from with fear and trembling, be as agreeably disappointed. May he see the consistency running through the whole of our author's system and giving character to it: and while seeing, may he rejoice in it, and be led to study all his works with profit and delight.

ARTICLE V.

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THEODORE BEZA.¹

By R. D. C. Robbins, Professor of Languages in Middlebury College, Vt.

The Lineage and Childhood of Beza.

IN a wild and mountainous part of Burgundy, a province in the eastern part of France, on the declivity of a mountain at the foot of which flows the river Eure, lies the small town of Vezelay. At a lit-

¹ This Article is founded mainly on a Work entitled: *Theodor Beza nach handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt von Johann Wilhelm Baum. Erster Theil. Leipzig. 1843.*

the distance out of the village, a stone cross may be seen, marking the spot where the "holy St. Bernard," by his fervid appeals and miracles, roused Louis VII. of France and many of his vassals to undertake the rescue of the holy sepulchre from infidel hands. Here too, forty-five years later, Philip Augustus of France and the Lion-hearted Richard of England, took upon themselves the sign of the cross as leaders of the new crusade to the Holy Land.

Among the noble families of Burgundy, in an early age, was that of de Bèze. And although in the disturbed state of the province which ensued, the castle of the Bezas was demolished, their property wasted, and their privileges taken from them, yet they could not long be kept in a state of subordination. Industry and tact brought wealth, and this was judiciously devoted to the elevation of their fallen family and the improvement of the neighborhood. At the time of the contest between Francis I. and Charles (V.) of Spain, Peter de Bèze had the command of a castle that overlooked the town of Vezelay before designated, and the adjoining region. His wife, Maria Bourdelot, also of noble origin, was distinguished for the activity, zeal, and tenderness with which she performed the duties of wife and mother. Three daughters and two sons already demanded the care and solicitude of these parents, before the birth of Theodore de Bèze, June 24, 1519, more commonly designated among us Beza, who is the subject of the present narrative. As the young Theodore was rather delicate, he seems to have been the object of peculiar care, even during the short time of his stay under the paternal roof.¹ But he was hardly out of the nurse's arms before his uncle, Nicholas de Bèze, a member of the parliament of Paris, who was visiting at Vezelay, pleased with the child, determined to take him back with him to Paris, and rear him as his own offspring. His mother after long refusal, was rather constrained than persuaded to give up her child to his uncle. She could not send the loved one away from the paternal roof, but herself accompanied him to his new home.

The few short years which remained for the mother on earth, were so spent as to indicate, that it was with no empty show of filial piety, nor with the mere partiality of a child, that Beza when he had grown to man's estate thanked God that he had been born of such a mother. Soon after her return from Paris, she was thrown from a horse while riding; and although she fractured the bone of one of her limbs above the knee, yet her own tact and knowledge of medicine enabled her to perfect a cure, without aid from the surgeon. She seems ever to have had a peculiar fondness for this science from her early days, and was

¹ He says of himself, in a letter to Wolmar: *In paterna domo tennerrime educatus.*

thus able to render herself useful to, and beloved by the poor in all the region around. But she was soon attacked by a fever, which baffled all medical aid ; and in the bloom of life, when only thirty-two years old, was taken from a family of which she was the centre of attraction, and from a community who lamented for her as for a friend and benefactor. Twenty-five years after her death, Beza, when on a visit to his native town, placed on her monument an inscription commemorative of his sorrow for her early death.¹

In the house of his bachelor uncle, the young Beza received every attention that wealth and kindness could suggest ; but it was long doubtful whether life or death was to claim the puny nursling for itself. He could scarcely leave his cradle till after he was four years old. And soon after this, he took from a servant, with whom he was accustomed to play, a troublesome disease,² which was aggravated not only by his own feebleness, but by the unskilfulness of the physician, although the best which Paris afforded was employed. So severe were the remedies used, that even thirty years afterwards he says, that he cannot think of the tortures which he then endured, without shuddering. At first the physician attended the child in the house of his patron ; but when the uncle could no longer endure to witness his sufferings, he commanded his servants to take him, with another young relative, also infected with the same disease, to the physician. The way from the university where the uncle lived to the house of the physician near the Louvre, lay across a bridge. The boys frequently went on before the servants and stopped upon this bridge, which, on one occasion, but for an apparently providential occurrence, had proved fatal to them both. Beza, in a letter to Wolmar, says : " My companion, from a dread of the operation which awaited us with the physician, already possessed of the courage of a soldier, often urged me to throw myself, with him, from the bridge, that we thus might end our sufferings. I being of a more timid nature, at first shrank from it ; but afterwards,

¹ MARIAE BURDELOTTAE, MATRIS DULCIS.

Vix dum vivere coeperam puellus
Mater, vivere quando desiisti,
Ut te vix ego dixero parentem,
Vix tu me quoque filium vocaris :
Hinc lustris tibi quinque jam sepulchri
Sub hoc pondere frigidi peractis,
Nunc primum. Aonidum favore fretus,
Heu mater cineres tuos saluto :
Felix ah nimium futurus olim,
Si natus citius forem vel ipse,
Vel tu mortua serius fuisses.

² The Scaldhead, which then was prevalent at Paris.

urged on by the increasing severity of pain and by his more urgent entreaties, promised to follow, when he had first thrown himself over!" When they were on the point of accomplishing the proposed deed, it so happened that their uncle passed that way, in returning home from the parliament-house, and seeing them without the servants near them, took them, though unwilling, home with him. Whether he had any suspicion of their intentions does not appear, but they were not afterwards sent to the physician.

The early Education of Beza ; his Teacher Melchior Wolmar.

The young Theodore received the first elements of an education, under his uncle's roof, from a teacher employed for that purpose. The activity of mind that he exhibited, and his readiness to learn, early induced his foster-father to devote him to study. Paris, which under Francis I. became the most cultivated capital in Europe, and was resorted to by many of the learned men of the age, would undoubtedly have furnished the whole intellectual nurture and training of the young student, but for one circumstance. A kinsman of Nicholas de Bèze, a member of the great council of the king, when dining one day with him, noticing the boy, said to his host that he had at his home in Orleans, a son of the same age, who was a pupil of one Wolmar, a proficient in the Greek language, then a rare acquisition, and also peculiarly fitted for the training of the young. The confidence placed in this relative was so great, that the uncle decided to send the young Beza to Orleans, where he hoped perhaps that he would escape the corruptions of the great city ; and requested that he might be received as the companion and playfellow of the son of his friend.

Melchior Wolmar, or as he was often termed by friends and pupils, Melior, was a native of Rotweil in Germany. After receiving the elements of an education at Berne, he pursued his studies at Paris under Faber (Stapulensis), William Budæus, and John Lascaris, and became so distinguished in study, that among one hundred who received the master's degree, he was first. Orleans was celebrated for its school of law at this time, under the direction of the celebrated Peter Stella, president of the parliament of Paris, and Wolmar repaired thither in order to avail himself of his instructions. Here, in order to gain a support, as well as from the desire to see the youth of gentle origin instructed in language and polite learning, he received a limited number of pupils into his family. His treatment of and influence over his pupils, is thus generally described by a Catholic biographer of Calvin :¹

¹ Audin.

"Melchior cherished as the sons of his own flesh, the pupils which he engendered, rather for Luther than for Sophocles or Demosthenes; he took especial care of them, caressed them, and in case of need even paid their debts."

It was on the 5th of Dec. 1528, when Beza was in his tenth year, that the anxious foster father committed him to the instruction and guardianship of the teacher at Orleans. Wolmar was at that time thirty-one years old. The kindliness with which he received the young student into his house, and the gentleness which he ever manifested toward him soon won his affection; and a mutual friendship, which strengthened day by day and only ended with life, was the result. Wolmar was soon after called by Margaret, duchess of Alençon and Berri, afterwards "Queen of Navarre," to Bourges, where his pupil followed him, and remained with him in all seven years. When in his seventeenth year he had made such progress under this teacher, that it was said that there was no Greek or Latin author that he had not read, and no science except that of jurisprudence in which he had not made some proficiency.

Wolmar was not however satisfied with merely instructing his pupil in language and science. He was careful in regard to his manners, habits and principles. He had himself been early imbued by his teachers at Paris with something of the new religious spirit that was here and there manifesting itself in France, and as a German he had not been unmindful of or uninterested in the changes that were taking place in his own native land and Switzerland. It was natural that the favorite pupil should also sympathize with him. Besides, Bourges itself, as is well known, was the refuge of many who embraced the new doctrines, and the persecutions of the Sorbonnists only added fuel to the flame which had been kindled. It was during Beza's residence at Bourges that Margaret was so quietly active in defending and disseminating the sentiments of reform. He himself says of this time, in his Church History: "God made his voice heard at Orleans, Bourges and Toulouse, three cities with universities." At Paris at one time, too, there had been three evangelical preachers. In Guienne and Bearn in consequence of the influence of the duchess Margaret, divine service was performed and the sacrament administered according to the reformed doctrine. The house of Wolmar was ever open for the reception of those who, for conscience' sake, had taken refuge in Navarre. Under such influences at home, and with such examples about him, the young Beza could not have failed to be, at least, secretly influenced in favor of reform. Among those with whom Beza came in contact at Bourges, was John Calvin of Noyon in Picardy. He had studied law

at Orleans, and was attracted to Bourges by the reputation of André Alciato, "the man of all sciences," when about twenty¹ years old, ten years the senior of Beza. Beza in his Church History, says of him just previous to his stay at Bourges: "There were some few at Orleans who knew the truth, as F. Daniel and Nicholas du Chemin; but this was as nothing until Calvin, still a very young man, but already marked out as an excellent instrument for the work of the Lord, came to Orleans to study jurisprudence." He, it is said, by his science and zeal for the kingdom of God, wonderfully promoted the cause in many families. And when at Bourges "he strengthened all the faithful residing in the city, and preached in several castles in the surrounding district."² He had when at Orleans spent his nights in the study of the Bible. But new facilities now awaited him. In the house of Wolmar he found not only encouragement, but assistance in his studies. He made rapid advances under his new teacher, in the study of Greek literature, especially as applied to the study of the New Testament. The liberal and enlightened views of this man, exerted such an influence upon Calvin, that he subsequently declared, that he owed much of his elevation in knowledge and piety to him. As a token of his gratitude he dedicated to him in 1546, his Commentary on the second epistle to the Corinthians. At this time there were points of contrast as well as of similarity between the youthful Burgundian and the more mature scholar from Noyon. The one was so highly adorned with external excellencies as to seem to be made for this world alone, and now in the bloom of youth he was devoted to its pleasures. He was, says Audin, "an elegant young man quite perfumed with amber and poesy, who at the same time, made court to women, to the muses, and to his professor Wolmar." The other, simple and unpretending in appearance, had already begun by his nightly vigils over his books and in meditation upon the studies of the previous day, to waste the freshness of his earlier days. The one, had little love for the more rigid habits and sentiments of the other. But they were both humanists, both possessed the spirit of scholars, and the fire that gleamed from the eye of the guest, often penetrated the heart of the impetuous youth, and the sincerity and earnestness which were characteristic of Calvin attracted Beza; and when his better life had begun, he felt a love for him, which lasted even when the clouds of the valley were resting upon the earthy remains of the senior friend, and dictated the simple but

¹ Baum, in his Life of Beza, says when he was twenty-three years old. But Henry in the edition of his *Leben J. Calvinis*, published in 1846, places his residence at Bourges earlier.

² Henry's *Life of Calvin*, Vol. I. p. 26.

earnest biographical sketch of the Life of the great Reformer. But the death of his father soon called Calvin away from his delightful studies in the house of the German teacher, and his acquaintance with Beza was broken off, to be again renewed after ten or twelve years of varied experience.

But Calvin was not the only one who was destined to experience trouble and change. The uncle of Beza, who had thus far reared him as his own child, had died in 1532, and from that time, he had looked upon Wolmar as his foster-father, and upon his home as home. But the persecutions which desolated so many homesteads in France soon made its appearance at Bourges. Not even the duchess Margaret could shield her chosen professor from suspicion, or from fear of violence. His own quiet and blameless life, too, did not conceal him from the threatening glance of the infuriated Sorbonne. But he would not long remain, where he was the object of baseless suspicion, and where he foresaw that he should be constrained to relinquish his favorite pursuits, or mingle his blood with others of the faithful, which he did not feel called upon yet to do. He accordingly decided to take refuge in Germany, where others of a similar faith and spirit had gone before him. The announcement of his determination fell heavily upon the hearts of his companions and pupils, although it approved itself to their judgments, and even in some instances, had been advised on account of the solicitude felt for his personal safety. No one, as may be readily supposed, felt the bereavement so keenly as the foster-son, and the pupil who during seven years had been the daily recipient of kindness, as well as of wisdom and instruction from him. In anticipation of this separation Wolmar had not been unmindful of the religious welfare of his pupil, but had been solicitous to implant in his mind and heart the principles of the true gospel. By this means a new bond of sympathy had sprung up between them which with personal attachment, led to urgent solicitations to the elder Beza to allow his son to accompany his friends to their new home. But the father as little willing that his son should thus forego the preferment which awaited him in his own country, as that he should be exposed to the influence of heretics, refused his consent. Thus sadly but trustingly they separated, and in the first day of Spring, 1535, Wolmar was on his way to Lyons, in order to go thence to Basle, where Calvin was then engaged in the study of Hebrew and in publishing his Institutes, and ere long to Tübingen where he had been invited by duke Ulrich, as Württemberg counsellor.

Beza at the University of Orleans.

On the same first of May in which Wolmar had turned his steps toward Germany, the young Beza, in obedience to the command of his father, went from Bourges to Orleans, whose university then boasted the best teachers and the largest number of pupils in the department of law, of any in France. Nor was it less distinguished as a seat of classical learning. For Erasmus and Reuchlin and Alexander had been teachers there and had left their impress. But neither the joyousness of all nature, just emancipated from the icy bands of winter, nor the hopefulness of youth in prospect of the free life of the university, were sufficient to dispel the sadness which brooded over the young scholar. Twenty-five years after he says: "The calends of May, the day in which I was torn from you, and you departed for Lyons, and I, by the command of my father (*ex patris imperio*), went to Orleans, always have been and always will be, present to my mind. I remember and always shall remember, that no sadder day ever dawned upon me."¹ One of his first poems if not his very first, written when in his fifteenth year, is expressive of his strong attachment to his friend and teacher.²

Orleans was not a strange place to Beza, but the course of life on which he now entered was new. Temptations throng around any body of young men, who are in frequent intercourse with each other. But nowhere perhaps are more blandishments thrown about vicious inclinations and practices than where young men are associated together for literary pursuits. The most ruinous habits are not rarely concealed under the garb of honor or refinement. The young Beza is now not only exposed to the allurements of vicious companions, but he must meet them single handed and alone. Hitherto a careful and friendly hand has guided him. The restraints of the family, so gently exerted

¹ *Epist. ad Wolmarium.*

² *In Meliorem Wolmarium praeceptorem summe observandum doctissime Homerum in Academia Bituricensi interpretantem, anno Domini 1534, quum ageret annum Beza 15.*

Flacce tibi quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus,
Sed num propterea caecus Homerus erat.
Immo oculis captus quinam credatur Homerus,
Quem sequitur vatium caetera turba ducem ?
Illius sed enim splendorem longa vetustas,
Obtruerat densis — heu — nimium tenebris.
Tu Melior, donec, fato meliore, renato
Dux ipsi fieri, Volmare Magne, duci.

as not to be felt, are no longer about him. We look forward into his future with solicitude, yet not without hope.

The study of law, as conducted in the schools of the sixteenth century, had few charms for an imaginative youth of fifteen years. The legal science consisted of little else than dry details, without the philosophical or literary attractions that have since clustered around it. It is not strange then, that the father's authority was not sufficient to induce the son to wholly discard the poets of antiquity for the pragmatic institutes of civil law. We are not surprised to find the young student spending more hours over the pages of Ovid or the lyrics of Catullus and Tibullus than over the clumsy folios of the legal professors. "Since the study of law," he says in a letter to Wolmar, "was pursued in a barbarous, unmethodical and dry manner, I felt an unaccountable repugnance to it, and only engaged in the study of it, on condition that I might devote a great share of my leisure hours to literature, to the reading of the authors of Greece and Rome." Besides the reading of classical authors, his naturally poetical temperament led him to the imitation of his favorite poets in Latin verse. And thus doubtless many an hour was passed, which would else have hung heavily upon him in his present circumstances.

But objects of engrossing interest he was not destined long to want at Orleans. After speaking of his love of classical pursuits his biographer says: "Another and more powerful passion, which even in the most common, and dull natures, is accustomed to awaken poetic sentiment or something akin to it, and which inspirited and nourished the already awakened talent of poetic composition in him, a first love, was enkindled in his youthful breast. Not long after his arrival, when looking out for teachers of law, he saw Maria de Stella, niece of the celebrated Peter de Stella, who soon became literally the star around which the whole world of his feeling, poetry and dreams revolved. No wonder that the uncle, aside from his real superiority, soon became the favorite teacher of the young student. Under the influence of the morning rays of this youthful passion, many of the tenderest and most passionate of his poetical effusions burst forth. But this cup of pleasure was soon dashed from his lips. Maria de Stella died in the bloom of her youth, and as a last token of affection Beza placed over her grave an inscription in Latin and French. Two hundred years afterward the stone was yet in existence, but a fanatical hand had obliterated all the inscription except the name: *Marise Stellae*.

The sadness which lingered around the youth of not more than seventeen years, seems to have been gradually dissipated by the assiduity of numerous friends, who already clustered around him in the

university. His pleasant manners and genial and elevated nature made him an acceptable companion to both young and old. The most virtuous and cultivated of the members of the university courted his society and encouraged his devotion to the Muse of poetry. He was also appointed Procurator of the Burgundians, a post of the highest honor and authority in his division of the university.¹ And notwithstanding his devotion to literature and poetry, Beza was able in consequence of his power of acquiring and retaining knowledge, to pass the necessary examination, and August 11, 1539, received the degree of Licentiate of Law. Thus ended his university life.

First years at Paris, Dissatisfaction of his Father, Friendship and Correspondence with Pomponius.

It is not without interest that we see the young student separated from his numerous acquaintance at the university, and severed from his youthful friends such as never afterward greet him in life, and plunged into the great world, to struggle on to posts of honor and usefulness. It is especially perilous to the young aspirant, when thrown into the confusion of such elements of discord as pervaded Paris toward the middle of the 16th century. More than six years before Beza repaired thither from the university at Orleans, John Calvin, then twenty-three years old, had exhorted and instructed those who secretly assembled for that purpose, and the persecutions which ensued are too well known to need recapitulation. Although the bloody Morin, the leaders in parliament and in the Sorbonne were now sustained by Francis I., who publicly declared that if he knew that one of his limbs was infested with heresy, he would not spare his own flesh and blood, yet the word sown was not ineffectual. The contest could not be avoided. Reformation in literature and religion could not long be withstood, although it were compelled to fight every inch of ground which it possessed, and that too, in a city where dissipation and immorality already had a strong hold.

It was not without many backward longings and much discouragement that Beza took up his abode in Paris. His enthusiastic love for the friends that he had left at Orleans, often remanded back his unbidden thoughts. His love for literature, which stood in such opposition to the prosaic path which his father and friends had marked out for him, whom they already in vision saw in his seat in parliament, his aversion to the dry details of law, and the barren themes of the advocate, now

¹ For an account of the division of the different members of the university into separate corporations, and attending circumstances, see Baum's Beza, S. 24 seq.

stood out in bold relief before him. Yet his return to the scenes of his earliest years was not without shades of light in the midst of the gloom. His uncle who watched over his childhood, as has been mentioned, had gone from earth. But his colleagues in parliament did not leave unnoticed the young man who had returned among them, with graceful manners, gallant bearing, and the highest literary culture which the age afforded. And another brother, Claudius de Beza, abbot of the Cistercian cloister of Froimont, who was not less devoted to him, and who had a yearly income of five thousand crowns, occupied the place of the departed one. By the exertions of friends the young licentiate had before his arrival and without his knowledge been provided with two benefices which yielded annually about seven hundred crowns.¹ He found also at Paris his own eldest brother who had been canon at Orleans, and had now, in ill health, considerable benefices at his command. Yet in all this prosperity, and amidst the dazzling hopes which beckoned him on to fortune and to fame, internal convictions of religion, which the fear of physical violence, and the anger of his father did not allow him to express, were ever present with him. So strong indeed were they that he early decided with himself that, so soon as he should be independent, and have certain means at his disposal, he would go to Wolmar at Tübingen, where the gospel had free course, and where all could obey the dictates of their consciences without any to molest or make afraid. On his knees before God, with tears, he often entreated that he might soon be able to carry this determination into effect.²

The course of life now entered upon was one of difficulty to the youthful Beza. Thus he writes to his friend Pomponius: 'When I left Orleans my father expected nothing else but that I should devote myself body and soul to courts and the practical life of an advocate; but since both my early training and my whole nature were at variance with it, I could not bring myself, for the sake of paltry gain, to relinquish the study of philosophy.' The consequence was, frequent contentions and constant reproach.³ But a gleam of light shot across his path which though it cheered and strengthened him for the time, left him in greater darkness than ever. In November or December 1539 Wolmar

¹ Huc accedebat quod duobus pinguibus et opimis beneficiis, me alioqui macrum adolescentem et praeterea, quod vere testor, istarum rerum prorsus ignarum et absentem onerarent, quarum vectigalia aureos coronatos annuos plus minus septingentos aequabant. — *Epist. ad Wolm.*

² Omnino decreveram antea, simulatque mei juris essem, et nonnullae mihi facultates non deessent, ad te (sc. Wolmarium) discedere et purae conscientiae libertatem ceteris rebus omnibus anteferre et saepissime a Deo cum precibus et lachrymis postularam ut me hujus voti reum exaudiret. — *Epist. ad Wolm.*

³ Mirae lites, assidua jurgia.

came to Paris on business for his prince, and after four years' separation again took his former pupil to his heart, heard with sympathy his bitter complaints, and admonished and encouraged him. In a warm hearted and pretty poem,¹ he invites the most distinguished and best loved of his friends to a feast in honor of the new arrival, and many, we may suppose, were the free words spoken in this little circle, in reference to the present commotions of and future hopes for France. But his father was not unmindful of the growing distaste of his son for the life which he had marked out for him, and plainly saw, that more decided

¹ I cannot deny myself or my readers the quotation of this poem entire, so descriptive is it of his regard for his friend, and so just a sample of his lighter poems.

Audite, ò lepidi mei Sodales,
Ter suavem atque hilarem locutionem.
Ille Volmarius, mei ò Sodales,
Integerrimus omnium virorum,
Ille Volmarius modo est reversus,
Hunc ergo, ò lepidi mei Sodales,
Diem cantibus, oro, transigamus.
Procul moestitiae, molestiaeque,
Procul tristitia, atque solitudo,
Procul sint gemitus, procul dolores,
At tu laetitia, adveni, tuumque
Adducas comitem, optimum Deorum,
Lyaeum et Cererem optimam Dearum,
Io, mi bone Bacche, mi Lyaeae,
O Ceres mea, ne mihi negetis,
Quaeso, istam exiguum petitionem:
Advolate; rogo, Deis relictis.
Hic nulli tetrici deambulones,
Hic rixosus erit Sophista nullus;
Sed convivae aliquot boni poetae,
Nempe Rillierius, Jobertiusque:
Tertius quoque Claudius futurus.
Locum post alios tenebo quartum.
At tu, Melchior, in loco supremo
Sedens, Mercuriique Apollinisque,
Et vices Charitum supplebis unus.
Quod si forte tua eruditione
Audita, (quis enim tuam negarit
In coelum quoque transiisse famam?)
Facundus veniat nepos Atlantis,
Aut Phoebus, Charitesve: tunc manebis
Suprema nihilominus cathedra,
Et tacentibus omnibus loqueris.
Nam quis (ni penitus caret cerebro)
Phoebo, Mercurioque, Gratiisque,
Neget Volmarium eruditorem?

measures must be taken to dispel the profitless fancies in which he indulged, and bind him to a more practical and available course of action and study.

The plan agreed upon by the father and uncle was, that Beza should remain in Paris, devote a year to the practice of canonical law, the two following years to the acquiring of every facility and artifice of the Parisian courts; and then, that measures should be taken to bring him into public notice, under the direction of some one of the cardinals. Thus a course was marked out, not unfitted to call forth the exertions, and raise the expectations of one of a different temperament and tastes from the pupil of the humanist Wolmar. How he received the plan, is sufficiently evident, from a letter written about this time. "I ask you my dear Pomponius, am I not a ruined, a lost man? But however unpleasant it may be, I must submit myself *at least for a long time.*" He however, proceeds to express the confidence that God will finally have compassion upon him and release from a bondage which has not come upon him unexpectedly, but after he has had time to prepare his mind for it, and which he will bear the more patiently, as he hears that his friend is not displeased with the life marked out for himself. But all his efforts to bring his best thoughts to bear upon his profession, or at least to prevent his feelings from rising in rebellion were in vain. So true is the saying of the wisest among the ancient students of human nature: *naturam expellas furca tamen usque recurrit.* New complaints arose, and the older son coming to the rescue of Theodore,¹ it was again decided, that the two brothers should hire a house and live together; the older, attending to domestic arrangements, and leaving the younger at liberty to devote himself to his studies. Two happy years were passed in this way, by the young student, without care or anxiety; and new zeal animated his breast for the pursuits which were especially congenial with his nature. Neither was he compelled to struggle on without aid and encouragement. In spite of the persecutions at Paris, literature had received a new impulse, and teachers of almost every art could be obtained. "Friendship and knowledge, the two noblest genii of studious youth," says his biographer,² "accompanied and animated him."

The warm regard and friendship of Beza for Pomponius deserves consideration in connection with the first years of his life at Paris. He opened his whole heart to him, but unfortunately many of the letters are lost. Yet enough remain to show the strength of the attachment as well as to cast much light upon his course of life and feeling. His expressions of regard might seem almost enthusiastic to

¹ *Intervenit frater qui causae meae faveret, etc.* Baum, S. 91.

² L. 46.

one of a more phlegmatic temperament. To write to him and assure him of his love, is his only consolation in their separation. He contrives in every manner to induce him to come to Paris, so that he may again see his face and enjoy his society. When the Emperor Charles V. was expected, he describes the preparation for his reception, and the spectacles to be exhibited; so as to induce his friend to be present. He begins the letter to him as follows: "the letter which I committed to the care of the bookseller Stephanus, my dear Poinponius, I fear that you have not received, for there has been enough of time and leisure to you for answering it unless, forsooth, the approach of the emperor has delayed all the couriers between you and us. But however that may be, my good fellow, do not suppose that I have taken offence. I only wish to remind you that if you have received no letter from me, it is to be charged to the negligence of the bookseller rather than to my delay. Moreover, my love for you is so great that I cannot endure the longing that I feel. Do you remember that we often, when I was present with you, discussed the strength of affection? I well recollect, that notwithstanding your eloquence, I could never understand what that which they call love is. But your power has been greater, in this particular, when absent than when present. I confess that I now know the strength of love, I feel its power, and indeed unless you come to heal me I shall soon sink under it. Love is truly a violent thing, therefore come or I shall die." Near the close of the letter he throws out an expression which seems to indicate that he was not allowed by his father the use of the whole seven hundred crowns, furnished by his benefices, and also that he was not altogether submissive in spirit to the restraints put upon him: "In respect to my private affairs," he says, "I do nothing else than that which my furies desire, from whom however I receive *four hundred livres* annually."

Another letter, written not long after, is scarcely less expressive of warmth of affection. "I have received two letters from you, both most acceptable. For what of yours would not bring incredible pleasure to me! Grateful indeed I may say they were, since like light in a mirror, I perceived your regard for me, which is very great, but of a kind that can be excelled. For I so love you, my Poinponius, that I suppose you who much excel me in other things, will grant the precedence to me in this," etc. As a proof of his regard he proceeds to relate in verse to him what he calls a true dream.¹ Beza seems to have devoted some time to the study of Hebrew with Vatable which at this time was so rare an acquisition for one not devoted to theology,

¹ See in Baum's Beza, S. 86, 87.

as to show some interest in the sacred Scriptures, as well as a right appreciation of the proper manner of studying them critically. He also seems to have undertaken to publish an edition of the "Salic Law," probably to pacify his father, in the office of Neobanius, a celebrated printer of the time,¹ but whether the book ever make its appearance is uncertain. Sometime during the first years of the abode of Beza at Paris, Pomponius went to Italy for a time, and the regret of the former at the farther separation, he expresses with much feeling. During his absence a rumor was prevalent that he had perished in the mountains not far from the Lake of Geneva. Beza was almost inconsolable, and thus addresses his spirit: "Hear, oh hear me wherever thou mayest be; whether thou joyfully dwellest near the throne of Jupiter, as a new inhabitant and citizen of heaven, or the nine sisters have bound you to the two pointed summit of Parnassus, hear me! Inexorable fate has snatched thy life from me, has taken from me also thy body. This is all that remains to me, so often as the year revolves around, to pour out the offering of a similar lamentation at thy grave, my Pylades, my Achates! Not before my voice is silent in death, will I cease to lament thee, my dear Pylades, my loved Achates." Letters, however, soon arrived from the living friend, which restored to life the spirit which had sunk in despair.

In May, 1542, Pomponius returned to Dijon and settled there and married. Soon after, Beza directed to him a letter of congratulation, of which the following is the substance: "I hear that you have become a married man (*γαμωτός*), and I congratulate you thereupon, since your prudence and foresight is known to me, and I am sure you would not enter upon this mode of life unadvisedly. Besides, I know that our friend Agianthus,² who is wise in all things, would not have permitted you to entangle yourself in these bonds, if he had not been sure that the connection was desirable. So I am confident you have not taken this step, without advice and consideration. May God add his blessing. In respect to myself, I have no wife but philology, which, while it offers not all the delights that you married men experience, is still free from all those things from which divorces arise, such as caprices, self-will, and the like. Thus I am so delighted with my own bonds, that I will not cease to supplicate equal felicity for you. . . . Ere long you shall receive an Epithalamion from me; in the mean time, show

¹ In the postscript of a letter to Pomponius he says; *Lex Salica intra paucos menses mittetur ex officina Neobanii typographi eruditissimi idque meo auspicio. Ride Graeculum vestratem.*

² He speaks in terms of the highest praise of Agianthus in another letter, quoted in Baum, s. 92.

yourself a man. Farewell, and salute your bride again and again for me."

We find little in the letters of Beza during these first years at Paris to indicate the progress that his mind was making in respect to religious truth. But it is not strange that it is so. The rigid measures that were taken in respect to heretical books and writings at Paris, and the system of espionage that was maintained, rendered it difficult and dangerous to expose one's self in this way. An occasional expression shows that he was not unmindful of passing events, yet it is evident that poetry and classical studies were the engrossing objects of his attention. Still his silence in respect to the new views of the age were not enough to keep his father quiet. His undisturbed happy life with the young friends who were his constant guests, was destined soon to be interrupted.¹

Last Years at Paris, and Marriage.

The brother of Beza with whom he resided, finally sunk under the disease that had long preyed upon him. The father again renewed his complaints, and the son obstinately persisted in not submitting himself to those employments against which his whole nature revolted. The abbot uncle was again appealed to for the settlement of the controversy. "He," says Beza in a letter to Pomponius, "was more favorable to me. Since I was so averse to the forum, he decided that I should continue in my chosen pursuits, yet that I should devote myself as client to some chief or noble, from whom I might hope to receive some fruit of my labors. With what feeling do you suppose I received this proposition. I, who had never learned to feign or flatter, should I embrace a life at court exposed to so many commotions, who had anticipated a life of such honest quiet? But it was necessary to be submissive, and I was accordingly just about to go to the house of the bishop of Constance to make application, when these warlike disturbances caused me to defer my application if not to change my plan. Thus I was enabled to return to my former course of life, in which I will pass my days unless some higher power prevents, and I believe that I shall do something that will be a witness to posterity, that Beza did not live an entirely idle and useless life."

The years of the life of Beza after his brother's death until he left Paris in 1548, are the darkest in his history. The little income which fell to him from his dead brother's estate, rendered him more independent of his friends, and enabled him to devote himself with less distraction

¹ See Epist. in Baum, s. 91.

to his literary pursuits. His aim evidently was to become one of the most distinguished humanists of his age, and to strive for the laurel with the most gifted of his contemporaries. He was of too noble a nature to admit feelings of petty rivalry or to harbor jealousies. He had the ability and the advantages for acquiring distinction, and this for a time seems to have been the ruling object of his life. He did not, however, even in his most worldly and thoughtless days, long forget the instructions of Wolmar. He obtained the writings of the reformers notwithstanding their prohibition, and read them with eagerness, and often longed to rank himself among them. So he expressly says in a letter to Bullinger, which will be subsequently quoted. Still, while such thoughts and desires, without doubt, were often in his mind, they were not yet the abiding impressions, which lead to decisive actions. Many waverings and wrestlings with self and with the world, were yet necessary before he was fully ready and prepared for the great work to which his Master had called him. Youthful aspirations for heroic excellence are too often, as in the case of Beza, dispelled as the morning dew by the sun of prosperity, honor, wealth, and friendship.

The youthful foibles and errors of the student of Paris, as those of all the other reformers, have been freely canvassed, greatly multiplied, and much aggravated, by those who have been desirous to bring odium upon the doctrines of evangelical religion. The sentiments that he embraced heartily later in life are, they would have us suppose, to be charged with the sins of his youth. But the injustice of this is too palpable to require a word of confutation. We have no desire to palliate or excuse even the youthful faults of this great man. Such as they were, he himself, in his mature age, and when he was known throughout Christendom, confesses and deploras with a strength and fullness which we cannot but admire: "I will freely and openly unfold the matter as it is. When I was an inexperienced youth, and besides had from my friends leisure and money in abundance, and in short everything that I could desire, I wanted nothing, alas! so much as wise and good counsel. And as Satan suddenly placed all these hinderances in my way, I found myself so drawn away by the glitter, and vain show, and magnificence of such a life, that I easily allowed myself to be enticed sometimes to the one side and sometimes to the other. But why need I here recount all the numerous perils into which I plunged myself knowingly and willingly, and how often, both at home and abroad, I threw both body and soul into jeopardy. But while, on the one hand, the remembrance of that time must, for various reasons, be bitter and painful, so on the other, the consideration of the entirely peculiar and almost incredible goodness

and compassion of God toward me causes me, when I think of *that day*, to feel an inexpressible delight, since I have the clearest and most convincing proof in regard to myself, of the care and love with which our heavenly Father has promised to visit all his chosen ones. For although I, of my own free will, departed from the right way, yet he never allowed me to sink so low and to wander so far, that I did not often, in the depth of my heart, sigh and confirm my vows wholly to renounce popery ! He caused me, through his grace, to lead such a life that, although I deserved neither the one nor the other, I at that time was not the last in piety among the devout, and among the learned and cultivated, and was considered as one not devoid of wisdom. Aside from the above-mentioned obstacles, Satan had encircled me with three strong bonds : the enticements of sensuality, which in that city [Paris] were numberless and most powerful ; the sweet, alluring hope of celebrity, which I especially by the edition of my Epigrams had in no small degree obtained, even in accordance with the judgment of an Italian, the learned poet M. Antonius Flaminus ; and finally the expectation which was held out to me of the highest posts of honor, to which even some of the great ones of the court already called me in anticipation, to the attainment of which my friends spurred me on, and my father and uncle constantly admonished me." Farther statements may be found in connection with the account of the "*Juvenilia*" and "*Departure from France*." I may add here, and from the best authority, that the accusation of licentiousness, so frequently made against Beza by the Catholics, as belonging to this period of his life, is wholly without proof or foundation. He gave the explanation quoted in part above, and called upon all his friends of high and low degree, upon his bitter opponents who had known him at this time, and upon all the world, to bring proof, if any they had, of crimes from which he declared himself free ; but it was not brought, and we may safely say, that the accusations originated in a desire to prop up a falling cause, and to counteract the influence of one whose learning and ability could not be allowed silently to pass over to the side of the Protestants.

One event which occurred about four years before Beza left France, deserves a more particular notice here, his private betrothal to Claude Desnosz. It was known only to two of his friends, Lorenzo de Normandie and John Crispin, distinguished lawyers in Paris, with the latter of whom he was afterwards associated in Geneva. "This was kept secret," he afterwards says, "partly in order that I might not give offence to others and partly because I could not then deprive myself of that cursed gold, which I obtained from those spiritual

benefices previously mentioned." "But," he adds, "I gave her the express promise at the betrothal, that very soon, all impediments being removed, I would publicly confirm my marriage with her in the church of God."¹ This promise, as we shall see, he fulfilled immediately on his arrival at Geneva. This woman was far inferior in rank and position to Beza, but virtuous, and indeed possessed of qualities which made her during forty years of married life a comfort to her husband, who in old age poured forth burning tears over her dead body; and in his will described the place where she was buried, and requested that he might be allowed to rest by the side of this true companion of his life.² The calumny that she was the wife of a tailor who lived long after this time, is wholly without foundation.³

The Juvenilia.

The fugitive poems of Beza were becoming widely known among his friends during his residence at Paris. His persevering and untiring devotion to literature and the muse in opposition to the will of family friends, and especially of his father, was notorious in the literary circles of the metropolis. Many too of his verses were known out of France. Wolmar at Tübingen had been frequently favored with poetical missives from his devoted pupil and friend. When urged by others to publish, he very naturally turned to this friend for advice. After consulting with the learned Camerarius, they both were of the opinion that Beza should make his appearance as an author before the public. He accordingly soon after sent a selection, made with the aid of learned and judicious friends from the many manuscripts which he had in possession, to the celebrated publisher Jodocus Badius, who brought them out in a beautiful octavo volume. The frontispiece to the volume, suggested, it is presumed, by a couplet from one of his poems, which forms a part of it, was certainly not unhappily designed. It consists of a portrait of the author with the ends of his fingers just touching a crown of laurel, around which these lines were placed :

Vos docti docta præcingite tempora lauro ;
Mi satis est illam vel tetigisse manu.

¹ Fore ut illam primo quidem tempore rejectis impedimentis omnibus in Ecclesiam Dei (eam) abducerem.

² He says of her, p. 64., Uxorem mihi ea quam illa tempora ferebant ratione (ut alibi plenissime exposui) quatuor circiter annis ante voluntarium meum exilium despondi, genere quidem imparem sed ea virtute præditam mulierem, cuius me poenitere ab eo tempore minime oportuit.

³ See pp. 40 and 51.

The dedication of the volume, written on his birth-day in 1548, was to Wolmar whom he ever remembered with gratitude as his intellectual and spiritual father: A passage from it cannot be without interest in this connection. "This little book, although I indeed at first had determined to dedicate it to no one, because it seemed too trivial a thing to deserve to bear the name of even one of no reputation; yet, I changed my purpose, and did not hesitate to dedicate it to you, partly, that you might help to sustain that which you was so conspicuous an agent in bringing to light, and partly, that by this small offering I might bear witness to my regard or rather filial affection for thee before all others. For there are very many whom I may love either on account of worth or relationship or friendship, to whom, I know, that this testimony of regard had not seemed to be unpleasant, but they, if they knew what benefits you have conferred on me, I doubt not, would acknowledge that Wolmar, although a foreigner, should be preferred to themselves." The time of the appearance of these poems should be borne in mind, in forming a judgment upon them. They were published some months before his leaving Paris and before the severe sickness which brought him to the full determination to yield to the oft-repeated call of Christ to follow him.—Great injustice has been done him, by considering them as the effusions of Beza, the church leader and reformer, and not as belonging to the advocate and parliamentary counsellor, and the young humanist. By this means, the Catholics were assiduous in their exertions to counteract his influence when he became so valiant a champion against them.

But a little more definite account of this volume may not be out of place here. It consisted of four *Sylvae*, twelve *Elegies*, several *Epitaphs*, and the remainder, comprising nearly half of the volume, was made up of *Epigrams*. Of the four *Sylvae* the first two, *The Self-sacrifice of Decius*, and *The Death of Cicero*, as we might expect from the subjects, belong to the first productions of the youthful scholar, while yet in school life. The remaining two, "*Christmas*" and "*A Poetical Preface to the Penitential Psalms*," remind one of the author's familiarity with Virgil and in accordance with the spirit of the age are a singular medley of the precepts of Christianity and heathen mythology, which his biographer says reminds one of the statues of Apollo and Venus on each side of the Grave of Sannazar, upon which some one, in order to preserve the sanctity of the church where they stood has caused the names of David and Judith to be inscribed.

The *Elegies*, many of them at least, indicate an advancement in poeti-

cal beauty and grace, and more independence and self reliance than the preceding pieces, but remind one both in style and manner of Ovid. There is much feeling exhibited in many of them, and much beauty of poetic imagery, as for example, in one where he represents himself as wandering about through field and wood in order to forget his love, but field and wood, mountain and valley only remind him of it, and flight only can restore him to sanity; or where he compares the storm of feeling to a tempest at sea, where one is continually and hopelessly tossed about with the desire to come to land; or when he implores all the gods to spare his friend Validus who is sick with a mortal fever. His lament at the fate of Ovid, too, of which he is reminded by a cold rainy new year's day, is both poetical and touching.

The Epitaphs and funeral poems that follow the Elegies, for the most part, belong among his earlier poems. They are generally of serious and loving cast, although some of them are not without irony and sarcasm. The one upon the learned reformer of Basle, Simon Grynaeus, and upon Huss, seem to flow from a warm heart, and show that he had learned to know and appreciate the distinguished men of foreign nations.

The last, longest, and best division of the volume is more miscellaneous, some of them being mere short epigrammatic pieces full of wit and humor, and longer amatory pieces inscribed "*Ad Candidam*," and others of a more general nature. These were in the style of Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius, all three of whom, it is said, he imitated successfully, both in purity, and ease, and graceful turn of expression. The poem written to welcome Wolmar to Paris, we have already quoted. The one to the author in his library, in apology for his neglect of it, is so much in accordance with the feelings of the scholar, when driven from his books to practical life, that we cannot refrain from quoting it entire :¹

¹ *Salvete, incolumes mei libelli,
Meae deliciae, meae salutes.
Salve, mi Cicero; Catulle, salve,
Salve, mi Maro, Plinîdmque uterque—
Mi Cato, Columella, Varro, Livi—
Salve, mi quoque Plaute, tu Terenti,
Vos salvete etiam, disertiores
Graeci, ponere quos loco priore
Decubat, Sophocles, Isocratesque.
Et tu, cui popularis aura nomen
Dedit, tu quoque, magne Homere, salve.
Salve Aristoteles, Plato, Timaeus,
Et vos ô reliqui, quibus negatum est*

The composition of these poems falls entirely into the period of his abode at Orleans and Paris, from his sixteenth to his twenty-ninth year, and he himself attributes a large share of them to his school days at Orleans, although it is evident that many of them were written at Paris, after he had devoted himself more exclusively to the muse. The poems were everywhere well received,¹ and indeed he was the first to express disapprobation of them, even while he was reaping the laurels of general approbation from his humanist contemporaries. Scarcely two years after the first appearance of this volume, he says: "I confess that I by nature always loved the noble art of poetry; I can never regret this, yet I am sorry to say, that I have not devoted this gift to God, as small as it may be, but to things the remembrance of which already fills me with shame." In explanation of his feelings in reference to these poems, we quote further from the Preface to the second edition of poems, published when he was in his fiftieth year: "Some may wonder, and perhaps justly, that a man of my age, who is engaged in such serious studies, and whose previous edition of such poems resulted so disastrously, should now turn back to youthful days, and seek again his old sports, and add to them perhaps new follies. I will therefore here explain somewhat circumstantially the facts in the case, partly in order to confute the calumnies of certain persons, and partly to forestall the reproaches that may be in store for me. From my boyhood I was devoted to the

Includi numeris Phaleuciorum.
 Cuncti denique vos mei libelli,
 Salvetote, iterumque, tertiumque
 Atque audite meam precationem.
 Hoc ergo precor, ô mei libelli,
 Ut ne longa mihi mora illa (senis
 Nam a vobis procul abfui diebus)
 Obsit, quominus undique tali
 Sitis in me animo et favore deinceps,
 Quali, dum proficiscerer, fuistis,
 Nimirum faciliq[ue] candidoque.
 Quod si istam supplicationem
 Vos concesseritis, mei libelli,
 Id vobis quoque pollicebor ipse,
 Non me unam hebdomadam procul, quid ? immo
 Non diem ? immo nec horulam, immo nullum
 Punctum temporis, ut libet pusillum.

¹ Stephen Pasquier, himself a poet nine years younger than Beza, says in his *Recherches sur la France*, p. 913: *Beze pendant sa jeunesse fit divers poemes François et Latins qui furent très favorablement embrassés par toute la France, et singulièrement ses Epigrammes Latins dedans lesquelles il celebrat sa mairesse sous nom de Candide.*

art of poetry and diligently practised it, both because the natural bent of my mind impelled me thereto, and because Wolmar, at that time teacher at Bourges, not only urged me on in other studies suitable to my age, but also in the practice of this art. When I, near the beginning of my seventeenth year, went to Orleans in order, in obedience to my father's will, to engage in the study of civil law, and found there cultivated men and those inspired by the muses . . . John Dampierre, Antonius Agianthus, afterwards first president of the parliament of Rouen, and not now long dead, John Trouchy, Maclot Pomponius, and L. Validus, who are, as far as I know, now alive and in France, clothed with the highest dignity, and in the most honorable employments, I did not neglect the study of poetry. But on account of the emulation that existed in some measure among us, I devoted myself to it with greater love than ever. In my bucolic poems and the *sylvæ*, I took Virgil, the king of all poets, as my prototype, than whom, at that time, I knew no higher. But in my elegies I copied Ovid, whose genial fulness enchained me more completely than the measured elegance of Tibullus. As respects the epigrams, those of Catullus and Martial so charmed me, that as often as I suspended my more grave pursuits (for poetry was only an incidental employment), I betook myself nowhere else with more delight than to their gardens of pleasure. Although my feeling sometimes (as I can truly bear witness) was so offended by their obscenity, that I, in reading, would turn my eyes from some passages; yet, as it too often happens in that age, I was not sufficiently prudent, and became so captivated with the honeyed tenderness of the one, and the keen wit of the other, that I strove to imitate their style of writing as much as possible. Thus the most of these poems, which were afterwards published, came into existence. . . . Through the hope of some renown, as well as from the desire to comply with the urgent solicitation of a teacher deserving so much, I was moved to the publication of the little volume; and it was so favorably received, both by my own countrymen the French, and the Italians, that they quite put me to the blush by their congratulations." He then proceeds to confute the calumnies of the Catholics in reference to his moral character, and says: Let us see upon what they base such accusations. They adduce my little poems, for they cannot (God be praised) bring forward anything else, even if they suborn ever so many witnesses. But I may now remark before all, that they, in such a small book, can find only a few which merit the definite appellation of amatory poems; and these, with the exception of a very few epigrams, are written rather in style too free than strictly indelicate. After speaking of the ideal Candida and of his young and gifted friend Audebert, to whom he had addressed lines

in a somewhat exaggerated and sportive tone of affection, he proceeds to notice the accusation of a monk in respect to a pretended violation of the marriage relation : " Great God ! — Behold, if a man lives who can bring against Beza even the least suspicion of adultery, I will place myself before any tribunal." In his second apology against Claude, he asserts his innocence in stronger terms, and confidently demands that his accuser should bring his proofs, or appear before the world as a shameless calumniator. But proof was never brought, and impartiality demands, that the claim of Beza should not be disputed.

Departure from France and Arrival at Geneva.

In the fall of 1548 Beza was preparing to leave France. No one of his numerous friends knew the cause or object of his journey. He has said little of the struggles which it must have cost such a nature as his, to break away from his native land, his large circle of admiring friends, and to forego the posts of honor and emolument which awaited him, and to throw in his lot with the much abused people of God. He has however given the outlines of the picture, and left it for others to fill it up. " It was," he says, " the counsel of a compassionate God, that I, wretch that I was, who had knowingly and willingly plunged myself into the fearful abyss, should extricate myself from the danger." After speaking of his marriage, he proceeds : " Besides also, the gracious God helped me to resist a longing after renown, and enticing posts of honor, to such a degree that my friends not only wondered, but most of them reproached me, and called me in derision, ' the new philosopher.' Yet I remained a long time undecided. For my own affairs pressed upon me, I was destined, some time, to take a certain position, and my uncle offered me all his wealth ; so that, on the one side, my conscience admonished me and my wife reminded me of my promise ; and, on the other, the incarnate Satan sometimes flattered me in a most friendly manner, and my revenues in consequence of the death of my brother were still more increased, so that I was miserable in these circumstances, as one entirely devoid of all counsel. But how wonderfully at this time God pitied me I will gladly relate. Behold ! he visited me with a severe sickness, which made it doubtful whether I should recover. What could I miserable do, before whose eyes nothing floated but the fearful judgment of God ? What was the result ? After numberless tortures of the body and soul, the Lord again commiserated his perishing servant and consoled me, so that I no longer doubted of his pardoning grace. In the midst of a thousand tears I abhorred myself, implored his forgiveness, renewed my vows to openly devote myself to

his true church and honor ; in brief, I gave myself entirely up to him. Thus it happened that the image of death presented as a reality before me, awakened in me a slumbering and concealed longing after the true life ; and that sickness was the beginning of my recovery and of real soundness. So wonderful is the working of the Lord with his own, that he, by the same means, casts down and raises up, wounds and heals. Accordingly, so soon as I could leave my bed, I burst all bonds which had previously held me bound, gathered together my few goods, and left my native land, parents, and friends, in order to follow Christ, and with my wife went into voluntary banishment to Geneva."

Beza arrived in the city of Geneva on the twenty-third of Oct. 1548, as it is said, under the assumed name of Thibaud de May. Many refugees from France had already taken up their abode there, where it had been decreed and placed on a brazen tablet, in large letters, at the entrance of the senate house, as a witness of their gratitude to God and as an everlasting memorial to all posterity, that both the gospel and the city should be free from all tyranny. The contests which Calvin and his coadjutors had maintained for liberty and the gospel against all classes of opposers, are too well known to need to be enlarged upon here. The year 1547 was celebrated for the contests with the political libertines of Geneva, headed by Ami Perrin and Gruet. In the same year of the arrival of Beza, and but a few days before, Calvin had summoned Farel to come to aid him in withstanding the factions, which pressed so constantly and violently upon him ; and he had given the disaffected members of the council that severe rebuke which they so richly deserved.

At such a time, as we should naturally suppose, Calvin was prepared to heartily welcome the young stranger, who was brought to him by Crispin, a refugee from France and one of Beza's most intimate friends, who had been a witness of his private marriage at Paris. The Geneva reformer was not long in calling to mind the young student whom he had formerly met in the house of Wolmar, and in whom he had even then discerned a spirit which would, if not repressed, make itself known upon the side of free principles and scholarly pursuits. But he now, his biographer says,¹ proved to be even more ; a great consolation to Calvin, and a great gain for the church and protestantism. For not only the genius and talent, but also the lineage and civil position, gave to the formal transference of such a man to the side of the reformed, a peculiar importance. " Calvin saw in him one whom God had sent to share his conflicts, to become as it were his right arm, to carry forward the

¹ S. 114.

reformation at a later period, and to supply his place in the consistory of Geneva."¹

It has been previously mentioned that his marriage was publicly celebrated the first time that he entered a church after his arrival in Geneva. It was not without much feeling that he, as he approached, heard chanted forth from the assembly, many of them like himself refugees for the sake of the gospel, the words of the ninety-first Psalm according to Marot's version: He, who sits under the protection of the Most High and abideth under the shadow of the Almighty, saith to the Lord: My refuge and my fortress, my God in whom I trust, etc. And the answering declaration of Jehovah was specially consoling to him: He calleth upon me, and I will hear him; I am with him in his necessities, I will deliver him and honor him. With long life will I satisfy him, and will show him my salvation. The Psalm was ever after especially dear to him, and ever recurred to him in times of trouble.

First Abode in Geneva; Journey to France and Germany.

Beza was soon settled in a house at Geneva, and with a peaceful conscience, both in respect to his domestic relations and his religious duties, he experienced a happiness which had never before fallen to his lot. It is true, he had exchanged affluence for poverty, and instead of a life of careless ease, he now looked forward to one of toil and struggle. But he had counted the cost. He preferred the asperities of a life of obedience to God and conscience, before all the luxuries and blandishments of a life devoted to the god of this world. Neither did he feel that his influence on the side of the reformers gave him any claim to favor. He immediately applied himself to the acquisition, by personal exertion, of maintenance and independence for himself and family. Crispin, a kindred spirit, first made the proposal to him, which subsequently eventuated in so much good, to establish a printing press in Geneva, which might powerfully aid the cause of the reformation and humanistic learning, especially in France, where in consequence of rigid edicts and the vigilant watchfulness of the inquisition, the printing of the writings of the reformers and even of translations of the Bible was attended with danger, and the deficiency could not be supplied without recourse to Basle or Germany. But while Crispin was preparing to put his plan into execution, and endeavoring to persuade Beza who was yet undecided, perhaps partly through the influence of Calvin, who urged him to higher exertions, the last months of the year passed away, (occupied mainly in resisting the obstinate attacks

¹ Henry, Vol. II. p. 84.

of the Libertines), and spring approached. In April 1549, Beza made a journey probably to France, and perhaps to his native Vezelay, but we are left entirely to conjecture as to its object. We may naturally suppose that it was to console his father, now lord of Vezelay, for the loss of himself, and to appease his wounded pride and that of his family on account of the heresy of the son and brother. It is not improbable also that some pecuniary transactions may have demanded his attendance. The laconic protocol of the republic of Geneva probably designates the period of his return: "On the third of May, 1549, eight noblemen arrived here, among whom is Theodore Beza, and they have permission to take up their residence with us."

His return was indeed a consolation to Calvin, who about this time was bereaved by the death of his wife, assailed by disease and worn out by incessant factions in his little community. A catholic biographer of the Genevan reformer, says: Had the soul of Calvin been more poetic, he would, in verse, have hailed the advent of this muse which Heaven seemed to send him in order to mingle a little honey in his cup of gall and tears, which he was doomed to quaff to the very dregs. — Beza, steeped in Greek and Latin, promised to be as learned and as obedient as Philip the disciple of Luther, and he kept his word. His "milder and softer nature" peculiarly fitted him to comfort his more rigid but now stricken and wearied fellow-pilgrim, with whom he soon became one in thought and feeling. It is pleasant to know that the union now formed between them, was never disturbed. Beza when not separated by duty was ever with him whom he loved to call father, in health and sickness, and finally stood by him to cheer the last hours of life, and was ready to defend the character of his friend after he was gathered to his fathers. He had not yet however decided anything in reference to his future course of life. It is not to be wondered at, that in the harassing uncertainty in which he was placed, his thoughts reverted to his old teacher, whose wise and paternal counsel had so often been to him as a light shining in a dark place. It is not improbable that he looked upon a situation near him as possible, as it certainly was desirable. At least, near the close of August of the year of his return to Geneva, he prepared to visit Germany.

A joyous meeting it surely was when the pupil, supposed to be still at Paris, fell upon the neck of the Professor, and the foster-mother cast her astonished eyes upon her Theodore, now grown to man's estate. Doubly joyous were they when he made known to them that he had renounced all catholic superstitions, and that the good seed sown in his heart at Bourges, though long obstructed by the overlying incumbrances of evil passions and inclination, had finally, by the grace of

God, sprung into vigorous life. After the first greetings were over, Beza made known the object of his journey. The state of things at this time was specially unsettled in Germany under the Interim which had just come into full operation, and any desires that Beza might have had to reside permanently in Germany were soon dispelled. Many evangelical preachers had already taken refuge in Switzerland, and a general persecution of the "evangelicals" was feared, so that Geneva with all its factions scarcely held in subjection by the strong arm of Calvin, was a more safe and desirable place of residence than any of the German towns. Yet the project of a printing press and the usual concomitant, a book-shop, did not strike Wolmar favorably. Although this business had been sanctioned by such scholars as Robert Stephens, J. Badius, Oporinus and Plater, yet he thought that a young man of so much genius and cultivation as Beza, should occupy a more influential position in the learned world and in the church.

Beza took leave of his friends in Germany near the end of August without having fixed upon his future course. He returned in company with the Genevan book publisher, stopping at Basle, where he made the acquaintance of Oporinus, and at Lausanne, where he immediately sought out Viret, whom he had probably before seen at Geneva. His arrival was a source of joy to the numerous refugees collected there from the different provinces of France. Any new comer from there was hailed as a brother, but Beza, so well fitted to interest by his genius, learning, and especially by his noble nature and courtly bearing in society, was received with enthusiastic delight. The school at Lausanne was an object of special solicitude to those who embraced the principles of the reformation, and especially to Viret who was the very mainspring of the reformed cause there. Well might they count it a great gain if they could retain the services of Beza as teacher. It was a post that he seemed eminently qualified to fill. After Viret had given his guest a most hearty welcome, he told him that his face seemed to indicate a restoration of health, and besought him to devote himself to the service of the church and, if it might be, take the chair of ancient literature in the school. So much in earnest was he, that when Beza gave an undecided answer, he wrote forthwith (Aug. 29th) to his friends at Geneva to implore them to unite their solicitations with his; "for," he says, "I doubt not that the assistance of this man will in a short time be very serviceable to us. He would truly be a great ornament to the school here, and an instrument in the highest degree fitted for the execution of the greatest and varied offices. He hopes to return within a month. I am aware that you cannot but desire the society and companionship of such a man, but the welfare of

the church is an object that lies even nearer your heart." Calvin's answer shows that Viret had not misjudged him: "So soon as Beza arrives," he writes, "I will use every exertion in order to influence him to comply with your wishes." But two days after this letter was received, Viret was sent to the council of Berne, under whose jurisdiction they were, with the request that they would give a favorable hearing to their representative in reference to the appointment of the two "brothers," Theodore Beza and Francis Hotoman, as teachers in the academy, the one of the Greek language, and the other of the Latin and eloquence. Viret was delighted with the favorable reception with which his request was met, and more so at the reception of a letter (Oct. 21st) from Calvin signifying Beza's willingness to make the attempt, although he thinks there is danger that his health will not be adequate to the burden. "For," says Calvin, "I hear that the boys are almost overburdened by the multitude of their lessons. If the relinquishment of the two hours after noon could be obtained of the council at Berne, the future teacher could more easily and better attend to the remainder." Yet with his usual disinterestedness he adds, neither myself nor Beza desires that the public welfare should be sacrificed for individual good.

Not long before Beza left Geneva he wrote the Satire entitled: *Brevis et utilis zoographia Joannis Cochlaei*, and addressed to Conrad Gessner, who remembered Beza when a pupil of Wolmar at Bourges, and sent him a poetical welcome by Calvin on his return with Farel from Zurich. This was occasioned by a silly and ignorant attack upon Calvin by Cochlaeus, which, Beza thinks, renders it necessary that the learned world in future ages, should know that such a celebrated beast once lived: and as Gessner had written a History of Beasts, he directed his account to him, thinking that he might insert it in an appendix to that work.¹

Removal to Lausanne, and reception as Professor of Greek.

On the 6th of November, Beza bade adieu to Geneva, Calvin to his spiritual father and his friend Crispin, and was soon settled among the hills by the side of the beautiful Lake Lemán. On the 25th of the same month Farel writes to Calvin, 'I heartily congratulate the city of Lausanne on account of its good fortune in the acquisition of Beza.' The people of the city itself had also sufficient appreciation of his

¹ Those who have the curiosity to look at this second of the publications of Beza, will find it entire in the App. to the first Vol. of Baum's Life of Beza.

worth to give him a warm reception. We have already seen that it cost Beza no little struggle to take upon himself the responsibilities of the station. So sensitive and conscientious was he in reference to his past errors, especially in regard to his poems which were scattered about everywhere, that he would not formally enter upon his duties as teacher of Greek, before he had submitted to his colleagues a full explanation in regard to them, and requested them to decide whether they were a valid objection to his connection with a Christian school. This frank and humble course was so pleasing to all, that they unanimously decided, that as this volume was published before he renounced popery, it should be no obstacle either in their or his way. He was accordingly formally inducted into office, by taking the customary political and religious oath¹ and subscribing his name thereto.

Nine years was Beza united in the closest bonds of fraternity and intercourse with the colleagues to whom he now joined himself. Those who are familiar with the life of John Calvin, will recollect that the patriarch of this little band, was the excellent Maturin Cordier, who had been the teacher of the Genevan reformer, and who in turn had dedicated to him his Commentary on the Epistle to the Thessalonians. This man though now seventy years old, when Beza went to Lausanne, was as active in mind and fresh in spirit as those who were his juniors in age. He was, says Baum, a true type of a schoolman who had devoted his whole life to the instruction of youth in Latin; and they in turn were sincerely attached to him. "Good Latin and good habits" was his motto in school, and barbarisms and solecisms were the only proper heresies in his opinion; although he was at heart both a friend to man and reverent toward God. Others of the fraternity we should like to introduce to our readers, but must refer them to more extended biographies of the Greek professor.

The school at Lausanne under the care of those possessed of so much zeal and learning, soon gained celebrity, and youth flocked there from different parts of Switzerland, both to attend to the usual school studies and to the French language. The fame of Beza was soon noised abroad, and early in the year after his settlement in Lausanne, Gessner, the most distinguished man of the church of Zurich, sent him a letter expressing his great joy at his present position, and his confidence in him, notwithstanding the severity of his satire against Cochlaeus. He also became known to Peter Paul Vergerius, previously papal nuncio, and bishop of Istria, but at this time, preacher to a reformed church in the country of the Grisons, and through Bullinger,

The form of the oath may be found in Baum's Beza, S. 132.

had received a letter from him. His first letter to Bullinger exhibits so well the warmth of his feelings and especially his regard for the leaders of the reformation in Switzerland, that I cannot withhold a rather long extract from it: "Now I know," he says (March 14, 1550), "that that is true, which the Lord has promised his followers, that not even a drink of cold water given by them shall be unrewarded, for I know of nothing smaller, to which I may compare the very little that I have hitherto done for the church of God; and yet, I have reaped the richest fruit from it, namely, your friendship, which I value so highly that I would not exchange it for the treasures of all kings. Your distinguished condescension and kindness is conspicuous, in that you not only receive a man of so little consideration with so much affection, but also of your own free will, honor him with your correspondence. And what now shall I offer in recompense? That indeed, I think, which I have already offered without your perceiving it, myself, all that I am and have. Formerly, to wit, when I, in my own unfortunate country, read some of your Christian writings and those of others, and with a sigh said to myself: Alas! how much longer shall I wallow in the filth of popery? When shall I hear all those truly pious men with my own ears, enjoy their society, confess with them the true faith before the God of heaven and earth, and joyfully finish the course of this troublesome life? These at that time silent wishes, He has to a good degree vouchsafed, who gave the thoughts. First he sent to me the grace of which I might always boast, that I preferred the cross to native land and all riches; then he sent to me the friendship—of what men?—of Calvin, Viret, Musculus, Haller. When I recollect that I enjoy the friendship of such men, I feel not only that I do not live amid the privations of banishment, but that I must with Themistocles exclaim: 'I had been lost, if I had not suffered loss.' But since I now perceive that I am not only known, but also am dear to you, which my unworthiness scarcely allowed me to hope, I have truly received more than I anticipated."

The deepening interest of Beza in his work and in the success of the cause for which he had embarked, as well as the deplorable state of the church, is exhibited in a subsequent part of the same letter: "In respect to the Council of Trent, the Romish Antichrist has not deceived our expectations, but I know full well that his hopes will prove futile. The Lord will surely sustain his church. In the mean time, I am ashamed when I compare our remissness with the activity and watchfulness of our opponents, and I must freely express to you my feelings. I regret much in our church, but especially desire at the present time when our enemies unite and conspire together, that

representatives chosen from the clergy of the several Helvetic and neighboring churches would assemble and consult together in accordance with the word of God, in reference to church discipline, now at an end, and the threatening perils which surround us. I wish that for once at least, we might follow the example of the Ninevites. All, even the blind, see that the anger of God is enkindled against us. All lament the misfortunes of the church, but only a very few seek to avert the anger of God. No one is warned by the punishment of his neighbor. The magistrate believes that he has wholly performed his duty when he has issued certain orders. In vain the clergy zealously lift up a warning voice, since public scandal is entirely overlooked, or not punished with the rigidity which the irreligion of the people deserves. Zeal for the Lord has grown cold. Here at least the ordinances of the princes are openly violated with impunity. Drunkenness, blasphemy and lewdness are common. Few attend the churches, so that I may say in short, that the circumstances of the church are pitiable. I know how much your authority avails in both republics (Berne and Zurich) with most of the magistrates, therefore I beseech you by the Lord Jesus Christ, whom we all serve, that you exert your influence in favor of the common cause of the church in common peril. These are the things, most excellent father, which I wished to write you, and perhaps I have been too presumptuous in doing it; but if you do not approve of my counsel, you will I doubt not accept my good intentions, and my good will to you."¹

The heterogeneous mass of the reformed community of Lausanne, has been previously noticed. As we might suppose, they were united more by opposition to the existing religious domination and by their common privations and voluntary expatriation, than by any strong attachment, or even accurate knowledge of the true faith. Beza, sensible of this, soon applied himself to their instruction. After he had completed the duties of the day in the Gymnasium, he called together his countrymen, and explained to them in French, practically and yet methodically and thoroughly the Epistle to the Romans. He chose this epistle as containing the ground principles of apostolic teaching, and after he had gone through with it, he took up in the same manner the two Epistles of Peter. These explanations of the Scripture in which Beza undoubtedly derived much aid from the Commentary of Calvin, led him to a thorough study of the original text which laid the foundation for his later exegetical and critical expositions of the New Testament, which continued to be a favorite occupation until old age,

¹ S. 134 sq

and which contributed not more to his reputation than to the profit of the church and theological science. His earnest piety and powerful eloquence, united with a fascinating manner, now had an opportunity for full exertion. We, for the present, take leave of Beza, surrounded by his pupils and the listeners to his expositions of the word of life. His private study too is not neglected, and as we may at some subsequent time see, he is not wholly deserted by the Muses. We can easily imagine that the Catholic biographer of Calvin¹ is not at all partial when he says of his first labors at Lausanne: "The professor met with brilliant success; they flocked to attend his lectures from Berne, Fryburg and even from Germany. His language was well condensed and very correct. Those who listened to him imagined themselves hearing Melancthon. 'He had,' they said 'the harmonious and copious style of Luther's disciple, but more warmly colored.'"

ARTICLE VI.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT AND THAT OF THE FEELINGS.

A Discourse delivered before the Convention of the Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts, in Brattle Street Meeting-house, Boston, May 30, 1850, by Edwards A. Park, Professor in Andover Theological Seminary.²

THE STRENGTH OF ISRAEL WILL NOT LIE NOR REPENT: FOR HE IS NOT A MAN THAT HE SHOULD REPENT.—1 SAM. 15: 29.

AND IT REPENTED THE LORD THAT HE HAD MADE MAN ON THE EARTH, AND IT GRIEVED HIM AT HIS HEART.—GEN. 6: 6.

I HAVE heard of a father who endeavored to teach his children a system of astronomy in precise philosophical language, and although he uttered nothing but the truth, they learned from him nothing but

¹ J. M. V. Audin, p. 464.

² When the author began to prepare the ensuing discourse, he intended to avoid all trains of remark adverse to the doctrinal views of any party or school belonging to the Convention. But, contrary to his anticipations, he was led into a course of thought which he was aware that some clergymen of Massachusetts would not adopt as their own, and for the utterance of which he was obliged to rely on their liberal and generous feeling. Although it is in bad taste for a preacher on such an occasion, to take any undue advantage of the kindness of his hearers, yet perhaps it is not dishonorable for him, confiding in their proverbial charity, to venture on the free expression of thoughts which he cannot repress without an injurious constraint upon himself.

falsehood. I have also heard of a mother who, with a woman's tact, so exhibited the general features of astronomical science that although her statements were technically erroneous, they still made upon her children a better impression, and one more nearly right than would have been made by a more accurate style. For the same reason many a punctilious divine, preaching the exact truth in its scientific method, has actually imparted to the understanding of his hearers either no idea at all or a wrong one; while many a pulpit orator, using words which tire the patience of a scholastic theologian, and which in their literal import are false, has yet lodged in the hearts of his people the main substance of truth. John Foster says, that whenever a man prays aright he forgets the philosophy of prayer; and in more guarded phrase we may say, that when men are deeply affected by any theme, they are apt to disturb some of its logical proportions, and when preachers aim to rouse the sympathies of a populace, they often give a brighter coloring or a bolder prominence to some lineaments of a doctrine than can be given to them in a well compacted science.

There are two forms of theology, of which the two passages in my text are selected as individual specimens, the one declaring that God never repents, the other that he does repent. For want of a better name these two forms may be termed, the theology of the intellect, and the theology of feeling. Sometimes, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods, and the object of the present discourse is, to state some of the differences between the theology of the intellect and that of feeling, and also some of the influences which they exert upon each other.

What, then, are some of the differences between these two kinds of representation?

The theology of the intellect conforms to the laws, subserves the wants and secures the approval of our intuitive and deductive powers. It includes the decisions of the judgment, of the perceptive part of conscience and taste, indeed of all the faculties which are essential to the reasoning process. It is the theology of speculation, and therefore comprehends the truth just as it is, unmodified by excitements of feeling. It is received as accurate not in its spirit only, but in its letter also. Of course it demands evidence, either internal or extraneous, for all its propositions. These propositions, whether or not they be inferences from antecedent, are well fitted to be premises for subsequent trains of proof. This intellectual theology, therefore, prefers general to individual statements, the abstract to the concrete, the lit-

eral to the figurative. In the creed of a Trinitarian it affirms, that he who united in his person a human body, a human soul and a divine spirit, expired on the cross, but it does not originate the phrase that his soul expired, nor that "God the mighty Maker died." Its aim is not to be impressive, but intelligible and defensible. Hence it insists on the nice proportions of doctrine, and on preciseness both of thought and style. Its words are so exactly defined, its adjustments are so accurate, that no caviller can detect an ambiguous, mystical or incoherent sentence. It is, therefore, in entire harmony with itself, abhorring a contradiction as nature abhors a vacuum. Left to its own guidance, for example, it would never suggest the unqualified remark that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them; nor that he has suffered the whole punishment which they deserve, for it teaches that this punishment may still be righteously inflicted on themselves; nor that he has entirely satisfied the law, for it insists that the demands of the law are yet in force. If it should allow those as logical premises, it would also allow the salvation of all men as a logical inference, but it rejects this inference and accordingly, being self consistent, must reject those when viewed as literal premises.¹ It is adapted to the soul in her inquisitive moods, but fails to satisfy her craving for excitement. In order to express the definite idea that we are exposed to evil in consequence of Adam's sin, it does not employ the passionate phrase, "we are guilty of his sin." It searches for the proprieties of representation, for seemliness and decorum. It gives origin to no statements which require apology or essential modification; no metaphor, for example, so bold and so liable to disfigure our idea of the divine equity, as that Heaven imputes the crime of one man to millions of his descendants, and then imputes their myriad sins to him who was harmless and undefiled. As it avoids the dashes of an imaginative style, as it qualifies and subdues the remark which the passions would make still more intense, it seems dry, tame to the mass of men. It awakens but little interest in favor of its old arrangements; its new distinctions are easily introduced, to be as speedily forgotten. As we might infer, it is suited not for eloquent appeals, but for calm controversial treatises and bodies of divinity; not so well for the hymn-book as for the catechism; not so well for the liturgy as for the creed.

In some respects, but not in all, the theology of feeling differs from that of intellect. It is the form of belief which is suggested by, and adapted to the wants of the well-trained heart. It is embraced as involving the substance of truth, although, when literally interpreted,

¹ See note A. at the end of the Discourse.

it may or may not be false. It studies not the exact proportions of doctrine, but gives especial prominence to those features of it which are and ought to be most grateful to the sensibilities. It insists not on dialectical argument, but receives whatever the healthy affections crave. It chooses particular rather than general statements; teaching, for example, the divine omnipotence by an individual instance of it; saying, not that God can do all things which are objects of power, but that He spake and it was done. It sacrifices abstract remarks to visible and tangible images; choosing the lovely phrase that 'the children of men put their trust under the shadow of Jehovah's wings,' rather than the logical one that his providence comprehendeth all events. It is satisfied with vague, indefinite representations. It is too buoyant, too earnest for a moral result, to compress itself into sharply-drawn angles. It is often the more forceful because of the looseness of its style, herein being the hiding of its power. It is sublime in its obscure picture of the Sovereign who maketh darkness his pavilion, dark waters and thick clouds of the sky. Instead of measuring the exact dimensions of a spirit, it says, "I could not discern the form thereof: an image was before mine eyes; there was silence and I heard a voice;" and in the haziness of this vision lies its fitness to stir up the soul. Of course, the theology of feeling aims to be impressive, whether it be or not minutely accurate. Often it bursts away from dogmatic restraints, forces its passage through or over rules of logic, and presses forward to expend itself first and foremost in affecting the sensibilities. For this end, instead of being comprehensive, it is elastic; avoiding monotony it is ever pertinent to the occasion; it brings out into bold relief now one feature of a doctrine and then a different feature, and assumes as great a variety of shapes as the wants of the heart are various. In order to hold the Jews back from the foul, cruel vices of their neighbors, the Tyrian, Moabite, Ammonite, Egyptian, Philistine, Babylonian; in order to stop their indulgence in the degrading worship of Moloch, Dagon, Baal, Tamuz, they were plied with a stern theology, well fitted by its terrible denunciations to save them from the crime which was still more terrible. They were told of the jealousy and anger of the Lord, of his breastplate, helmet, bow, arrows, spear, sword, glittering sword, and raiment stained with blood. This fearful anthropomorphism stamped a truth upon their hearts; but when they needed a soothing influence, they were assured that "the Lord shall feed his flock like a shepherd, he shall gather the lambs with his arm and carry them in his bosom, and shall gently lead those that are with young." Thus does the theology of feeling individualize the single parts of a doc-

trine ; and, so it can make them intense and impressive, it cares not to make them harmonious with each other. When it has one end in view, it represents Christians as united with their Lord ; now, they being branches and he the vine-stock ; again, they being members and he the body ; still again, they being the body and he the head ; and once more, they being the spouse and he the bridegroom. But it does not mean to have these endearing words metamorphosed into an intellectual theory of our oneness or identification with Christ ; for with another end in view it contradicts this theory, and teaches that he is distinct from us, even as separate as the sun or morning star from those who are gladdened by its beams ; the door or way from those who pass through or over it, the captain from his soldiers, the forerunner from the follower, the judge from those arrayed before him, the king from those who bow the knee to him. In order to make us feel the strength of God's aversion to sin, it declares that he has repented of having made our race, has been grieved at his heart for transgressors, weary of them, vexed with them. But it does not mean that these expressions which, as inflected by times and circumstances, impress a truth upon the soul, be stereotyped into the principle that Jehovah has ever parted with his infinite blessedness ; for in order to make us confide in his stability, it denies that he ever repents, and declares that he is without even the shadow of turning. It assumes these discordant forms, so as to meet the affections in their conflicting moods. Its aim is not to facilitate the inferences of logic, but to arrest attention, to grapple with the wayward desires, to satisfy the longings of the pious heart. And in order to reach all the hiding-places of emotion, it now and then strains a word to its utmost significance, even into a variance with some other phrase and a disproportion with the remaining parts of the system. We often hear that every great divine, like Jonathan Edwards, will contradict himself. If this be so, it is because he is a reasoner and something more ; because he is not a mere mathematician, but gives his feelings a full, an easy and a various play ; because he does not exhibit his faith always in the same form, straight like a needle, sharp-pointed and one-eyed.

The free theology of the feelings is ill fitted for didactic or controversial treatises or doctrinal standards. Martin Luther, the church fathers, who used it so often, became thereby unsafe polemics. Anything, everything, can be proved from them ; for they were ever inditing sentences congenial with an excited heart, but false as expressions of deliberate opinion. But this emotive theology is adapted to the persuasive sermon, to the pleadings of the liturgy, to the songs of Zion. By no means can it be termed *mere* poetry, in the sense of a playful

fiction. It is no play, but solemn earnestness. It is no mere fiction, but an outpouring of sentiments too deep, or too mellow, or too impetuous to be suited with the stiff language of the intellect. Neither can its words be called *merely* figurative, in the sense of arbitrary or unsubstantial. They are the earliest, and if one may use a comparison, the most natural utterances of a soul instinct with religious life. They are forms of language which circumscribe a substance of doctrine, a substance which, fashioned as it may be, the intellect grasps and holds fast; a substance which arrests the more attention and prolongs the deeper interest by the figures which bound it. This form of theology, then, is far from being fitly represented by the term *imaginative*, still farther by the term *fanciful*, and farther yet by the word *capricious*. It goes deeper; it is the theology both of and for our sensitive nature; of and for the normal emotion, affection, passion. It may be called *poetry*, however, if this word be used, as it should be, to include the constitutional developments of a heart moved to its depths by the truth. And as in its essence it is poetical, with this meaning of the epithet, so it avails itself of a poetic license, and indulges in a style of remark which for sober prose would be unbecoming, or even, when associated in certain ways, irreverent. All warm affection, be it love or hatred, overleaps at times the proprieties of a didactic style. Does not the Bible make this obvious? There are words in the Canticles and in the imprecatory Psalms, which are to be justified as the utterances of a feeling too pure, too unsuspicious, too earnest to guard itself against evil surmises. There are appearances of reasoning in the Bible, which the mere dialectician has denounced as puerile sophisms. But some of them may never have been intended for logical proof; they may have been designed for passionate appeals and figured into the shape of argument, not to convince the reason but to carry the heart by a strong assault, in a day when the kingdom of heaven suffered violence and the violent took it by force. In one of his lofty flights of inspiration, the Psalmist cries, "Awake! why sleepest thou, oh Lord;" and Martin Luther, roused more than man is wont to be by this example, prayed at the Diet of Worms, in language which we fear to repeat, "Hearest thou not, my God; art thou dead?" And a favorite English minstrel sings of the "dying God," of the "sharp distress," the "sore complaints," of God, his "last groans," his "dying blood;" of his throne, also, as once a "burning throne," a "seat of dreadful wrath;" but now "sprinkled over" by "the rich drops" of blood "that calmed his frowning face." It is the very nature of a theology framed for enkindling the imagination and thereby inflaming the heart, to pour itself out, when a striking emergency calls for them, in words that burn; words that excite no conge-

nial glow in technical students, viewing all truth in its dry light, and disdaining all figures which would offend the decorum of a philosophical or didactic style, but words which wake the deepest sympathies of quick-moving, wide-hearted, many-sided men, who look through a superficial impropriety and discern under it a truth which the nice language of prose is too frail to convey into the heart, and breaks down in the attempt.

Hence it is another criterion of this emotive theology that when once received, it is not easily discarded. The essence of it remains the same, while its forms are changed; and these forms, although varied to meet the varying exigencies of feeling, are not abandoned so as never to be restored; for the same exigencies appear and reappear from time to time, and therefore the same diversified representations are repeated again and again. Of the ancient philosophy the greater part is lost, the remnant is chiefly useful as an historical phenomenon. Not a single treatise, except the geometry of Euclid, continues to be used by the majority of students for its original purpose. But the poetry of those early days remains fresh as in the morning of its birth. It will always preserve its youthful glow, for it appeals not to any existing standard of mental acquisition, but to a broad and common nature which never becomes obsolete. So in the *theology* of reason, the progress of science has antiquated some, and will continue to modify other refinements; theory has chased theory into the shades; but the theology of the heart, letting the minor accuracies go for the sake of holding strongly upon the substance of doctrine, need not always accommodate itself to scientific changes, but may often use its old statements, even if, when literally understood, they be incorrect, and it thus abides as permanent as are the main impressions of the truth. While the lines of speculation may be easily erased, those of emotion are furrowed into the soul, and can be smoothed away only by long-continued friction. What its abettors feel, they feel and cling to, and think they know, and even when vanquished they can argue still; or rather, as their sentiments do not come of reasoning, neither do they flee before it. Hence the permanent authority of certain tones of voice which express a certain class of feelings. Hence, too, the delicacy and the peril of any endeavor to improve the style of a hymn-book or liturgy, to amend one phrase in the common version of the Bible, or to rectify any theological terms, however inconvenient, which have once found their home in the affections of good men. The heart loves its old friends, and so much the more if they be lame and blind. Hence the fervid heat of a controversy when it is provoked by an assault upon the words, not the truths but the words, which have been embosomed in the love of the church.

Hence the Pilgrim of Bunyan travels and sings from land to land, and will be, as he has been, welcome around the hearth-stone of every devout household from age to age; while Edwards on the Will and Cudworth on Immutable Morality, knock at many a good man's door, only to be turned away shaking the dust from off their feet.¹

Having considered some of the differences between the intellectual and the emotive theology, let us now glance, as was proposed, at some of the influences which one exerts on the other.

And *first*, the theology of the intellect illustrates and vivifies itself by that of feeling. As man is compounded of soul and body, and his inward sensibilities are expressed by his outward features, so his faith combines ideas logically accurate with conceptions merely illustrative and impressive. Our tendency to unite corporeal forms with mental views, may be a premonition that we are destined to exist hereafter in a union of two natures, one of them being spirit, and the other so expressive of spirit as to be called a spiritual body. We lose the influence of literal truth upon the sensibilities, if we persevere in refusing it an appropriate image. We must add a body to the soul of a doctrine, whenever we would make it palpable and enlivening. It is brought, as it were, into our presence by its symbols, as a strong passion is exhibited to us by a gesture, as the idea of dignity is made almost visible in the Apollo Belvedere. A picture may, in itself, be superficial; but it expresses the substantial reality. What though some of the representations which feeling demands be a mere exponent of the exact truth; they are, *as it were*, that very truth. What though our conceptions be only the most expressive signs of the actual verity; they are *as if* the actual verity itself. They are substantially accurate when not literally so; moral truth, when not historical. The whole reality is at least *as good, as solid* as they represent it, and our most vivid idea of it is in their phases.

The whole doctrine, for example, of the spiritual world, is one that requires to be made tangible by an embodiment. We have an intellectual belief that a spirit has no shape, and occupies no space; that a human soul, so soon as it is dismissed from the earth, receives more decisive tokens than had been previously given it of its Maker's complacency or displeasure, has a clearer knowledge of him, a larger love or a sterner hostility to him, a more delightful or a more painful experience of his control, and at a period yet to come will be conjoined with a body unlike the earthly one, yet having a kind of identity with it, and furnishing inlets for new and peculiar joys or woes. It is the judgment of some that the popular tract and the sermons of such men as

¹ See Note B, at the end of the Discovers.

Baxter and Whitefield ought to exhibit no other than this intellectual view of our future state. But such an intellectual view is too general to be embraced by the feelings. They are balked with the notion of a spaceless, formless existence, continuing between death and the resurrection. They regard the soul as turned out of being when despoiled of shape and extension. They represent the converted islander of the Atlantic as rising, when he leaves the earth, to the place where God sitteth upon his throne, and also the renewed islander of the Pacific as ascending, at death, from the world to the same prescribed spot. When pressed with the query, how two antipodes can both rise up, in opposite directions, to one locality, they have nothing to reply. They are not careful to answer any objection, but only speak right on. They crave a reality for the soul, for its coming joys or woes, and will not be defrauded of this solid existence by any subtilized theory. So tame and cold is the common idea of an intangible, inaudible, invisible world, that few will aspire for the rewards, and many will imagine themselves able to endure the punishments which are thus rarified into the results of mere thought. Now a doctrine of the intellect need not, and should not empty itself of its substance in the view of men because it is too delicate for their gross apprehension. "God giveth" to this doctrine "a body as it hath pleased him," and it should avail itself of this corporeal manifestation for the sake of retaining its felt reality. If it let this scriptural body go, all is gone in the popular consciousness. It is not enough for the intellect to prove that at the resurrection a new nature will be incorporated with the soul, and will open avenues to new bliss or woe; it must vivify the conception of this mysterious nature and its mysterious experiences by the picture of a palm-branch, a harp, a robe, a crown, or of that visible enginery of death which, in the common view, gives a substance to the penalties of the law. Our demonstrable ideas of the judgment are so abstract, that they will seemingly evaporate unless we illustrate them by one individual day of the grand assize, by the particular questionings and answers, the opened book, and other minute formalities of the court. The emotions of a delicate taste are, of course, not to be disregarded; but it is a canon of criticism — is it not? — that we should express all the truth which our hearers need, and express it in the words which they will most appropriately feel. The doctrine of the resurrection also seems often to vanish into thin air by an overscrupulous refinement of philosophical terminology. The intellect allows the belief that our future bodies will be identical with our present, just as really as it allows a belief that our present bodies are the same with those of our childhood, or that our bodies ever feel pleasure or pain, or that the grass is green or the sky blue, the

fire warm or the ice cold, or that the sun rises or sets. The philosopher may reply, The sun does not rise nor set, the grass is not green nor the sky blue, the fire is not warm nor the ice cold, and our physical nature in itself is not sensitive. The man responds, They are so for all that concerns me. The philosopher may affirm that our present bodies are not precisely identical with those of our childhood; the man answers, They are so to all intents and purposes; and when we practically abandon our belief in our physical sameness here, then we may modify our faith in our resumed physical identity at the resurrection. But while man remains *man* upon earth, he will not give up the forms of belief which he feels to be true. He must vivify his abstractions by images which quicken his faith; and even if these images should lose their historical life, they shall have a resurrection in spiritual realities. Through our eternal existence, the biblical exhibitions of our future state will be found to have a deeper and deeper significance. They will be found to be literal truth itself, or else the best possible symbols by which that truth can be shadowed forth to men incapable of reaching either its height or its depth. In the Bible is a profound philosophy which no man has fully searched out. As this volume explains the essence of virtue by the particular commands of the law, the sinfulness of our race by incidents in the biography of Adam, the character of Jehovah by the historical examples of his love, and especially by portraying God manifest in the flesh; so, with the intent of still further adapting truth to our dull apprehension, it condescends to step over and beyond the domain of literal history, and to use the imagination in exciting the soul to spiritual research; it enrobes itself in fabrics woven from the material world, which seems as if it were formed for elucidating spiritual truth; it incarnates all doctrine, that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err, and that all *flesh* may see the salvation of God.¹

But the sensitive part of our nature not only quickens the percipient, by requiring and suggesting expressive illustrations, it also furnishes principles from which the reasoning faculty deduces important inferences. I therefore remark in the *second* place,

The theology of the intellect enlarges and improves that of the feelings, and is also enlarged and improved by it. The more extensive and accurate are our views of literal truth, so much the more numerous and salutary are the forms which it may assume for enlisting the affections. A system of doctrines logically drawn out, not only makes its own appeal to the heart, but also provides materials for the imagination to clothe as to allure the otherwise dormant sensibility. The per-

¹ See Note C. at the end of the Discourse.

ceptive power looks right forward to the truth, (for this end was it made), from it turns to neither side for utilitarian purposes, but presses straight forward to its object; yet every doctrine which it discovers is in reality practical, calling forth some emotion, and this emotion animating the sensitive nature which is not diseased, deepening its love of knowledge, elevating and widening the religious system which is to satisfy it. Every new article of the good man's belief elicits love or hatred, and this love or hatred so modifies the train and phasis of his meditations, as to augment and improve the volume of his heart's theology.

It is a tendency of pietism to undervalue the human intellect for the sake of exalting the affections; as if sin had less to do with the feelings than with the intelligence; as if a deceived heart had never turned men aside; as if the reason had fallen deeper than the will. Rather has the will fallen *from* the intellectual powers, while they remain truer than any other to their office. It cannot be a *pious* act to underrate these powers, given as they were by him who made the soul in his image. Our speculative tendencies are original, legitimate parts of the constitution which it is irreverent to censure. We *must* speculate. We must define, distinguish, infer, arrange our inferences in a system. Our spiritual oneness, completeness, progress, require it. We lose our civilization, so far forth as we depreciate a philosophy truly so called. Our faith becomes a wild or weak sentimentalism if we despise logic. God has written upon our minds the ineffaceable law that they search after the truth, whatever, wherever it be, however arduous the toil for it, whithersoever it may lead. Let it come. Even if it should promise nothing to the utilitarian, there are yet within us the *mirabiles amores* to find it out. A sound heart is alive with this curiosity, and will not retain its health while its aspirations are rebuffed. It gives no unbroken peace to the man who thwarts his reasoning instincts; for amid all its conflicting demands, it is at times importunate for a reasonable belief. When it is famished by an idle intellect, it loses its tone, becomes bigoted rather than inquisitive, and takes up with theological fancies which reduce it still lower. When it is fed by an inquiring mind it is enlivened, and reaches out for an expanded faith. If the intellect of the church be repressed, that of the world will not be, and the schools will urge forward an unsanctified philosophy which good men will be too feeble to resist, and under the influence of which the emotions will be suited with forms of belief more and more unworthy, narrow, debasing.

But the theology of reason not only amends and amplifies that of the affections, it is also improved and enlarged by it. One tendency

of rationalism is, to undervalue the heart for the sake of putting the crown upon the head. This is a good tendency when applied to those feelings which are wayward and deceptive, but an *irrational* one when applied to those which are unavoidable and therefore innocent, still more to those which are holy and therefore entitled to our reverence. Whenever a feeling is constitutional and cannot be expelled, whenever it is pious and cannot but be approved, then such of its impulses as are uniform, self-consistent and persevering are data on which the intellect may safely reason, and by means of which it may add new materials to its dogmatic system. Our instinctive feelings in favor of the truth, that all men in the future life will be judged, rewarded or punished by an all-wise lawgiver, are logical premises from which this truth is an inference regular in mood and figure. Every man, atheist even, has certain constitutional impulses to call on the name of some divinity; and these impulses give evidence that he ought to pray, just as the convolutions of a vine's tendrils and their reaching out to grasp the trellis, signify that in order to attain its full growth the vine must cling to a support. The wing or the web-foot of an animal is no more conclusive proof of its having been made with the design that it should fly or swim, than the instinctive cravings of the soul for a positive, an historical, a miraculously attested religion, with its Sabbaths and its ministry, are arguments that the soul was intended for the enjoyment of such a religion. If the Bible could be proved to be a myth, it would still be a divine myth; for a narrative so wonderfully fitted for penetrating through all the different avenues to the different sensibilities of the soul, must have a moral if not a literal truth. And so it appears to me, that the doctrines which centre in and around a vicarious atonement are so fitted to the appetences of a sanctified heart, as to gain the favor of a logician, precisely as the coincidence of some geological or astronomical theories with the phenomena of the earth or sky, is a part of the syllogism which has these theories for its conclusion. Has man been created with irresistible instincts which impel him to believe in a falsehood? Or has the Christian been inspired with holy emotions which allure him to an essentially erroneous faith? Is God the author of confusion;—in his word revealing one doctrine and by his Spirit persuading his saints to reject it? If it be a fact, that the faithful of past ages, after having longed and sighed and wrestled and prayed for the truth as it is in Jesus, have at length found their aspirations rewarded by any one substance of belief, does not their unanimity indicate the correctness of their cherished faith, as the agreement of many witnesses presupposes the verity of the narration in which they coincide? In its minute philosophical forms, it may

not be the truth for which they yearned, but in its central principles have they one and all been deceived? Then have they asked in tears for the food of the soul, and a prayer hearing Father has given them a stone for bread.

Decidedly as we resist the pretension that the church is infallible, there is one sense in which this pretension is well founded. Her metaphysicians as such are not free from error, nor her philologists, nor any of her scholars, nor her ministers, nor councils. She is not infallible in her bodies of divinity, nor her creeds, nor catechisms, nor any logical formulae; but underneath all her intellectual refinements lies a broad substance of doctrine, around which the feelings of all renewed men cling ever and everywhere, into which they penetrate and take root, and this substance must be right, for it is precisely adjusted to the soul, and the soul was made for it.

These universal feelings provide us with a test for our own faith. Whenever we find, my brethren, that the words which we proclaim do not strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the choice men and women who look up to us for consolation, when they do not stir the depths of our own souls, reach down to our hidden wants, and evoke sensibilities which otherwise had lain buried under the cares of time; or when they make an abiding impression that the divine government is harsh, pitiless, insincere, oppressive, devoid of sympathy with our most refined sentiments, reckless of even the most delicate emotion of the tenderest nature, then we may infer that we have left out of our theology some element which we should have inserted, or have brought into it some element which we should have discarded. *Somewhere it must be wrong.* If it leave the sensibilities torpid, it needs a larger, infusion of those words which Christ defined by saying, they are spirit, they are life. If it merely charm the ear like a placid song, it is not the identical essence which is likened to the fire and the hammer. Our sensitive nature is sometimes a kind of instinct which anticipates many truths, incites the mind to search for them, intimates the process of the investigation, and remains unsatisfied, restive, so long as it is held back from the object toward which it gropes its way, even as a plant bends itself forward to the light and warmth of the sun.¹

But while the theology of reason derives aid from the impulses of emotion, it maintains its ascendancy over them. In all investigations for truth, the intellect must be the authoritative power, employing the sensibilities as indices of right doctrine, but surveying and superintending them from its commanding elevation. It may be roughly compared

¹ See note D. at the end of the Discourse.

to the pilot of a ship, who intelligently directs and turns the rudder, although himself and the entire vessel are also turned by it. We are told that a wise man's eyes are in his head; now although they cannot say to the hand or the foot, we have no need of you, it is yet their prerogative to determine whither the hand or foot shall move. The intellectual theology will indeed reform itself by suggestions derived from the heart, for its law is to exclude every dogma which does not harmonize with the well-ordered sensibilities of the soul. It regards a want of concinnity in a system, as a token of some false principle. And as it will modify itself in order to avoid the error involved in a contradiction, so and for the same reason it has authority in the last resort to rectify the statements which are often congenial with excited emotion. I therefore remark in the *third* place,

The theology of the intellect explains that of feeling into an essential agreement with all the constitutional demands of the soul. It does this by collating the discordant representations which the heart allows, and eliciting the one self-consistent principle which underlies them. It places side by side the contradictory statements which receive, at different times, the sympathies of a spirit as it is moved by different impulses. It exposes the impossibility of believing all these statements, without qualifying some of them so as to prevent their subverting each other. In order to qualify them in the right way, it details their origin, reveals their intent, unfolds their influence, and by such means eliminates the principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine. When this principle has been once detected and disengaged from its conflicting representations, it reacts upon them, explains, modifies, harmonizes their meaning. Thus are the mutually repellent forces set over against each other, so as to neutralize their opposition and to combine in producing one and the same movement.

Seizing strongly upon some elements of a comprehensive doctrine, the Bible paints the unrenewed heart as a stone needing to be exchanged for flesh; and again, not as a stone, but as flesh needing to be turned into spirit; and yet again, neither as a stone nor as flesh, but as a darkened spirit needing to be illumined with the light of knowledge. Taking a vigorous hold of yet other elements in the same doctrine, the Bible portrays this heart not as ignorant and needing to be enlightened, but as dead and needing to be made alive; and further, not as dead but as living and needing to die, to be crucified, and buried; and further still, not as in need of a resurrection or of a crucifixion, but of a new creation; and once more, as requiring neither to be slain, nor raised from death, nor created anew, but to be born again. For the sake of vividly describing other features of the same truth, the

heart is exhibited as needing to be called or drawn to God, or to be enlarged or circumcised or purified or inscribed with a new law, or endued with new graces. And for the purpose of awakening interest in a distinct phase of this truth, all the preceding forms are inverted and man is summoned to make himself a new heart, or to give up his old one, or to become a little child, or to cleanse himself, or to unstop his deaf ears and hear, or to open his blinded eyes and see, or to awake from sleep, or rise from death. Literally understood, these expressions are dissonant from each other. Their dissonance adds to their emphasis. Their emphasis fastens our attention upon the principle in which they all agree. This principle is too vast to be vividly uttered in a single formula, and therefore branches out into various parts, and the lively exhibition of one part contravenes an equally impressive statement of a different one. The intellect educes light from the collision of these repugnant phrases, and then modifies and reconciles them into the doctrine, that *the character of our race needs an essential transformation by an interposed influence from God*. But how soon would this doctrine lose its vivacity, if it were not revealed in these dissimilar forms, all jutting up like the hills of a landscape from a common substratum.

We may instance another set of the heart's phrases, which, instead of coalescing with each other in a dull sameness, engage our curiosity by their disagreement, and exercise the analytic power in unloosing and laying bare the one principle which forms their basis. Bowed down under the experience of his evil tendencies, which long years of painful resistance have not subdued, trembling before the ever recurring fascinations which have so often enticed him into crime, the man of God longs to abase himself, and exclaims without one modifying word: "I am too frail for my responsibilities, and have no power to do what is required of me." But in a brighter moment, admiring the exuberance of divine generosity, thankful for the large gifts which his munificent Father has lavished upon him, elevated with adoring views of the equitable One who never reaps where he has not sown, the same man of God offers his unqualified thanksgiving: "I know thee, that thou art *not* an hard master, exacting of me duties which I have no power to discharge, but thou attemperest thy law to my strength, and at no time imposest upon me a heavier burden than thou at that very time makest me able to bear." In a different mood, when this same man is thinking of the future, foreseeing his temptations to an easily besetting sin, shuddering at the danger of committing it, dreading the results of a proud reliance on his own virtue, he becomes importunate for aid from above, and pours out his entreaty, with not one

abating clause: "I am nothing and less than nothing; I have no power to refrain from the sin which tempts me: help, Lord, help; for thou increasest strength to him who hath no might." But in still another mood, when the same man is thinking of the past, weeping over the fact that he has now indulged in the very crime which he feared, resisting every inducement to apologize for it, blaming himself, himself alone, himself deeply for so ungrateful, unreasonable, inexcusable an act, he makes the unmitigated confession, with his hand upon his heart, he dares not qualify his acknowledgment: "I could have avoided that sin which I preferred to commit; woe is me, for I have not done as well as I might have done; if I had been as holy as I had power to be, then had I been perfect; and if I say I have been perfect, that shall prove me perverse." Thus when looking backward, the sensitive Christian insists upon his competency to perform an act, and fears that a denial of it would banish his penitence for transgression; but when looking forward, he insists upon his incompetency to perform the same act, and fears that a denial of this would weaken his feeling of dependence on God. Without a syllable of abatement, he now makes a profession, and then recalls it as thus unqualified, afterward reiterates his once recalled avowal, and again retracts what he had once and again repeated. It is the oscillating language of the emotions which, like the strings of an Æolian harp, vibrate in unison with the varying winds. It is nature in her childlike simplicity, that prompts the soul when swayed in opposing directions by dissimilar thoughts, to vent itself in these antagonistic phrases awakening the intenser interest by their very antagonism. What if they do, when unmodified, contradict each other? An impassioned heart recoils from a contradiction, no more than the war-horse of Job starts back from the battle-field.

The reason, however, being that circumspect power which looks before and after and to either side, does not allow that of these conflicting statements, each can be true save in a qualified sense. It therefore seeks out some principle which will combine these two extremes, as a magnet its opposite poles; some principle which will rectify one of these discrepant expressions by explaining it into an essential agreement with the other. And the principle, I think, which restores this harmony, is the comprehensive one, that man with no extraordinary aid from Divine grace is obstinate, undeviating, unrelenting, persevering, dogged, *fully set* in those wayward preferences which are an abuse of his freedom. His unvaried wrong choices imply a full, unremitted, natural power of choosing right. The emotive theology therefore, when it affirms this power, is correct both in matter and

style; but when it denies this power, it uses the language of emphasis, of impression, of intensity; it means the certainty of wrong preference by declaring the inability of right; and in its vivid use of *cannot* for *will not* is accurate in its substance though not in its form. Yet even here, it is no more at variance with the intellectual theology than with itself, and the discordance, being one of letter rather than of spirit, is removed by an explanation which makes the eloquent style of the feelings at one with the more definite style of the reason.¹

But I am asked, "Do you not thus explain away the language of the emotions? No. The contradictoriness, the literal absurdity is explained out of it, but the language is not explained away; for even when dissonant with the precise truth, it has a significancy more profound than can be pressed home upon the heart by any exact definitions. Do you not make it a mere flourish of rhetoric? I am asked again. It is no flourish; it is the utterance that comes welling up from the depths of our moral nature, and is too earnest to wait for the niceties of logic. It is the breathing out of an emotion which will not stop for the accurate measurement of its words, but leaves them to be qualified by the good sense of men.

If, however, this language be not exactly true, I am further asked, how can it move the heart? We are so made as to be moved by it. It is an ultimate law of our being, that a vivid conception affects us by inspiring a momentary belief in the thing which is conceived. But, the objector continues, can the soul be favorably influenced by that which it regards as hyperbolical? Hyperbolical! What is hyperbolical? Who calls this language an exaggeration of the truth? If interpreted by the letter, it does indeed transcend the proper bounds; but if interpreted as it is meant, as it is felt, it falls far short of them. To the eye of a child the moon's image in the diorama may appear larger than the real moon in the heavens, but not to the mind of a philosopher. The literal doctrines of theology are too vast for complete expression by man, and our intensest words are but a distant approximation to that language, which forms the new song that the redeemed in heaven sing; language which is unutterable in this infantile state of our being, and in comparison with which our so-called extravagances are but feeble and tame diminutives.

Astronomers have recommended, that in order to feel the grandeur of the stellary system we mentally reduce the scale on which it is made; that we imagine our earth to be only a mile in diameter, and

¹ See Note E, at the end of the Discourse.

the other globes to be proportionally lessened in their size and in their distances from each other ; for the real greatness of the heavens discourages our very attempt to impress our hearts by them, and we are the more affected by sometimes narrowing our conceptions of what we cannot at the best comprehend. On the same principle, Christian moralists have advised us not always to dilate our minds in reaching after the extreme boundaries of a doctrine, but often to draw in our contemplations, to lower the doctrine for a time, to bring our intellect down in order to discern the practical truth more clearly, to humble our views in order that they may be at last exalted, to stoop low in order to pick up the keys of knowledge ;—and is this a way of exaggerating the truth ? *We do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God*, if we imagine that when for example he says, the enemies that touch his saints “touch the apple of his eye,” and “he will lift up an ensign to the nations from far and will hiss unto them from the ends of the earth,” he uses a mere hyperbole. No. Such anthropopathical words are the most expressive which the debilitated heart of his oriental people would appreciate, but they fail of making a full disclosure, they are only the foreshadowings of the truths which lie behind them. These refined, spiritual truths, the intellect goes round about and surveys, but is too faint for graphically delineating, and it gives up the attempt to the imagination, and this many-sided faculty multiplies symbol after symbol, bringing one image for one feature, and another image for another feature, and hovers over the feeble emotions of the heart, and strives to win them out from their dull repose, even as ‘the eagle stirreth up her nest, and fluttereth over her young, and spreadeth abroad her wings, and taketh up her little ones, and beareth them on her out-stretched pinions.’ Into more susceptible natures than ours the literal verities of God will penetrate far deeper than, even when shaped in their most pungent forms, they will pierce into our obdurate hearts. So lethargic are we, that we often yield no answering sensibilities to intellectual statements of doctrine ; so weak are we, that such passionate appeals as are best accommodated to our phlegmatic temper are after all no more than dilutions of the truth, as “seen of angels ;” and still so fond are we of harmony with ourselves, that we must explain these diluted representations into unison with the intellectual statements which, however unimpressive, are yet the most authoritative.¹

We are now prepared for our *fourth* remark,— the theology of the intellect and that of feeling tend to keep each other within the sphere

¹ See Note F. at the end of the Discourse.

for which they were respectively designed, and in which they are fitted to improve the character. Both of them have precisely the same sphere with regard to many truths, but not with regard to all. When an intellectual statement is transferred to the province of emotion, it often appears chilling, lifeless; and when a passionate phrase is transferred to the dogmatic province, it often appears grotesque, unintelligible, absurd. Many expressions of sentiment are *what* they ought to be, if kept *where* they ought to be; but a narrow creed *displaces* and thus spoils them. It often becomes licentious or barbarous, by stiffening into prosaic statements the free descriptions which the Bible gives of the kindness or the wrath of God. The very same words are allowed in one relation, but condemned in a different one, because in the former they do, but in the latter do not harmonize with the sensibilities which are at the time predominant. When we are enthusiastic in extolling the generosity of divine love, we feel no need of modifying our proclamation that God desires all men to be saved, and in these uninquisitive moods we have no patience with the query which occupies our more studious hours, "whether he desire this good all things, or only itself considered." Often, though not in every instance, the solid philosophy of doctrine, descending into an exhortation, makes it cumbrous and heavy; and as often the passionate forms of appeal, when they claim to be literal truth, embarrass the intellect until they are repelled by it into the circle distinctively allotted them.

At the time when the words were uttered, there could not be a more melting address than, "If I, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet;" but when this touching sentiment is interpreted as a legal exaction, an argument for a Moravian or Romish ceremony, its poetic elegance is petrified into a prosaic blunder. There are moments in the stillness of our communion service, when we feel that our Lord is with us, when the bread and the wine so enliven our conceptions of his body and blood as, according to the law of vivid conception, to bring them into our ideal presence, and to make us *demand* the saying, as more pertinent and fit than any other, 'This is my body, this is my blood.' But no sooner are these phrases transmuted from hearty utterances into intellectual judgments, than they merge their beautiful rhetoric into an absurd logic, and are at once repulsed by a sound mind into their pristine sphere. So there is a depth of significance which our superficial powers do not fathom, in the lamentation: "Behold! I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." This will always remain the passage for the outflow of his grief, whose fountains of penitence are broken up. The channel is worn too deep into the affections to be easily changed. Let the schools

reason about it just as, and as long as they please. Let them condemn it as indecorous, or false, or absurd, and the man who utters it as unreasonable, fanatical, bigoted. Let them challenge him for his meaning, and insist with the rigidity of the judge of Shylock, that he weigh out the import of every word, every syllable, no more, no less : — they do not move him one hair's breadth. He stands where he stood before, and where he will stand until disenthralled from the body. "My meaning," he says, "is exact enough for me, too exact for my repose of conscience ; and I care just now for no proof clearer than this : "Behold ! I *was* shapen in iniquity, and in sin *did* my mother conceive me." Here, on my heart the burden lies, and I *feel* that I am vile, a man of unclean lips, and dwell amid a people of unclean lips, and I went astray as soon as I was born, and am of a perverse, rebellious race, and there is a tide swelling within me and around me, and moving me on to actual transgression, and it is stayed by none of my unaided efforts, and all its billows roll over me, and I am so troubled that I cannot speak ; and I am not content with merely saying that I am a transgressor ; I long to heap infinite upon infinite, and crowd together all forms of self-reproach, for I am clad in sin as with a garment, I devour it as a sweet morsel, I breathe it, I live it, I *am* sin. My hands are stained with it, my feet are swift in it, all my bones are out of joint with it, my whole body is of tainted origin, and of death in its influence and end ; and here is my definition and here is my proof, and, definition or no definition, proof or no proof, here I plant myself, and here I stay, for this is my feeling, and it comes up from the depths of an overflowing heart : "*Behold ! I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me.*" — But when a theorist seizes at such living words as these, and puts them into his vice, and straightens or crooks them into the dogma, that man is blamable before he chooses to do wrong ; deserving of punishment for the involuntary nature which he has never consented to gratify ; really sinful before he actually sins, then the language of emotion, forced from its right place and treated as if it were a part of a nicely measured syllogism, hampers and confuses his reasonings, until it is given back to the use for which it was first intended, and from which it never ought to have been diverted.¹ When men thus lose their sensitiveness to the discriminations between the style of judgment and that of feeling, and when they force the latter into the province of the former, they become prone to undervalue the conscience, and to be afraid of philosophy, and to shudder at the axioms of common sense, and to divorce faith from reason, to rely on *church government* rather than on fraternal discussion.

¹ See Note G. at the end of the Discourse.

It is this crossing of one kind of theology into the province of another kind differing from the first mainly in fashion and *contour*, which mars either the eloquence or else the doctrine of the pulpit. The massive speculations of the metaphysician sink down into his expressions of feeling and make him appear cold-hearted, while the enthusiasm of the impulsive divine ascends and effervesces into his reasonings and causes him both to *appear*, and to *be*, what our Saxon idiom so reprov-ingly styles him, hot-headed. There are intellectual critics ready to exclude from our psalms and hymns all such stanzas as are not accurate expressions of dogmatic truth. Forgetting that the effort at precision often mars the freeness of song, they would condemn the simple-hearted bard to joint his metaphors into a syllogism, and to sing as a logician tries to sing. In the same spirit, they would expurgate the *Paradise Lost* of all phrases which are not in keeping with our chemical or geological discoveries. But it is against the laws of our sensitive nature to square the effusions of poesy by the scales, compasses and plumb-lines of the intellect. The imagination is not to be used as a dray horse for carrying the lumber of the schools through the gardens of the Muses. There are also poetical critics who imagine that the childlike breathings of our psalmody are the exact measures, the literal exponents of truth, and that every doctrine is false which cannot be transported with its present bodily shape into a sacred lyric. But this is as shallow an idea of theology as it is a mechanical, spiritless, vapid conception of poetry. If this be true, then my real belief is, that 'God came from Teman and the Holy One from Mount Paran; that he did ride upon his horses and chariots of salvation; the mountains saw him and they trembled; the sun and the moon stood still; at the light of his arrows they went and the shining of his glittering spear; he did march through the land in indignation, he did thresh the heathen in anger.' And if this be the language of a creed, then not only is the suggestion of Dr. Arnold¹ a right one that 'in public worship a symbol of faith should be used as a triumphal hymn of thanksgiving, and be chanted rather than read,' but such is the original and proper use of such a symbol at all times. And if this be true, then I shall not demur at phrases in a Confession of Faith, over which, in my deliberate perusal, I stagger and am at my wit's end. Wrap me in mediaeval robes; place me under the wide-spreading arches of a cathedral; let the tide of melody from the organ float along the columns that branch out like the trees of the forest over my head; then bring to me a creed written in illuminated letters, its history

¹ *Life*, p. 102, First Am. Ed.

redolent of venerable associations, its words fragrant with the devotion of my fathers, who lived and died familiar with them; its syllables all of solemn and goodly sound, and bid me cantilate its phrases to the inspired notes of minstrelsy, my eye in a fine phrensy rolling, and I ask no questions for conscience' sake. I am ready to believe what is placed before me. I look beyond the antique words, to the spirit of some great truth that lingers somewhere around them; and in this nebulous view, I believe the creed *with my heart*. I may be even so rapt in enthusiasm as to believe it because it asserts what is impossible. Ask me not to prove it, — I am in no mood for proof. Try not to reason me out of it, — reasoning does me no good. Call not for my precise meaning, — I have not viewed it in that light. I have not taken the creed so much as the creed has taken me, and carried me away in my feelings to mingle with the piety of by-gone generations. — But can it be that this is the only, or the primitive, or the right idea of a symbol of faith? For *this* have logicians exhausted their subtleties, and martyrs yielded up the ghost, disputing and dying for a song? No. A creed, if true to its original end, should be in sober prose, should be understood as it means, and should mean what it says, should be drawn out with a discriminating, balancing judgment, so as to need no allowance for its freedom, no abatement of its force, and should not be expressed in antiquated terms lest men regard its spirit as likewise obsolete. It belongs to the province of the analyzing, comparing, reasoning intellect; and if it leave this province for the sake of intermingling the phrases of an impassioned heart, it confuses the soul, it awakens the fancy and the feelings to disturb the judgment, it sets a believer at variance with himself by perplexing his reason with metaphors and his imagination with logic; it raises feuds in the church by crossing the temperaments of men, and taxing one party to demonstrate similes, another to feel inspired by abstractions. Hence the logomachy which has always characterized the defence of such creeds. The intellect, no less than the heart, being out of its element, wanders through dry places, seeking rest and finding none. Men are thus made uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other; the imaginative zealot does not apprehend the philosophical explanation, and the philosopher does not sympathize with the imaginative style of the symbol; and as they misunderstand each other, they feel their weakness, and “to be weak is miserable,” and misery not only loves but also makes company, and thus they sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel; nor will they ever find peace until they confine their intellect to its rightful sphere and understand it according to what it says, and their feeling

to its province and interpret its language according to what it means, rendering unto poetry the things that are designed for poetry, and unto prose what belongs to prose.

The last clause of our fourth proposition is, that the theology of intellect and that of feeling tend to keep each other within the sphere in which they are fitted to improve the character.¹ So far as any statement is hurtful, it parts with one sign of its truth. In itself or in its relations it must be inaccurate, whenever it is not congenial with the feelings awakened by the Divine Spirit. The practical utility, then, of any theological representations is one criterion of their propriety. Judged by this test, many fashionable forms of statement will sooner or later be condemned. Half of the truth is often a falsehood as it is impressed on the feelings; not always, however, for sometimes it has the good, the right influence, and is craved by the sensibilities which can bear no more. The heart of man is contracted, therefore loves individual views, dreads the labor of that long-continued expansion which is needed for embracing the comprehensive system. Hence its individualizing processes must be superintended by the judgment and conscience, which forbid that the attention be absorbed by any one aspect of a doctrine at the time when another aspect would be more useful. If the wrong half of a truth be applied instead of the right, or if either be mistaken for the whole, the sensibilities are mal-treated, and they endure an evil of which the musician's rude and unskilful handling of his harp, gives but a faint echo. The soul may be compared to a complicated instrument which becomes vocal in praise of its Maker when it is plied with varying powers, now with a gradual and then with a sudden contact, here with a delicate stroke and there with a hard assault; but when the rough blow comes where should have been the gentle touch, the equipoise of its parts is destroyed, and the harp of thousand strings all meant for harmony, wounds the ear with a harsh and grating sound. The dissonance of pious feeling, with the mere generalities of speculation or with any misapplied fragments of truth, tends to confine them within their appropriate, which is their useful sphere. In this light, we discern the necessity of right feeling as a guide to the right proportions of faith. Here we see our responsibility for our religious belief. Here we are impressed by the fact, that much of our probation relates to our mode of shaping and coloring the doctrines of theology. Here also we learn the value of the Bible in unfolding the suitable adaptations of truth, and in illustrating their utility, which is, on the whole, so decisive a touchstone of their correctness.

¹ In consequence of the length of the Discourse, this paragraph and that which follows it, were omitted in the delivery.

When our earthly hopes are too buoyant we are reminded 'that one event happeneth to all,' and "that a man hath no preëminence above a beast;" but such a repressing part of a comprehensive fact is not suited to the sensual and sluggish man who needs rather, as he is directed, to see his 'life and immortality brought to light.' When we are elated with pride we are told that "man is a worm;" but this abasing part of a great doctrine should not engross the mind of him who despises his race, and who is therefore bidden to think of man as 'crowned with glory and honor.' If tempted to make idols of our friends, we are met by the requisition to 'hate a brother, sister, father and mother;' but these are not the most fitting words for him who loves to persecute his opposers, and who requires rather to be asked, "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" In one state of feeling we are stimulated to "work out our salvation with fear and trembling," but in a different state we are encouraged to be neither anxious nor fearful, but to "rejoice in the Lord always." I believe in the "final perseverance" of all who have been once renewed, for not only does the generalizing intellect gather up this doctrine from an induction of various inspired words, but the heart also is comforted by it in the hour of dismal foreboding. Yet when I wrest this truth from its designed adjustments, and misuse it in quieting the fears of men who are instigated to 'count the blood of the covenant wherewith they were sanctified an unholy thing,' I am startled by the threat that 'if they shall fall away, it will be impossible to renew them *again* unto repentance.' This threat was not designed, like the promise of preserving grace, to console the disconsolate, nor was that promise designed like this threat, to alarm the presumptuous. Let not the two appeals cross each other. My judgment, and, in some lofty views in which I need to be held up by the Divine Spirit lest I fall, my feelings also are unsatisfied without the biblical announcement that "the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart;" but at my incipient inclination to pervert these words into an excuse for sin, or a denial of my entire freedom, or of my Maker's justice or tenderness, I regard them as a "form of sound words" from which my depravity has expelled their spirit, and I flee for safety to the other words, which are a complement to the first, that "Pharaoh hardened his own heart." When even a Puritan bishop is inflated with his vain conceits, it is perilous for him to concentrate his feelings upon the keys with which he is to open or shut the door of heaven. Such a man should oftener tremble lest having been a servant of servants here, he be cast away hereafter. But with a melancholic though faithful pastor, this application of Scriptures may be reversed. We delight in the thought, that he who

hath made everything beautiful in its season, who sendeth dew upon the earth when it has been heated by the sun, — and again, when it has been parched by drought, sendeth rain; who draweth the curtains of darkness around us when the eye is tired of the bright heavens, and irradiates the vision when the night has become wearisome; who intermingleth calm with tempest and parteth the clouds of an April day for the passage of the sun's rays, — hath also adopted a free, exuberant, refreshing method of imparting truth to the soul; giving us a series of revelations flexible and pliant, fitting across the mental vision with changeful hues, ever new, ever appropriate, not one of its words retaining its entire usefulness when removed from its fit junctions, not one of them being susceptible of a change for the better in the exigency when it was uttered, but each being "a word spoken in due season, how good is it."

There is a kind of conjectural doctrine, which in the Swedenborgian and Millenarian fancies is carried to a ruinous excess, but which within, not beyond the limit of its practical utility may be either justified or excused. Our feelings, for example, impel us to believe that we are compassed about with some kind of superior and ever wakeful intelligence. To meet this demand of the heart, Paganism has filled the air with divinities, but a wiser forecast has revealed to us the omnipresence of an all-comprehending mind. Still our restless desires would be sometimes gratified by a livelier representation of the spiritual existence around us, and accordingly in the more than paternal compassion of Jehovah, he maketh his angels ministering spirits, sent forth to attend upon the heirs of salvation, and to animate our spiritual atmosphere with a quick movement. But even yet, there are times when the heart of man would be glad of something more than even these cheering revelations. We are comforted with the thought that our deceased companions still mingle with us, and aid us in our struggles to gain their purity, and that, after we have left the world to which thus far we have been so unprofitable, we shall be qualified by our hard discipline here, for more effective ministries to those who will remain in this scene of toil. Such a belief however is not one which the reason, left to itself, would fortify by other than the slightest hints. It is a belief prompted by the affections, and the indulgence in it is allowed by the intellectual powers no farther than it consoles and enlivens the spirit which is wearied with its earthly strifes. If we begin to think more of friends who visit us from heaven than of Him who always abideth faithful around and over and within us, if we begin to search out witty inventions and to invoke the aid of patronizing saints, if we imagine that she who once kept all her child's sayings in

her heart will now lay up in her motherly remembrance the *Ave Marias* of all who bless her image, then we push an innocent conjecture into the sphere of a harmful falsehood. The intellectual theology recognizes our felt need of a tenderness in the supervision which is exercised over us, but instead of meeting this necessity by picturing forth the love of one who after all may forget her very infant, it proves that we are ever enveloped in the sympathies of Him who will not give away to his saints the glory of answering our feeble prayers. The intellectual theology does indeed recognize our felt want of a Mediator, through whose friendly offices we may gain access to the pure, invisible, sovereign, strict lawgiver. But instead of an unearthly being canonized for his austere virtues, it gives us him who ate with sinners, who called around him fishermen rather than princes, and lodged with a tax-gatherer instead of the Roman governor, so as to remind us that he is not ashamed to call us brethren. Where men looked for a taper, it gives a light shining as the day, and hides the stars by the effulgence of the sun; where they looked for a friend it gives a Redeemer, where for a helper, a Saviour, where for hope, faith. It takes away in order to add more, thwarts a desire so as to give a fruition. It not so much unclothes as clothes upon, and swallows up our wish for patron saints in the brotherly sympathies of him who ever liveth to make intercession for us.

In conclusion allow me to observe, that in some aspects our theme suggests a melancholy, in others a cheering train of thought. It grieves us by disclosing the ease with which we may slide into grave errors. Such errors have arisen from so simple a cause as that of confounding poetry with prose. Men whose reasoning instinct has absorbed their delicacy of taste, have treated the language of a sensitive heart as if it were the guarded and wary style of the intellect. Intent on the sign more than on the thing signified, they have transubstantiated the living, spiritual truth into the very emblems which were designed to portray it. In the Bible there are pleasing hints of many things which were never designed to be doctrines, such as the literal and proper necessity of the will, passive and physical sin, baptismal regeneration, clerical absolution, the literal imputation of guilt to the innocent, transubstantiation, eternal generation and procession. In that graceful volume, these metaphors bloom as the flowers of the field; *there* they toil not neither do they spin. But the schoolman has transplanted them to the rude exposure of logic; here they are frozen up, their fragrance is gone, their juices evaporated, and their withered leaves are preserved as specimens of that which in its rightful place surpassed the glory of the wisest sage. Or, if I may change the illustration, I

would say that these ideas, as presented in the Bible, are like oriental kings and nobles, moving about in their free, flowing robes, but in many a scholastic system they are like the embalmed bodies of those ancient lords, their spirits fled, their eyes, which once had speculation in them, now lack lustre; they are dry bones, exceeding dry. Not a few technical terms in theology are rhetorical beauties stiffened into logical perplexities; the exquisite growths of the imagination pressed and dried into the matter of a syllogism in Barbara. Many who discard their literal meaning retain the words out of reverence to antique fashions, out of an amiable fondness for keeping the nomenclature of science unbroken, just as the modern astronomer continues to classify the sweet stars of Heaven under the constellations of the Dragon and the Great Bear.¹

In this and in still other aspects our theme opens into more cheering views. It reveals the identity in the essence of many systems which are run in scientific or aesthetic moulds unlike each other. The full influence of it would do more than any World's Convention, in appeasing the jealousies of those good men who build their faith on Jesus Christ as the chief corner-stone, and yet are induced, by unequal measures of genius and culture, to give different shapes to structures of the same material. There are indeed kinds of theology which cannot be reconciled with each other. There is a life, a soul, a vitalizing spirit of truth, which must never be relinquished for the sake of peace even with an angel. There is (I know that you will allow me to express my opinion,) a line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert, and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus. This is the doctrine which blends in itself the theology of intellect and that of feeling, and which can no more be struck out from the moral, than the sun from the planetary system. Here the mind and the heart, like justice and mercy, meet and embrace each other; and here is found the specific and ineffaceable difference between the Gospel and every other system. But among those who admit the atoning death of Christ as the organic principle of their faith, there are differences, some of them more important, but many far less important, than they seem to be. One man prefers a theology of the judgment; a second, that of the imagination; a third, that of the heart; one adjusts his faith to a lymphatic, another to a sanguine, and still another to a choleric temperament. Yet the subject matter of these heterogeneous configurations may often be one and the same, having for its nucleus the same cross, with the formative influence of which all is safe.

¹ See Note H. at the end of the Discourse.

Sometimes the intellectual divine has been denounced as unfeeling by the rude and coarse preacher, who in his turn has been condemned as vulgar or perhaps irreverent by the intellectual divine ; while the one has meant to insinuate into the select few who listened to him, the very substance of the doctrine which the other has stoutly and almost literally *inculcated* into the multitudes by which he was thronged. The hard polemic has shown us only his visor and his coat of mail, while beneath his iron armor has been often cherished a theology of the gentle and humane affections. Dogmas of the most revolting shape have no sooner been cast into the alembic of a regenerated heart, than their more jagged angles have been melted away. We are cheered with a belief, that in the darkest ages hundreds and thousands of unlettered men felt an influence which they could not explain, the influence of love attracting to itself the particles of truth that lay scattered along the symbols and scholastic forms of the church. The great mass of believers have never embraced the metaphysical refinements of creeds, useful as these refinements are ; but have singled out and fastened upon and held firm those cardinal truths, which the Bible has lifted up and turned over in so many different lights, as to make them the more conspicuous by their very alterations of figure and hue. The true history of doctrine is to be studied not in the technics, but in the spirit of the church. In unnumbered cases, the real faith of Christians has been purer than their written statements of it. Men, women, and children have often decided aright when doctors have disagreed, and doctors themselves have often felt aright when they have reasoned amiss. "In my heart," said a tearful German, "I am a Christian, while in my head I am a philosopher." Many who now dispute for an erroneous creed have, we trust, a richer belief imbedded in their inmost love. There are discrepant systems of philosophy pervading the sermons of different evangelical ministers, but often the rays of light which escape from these systems are so reflected and refracted, while passing through the atmosphere between the pulpit and the pews, as to end in producing about the same image upon the retina of every eye. Not seldom are the leaders of sects in a real variance when the people, who fill up the sects, know not why they are cut off from their brethren, and the people may strive in words while they agree in the thing, and their judgments may differ in the thing while their hearts are at one.

Thus divided against itself, thus introverting itself, thus multifarious in its conceptions, so quick to seize at a truth as held up in one way, and spurn at it as held up in another, so marvellous in its tact for decomposing its honest belief, disowning with the intellect what it embraces with the affections, so much more versatile in regulating its merely inward processes than in directing the motions of an equilibrist,

thus endued with an elastic energy more than Protean,—thus great is the soul, for the immense capabilities of which *Christ died*. Large-minded, then, and large-hearted must be the minister, having all the sensibility of a woman without becoming womanish, and all the perspicacity of a logician without being merely logical, having that philosophy which detects the substantial import of the heart's phrases, and having that emotion which invests philosophy with its proper life,—so wise and so good must the minister be, who applies to a soul of these variegated sensibilities the truth, which may wind itself into them all, as through a thousand pores; that truth, which God himself has matched to our nicest and most delicate springs of action, and which, so highly does he honor our nature, he has interposed by miracles for the sake of revealing in his written word; that word, which by its interchange of styles all unfolding the same idea, by its liberal construction of forms all enclosing the same spirit, prompts us to argue more for the broad central principles, and to wrangle less for the side, the party aspects of truth; that word, which ever pleases in order to instruct, and instructs in such divers ways in order to impress divers minds, and by all means to save some. Through the influence of such a Bible upon such a soul, and under the guidance of Him who gave the one and made the other, we do hope and believe, that the intellect will yet be enlarged so as to gather up all the discordant representations of the heart and employ them as the complements, or embellishments, or emphases of the whole truth; that the heart will be so expanded and refined as to sympathize with the most subtle abstractions of the intellect; that many various forms of faith will yet be blended into a consistent knowledge, like the colors in a single ray; and thus will be ushered in the reign of the Prince of peace, when the lion shall lie down with the lamb, when the body shall no more hang as a weight upon the soul, and the soul no longer wear upon its material frame-work, when the fancy shall wait upon rather than trifle with the judgment, and the judgment shall not be called as now to restrain the fancy, when the passions shall clarify rather than darken the reasoning powers, and the conscience shall not be summoned as now to curb the passions, when the intellect shall believe, not without the heart, nor against the heart, but *with the heart unto salvation*; and the soul, being one with itself, shall also be one with all the saints, in adoring one Lord, cherishing one faith, and being buried in one baptism; and when we who are united unto Christ on earth, he dwelling in us and we in him, shall, in answer to his last prayer for us, be made perfect with him in God.

NOTE A. Page 535.

This reasoning is valid only on the supposition that our Saviour died for all men. —One of Mr. Symington's arguments for the doctrine that Christ made his atonement for a part only, not the whole of the race, is derived, singular as it may appear, from the "rectitude of the divine character." He says in his *Treatise on the Atonement*, Part I. Sect. XI. § II. 2: "The supreme Being gives to every one his due. This principle cannot be violated in a single instance. He cannot, according to this, either remit sin without satisfaction, or punish sin where satisfaction for it has been received. The one is as inconsistent with perfect equity as the other. If the punishment for sin has been borne, the remission of the offence follows of course. The principles of rectitude suppose this, nay peremptorily demand it; justice could not be satisfied without it. Agreeably to this reasoning it follows, that the death of Christ being a legal satisfaction for sin, all for whom he died must enjoy the remission of their offences. It is as much at variance with strict justice or equity, that any for whom Christ has given satisfaction should continue under condemnation, as that they should have been delivered from guilt without a satisfaction being given for them at all. But it is admitted, that all are not delivered from the punishment of sin, that there are many who perish in final condemnation. We are therefore compelled to infer, that for such no satisfaction has been given to the claims of infinite justice — no atonement has been made. If this is denied, the monstrous impossibility must be maintained, that the infallible judge refuses to remit the punishment of some for whose offences he has received a full compensation; that he finally condemns some the price of whose deliverance from condemnation has been paid to him; that, with regard to the sins of some of mankind, he seeks satisfaction in their personal punishment after having obtained satisfaction for them in the sufferings of Christ; that is to say, that an infinitely righteous God takes double payment for the same debt, double satisfaction for the same offence, first from the surety, and then from those for whom the surety stood bound. It is needless to add that these conclusions are revolting to every right feeling of equity, and must be totally inapplicable to the procedure of Him who '*loveth righteousness and hateth wickedness.*'

Mr. Symington's inferences in this paragraph are correct, if his premises are to be understood as intellectual statements of the truth. But Dr. Jonathan Edwards (in his *Works*, Vol. II. p. 26) teaches us that "Christ has not in the *literal* and *proper* sense paid the debt for us;" that this expression and others similar to it are "metaphorical expressions, and therefore not literally and exactly true." He says further (*Works*, Vol. II. p. 48) concerning *distributive* justice, that it "is not at all satisfied by the death of Christ. But *general* justice to the Deity and to the universe is satisfied." A similar remark he appends with regard to the satisfaction of the law. See also Andrew Fuller's *Works*, Vol. IV. pp. 92—100. 1st Am. Ed. A true representation seems to be, that although Christ has not literally paid the debt of sinners, nor literally borne their punishment, nor satisfied the legislative or the remunerative justice of God in any such sense or degree as itself to make it *obligatory* on him to save any sinners; yet the atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God, as to make it *consistent* with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice to save all men, and to make it essential to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice to renew and save some. Therefore it satisfies the law and justice of God *so far and in such a sense*, as to ren-

der it proper for him not only to give many temporal favors, but also to offer salvation to all men, bestow it upon all who will accept it, and cause those to accept it, for whom the interests of the universe allow him to interpose his regenerating grace.

NOTE B. Page 540.

It has already been explained, that *the* theology of the intellect, is the system which recommends itself to a dispassionate and unprejudiced mind as true, and the present discourse has no direct and prominent reference to the various forms of intellectual theology which, in the view of such a mind, are false. It has also been explained, that *the* theology of the heart is the collection of statements which recommend themselves to the healthy moral feelings as right, and the present discourse has no direct and prominent reference to the various forms of representation which are suggested by and suited to the diseased, the perverted moral feelings. One of the most graphic descriptions of a theology which is neither of a sound intellect nor sound heart, but is alike impervious to argument, reckless of consequences, and dependent on an ill-balanced state of the sensibilities, may be found in the following Letter to Dr. Henry Ware, Jr. That calm reasoner had published a sermon in opposition to some injurious sentiments which had been recently propounded at Cambridge, and in acknowledging the receipt of the sermon, the advocate of those sentiments replied :— If your discourse “assails any doctrines of mine, — perhaps I am not so quick to see it as writers generally, — certainly I did not feel any disposition to depart from my habitual contentment, that you should say your thought, whilst I say mine.

“I believe I must tell you what I think of my new position. It strikes me very oddly, that good and wise men at Cambridge and Boston should think of raising me into an object of criticism. I have always been, — from my very incapacity of methodical writing, — ‘a chartered libertine,’ free to worship and free to rail, — lucky when I could make myself understood, but never esteemed near enough to the institutions and mind of society to deserve the notice of the masters of literature and religion. I have appreciated fully the advantages of my position; for I well know, that there is no scholar less willing or less able to be a polemic. I could not give account of myself if challenged. I could not possibly give you one of the ‘arguments’ you cruelly hint at, on which any doctrine of mine stands. For I do not know what arguments mean, in reference to any expression of a thought. I delight in telling what I think; but if you ask me how I dare say so, or, why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men. I do not even see, that either of these questions admits of an answer. So that, in the present droll posture of my affairs, when I see myself suddenly raised into the importance of a heretic, I am very uneasy when I advert to the supposed duties of such a personage, who is to make good his thesis against all comers.

“I certainly shall do no such thing. I shall read what you and other good men write, as I have always done, — glad when you speak my thoughts, and skipping the page that has nothing for me. I shall go on, just as before, seeing whatever I can, and telling what I see; and, I suppose, with the same fortune that has hitherto attended me; the joy of finding, that my abler and better brothers, who work with the sympathy of society, loving and beloved, do now and then unexpectedly confirm my perceptions, and find my nonsense is only their own thought in motley. And so I am your affectionate servant,

R. W. EMERSON.”

One of the amazing mal-adjustments in human life, is that in which a pious man has such idiosyncracies, or has been so mis-educated as to believe in a false

intellectual system, and to feel an impulsive attachment to it. He is of all men the most incorrigible. Argument is wasted upon him, and his prejudices are the more unyielding because fortified by conscience. He is also an unhappy man, for his erroneous views do not harmonize entirely or easily with his pious feelings. Hence he often becomes a schismatic, a disorganizer, a crossed and uncomfortable member of society, a public phenomenon.

NOTE C. Page 542.

The censure frequently pronounced upon the style in which writers like Baxter, Bunyan, and Davies describe the punishment of the lost, is no further merited, than this style can be shown to be unfaithful to the truth, or to the imperative necessities of the minds to which it was addressed. If the publications of the American Tract Society, which are designed not for philosophical criticism but for practical impression, should, as some would have them, describe the future state of the lost as it is described by a merely scientific theologian, they would forfeit their popular influence, and perhaps would convey error instead of truth to the mass of their readers. That all uninspired volumes are imperfect in delineating "the terrors of the Lord," is doubtless true. Their imperfection, however, does not consist in their using the Biblical forms of statement, but in their deviating from or else misapplying these forms. Our Saviour adopted a different phraseology from that of the prophets before him, and that of the apostles after him; and a wise preacher would not exhort a Newton and a Leibnitz in the same terms, although he would use the same great ideas, which he would employ in addressing little children, or in expostulating with the rudest and coarsest of malefactors. The Biblical impression of the particular incidents in the eternal punishment of some and the eternal blessedness of others, is of course the best impression which can be made upon the heart; but the mental eye hath not seen, nor ear heard of the exact, precise instruments which God hath prepared for the retribution of those who hate, or of those who love him.

NOTE D. Page 545.

It is on the principles indicated in the preceding topic, that the aphorism of Pascal (*Thoughts*, ch. III.) may be explained: God "has chosen that" divine truths "should enter from the heart into the mind, and not from the mind into the heart, in order to humble that proud power of reasoning, which pretends it should be the judge of things which the will chooses, and to reform that infirm will which is wholly corrupt through its unworthy inclinations. And hence, instead of saying, as men do when speaking of human things, that we must know them before we can love them, which has passed into a proverb, the saints, when speaking of divine things, say, that we must love them in order to know them, and that we receive the truth only by love; — which is one of their most useful maxims." These words mean, not that the heart ever perceives, for the intellect only is percipient, but that holy feelings prompt the intellect to new discoveries, furnish it with new materials for examination and inference, and regulate it in its mode of combining and expressing what it has discerned. An affection of the heart toward a truth develops a new relation of that truth, and the intellect perceives the relation thus suggested by the feeling. On the same principles may we interpret the celebrated paradox of Anselm, of Canterbury: "I do not seek to understand a truth in order that I may believe it, but I believe it in order that I may understand it." This remark may be made to appear rational by the paraphrase: I first have some idea of a doctrine; I then cordially believe all that I have an idea of; next, by the love in-

volved in this hearty faith I am inspirited to form still more definite ideas of that which I had before perceived clearly enough to believe it affectionately; and at last, by the relation which is thus developed between the doctrine and my feelings, I obtain yet more distinct and extended ideas of it, so that I may be said to understand it.

NOTE E. Page 549.

The preceding illustration suggests *some*, not all, of the causes why the doctrine that men are unable to be more virtuous than they really are, becomes less injurious as it is taught by pious divines than as it is taught by infidel philosophers.

One generic cause is, that the earnest preacher often contradicts in his exhortation what he has seemed to advocate in his discussion; but the intellectual deist has not the heart to modify his denial of human freedom; he retains in all exigencies the unbending theory, that man has no power to be better than he is.

A *second* subordinate cause, really included in the first, is, that the Christian points this doctrine chiefly to the present or the future, but the infidel extends it equally to the past. The pious necessarian has a good moral purpose in declaring that the *present* and *future* obligations of men, do and will exceed their power; he designs to foster thus a spirit of dependence on God; but, for another good moral purpose, he shrinks from informing men that their *past* obligations exceeded their power. The reckless fatalist, however, is as willing to assert that men *have* obeyed the law heretofore to the extent of their ability, as that men *will* have no ability, without supernatural aid, to obey the law hereafter. He is ready to stifle remorse by assuring the convicts of a penitentiary, that they have possessed no more power than they have exercised to choose aright; that is, their choices have been as benevolent as they could have been. It is doubtless true, that in precisely the same sense in which a man is or *will* be unable to perform his duty, in that sense he *has* performed his duty as well as he was able to perform it, has done all the good which was possible for him to do. But the best feelings of a Christian forbid his use of such language in regard to the past, favor his use of the opposite, and thus induce him to mitigate the evils of asserting without qualification that man's power is less than his duty.

A *third* reason, why the necessarianism of Christian divines becomes less injurious than the fatalism of infidel philosophers is, that the most trust-worthy of these divines acknowledge their necessarian doctrine to be expressed in the language of the emotions, while the fatalist contends for the intellectual exactness of his phraseology. The wise preacher believes in only a moral, the fatalist in a natural impotence. In Andrew Fuller's *Apparent Contradictions Reconciled* (Works, Vol. VIII. pp. 51—55, First Am. Ed.), his fourth proposition is, "The depravity of human nature is such that no man, of his own accord, will come to Christ for life;" and his fifth proposition is, "The degree of this depravity is such, as that, figuratively speaking, men cannot come to Christ for life." The younger Pres. Edwards says (Works, Vol. I. p. 307), "Dr. Clarke, in his Remarks on Collins (p. 16), gives a true account of moral necessity: 'By moral necessity consistent writers never mean any more than to express in a figurative manner the certainty of such an event.'" Dr. Day (on the Will, p. 107) remarks, "We are not justified in pronouncing this figurative use to be wholly improper" (inadmissible). The elder Pres Edwards, although he may not have applied the epithet *figurative* to the necessarian terminology which he employs, yet often applies to it the epithet *improper*, which means in this connection not inadmissible but figurative. "No inability whatsoever," he

says (on the Will, Part III. Sect. IV.), "which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of *inability*." Natural inability "alone is properly called inability." "I have largely declared," he says in his Letter against the literal necessarianism of Lord Kames (Works, Vol. II. pp. 293-4, Ed. 1829), "that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones which takes place with regard to the acts of men's wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of *necessity* improperly; and that all such terms as *must*, *cannot*, *impossible*, *unable*, *irresistible*, *unavoidable*, *invariable*, etc., when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their use in common speech; and that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's will is more properly called *certainty* than *necessity*; it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence."

So sure is it that man with his unrenewed nature will sin, and only sin in his moral acts, and so important is it that this infallible certainty be *felt* to be true, that our hearts often incline us to designate it by the most forcible epithets. These epithets often make the truth appear obvious to those whom pride has removed to a distance from it, just as the colossal proportions of a statue raised above the capital of a pillar, make the statue appear like the exact image of a man to those who look up to it from the remote valley. But if we infer from the literal meaning of necessity, that our so-called necessary choices are in fact inevitable, we commit the same mistake as if we should infer from the colossal dimensions of the statue, that the individual represented by it is a giant. It is easy to see, that the language of feeling in which divines may and do occasionally express the certainty of wrong choice, must be different in its influence from the language of the intellect in which fatalists invariably express their doctrine of the necessity of all choice. The demands of a soul which loves to invoke aid from Heaven, are met by a faithful description of that certainty which, in the words of Pres. Day (Examination of Edwards, p. 167), is a "necessity falsely so called." The truth is mournful, humbling, well fitted to awaken a spirit of prayer, that man left to himself will *invariably*, *surely* sin. but it gives no sanction to the demoralizing falsehood that, in the literal and proper sense, he *must inevitably* sin.

That the terms of feeling and of common life should have been adopted as the scientific nomenclature on the subject of the will, has been submissively regretted by our best theologians. He must be a strong man who can bear up under this cumbrous nomenclature without lapsing sometimes into its literal, which is not its technical meaning; and many a Samson having been overpowered by its heaviness, has been compelled to "grind in the prison-house" of Gaza. In one of his most eloquent passages, Pres. Edwards thus laments the deceptive influence of these "terms of art:" "Nothing that I maintain supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it; for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms *necessary*, *must*, *cannot*, *impossible*, etc.; the association with these terms of certain ideas inconsistent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it; as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former curvity again and again." (Works, Vol. II. pp. 293, 294. Ed. 1829.)

The epithets *figurative, improper*, when applied by the Edwardses, Fuller, Day, and others, to the necessarian phraseology of the will, are to be understood according to the principles laid down in the preceding Discourse, pp. 537, 538.

NOTE F. Page 550.

We have a safeguard against the dreams of visionaries in the two principles already stated, that reason has an ultimate, rightful authority over the sensibilities, and that it will sanction not only all *pious* feelings, but likewise all those which are *essential* developments of our original constitution. As the head is placed above the heart in the body, so the faith which is sustained by good argument, should control rather than be controlled by those emotions which receive no approval from the judgment. The perfection of our faith is, that it combine in its favor the logic of the understanding with the rhetoric of the feelings, and that it exclude all those puerilities and extravagances, which have nothing to recommend them but the pretended inspirations of the fanatic. Whenever a discrepancy exists between a creed and an expression of devotional feeling, as for example between the "Thirty-nine Articles" and the "Book of Common Prayer," the symbol of faith ought to be in a style so prosaic and definite as to form the decisive standard of appeal, and to explain, rather than be explained by the liturgical, which are apt to be fervid utterances.

NOTE G. Page 552.

The fallen, evil nature, which precedes and certainly occasions a man's first actual sin, is, like all other evil, odious, loathsome. So prolific is it in results which are so melancholy, that while we are trembling at its power, we are roused up to stigmatize it as "sinful." We may thus earnestly reprobate it, if we do not insist that the word "sinful" shall be interpreted, in scientific language, to mean that quality which is itself worthy of punishment. In our abhorrence of this disordered state of our sensibilities, we may call it "blamable," if we do not insist that a man is to be blamed for being involuntarily in this calamitous state; we may call it "guilty," if we mean by this word "intimately connected with guilt," or "exposing us to suffering," for this diseased nature leads to sin, and thereby to its most painful consequences. We may in fact apply any epithet whatever to our inborn, involuntary corruption, provided that this epithet express our dread or hatred of it, and do not require the belief that a passive condition, previous to all active disobedience, is itself deserving of punishment. As there was much that was amiable in the young man who possessed nothing holy, so there is much that is unamiable, and still not properly sinful, in every man. But although in our fervid diaries we may often pour these unmeasured reproaches upon our corrupt nature, yet in a scientific treatise we embarrass ourselves by using the emotional, as if it were didactic language; by applying the loose terms of the heart to themes where the sharpest discrimination is needed; by speaking, as many do, of a kind of sin for which the man who is charged with it does not, in the view of conscience, deserve to be punished; by reasoning about a state for which the child involuntarily subjected to it is "guilty," but not himself properly blamable. The well-schooled divine *may*, although he seldom *does* escape the confusing influence of this ambiguous nomenclature; but men who are conversant with only the "English undefiled" of our literature, are led by such a peculiar, when used as a dogmatic phraseology, into serious, perhaps fatal prejudices against the truth. When these terms, often allowable for the heart, are used for the intellect, they change their character, and although meant for "the lights of science," they fail of their artificial purpose, and become "in many instances the shades of religion."

Is it said, however, that a passive nature, existing antecedently to all free action, is itself, strictly, literally sinful? Then we must have a new language, and speak, in prose, of moral *patients* as well as moral agents, of men *besinned* as well as sinners, (for *ex vi termini* sinners as well as runners must be active); we must have a new conscience which can decide on the moral character of dormant conditions, as well as of elective preferences; a new law, prescribing the very *make* of the soul, as well as the way in which this soul, when made, shall act; and a law which we transgress (for sin is "a transgression of the law") in being before birth passively misshapen; we must also have a new Bible, delineating a judgment scene in which some will be condemned, not only on account of the deeds which they have done in the body, but also for having been born with an involuntary proclivity to sin, and others will be rewarded not only for their conscientious love to Christ, but also for a blind nature inducing that love; we must, in fine, have an entirely different class of moral sentiments, and have them disciplined by Inspiration in an entirely different manner from the present; for now the feelings of all true men revolt from the assertion, that a poor infant dying, if we may suppose it to die, before its first wrong preference, *merits* for its unavoidable nature, that eternal punishment, which is threatened, and justly, against even the smallest real *sin*. Although it may seem paradoxical to affirm that "a man may believe a proposition which he knows to be false," it is yet charitable to say that whatever any man may suppose himself to believe, he has in fact an inward conviction, that "all sin consists in sinning." There is comparatively little dispute on the nature of moral evil, when the words relating to it are fully understood.

NOTE H. Page 559.

It is a noted remark of John Foster, that many technical terms of theology, instead of being the signs, are the monuments of the ideas which they were first intended to signify. Now it is natural for men to garnish the sepulchre of one whom, when living, they would condemn.

When it is said in palliation for certain technics of theology, that they are no more uncouth or equivocal than are the technics of some physical sciences, we may reply, that the sacred science above all others should, where it fairly can, be so presented as to allure rather than repel men of classical taste, and not superadd factitious offences to the natural "offence of the cross." True, we may be deceived by the figurative terms of mineralogy or botany, but we are less liable to mistake the meaning of words which refer to material phenomena, than the meaning of those which refer to spiritual, and then an error in physics is far less baneful than one in religion. If chemical substances were denoted by words borrowed from moral science, if one acid were figuratively called "sanctification," and one alkali were termed "depravity," and one solution were denominated "eternal punishment," we should weep over the sad results of such a profane style, even if it were well intended. And on a similar principle, when we read of "the vindictive justice of God," although we revere the authors who use the term in its technical sense, we mourn over the ruinous impression that will be made by such a piously meant phrase. Doubtless it may be needful for us to refer occasionally to the obnoxious technics which were once in such authoritative use, but if we make them *prominent*, or if, in employing them, we neglect to explain their peculiar meaning, we unwittingly convey false and pernicious ideas to men who are wont to call things by their right names.

It is against some first principles of rhetoric to say, that we may safely regulate our scientific nomenclature by the figurative expressions of the Bible. These ex-

pressions are easily understood in the spirit which prompted them, but are less easily understood in the spirit of the schools. If all the Biblical figures were arranged into a system, and if, when thus classified, they were reasoned upon as literal and dogmatic truths, we should have, on an extended scale, the same allegorical logic, which we now have on a scale so limited as to conceal many of its injurious effects. Perhaps we should then begin to shape the Copernican and Newtonian philosophy in the mould of the passage, "The Lord maketh the earth empty, and maketh it waste, and turneth it upside down." Some errors are most easily refuted by carrying them out to their entire length with all possible consistency. An extreme view of them develops their essential nature. What is a large part of Quakerism, and even Swedenborgianism, but a collection of fancies, interesting as such, but now flattened into theories?

ARTICLE VII.

TICKNOR'S SPANISH LITERATURE.

History of Spanish Literature. By George Ticknor. In three volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1849.

By Prof. C. C. Felton, Cambridge.

THE appearance of a work like the present is an important event in our literary history. For completeness of plan, depth of learning, and thoroughness of execution, nothing superior has been produced in the English language, in our day. It will take at least an equal rank with either of the works of Hallam, and with the best historical productions of the continent. Mr. Ticknor has had ample time, abundant means, and every opportunity which travel and residence in Europe, and extensive acquaintance with the most eminent men in literature could give him. He has surveyed his subject in all its bearings with unwearied industry and the most conscientious determination to understand it thoroughly. Possessing a comprehensive knowledge of ancient and modern literature, he has been able to illustrate the literature of Spain by just comparisons, and to assign to it its true position in the history of the achievements of the human mind. The breadth of his culture and the catholic spirit with which all his judgments seem to have been formed, have saved him from giving an undue importance or prominence to the literature for which he evidently has a strong predilection, and which he understands better than any scholar ever understood before. If we compare this work with

the volumes of Sismondi and Bouterwek the best which had hitherto been published in Europe—we shall be at once aware of the immense superiority of Mr. Ticknor over all his rivals.

In his preface, written with candor and liberality, Mr. Ticknor gives an account of the origin and progress of this work. At an early period of his life, and while still pursuing his studies at the great seats of learning abroad, he was appointed Professor of French and Spanish literature in Harvard College. The lectures he gave after his return were the first form into which the results of his researches were cast. At a later period, Mr. Ticknor made a second visit to Europe, and used the opportunities thus afforded him, to complete the studies of preceding years, consulting the libraries, public and private, which were thrown open to him everywhere. His own collection of printed and manuscript works, connected with or constituting portions of Spanish literature is probably unrivalled in the world. Returning to the United States, he first undertook the preparation of his college lectures for the press, with such additional matter as he had recently collected. Further reflection, however, led him to change his plan entirely. The lectures were thrown aside, and a systematic work was commenced *de novo*, in which the whole subject is carefully laid out, and all the details wrought up with the most deliberate reference to the whole, and so arranged that the multiplicity of the particulars, each finding its appropriate place, and none exceeding a just proportion, present themselves to the mind in lucid order, and leave there an unbroken impression. The classical completeness of the plan and the exquisite purity of the style, next to the exact and affluent learning by which every page is distinguished, form the most remarkable characteristics of the book. The political history of Spain is interwoven so far as it is necessary to illustrate the literary character of the successive periods. The great historical events, which have given a peculiar turn to each of the changing fortunes of Spain, are set forth in the various bearings on the intellectual and literary phenomena of that romantic land. The struggle between contending influences, as they came up one after another, until the distinctive features of the Spanish character, were shaped, is unfolded with singular clearness of view, fulness of knowledge, and steadiness of power. We see the country passing from the Roman to the Gothic sway; then the fierce struggle of more than seven centuries with the Moorish invaders from Africa; and finally the consolidation of its feudal kingdoms under a single sovereign head. We are spectators of the contest, often remitted but never abandoned, between the Christian faith and the Mohammedan imposture, until the crescent was driven back to the regions whence it rose; and we be-

hold the gradual development of that fierce religious bigotry which first endured and then embraced the dreadful tyranny of the Inquisition, spreading terror through the land, and filling its history with scenes the bare imagination of which makes the flesh to creep, and the hair to stand on end at the wickedness of man usurping the prerogatives of God.

The whole work is divided into three parts or periods. The first commences at the end of the twelfth century and extends to the beginning of the sixteenth. Within these dates are comprehended many of the richest and most original phenomena of Spanish literature. Mr. Ticknor remarks :

“ Indeed, if we look at the condition of Spain, in the centuries that preceded and followed the formation of its present language and poetry, we shall find the mere historical dates full of instruction. In 711, Roderic rashly hazarded the fate of his Gothic and Christian empire on the result of a single battle against the Arabs, then just forcing their way into the western part of Europe from Africa. He failed ; and the wild enthusiasm which marked the earliest age of the Mohammedan power achieved almost immediately the conquest of the whole of the country that was worth the price of a victory. The Christians, however, though overwhelmed, did not entirely yield. On the contrary, many of them retreated before the fiery pursuit of their enemies, and established themselves in the extreme northwestern portion of their native land, amidst the mountains and fastnesses of Biscay and Asturias. There, indeed, the purity of the Latin tongue, which they had spoken for so many ages, was finally lost, through that neglect of its cultivation which was a necessary consequence of the miseries that oppressed them. But still, with the spirit which so long sustained their forefathers against the power of Rome, and which has carried their descendants through a hardly less fierce contest against the power of France, they maintained, to a remarkable degree, their ancient manners and feelings, their religion, their laws, and their institutions ; and, separating themselves by an implacable hatred from their Moorish invaders, they there, in those rude mountains, laid deep the foundations of a national character, — of that character which has subsisted to our own times.”

It was during the centuries of conflict with the Moors, that the elements of the Spanish language and the materials of the Spanish poetry developed themselves. This was in truth the heroic age of Spain. The contrast of nationalities, the warfare of adverse religions, and the spirit of chivalry, filled up this long period with enterprises of great pith and moment, with personal adventures of more romantic daring than are to be found in the spring time of any other modern literature. This long struggle is the source from which the Spanish poets have drawn their most abundant materials ; and the memorable ex-

plots of the champions of the Christian Faith against the unbelieving intruders from Africa, kindled the enthusiasm of successive generations as they were recounted in the nameless and numberless ballads with which the kingdoms of the Iberian peninsula resounded;—these subjects, and the metrical poetry in which they were celebrated were of the highest epic interest; and though the form never reached the perfect and harmonious development which the happy genius of Ionia achieved for the legends of the heroes on the plains of Troy, yet as we read those “Iliads without a Homer,” we feel that the costume has indeed been changed, but the genuine epic strain still lives and breathes, as true to the instincts of the Castilian character as the glorious rhapsodies of Homer were to the exuberant heroism that blazed in the morning glow of Hellenic life.

The oldest written monument of the Spanish language with an ascertained date belongs to the year 1155; and Castilian verse may be traced very nearly back to this period, not only in ballads but in works of more elaborate character and greater extent. The first or one of the first of these is the famous poem of the Cid. The Cid, or Lord, was the impersonation of Spanish chivalry, and he has always been the foremost figure in the poetry and traditions of the country. This personage was born in the northwestern part of Spain about the middle of the eleventh century, and died towards its end, at Valencia. He was one of the powerful barons of the country, bearing originally the name of Ruy or Rodrigo Diaz. He received the title of Cid from the circumstance that five Moorish kings were conquered by him in one battle, and acknowledged him as their Seid, or Lord; he is also known generally as the *campeador* or champion. In truth, he passed his whole life either in fighting the enemies of his country, or in exile to which he was more than once driven by the princes in whose service he had so often breasted the shock of the Moslem hosts. No doubt there is much of fable blended with the history of this great champion's achievements. Says Mr. Ticknor:

“He comes to us in modern times as the great defender of his nation against its Moorish invaders, and seems to have so filled the imagination and satisfied the affections of his countrymen, that centuries after his death, and even down to our own days, poetry and tradition have delighted to attach to his name a long series of fabulous achievements, which connect him with the mythological fictions of the Middle Ages, and remind us almost as often of Amadis and Arthur as they do of the sober heroes of genuine history.”

The poem of the Cid may be compared in various respects with

the *Iliad*, or rather with single books of the *Iliad*. Some have considered it in the light of versified history. Mr. Southey was inclined to this view; but from the very nature of the case it must be erroneous. Its spirit is epical and not historical; and as Mr. Ticknor remarks "the very marriage of the daughters of the Cid has been shown to be all but impossible; and thus any real historical foundation seems to be taken away from the chief event which the poem records." The poem has not been preserved entire; a few pages of the beginning, and a short passage in the middle being lost. The name of the author has not been preserved. This most interesting monument of the early poetical genius of Spain is now tolerably well known, in its leading characteristics, by the writings of Mr. Southey, especially his paraphrase of the *Chronicle of the Cid*,¹ in the appendix to which he published the very fine translations by the Hon. John Hookham Frere. Mr. Ticknor draws the character of the poem in the following finely expressed passage:

"Of course there can be no doubt about the subject or purpose of the whole. It is the development of the character and glory of the Cid, as shown in his achievements in the kingdoms of Saragossa and Valencia, in his triumph over his unworthy sons-in-law, the Counts of Carrion, and their disgrace before the king and Cortes, and, finally, in the second marriage of his two daughters with the Infantes of Navarre and Aragon; the whole ending with a slight allusion to the hero's death, and a notice of the date of the manuscript.

"But the story of the poem constitutes the least of its claims to our notice. In truth, we do not read it at all for its mere facts, which are often detailed with the minuteness and formality of a monkish chronicle; but for its living pictures of the age it represents, and for the vivacity with which it brings up manners and interests so remote from our own experience, that, where they are attempted in formal history, they come to us as cold as the fables of mythology. We read it because it is a contemporary and spirited exhibition of the chivalrous times of Spain, given occasionally with an Homeric simplicity altogether admirable. For the story it tells is not only that of the most romantic achievements, attributed to the most romantic hero of Spanish tradition, but it is mingled continually with domestic and personal details, that bring the character of the Cid and his age near to our own sympathies and interests. The very language in which it is told is the language he himself spoke, still only half developed; disencumbering itself with difficulty from the

¹ Mr. Southey's *Chronicle of the Cid* was republished a few years ago by Mr. Bixby in Lowell, in a very handsome form. But that enterprising publisher found that "the age of chivalry had gone," at least from Lowell. Spindles left no space for spears, and cotton was a stronger interest than martial combats. The book scarcely paid for the binding.

characteristics of the Latin ; its new constructions by no means established ; imperfect in its forms, and ill furnished with the connecting particles in which resides so much of the power and grace of all languages ; but still breathing the bold, sincere, and original spirit of its times, and showing plainly that it is struggling with success for a place among the other wild elements of the national genius. And finally, the metre and rhyme into which the whole poem is cast are rude and unsettled ; the verse claiming to be of fourteen syllables, divided by an abrupt cæsural pause after the eighth, yet often running out to sixteen or twenty, and sometimes falling back to twelve ; but always bearing the impress of a free and fearless spirit, which harmonizes alike with the poet's language, subject and age, and so gives to the story a stir and interest, which, though we are separated from it by so many centuries, bring some of its scenes before us like those of a drama."

We must add one of the passages translated by Mr. Frere. It is the rescue of the Cid's standard, recovered by an onslaught upon the Moorish array at Alcocer.

Their shields before their breast, forth at once they go,
 Their lances in the rest, levelled fair and low,
 Their banners and their crests waving in a row,
 Their heads all stooping down towards the saddle-bow ;
 The Cid was in the midst, his shout was heard afar,
 " I am Ruy Diaz, the champion of Bivar ;
 Strike amongst them, Gentlemen, for sweet mercies' sake ! "
 There where Bermuez fought amidst the foe they brake,
 Three hundred bannered knights, it was a gallant show ;
 Three hundred Moors they killed, a man with every blow ;
 When they wheeled and turned, as many more lay slain ;
 You might see them raise their lances and level them again.
 There you might see the breast-plates how they were cleft in twain,
 And many a Moorish shield lie shattered on the plain,
 The pennons that were white marked with a crimson stain,
 The horses running wild whose riders had been slain.

The student of German literature will naturally be reminded of the *Nibelungenlied*,—an old heroic poem, which has of late years excited great interest and enthusiasm among the literary men of Germany. It dates about half a century later than the poem of the Cid, but is more mythical in its details, as might perhaps have been expected from the difference of nationality it represents, and is more complete in its arrangement, as a work of early poetical art. The reader will find it instructive to compare the translated passages of the Cid, with those which are given from the *Nibelungen* in Mr. Longfellow's *Poets and Poetry of Europe*.

Many other important subjects are embraced in the history of this period. Among the most prominent names are those of Gonzalo de Berceo, Alfonso the Learned, whose influence is even now felt in the legislation of both hemispheres, Don Juan Manuel, the author of the

celebrated Conde Lucanor, and the archpriest of Hita. The works of all these writers are carefully examined and criticised by Mr. Ticknor, and numerous details not suitable to be incorporated in the continuous narrative of the text, are presented in the learned and elaborate notes. But the three classes of writings which form the most marked characteristics of this period are the old ballads, the chronicles, and the romances of chivalry. The ballads are known to English readers chiefly through Mr. Lockhart's translations, which have been repeatedly published both in England and here. The chronicle of the Cid, to which we have already alluded, is a good specimen of the second; and Amadis of Gaul is a type of the third. With regard to the ballads, Mr. Ticknor unhesitatingly rejects the theory of their being imitated, either in form or spirit, from the Arabic, for reasons which we suppose will be considered as quite settling the question. They are thoroughly national in their tone and sentiments, and do not deal with Moorish subjects until down to the time of the fall of Grenada. Their external form is the eight syllable line, sometimes arranged in stanzas of four lines, rhyming in the second and fourth, or in the first and fourth. The most characteristic peculiarity is the imperfect rhyme called the *asonante*, confined to the vowels, and beginning with the last accent in the line. In its rhythmical peculiarity it stands between blank verse and rhyme. In English, however, the effect would be scarcely perceptible on account of the various powers which the same vowel possesses in different combinations. Mr. Ticknor gives an illustration from the Retrospective Review, in a translation from a ballad of Góngora, which preserves the asonant rhythm to the eye, but to the eye alone. We quote the original and the translation:

Aquel rayo de la guerra,
Alferez mayor del réyno,
Tan galan como valiente,
Y tan noble como fiero,
De los mozos envidiado,
Y admirado de los viejos,
Y de los niños y el vulgo
Señalado con el dedo,
El querido de las damas,
Por cortesano y discreto,
Hijo hasta allí regalado
De la fortuna y el tiempo, etc.

Obras, Madrid, 1654, 4to, f. 83.

"He the thunderbolt of battle,
He the first Alferez titled.
Who as courteous is as valiant,
And the noblest as the fiercest;
He who by our youth is envied,
Honored by our gravest ancients,
By our youths in crowds distinguished
By a thousand pointed fingers;
He beloved by fairest damsels,
For discretion and politeness,
Cherished son of time and fortune,
Bearing all their gifts divinest," etc.

Retrospective Review, Vol. IV. p. 35.

These ballads are for the most part written by unknown authors of a date anterior to the middle of the sixteenth century. They are found in the collections entitled *Romanceros Generales*, and they amount in number to over a thousand old poems, of unequal length,

and various degrees of merit, but taken as a whole wonderfully faithful expressions of the character and feelings of the nation. The following remarks present some very interesting general views upon this subject.

"For a long time, of course, these primitive national ballads existed only in the memories of the common people, from whom they sprang, and were preserved through successive ages and long traditions only by the interests and feelings that originally gave them birth. We cannot, therefore, reasonably hope that we now read any of them exactly as they were first composed and sung, or that there are many to which we can assign a definite age with any good degree of probability. No doubt, we may still possess some which, with little change in their simple thoughts and melody, were among the earliest breathings of that popular enthusiasm which between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries, was carrying the Christian Spaniards onward to the emancipation of their country; ballads which were heard amidst the valleys of the Sierra Morena, or on the banks of the Turia and the Guadalquivir, with the first tones of the language that has since spread itself through the whole Peninsula. But the idle minstrel, who, in such troubled times, sought a precarious subsistence from cottage to cottage, or the thoughtless soldier, who, when the battle was over, sung its achievements to his guitar at the door of his tent, could not be expected to look beyond the passing moment; so that, if their unskilled verses were preserved at all, they must have been preserved by those who repeated them from memory, changing their tone and language with the changed feelings of the times and events that chanced to recall them. Whatever, then, belongs to this earliest period belongs at the same time, to the unchronicled popular life and character of which it was a part; and although many of the ballads thus produced may have survived to our own day, many more, undoubtedly, lie buried with the poetical hearts that gave them birth."

Mr. Ticknor has illustrated his statements regarding the ballads by a series of translations admirably executed, whether we look to the fidelity or to the poetical spirit and finished elegance of the style.

The chronicles succeeded the ballads, at least as the entertaining literature of the upper classes of society. Strictly speaking, we should perhaps consider them as taking the place of the monkish Latin chronicles, and legends. Mr. Ticknor classifies them into the royal chronicles and chronicles of particular events, particular persons, travels, and romantic chronicles, and gives a clear account of each kind. We have not space for any remarks upon their character, and shall content ourselves with quoting what Mr. Ticknor says in finishing the topic:

"But as we close it up, we should not forget, that the whole series, extending over full two hundred and fifty years, from the time of Alfonso

so the *Wise to the accession of Charles the Fifth, and covering the New World as well as the Old, is unrivalled in richness, in variety, and in picturesque and poetical elements. In truth, the chronicles of no other nation can, on such points, be compared to them; not even the Portuguese, which approach the nearest in original and early materials; nor the French, which, in Joinville and Froissart, make the highest claims in another direction. For these old Spanish chronicles, whether they have their foundations in truth or in fable, always strike further down than those of any other nation into the deep soil of the popular feeling and character. The old Spanish loyalty, the old Spanish religious faith, as both were formed and nourished in the long periods of national trial and suffering, are constantly coming out; hardly less in Columbus and his followers, or even amidst the atrocities of the conquests in the New World, than in the half-miraculous accounts of the battles of Haxinas and Tolosa, or in the grand and glorious drama of the fall of Granada. Indeed, wherever we go under their leading, whether to the court of Tamerlane, or to that of Saint Ferdinand, we find the heroic elements of the national genius gathered around us; and thus, in this vast, rich mass of chronicles, containing such a body of antiquities, traditions, and fables as has been offered to no other people, we are constantly discovering, not only the materials from which were drawn a multitude of the old Spanish ballads, plays, and romances, but a mine which has been unceasingly wrought by the rest of Europe for similar purposes, and still remains unexhausted."*

The next two chapters are devoted to the *Romance of Chivalry*. These are followed by three on the early Spanish Drama; one on the Provençal Literature in Spain; one on the Catalonian and Valencian Poetry, three on the Courtly School in Castile; and one, in which a brief account is given of the distinguished family of the Manriques, known in English literature by Prof. Longfellow's exquisite translation of the "Coplas" of Don Jorge Manrique; and of another eminent family, the Urreas; one chapter is also given to the prose writers of the latter part of the fifteenth century; and one to the Cancioneros, a collection of poems commencing from about the middle of the fifteenth century. This brings us down to the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, a period of Spanish history which has been so splendidly illustrated by the classical pen of Mr. Prescott. This reign was one of the most brilliant for its achievements in discovery as well as in arms, and most especially for the ever memorable voyage of Columbus, which "gave a new world to Castile and Leon." But in the midst of this great apparent prosperity, the royal pair introduced the Inquisition, partly as an engine of State, and partly in accordance with the bigotry and intolerance of the Spanish nation. Many causes conspired to develop this, but most especially the wars

against the Moors, who, after seven centuries of a contested occupation, were finally expelled from every part of the kingdom. The effects of this terrible institution were most deadly to the material and intellectual fortunes of Spain. It is a piece of poetical justice that the country which has most fatally suffered from this infernal tribunal, has also furnished the historian, Llorente, who has most effectually exposed its horrors and iniquities to the indignant condemnation of an outraged world. In a letter of Southey's to Mr. Coleridge, published in the third volume of his *Life and Correspondence*, the title of an old Latin work is given, bearing date 1598, in which it is maintained that God was the first Inquisitor and that the first Auto da Fé was held upon Adam and Eve. The Inquisition had been established in Spain more than a century, when this work was published; and its career, beginning with the ferocious villanies of Torquemada, had been marked by every crime which most disgraces the history of man. The old Latin Chronicler mistook the origin of the Institution. It came from the opposite direction. Some of its immediate effects are pointed out in the following passage, and its lasting consequences are developed through all the subsequent periods of the history.

"Such severity brought with it, of course, a great amount of fraud and falsehood. Multitudes of the followers of Mohámmed — beginning with four thousand whom Cardinal Ximenes baptized on the day when, contrary to the provisions of the capitulation of Granada, he consecrated the great mosque of the Albaycin as a Christian temple — were forced to enter the fold of the Church, without either understanding its doctrines or desiring to receive its instructions. With these, as with the converted Jews, the Inquisition was permitted to deal unchecked by the power of the State. They were, therefore, from the first, watched; soon they were imprisoned; and then they were tortured, to obtain proof that their conversion was not genuine. But it was all done in secrecy and in darkness. From the moment when the Inquisition laid its grasp on the object of its suspicions to that of his execution, no voice was heard to issue from its cells. The very witnesses it summoned were punished with death or perpetual imprisonment, if they revealed what they had seen or heard before its dread tribunals; and often of the victim nothing was known, but that he had disappeared from his accustomed haunts in society, never again to be seen.

"The effect was appalling. The imaginations of men were filled with horror at the idea of a power so vast and so noiseless; one which was constantly, but invisibly, around them; whose blow was death, but whose steps could neither be heard nor followed amidst the gloom into which it retreated farther and farther as efforts were made to pursue it. From its first establishment, therefore, while the great body of the Spanish Christians rejoiced in the purity and orthodoxy of their faith, and not unwillingly saw its enemies called to expiate their unbelief by

the most terrible of mortal punishments, the intellectual and cultivated portions of society felt the sense of their personal security gradually shaken, until, at last, it became an anxious object of their lives to avoid the suspicions of a tribunal which infused into their minds a terror deeper and more effectual in proportion as it was accompanied by a misgiving how far they might conscientiously oppose its authority. Many of the nobler and more enlightened, especially on the comparatively free soil of Aragon, struggled against an invasion of their rights whose consequences they partly foresaw. But the powers of the government and the Church, united in measures which were sustained by the passions and religion of the lower classes of society, became irresistible. The fires of the Inquisition were gradually lighted over the whole country, and the people everywhere thronged to witness its sacrifices, as acts of faith and devotion.

“From this moment, Spanish intolerance, which through the Moorish wars had accompanied the contest and shared its chivalrous spirit, took that air of sombre fanaticism which it never afterwards lost. Soon, its warfare was turned against the opinions and thoughts of men, even more than against their external conduct or their crimes. The Inquisition, which was its true exponent and appropriate instrument, gradually enlarged its own jurisdiction by means of crafty abuses, as well as by the regular forms of law, until none found himself too humble to escape its notice, or too high to be reached by its power. The whole land bent under its influence, and the few who comprehended the mischief that must follow bowed, like the rest, to its authority, or were subjected to its punishments.

“From an inquiry into the private opinions of individuals to an interference with the press and with printed books there was but a step. It was a step, however, that was not taken at once; partly because books were still few and of little comparative importance anywhere, and partly because in Spain, they had already been subjected to the censorship of the civil authority, which, in this particular, seemed unwilling to surrender its jurisdiction. But such scruples were quickly removed by the appearance and progress of the Reformation of Luther; a revolution which comes within the next period of the history of Spanish literature, when we shall find displayed in their broad practical results the influence of the spirit of intolerance and the power of the Church and the Inquisition on the character of the Spanish people.”

The Second Period embraces the literature of Spain from the accession of the Austrian family to its extinction, or from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth, about two centuries. The preceding period had brought to light the germ of Spanish culture, had marked its direction, and indicated its leading features and forms. It had also seen the convulsions of the political elements passing away, and the divided kingdoms consolidating into a single mighty monarchy. The national character was distinctly traced out; the materials of a magnificent literature were accumulated; a lan-

guage of wonderful beauty and power had been formed ; and the genius of the people had already manifested a force and originality and depth, from which the noblest results might rightfully have been anticipated. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fatal introduction of the Inquisition, this second period saw the literature of Spain reach its most blooming state. True the popular bigotry increased, and the fires of persecution burned with fiercer intensity in consequence of the breaking out of the Reformation. Yet every department of Spanish culture flourished within this period, and some departments were developed with a luxuriant abundance such as the world has rarely if ever witnessed. The history of this portion of his subject occupies the greater part of Mr. Ticknor's work, filling the last quarter of the first volume, the whole of the second, and about half of the third. We can only touch here and there upon the most prominent of the successive topics.

Hi herto the tone of Spanish literature had remained unaffected by foreign influences. During the reign of John the Second, letters and taste had decayed, and but little was done in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella. But the connections with Italy, diplomatic and otherwise, became close, and brought the influence of the genius of that classic land to bear directly upon the state of letters in Spain. War and negotiations carried many of the most distinguished Spaniards to Italy, and made them familiarly acquainted with the poets, historians and artists who had raised the intellectual glory of the Italian republics to its highest pitch, and whatever was most distinguished for rank and ability in Spain crossed the Alps and willingly breathed in the genial atmosphere of letters and the arts amidst the inspiring memorials of the ancient seat of Roman power. From these causes arose the Italian School, founded by Boscan and Garcilasso, and the literary controversies that followed in its train. Mr. Ticknor's account of this phase in Spanish culture is highly interesting and learned ; but the rapid growth of dramatic literature is the most remarkable phenomenon in the reign of Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second. The progress of the drama from the rude but spirited pieces of Lope de Rueda to the highest works of Lope de Vega and Calderon presents one of the most remarkable features of modern literature, and can only be compared with the wonderful period of *Æschylus*, *Sophocles* and *Euripides* at Athens. The Spanish dramatic literature of that time is not only surprising for the richness and brilliancy of invention it displays ; for its thorough national spirit ; for the unexampled fertility of its principal authors ; but further, it is profoundly original not only in essence but in form, its rhythmical peculiarities being as national as the chivalrous manners and the tone of sentiment. The facile rhythm of the old

asonant ballads, which the Spanish poets consider equally adapted to every species of composition, the metrical form of the dialogue, is wholly unlike the dialogue of any other dramatic literature, ancient or modern; wholly unlike the iambic senarii of the Greeks and Romans, or the ten syllable blank verse of the English and German, or the Alexandrines of the French or Italians, and wanting, certainly to the foreign ear, in the gravity and dignity which are usually considered appropriate at least to tragedy. The Spanish drama is besides remarkable for the variety of its species and classes, and for the large intermixture of the lyrical element, which on the other hand brings it again into a certain resemblance to the tragedy and comedy of the Athenians.

Mr. Ticknor has discussed all these points at great length, with a minuteness of knowledge, and a clearness of exposition which place him, as a profound critic, far above Bouterwek and Sismondi, who up to this time have been the leading authorities. In his account of Lope de Vega, we recognize a more thorough acquaintance with the life, works and character of that wonderful man than in the *Life of Lope* by the late accomplished nobleman, Lord Holland; and in the estimate of the character and genius of Calderon, the successor of Lope, who has been placed by Schlegel at the head of the romantic school, we find a much more discriminating judgment than in the discourses of the eloquent, but somewhat mystical and exaggerating German. We merely add that the criticisms are illustrated and sustained by copious analyses, and translated passages, from the principal works of these writers. Three chapters are devoted to the life and works of Cervantes, whose name is, of course, the best known abroad of all the Spanish writers, and who is one of the noblest as well as most unfortunate of literary men. Mr. Ticknor discusses with singular ability the theories that some speculating critics have started, respecting the internal or symbolical meaning of *Don Quixote*, and shows in the most conclusive manner that the meaning obvious on the face of the work is the true and only one. We cite the concluding paragraph.

“The romance, however, which he threw so carelessly from him, and which, I am persuaded, he regarded rather as a bold effort to break up the absurd taste of his time for the fancies of chivalry than as anything of more serious import, has been established by an uninterrupted, and, it may be said, an unquestioned, success ever since, both as the oldest classical specimen of romantic fiction, and as one of the most remarkable monuments of modern genius. But though this may be enough to fill the measure of human fame and glory, it is not all to which Cervantes is entitled; for, if we would do him the justice that would have been

dearest to his own spirit, and even if we would ourselves fully comprehend and enjoy the whole of his *Don Quixote*, we should, as we read it, bear in mind, that this delightful romance was not the result of a youthful exuberance of feeling and a happy external condition, nor composed in his best years, when the spirits of its author were light and his hopes high; but that — with all its unquenchable and irresistible humor, with its bright views of the world, and its cheerful trust in goodness and virtue — it was written in his old age, at the conclusion of a life nearly every step of which had been marked with disappointed expectations, disheartening struggles, and sore calamities; that he began it in a prison, and that it was finished when he felt the hand of death pressing heavy and cold upon his heart. If this be remembered as we read, we may feel, as we ought to feel, what admiration and reverence are due, not only to the living power of *Don Quixote*, but to the character and genius of Cervantes; — if it be forgotten or underrated, we shall fail in regard to both."

The remaining chapters of this division are devoted to historical and narrative poems, lyric poetry, satirical poetry, ballad poetry, romantic fiction, epistolary correspondence, historical composition and didactic prose. From the concluding remarks on the decay of the Spanish character, we quote a short passage setting forth, in vivid but sober terms the effects of the poison introduced into the national character by the inquisition.

"Unhappily, this spirit, mistaken for the religion that had sustained them through their long-protracted contest with their infidel invaders, was all but universal in Spain during this whole period. The first and the last of the House of Austria, — Charles the Fifth and the feeblest of his descendants, — if alike in nothing else, were alike in the zeal with which they sustained the Holy Office while they lived, and with which, by their testaments, they commended it to the support and veneration of their respective successors. Nor did the intervening kings show less deference to its authority. The first royal act of Philip the Second, when he came from the Low Countries to assume the crown of Spain, was to celebrate an *auto da fé* at Valladolid. When the young and gay daughter of Henry the Second of France arrived at Toledo, in 1560, that city offered an *auto da fé* as part of the rejoicings deemed appropriate to her wedding; and the same thing was done by Madrid, in 1632, for another French princess, when she gave birth to an heir to the crown; — odious proofs of the degree to which bigotry had stifled both the dictates of an enlightened reason and the common feelings of humanity.

But in all this the people and their leaders rejoiced. When a nobleman, about to die for adherence to the Protestant faith, passed the balcony where Philip the Second sat in state, and appealed to him not to see his innocent subjects thus cruelly put to death, the monarch replied, that, if it were his own son, he would gladly carry the fagots for his execution; and the answer was received at the time, and recorded afterwards, as one worthy of the head of the mightiest empire in the world. And again, in

1680, when Charles the Second was induced to signify his desire to enjoy, with his young bride, the spectacle of an *auto da fé*, the artisans of Madrid volunteered in a body to erect the needful amphitheatre, and labored with such enthusiasm, that they completed the vast structure in an incredibly short space of time; cheering one another at their work with devout exhortations, and declaring that, if the materials furnished them should fail, they would pull down their own houses in order to obtain what might be wanting to complete the holy task.¹

“Nor had the principle of royalty, always so prominent in the Spanish character, become less perverted and mischievous than the religious principle. It offered its sincere homage alike to the cold severity of Philip the Second, to the weak bigotry of Philip the Third, to the luxurious selfishness of Philip the Fourth, and to the miserable imbecility of Charles the Second. The waste and profligacy of such royal favorites as the Duke of Lerma and the Count Duke Olivares, which ended in national bankruptcy and disgrace, failed seriously to affect the sentiments of the people towards the person of the monarch, or to change their persuasions that their earthly sovereign was to be addressed in words and with feelings similar to those with which they approached the Majesty of Heaven. The king — merely because he was the king — was looked upon substantially as he had been in the days of Saint Ferdinand and the “Partidas,” when he was accounted the direct vicegerent of Heaven, and the personal proprietor of all those portions of the globe which he had inherited with his crown. The Duc de Vendôme, therefore, showed his thorough knowledge of the Spanish character, when, in the War of the Succession, — Madrid being in possession of the enemy, and everything seeming to be lost, — he still declared, that, if the persons of the king, the queen, and the prince were but safe, he would himself answer for final success. In fact, the old principle of loyalty, sunk into a submission — voluntary,

¹ One of the most remarkable books that can be consulted, to illustrate the character and feelings of all classes of society in Spain at the end of the seventeenth century, is the “Relacion,” etc., of this “Auto General” of 1680, published immediately afterwards at Madrid, by Joseph del Olmo, one of the persons who had been most busy in its arrangements. It is a small quarto of 308 pages, and gives, as if describing a magnificent theatrical pageant, the details of the scene, which began at seven o'clock in the morning of June 30th, and was not over till nine o'clock of the following morning, the king and queen sitting in their box or balcony, to witness it, fourteen hours of that time. Eighty-five grandees entered themselves as especial *familiares*, or servants, of the Holy Office, to do honor to the occasion; and the king sent from his own hand the first fagot to the accursed pile. The whole number of victims exhibited was one hundred and twenty, of whom twenty-one were burnt alive; but it does not appear that the royal party actually witnessed this portion of the atrocities. From the whole account, however, there can be no doubt that devout Spaniards generally regarded the exhibition with favor, and most of them with a much stronger feeling. Madame d'Aulnoy (Voyage, Tom. III. p. 154) had a description of the ceremonies intended for this *auto da fé* given to her, as if it were to be an honor to the monarchy, by one of the Counsellors of the Inquisition; but I think she left Madrid before it occurred.

it is true, and not without grace, but still an unhesitating submission — to the mere authority of the king, seemed to have become the only efficient bond of connection between the crown and its subjects, and the main resource of the state for the preservation of social order. The nation ceased to claim its most important rights, if they came in conflict with the rights claimed by the royal prerogative; so that the resistance of Aragon in the case of Perez, and that of Catalonia against the oppressive administration of the Count Duke Olivares, were easily put down by the zeal of the very descendants of the *Comuneros* of Castile.

"It is this degradation of the loyalty and religion of the country, infecting as it did every part of the national character, which we have felt to be undermining the general culture of Spain during the seventeenth century; its workings being sometimes visible on the surface, and sometimes hidden by the vast and showy apparatus of despotism and superstition under which it was often concealed even from its victims. But it is a most melancholy fact in the case, that whatever of Spanish literature survived at the end of this period found its nourishment in such feelings of religion and loyalty as still sustained the forms of the monarchy, — an imperfect and unhealthy life, wasting away in an atmosphere of death. At last, as we approach the conclusion of the century, the Inquisition and the despotism seem to be everywhere present, and to have cast their blight over everything. All the writers of the time yield to their influences, but none in a manner more painful to witness, than Calderon and Solis; the two whose names close up the period, and leave so little to hope for the future. For the "*Autos*" of Calderon and the "*History*" of Solis were undoubtedly regarded, both by their authors and by the public, as works eminently religious in their nature; and the respect, and even reverence, with which each of these great men treated the wretched and imbecile Charles the Second, were as undoubtedly accounted to them by their contemporaries for religious loyalty and patriotism. At the present day, we cannot doubt that a literature which rests in any considerable degree on such foundations must be near to its fall."

By these observations we shall be prepared to find the history of Spanish literature during the third period, or from the accession of the Bourbon family to the invasion of Buonaparte, a sad record of political and literary decline. The war of the Succession following upon the death of Charles the Second still further exhausted the energies of unhappy Spain, and made it the battle-field of foreign and civil strife, until the peace of Utrecht, concluded in 1713, established the claims of the Bourbon family, and left the kingdom, though shorn of half its European dominions, at least the blessings of peace for the renewed cultivation of literature and art. Philip the Fifth, however, had been educated at the court of Louis the Fourteenth, and it could not well be otherwise than that French influences and French taste should prevail in the literature he was sincerely desirous of promoting. The first important work undertaken in his reign was the

founding of an academy, principally for the cultivation and establishment of the purity of the Castilian language, whose members immediately set about the preparation of a dictionary. This great work they completed in six folio volumes, between 1726 and 1739, an abridgment of which was printed in 1780, and this has continued to be an authoritative standard of the language. Other works relating to the Spanish language gave evidence that the academy was not idle. But the creative spirit of the Spanish seemed to have exhausted itself in the brilliant ages which were gone; and there was little to give hope of a revival of the ancient national tone. Unlike England and France, the Spanish nation took little pains to lay a deep foundation for the permanent development of the national mind. The bad influence of the Catholic church, though not directly interfering with the first sprightly runnings of inventive imagination, was deadly to the cultivation of the reason. A sound intellectual philosophy could not grow up under the shadow of the Inquisition; a comprehensive and liberal education had but a small chance of general adoption when it pointed to the horrors of the secret chamber, or led to the fiery martyrdom of the stake. Physical science was stifled ere its birth under the watchful jealousy of a priestly tyranny which detected damnable heresies in every natural truth. Critical interpretation of the Scriptures would find but little favor after the rumor of certain opinions respecting the Song of Solomon, not quite in accordance with the views of the popish doctors, carried the illustrious Ponce de Leon to the prisons of the Holy Office, and kept him there five years undergoing every torture that could be inflicted consistently with the preservation of life. These are the secrets of the decline of Spain. Yet many noble men have adorned this period by the display of genius capable of exalting a nation; of patriotism ready to bear all things — reproach, imprisonment, exile, and death itself for their beloved country. We need mention only such men as Father Isla, the Moratins, Yriarte, Melendez Valdes, Jovellanos, and Quintana. Able scholars and admirable writers are still upon the stage of life. The spirit of the age may still, through them, breathe fresh energies into the national character. Works like this of Mr. Ticknor must make them feel that the genius of Spain is honored and revered, and that the scholars of another hemisphere regard the country with admiration for the past and hope for the future.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE SYSTEM OF EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITIES OF
OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE.

THE basis of education at these universities has long been, as is well known, the classics and mathematical science. At Oxford, classical study has been the reigning, though not the exclusive pursuit. At Cambridge, mathematical science has had the precedence, though, for many years, the study of Latin and Greek has been earnestly pursued. The system of instruction at both universities has lately undergone some important changes, and it is doubtless susceptible of still further improvements. This system had its origin many ages ago, and it is not strange that it should not have kept pace with the busy world around. Yet with all the acknowledged imperfections of the system, with all the evils which may have resulted from those imperfections, Oxford and Cambridge have been the source of great and inestimable blessings. The system has worked out an amount of good far preponderant over the evil; and we may ask, Do not the two subjects—Mathematical Science and the Classics—*now* lie, as in past times, at the basis of liberal education? Are other sciences and branches of literature, however important, to be regarded as fundamental? Is a natural science, or a modern language to be put on a level with geometry and Greek? These questions we shall endeavor to discuss in a future Number of this Journal. They seem to us to deserve a patient and fresh examination. We wish to call attention, particularly, to some of the results of the English system. At present we shall confine ourselves to a brief exhibition of certain changes recently effected at Oxford and Cambridge, and of further alterations which are advocated from various quarters.

The changes effected in the Oxford course are in substance the following. There are to be three public university examinations, instead of two as heretofore. In the examination, technically termed "Responsions," which takes place about one year and a half from the commencement of the course, little change has been introduced. The subjects comprise one Greek and one Latin author, arithmetic, two books of Euclid, or, instead of arithmetic, algebra may be substituted. The second examination, the "first Public Examination," occurs about the end of the fourth year from matriculation. For the ordinary candidates, the following are the subjects: one Latin and one Greek book (different from those used in "the Responsions"), the four Gospels in Greek, algebra,

either logic or three books of Euclid, the translation of English into Latin, and a paper of questions in syntax. For candidates for classical honors, the following are the subjects: the four Gospels, the great writers of antiquity (Homer, Virgil, Cicero and Demosthenes being recommended), logic, if the candidate wishes to be in the first division, otherwise Euclid and algebra, critical and other papers, translations into Latin and Greek. Candidates for mathematical honors must "bring up" pure mathematics. At the third or "Final Examination," the candidate must necessarily pass two of the four schools to be named. In the first school, "*Literae Humaniores*," the topics are the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, sacred history, the subjects of the books of the Old and New Testament, evidences of Christianity, one philosophical and one historical author in Greek or Latin (but not the same books as in the "*Responsions*"), papers of questions. The "class men" may "give up" one or more of the Epistles, logic (logic necessary if one aims at the first or second class), Greek and Latin languages, history, chronology, geography, poetics, political ethics, as in the present system, and illustrated by modern writers. All the candidates must pass, besides, in one of the three following schools, but not necessarily in the same term. The "first school" embraces the mathematical part of mineralogy, six books of Euclid, or the first part of algebra, and for candidates for honors, pure and mixed mathematics. The "second school" — "natural science" — includes mineralogy, the principles of two of these three parts of natural philosophy, viz. mechanical philosophy, chemistry, and physiology, and an acquaintance with some one science included under mechanical philosophy. The candidate for honors must be acquainted with the three parts above named. The "third school" — is "law and history." The minimum includes English history from the Conquest to the end of Henry the VIIth's reign, or from the accession of Henry VIII. to George I. For those who take the earlier part of English history, Blackstone on Real Property is required; for those who take the latter portions of English history, Blackstone on Personal Property and the Rights of Persons, or Justinian in lieu of Blackstone. The candidates for honors must take, in addition, Adam Smith, modern history to 1790, international law and civil law. "Elegant scholarship will be rewarded by distinguished marks." "It is necessary that arithmetic should be well taught in schools, as none can go through the examinations without a knowledge of geometry."

Some of the changes above indicated were adopted on the 24th of April, 1850. Some time must of course elapse before the new system can be brought into practice. A serious difficulty as to its working has been suggested, arising from the mode of electing fellows to the differ-

ent colleges. The entire instruction is in the hands of the college tutors, unless the student resorts to the expense of private tuition. The tutors are usually chosen from the fellows. The average number of fellows in a college at Oxford is twenty-eight. But as more than half of these are non-resident, the available number, out of which tutors must be chosen, is less than fourteen. The majority of the colleges, however, have not the option of selecting the tutor out of fourteen. The colleges which have the larger number of fellows, have the smaller number of undergraduates. Several of the colleges have forty fellows each, while some come down to an average of six or seven, out of whom the tutors are to be chosen. But in so small a number as six or seven, persons are not likely to be found competent to teach in the various branches of the languages, logic, poetics, politics, ethics, ancient history, mathematics, various departments of physical science, etc. Yet there must be a considerable number of competent teachers in all these branches, if the new system is to be carried through efficiently. The difficulty is still further enhanced by the close-fellowship system which is peculiar to Oxford. With the exception of nearly all the fellowships of Oriel and Balliol, those of the other colleges are subject to various restrictions. In ten out of the nineteen colleges, the great majority of the fellowships are restricted in respect to birth. Candidates must be born in particular counties, or dioceses, and in few cases on particular manors, or in particular families. Consequently tutors must be chosen, not merely out of the average number of fourteen individuals, but these individuals must not be selected out of the university at large. Another class of restrictions make it necessary to elect a youth of from seventeen to nineteen years of age, either to a fellowship at once, or to a scholarship which leads to a fellowship. Eleven colleges are more or less subjected to this restriction. Several of them require, besides, that the candidates for fellowships or scholarships should have been educated at particular schools. Christ Church, New College, Magdalene, St. John's, Jesus and Pembroke, which, taken as a whole, are by far the wealthiest in the university, are among the colleges in which the custom prevails of electing youths to be fellows at once, prior to their admittance to the university, or the nearly similar one, of electing them to scholarships which lead to fellowships.¹ Such regulations would seem to be ill fitted to produce accomplished tutors in the various departments of knowledge. Still, if there be an honest intention on the part of the university to carry out the recent enactments, — and in the present state of the public mind in England, the university would find it unwise to recede or remain stationary — means for instruction will be provided by a more liberal ar-

¹ London Athenaeum, Jan. 19, 1850.

range in regard to the fellowships, or by establishing a system of teaching independent of the colleges, or by increasing the university rewards and distinctions, or by all these combined.

We will now proceed to the sister university, Cambridge. In May, 1846, a standard scheme or system for the study of the more elementary portions of the mathematics was established. The elementary subjects thus included are Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid, Plane Trigonometry, Mechanics, and the elementary parts of Hydrostatics, Optics and Astronomy. The examinations for mathematical honors have been regulated by this scheme since January, 1848. Another change is, that this elementary examination is separated from that in the higher mathematics. The latter takes place after an interval of eight days, and those persons only are admitted to the examination who are declared by the examiner to have acquitted themselves satisfactorily in the lower subjects. A third change is the establishment of a "Board of Mathematical Studies" for the purpose of taking a general oversight of those studies in the university, and of determining what portion of mathematics shall be included in the examination for the higher honors. It is made the duty of this Board to publish every year a report on the subject. The Report for May, 1849, gives a favorable view of the effect of these changes. "Generally, the candidates, who acquitted themselves [in the examination of 1848, 1849] best on the first three days of examination were also the most successful in the remainder; and it never happened that those who acquired little credit in the first part of the examination, attained eventually to a high place on the Tripos." The hours of examination in the first three days, in the examination of 1849, amounted to 17; in the last five to 27½. The number of candidates that obtained honors was 135.

Another change of great importance was the establishment by vote of the Senate, Oct. 31, 1848, of two new Triposes, or Honor Lists, (schemes of assigning honors according to the result of an examination in a general collection of sciences to be grouped together by the university for that purpose). The "Moral Sciences Tripos" includes Moral Philosophy, Political Economy, Modern History, General Jurisprudence and the Laws of England; the "Natural Sciences Tripos" includes Human and Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Chemistry, Botany, Geology and the Mathematical part of Mineralogy. These new honors are made accessible to all who have passed the ordinary examination, that is to the *Polloi*. The reason for not requiring a mathematical honor as a condition for the new Triposes was the wish to encourage the competition for honors in these new sciences, since these Triposes do not yet open doors to stations and emoluments in the col-

leges, as the mathematics and classics do. Dr. Whewell, Master of Trinity College, has offered two prizes, annually, so long as he is professor of Moral Philosophy, of fifteen pounds sterling each, to the two persons who shall show the greatest proficiency in Moral Philosophy. An important change has also been made in the "Classical Tripos," which was established in 1822. The honors of this Tripos have been hitherto restricted to those who had obtained the mathematical honor of Junior Optime. But by a vote of Oct. 31, 1849, the first class of the *Polloi*, as well as the Wranglers and Senior and Junior Optimes, are to be admitted to compete for the classical honors.

Some changes were introduced in 1842 into the Theological Examinations. All students, whether intended for holy orders or not, are now examined, at "the previous examination," in one of the four Gospels in Greek, Paley's Evidences of Christianity, the Old Testament History and one of the Greek and one of the Latin classics, besides some elementary mathematics. The Old Testament History is a new topic. In the ordinary examination of all the students for the degree of B. A., the subjects are the first fourteen, or the last fourteen, chapters of the Acts, one of the longer or two or more of the shorter Epistles in Greek, one Greek and one Latin classic, three of the six books of Paley's Moral Philosophy, the history of the church from its origin to the assembling of the council of Nice, the History of the English Reformation, and the prescribed Mathematics. These subjects had not previously been required, except the classics, the mathematics, and some part of Paley. In the first or second week of the Michaelmas term of each year, there is an examination, for those who are intended for holy orders, in the Greek Testament, assigned portions of the early Fathers, Church History, the Articles of Religion, and the Liturgy of the Church of England. A voluntary examination succeeds in a portion of the Hebrew Scriptures. This theological examination is affirmed to be "exercising a very beneficial influence upon the theological training of the Cambridge students because almost all the bishops require that the persons whom they ordain shall have passed this examination satisfactorily." It is voluntary so far as the university is concerned, but the bishops make it compulsory on candidates for holy orders. Some laws have also been enacted in regard to degrees in medicine.¹

Some of these changes, it will be perceived, are of special significance, particularly the one which dispenses with a mathematical honor

¹ Cambridge Education. Discussions and Reports, 1840--1850. By William Whewell, D. D., Master of Trinity College. London, 1850. See also Cambridge University Calendar for 1850.

as a condition for those who would take part in the new triposes. Dr. Whewell, who was one of the most efficient promoters of the late reforms, and who, from his position and character, exerts a commanding influence, thinks that any further legislation at present is unadvisable. Most of the new laws will require time for their effect, and even to show of what nature their effect will be. There is, however, one exception to this remark. A beneficial change may at once be introduced into the method of studying the classics. The formal study should no longer be exclusively pursued. Earnest attention should be devoted to the substance of the Greek and Latin authors. Matters of history, politics, law, antiquities, etc., ought to form essential topics for the public examinations. An unfounded prejudice has long been felt at Cambridge in relation to this species of acquisition, which, in combination with the study of forms, metres, dialects, etc., has so honorably distinguished the German method of studying the classics.

Yet, along with a change at the universities in this respect, a reform is greatly needed at the public, preparatory schools. "The flower of our English youth," Dr. Whewell remarks, "spend at these schools the years during which the greater part is acquired of all that youths do acquire in the way of learning. The tastes there generated, the estimates of different kinds of knowledge there communicated by the contagion of society, are not easily afterwards changed." "It is not, I conceive, too much to say that the great schools (Winchester, Eton, Westminster, etc.), exercise a greater influence than the universities upon the higher education in England; and that no measures for the improvement of that education will be efficacious if they do not extend their effects to the schools as well as the universities."¹ It is well known that the classics form almost the exclusive pursuit at these schools. Other studies, if introduced, are not regarded with favor and are not suitably rewarded. It is urged with great propriety, that the elements of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, etc., should form a part of the *daily* business of every school which is intended to prepare students for the universities. The student ought not to confine the first seventeen or eighteen years of his life to the study of the classics, however essential that study may be. He should become familiar with the elements of some of the sciences, and acquire those habits which these studies alone produce.² In no other way will the particular intellec-

¹ Cambridge Education, pp. 63, 64.

² "I was a good classic, and acquitted myself well in the college examinations; but mathematics which my mind greatly needed, I almost entirely neglected, and was told that I was too clever to require them." — Life of Wilberforce, Am. Ed. p. 17.

tual tendency of different individuals have an opportunity to show itself.

Some additional changes of a more general character are strenuously and with reason urged by various individuals and parties in England. Before alluding to these, however, it may be well for a moment to consider the legality of any change. The friends of improvement in the university discipline have been met with the allegation, that any interference, especially from without, would be a violation of chartered rights, that the will of the founders of the colleges must be preserved intact, that neither the government of the country or of the university have any right to set aside the explicit statutes of a benefactor or founder.

In opposition to these representations it is maintained, that the founders themselves, if now living, would acquiesce in the propriety of many changes; that it cannot be supposed that they would wish to have their benefactions remain in abeyance, much less prove the means of injury to the country; that in proportion to their real benevolence, they would wish to have their legacies available in the highest degree for the good of the community; in other words, that in the interpretation of trusts of this nature, we cannot be tied by exact rules; we must rather be governed by enlarged considerations of duty and expediency.

Again, the statutes of the founders, on fundamental points, have been formally and repeatedly annulled. In the reign of Edward VI. the Royal Visitation declared everything null and void in the statutes which had any essential connection with the Papacy. Most of the scholastic exercises were abolished. The study of scholastic theology and canon law had been already laid under restrictions by Henry VIII. When Mary ascended the throne, the old *regime* was restored, including the study of Scholastic Philosophy, Theology and Canon Law. Under Elizabeth, the universities were again made essentially Protestant. Every academican, whose conscience forbade him to take the oath of supremacy and to renounce the catholic religion, was ejected. In Oxford, no less than fourteen heads of colleges and nearly ninety fellows were expelled. In Cambridge, besides several fellows, eleven heads of colleges were driven out.¹ It is to be remembered, also, that the representatives of this ejected party still exist in England.

Religious and most solemn obligations of the founders of particular colleges have often been completely annulled. Thus the charter of All Souls at Oxford imposes an obligation on the society forever to

¹ Huber's English Universities, Newman's Ed. I. 307.

pray for the good estate of Henry VI. and the archbishop, during their lives, and for their souls after their decease; and also for the souls of Henry V. and others, and for the souls of all the faithful deceased. Thus this charter on a vital provision has been annulled.

Again, portions of founders' statutes become inextricably involved, and occasion endless litigation. Thus Henry Chichele, archbishop of Canterbury, the founder of All Souls College, ordained that the fellows should be born in lawful wedlock, in the province of Canterbury, with a preference to the next of kin, descended from his brothers Robert and William. But in the progress of time, the difficulty of ascertaining consanguinity becomes almost insuperable. In 1765, the collateral descendants of the founder were to be traced through nearly twelve hundred families. In 1766, on application to archbishop Cornwallis, as visitor, he decreed that the number of fellows admitted on claim of kindred should be limited to twenty.¹

In short numerous precedents exist which fully justify the alteration or the annulling of founders' statutes when the best good of the universities requires such change. Doubtless the will of the donor is to be sacredly respected in all doubtful cases. No change is to be introduced except where the expediency of it is undoubted. But to pertinaciously resist any alterations or abrogation of a statute would, in some instances, lead to the infliction on the community of positive, perhaps unmitigated evil; in other instances, a strict compliance is an impossibility.

One of the reforms in the universities which has at various times been urged is the abolition of the ecclesiastical test, by which Dissenters are excluded from matriculation at Oxford and from degrees at Cambridge. In the year 1834 a bill for the admission of Dissenters to academical degrees at Oxford and Cambridge, passed the House of Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords. Among the statesmen, who gave their sanction to the proposed opening, either in whole or in part, were Lords Stanley, John Russell, Radnor, Palmerston, etc. A Cambridge petition in favor of the change was signed by sixty-two resident members of the Senate of the university, among whom were Bishop Thirlwall, Dr. Peacock now dean of Ely, etc. In this petition it is stated that "the university is a body recognized by the law of England as a Lay Corporation, invested with important civil privileges, and on that account resting on no secure foundation which is not in harmony with the social system of the State." By the repeal of the Test Act, Christians of all denominations are admitted to seats in Parliament. Why should a test still be required in the university, which debars from the civil privileges implied in a degree? A counter peti-

¹ Chalmers's Oxford, I. 167.

tion was presented which was signed by two hundred and fifty-eight members of the Senate, only ninety-eight of whom, however, were resident members. The principal reason assigned by the remonstrants was, that a compliance with the prayer that the admission of persons, whose religious opinions were adverse to those of the established church, would render the maintenance of any uniform system of wholesome discipline or sound religious instruction impracticable. To this it was replied by Lord John Russell and others, that Dissenters of all denominations had for a long time been admitted into the university of Cambridge, and no practical inconvenience had resulted from it.¹ The only difficulty was that when they were about to leave the university, they were told that they should not receive the degree to which their knowledge and good conduct fully entitled them. "All observation and all analogy," observes Bishop Thirlwall, (formerly fellow of Trinity College), "lead us to expect that the sons of Dissenters of the middling class and it is such alone that we have to look for here, would add strength to that part of our students which we desire to see growing till it absorb all the rest, to that part which includes the quiet, the temperate, the thoughtful, the industrious, those who feel the value of their time and the dignity of their pursuits."² "At the present time," 1843, says Mr. Heywood, "the strictest impartiality characterizes the examinations both of the university and the colleges at Cambridge. No questions are asked about the Church of England students or Roman Catholic or Dissenting students, and the rewards which are accessible to all, are faithfully distributed to the most deserving. In Trinity College, Cambridge, Dissenters have been repeatedly candidates for the scholarships, and, occasionally, they have obtained these honorable rewards of merit."³ Little danger could be apprehended of the overthrow of the authority of the established church at the universities by the admission of Dissenters, for those classes in England from which the universities are recruited, are by an immense preponderance, connected

¹ In 1834, a son of the Earl of Surrey, a Roman Catholic, was a member. In 1836, Mr. Adlam, a member of Trinity College, and belonging to the society of Friends, and now M. P. for Leeds, obtained the distinguished honor of fourth Wrangler. Mr. Sylvester, a Jew, obtained in 1837, the still more distinguished honor of second Wrangler. He would have competed for and probably obtained the two Smith prizes of £25 each, had not the religious test stood in the way. A Turkish student at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, was recently allowed to absent himself from chapel in that College. The provost of Trinity College, Dublin, liberally grants leave for Dissenting or Roman Catholic students to absent themselves from the services of the Church of England in the college chapel. Dissenters are admitted to degrees, though not to emolument in that college.

² Letter to the Bishop of Peterborough.

³ Appendix to Huber's Universities, III. p. 668.

with that church. "By thus admitting Dissenters to her privileges and emoluments, the University may gain a considerable accession of numbers and talent to her ranks, and whilst she enlarges the sphere of her usefulness, will positively increase the security of her position. It is impossible to observe what is passing around us and not be convinced that no present superiority of numbers can render a position tenable and safe, which involves a manifest injustice to the minority; by conceding that which in justice ought to be conceded, the friends of the church may strengthen their means of resistance to undue encroachment."¹ It is said, indeed, that the liberal terms on which the Scotch Universities are opened to all classes, and the establishment of the London University, preclude the necessity of the opening of Oxford and Cambridge to Dissenters. But to be jealously excluded from a right, even if that right when granted should not be made use of, is particularly irritating. Besides, there is a *prestige* with the names of Oxford and Cambridge, which later institutions can never hold out. There are venerable associations which cannot exist elsewhere. And, in addition, there are admirable facilities for acquiring an education to which no other places in Britain can lay claim.

Another reform, which is strenuously urged is the abolition of the compulsory celibacy of Fellows imposed by the later statutes of Elizabeth. "This prohibition is contained in the statutes of the 12th year of Elizabeth, which have never been embodied in an act of Parliament, and never formally adopted by the senate of the university. The promulgation of these statutes, which effected a complete revolution in the constitution of the university, created nearly universal discontent, and as much opposition as the arbitrary principles of the government of Elizabeth rendered safe or tolerable." Whitgift, and other heads of colleges, who drew up the code, were careful not to impose on themselves the condition of celibacy, thus binding heavy burdens and not moving them with one of their fingers. There is reason to think, that the obnoxious prohibition may be ascribed in a measure to Elizabeth's strong prejudices against the marriage of the clergy in general. "Her majesty," writes secretary Cecil, "continueth very ill affected as to the state of matrimony in the clergy." It is an interesting fact that there is a clause in the university statutes, which renders every ordinance contained in them null and void, which is opposed to holy Scripture. Now it cannot be denied that institutions which forbid any class of men to marry, are contrary both to the

¹ Observations on University Reform by C. Eyres, M. A., Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, 1849, p. 12.

letter and spirit of Christianity. It has been said that marriage is unfavorable to a continued course of study, and incompatible with the due performance of collegiate duties. Such assertions, however, are not supported by facts. A clergyman on marriage does not become less studious of theology, or a less zealous pastor of his flock. The German universities produce critics, philologists, lecturers, unsurpassed elsewhere, and yet their superiority is not owing to the genial influence of celibacy. "The Fellows of Trinity College, Dublin, maintain the highest reputation for learning and ability and devotion to their calling, and cultivate a wider field of knowledge than is usual in the sister universities, yet all are married men."

The principal argument for adhering to the statute of celibacy is, that without it the vacant fellowships would not be sufficiently numerous to foster studious habits and a spirit of emulation among the undergraduates. In reply, it has been urged, that the number of undergraduates who, after their first year, pursue their studies in the hope of obtaining a fellowship, bears a small proportion to the whole, and if the number of vacancies were reduced by one fourth or one fifth, which is perhaps a larger proportion than is caused by marriage, it would not probably produce any sensible effect on the race of competitors. Besides, marriage removes from college men of eminent talents, who rely on their own abilities to obtain a livelihood, but who if they remained, would exercise the most salutary influence upon the undergraduates. It is also thought that the revenues of many of the colleges will soon be sufficient to enable them to enlarge the number of their fellowships. It has also been proposed that all fellowships shall be rendered voidable at a certain age, with an exception in favor of professors and of those who distinguish themselves by scientific or literary labors.¹

"The regulation which partially ejects a tutor from his office in case of his marrying has two bad results: first, it deprives the colleges of the services of their ablest members just at the time when their talents and services are ripening, so that those which have the most capable Fellows, are most exposed to the inconvenience of having too young tutors, for as a *general* rule the cleverest men marry the earliest, since they most easily find other means of supporting themselves; but secondly the number of resident families is greatly diminished by the tutorial celibacy, and the same may be said of non-resident professors. It is hardly requisite to argue and prove that the company of educated and amiable females tends to soften the boisterous spirit of youth,

¹ See the pamphlet of Mr. Eyres, pp. 14—22.

and to sustain in them the same modesty and discretion, which they observe in the presence of their mothers and sisters."¹

Again, it is contended that larger resources and greater prominence should be given to the universities in distinction from the colleges. "The university existed and flourished before the colleges were established. The students were accommodated in numerous halls. Every master of arts enjoyed a free trade in tuition. The effect of the foundation of the colleges has been to sink the university in the colleges. The latter, according to the original idea of their foundation, were not intended for the accommodation of a greater number of students than the members of their own several foundations. Gradually, however, they have encroached on the functions of the university. They have subverted all the existing Halls, [at Oxford] except five which are governed on strictly college principles. Five-sixths of the students are subject to their care and wholly dependent on them for tuition. The collegiate system has thrown the whole government of the university into the hands of the college Fellows, by affording them a liberal maintenance on the spot, and thus making them always the majority of the resident governing body."²

A partial remedy for this state of things, without interfering with the college fellowships, would be to increase the number and resources of the university professorships, reducing or abolishing the fees for attendance on the lectures of the professors, and by requiring attendance on these lectures, or a large number of them, as a condition for a degree. The general resources of the universities, also, should be increased. The University of Cambridge as such seems to be poor in available income. The principal sources of its annual income are as follows: The rectory of Burwell and a farm at Barton, producing about £1000 per annum; the produce of fees at matriculation, for degrees, etc., about £2000 per annum; and the trading profits of the Pitt University Press, which have as yet seldom been very considerable; as large sums of money have been expended for the improvement and extension of the establishment which will require, for adequate returns for the capital thus expended, many years of prosperous business. No account is here taken of the fees paid to proctors, moderators, etc., amounting to about £2400 per annum, as they are all paid to these officers, nor of the library tax of six shillings upon every member of the university, which is appropriated to the purchase of books for the public library.¹ The aggregate income of

¹ Newman in Huber's *Universities*, III. 519.

² London *Athenaeum*, Jan. 19, 1850, p. 73.

³ University Calendar, 1850, p. 5.

the colleges is stated to be one hundred and eighty thousand pounds sterling. "Here is a university the poorest in the world, composed of an aggregate of colleges the richest in the world, with the exception of the sister institutions at Oxford."¹ It is stated that the university has no church sufficiently large to receive all its members at a common service, while the only building at all fitted for such a congregation, King's College Chapel, is frequently destined to echo back the voices of a few choristers chanting before, or it may be with, still fewer worshippers. A laboratory for experiments in physics, a museum of natural history, a new botanical garden, etc., are also, it is said, urgently needed.² Of course, the university is in possession of an immense property in its library, Fitzwilliam museum, Pitt press, etc. These, however, furnish, with the exception of the press, no available income, but rather absorb a part of the income of the university.

Among the minor reforms which are needed at Cambridge is the placing of King's College on the same footing with the other colleges. Its present anomalous position awakens not a little uneasiness and complaint. The provost of this college has absolute authority within the precincts, and by special composition between it and the university, its undergraduates are exempt from the power of the proctors and other university officers within the limits of the college, and they are in no way examined by the university for their degree of B. A. "No traces," says Dr. Peacock, in his work on the Statutes, "of the real or contemplated existence of such a privilege, (exemption from university examinations,) are discoverable in the statutes of King's College." The university never agreed to make such an exemption, and yet it has been acquiesced in for several centuries. The practical effect is said to be, "that jealous isolation is substituted for independent freedom; as a body the public character of the King's men is lost, and the aimlessness which takes its place is felt throughout the inward life of the college. If their men are persons of ability, they are pent up in an unnatural stagnation; if the contrary, they hold their station by an equally unnatural tenure."³ It is stated that New College, Oxford, which, for many years, enjoyed, or rather suffered, the same exemption, has voluntarily abandoned it. Here is manifestly a case where some visitatorial or parliamentary interference is demanded. The

¹ Letter of Rev. C. Morivale, Fellow of St. John's College, quoted in Remarks on some questions of Economy and Finance, affecting the University of Cambridge, by J. R. Crowfoot, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, 1848, p. 7.

² Crowfoot's Remarks, p. 15.

³ Further Remarks on Statutes, and the Present System of King's College 1848, p. 23.

college, with all its wealth, has only *twelve* undergraduates, while Trinity has *five hundred and twenty-five*. The twelve scholars are supplied by a regular succession from Eton. The vacancies at King's for the last twenty years are under four in the year. The college has *fifty-eight* fellowships, and has the privilege of electing its undergraduates as fellows.

We may subjoin that further improvements in the course of instruction are urged and will, doubtless, sooner or later, be effected. Opportunity for certain changes may be furnished as soon as the great classical schools shall adequately teach the elements of the mathematics, so that all who enter the universities shall be well grounded in algebra and the principles of geometry. The vacations, too, at the universities seem to be unnecessarily long. Between twenty and thirty weeks only are annually devoted to study. It should seem that some means might be devised by which poor students might be enabled to continue a course of study for thirty-five or forty weeks. If these changes in the classical schools and in the length of the university course cannot be made, it would be a serious question whether the university course should be much enlarged by additional studies.

Nearly all who enter holy orders in the established church are educated at Oxford or Cambridge, yet with the late improvements at Cambridge, the system is very inadequate. The study of Hebrew is voluntary and finds but few votaries. It is urged that much more system should be introduced into theological instruction, that the theological professors should act more in concert in the construction of their lectures, and that the students should be required to attend the lectures more methodically, or for a longer period.¹

We have thus given some account of the changes which have been recently effected at these venerable seats of learning and of the reforms which are urged. In regard to the propriety of some of these reforms, or of the reasons which may be adduced against them, we express no opinion. We have gone into the subject with a little detail, first, that we might communicate some information which may be new, at least, to our American readers; secondly, that it might be shown that improvements and reforms, even at Oxford, are suggested and accomplished from within, though possibly under some external pressure; and thirdly, in order to prepare the way for some observations, which we propose to offer hereafter, on the course of studies at

¹ Letter of Rev. J. J. Blunt, Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, to Dr. Ollivant, Regius Professor, 1848.

these universities, and on the effects of this discipline on the English scholarship and character.

We observe, in the meantime, that Lord John Russell has intimated that a Royal Commission will soon be appointed to inquire into the state of the universities. It will be of a voluntary character, not compelling the attendance of witnesses, or the production of records, neither will it consider the question of the admission of dissenters to the universities. As it will, doubtless, be composed, in a great measure, of the alumni and friends of the universities, we can see little ground for the fears expressed by Sir R. H. Inglis, Mr. Gladstone, and other gentlemen, that the reforms commenced by the universities themselves may be interrupted, that radical and unwise measures may be recommended, and that chartered rights and privileges may be infringed or endangered. We can conceive that a thorough and impartial Report from a well constituted committee, would allay groundless apprehensions, and in many ways promote the usefulness and reputation of the universities.

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

1. SEARS'S LIFE OF LUTHER.¹

IN reading this volume, we receive a new impression of the wondrous providence of God in adapting means to ends, in fitting instruments for his needs. Calvin, Zuingli and Melancthon together could not have done Luther's work. That work called for the hearty, whole-souled, energetic, facetious, we had almost said half-civilized, Luther. When we look out for some individual to take charge of a great enterprise, we are apt to be anxious to obtain a perfect man, wise, prudent, temperate in all things, having his passions and his powers under perfect subjection. We do not remember that there are exigencies, great occasions, which, in a sense, demand imperfect agents. The excess of a good quality may be needed, to carry an actor through some trying emergency. Without overflowing

¹ The Life of Luther; with special Reference to its Earlier Periods, and the Opening Scenes of the Reformation. By Barnas Sears, D. D. Am. Sund. School Union. 1850. pp. 528.

animal spirits, he might faint and leave his work half done. Without a vein of pleasantry and humor, he might become melancholic or dull. Without an indomitable energy, not always tempered by discretion, he could not have borne his heavy burden. Without a boldness bordering on rashness, he would not have struck the decisive blow at the right time. A perfectly balanced character, especially at a great juncture, is a rare phenomenon. Luther enstamped himself on the heart of his country and of Protestant Christendom to the latest generations. Calvin engraved his intellect on a large section of the Christian world as with an iron pen in the rock forever. Melancthon's gentleness and learning are proverbial. Yet Luther's great intellect and greater heart, and, we may add, great imperfections, were indispensable "in the opening scenes of the Reformation." Calvin was feared, Melancthon was loved, Luther was loved and feared. There is perhaps no name in history so fresh, after three centuries, as is his, especially in Protestant Germany. The colors are unfading. It is a household word, imbedded in the hearts of millions, and which parents, unconsciously as it were, hand down to their children and their children's children. A spring or a tree becomes sacred, if he in a single instance quenched his thirst at the one or sat under the shade of the other. Every incident in his life is investigated. Any one who came in contact with him, whether friend or foe, shares a portion of his immortality. "There is one name, one man in German history, who, recognized indeed, only by half of Germany, still in this half, with the exception of a few who delight in singularity, or who are unfeeling skeptics, is named and celebrated with reverence and admiration as a benefactor and saviour by all others, without distinction of rank or culture." "Luther is a phenomenon in history, at the side of which nothing can be placed. There is no antitype to him in antiquity. Spiritual conflicts, such as were fought out by him, were reserved to modern times. But no other nation of modern times has one like him, and Germany itself has no second. True, there were besides, before and after him, many learned, pious men, courageous even unto death, pervaded by the insight of that which was necessary to be done; but no one was all this at once in the same degree as Luther."¹ Even Catholic Germany gives indications of beginning to share in this all-pervading sympathy. Catholic Bavaria has been compelled by stress of public opinion, to open her Valhalla to a statue of this "arch heretic."

Dr. Sears's Life of the reformer is the fruit of long and patient research. He speaks of having examined several hundred works pertaining to Luther. Every page bears testimony to the faithfulness with which he

¹ Preface of Gustav Pfizer's *Life of Luther*, 1836.

has used his rich materials. Clearness is the most striking characteristic. The tangled web of German history, geography, and topography, so far as Luther is concerned, is unravelled, and the reader enjoys the satisfaction of following a faithful and intelligent guide at every step. Theological terms, phraseology, manners, customs, etc., peculiar to the sixteenth century, are explained. The relations of Luther to the other reformers, to the princes, to the universities, to the pope, to the ruling powers in the church, etc., are accurately delineated. In short, the English reader now is furnished, for the first time, so far as we know, with the exact information which he needs for the comprehension of this great subject.

2. REID'S ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL POWERS.¹

A text-book on psychology has long been a *desideratum* in our university course. This want is now supplied by the republication of Reid's Essays in a volume separate from his other Works. These Essays have many claims to be the classical standard of our Intellectual Philosophy. They are written by an original thinker, and from that fact derive an exciting influence over the minds of students. A far greater stimulus is received from an author who thinks for himself than from a compiler, even when the compiler is more uniformly correct than are the men from whom he gathers his materials. Dr. Brown is less accurate than Dr. Payne, who gave an amended and condensed version of Brown, but we receive far more strength and real knowledge from the diffuse pages of the original lecturer, than from the cautious but mechanical statements of his copyist. The former is sprightly and eloquent, but over the mind of the latter the genius of gravitation seems often to have presided. The style of Reid is pellucid, and with one exception is admirably fitted for metaphysical discussion. It is perspicuous as glass. It also affords many specimens of a quiet and to certain minds an imperceptible humor. It is often, however, too diffuse. In the present Edition of Dr. Walker, this fault is remedied in some degree, for the Essays are here necessarily abridged. The general features of Dr. Reid's Philosophy are such as commend themselves to the sound sense of practical men, and receive the approval not only of the British and American schools, but also of many illustrious French and German philosophers. Dr. Walker has enriched the present volume with many valuable notes; some original, others selected from eminent psychologists, particularly from Sir William Hamilton. Having been for a

¹ Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man: by Thomas Reid, D. D., F.R.S.E., abridged. With Notes and Illustrations from Sir William Hamilton and others, Edited by James Walker, D. D., Prof. of Intellect. and Mor. Philos. in Harvard College.

long time a faithful student and a steadfast admirer of Reid's works, Sir William is admirably qualified to correct them where they are erroneous, and to supply their defect of learned illustration. His multifarious erudition surpasses his metaphysical acuteness even.

3. DAY'S ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC.¹

This work evinces both the learning and the acumen of its author. The preparation of it must have required an extensive acquaintance with the German treatises on rhetoric, and also an analytic, philosophical habit of thought. It exalts our estimate of the Rhetorical Science. This is a science which many regard as unworthy of them. But the truth is, they are unworthy of it. There is no better collection of the principles of mental philosophy and the maxims of common sense, than are found in a good Rhetorical System. In our country especially, which is a country of "words and more words," we need a scientific acquaintance with the great laws of speech. We dislike to hear the disparaging remarks which it is so fashionable to utter against the study of these laws. We believe that all science is sacred, and if one branch of it be condemned, another and indeed every other may be. Let the clerical Profession, in an especial manner, guard against the habit of undervaluing either the sciences or the arts, for by these we have no small part of our intellectual and moral wealth.

4. THEREMIN'S RHETORIC.²

Dr. Theremin, the eloquent court-preacher at Berlin, died in 1846. He was the author of various treatises on Rhetoric, in which he proceeds on the ground of the high ethical character of all true eloquence, that its basis is virtue, that every true orator must have a great and laudable end in view, that he must compass this end by just means, that he must utterly renounce all sophistical arts, all attempts to confuse an opponent, and all exaggerated exhibitions of the truth. Not only the highest, but all genuine exhibitions of oratory, must be the development of truth, must be coincident with the decisions of the moral law. The fact that the orator must be a good man has been recognized from the days of Cicero down; but Dr. Theremin is the first, we believe, who has fully unfolded the idea, who has

¹ Elements of the Art of Rhetoric, adapted for use in Colleges and Academies, and also for private study. By Henry N. Day, Professor of Rhetoric in Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio.

² Eloquence a Virtue; or Outlines of a Systematic Rhetoric. Translated from the German of Dr. Francis Theremin. By William G. T. Shedd, Prof. of English Literature in the University of Vermont. New York: John Wiley, 1850. pp. 162.

illustrated it from many points of view, and has made it the vitalizing principle of the whole subject. Perhaps we should be justified in saying that it became somewhat of a hobby with him, and led him to press certain points too far. Still, all his works are eminently worthy of study. The treatise before us will not supercede more formal and systematic works. It will be particularly serviceable, as Prof. Shedd suggests, to teachers. It will furnish them with invaluable hints and ideas which may be widely illustrated and strikingly enforced. Advanced students, also, will find it well worthy of perusal. The adoption of its leading ideas would ennoble the art of rhetoric into a science, the practice of speaking into a virtue, and would clothe the whole subject in our schools and colleges with a fresh and vital interest.

5. THE PERSIAN VIEW OF MOHAMMED.¹

Mr. Merrick resided eleven years as a missionary in Persia, and became familiar with the Persian language and literature. This translation was made in Persia, and was sent to London, and submitted to Sir Gore Ouseley, formerly President of the Royal Asiatic Society, and British Ambassador at the Persian court. Sir Gore spoke in the highest terms (we have read his note) of the work, and expressed his regret that the funds of the Asiatic Society did not admit of its publication. The translation has also been examined by two committees of the American Oriental Society, both of whom expressed their strong desire that it might be published. The funds of that Society, unhappily, not admitting of the outlay, an enterprising Boston firm, at the suggestion and encouragement of a member of the Society, have at length accomplished what the two Societies were not able to effect. The publication will be attended with several important advantages. It will enable us better to understand the Persian character, literature, modes of thought and feeling, etc. We shall be better able to approach the Persians. In this light, idle fancies, ridiculous stories, amatory songs, have their value. The missionary cannot well convey the lessons of occidental science or of Christianity without becoming familiar with the exact methods of native thought, of oriental imagery and story-telling. In this view, Mr. Merrick and his publishers have rendered a great service to the men who shall hereafter carry the lights of learning and Christianity to Persia. Again, the work is of much value to the oriental student. It opens a new field of research. The information communicated may not be of much positive value. Not a little may consist of the veriest dreaming, yet it affords to the reflecting mind materials of

¹ The Life and Religion of Mohammed, as contained in the Sheeah Traditions of the Hyât-ul-Kuloob. Translated from the Persian. By Rev. James L. Merrick. Boston : Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1850. pp. 483.

valuable speculation and inquiry, though the moral impression may be very melancholy. We have here, thirdly, not Prideaux or Maracchi on Mohammed, but the view which the great eastern division of his devotees entertain of his life and character. The original work consists of three quarto volumes, the first relating to the prophets and times before Mohammed, the third, which is incomplete, being on the Imâmite, or the establishment of religious guides after him, while the second of 894 pages, which Mr. Merrick has translated, contains a full Sheeah view of his life and religion, with sketches of his ancestors, companions and times, together with oriental maxims and legends. We heartily commend the work to all who feel an interest in the East, or in foreign missions, or in human nature in one of its most important modifications, or who rejoice with great joy in the inestimable gift of a true Revelation from Heaven. How infinite the contrast between that and the Koran or the Hyat-Ul-Kuloob!

5. STUART ON DANIEL.¹

The book of Daniel is one of the most instructive in the Old Testament on various accounts. It is an historical treasure. It purports to be the testimony of a resident, an eye-witness for many years of what he narrates, not the reports of a foreigner, or of a casual visitor. Instead, therefore, of making Xenophon or Herodotus the standard, literary justice would require us to try their statements by Daniel. If there are discrepancies, the fault is not to be charged upon him, but upon them. The incidental notices which he gives of Babylonian manners and customs coincide with all which we can learn of the subject elsewhere. Again, part of the book is written in the Chaldee dialect. It is a precious and authentic relic of the language of one of the world-monarchies. It is invaluable as one of the sources of the history and comparison of the Semitic dialects. Furthermore, the history furnishes us with some of the noblest specimens of heroic fortitude and unshaken confidence in God—the great prototypes of the Christian sufferers in all subsequent ages. The Messianic prophecies of Daniel are among the most important in the Old Testament. They have a character of their own, definite, earnest, sublime, as though the seer was standing on the very threshold of the Advent. Finally, the prophecy is the Apocalypse of the old dispensation, the kernel, the “germinant principle,” the suggestive ground-work of the Revelation of John. The last pages of the New Testament are the sublime and inspired comment of what Daniel and Ezekiel and Zechariah saw in symbols and in dim visions.

¹ A Commentary on the Book of Daniel. By Moses Stuart, lately Professor of Sacred Literature in the Theol. Sem., Andover. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 496. Boston: Crocker & Brewster, 1850.

Interesting, however, as the book of Daniel is, yet little of a fundamental character has been written upon it, so far as we know, in any language. In Latin, we have the commentaries of Rosenmüller and Maurer, quite valuable in some respects, but failing to grapple with the great questions of the book. In German, Lengerke of Königsberg has mustered all the resources of skepticism, and has assailed the book with the utmost pertinacity and with a great array of learning. Hengstenberg and Hävernick have written on the book with distinguished ability and in an excellent spirit. Many commentaries have been written in England, which contain valuable practical matters, particularly on the historical parts of the book. But want of acquaintance with the original languages of Daniel, ignorance or misapprehension of the true principles of biblical criticism, or adherence to some worthless theories of the interpretation of prophecy, essentially vitiate these commentaries. Little confidence can be placed in a commentator on such a book, who is not thoroughly versed in Hebrew and Chaldee. How can it be otherwise? Very important points turn on the interpretation of single words, or on constructions where a nice and critical knowledge of the principles of grammar is indispensable. E. g. examine ch. 9: 25.

Of the commentary of Prof. Stuart, 372 pages are taken up with an extended, critical commentary, verse by verse, with several excursus or essays on difficult points. The remainder of the volume, 124 pages, exhibits a Critical History and Defence of the Book of Daniel, under the heads of personal history of Daniel, nature and design of the book, style and aesthetical character, language and idiom, unity of authorship, genuineness and authenticity, ancient versions and apocryphal additions. All these questions are despatched in a very few pages, except the genuineness and authenticity, which are elaborately discussed, especially in relation to the objections of Lengerke. A marked feature of the book is the grammatical analysis of the Chaldee portions, with copious references to Prof. Hackett's Translation of Winer's Grammar. The true student of the Scriptures will welcome this volume as a guide in the investigation of a most difficult and interesting portion of the word of God, as a storehouse of facts, critical remarks, and illustrations. The substance of the volume was in readiness for the press several years ago, and is the fruit of many years of study on the book and on kindred topics. We may hereafter refer more particularly to this volume.

ARTICLE X.

MISCELLANIES, LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL.

In the last two Numbers of this Journal, pp. 173-191 and 402-7, we communicated some information in regard to the Public Libraries and some of the principal private libraries in New England. We have since received a Catalogue of the Redwood Library in Newport, R. I. This library owed its origin to a literary and philosophical society established in Newport in 1730. One of the founders was Bp. Berkeley, who resided in Rhode Island from Jan. 1729 to Sept. 1731. In 1747, Abraham Redwood gave £500 for the purchase of books. For the erection of a building, £5000 were subscribed. Dr. Ezra Stiles was one of the principal benefactors of the library. The present number of volumes is 5,500. For the last ten years, about 200 vols. a year have been added. Its means are a tax of \$2 each annually on its 100 members. It has some rare and costly works. Augustus Bush, librarian. The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions have a very good library of more than 4,000 volumes and some valuable MSS., at the Missionary House in Pemberton Square, Boston. In works relating to missions to the heathen, it is quite rich. It has also a fine collection of Bible Translations, in various languages, books of travels, voyages, etc., and a large collection of curiosities, etc., from all parts of the world. We may also add that there is a good library of several thousand volumes in Salem, Mass. On p. 404, we put the number of books in the libraries at Williams College at 10,434; it should be 11,434. On p. 406, the number of books in the libraries in Maine should be 44,500. The sum total of books in the New England public libraries is, accordingly, 473,067. — A translation, by Dr. Murdock, of the celebrated work of Mosheim, "*De Rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum Magnum Commentarii*," is about to be published at New Haven, in 2 vols. It is a work of standard character and of great and permanent value.

A new edition of the Orations and Addresses of Mr. Edward Everett will soon be published. Mr. E. has in preparation a work on International Law.

A new Number of the Journal of the American Oriental Society will soon be published. A large number of valuable papers are on hand, communicated by foreign missionaries and others. A second edition of the first number of the first volume, which has been for some time out of print, will be published.

We have received from the author, Dr. Caspari of the University of Christiania in Norway, an essay "on the Syrian-Ephraimitic War under Jotham and Ahaz, a Contribution to the History of Israel in the Assyrian Period, and to the question in respect to the Trustworthiness of the Chronicles, and to the Plan of Isaiah." It is an octavo pamphlet of 103 pages, is full of learning, and is, in part, devoted to the defence of some much-abused passages of Scripture.

The third Number for 1850, of the "Theological Studies and Criticisms," edited by Drs. Ullmann and Umbreit of Heidelberg, contain the following articles: Recollections of Dr. DeWette by Dr. F. Lücke; on some new Contributions to the Jewish History from Greek Historians by Dr. Frederic Creuzer; a Continuation of an Essay by Dr. Schweizer of Zurich, on the Development of the Moral System in the Reformed Church; Observations on the Address of the Apostle Paul at Athens, by F. W. Laufs, pastor at Waldmiel; Additions to the 'Exegetico-Critical Gleanings' from the Old Testament, by Dr. F. Böttcher of Dresden; Appendix to the Review of Dr. Bähr's Temple of Solomon, by Pastor Merz of Halle in Suabia; A Relation [by an eye-witness] of what took place at the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, communicated by Dr. Möller of Gotha; a Review, by Bähring of Freinsheim in the Palatinate, of Malou's Work on the Author of the Book "De Imitatione Christi;" and an Essay on the Character of the German Reformed Church and the Relation of the same to Lutheranism and Calvinism, by Dr. H. Heppé, *privat-docent* at Marburg. The Recollections of De Wette, by Lücke, we have read with deep interest, and shall probably present a translation of them in our next Number. The two friends lived in habits of special intimacy, several years, at Berlin. Though they were afterwards widely separated from each other, and by no means agreed in religious opinions, yet this warm, personal friendship was never interrupted. — Dr. Daniel Schenkel of Schaffhausen, the pupil and now the successor of De Wette, has published a Memorial of his deceased friend, and of the Value of his Theology for our Times, in 111 pages. The Address of Dr. Hagenbach of Basle, at the funeral of De Wette, is also published.

The second vol. of Hengstenberg on the Apocalypse will appear in the course of the present year. The title is: "Offenbarung des heiligen Johannes für solche, die in der Schrift forschen erläutert."

Ten parts of Meyer's Critico-Exegetical Commentary of the New Testament have appeared. The pressure of the duties of his office and the necessity of preparing new editions of the earlier parts, have compelled him to call in the aid of two younger theologians, Prof. Huther of Schwerin and Dr. Lünemann of Göttingen. A Commentary by the latter on the

two Epistles to the Thessalonians is published, and one on the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, by Dr. Huther, is in press.

The last Heft of the Journal of the German Oriental Society for 1849, contains an article of 44 pages, entitled "Contributions to the Correction of single passages and words in Syriac printed works," by Dr. Bernstein of Breslau. "Syriac lexicography," says the author, "is still in its infancy. Castell, in his Lexicon, 1669, certainly did what was possible for the time in which he lived and wrote. J. D. Michaelis, who caused Castell to be reprinted, enlarged it but a little, and rarely amended it, though more important helps were accessible. This, with all its poverty and weaknesses, is the most copious Syriac lexicon which we possess." In order to supply this great deficiency, Dr. Bernstein has been laboring on a Syriac Dictionary for many years, sparing neither time nor money. He speaks of making much use of the rich and important Lexicon of Bar-Bahlul and of Lorsch's collections for a Syriac Lexicon. — The first Heft of the Oriental Journal for 1850, contains, among other articles, one by Dr. Frankel, chief Rabbi at Dresden, on the Relation of the Alexandrian and Palestine Jews, particularly in an exegetical respect. — Two new Arabic Grammars have lately appeared in Germany, that of Caspari, "*Grammatica Arabica in usum Scholarum Academicarum*," with a brief Chrestomathy, Leipsic, 1848, pp. 350, and "*Grammaire Arabe*," by Ch. Schier, Dresden and Leipsic, 1849, pp. 466. "Neither," says Prof. Fleischer, "lays claim to any independence. Both, in all essential particulars, are dependent on De Sacy and Ewald." For the scientific advancement of Arabic grammar, there is needed a "revision of the original sources used by De Sacy, and the mastery of the most important remaining sources. The original lexicons in Arabic, and the oriental translations of the same, the printed and unprinted works of grammarians and commentators, contain for the material and formal culture of the grammar of the ancient Arabic an affluence of noble ore hardly yet uncovered."

A fragment of the 98th book of Livy has been discovered on a parchment beneath Jerome's Commentary on Isaiah. It was purchased of a Spaniard in Toledo, by Dr. Heine. The age is the first century of the Christian era, the oldest known MS. It contains a narrative of events in the years 70 to 68 B. C. under the censorship of a Metellus. — The vol. of "*Neuer Necrolog der Deutschen* for 1848," completes the 25th year of the work. In this quarter of a century copious biographies have been given of 8449 persons, short notices of 25,630 persons; in all, 34,279. In 1848, pp. 1038, the deaths of 1914 were recorded, 304 of whom were accompanied with more or less full notices.

The most copious and valuable Manual on Ancient Geography is that by Albert Forbiger, the well known editor of Virgil, and one of the teachers

in the Nicolai School at Leipsic. It is entitled, "*Handbuch d. Alten geographie aus den Quellen bearbeitet.*" Vol. I. 1842, 668 pp. 8vo., contains an Historical Introduction, and Physical and Mathematical Geography ; Vol. II. 1844, pp. 920, the political geography of Europe. The work is supplied with maps and full indices.

A valuable history of the university of Tübingen, by the librarian, Dr. Karl Klupfel, 1 vol. 1849, pp. 539, has been published. The university is one of the oldest in Germany, and its religious history at the period of the Reformation and subsequently, was very interesting. The number of volumes now in the library is stated at 200,000 ; of MSS. about 2,000.

Garcin de Tassy's History of Hindustani Literature has been translated into Hindustani at Delhi, in a folio of more than 500 pp.

The new Museum at Basle has been completed, and has received the collections in natural history, the library of the University, the Holbein paintings, etc.

The 9th vol. of Dr. Henry Ritter's History of Philosophy, the first on Modern Philosophy, has appeared. — The 5th and concluding vol. of Mailath's History of Austria, ending with the capitulation of Comorn, has been published.

The number of students at some of the German universities in the session just closed was as follows : Erlangen, 386, of whom 159 studied theology ; Freiburg in the Breisgau, 388, Theol. 158 ; Giessen 430, Theol. 81, Chemistry 23 ; Göttingen 789, Theol. 146 ; Halle 652, Theol. 348 ; Heidelberg 537, Theol. 52, Jurists 302 ; Leipsic 950, Theol. 200 ; Pesth 661, Theol. 47.

We have before us two Numbers of the "*Allgemeine Monatschrift für Literatur,*" which has taken the place of the *Allgem. Litt. Zeitung*. It is under the charge of Drs. L. Ross and G. Schwetschke of the university of Halle. Dr. R. was formerly professor in the university at Athens. The new periodical is printed on fine paper, in a convenient 8vo. form, is published in half-monthly parts, and has decided advantages over its cumbersome predecessor. The leading papers in the two Nos. are a notice of two Scandinavian works by Jacob Grimm ; on the Idea of a Christian "*Irenik*" by Prof. Fortlage of Jena ; on Herbart's Doctrines and the Present times by Dr. Erdmann ; Palaeontology by Dr. Burmeister of Halle ; on the Modern Investigations in regard to the Phoenicians by Dr. Ross ; Present Condition of the Science of Language by Dr. Steinthal of Berlin ; Gottsched and Lessing by H. Düntzer of Cologne ; Anaesthetics and its Literature by Dr. Ross of Altona ; Politics of the Present Times by R. Haym of Halle. Notices of books, intelligence, and a copious list of new works, are appended to each Number. The German "*productivity*" in books, after the collapse, is again obvious.

Among the additional works lately advertised in Germany, we notice the following: Isaiah, not Pseudo-Isaiah, exposition of chs. 40—66 of his Prophecy. With an Introduction against the Pseudo-criticism, by Dr. R. Stier, first part published; Plato's *Whole Works*, translated into German by H. Müller, with Introductions by K. Steinhart; *Travels in the Holy Land* by Dr. Philip Wolff, preacher at Rotweil, with a new Plan of Jerusalem; the first half of the second part of Dr. Moritz Dreschler's translation and exposition of Isaiah, from ch. xiii. to ch. xxvii.; Stengel's *Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews*; Second enlarged and improved edition of Meyer's *Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*; *Interpretation of the Discourse of Stephen the proto-Martyr*, by H. Thiersch; the Greek N. Testament critically revised according to the best helps, with a new German translation by Dr. H. Meyer, the commentator; the third part of Hävernicks *Introduction to the Old Test.*, edited by Dr. K. F. Keil; the first part of the 2d vol. of Böhringer's *Church Biographies*, embracing the Middle Ages; Denzinger of Wurzburg, on the Genuineness of the existing text of the Ignatian Epistles, pp. 108; the 3d and 4th parts of the 2d vol. of the 2d edition of Gieseler's *Manual of Church History*; 3d edition of Hundeshagen's *German Protestantism*.

Rev. William Cureton of the British Museum is about to edit a new edition of the *Peschito*, or ancient Syriac Version of the Old Testament. He proposes to commence with the Pentateuch from a MS. of the very early date of A. D. 464. With the exception of the books of Chronicles, there are, among the Nitrian treasures in the British Museum, MSS. of the several books of the Old Testament, not less than 1300 years old, from which he is prepared to take the text of the new edition. For the "Reasons" for this new edition, see a valuable pamphlet by the Rev. J. Rogers, canon of Exeter cathedral. Lond. 1849.

The expenditures for the British Museum for 1849 were £41,791, of which for the excavations at Nineveh £1855. The number of persons admitted in 1848-9 was 979,073.

Dr. Henry Barth's *Wanderings along the Punic and Cyrenaic Shores of the Mediterranean*, from Tangier to the Nile, have been translated into English. Barth is a pupil of Ritter. He describes particularly Carthage and Cyrene.

Mr. Loftus, the geologist, attached to the British expedition that is running the frontier line between Persia and Turkey, has visited "Ur of the Chaldees," and represents it as of great extent and of extraordinary interest. He found vast numbers of ancient coffins of baked clay.

A new edition of Dr. Samuel Davidson's *Lectures on Biblical Criticism* is in preparation. It will be entirely rewritten. — Rev. Henry Burgess is engaged in preparing a translation of the *Festal Letters of Athanasius*,

recently discovered in a Syriac translation, the Greek text having long been lost. — Some valuable additions have lately been made to the Bodleian Library, among which is a collection of Sanscrit MSS., 160 in number, made by Dr. Mill, when in India.

Cambridge University.—The number of undergraduates in 1850 is as follows: Trinity Coll. 525, St. John's 345, Caius 110, Christ's 82, Queen's 93, Emmanuel 95, Corpus Christi 68, St. Catharine's Hall 79, St. Peter's 50, Clare Hall 50, Jesus 59, Magdalene 61, Trinity Hall 48, Sidney 31, King's 12, Pembroke 23, Downing 11, Total 1742. Members on the Boards 7047. Members of the Senate 3931.

We have received Dr. Owen's edition of the Acts of the Apostles, and shall examine it at some length hereafter. The Greek type is the Porson, so called, most beautiful. It is a real luxury to look at the pages. The Notes, which are mostly grammatical, give evidence of the editor's usual care and scholarship.

A number of errors of the press have remained in the Article on Champlin's Demosthenes, in consequence of the writer's not having seen the proofs. The most important of these are the following:

P. 428, note 2, for *Lehr*. 6, read *Lehrb*. P. 429, line 9, dele *in*. P. 429, line 23, for *eponymers* read *eponymus*. P. 429, note 2, line 1, insert *are* after *remarks*. P. 430, line 11 from the bottom, read *βυδικα*. P. 431, lines 25, 28, 31, read 337 for 339. P. 436, line 12 from the bottom, after *code*, the point should be a semi-colon. P. 436, the 5th line from the bottom is misplaced; it should follow the present 3d line from the bottom. P. 437, line 11, after *thus*, insert ". P. 437, note 2, line 4, after *Timocr.*, insert § 27. Bekker. P. 441, line 4, for *Hartung* 6, read *Hartung's*. P. 442, line 8 from bottom, for *ἐξαπάσασθαι* read *ἐξαπαύσασθαι*. P. 443, line 15, for *Athenian*, only point *Athenian only*, P. 443, lines 11, 13, etc., the two forms *pylagorae* and *pylagori* appear together on this page by an oversight; the writer prefers *pylagorae*. P. 445, line 4 from the bottom, *Tauric* for *Tauria*. P. 449, line 23, add " before *this*. P. 450, line 27, read *Boedromion* for *Baedromion*. P. 450, line 5 from bottom, read *a* for *an*.

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ARTICLE I.

ON THE IDEA OF AN INFINITE SERIES, AS APPLICABLE TO
NATURAL THEOLOGY.

By Rev. Joseph Tracy, Boston, Mass.

THERE was no first man, say some atheists. The human race, they assert, has been from eternity, and each of us has an infinite series of ancestors.

The answer is old, that this hypothesis is self-contradictory. It assumes, concerning each and every individual of this infinite series, that there was a time when he had not yet come into existence; and if this is true of every one of them, it must be true of all of them. There must, therefore, have been a time when none of them existed; which is contrary to the supposition.

This reasoning has usually been met, we believe, by the naked assertion, that it is unsatisfactory, a mere dialectical subtilty; that, as eternity runs back without limit, it is evident that the same may be true of the human race; and that the argument which pretends to prove the contrary, must contain some sophism. It would be more satisfactory, could we be told precisely what that sophism is, and where it lies.

But we will not insist upon that. For the sake of honest minds, to whom the atheists' reply seems plausible and embarrassing, we will take up the question anew, and endeavor to ascertain whether any series of finite terms, or of individuals, can be infinite, except in theory. If we succeed in showing that the actual completion of an infinite series of finite terms is an absurdity, it will follow of necessity that the series of fathers and sons, to which we belong, is not infinite, but must have had a beginning.

Every scholar knows that there are theories which, though demonstrably true as theories, are yet demonstrably incapable of being reduced to practice. A mathematical point, for example, can exist only in theory — only as an idea ; for if it exist otherwise, it must occupy space, — must have extension, and is therefore not a mathematical point. The same is true of a mathematical line, which is only the imagined path of a moving point. Lines and points are what some old logicians call *entia rationalia*, entities for the reason, in distinction from *entia realia*, entities which have an existence of their own, whether thought of or not. They are ideas, evolved by the mind itself, and by a right use of which we are enabled to reason on the subjects to which they pertain, with perfect accuracy ; though *things* answering to those ideas, cannot possibly exist. Our task is, to show that an Infinite Series, like a mathematical point, is one of these *entia rationalia* ; a mere fiction of the mind, for its own convenience in arithmetical calculation ; and that no series of actually existing terms can possibly be infinite. The infinity of any series is merely a theory, and not a fact.

We must first guard against an error in respect to the kind of proof appropriate to this discussion. The question is arithmetical. It relates to number, and to possibilities in respect to number. It must be settled, therefore, if at all, by proofs drawn from arithmetical principles. The attempt to settle it on other principles, exclusive of these, must be as futile as the attempt to settle metaphysical questions by arithmetic. Here many have erred. They have shown, to their own satisfaction, that there is no *metaphysical* impossibility in the existence of an infinite series, and then infer that such a series is possible. But if arithmetically impossible, it cannot exist.

Let us illustrate this by a case, more closely related to the subject than may at first be suspected. Suppose it asserted that God, or nature, or fate, has arranged ten square blocks, all of the same dimensions, in close contact with each other on the same plane, so as to form a perfect square. We show in a moment by arithmetical proof, that the assertion is false ; that nine or sixteen blocks may be so arranged, while ten cannot. But exclude all arithmetical arguments, draw your proofs wholly from the nature of being, the power of God, the necessary relations of God to matter, and other topics purely metaphysical, and the proof might not be easy. But no reasoning from such sources, be it seemingly ever so strong, can invalidate the arithmetical argument. Such a square is arithmetically impossible, and therefore cannot be. So, when some assert that nature has made an infinite series of men, we prove, arithmetically, that the assertion is absurd.

It is obvious that this discussion must require some closeness and

continuousness of attention, and some repetition of the same argument in different forms, to meet different sophisms. These things, however, will be pardoned by all who think the subject worth discussing. — We must begin by gaining a perfectly clear idea of an Infinite Series.

Perhaps nothing gives this idea more easily and clearly, than the reduction of a vulgar fraction to a decimal. To do this, as every schoolboy knows, we divide the numerator, with as many ciphers at its right hand as the case requires, by the denominator. By this process, $\frac{1}{2}$ gives a decimal of a single figure, .5; $\frac{1}{4}$ gives a series of two figures, .25; $\frac{1}{8}$ gives a series of three figures, .125. In every instance, the series continues till the dividend is exhausted and no remainder is left. But when we attempt to reduce $\frac{1}{3}$ to a decimal, the dividend can never be wholly exhausted. At every division, there is a remainder of 1, which must be divided, giving another 3 in the quotient, and another remainder of 1, to be divided again with the same result. The series, therefore, is infinite. Carry on this process, as industriously as you please, to the end of the last day of the longest life, and let your posterity work at it to the last moment of a thousand generations, and there would still be that remainder of 1. Your written decimal would still be less than the vulgar fraction $\frac{1}{3}$, by just one third of that last remainder. The impossibility of writing down that whole decimal does not arise from the amount of labor, or the want of time, or the want of space to receive the figures, but from the nature of three and ten, which is such that divisions of ten by three must always leave a remainder. However long the written quotient may be, an unwritten part, consisting of no particular number of terms, but understood to be equal to one third of the last remainder, must be mentally added to it, to make it complete. An unwritten part is an essential element of the series. Without it, the series will be finite, and will express less than the true idea of one third. With the unwritten part mentally added, the decimal is complete, though it consist of only a single 3, and may be used in calculation without error; as is taught by all the school-books which treat of circulating decimals. The point to be particularly noticed here is, the necessity of an unwritten part, which must remain unwritten, in order to complete the idea. The figures of that part must have only a theoretical existence; for if you imagine them to receive an actual existence by being written down, you must of necessity imagine a remainder of 1 at the end of them, needing still to be divided, or represented by a still unwritten part, having only an ideal existence; for, to imagine that divisions by 3 have exhausted 10, leaving no remainder, is to imagine an arithmetical absurdity.

But as we have eternity before us, might not all the members of this

infinite series be written down by an infinite succession of writers, laboring from this time onward?

This suggestion is plausible, but fallacious. There is certainly no more difficulty in the conception of an infinite series of arithmeticians, recording their work, than there is in that of an infinite series of divisions to be performed by them. But as eternity will never come to an end, so the work never can be completed. It never can become true, that all the figures in the quotient have been written down, or that all of the infinite series of arithmeticians have done their part. It must always remain true, that some of the figures of the quotient, and some of the men who were to make them, have yet only an ideal existence.

But there is also a past eternity. Might not all the figures of this infinite series have been put into actual existence by an infinite series of writers, laboring from eternity to the present time?

This supposition is still more plausible, but equally fallacious. It assumes that actual divisions by 3 may have actually exhausted 10, leaving no remainder; which can never be. From the nature of the case, the last performance of your last arithmetician, who is now at work, must have been the division of 10 by 3, leaving a remainder of 1, so that the quotient is not yet complete. It has members yet to be written, and having, as yet, only an ideal existence. And so it must ever remain. True, the supposition is, that the series of figures already actually written down in the quotient is infinite, and therefore an adequate decimal expression of $\frac{1}{3}$; but the supposition involves the absurdity of supposing that divisions by 3 have exhausted 10, whereas the last division, just made before our eyes, left a remainder of 1. The supposition contradicts itself; and being self-contradictory, is incapable of being realized.

And here we get the true idea of an Infinite Series, as a series which, from its own nature, is incapable of being completed. We have the true idea of any particular infinite series, when we have its first term, or circle of terms, the law by which its successive terms are evolved, and in that law, the ground of the certainty that the series can never come to an end. In the series before us, the first term is .3, with a remainder of 1, from which another division must evolve another .3, with another remainder of 1, and so on without end. The law of the series is, that every division gives 3 in the quotient, leaving a remainder of 1, from which another 3 is to be evolved. To suppose the series completed, is to suppose 10 divided by 3 without a remainder. In reducing the fraction $\frac{1}{3}$ to a decimal, the series .135135 and so on *ad infinitum* is evolved; for after every third division, the same remainder, 1, recurs, and produces over again the same circle,

135. But in extracting the square root of 2, you get 1.4142, with a remainder, which, so far as yet appears, may be exhausted by further divisions, or may not. The same remainder has not yet recurred; and no law of the series has appeared, showing that it can never end. The series is at present indefinite, but we cannot pronounce it infinite, for we have no evidence that it may not end.

In the series evolved in reducing $\frac{1}{2}$ to a decimal, each term is one tenth of the preceding. Another series might be formed, under a different law, each term, after the first, being half of the preceding, thus: 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, and so on without end. The law of another series requires each term, after the first, to be one third of its predecessor, thus: 1, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{9}$, $\frac{1}{27}$, and so on. In all these cases, the law of the series is such that the evolution of each term must of necessity prepare the way for the evolution of another; so that the actual completion of the series is impossible. All the terms of the series may be said to have an ideal existence, inasmuch as we have a law, by which any one of them may be evolved; but the supposition that they have all been actually evolved, that every one of them has received an actual existence, is an absurdity.

In such a series, each term is finite; but the series is infinite, because one term follows another without end. The series is not *composed* of finite terms, because it can never be *composed* at all. The work of *composing* it may be always going on, but can never be finished. It is absurd, therefore, to say that an infinite series may be *composed* of an infinity of finite terms. A finite term and an infinite series may be multiplied together. For example, the decimal .333+, representing $\frac{1}{3}$, multiplied by 2, gives the decimal .666+, which is an infinite series equal to $\frac{2}{3}$. The infinitude of this second series, however, is not produced by the multiplication. It was found in the multiplicand, .333+. In like manner it will be found that every attempt to produce infinity by the multiplication of finites, is a begging of the question; that the infinity of the product arises, not from the multiplication, but from the infinity of one of the factors; and as the infinite factor involves terms which have only an ideal existence, the same must be equally true of the product.

In the examples just adduced, the terms of each series decrease in value by a certain law; but in other cases, the terms regularly increase in value. The series of numbers, 1, 2, 3, and so on, by which we count, is an obvious example. The law of this series is, that each term is formed by the addition of 1 to the preceding; and this series is infinite, because each addition produces a term of definite amount, to which 1 can be added. To suppose the series completed, is to suppose that successive additions of 1 have been made, till another

addition has become impossible; for if another addition is possible, the series is not complete. The first term of the series is a definite number, 1. Every addition increases it by a definite amount. Every term, therefore, brought into actual existence under this law of definite increase, must be definite, and there must be, beyond it, other terms, having only an ideal existence. Every actual number must be finite. There can be no actual infinite number; and therefore, no infinite number of actual men, whether contemporaneous or successive.

But, in each of these cases, the series can never be complete, because there is a law in the series itself, by which additional terms are continually evolved. May there not be a series, the terms of which are not evolved by any such law, but produced by some cause extraneous to the series; and may not the number of its terms be infinite?

Certainly not, if an infinite number is an impossibility. In every series, the number of terms, whatever be the amount of each term, must correspond to the series of natural numbers, which, as we have just seen, cannot be actually infinite. Let us place, in three lines, the terms of the decimal .333+, the corresponding terms of the series of natural numbers, and the series of terms composed of the ages of men at the birth of their sons, according to the atheist's hypothesis. As the atheist admits no first term, no beginning of his series, the third series must commence at the present time, and be reckoned backwards. The table will begin thus:

First series,	.3	3	3	3	3
Second series,	1	2	3	4	5
Third series, say,	25	31	29	27	36

The first series, as we have seen, can never be completed, because 10 can never be divided by 3 without a remainder. That the second never can be completed is evident, because its terms number the terms of the first. So long as another 3 can be added to the first series, a corresponding term may be added to the second, by adding 1 to the last preceding term. But this second series bears precisely the same relation to the third, as it does to the first. The quantity of each term, whether 3, or 25, or 29, makes no difference. The question relates, not to the magnitude of the several terms, but exclusively to the number of terms. If the number of terms in the third series is less than the number of terms, actual and ideal, in the second, then it may be numbered by some term in the second, and is not infinite. If it is not less, then it is equal to the number of divisions of 10 by 3, which are necessary to exhaust the dividend, so as to leave no remainder; which is an arithmetical impossibility. There can, therefore, be no number

actually infinite, and therefore no infinite number of generations. The atheist's hypothesis is false. The human race must have had a beginning; and if so, few will doubt that God made the first man.

And here we might stop; but the argument, though not more complete, may be more effective, if we add some illustrations and consider some objections.

For illustration, let us apply this reasoning to infinite space, which may be represented by a sphere, the centre of which is anywhere, and its radius an infinite series of miles, stretching away, one after another, in the same direction. The first term of this series will be 1; the second, 2; the third, 3; and so on, *ad infinitum*. It is perfectly plain that the actual existence of all the members of this series, actually written down or measured off, is an absurdity. There must be an ideal continuation of the series, or the space represented will be only finite. Every term of the series represents exactly a certain definite number of miles, beyond which there is room in infinite space for still other miles.

It is of no consequence to the argument, whether the supposed radius extends towards the north, south, east, or west, up or down, or in any other direction, or in what direction the measuring and numbering is done. Suppose it stretches away towards the north. Some airy spirit, passing over it at the rate of a mile a minute, would be forever on his way, and would never accomplish the journey.

But suppose one to have come, at the same rate, along an opposite radius, from the south, and to have been eternally coming. Might he not now have arrived at the centre? If we suppose him to have existed from eternity, the minutes of his existence have been as numerous as the miles to be travelled; and it is conceivable that he has spent each of those minutes in passing over one of those miles.

Suppose it to have been so, and then look at the consequences. The same argument would have proved, with equal conclusiveness, that he had reached the same centre six thousand years ago; since which time he has travelled as many miles as there are minutes in six thousand years, and has not yet passed the centre. What shall we think of an argument which proves that a centre, a mathematical point, is so many miles in diameter; or that our traveller has passed the centre long ago, and yet has only arrived at it now?

Look at another consequence. On the supposition before us, it must have been possible that, at the end of each day, the number of miles travelled that day should have been computed and set down. At the close of each year, the sum of all these days' works might have been added together, and the amount added to the number of miles pre-

vionally passed over. This process, continued to the present time, would give us, in miles, the semi-diameter of infinite space.

Let us now transfer this reasoning to the idea of time. Let the centre of our sphere represent the present moment. Let the successive miles of radius, extending northward, represent generations yet to come. Evidently, the number of actual generations, like the number of actually measured miles, must always remain finite, with merely theoretic generations, like theoretic miles in the other case, beyond them. The nature of the series, requiring a continuation of merely theoretic terms in order to be infinite, is the same in both cases. And this nature is not changed by wheeling the radius about from north to south, or by wheeling the series of generations about from the future into the past. The series still corresponds to the series of natural numbers, and like that series, is capable of only a theoretic infinity. The series is in fact the same, and has the same law, whether we call it 1, 2, 3; or 1st, 2d, 3d; or 1 mile, 2 miles, 3 miles; or 1st generation, 2d generation, 3d generation. When we say that this series is infinite, all that we can mean without absurdity is, that whatever the number of its terms may be, another may be added, and then another, and so on without end. So, a series of men can be infinite only in this sense; that, to the number actually existing, or having existed, others may be added without end. Set up your series of men, a mile apart, on the aforesaid radius of infinite space. The series is infinite only in this sense: that infinite space affords unlimited room for other miles and men beyond them. And the same is true if you set them at distances of thirty years in time.

But why may not an infinite number of past generations make up a past eternity? Because an infinite number is an absurdity. An infinite number must be no number in particular, and therefore not a number. Every number, from its very nature, must point out just so many, in distinction from more and fewer. It is therefore finite. The power of numbering, the series of numbers by which we count, is infinite, because, to any term of the series, 1 may be added; but *a number*, that is, any one number, being one of the terms of this series, is necessarily finite. To talk of an infinite number of generations, therefore, is an absurdity.

But, as each term in the infinite series of numbers may represent a generation, why may there not be, extending backwards from the present time, an infinite series of generations, as well as of numbers? Certainly there may, just as well, and no better. The series of numbers, and that of men to be numbered, are subject to the same law. Both must equally, for the same reason, run out into an ideal continuation, not made up of actually existing terms. In other words, no series, whether of numbers or of men, can be infinite, otherwise than in theory.

This difficulty cannot be surmounted by resorting from arithmetic to geometry, and talking about lines of infinite length. For, in the first place, the question before us is one of arithmetic, and not of geometry; so that, if the latter science should afford an illustration not to be found in the former, that illustration would be inapplicable. And then, lines can be infinite only in theory. Asymptotes, in Conic Sections, for example, are lines which continually approach other lines, but can never meet them. They are therefore of infinite length. But their length is infinite only in theory. To suppose them actually drawn of infinite length, is to suppose them drawn till they meet, which, it is demonstrated, can never be. And yet asymptotes can be as long as any other lines can be.

But if there be a God, he must be infinite, not only in theory, but also in fact.

We reply, that he is not infinite *in number*. There is but one God. Nor is he a series of individuals, or a sum total of parts. We speak of him as omnipresent; but we do not say that one part of him is in one place, and another part in another place. It would be as unphilosophical as irreverent, to say that a room four yards square and four yards high, contains sixty-four cubic yards of God. We can form no conception of his presence in any place, beyond the fact that he *acts* there. We do not think of him as a whole, made up of measurable parts; nor as a series, beginning with finite terms, and continuing infinitely. In speaking of him, all our mathematical ideas are inappropriate, and if used at all, must be used figuratively. If we apply the term *infinite* to him, we must not mean by it that he possesses, in an infinite degree, any of the attributes of *matter*.

But space is infinite. Certainly; but what is space? A mere possibility that points should be distant from each other; a mere possibility that the idea of extension should be realized. It exists, only as every infinite series exists. Our idea of it is merely a theory, which has been reduced to practice so far as the material universe extends, with an ideal continuation beyond.

The same remark is equally applicable to time, which is the mere possibility that events should be successive; that the idea of duration should be realized. Our idea of time is a theory, which has been reduced to practice so far as events have occurred in succession. Beyond this series of successive events, time is a mere theory, and its infinity does not prove that a quantity can be infinite, except in theory.

But, we are told, if there is a God, an intelligent, designing First Cause, it must be that he thinks. Thought is, in its very nature, suc-

cessive. There must, therefore, have been an eternal succession of thoughts in the divine mind. Each of these successive thoughts has occupied a definite portion of time. Hence it follows, in despite of all demonstrations to the contrary, that past eternity has actually been made up of successive portions of time, measured off by these thoughts. There is therefore no absurdity in supposing it to be measured off into longer portions, each occupied by a human life.

To this argument we reply, first, that it does not pretend to detect and expose any fallacy in any of our past reasonings. It merely attempts to show that there must be some fallacy in them, inasmuch as this conclusion is inconsistent with a certain alleged fact, the succession of thoughts in the divine mind. If the alleged fact is unquestionable, the argument drawn from it is perfectly fair, and perfectly conclusive; and we must admit that those reasonings do contain some sophism, even though we may be unable to detect it. But if the alleged fact is questionable, those reasonings, in which no sophism has been detected, are still valid to disprove its reality.

Is it, then, an unquestionable fact, that there is a succession of thoughts in the Divine Mind? Do we know enough of God, to exclude all doubt on the subject? If so, how did we learn it? Did we ever look on and see the operation of the Divine Mind, elaborating thought after thought? If not, then we must have learned it, if at all, by considering the nature of thought, as we find it in our own experience. The argument must be, that thought is successive in our own minds, and therefore it must be so in the Divine Mind. But is it quite certain that his mind and ours must be just alike in that respect? If so, how came we by the certain knowledge of that likeness? Not by observation, for we never saw him think. Not by experience, for all our experience relates to *human* modes of thought. Shall we say, that we have no clear conception of any thought that is not successive? Suppose we have not. If beings not human have modes of thought differing from ours, and of which, therefore, we have no experience, how are we to obtain any clear conception of them? And as the blind man is not authorized to conclude against the possibility of colors, so neither are we authorized to conclude, from our own inexperience, against the possibility of that which, if it exists, we have no means of experiencing. Such is the whole basis of the assumption, that the thoughts of God are successive.

On the other hand, there are grounds for a strong presumption, at least, that the Divine Mind is, in this respect, very unlike to ours. We are stimulated to progressive thought by conscious imperfection. We find it necessary to reason from what was previously known to what

was previously unknown ; to enlarge our stock of information, by observing facts that are new to us ; to call to remembrance, ideas that had passed out of our minds. God can have none of these wants. So far as we know, he can feel none of the motives which impel or allure us to progressive thought. Does God think uselessly ? Does he learn by thinking ? If not, what is the result of his progressive thought ? None will contend that he gains new knowledge by inference from what he knew before. Perhaps it will be said that with him, successive thought consists in rapid surveys and re-surveys of the several individual persons and things that constitute his vast kingdom ; his attention being withdrawn from each for a time so short that no clock can measure it ! And this, forsooth — as no unobserved change can be supposed to occur during such short absences — is practically equivalent to omniscience ; though it represents his attention, at any one point of time, as confined to a single object, and therefore finite ! Or perhaps his thoughts are successive, only as he sees one thing happen after another, and thereby gains a new idea !

But, we are told, events actually are successive, and God sees things as they are, future, present, and past.

But this does not prove that he sees them by successive observations. How do we know that he does not see the same event, in all its relations of time, as well as its other relations, by one eternal, unchanging intuition ; or in some other form of thought, which we are unable even to imagine ?

And even if we admit that there is so much of change in the Divine Mind as this objection implies, the atheist's conclusion will by no means follow. It will only follow that he has been seeing successive events by successive observations, so long as events have actually been occurring in succession. How long that has been, and whether it has been from eternity, is an entirely different question, which must be settled, if at all, on other grounds. If the Divine Mind is capable of change as here supposed, then it may have begun to observe events successively, at some time when events began to occur successively ; and if so, the succession of thoughts in the Divine Mind has not been eternal.

Even with us, thought is not always progressive. We contemplate an object, — a picture, for instance, — as a whole. We are not, at the time, noticing one part by itself after another in rapid succession ; but we see them all at one view, in the whole which we are contemplating. And we remain in that state of contemplation for a time longer or shorter, but often long enough to be distinctly appreciable ; and during that appreciable time, thought is not successive. Why may not a

mind, sufficiently larger than ours, take in all created things, at one view, and contemplate them as a whole? The builder of a machine, not too large or complex for his eye, may contemplate it when in motion as a whole, and may notice, in the revolving of its wheels, not successive events, successively observed, but only the steady realization of the idea according to which he built it. The created universe is neither too large nor too complex for the eye of its Maker. How do we know, then, that he cannot contemplate it otherwise than by successive thoughts?

It is not necessary to our argument, nor is it our purpose, to show what is the mode of thought in the Divine Mind. We have already shown that it may be a mode of which we can have no clear conception. We are meeting the alleged fact, that in the Divine Mind, thought has eternally followed thought, each occupying a finite amount of time. We are only bound to show that this alleged fact is, at least, questionable; that we do not know it to be a fact. This being shown, as we think it has been, our argument against the possibility of an infinite series, actually made up of finite quantities, remains in full force. No sophism has been detected in it, and no fact has been established, inconsistent with it. We are authorized to conclude from it, that the past eternity of God has not been made up of finite portions of time, measured off by successive thoughts in the Divine Mind; notwithstanding any necessity we may be under, when speaking of him, to speak after the manner of men.

But if man now exists as an effect of the power of God now put forth, it must have been equally possible for him to put forth that same power, in the same way, during every period of his eternal existence; thus producing an eternal, and therefore an infinite series of men.

We reply, that this attempt to settle an arithmetical question by appealing to a metaphysical speculation concerning the power of God, is not allowable, — especially in one who holds that there is no God. It is true, that we know nothing concerning the power of God, from which we can infer his inability to cause men to exist, whenever it may have pleased him; but this does not show that the number of human generations may have been so great, that if one division of 10 by 3 had been performed in each generation, the reduction of $\frac{1}{3}$ to a decimal would have been finished, the last division leaving no remainder. And if not, then it has not been so great as to exhaust the parallel series of natural numbers. And if this series is not exhausted, the number is not infinite. The power of God has doubtless, from eternity, been adequate to the production of any imaginable effects, which are in their nature capable of being the result of power. But the principles of arith-

metic are not the result of power. They are necessary and eternal truths. Power never established them, and can never annul, suspend, or modify them. Power can never accomplish, nor have any tendency to accomplish, what is arithmetically impossible. It is absurd, therefore, to argue from the power of God, that three times three may have been made to be ten, so that 10 could be divided by 3 without a remainder; or that the infinite series of numbers, 1, 2, 3, and so on, may have been used in numbering human generations, till its terms have all been used up.

We reply again, that the objection now before us begs the question, by assuming that the past eternity of God has been made up of successive periods of time, in each of which a human generation may have existed. In thinking of ourselves as coexisting with God, and as sustaining relations to him which change with the changes of our own character and condition, we are under a necessity, to some extent, of transferring to him our ideas of time. We have no forms of thought which can enable us wholly to dispense with such a transfer. What he does for us in successive periods of our existence, we speak of as done in successive periods of his own existence. We may represent his eternity to our minds, as a series of such periods, theoretically infinite. In our reasonings, the use of this formula is often found convenient, and when kept within proper limits, is perfectly safe. It is, however, only as a theory, and by virtue of its theoretic infinity, that such a series can represent eternity. A succession of periods theoretically infinite can only prove, at most, the possibility of a series of men theoretically infinite.

We have a rational idea of eternal existence; that is, reason enables us to see that eternal existence must be possible. But we have no clear conception of eternal existence; because it has not been possible for us to gain that conception, either by experience or observation, and we have no other way of gaining clear conceptions of modes of existence. We therefore invent the fiction of an infinite series of periods, and use that fiction instead of the clear conception which we cannot have; somewhat as we use an algebraic expression for an unknown quantity; and, when modestly and discreetly used, the substitute answers, very well, the purposes for which piety needs it. But sound logic forbids us to take this our fiction for a fact, and infer from it the possibility of other facts. Our inability to reason concerning the past eternity of God without using our fiction, may be some excuse, morally, for such a blunder, but in no way mends its logic. Notwithstanding our inability, it still remains certain, that the supposition of an infinite series of periods, actually made up, is an arithmetical absurdity, and

that the safe use of our fiction ceases before we arrive at such a conclusion.

But the stream of vital action in the human race is an uninterrupted stream; the living substance of the father becoming, while yet alive, the germ of the son. If God has existed from eternity, why may not that stream of human life have existed from eternity?

Because that stream, as we very well know, is a stream which has been measured out into definite periods of duration. This, had the stream been eternal, would have been impossible. The successive generations form a series of finite terms; and such a series, as we have shown, cannot be infinite, except in theory. The number of terms actually realized, must be finite. The series, then, had a beginning. There was a first man; and as no other adequate cause can be assigned for his existence, there must be a God, who made him.

ARTICLE II.

THE UTILITY OF COLLEGIATE AND PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS.

An Address in behalf of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Theological Education at the West; delivered in Tremont Temple, Boston, May 29, 1850. By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in the Andover Theological Seminary.

It is a stale proverb that Ignorance is the mother of Devotion, but the true apothegm is that Devotion is one parent of Knowledge. There is an inherent affinity between science and virtue. God has joined them together, and although man has often put them asunder, yet the disquiet which ensues from their divorce is a sign that nature demands their union. Hence we find, that nearly all the universities of the Christian world have been founded by the clergy and for their use. The oldest colleges in our land were for a long time regarded and conducted as the schools of the church. Of the hundred and twenty colleges now existing among us, a large majority are under evangelical influence, and their paramount design is to furnish able defenders of the Christian faith. Accordingly, a pious man feels an interest well nigh personal in these institutions, and in our forty-two Theological Seminaries; nor, as the spirit of his religion is in sympathy with all learning, can he fail of a kindly regard for our thirty-five Medical Schools, where are to be trained those who ought to be spiritual physicians, and in our twelve Law Schools, where are to be edu-

cated those who ought to defend the laws of God. With the persuasion, therefore, that all good and thinking men will desire to strengthen the alliance between knowledge and piety, between the institutions of learning and the church of the Most High, I beg leave to say a few words on the benefits resulting from our collegiate and professional schools.

And in the *first* place, these schools are monuments to the dignity and worth of mind. This dignity and worth must be respected, or the doctrines and forms of Puritanism will not be loved. These doctrines and forms require a taste for intellectual statements ; for pure, naked truth. Hence they encourage a style of thinking and writing which fails to interest men of mere flesh. Our clergy, not being priests but moral teachers, must depend for their influence, under God, upon their spiritual cultivation ; and, giving themselves wholly to their work, they must rely for their maintenance, not so much on rich benefices as upon the will of the people ; and unless the people revere their own inward, more than their outward nature, they will give no adequate support to an intellectual ministry.

But one fault of both our age and our nation is, an excessive devotedness to material interests. The inestimable advantages of our exuberant soil, our singularly threaded navigation, and our variegated extent of country are combined with peculiar temptations to avarice. Large masses of our population have immigrated hither for the *avowed purpose* of acquiring wealth. Not even the original discoveries of Mexican and Peruvian gold enticed so many devotees of Mammon to the enchanted ground, as have been allured to it by the disclosures of our modern Ophir. Hence results a danger, that we shall become more and more intoxicated with a passion for ceiled houses and splendidly caparisoned horses, for goblets and vases of curiously wrought metal ; and that our favorite studies will be those most immediately subservient to the processes of the mechanic. Far be it from us to depreciate the arts of metallurgy and engineering, but with our researches into the organism of matter we, above all men, need to combine the *humanities* of the schools. Amid the whirl of our locomotives, and the jangle of our machinery, and the noisy working of our political system, we feel a repose and a refreshment in merely looking upon the walls of an institution devoted to a quiet, spiritual discipline. They are a memento that the value of money is computed by some of our citizens according to its moral, even if they be intangible uses.

The young men of a republic are apt to be impatient of control, and therefore need the hints and the dictatorship of a college bell. They are apt to be restless for public action, and therefore need the

"four years" confinement to a severe, exact and comprehensive study. They are apt to be opinionated and wilful, and therefore need the friction of class-debates, the subduing operation of college law, the singularly republican influences of college society, where the distinction of merit absorbs that of birth or wealth. Apart from the study which our learned schools demand, they are associated with nameless and numberless incidents which discipline a student without his knowing it. His excrescences of character are worn away by his intercourse with teachers and classmates, by his experiences in the recitation room and on the platform, the occurrences of his sophomore and freshman year. The very contact with college walls has an abrading effect, which no one can fully analyze. In many particulars he may surpass all other men, but in some particulars a *self-taught*, must be an *untaught* man; for he has not been overawed by the authority, nor regaled by the reminiscences, of those institutions which are both intended and fitted to remind us of the treasures lying hid in the soul. The man who, like our own Williston, consecrates his silver and gold to the development of these treasures, honors himself by thus offering up money to the service of mind. He will be remembered when mere theological pugilists lie forgotten in their narrow graves. We name it to the praise of Dr. Calamy, Dr. Bentley, Dr. Halley, Dr. Burnet, Sir Richard Steel and Sir Isaac Newton, that they made donations of books to Yale College. Dr. Watts gave a pair of globes to it; he performed many forgotten acts of philanthropy, but this gift will continue to be recorded as a memorial of *him*, not less than of the school which he distinguished. If Napoleon, instead of melting up the cannon of Austerlitz into a column for signalizing his exploits, had endowed some liberal institute for the right education of his people, he would have raised a monument to the worth of the soul which would also have perpetuated his own fame. We speak of Alexander as the Great, chiefly because he lavished his treasures upon the Stagirite, and thus bequeathed a rich boon to the mind of his posterity. The name of Maecenas is remembered not so much for his martial or his convivial virtues, as for making his wealth subservient to the mental garniture of a Virgil and a Horace. We know but little of Ambrose, the Alexandrian Gnostic, but we hold him in lasting reverence because we know that he was the patron of Origen, that he published the works of that father, and nurtured the tree of which the Hexapla was the fruit. A rational utilitarian can easily perceive that to enrich a seminary of learning, especially of sacred learning, that learning which does not immediately minister to the comfort of the body, which is not directly

productive of tangible benefits, which exerts an influence too ethereal to be calculated by mercantile tables, — such a bounty indicates and promotes a refinement of conception, begins with and ends in a contemplative habit, which, amid the uproar of our merchandize and politics, must have the highest style of usefulness.

As our collegiate and professional schools pay this deserved tribute to our spiritual nature, so, in the *second* place, they give an impulse to popular education. Almost their entire history is one of stimulus to mind. A gift bestowed upon them, instead of being a sedative, prompts them to effort. They are intended to meet the wants of the soul, and the soul needs incentives to activity. The small estate given by the bishop of Cloyne to found scholarships and provide premiums for the more studious pupils of Yale College, has had a quickening effect upon men who have well repaid the world for the smallest good influence upon them. Wheelock, Dagget, Stiles, Burr, Dwight, all of whom were presidents of colleges, John Worthington, Simeon and Nathan Strong, Silas Deane, Gov. Trumbull and Gov. Treadwell, David Brainerd, Buell, Buckminster and other educators of the people were incited to labor for the annual donation of Berkeley; they succeeded in their struggle for it, and imparted the impetus which they gained from it to succeeding times.

It is a false idea that influence mainly works from beneath upward. It also descends with power from above downward. The science of Aristotle has affected the lowest of the people for two thousand years. The learning of the church reformers has wrought on the common mind for three centuries. It is because Whitefield and Wesley were well taught, that they were enabled to move the depths of the populace. The multifarious learning of Richard Baxter has given an impetus to the masses for two hundred years; and his practical writings were the means of permanent good to Philip Doddridge, who in his turn became an instructor of the multitude as well as of theologians; and his "Rise and Progress" exerted a transforming influence on William Wilberforce, who acted well his part in disenthraling the poor and degraded from their moral slavery; and his "Practical View" resulted in lasting good to Legh Richmond, whose Dairyman's Daughter is now, in more than fifty different languages, refining the conceptions of the learned and the vulgar. As with individuals so is it with institutions; the higher give impetus to the lower. The enterprise of foreign missions awakens that of home; home missions kindle a zeal for our own individual churches; these churches interest us in our private families. In the scientific processes of ventilating our

public buildings, a fire in the attic brings upward the air from the basement. Where the university is cherished, classical schools will be formed to prepare the candidates for it; and where the classical schools are prosperous, common schools will spring up around them. The college requires lower institutes as its auxiliaries, and what it demands will be supplied for it. It enriches the soil from which it draws up its nutriment. It awakens the spirit of education, and without this a State law may appoint masters over the children, but will never make those children scholars, nor those masters instructors. Our land is one of competition. If there be a college in the capital city, there will be an academy in the shire-town; and if there be an academy near the court house, there will be select schools in the neighboring villages. And as no institution, so no man stands alone. The youth who leaves his still hamlet for the university, induces some of his comrades to follow him, and many others to sympathize with him in his literary spirit. Obvious and lasting is the impetus which he may give to the mental character of his former townsmen. He teaches their schools, and imparts to the tenderest minds the benefits of his own generous culture. We do not suitably esteem the influence of young men. It was in the thoughts of youthful collegians that our foreign missionary enterprise had its birth. Some of the pupils in our professional seminaries have as much power over the common, especially the juvenile mind, as they will ever have. Some of them are precocious, and the most important thoughts which they will hereafter elaborate, have already occurred to them. David Hume planned his *Treatise of Human Nature* before he was twenty-one years of age, and composed it before he was twenty-five, and this treatise contains the raw material of his more finished essays. At the age of twenty-six John Calvin had published the first edition of his *Institutes*; it was afterwards improved, but its basis was retained. So in military life, the arch-duke Charles was but twenty-six years old when he conducted the campaign against Napoleon, and Napoleon was but twenty-seven when he had subdued Italy, and the hero of Macedon died in his thirty-second year. The subsequent life of men does not always fulfil the promise of their youth. Of not a few preachers it may be said, that their earlier sermons are as thoughtful as their later. When the members of our colleges and professional schools, therefore, some of whom have already developed the germs of their more matured speculation, go out in all the freshness of a scholar's zeal among the laboring classes of the land, especially its ruder sections, they *must* contribute to the education of the people. Nearly fifty thousand alumni have been trained

in our colleges, many of whom have been connected as authors, superintendents or instructors with our common and our Sabbath schools. About eight thousand have been taught at our theological, and sixteen thousand at our medical institutions. During the past year more than seventeen thousand young men were convened under nearly thirteen hundred teachers, at all our higher seminaries of learning. From the conversation and correspondence of so many scholars, there must diverge a quickening influence into as many distinct communities. But this influence is neither so wide spread nor stimulating as it ought to be, and therefore we aim to extend it, and to purify it, until from these higher seminaries, as from the heart itself, there circulate a genial warmth through the whole system of popular education, and until this system pervade the very recesses of the land.

It is not solely, however, by direct effort that our learned schools give a stimulus to the mind of the community. They do good by the very shadow of their towers. Many a young man has been attracted from the plough to the classic, by merely looking upon the groves of the academy. He was a spectator of the scene when some of his village friends received their diploma; and in six years afterward, he had obtained a better education than they.¹ There steals forth from the shades of the lyceum a noiseless influence imbu- ing the mind that is even unconscious of it, with a love of letters. Hence we cannot expect that a university at Brunswick or Burlington will diffuse the same healthful glow among the inhabitants of Wisconsin and Iowa, as among the population closely encircling it. We might as well expect that the flowers which bloom in Maine or Vermont would sweeten the air of the prairies; that one forest, one

¹ In the Fifth Report of the Society for the Promotion of Collegiate and Professional Education at the West, pp. 29, 30, we read: "On one such [commencement] occasion a young man sat among the crowd, and, as he listened, a desire to obtain an education was awakened, and kindled to a flame, and he resolved that he would never rest till he had availed himself of the advantages of the institution. But his father was in straitened circumstances, and knew not how to dispense with the services of his son till he should become of age. For the time being the son abandoned the execution of his purpose, but his daily labors were within sound of the college bell, and every stroke reminded him of privileges of which he could not avail himself, and served to kindle afresh the fires within. Months and years passed away, and when at last told by his father, in the field, that he would cheerfully relinquish all further claim on his services, he dropped his instrument of husbandry, hastened to the house of one of the professors in the college, and in the space of one hour had completed his arrangements for a course of study, and was quietly seated, getting his lesson. A few years afterward he mounted the platform, on commencement day, to carry into complete execution the resolution of by-gone years, and to awaken similar desires in the minds of listening youth."

mountain-range would purify the atmosphere of our entire land. The western waters cannot be navigated by steamers all whose engines are kept at the east. Our higher schools must be near to the communities which they would attract with a magnetic power. They must be seen in order to become remembrancers of our mental worth. Their libraries and philosophical apparatus must charm the eye of the loiterers from the adjacent towns; their literary festivals must allure parents and children to come up and witness the refining influences of a student's life; their classic grounds, their rules of courtesy, the bland spirit which breathes in and over them, must invite the inquisitive youth to exchange the toils and pleasures of the body for those of the mind.

Doubtless, there is a liability to multiply our higher seminaries beyond the proper limits. In some parts of our land they have been thus multiplied. They should not be so numerous as to be equally in want of funds and scholars; as to have but little to do and less to do it with; as to keep their professors hungering after the loaves of patronage, and so eager to secure pupils for themselves that they will be tempted to whisper mysterious charges against rival seminaries. There must be no such unhallowed rivalry among schools sacred to knowledge and religion. They should be so numerous, and it is a great object of this Society to keep them so and only so numerous, as to meet the demands of the whole country, without interfering with each other; as to be accessible to all young men who ought to be educated; as to provide the richest instruction for the largest number; as to extend their influence into the common schools of every neighborhood; as to reach the lowest minds, and give them an ideal of a culture too high perhaps for themselves, but waiting to bless their children.

This tendency to popularize knowledge is, in the empirical view, the highest recommendation of literary institutes; in the Romish view their main usefulness consists in preserving the results of previous study; but in the Protestant and liberal view they have another high design. I remark, then, in the *third* place: Our collegiate and professional schools are needed for the extension of science. They enlarge as well as protect its domain; exalt as well as multiply its votaries. Doubtless many improvements are made in philosophy and the arts by men who have not been disciplined at the university; but it is in the light radiating from the university, in the atmosphere impregnated by it, that most of these improvements are made permanently valuable. A mechanic stumbles upon a new invention, but he

would not know its importance, were he not surrounded by erudite scholars. When a rare phenomenon was detected at Greenfield, its value was determined at Amherst. The self-made man is often indebted to the university for the materials with which he boasts that he has made himself. At least fifty-two of the inventions which are now used and prized by the civilized world were made in Germany, not perhaps within the walls, but within the influence of her learned institutions. Such institutions enlarge the class of investigating spirits that come in contact with each other, giving and receiving acumen as iron sharpeneth iron. They secure such a division of labor as enables a single mind to concentrate itself on a single department, and thus pry into the laws which lie hidden from a cursory and divided view. By their libraries, laboratories and observatories they excite a truth-loving spirit and provide facilities for its exercise. So numerous are the discoveries made under their influence, that it has become as difficult for men in active life to keep an account of the new arts and the new ramifications of science, as it is for an American adult to keep up his chase after the geography of his country. Once, the number of planets and satellites in the solar system, as well as of the States in our confederation, was stereotyped in school books; but now we feel afraid to mention either of these numbers until we have inquired for the last telegraphic despatch. In the telescope of Lord Rosse, which is every year antiquating the charts once regarded as the permanent philosophy of the heavens; in the cylinder press, by which a man will publish as many syllables in an hour as, before the invention of printing, he would not have written in less than fifty years; in locomotion on the land and on the sea, by an apparatus which indicates more genius and science than were needed for constructing the pyramids of Egypt; in the transmission of intelligence along wires that swell with thought and seem to have as much expressive life as the nerves of some men; in that spiritual process of using the rays of light as pencils for delineating the human features, catching the glance of a moment, preserving it for years, even when that glance could not be repeated by any voluntary effort of the child, it may be, who accidentally threw it; in that ethereal appliance by which men have learned to sleep under the endurance of amputations, the thought of which would once have overmastered them; in all the secular departments of knowledge there is now a progress, the most notable peculiarity of which is that it prepares the way for still more colossal strides,— each new discovery opening the door for yet more wonderful disclosures, and all of them demanding a new activity of mind, and increasing the importance, the necessity of its culture.

Every acquisition to the secular sciences enlarges the compass of that science which comprehends all others in itself. Objective theology has been taught us in a perfect revelation, but men have not been perfect in understanding it.¹ The truths in the book of nature and in the inspired volume are incapable of improvement; but our knowledge of these truths is progressive. The more we learn, so much the more capacious become our minds, and accordingly so much the more expanded may be our ideas of religious doctrine, and this expansion is itself an enlargement of our subjective theology. The speculations of every successive age will develop new features in those great truths which are to shine brighter and brighter unto the perfect day. The central principles of the Bible will be illustrated with additional glories, as the Copernican system, though always remaining true, will become more and more resplendent with every newly found star. The speculations of Adam Smith, Price, Jouffroy, and even Bentham will enable some future Edwards to write a more transparent "Dissertation concerning the Nature of True Virtue." The extended researches of anatomists, chemists, botanists and entomologists are preparing additional leaves for a more convincing volume of Bridgewater Treatises. Scattered through the philosophy of continental Europe are to be found the germs of a more comprehensive discussion than has ever yet appeared, on the phenomena of the will. Additions to the proof of total depravity may be gleaned from the reasonings of David Hume; new arguments for the Divine decrees from the speculations of Schleiermacher; fresh indications of the sacrificial atonement from the criticisms of Gesenius. We confide in the truth and in the God of truth, and believe, with our Puritan fathers, that the Puritan faith is so interwoven with the texture of science as to be ultimately confirmed or illustrated by every addition to our knowledge. Its foundations sink deep into the very structure and the relations of the soul, and therefore of all systems that of Calvinism should be the last to complain logic or of metaphysics or of any sharp investigation. It never dies, and this is one part of the internal evidence in its favor, it never will and never can flourish where some of its advocates are not reasoners, where they are not *men*. It is in itself strong doctrine, and requires something more than milk for babes.

It is only one century and a half since ten ministers of a neighbor-

¹ "It is not at all incredible," says Bishop Butler, "that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind should contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For all the same phenomena and the same faculties of investigation, from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years before."

ing colony met at Branford, and each, presenting a number of volumes, said, "I give these books for founding a college in Connecticut." From that college went forth, twenty years afterward, Jonathan Edwards; and among her fifteen hundred clerical alumni are Bellamy, Hopkins, Smalley, Hart, Emmons, Dwight, Strong, Austin, Backus, Hooker, Griffin, Day, Murdock, Beecher, Stuart, and others, of whom it is not too much to say that they have left the literature of the church more luminous than they found it. And the moral results which have flowed from the studies of these men, — the world *feels* them, even if it do not *know* them. And these results are the harvest of which those humble counsels at Branford were the seeds. And in a century and a half from this day, among the descendants of men who are now subduing our western wilderness, there will arise, — such is our trust in God, — a sturdy band of pioneers in the fields of truth, who shall redeem many waste places of speculation and make them blossom as the rose. Some of these elect spirits will be trained, — such is our prayer, — in the colleges which are now asking that we give to them of our abundance what our fathers gave of their penury to the germinating schools of their day. And it is one of the noblest motives which can dawn upon us, that in nurturing these yet feeble colleges, among a population of quick-sighted and far-sighted men, we are prospectively widening the compass of all science; we are making medicine more sure, law more definite, subjective theology more extensive; we are providing facilities for the men who are predestined to explain the Bible more clearly, and develop its relations more comprehensively, and to do for a coming age what Owen and Chillingworth and Butler did for their times; we are laying, in silver and gold, the basis of that temple which the Spirit of truth is to illumine with unwonted effulgence, and the brightness of which is to irradiate all minds.

The agency of our collegiate and professional schools in widening the sphere of science suggests a *fourth* benefit to be derived from them; they illustrate the cost and provide means for overcoming the difficulties of truth. Men estimate science the more highly when they see the apparatus which is needed for acquiring it. A thoughtful spectator of a library like the National Library of Paris or the Royal Library of Munich, begins at once to soliloquize on the painstaking with which truth has been sought:

"How many vexations have been endured by the writers of the tomes that burden these shelves, in making an exact transcript of their thoughts, in remodeling their once carefully-adjusted plans; in erasures, interlinations, and final recurrences to the first draft. How many risings of

hope have these authors felt, that they had at last caught a glimpse of the truth, as of a jewel sparkling in the mine; but how soon have their hopes been clouded over, and followed by regrets for toil mispent. Who will count up the errors into which the most careful of these inquirers have lapsed in their enthusiastic defence of one favorite truth; the fears which have troubled them lest the influence of an entire treatise should be spoiled by some incidental mistake; the disappointments which have seized them when charged with a heresy which none but an envious, because disappointed man could have manufactured out of their well-intended words. How many of these authors have pined in a living mortification, or have atoned for their free but perhaps wholesome thoughts on the rack. How small an advance has been made by any one scholar who has wearied himself by night and by day, to reach the end of the golden chain."

The variety of experiences in a single mind, and the multitude of different minds which have been needed to elucidate any one doctrine, are faint emblems of the cost, and hence of the value of truth. This value is also illustrated by the inherent difficulties of science. — It is a belief no less common than baneful that the easiest interpretation of nature is the best. Truth is said to be simple. In certain great outlines it is so; but in its complete system it is full of mazes which no man has ever wandered through. The most common volitions which we put forth, are the most inexplicable. The pathways of the planets we may easily trace in the general, but their exact lines of motion it is toilsome to decipher. The energy of no single agent in nature is the precise exponent of the phenomena occasioned by it, for that agent is modified in its operation by unseen forces which will perhaps ever elude our scrutiny. The enigmas of science multiply as its old knots are untied. A good solution of that which once perplexed us, suggests new laws yet more perplexing. The end of our being is discipline. *Vexatio dat intellectum*. We may dispense with a prying examination into the hidden agencies of nature, we may make certain comprehensive guesses, which will hit somewhere near the truth, — near enough, as we carelessly say for practical purposes; — but these rough conjectures are sometimes the source of fatal disaster. A minute error may invalidate the most important demonstration. Vessels have been wrecked by a wrong figure in a table of logarithms, and souls have been ruined by a wrong inference of ethical reasoners. A single misapprehension of the meaning of John Locke, opened the flood-gates of French Infidelity. We sometimes wish that our Saviour had written a treatise explaining all the intricate problems of sacred science. But as in his intercourse with his disciples he roused within them a spirit of inquiry and even

wonder, so in the revelation which he sent us, he left many hints which we find it arduous to trace out. And it is a singular fact, that all other sciences roll over upon theology their most abstruse questions. We have a right to demand that the geologist answer the query whether matter be eternal; and the ontologist, whether it have a real or only an ideal existence; and the psychologist and the chemist, whether the mind be material; and the psychologist and the jurist whether man's volitions be fated or free; but all these scholars regard the theologian as responsible for solving all these difficulties. They may aid him, but he steps forward as the champion in defence of truths which they are primarily bound to maintain. And the followers of Augustine and Calvin have ever been foremost in grappling with the stern questions which baffle other philosophers. Therefore does the theology of our Puritan fathers magnify the importance of those institutions which provide means for overcoming the difficulties of truth. It insists on extensive libraries, by which the inquirer of to-day may be led into familiar converse with the spirits of all who have gone before him, and be relieved from the drudgery of laying over again the foundations which have been often laid by his predecessors. It insists on generous endowments and permanent funds by which the scholar may be sustained in his defence of truth, and not be harassed with petty fears lest his barrel of meal soon waste and his cruise of oil soon fail. It is often said that such accumulations of treasure may be perverted. But we must have faith in God. We must not prefer our personal care to his wakeful providence. Certainly he can preserve in its proper use the wealth of his friends when it is funded for ministerial education, as well as they themselves can preserve it when it is clasped in their individual purses. It is often said that every scholar of the church ought to feel the stimulus of poverty, as musical birds should not be too well fed, and as the nightingale sings the sweetest when her breast presses against a thorn. But our ministers and our professors will be poor enough, without our making their poverty a matter of the public conscience. There is no loud call on Americans to guard against such an excess of generosity as will enervate the studious man. They are rather called to redouble their generosity so as to exonerate him from the service of tables, and thus leave him free to follow out the sinuosities of science. He should not be dependent on the occasional, doubtful charity of the multitude; least of all should he be condemned, as he sometimes is, even in our own day, *to beg his bread from door to door*, and divide his attention between the truths which ought to engross it, and the collecting here and there of his precarious salary from men who have no commiseration for the difficulties of his pursuits, and who perhaps en-

deavor, according to a mournful but most expressive mercantile phrase, *to beat him down*. His processes of investigation are so modest, cautious, and therefore slow, that unlettered men in their eagerness for instantaneous results complain of him as bringing nothing to pass. They withdraw his daily bread, if he do not hold out before their eyes his daily earnings. Under a democratic government the poor have some peculiar tendencies to become jealous of the rich, the ignorant of the learned; and, thus exposed to causeless suspicions, a scholar needs the fostering care of some literary institute which he can rely upon as an *Alma Mater*. He becomes faint hearted,—so frail is the virtue of even disciplined men,—unless he be judged by his peers, unless he be cherished in the bosom of some enlightened and enduring seminary which will animate him, or rather require him, to buy the truth at whatever cost, and sell it not for whatever of popular applause. He loses his literary enterprise, unless raised above the fitfulness of a people who may be swayed by his envious rivals and may find it *economical* to have no confidence in him. It ought to be,—but so great is the lingering depravity of even good men that we must confess with blushing face it seldom is the fact,—that a Christian scholar will be patient enough, or manly enough, or pure-minded and spiritual enough to press onward through neglect or reproach, the foresight of his own and his children's penury, the daily consciousness of an enfeebled, sickly frame,—to persevere in resisting his own indolence, in wrestling with the difficulties of his science, so as to wear out the obstacles which had filled his path; to force his way into the temple against the portals of which he had been knocking through long and weary years, and at last to exclaim with the joy of him who announced one of his astronomical discoveries in the words which posterity will not willingly let die: "What I prophesied two-and-twenty years ago, as soon as I discovered the five solids among the heavenly orbits; what I firmly believed long before I had seen Ptolemy's Harmonics; what I had promised my friends in the title of this book, which I named before I was sure of my discovery; what, sixteen years ago, I urged as a thing to be sought; that for which I joined Tycho Brahe, for which I settled in Prague, for which I have devoted the best part of my life to astronomical contemplations;—at length I have brought to light, and have recognized its truth beyond my most sanguine expectations. It is now eighteen months since I got the first glimpse of light, three months since the dawn, very few days since the unveiled sun, most admirable to gaze on, burst upon me. Nothing holds me; I will indulge in my sacred fury; I will triumph over mankind by the honest confession, that I have stolen the golden vases of the Egyptians to build up a tabernacle for my God, far from the

confines of Egypt. If you forgive me, I rejoice; if you are angry I can bear it; the die is cast, the book is written, to be read either now or by posterity,—I care not which. I may well wait a century for a reader, as God has waited six thousand years for an observer.”

As our colleges and professional schools are remembrancers of the cost of truth, so, I remark in the *fifth* place, they are useful for their conservative influence upon society. Of course they do not nourish that sickly conservatism which bars out improvement, which clings to the false because it is old, and sacrifices the good of the world to an antiquarian taste; not that unbending obstinacy of Moliere’s doctors who deemed it far more honorable to fail according to rule than to succeed on any new plan. They rather engender a conservatism of truth, of goodness and of liberty; a tenaciousness of that spirit which animated our fathers, and is the life of all generous minds, the true spirit of progress; a caution against hailing every change as an amelioration, but a readiness to accept any amelioration even if it be a change. They make us reluctant to innovate without imperative reason upon systems which have been established with so much toil. They are needed, especially in our Western States, to resist the encroachments of foreigners upon those great principles for which our fathers so wisely suffered the loss of all things.

Their tendency to preserve our *language* pure, is a fit illustration of their conservative influence upon our habits of thought. Hordes of Britons are rushing in upon us, speaking a barbarous dialect, and corrupting our familiar speech with what the British critic will soon proscribe as *Americanisms*. On the Saxon stock of our language will be engrafted new German idioms, on the Norman stock new Gallicisms, unless our universities maintain, what in our republican land will be, the language of the court. Yale College alone has furnished her Webster, her Worcester and her Goodrich, who though in unequal degrees are erecting the barriers against an inundation of outlandish terms, and preparing the way for our mother tongue to be spoken in its purity over this entire continent; and where the undefiled language of England and America is spoken, there will be a healthful religious literature.

Among inquisitive, sagacious but unlearned men, will often spring up adventurers who will detect some one principle of science, and whose minds being vacant of other principles, will be absorbed with this one. Their favorite, single idea, not being made prominent in the received philosophy, is thought by them to have been entirely un-

recognized. They dream that a revelation has been made to them. They form a new school or a new sect. The majority of medical empirics are men who seize upon some fact or principle which is familiar to the medical school, but is new to themselves, and around which as a nucleus they gather the materials of a one-sided theory. The glaring discoveries of many theological pretenders have been long and well known to the accomplished theologian, but he has been wont to look upon them not as gaudy colorings untempered, unrelieved, filling up the entire picture, but as mere individual lines, offset by appropriate shadings. Now it is a tendency of our professional seminaries, to exhibit the complete system of which the empiric's one idea is a subordinate part. By thus illustrating the symmetry and the grandeur of the entire edifice, they deter short-sighted men from seizing at a single stone which falls from it and parading the fragment as their original invention. They do indeed foster a spirit of discovery, but they repress the vanity of it. While they develop the sagacious instincts of our Western mind, they will also guard those instincts and save them from becoming rampant. They preserve the results of past investigation, inspire a reverence for them, encourage a familiarity with them, and thereby rescue men from the vain conceit, that every principle which is novel to their own minds must have been unknown to their predecessors. If even Strabo announced the existence of a new continent which Columbus discovered after it had been visited by the Northmen; if navigators guided their barks by the needle centuries before the modern invention of the mariner's compass; if the arts of printing and paper-making were not originated by the men who commonly enjoy the honor of their first discovery; if even gunpowder was used on the Harz mountains, two hundred years before it was afterwards invented by a religious monk in a city contiguous to them; if the minds of men in successive ages are often revolving in the same forgotten rounds, then he who is called an original thinker, should not be hasty in claiming the first acquaintance with that which an antiquarian may hereafter find written out in some black-letter, worm-eaten volume of the college library. And as he should not seize at the notoriety of having discovered what may be true, still less of having been the first to believe in what is false. A singular shamefacedness creeps over him, when he finds that the rocket which he has made to blaze in the heavens, as if to rival the stars in brilliancy, is made up of combustibles which have been used over and over, and are now rekindled simply to evanesce once more with a transitory hissing. So soon as it is proved that an error is not new, it is despoiled of its main attraction. Coming forth armed from the brain of

a visionary, it is belligerent and seems formidable ; but when it is shown to be a new phasis of an error long since superannuated and regarded as too far gone for mischief, it ceases to be either feared or defended. It may be thus historically emptied of its power by those men who have access to the ancient documents of the church ; and nowhere is, or ought to be, such a treasure of these documents as in the libraries of our learned institutions.

Nor is the conservative influence of these institutions limited to matters of belief. We live in a land which is often styled new, but which in reality labors under the inconvenience of never as yet having been made. Therefore, while we are not destitute of profound philosophers, we have also many upstarts. We abound with modest men but have, both in our older and newer States, not a few mountebanks. We need seminaries of an elevated character, for the purpose of checking a tendency to radicalism in practice. When a minister has been far removed from the discipline of science, the attractions of elegant letters, he has adopted uncouth measures for winning the heart to the beauties of the gospel, has attempted to drive men in tumultuous, phrensied assemblages to the state of wisdom which is one of peace. His violent assaults on the will have resulted not so often from a want of piety, as a want of knowledge and taste. If while thus unlettered, he had been shut up to the rubrics and guarded by the canons of the church, his fanatical impulses might have been kept under duress ; but while he was his own bishop and his common sense was his book of discipline, he needed a high Christian scholarship to keep him from falling into indiscreet and indecent innovations upon the order of the Lord's house. It is the excellence of our ecclesiastical freedom, that it requires, and therefore promotes a degree of culture which saves men from intemperate, disorganizing measures.

Our theological seminaries have been suspected, for it has been an effort of modern radicalism to impair their influence by the charge, of fostering unduly a love of investigation and diverting the youthful mind to polite literature. Seldom, however, have they seduced a student into the guilt of too much learning or of too great refinement, although even this is not the deepest guilt into which the rude and lethargic mind of man is prone to sink. But by training the pupil to a reflective habit, our seminaries have often restrained him from that style of exhortation which is sonorous because hollow, and from that wildfire which comes with the crackling of light thorns. By the classic taste which they impart, they wither the luxuriance of a fanatical spirit, raise the mind above a low, levelling barbarism, cultivate a respect for regular discipline, for venerable usage. By nurturing a love of

rational, sedate meditation they add a dignity to the churches, and indispose them to be captivated with the antics of itinerant and extravagant reformers. By their permanency, by their old traditions, by their historical researches, they bring the good of past times into the present, and, all with God's help, will continue the good of the present into the future.

Intimately connected with their conservative influence is a *sixth* benefit which our collegiate and professional schools confer upon us; they are safeguards of our civil freedom. The contemplative spirit which prevails in them leads us to expect, and their past history confirms the expectation, that the God of all grace will make them the nurseries of an intelligent piety; and such a piety is the only sure regulator of our national politics. The spirit of the political press deteriorates and darkens, as the light of spiritual knowledge grows dim. The best patriot is the truly Christian scholar.

A monarch's throne relies upon the influence of a few families, and is safe when they are well disciplined. But a republic depends on the entire population, acknowledges them all as counsellors, and therefore demands of all, as a despotism of some, that their intellect, conscience and will, be virtuously trained. In order to secure the requisite culture of the masses, some individuals must be highly cultivated. They must be in form and gesture super-eminent, so as to oversee the mental habits of the operative classes. There must, then, be institutions on the Hill of Science, whose light cannot be hid from the circumjacent plains. It is true that her fifteen hundred newspapers¹ and her twenty-three universities have not given to Germany a liberal government; but if they be unable to originate, they are needed to preserve this blessing, as the radiance of the sun though impotent to create is essential to sustain the plant. The recent failures of the republican experiment in continental Europe, are only renewed proofs that her imperial schools have not, as they should have, blended the diffusive spirit of religion with that of learning. Still the surveillance under which her press and her universities are kept, for they are guarded like arsenals just ready to explode, is a sign of their tendency to introduce the freedom which they are indispensable for retaining.

A democratic government preserves its liberty by peace. It is too unweildy, too dependent on the suffrages of a slow-moving multitude

¹ Many of these have been authoritatively suppressed since this paragraph was written.

for long continued war. It should prefer an accommodating policy, and waive oftener than urge its disputes with foreign powers. It therefore requires a popular discretion. It enforces its own laws not upon subjects but upon citizens; hence not so often at the point of a bayonet as by the influence of reason. It becomes the weakest of all governments, when the people have not the patriotism which flows from a meditative and religious temper. Now the favored haunts of peace are the halls of science. Men of all ages and of all languages meet here as members of one household. When hostile armies encamp along the Ilissus, they shake hands together from opposite banks of the stream. We desire to give our learned schools a more controlling influence that we may prevent another Mexican war, and appropriate the two hundred million dollars which would be needed for such a brutal contest, to the enriching and perpetuating of all the schools of learning and of peace which our country will ever need.

Our national freedom is linked with our union under one government, and our union is cemented by the spirit of our universities; for this is a considerate spirit not easily provoked by political strifes, looking above the varieties of north, south, east and west, or rather regarding these topical distinctions as essential to the most durable unity. While far the larger part of our Southern and Western youth must be taught, if at all, in their own colleges, many of them should resort to the older institutions of the East, which have been touched by time with somewhat of its peculiar finish; and the influence which many of these scholars bear away to their homes from the scenes of their collegiate friendship, will be a bond of brotherhood to the distant sections of our land. Our permanent seminaries of learning are thus a connecting link between places as well as times, remote from each other. They cement in mutual attachment the controlling spirits of the nation; they foster life-long and endearing intimacies between the physicians, statesmen, clergymen, teachers and authors of the older and the newer States, and thus imbue our various learned professions with one sentiment, and that a sentiment of fraternal regard to each other, and of filial love to our country,—our whole country, which shall stand so long as it remains united, but will fall when divided.

The price of liberty is said to be perpetual vigilance; but the vigilance of uninstructed men sinks into jealousy, and jealousy alienates those whom the comprehensive spirit of science binds together. Already has one man, a son of a Massachusetts pastor, an alumnus of a New England college, brought the thirty States of our confederation into a fellowship closer than that of the original thirteen; for he has braided our national interests together by magnetic wires, and has

made it possible to transmit an amalgamating thought in a few seconds over more than twelve thousand miles of our electrified country. Our trust also is, that the rail car will soon fly like the shuttle from and to all the extremities of the Republic, and weave our sectional parties together as the warp and woof of one enduring fabric, to the praise and for the furtherance of that knowledge which, in union with charity, is a bond of perfectness.

If our freedom be ever lost, history allows us to prophesy that it will be for want of popular intelligence as a help to popular virtue; this vacuity will be filled up by brutal passions; these passions will add power to the military chieftain; and this chieftain may have reason to regard himself as called of Heaven to prevent the mischiefs of anarchy by the inferior mischiefs of his own usurpation. This usurpation may be degrading, but like the usurped sway of Napoleon, less hurtful than the tyranny of a murderous populace. It will presuppose that the people are deeply debased, and such debasement will imply that the press is inactive, and such inactivity will bespeak a want of tone in our seminaries of learning; for these seminaries should, like the "lips of the wise, disperse knowledge" and quicken the understanding; and an inspired teacher has said that "by a man of understanding and knowledge" the government shall be prolonged.

But our collegiate and professional schools not only tend to preserve our national freedom; I remark in the *last* place, they promote our national honor and influence. The representatives of a monarchy, like the Prussian, are the accomplished men who have been trained for office from early childhood, and are qualified to reflect lustre on the throne which has irradiated them with its favor. The mass of the subjects are degraded, and if they were made conspicuous would cover their land with ignominy. Here and there a traveller spies out their debasement; while to the observer from afar, they are like the vallies lying deeply hidden between the mountains which send up their pure summits to gladden his eye. But in our land, the representatives of the people are the people themselves. Every man may become an editor, without a license from the government, and his press, however coarse, is regarded as a specimen of American literature. Every citizen may climb up to a seat in the legislative hall, and while there he becomes a spectacle to foreign critics, is watched as one of our rulers, is compared or rather contrasted with the lords and princes of a refined European court. If the press of any other land were as free as ours, it would be as vituperative; but our liberty exposes the malice which, under a severe censorship, corrodes in secret. In process of

time the known evil becomes less perilous than the hidden one, but for the present is more disgraceful. The recent debates in the French Assembly demonstrate, that wherever an ill-taught people select their own representatives, and the representatives have a license to manifest their inward feelings, there will be as much broad-mouthed vulgarity, as in our own Congress even ; but where the speech of men is restrained by law, their malignant passions will be kept smouldering in their bosoms, will be gathering force to burst out in a revolutionary carnage ; and in the stillness which precedes this convulsion, all the national developments will be respectable and decorous. It is doubtless true, that no equal proportion of men on the globe are so generally instructed as our free-born citizens ; but it is also true, that we have a smaller number of highly finished scholars than are to be found in many other lands. A larger variety of elaborate volumes are annually published in a single German province, than in our whole country. It is said that the newspapers printed in Great Britain in a single year, if formed into a belt of a foot in width, might encircle the earth at the equator nearly six times. Our newspapers, although more numerous, are on the whole less reputable than hers, and our inferiority to her is greater still in the number and value of our scientific treatises. Our thirty thousand clergymen are, as a class, far less fitted to adorn the literature of their profession than are the Saxon or Hanoverian preachers. Some of the brightest jewels in the diadem of England, France and Prussia, are their well read statesmen, jurists, physicians, theologians ; their elegant writers, their living encyclopaedias. Such men of universal learning are needed in our land. They would divert the attention of mankind from our expulsion of the Creeks and Cherokees, our Seminole and Mexican wars, our repudiation and our negro slavery. But the training of such men to represent us before the world, would require that we raise the endowments of our Dartmouth and Amherst and Williams to an equality with those of Oxford, Göttingen and the Sorbonne ; that we no longer allow the public libraries of this entire land to contain fewer volumes than are collected in the single city of Paris ; that we give to our Western colleges an apparatus for instruction equal to the vigor with which they are prepared to use it ; that we strive to combine the Western enthusiasm with more than the Eastern culture ; above all, that we beseech the God of science to endue our schools with his wisdom liberally.

The true honor of our nation consists in its influence on the world. We are an insulated, also a peculiar people, and therefore attract the gaze of others. Just so soon as foreign countries begin to reconstruct their governments, they begin to examine our civil constitutions, our in-

ternal policy, our religious, social, and even domestic life. This influence of the Model Republic should be preserved. It is a treasure, compared with which the gold of the Sacramento is but yellow dust. The American who educates his own mind and heart is a benefactor to his entire country, for he contributes to the elevation of his country's influence. The parent who is generous in devoting his material treasures to the spiritual training of his offspring, acts not only as a good father, but as a patriot; nor only as a patriot but as a philanthropist, for he not only enlarges the sphere of his children's influence, but adds an attraction to his native land, and kindles a new light for the darkened nations. The American divine who is enabled to sway the prejudices and the consciences of his countrymen, so as to make them a temperate and a sabbath-keeping people, is extending his power, and this both a religious and a political power, not only to the Pacific shores but to the islands of the sea, to the reddened fields of Hungary, along the *steppes* of the Czar, the snows of Norway, and even to the seven-hilled city. Those national benefactors who deserve the freedom of the city in a golden box, are not the heroes of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo; but they are the Corneliuses who conduct our Education Societies, and labor to educe from obscurity the select spirits by means of whom the church and therefore the nation are to be refined; they are such home missionaries as amid the forests of the Wabash kneeled down upon the snow, and dedicated to Heaven the college which then had no existence save in their own faith and in the divine decrees, but which was to be raised by a prayer-hearing God on the very spot where they kneeled for his blessing; they are the pious founders of that log cabin in New Jersey, in which have now been trained a hundred and sixty-eight occupants of the very highest offices in our land, and more than four hundred and fifty ministers of the gospel. Our Education Societies and our universities are seminal, and he who nurtures the growth of one, causes a thousand good influences to spring up as the exuberant fruit of a small seed.

The most thrilling revolution of our times is, that our home missions are becoming foreign, and our foreign is turning itself into a home field. Four years since and New Mexico, Utah, and California might have claimed the patronage of the American Board; now we have received them bodily to our embrace, and we must educate home missionaries for them, and thus prepare them for the civil franchises which were never designed for an ignorant Spanish population. Every year a half million emigrants will continue to land upon our shores, become at once our brethren, impress on us the duty of providing teachers for them, and if we impart to them the true wisdom, we trans-

mit a benignant influence through them to the foreign hamlets from the bosom of which they came. A single word from John Jacob Astor would give an electric impulse to a whole German village; and if all his countrymen should find here the spiritual wealth, as he found the material, who can estimate the results of their quickening intercourse with their father-land? Every letter which they wrote would wake up the mind and the heart of an affectionate circle to truth and duty.

Besides, men of genius and of multifarious erudition are coming among us, like exiled princes, leaving none of their treasures behind. We welcome them as our instructors. But we must not be the mere recipients of their European culture. We should prepare ourselves to bestow good as well as to receive it. We should greet them to our Puritan homes, enriched as these homes ought to be with the treasures of the Puritan mind. We must not tamely surrender the character which our fathers wrought out for us through suffering, but we must form an American literature, instinct with the spirit of our ancestry. Never had a people a surer and a broader basis on which to erect a temple of national learning. Blended with our mental activity are all the associations of the ancient Briton, Dane, Saxon, Norman; of the modern Spaniard, Hollander, Helvetian and Roman. As our land comprehends all varieties of climate and soil, and therefore if the northern fruit be blighted the southern will supply its place, and if disease invade the prairie the sea-board opens its wide-spread asylum; so our national mind embraces all varieties, and by amalgamating them into a solid composite, promises to rise above the one-sided developments of a strictly homogeneous people. It is not only the imagination of a Shakspeare and Milton that inspires us, but also that of a Goethe and Klopstock; not alone the intellect of Locke and Reid that instructs us, but likewise that of Kant and Cousin. As the mixture of races improves the physical system, so this variety in the sources of mental impression expands the mental view. Under so wide a range of influences, and with our national spirit of freedom, we can never sit down at the feet of an Oxford divine whose vision has been circumscribed by the shores and mystified by the fogs of his own island; nor can we make our theology a miniature edition of the German, which needs to be rectified rather than abridged; but, by the reverence which we owe to our ancestors and by the solicitude which we should feel for our descendants, we must retain that firm groundwork of Puritan excellence on which the mind of our country has so long rested, and must blend with it the definiteness and precision of the Port Royal, the comprehensiveness and genial glow of the land of the Reformers, the tact and delicacy of the Italian, the hardihood of the Swede and Russian, the

vigor of the Scotch, the practical, mechanical good sense of the modern Englishman ; nor should we disdain, perhaps, the humble tribute which the poor, untutored Indian is to bring us of an eloquence fresh as his forest leaves, nor will we vilely cast away the affectionate and grateful and confiding spirit of the African, who will yet make melody with the links of the chain that has bound him.

I have trust in God, that as he kept our continent hidden from the European masses until he had made known to them the uses of the type and the printing press, and had laid the train for the Reformation of the church ; as he sent hither the best men from the most enlightened of lands, who should employ their forecast and reach of mind in laying a broad, deep basis on which their successors might erect a worthy superstructure, so has he designed this land for the comprehensive and variegated activity of his church ; and as he has mingled, so he will continue to mingle in it those diversified elements which coalesce in the richest and most durable character, and the result of which, under a liberal culture, will be a poetry, a philosophy, a theology more capacious, more profound, more soul-stirring than he has vouchsafed to any other people. A character gleaned thus from all nations, will be so versatile, so energetic, as to qualify us for mingling with them all and elevating their religious spirit. As Harvard College has trained forty-one presidents and a hundred and thirteen professors for herself and other colleges, and as she educated the first four presidents of Yale ; and as Yale College, in her turn, has trained forty-one presidents and a hundred and thirteen professors for herself and other colleges, and as she educated the first three presidents of Nassau Hall, and as Nassau Hall has followed these examples and furnished fifty-four presidents and professors for our Southern and Western colleges ; so may we hope that the Western seminaries which have already begun their beneficent action, will ere long send forth their hundred teachers for the universities of our Pacific shores, and these universities, with all the composite strength of Western character, will train still more exemplary instructors for the colleges of China and Japan. As the tree of learning has thus sent out its branches toward the setting sun, and these branches have taken root and grown up as affiliated trees, so the boughs from these trees will also take root, and like the banyan spread out their limbs to reach the earth and rise again as other trees, and at length fill the land with their shade and their fragrance. From Dartmouth College have gone out twenty-four missionaries to foreign countries ; from Amherst, so recently established, twenty-seven ; from Williams, thirty-three ; from Middlebury, have gone only eight hundred and seventy-two alumni, but three hundred and seventy-five of these

have become preachers; and twenty-four, preachers to the heathen. Our hope and prayer is that from Cincinnati, Hudson and Marietta, Knox, Wittenberg and Beloit, there will come not only sturdier and more versatile missionaries, but also numerous teachers of missionaries, who shall roll forward the tide of evangelical learning further and further, and make our country the spiritual benefactor of the world. With the eye of faith I see the islands of the deep sending their princes and warriors to the schools of Oregon, and her choice youth there becoming princes in the realm of letters and warriors doing battle for the church militant. I see what has long been called "the land of the rising sun" looking to the East for light; and *her* luminous East,—so rapid are the mutations of our intellectual geography,—is soon to be found on our western shores. I see the Brazilian and the Patagonian crowding into our Californias, that they may dig for knowledge as for hid treasures, and search for that wisdom which is more precious than rubies. I rejoice in the mines which our eager countrymen are exploring; for if we send among them the teacher who has himself been taught of God, we may hope that the stones of the new-found quarries will lie at the foundation of colleges all along our western prairies, and that the enterprise which this Dorado has awakened will become a zeal to seek out the truth, an earnestness to enrich the hearts of men, an absorbing interest in those treasures which are without alloy. Not in vain has He who seeth the end from the beginning, sounded aloud the trumpet and summoned the nations together in this new world. It is to make us a *missionary* people, that he is thus adorning us with the spoils of all countries and all times. From the ardent, the sympathetic and the meditative temper which distinguishes our Colleges, we are permitted to hope that God will continue, as he has begun to make them the favored residences of his Spirit, without whose life-giving power we are all as dead men. From the influence of religion upon the susceptible minds of our youthful students, we are allowed to believe that they, above all others, will be animated with the missionary zeal. In the diffusion of this missionary spirit lies our best national influence. In this kind of national influence is our highest national honor; and all the honor of ourselves and our nation is and is to be but a garland upon the brow of Him "born to redeem and strong to save," who came to us as the first missionary, and is ever to be our great teacher in his school of wisdom, which is one of pleasantness and peace.

ARTICLE III.

CRITICISM ON GESENIUS'S DOCTRINE OF THE ACCENTS AND MAKKEPH.

By Jacob T. M. Falkenau, New York.

IN the "Hebrew Grammar of Gesenius, as revised by Roediger, from the fourteenth edition, translated by T. J. Conant, Prof. in Madison University, Hamilton," we read as follows :

"I. Book, on Orthography. § 15. Note 11, 5. But two conjunctives cannot be employed together. If the sense requires that several words should be connected, it is done by Makkeph."

"§ 16, 1. The use of it [Makkeph] moreover depends chiefly on the principle that two conjunctive accents cannot be written in succession."

We read substantially the same, with a little variation, in Prof. Stuart's translation, published 1846.

I assert that to whatever part of the Bible we may apply this rule and theory, it will prove to be a failure. Let us then take for examination the 1st chapter of Genesis.

In 1, 26. 4, he asserts that when one conjunction follows another, as may be the case "in very long verses," (but we have pointed it out in such short verses as Gen. 2: 4. 3: 12, 21), one of them is used as a lesser disjunctive (*legatus domini*), as e. g. the T'lisha K'tanna on the first word of the phrase סֵפֶר הַחֹרֶה הַזֶּה *this book of the law*, which occurs in the verse Josh. 1: 8, which he gives as an illustration of the use of the accents. It is evident that this is but an expedient to escape from the dilemma created by his own arbitrary rule. Moreover, he has made a bad choice in selecting the first accent as the representative of a disjunctive; for as the pron. הֵנָּה is of the masc. gender, it agrees, not with הַחֹרֶה, but with סֵפֶר, and consequently there is even a closer degree of logical connection between the first two than between the last two words of the phrase. Comp. Deut. 29: 20. 30: 10. 31: 26.

But for the better investigation of the subject, let us refer to the author's original work, the "Lehrgebäude."

In any of the other verses quoted there as containing the most accents, the author might have met with the same difficulty of finding two or more conjunctives in succession. The quotation of 1 Chron. 28: 1, even numbers five conjunctives in succession.

8. It answers the same purpose as the recession of an accent (קטוב אחר), to prevent the concurrence of two tone-syllables; for a word has no accent when it receives Makkeph. Usually either expedient might be employed. But since a receded accent has but the power of Metheg and cannot be placed on a closed syllable, the joining of the two words by Makkeph is resorted to in those cases where the penult of the first word is a closed syllable (compare Gesenius's "Lehrgebäude," § 28, 2. b.); further, also, when it has some other grammatical advantage over the "recession of accents; e. g. יְהוֹשֻׁעַ, יְהוֹשֻׁעַ Gen. 4: 24, 26, יְהוֹשֻׁעַ-יְהוֹשֻׁעַ Gen. 6: 9 and 1 Samuel 30: 31. יְהוֹשֻׁעַ-יְהוֹשֻׁעַ Deut. 16: 13. 19: 6. מְדַבֵּר when connected with the monosyllables זֶה, הֵן, זֶה, זֶה (but without Makkeph when connected with הֵן, זֶה, in which case there are not two tone-syllables in succession), וְהַמְדַּבֵּר 1 Sam. 28: 24, וְהַמְדַּבֵּר Isa. 45: 8, וְהַמְדַּבֵּר Gen. 2: 24.

4. It is employed when words are placed in such a position that the rules of the "consecutio accentuum" do not allow them to have any accent. And it is on this principle that the use of a Makkeph chiefly depends; since that system could never have been carried on without the aid of the Makkeph. For illustrations of our first three rules for the insertion of Makkeph, we refer the reader to the various existing Hebrew grammars; but this fourth rule requires further elucidation. In the first place, then, we remind the reader, that the "consecutio accentuum" has its rules systematically fixed both for the order of the accents: "Silluq habet Tiph'ha," etc. "Merca servit Tiph'ha," etc. (Gesenius, Lehrgebäude, § 26, 1. 2) and for the number of servants (conjunctives) which can accompany their rulers (disjunctives):

a) Silluq has but one servant (conjunctive).

b) Tiph'ha has usually no more and no other than Merca (occasionally it takes two, when it has *Merca Kefula*).

c) Athnah and Zakeph-Katon may have two and no more; but when Zakeph-Katon has two conjunctives the rhythm of the first one changes.

d) Between Mahpach and Pashtah, and between Darga and Tebbir, no other conjunctive accent can be interposed (Mishpete Hattaamim, ch. I. § 5. ch. II. § 1).

In addition to these rules, we have only to remark that they are strictly observed in all the prosaical books of the Bible (not speaking here of the metrical books אֲשֶׁר); and thus these few references to the system of the consecution of accents may here suffice in explanation of

Makkeph. For we must bear in mind that the founders of that system very often must have met with texts contrary to one or the other of these rules. Very often a text will present a connection in sense of more than one word with a word bearing Silluq or Teph'ha; it may present more than two words to be connected with a word bearing Athnah or Zakeph-Katon; or one or more words might have to be interposed between Darga and Tebhir or between Mahpach and Pashta; and so that whole system would have been overthrown, or would at least have remained incomplete, were it not for the introduction of another sign, adopted alike to show the connection of a word with a following one, and to make it lose its accent:—and such is the office of Makkeph. This will explain our fourth rule for the use of Makkeph, which will be made clear by the following examples:

1. To prevent a violation of rule *a*; בַּעֲלֵי בְרִית־אֲבָרָם Gen. 14: 13; אֲשֶׁר־אָמְרוּ לָוִי הַגִּלְלִיתִים Gen. 22: 3.

2. To prevent a violation of rule *b*; בְּשִׁבְעֵה־עָגָר יוֹם Gen. 7: 11; בְּלִדְהֶחָגֶר אֶת־יִשְׁמָעֵאל Gen. 14: 21; so 18: 1. 26: 19; בְּלִדְהֶחָגֶר אֶת־יִשְׁמָעֵאל Gen. 16: 16; so 26: 25.

3. To prevent a violation of rule *d*; viz. to avoid the interposition of an accent between Mahpach and Pashta: שָׁם אֲשֶׁר־אֲבָרָם Gen. 11: 29; so 19: 9. 20: 7; וַיַּחֲדֵל לָוִי בְּקִנְיַה־צֹאן Gen. 26: 14. To avoid interposing an accent between Darga and Debhir: וַעַץ עֲשֶׂה־סֵרֶךְ Gen. 1: 12; and so 10: 32. 24: 23; אֶת־שָׁם־בְּנוֹ הַזֵּלֶל־לָוִי Gen. 21: 3; אֶת־בֵּית־אֲבִי אֲמִלָּא Gen. 24: 38.

In all these examples, it might appear a matter of indifference where to place the Conjunctive and where the Makkeph; and so it is in a mere orthographical point of view, because either way would equally answer the purpose. It will however generally be observed, that the positions of the Makkeph are by no means arbitrarily chosen, but that in placing it, regard is had to perspicuity, even so as to disregard the orthographical rule of using it with monosyllables. And thus of the two or more words in successive connection, that which is least closely connected in sense with the one that follows it receives the conjunctive accent, and the other or others the Makkeph.

In the following passages we have two conjunctives in succession: Gen. 1: 12 עָשֶׂה וְעָשֶׂה בְּיוֹמֵי יוֹרֵד; and so 2: 3.

1: 21 וַיֵּאָחֶז עֲלֵי־נֶפֶשׁ הַחַיָּה; and so 3: 12, 14.

1: 21 אֲשֶׁר־לְרִצּוֹ הַחַיִּים; and so 1: 26. 2: 7, 19. 21: 22. 3: 14, 21, 24.

2: 4 אֵלֶּה חֹלְדוֹת הַנֶּפֶשִׁים

3: 6 וְכִי תֵאָחֶז הַחַיָּה לְעֵינֶיהָ

3: 8 אֶת־קוֹל יְהוָה אֲלֵהֶם; and so 3: 13.

In the following passages there are three in succession :

Gen. 1: 25 וַיַּעַשׂ אֱלֹהִים אֶת-הַיָּם וְהָאָרֶץ ; and so 3: 6.

2: 19 וַיִּבֶן אֱלֹהִים יְהוָה-לֵּוֹי תַּאֲרָם¹

ARTICLE IV.

A COMPARISON OF THE GREEK AND LATIN VERBS.

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It is proposed to offer here a specimen of what modern philology has done and is doing to illustrate the structure, development, and relationship of languages, by comparing in its light the Greek and Latin verbs. The analysis of these verbs, as being a subject of high and general interest, has been quite fully elaborated by the teachers of the science, and to their works² the student is referred for the full details of what can here be only concisely and generally stated.

The Greek and Latin verbs, as they appear in the classical literature of the two languages, offer so many and so striking points of difference as almost overwhelm and cover from view that fundamental resemblance which evidences their original identity. On a general view the two seem constructed upon quite a different plan, and the Latin

¹ Prof. Nordheimer, in his Grammar, §1142. 2. says: "Three words in immediate succession cannot all be accompanied by conjunctive accents, however close their connection may be." He adds in a Note to this as follows: "With the exception of *Kadhma* (') and *T'lisha K'tanna* ('), which, although conjunctives, possess a slight separating power, and hence may be placed before two other conjunctives, or before the officers *Pazer* (') and *Tlisha Gh'dhola* ('), which on account of their weakness do not draw the conjunctives so closely together." It is true that the above rule, thus qualified, will cover a good deal of ground; still such examples as:

2 Sam. 21: 2 וַיִּבֶן יִשְׂרָאֵל יְהוָה ; and so Eccl. 4: 8.

Ezek. 47: 12 וַיִּבֶן יְהוָה יְהוָה-עַל-שְׂפָחוֹתַי מִיָּדָי

1 Kings 6: 1 וַיִּבֶן בְּשִׁמּוֹנִים שָׁנָה וַאֲרָבַע מֵאוֹת שָׁנָה

even exclusive of *T'lisha K'tanna* and *Kadhma*, may be written in succession, as well as two. And as for that "slight separating power" which he attributes to these two conjunctives, is it not contrary to what is admitted on all hands, and to his own express declaration: "The conjunctive accents are all equal among themselves as regards their power of connection?" (Grammar, § 48.)

² As Bopp, comp Grammar; Pott, Etym. Forschungen; Curtius, Die Temp. und Modi im Gr. und Lat.; from the latter of which especially has been derived a large share of the materials of the following paper.

verb, without an augment, with traces only of a reduplication, with no dual, no aorist, no optative, a subjunctive independent, in its formation of the indicative, with its meagre array of imperative, infinitive, and participles, and with a passive of entirely distinct origin, seems not only vastly poorer than, but thoroughly diverse from, its Hellenic neighbor and sister. We have then to inquire, how much and what is still actually possessed in common by the two; how far the difference between them is owing to a loss by either of what both originally shared, and how far to a separate development by the two of the resources of formation which both enjoyed, for the purpose either of supplying original deficiencies or compensating subsequent losses; and finally how far such further developments have been prompted by a kindred spirit. It will not, it is believed, be necessary to take up each of these points separately; they will be sufficiently illustrated in the course of a general treatment of the subject.

To commence our comparison, then, with the present indicative. This tense is, of the whole series, the earliest in origin, and the simplest as regards the principle of its formation. It is produced by merely appending to the root, in which is contained the idea of the action, the personal endings, which are personal pronouns indicating the actor; and generally by the aid of a union-vowel, which is only a euphonic insertion, intended to facilitate the combination of root and ending. The present, then, we should expect to find most faithfully preserved, and presenting in the two verbs the closest resemblance; and we are not disappointed; the coincidence is very striking. It is in this tense only that the union-vowel and personal ending, being freed from the special influences, the one of any tense or mode sign, the other of any prefix to the root, are exhibited as modified merely by the general phonetic laws of either language, and it will therefore be worth while to compare them the more particularly. Take the root LEG in both languages. In the first person singular *lego*, λέγω, both for the older form LEG-A-MI (compare, for the ending, μέ, *me*), the resemblance is identity, both, like the Gothic *liga*, having lost the ending, and lengthened the union-vowel. Yet it is certain that at the time of their separation each language possessed the full termination *ami*, and that each has, independently, made the same mutilation, perhaps under the influence of the common feeling that here if anywhere the ending was unnecessary, and the simple enunciation of the root by the speaker enough to mark the action it signified as being performed by him. In the second person, *legis*, λέγεις, each for LEG-A-SI, (compare, for the ending, σέ, *te*), is first to be noted the different change of the union-vowel. The *a* of the original language has comparatively seldom been retained un-

changed by the Greek, but mostly appears as either *ε* or *ο*, governed in its choice between the two by euphonic laws which it is not always possible to detect. Here it is *ε*, the more common of the two substitutes. The Latin knows nothing of this double change, but more often, as here, simply weakens the *a* to *i*. The vowel of the ending, the Latin, as in all similar cases, has given up, while the Greek has transferred it to before the consonant. The third person is *legit*, *λέγει*, for LEG-A-TI, (compare, for the ending, *τό, is-te*, Sansk. *ta*). The union-vowel is as in the last person, but the one form has lost the consonant, the other the vowel of the ending. To the Greek dual the Latin has nothing analogous to offer, having, except in the two nominatives *duo* and *ambo*, lost all traces of that number. The first persons plural are *legimus*, *λέγομεν* (Doric: in the common dialects *λέγομεν*), for LEG-A-MAS (ending originally, probably, *ma-si*, *I* and *thou*; i. e. *we*). Here is noticeable a different form of the Greek union-vowel, and the vowel of the Latin ending, each probably due to the influence of the liquid *m*, *μ*. In *sumus* and *volumus*, the Latin connective has felt the same influence. The Latin is in the next person truer to its original than the Greek, or even than the Sanskrit. The forms are *legitis*, *λέγετε* (Sansk. *tudata*) for LEG-A-TAS (ending probably *ta-si*, with the pronoun repeated in two forms, *thou* and *thou*, i. e. *ye*). In *legunt*, *λέγουσι* (Doric: commonly *λέγουσι*) for LEG-A-NTI (ending a modification of that of the corresponding person in the singular by an added nasal with an intensive force), occurs the same change of the union-vowel as was noticed in the first person, and for a similar reason, the proximity of the liquid *n*, *ν*; as to the ending, while the Greek has preserved its final vowel, the Latin again enjoys an advantage in the purer retention of its consonants in the common language. It is plainly Latin verbs of the third conjugation only (wherein, however, are included nearly all the original root-verbs of the language), which admit of so close a comparison with the corresponding Greek class, the barytones. In other classes the usages of the two languages, especially as concerns the union-vowel, are considerably at variance. The class signs of the three Latin conjugations of derivatives, *ā*, *ē*, *ī*, have for the most part crowded out this vowel and taken its place, while in the Greek denominations in *άω*, *έω*, *όω*, the two are found subsisting together. To the Greek conjugations in *μ*, the Latin presents no proper analogies. *Sum*, *volo*, *edo*, *eo*, *fero*, in a few of their persons, lack a union-vowel, and in several roots of the first conjugation, as *do*, *sto*, *no*, *flo*, *for*, the long *a*, which is apparently the class sign, is in fact the final vowel of the root, to which the endings are appended without a connective, but for the other peculiarities of the verbs in *μ*, we look among them in vain.

Of the tense of simple past time, the imperfect, the characteristic is the augment. This is explained as having been originally a pronominal adverb, prefixed to the root, and serving to direct the mind to a *then*, in which the action is to be supposed as in progress. Besides, and in consequence of, this burdening of the root anteriorly, there arose later a weakening modification of the personal endings, which helped to distinguish the secondary or augmented tenses from the primary; compare $\epsilon\varsigma$ with $\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, ϵ with $\epsilon\nu$, $\omicron\nu$ with $\omicron\nu\tau\iota$. Thus was the Greek imperfect constructed. With it is to be ranked likewise the second aorist, for, in the comparatively few verbs in which that tense occurs, it is by origin only the imperfect of the earlier and unamplified form of the root, furnished with the series of moods which belonged to the present of that form, and with its original imperfect signification of continuous past action modified into the aoristic of indefinite and momentary action, to correspond with its own conciseness and quickness of utterance as compared with the new imperfect. Now the Latin, like the Gothic and the Zend, has, in the course of its reduction to its present condition, entirely worn off and lost the augment; in obedience, doubtless, to the same law of compression and brevity whose effect we have already seen in the obliteration of the final vowels of the personal endings. With the augment has of course been lost the whole tense formation of which it was the characteristic, so that of all the simple original imperfects of the Latin language only two, derived from the two roots of the substantive verb, remain, and of these only one has maintained an independent existence. This is *eram*; for *esam*, from the root ϵs . For this a sufficient distinction was won by the retention of the radical vowel e throughout (unless we are to recognize in this vowel the augment itself, or at least a relic of the long a into which augment and radical vowel coalesced, and which offered a stronger resistance to the corrupting tendency than would the augment alone), and by the adoption of a constant union-vowel, like that of the Greek perfect. We have a corresponding formation in Greek with which to compare it, namely, the Ionic imperfect of the same root, $\epsilon\alpha$, $\epsilon\alpha\tau\epsilon$, for $\epsilon\sigma\alpha$, $\epsilon\sigma\alpha\tau\epsilon$, etc.; the two are quite identical.¹ The other surviving imperfect of the ancient formation is similarly derived from the root $\phi\upsilon$ (Sansk. ϕu),

¹ It may be as well here once for all to direct attention to the Latin and Greek corruptions of an original sibilant between two vowels, which are of so frequent occurrence in either language, and often, as in the case before us, answer to one another; the Latin converting such a sibilant into r , the Greek dropping it entirely. We shall have them to notice more than once hereafter. A familiar illustration, out of the province of the verb, is afforded by the declension of neuters in os , us ; compare $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon$ (σ), $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon$ (σ) os , ι , and *genus*, *gene-r-is*, *gene-r-i*.

and is found only in composition, having been made use of for constructing all the other imperfects of the language. As is usual with forms thus compounded, it has suffered great mutilation, and is reduced from its full form, perhaps *abhvam*, to the *bam* which the language now offers us. As to the personal endings of this tense there needs to be further noticed only the retention of the consonant belonging to that of the first person singular, in which the two languages remarkably agree.

Of the Greek tenses, the first aorist is most nearly analogous in its origin to this Latin imperfect, being likewise a composition of the root with a preterite of the substantive verb, probably the same *ἔσα* spoken of above; compare *ἔ-δεικ-σα*, *ε-παίδευ-σα*. Each language supplied by this method the want which it most sensibly felt; the Greek having already a simple imperfect for all its verbs, and having been taught by its second aorists to desire a form of similar signification for those verbs in which no second aorist was possible; the Latin, on the other hand, being destitute of imperfects, and having, as will be seen, already provided itself an aorist in another way.

The temporal relation of the perfect, denoting action finished and complete, the Indo-European family symbolically indicated by a repetition of part of the radical syllable, that is to say, by the reduplication. Both the form and the signification of this tense, however, have been variously corrupted by the different members of the family. Its signification no language but the Greek has shown itself able to maintain in original purity. The Latin has given it the functions of the aorist also to perform, so that *cecini*, for instance, means quite as often, *I sang*, as *I have sung*. The Sanskrit and Gothic have gone a step further, and suffered the aorist almost wholly to supplant the original perfect signification. Of the modifications of form, however, euphonic rules lie at the foundation, and here, though no language has remained true to the original ideal of the tense, the delicate ear of the Greek has led him further on the track of corruption than the others have gone, even to the reduction of the reduplication in many cases to the semblance of the augment. Take for example the root *SPOND*, as originally reduplicated, *spospond*: of this the Latin has retained nearly all in its perfect *spospond-i*; Sanskrit rules would make of the same *pospond*, Gothic *sespond*, and Greek finally *ἔσπινον*. But the simple Latin perfects are, at the classical period, almost lost from the language. Only about thirty have come down to us with the reduplication, and of these more than one has lost that prefix during the time whereof we possess literary monuments. Nearly fifty more still survive, variously disfigured, either by a total loss of the redupli-

cation, as *scandi*, *verti*, *tuli*, (for which an older *tetuli* is likewise found) or by a contracting together of the radical and reduplicative syllables, as *fēci* for *fāfici*, *vīdi* for *vividī*. All others are compound and contain the perfect of one or other of the substantive verbs, a part that of *ES*, as in *scrip-si*, *duc-si*, a part that of *FU*, as in *ama-vi*, *mon-ui*, (compare for the latter *pot-ui*, where the fact of the composition cannot for a moment be doubted, and where *fui* has suffered the same excessive mutilation). There are sundry peculiarities about the perfects of both languages, some of which are not easy to explain and are still made subjects of controversy among the philologists. The Greek has adopted an unchangeable union-vowel throughout. The *κ*, (*πεναιδεν-κ-α*) and the aspiration, (*πένου-φ-α*) characteristic of its so-called first perfect, are probably inorganic intrusions, and not significant. The first person singular in each verb has lost the personal ending, as has the Sanscrit also, and the final *i* of the Latin, as distinguished from the *o* of the present and future, is noteworthy. The *ti* of the Latin second person singular corresponds to the Sanscrit ending *tha*, which also is used only in this tense, and which the Greek has preserved only in a few isolated instances, as ἦσθα, οἶσθα. The *s* by which it, as well as the ending of the second person plural, is preceded, is likewise an inorganic intrusion, and to be compared with the *s* appearing so often before the *θ* of the Greek medial terminations, (*τυττε-σ-θον*, etc.) The *runt* of the third person plural is explained as a further composition with *sunt*; this person showing in more than one instance a tendency toward a great and unnecessary fulness of form.

These three tenses, the present, imperfect, and perfect, are the only ones for which the common language in its earliest period struck out separate and original forms, and of which, therefore, the relics can be traced out in all the members of the family since their dispersion. But one of the chief relations of time, the future, still remains unprovided with its appropriate expression, and we have next to inquire how, and how far in a like spirit, the two languages we are considering respectively supplied this deficiency. It would appear to us easy to have formed a future by a method analogous to that adopted for the simple preterite, by prefixing another adverbial augment, which should point the mind forward instead of back to the time of the action. A future so constructed actually exists among some of the Slavonic dialects, but, for whatever reason, the mother tongue originated none such. Perhaps at first the present was found capable of performing both offices satisfactorily; there are many phenomena in language which prove an easy transition between present and future signification, and

the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon, to the end of their existence, contented themselves with nothing better. But, the deficiency once felt and its remedy determined upon, that recourse should have been had to optative and conditional forms cannot appear otherwise than most natural to us, who say *I shall go*, that is, *I ought to go*, and *I will go*, that is, *I wish to go*. Of such origin are both the Greek and Latin futures, and therefore closely related in spirit, although the special means used by either language are diverse. The Greek tense is fully explained by the Sanskrit, with which it is identical. It is constructed by compounding with the verbal root a tense which has been developed from the optative of the root $\epsilon\varsigma$ of the substantive verb. We may conceive that tense to have been, in its oldest and fullest form, $\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega$, and its relation to the still subsisting optative $\epsilon(\sigma)\eta\tau$ to be simply this, that the former adopted, or retained, the full primary endings, which belong to an unaugmented tense, while the latter went through the process which reduced those endings to a conformity with the general optative model. Starting from this $\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega$, it is not difficult to explain and connect the at present apparently discordant phenomena presented by the Greek futures. The old Doric dialect, here as elsewhere, gives us the most ancient and least corrupted forms, and in such future persons as $\beta\omicron\alpha\theta\eta\text{-}\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega$ $\pi\rho\alpha\gamma\text{-}\sigma\acute{\iota}\omicron\mu\epsilon\varsigma$ ($\pi\rho\alpha\zeta\acute{\iota}\omicron\mu\epsilon\varsigma$), which have lost only the initial ϵ , furnishes the strongest evidence to be gathered within Greek territory of the correctness of the explanation we have given of the origin of the tense. Excepting in these few relics, the ϵ which was originally the life and soul of the formation, (being the root ι , to wish, desire, go; the universal characteristic of the optative,) has disappeared; yet leaving behind it traces: on the one hand, in the so-called Doric future middle, where, changed to ϵ , it is contracted with the following union-vowel; as $\phi\epsilon\nu\zeta\omicron\upsilon\mu\alpha\iota$, for $\phi\epsilon\nu\zeta\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$, for $\phi\epsilon\nu\zeta\acute{\iota}\omicron\mu\alpha\iota$; on the other hand, in a few Homeric futures, where it is assimilated to the preceding sibilant; as, $\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\omega$, $\acute{\omicron}\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\sigma\omega$, for $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega$, etc. In the liquid verbs, the conjunction of a liquid and sibilant being offensive to Greek ears, the initial ϵ was retained, and then, after the ι had been dropped, and the sibilant too had disappeared in obedience to the rule already noted, this ϵ likewise became contracted with the union-vowel, giving the so-called second future; as, $\mu\epsilon\nu\acute{\omega}$, $\mu\epsilon\nu\acute{\omicron}\nu\mu\epsilon\nu$, for $\mu\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$, for $\mu\epsilon\nu\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu$. Finally, in the usual conjugation, both ϵ and ι were lost and the sibilant alone remained as sign of the tense. Of kindred origin with this $\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\omega$, probably, is the Latin *ero*, it too having lost its optative sign, and made the customary change of s into r . But of this the Latin did not make use in constructing its compound futures; it chose rather here, as in the imperfect, to avail itself of the correspond-

ing form from the other root, viz. *do*, and by its aid composed a tense which bears the same relation to that of the Greek as its imperfect to the Greek aorist: (*monebo*: *δοκήσω*:: *monebam*: *ἰδοκῆσα*). It was, however, only the verbs of the first and second conjugation which the Latin was compelled thus throughout to supply with a compound tense; in the third, and generally in the fourth, it converted the simple present optative itself into a future. For the *legēm*, *legēs*, *legēt*, of the Latin, are incontestably the *λέγοιμι*, *λέγεις*, *λέγει* (τ) of the Greek, the original diphthong *ai* made up of the union-vowel and the optative sign, having been by the one language changed in one of its constituents, according to a general analogy of that language, and, in the other, contracted into the diphthongal vowel *é*, by a rule no less general, and which the Sanskrit, also, in its *tudés*, *tudét*, *tudéma*, etc., has obeyed. But in the second conjugation, it was impossible that any tense so constructed should be distinguished from the present, and there accordingly the compound future became necessary. Before the analogous difficulty which necessitated a similar proceeding in the first conjugation can be fully explained, we must take into account the present subjunctive. The Greek subjunctive is plainly generated by a lengthening of, a pausing or dwelling upon, the union-vowel, as if to denote the doubtful or conditional nature of the relation subsisting between the action expressed by the root, and the actor signified by the personal ending. Nor is the Latin of different origin; *legāmus*, *legātis*, stand in the same relation to *legimus*, *legitis*, as *λέγωμεν*, *λέγητε* to *λέγομεν*, *λέγετε*; it being recollected that the union-vowel was in both languages originally *a*, and that the Latin knows nothing more of the customary Greek changes of long *a* into *η* and *ω*, than of those of short *a* into *e* and *o*. Proper subjunctives by descent, then, are the subjunctives present of the last three Latin conjugations. But in the first it would have been impossible to distinguish such a tense from the present indicative. The optative was therefore, made to do duty here as a subjunctive, and the same necessity for a compound future arose as in the second conjugation. There are a few other optatives performing in Latin the office of subjunctives, which should be noticed here, as deviating somewhat from the general model. They are *sīm*, *edīm*, *volīm*, and the like. These are analogous in formation to the optatives of the Greek conjugation in *μ*. To that conjugation, whose chief characteristic is the lack of a union-vowel, the verbs from which they are derived originally belonged, and in some of their persons, as has been already remarked, they yet give evidence of their relationship to it; compare *es-t es-tis*, *vol-tis*; for *sīm*, *sis*, etc., are still found in the earlier authors *sīm*, *sies*, etc., forms identical with the Greek *ἑ-(σ)ίην*, *ἑ-(σ)ίης*. The

others had lost before the historical period of the language the *e* with which *siem* parted during that period. It ought not to surprise us to find the Latin dealing thus arbitrarily with, and confounding, optative and subjunctive. As being both conditionals they are originally of very near kin, and it is only the Greek language that, giving one the primary, the other the secondary, endings, has succeeded in fully separating them. The Gothic has nothing but an optative, nor does the Sanskrit exhibit more than traces of a subjunctive, and that only in the Veda dialect.

The two imperatives correspond as closely as possible; compare λέγε, *lege*, λέγέτω, *legito*, λέγετε, *legite*, λεγόντων, *legunto*. In the second person singular, both have lost the ending *τι* or *θι*, as has the Sanskrit also in the great majority of its verbs. It appears, however, in the Greek verbs in *μ*, either in its full form, as *τίθεται*, *δίδοθι*, or corrupted to the sibilant, as in *θείς* and *δός*. The other and more frequent form of the third person plural *λέγέτωσαν*, is explained, like the corresponding person of the Latin perfect, as a composition with a form of the substantive verb. The additional forms of the Latin second persons, *legito*, (for *legitot*,) and *legitote*, have become obsolete not only in Greek, but also in the classical Sanskrit. The Veda dialect still preserves them. The imperative, it will be noticed, has no mode-sign. Its sufficient characteristic was the tone of voice in which a command is wont to be uttered.

These are the only temporal and modal forms concerning which it can be proved that they ever were possessed in common by both languages. They are, it will easily be seen, far from constituting the whole verbal apparatus, being only the indicative, subjunctive, optative, and imperative of the present, and the indicatives of a preterite and perfect, and even among these we have had to point out in the Latin verb various perversions, losses, and substitutions, more or less complete. These are probably all that, in the state of culture which prevailed in the parent nation at the time of separation of the two tribes, had been found necessary in order to the conveyance with requisite clearness of their thoughts and ideas. So much is characteristic of the race; the rest is the work of individual nations, undertaken when called for by their sense of the deficiencies which still existed in their store of verbal forms, and variously executed according to their command over the resources of formation at the time when they became sensible of such deficiencies. The Sanskrit, unsurpassed in formative power, failed greatly in its sense of syntactical distinctions, and was even unsuccessful in maintaining unimpaired the shades of meaning properly belonging to the forms of which it was already in possession.

The Teutonic was content with only a present and preterite, indicative and subjunctive, until the time for the production even of compound forms was past, and recourse was then necessarily had to periphrases. With both Latin and Greek the case is quite otherwise ; each language has given birth to a number of new compound moods and tenses, thus filling up its verb to answer to its own notion of completeness. As to tenses, the correspondence between the two is very close, nor does the Greek, saving in its aorist, maintain any advantage over the Latin. We have already seen how each provided itself with a future. The future-perfect, combining the two temporal ideas denoted by its name, would naturally be constructed out of the two tenses expressing those ideas, that is to say, by appending the future of the substantive verb to the root of the perfect. Accordingly we find in Greek, out of *παιδεύω* and *ἔσομαι*, *παιδεύσομαι* constructed ; in Latin out of *cecini* and *ero*, *cecinerō*. As plainly is the pluperfect a combination of perfect and imperfect, and in this tense also is the coincidence of the two languages quite as close, although not as evident, as in the one last mentioned. The composition of *cecineram* no one can fail at once to perceive ; that of *ἐπαιδεύκειν* is not so readily apparent. Its origin from *ἐπαιδεύον-εσα*, however, can be historically established. The Homeric form is *-κτα*, the *σ* having been dropped according to the rule so often already noticed ; this by regular contraction becomes *-κη*, the form in use among the older Attics, and finally, by an irregular contraction (which finds its parallel in *βασιλέας βασιλεῖς*) it assumed the form of *-κει*, which afterward came to prevail throughout the whole inflection of the tense. The final *ν* of the first person singular is an inorganic addition of that letter, such as is often found occurring in Greek.

The two languages, so closely accordant in their methods of expressing temporal relations, are as widely discordant in their whole system of moods. The Greek, with a keener sense of the nicer shades of syntactic relations and differences than any other language has displayed, with a most flexible system of sounds, and, in the series belonging to its present, a complete model after which to work, went on to create after its analogy that exuberant store of modal forms which distinguishes the Greek verb ; the Latin, less critical, with less pliant materials to work upon, with more stubborn phonetic laws, and left destitute of a model, devised to fill out its subjunctive compositions with the simple subjunctive tenses of the substantive verb.

Between the verbal nouns, the infinitives, attached to each verb respectively, no connection is to be pointed out. The Latin, in its supines, has preserved the formation of which the Sanskrit still makes

use as infinitive, but other than this, no correspondences has been traced between the infinitives of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and Gothic. It is quite otherwise with regard to the verbal adjectives, the participles. The present participle active is in each of these four great branches of the family, formed by the same suffix, *nt*. The differences here between Latin and Greek are common differences of declension merely. The Latin gerund in *-ndi*, *-ndo*, etc. is undoubtedly a derivative from this participle, by the softening of the final consonant of the suffix, and the addition of a vowel of declension; nor does it seem possible to assign to the future passive participle in *ndus* a different origin, although the transition of signification which it presents is remarkable and hard to explain. The suffix *turus*, of the future active participle, is to be compared with the Latin suffix *tor*, Greek *τηρ*, *τορ*, forming nouns denoting the agent; *daturus* being just such an expanded form of *dator* (Gr. *δοτήρ*) as *dandus* of *dant*. This is proved beyond all doubt by the Sanskrit, which forms by the unextended suffix words that bear both significations. The passive participle in *tus* has in Greek been degraded indeed from its position of participle, yet, as the verbal in *τός*, still plays in that language an important part. The Latin relics of the participle in *μερος* we shall have occasion to speak of hereafter.

The passives next claim our attention. They are plainly entirely distinct and independent formations, and offer one of the most striking points of difference between the two verbs which we have presented for our consideration. We have to inquire, then, respecting them, whether either was ever the common property of both languages, and, if this question be answered in the affirmative, we have further to ask what has caused the loss by the loser of this original passive, and on what principle, and by what means, the loss has been supplied by a new construction. To the first inquiry it may with confidence be replied that the Greek passive formation is original, and was in the possession of the whole family of languages ere their dispersion. This appears, first, from the nature of the mechanism which has been made use of in its formation. Comparative philology has demonstrated that the passive is in all cases originally a middle, and that the passive signification is a secondary one, derived through the reflexive. This is a law of language which it might not be easy to arrive at by *a priori* reasoning, but its truth is not to be denied. That its authority is not quite extinct even in the latest times is shown by the use in modern French of such phrases as *il se dit*, it says itself, *il se faisait*, it made itself, for, it is said, there was made. The Greek middle, then, to call it henceforth by its proper name, is evidently

derived from the active by a modification of the personal endings. Two modes of explaining this modification have been suggested. The one supposes it to be a doubling of the personal endings in such wise that *μαι,σαι,ται*, stand for *μαμι,σαιι,ταιι*, (the one pronoun of course standing in the nominative, the other in the accusative relation,) and that the medial consonant has been dropped, and the two vowels contracted into a diphthong. The other regards it as a mere expansion or strengthening of the ending, a dwelling of the voice upon it with greater force and fulness, to signify the greater concern of the actor with the action, as not only proceeding from, but also terminating in him. Whichever of these two explanations we adopt (and a thorough examination of the subject can hardly fail to lead us to prefer the latter) it is evident that such means could have been employed only in the earliest period of language, when it was still fully self-conscious, and in possession of all its resources of formation, and that a middle thus generated must have been the first of middles, established to answer the first felt need of such a voice. All the verbal forms which can be shown to have originated since the dispersion are of quite another stamp. Again, the Gothic, down to the middle of the fourth century, still retained fragments of this middle, and although this fact adds to our surprise on finding that the Latin, at the earliest period of our acquaintance with it, had not only entirely lost this ancient voice, but had already gone through all the steps of the process by which it had provided itself with a substitute, yet, as it seems impossible to assume that the Teutonic tribe left their home earlier than the Latin, or have inherited any of the original possessions of the family in which the Latin can claim no share, we must conclude that the Greek middle once formed part of the property of the Latin language. We might perhaps add to these grounds the frequent remains in Latin of the participle in *μενος*, but the conclusion hardly needs support, and moreover so weak is the connection between the participle and the verb, such an argument will not bear to be leaned hard upon.

How the Latin verb came to be deprived thus early of its passive, we may not find it possible to explain to our entire satisfaction, yet, considering that the characteristic of the voice lay wholly in the final vowel of the personal endings, we can hardly fail to recognize in this loss an effect of the same phonetic tendency which, as we have already seen, wore off those final vowels from the active endings, caused the total extinction of the augment, and nearly made way with the reduplication also. Here, then, as in the case of the imperfect, an important member of the verbal family was relinquished in obedience to

phonetic laws, and here as there, recourse was necessarily had to a composition in order to fill up the chasm that had been left.

What the process was by which the Latin accomplished this object it is not difficult to discover. Analogies sufficiently numerous point the direction of our search. The Slavonic has created a passive by appending to the active persons its full reflexive accusative *seja*. The Lithuanian has gained a new voice by a similar addition of a remnant only of the reflexive, the simple consonant *s*, but has not yet made the transition from middle to passive signification. But it is the Scandinavian languages which most instructively illustrate the course that the Latin must have pursued. The old Norse stands in the closest connection with the Gothic, which, as before noticed, possessed remains of the ancient passive as late as the fourth century. By the thirteenth, however, of which date are our earliest Norse records, this passive has entirely disappeared, and the passive relation is expressed periphrastically, by auxiliaries. A distinct middle had meanwhile established itself in the language, a middle originally constructed by appending its proper reflexive to each of the active persons respectively, as still existing remnants of forms so constituted abundantly proved. But the reflexive of the third person, *sik*, by virtue of the mobility belonging to that pronoun to a greater or less degree in many languages as a general expression for *self*, had by degrees supplanted the other two, and finally, corrupted by a series of mutilations, to the single consonant *s*, fixed itself as the sign of the formation. No further modification of form then took place, but by a repetition of that same process of modification of meaning which the original middle underwent, this likewise gradually became a passive, and as such it distinctly appears in the modern Swedish and Danish languages. With these examples before us, and bearing in mind the customary corruption of *s* into *r*, we cannot fail to recognize in the *r*, characteristic of the Latin passive, the consonant of the reflexive *se*. This pronoun has been variously appended to the persons of the active verb; in the first, of both numbers, without a union-vowel; in the third, by the aid of such a vowel, to which, as in other cases, the liquid *r* has given the form *u*; in the second of the singular both methods were apparently adopted, and we have a double form, *amari*s for *amari*s, for *amari*-i-se, and *amare*, for *amare*s, for *amare*-se. The second person plural evidently deviates entirely from the analogy of the five others, and in it has been recognized a remnant of the old participle in *μυρος*, namely, its nominative plural masculine, of whose origin the language has lost all consciousness, so as to suffer it to stand without an auxiliary and for all genders. The resemblance in form is so striking (compare

legimini, λεγόμενοι) that we cannot help accepting this explanation, supported as it is by a similar usage in one of the Sanskrit tenses; and we may perhaps conjecture, as the reason why the periphrasis *amamini*, -ae, -a, *estis*, was retained until time had been given for the language to forget its true character, and corrupt it into its present form, that, after the analogy of the first person, from *legitis* only *legitur* could have been formed, and that hereby would have arisen a confusion between this and the third person singular. Hard to account for, however, is the existence of similar forms in the imperfect, and in the present and imperfect subjunctive, and we have nothing better to say for them than that they are probably imitations after the present indicative. We have abundant evidence that the Latin formerly possessed the participle in *μερος*, in such nouns as *terminus* (*tar-minus*, the overpassed; compare *trans*, *tar-ans*, overpassing, beyond) and *alumnus*, (*alo-minus*, the nourished). For such of the active tenses as are derived from the root of the perfect the Latin language never originated independent passive forms. The periphrasis with the participle in *tus* was so easy and natural as to render that extension unnecessary.

As to the Greek middle-passive itself, any special analysis of its forms is impossible within the necessary limits of our present inquiry. The general principle upon which those forms are constructed, the extension, namely, of the personal endings, has already been stated. To the action of that principle is the origin of them all, with greater or less distinctness, traceable. Exceptions only are the first and second aorists passive and the futures formed from them. These are apparently proper passive formations, which have never passed through the intermediate stage of middle, but their derivation is a difficult question which as yet remains undetermined.

We have thus gone through with the series of regular forms presented by verbs of corresponding conjugation in the two languages, drawing the comparison between them with sufficient clearness, it is believed, to furnish satisfactory replies to the inquiries which were proposed at the commencement of our examination. Want of space renders it necessary not only to omit a host of details and deviations from general rules, all more or less interesting, but also to forbear introducing, what might most properly follow here, a comparative consideration of the internal modifications of the roots, and the formation of derivative and denominative verbs, in either language. The subject is one of high importance throughout, and its discussion brings before our view some of the most interesting steps in the progress of the development of language. It might be well, if even in the earlier stages of instruction more regard could be had to these higher princi-

ples of the study of language ; and if the verb, instead of being committed to memory as a mere congeries of arbitrary forms, could be understood and learned as the beautiful structure, complete, and significant in every part, which philology proves it to be. Then might grammatical analysis be deprived of somewhat of the tediousness with which in the mind of the student it is now generally invested, and a new and nobler interest in linguistic pursuits be awakened.

ARTICLE IV.

OF THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DIVINE BEING.

By George I. Chace, Prof. of Chemistry and Geology, Brown University.

HAVING in a former article considered the proofs of an author of the universe, from the manifestations of intelligence and design in the outward world, we propose to inquire in the present, what light may be derived from the same source concerning his character. Previous to engaging in this inquiry, however, it may be well to direct our attention for a moment to its nature and the proper mode of conducting it.

When a chemist or natural philosopher enters upon the investigation of any new substance, he is guided in putting his questions by what he has already learned of the properties of other similar bodies. He first asks whether the substance be simple or compound? If on being subjected to the proper tests it prove to be an element, he then inquires what relations it holds to the other elementary bodies? with which of them it enters into union, what are the conditions necessary to such union, what are the phenomena attending it, what are the products resulting from it? He further investigates the relations of this new substance to the imponderable agents. He inquires whether it be an electro-positive or an electro-negative body? whether it be a conductor or a non-conductor of heat, a refractor or non-refractor of light? Having obtained answer to these and other similar questions suggested by his acquaintance with the ordinary properties of matter, he is unable to proceed further. He has no intuitions, no pre-conceptions to guide him in his inquiries. There are no '*a priori*' considerations, no antecedent probabilities of any kind that can be of avail to him. All his light must come from experience. If the substance under examination chance to possess properties different in kind from any with

which he has become acquainted in the study of other bodies, he can put no direct questions concerning them. Their discovery if made at all, must be either accidental or else the result of a process of investigation instituted with reference to some hitherto unexplained phenomenon in the production of which they have had part.

But, when we come to inquire concerning the attributes of the Supreme Being, our knowledge of other beings can afford us no assistance. "He is *God*; there is none else beside him." "*Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum.*" Here all analogy even fails. The eternal, self-existent and all-powerful Creator of the universe is separated by too wide a remove from the most highly endowed of his creatures to admit of any parity of reasoning between them. Experience therefore can render us no aid in directing or limiting our inquiries. Our guides must be sought from within.

In the first place we need look for no attributes in the divine character, no motives for the divine conduct, to which there is nothing correspondent in our own natures. For however possible it may be that the divine Being is endowed with such attributes and influenced by such motives, it is wholly impossible that we should discover them. All our conceptions of character are necessarily limited to the analogies of what we are conscious of in ourselves. It is only so far as we are created in the intellectual and moral likeness of God that we are able to comprehend his plans or enter into his purposes. Beyond this we can no more go than a man blind from his birth can form an idea of color, or one who has never heard, can acquire a notion of sound.

In the second place, it is not among all the active principles embodied in the human constitution, that we need look for the moral elements of the divine character. The desires, appetites and passions immediately connected with our corporeal natures, which grow out of them on the one hand and minister to them on the other, are from the nature of the case excluded. Nor should we expect to find in the divine mind all those higher principles of action which have their origin in our spiritual natures. It is only the noblest and most worthy of them that we naturally look for. Having become satisfied of the existence of a Supreme Ruler of the universe, we instinctively ascribe to him all moral excellence and deny all moral imperfection. As our notions of these vary with the culture of our faculties, so will our conceptions of his attributes. It is only when our faculties have been fully and harmoniously developed, that we are conducted in this way to true views of the divine character. In every inferior stage of culture, our views will necessarily partake to a greater or less extent of the imperfections and biases of our own natures. Hence the importance

of some means by which we may verify them. These suggestions of our moral understandings are sufficient to guide us in putting the question and to awaken expectations concerning the answer. Nay more, they carry with them a certain degree of weight and authority, so that we cannot with safety neglect them. They do not alone, however, furnish a secure basis for a system of Natural Theology.

Now aside from an appeal to the teachings of revelation, the only mode of testing the ideas which we are thus led to form of the moral attributes of the Creator, is to see whether they are in harmony with the ends obviously provided for, and more or less fully attained in his works. If we find that they are,—more especially, if we find not only that these ends are secured in the case of ourselves, but that we are so made and placed in such circumstances, that whether we will or not we cannot avoid contributing by our agency to their attainment in others, then we conclude that they are the actual ends of the divine government, and that the anticipations of the reason and conscience were intended to be and in reality are, so far as these faculties have not been perverted, guides to a knowledge of the divine character.

Such is the nature of the inquiry upon which we are about to enter, and such the mode in which we propose to conduct it. We shall take for granted in this inquiry that the universe is a true index of the attributes of the Creator, that it originated in his simple, unbiased will, and was formed for his sole pleasure. Indeed any other supposition than this would be clearly absurd. For previous to the first creative act there was no one by whom the divine will could have been influenced or for whose happiness it could have been exerted. “Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight,” — “for thy pleasure they are and were created,” is the teaching of reason not less than of revelation. This however supposes other subordinate ends in the works of creation through the accomplishment of which they minister to the divine pleasure. It is in the character of these ends, that the moral attributes of the Supreme Being are manifested.

There is no attribute or quality of character which, guided by the dictates of our moral understanding, we more unhesitatingly ascribe to the Deity, than a benevolent regard for the welfare of his creatures. Indeed, independently of the desire to produce happiness, we can conceive of no adequate motive for the work of creation. Other principles of action may have coöperated with this, and may have determined, to a greater or less extent, the forms of its manifestation, but without benevolence as a leading attribute, the divine character would not only fail to command our highest respect and homage, but be absolutely unintelligible to us. The only being in the universe,

with no objects of his own to accomplish, beneficent purposes alone could have moved the omnipotent Creator to the displays of wisdom and power with which as far as the eye can see or the telescope reach, he has filled the mighty void of surrounding space.

To strengthen and confirm this intuitive apprehension of the divine goodness we have only to direct our observations to the part of the universe with which we are immediately connected. Our world is full of contrivances, or rather it is itself a vast assemblage of contrivances, adapted to the production of beneficent ends. There is not one of the innumerable forms of enjoyment, distributed among the different classes and orders of animals, which is not directly provided for in these contrivances, the actual and sole result of a greater or less number of them, nor is there one of these contrivances which is not either immediately or remotely tributary to the well-being of some portion of the animal creation. The kindly ministry of the elements, — of the air, the earth and the water, of the cheering light, the genial warmth and the refreshing shower, of summer and winter, spring-time and autumn varying the rolling year with ever-grateful vicissitude — is understood and felt by all. But, beside these arrangements of external nature which affect in common the entire population of our globe, there is wrapped up in each animal an organism equally complex and still more wonderful, upon whose action the continued existence even of that animal is every moment dependent. And if we look into this organism we discover the most convincing proofs of the infinite goodness and condescension as well as the matchless skill and power of the Creator. In the structure of every living being, most of the parts are so obviously subservient to useful ends, that no one can doubt in regard to their beneficent character. The senses are, in all cases, evidently designed to afford pleasure to the animal, as well as to convey to him a knowledge of whatever is necessary to his preservation and well-being. The limbs are as clearly intended to minister to his happiness, by enabling him to satisfy his natural wants, and by furnishing him with the means of pleasurable exertion. And if we examine the structure of the body, we find, in every instance, the form, disposition, and connection of the several parts so exactly adapted to the mode of life, that no anatomist has ever dreamed of an alteration, by way of improvement.

There is, however, one feature in the constitution of animals, of which the design is not so obviously benevolent. We allude to the provision through which they are liable to suffer pain either from the influence of external causes or from the derangement of their own organisms. Pain is in itself an evil; and when we consider to how

great an extent it prevails in our world, how broadly it casts its dark shadow over the otherwise fair scenes of earthly felicity, how large a portion of its bitterness mingles in the cup of experience which life proffers to all, and of how many it is almost the only heritage, it would seem scarcely reconcilable with that pure and absolute benevolence which we instinctively ascribe to the Deity, and we are not surprised that the provision so clearly made for it in the constitution of animals should have been regarded as indicating the existence of other and sterner qualities in the Divine character. But, on examination, it will be found that this like all the other endowments of the animal structure, is subservient to wise and beneficent purposes — nay, that without it, the other endowments would have failed of accomplishing the object for which they were intended.

As there is reason to believe, that the susceptibility of which we are now speaking is most fully developed in man, and as it is in him that we are best acquainted with it, it will be sufficient to consider its nature and tendencies, as manifested in our own species. The thought which most readily presents itself when we contemplate our relations to the outward world, is, that we are surrounded on every side by agents capable of destroying our bodies. Heat may dissolve them; cold may congeal them; gravity in any of its countless forms may crush them; while chemical affinity, in ways equally numerous and equally certain may effect their demolition. To protect us against the dangers of a situation so exposed, the Creator has endowed the various parts of our bodies with a sensibility to these agents, so that in all cases we may be admonished of their presence and by removing ourselves from them avoid the injury they would otherwise do us. When the infant attracted by the flame of the candle attempts to grasp the beautiful object, the sensations awakened cause the withdrawal of his hand which is thus preserved from being consumed. Or when the boy, eagerly pursuing his wintry sports, is exposed to a degree of cold that threatens his safety, his chilled body and aching and benumbed limbs inform him of the danger and persuade a retreat to the genial warmth of the fireside. Or when the man in any of the occupations of mature life is required to put forth his strength, he is apprised by his sensations of the limits which he may not pass with impunity, and is thus preserved from serious or perhaps fatal injury.

The great design of the Creator, therefore, in giving us a constitution by which we are susceptible of pain through the instrumentality of our bodies, was to protect them from the various dangers to which from the conditions of our being, they would necessarily be exposed. Agreeably to this design, the sensibility as it manifests itself in the

different parts of our bodies, varies both in kind and degree, according to the nature and severity of the evil against which it affords protection. The skin is delicately alive to heat, cold and pressure. The importance of this endowment is strikingly illustrated in the condition of those persons, in whom the nerves ministering to it have become paralyzed. Such persons unless constantly watched over by others are liable to suffer without knowing it, from any of these causes. The parts which lie beneath the skin, being, for the most part, sufficiently protected by it, are nearly destitute of feeling; muscles may be cut, cartilages burned and bones subjected to every form of mechanical violence without causing any considerable pain. The stomach may be handled, and the heart even forcibly grasped, without occasioning the slightest sensation to the individual. The lungs, on the contrary, are endowed with an exquisite sensibility to the mere contact of any foreign substance, so that whatever by accident finds its way into them is immediately and convulsively expelled. The design is obvious. Were it not for this provision, the lungs would soon become filled with foreign matter, and would no longer be capable of performing their office. The eye throughout its whole interior, is entirely insensible to any form of mechanical violence. It is covered, however, in front, by a membrane possessed of so delicate a sensibility, that it is painfully affected by the presence of the smallest mote. The surface of the eye is thus guarded against injury, and its transparency preserved. And so generally, to whatever part of the body we direct our attention, we find it endowed with precisely the form and degree of sensibility, necessary to protect it against the kind of danger to which it is exposed. There is no where gratuitous sensibility, but everywhere just that amount of it which is required for the safety of the part and the good of the whole. The benevolence of the provision cannot therefore be questioned. It was necessary to the preservation of our existence. Without it our very creation would have proved a failure.¹

The other class of pains, or those which arise from disease, are subservient to equally wise and benevolent ends. They not only acquaint us with the existence of the disease, but by indicating its nature and situation, they serve as guides to the proper remedies. When the danger is imminent they moreover compel us, by their severity, to submit to whatever confinement or privation may be necessary for its cure. They further inform us that some organic law has been vio-

¹ This, and one or two subsequent paragraphs are taken with but slight alterations from an article published some years since in the *Christian Review*.

lated, and admonish us to beware in future of a similar offence. The sensibility therefore with which the Creator has endowed our frames to the various forms of disease as well as injury, was intended to be the means of preserving them with all their powers and faculties healthy and entire, and of thus securing to us the conditions most favorable to our well-being. And whoever will consider how constantly during the whole of his past life, he has been indebted to it for safety and protection, will be convinced that by no provision of his constitution is he placed under greater or more unceasing obligation to gratitude.

That the suffering arising from this endowment of our organization is occasionally excessive, or that it continues after the ends to which it is specially directed have ceased to be attainable, is no argument against the benevolence of its design. Being provided for in the constitution of the sensory nerves, it must necessarily continue so long as these retain their functions, although the malady may have assumed a character precluding all possibility of recovery. Nor is there anything peculiar in this. All the provisions of nature are general and therefore liable in particular cases not only to fail of their object, but to be turned to other and different purposes. The same sun which in the spring, quickening into life the innumerable vegetable tribes, clothes the earth with verdure and beauty, in the summer scorches it to barrenness. The same air which cools and refreshes us by its gentle breezes and from whose ample store we each moment inhale the breath of life, may bear upon its bosom the seeds of pestilence and disease or wrought into fury by the other elements, may sweep along in the resistless tornado, everywhere marking its track with ruin, desolation and death. The same fire which warms us and prepares our food, and to whose kindly aid in the different mechanical arts we are indebted for so large a portion of the conveniences and comforts of life, from a faithful ally and friend, may suddenly become our most fearful enemy, remorselessly destroying our property or even consuming us within our dwellings.

Against this view of the design of pain in the animal economy, it is sometimes urged that God is all-powerful, and had he seen fit, might have so constituted matter as to render the beings composed of it incapable of injury. The necessity of a monitory system would in that case, it is said, have been avoided, and all the evils arising from it spared to his sensitive creatures.

As such an idea is incompatible with the supposition of the absolute and unqualified benevolence of the Creator, and is yet, there is reason to believe, quite generally entertained, we are disposed to give a brief

space to its consideration. For, if we mistake not, men are accustomed to indulge on this subject, in an unwarranted license of speech. Our knowledge of the attributes of the Deity, as it seems to us, is too imperfect and our acquaintance with the consistencies of things too superficial, to enable us to say, *à priori*, what is or what is not possible. The disposition to ascribe limitless power to the Divine Being proceeds in many cases, we have no doubt, from a deep reverence for his character, and from an overwhelming impression of his power as manifested in the world around us. In others, it probably arises from mere habit; while in not a few instances, we fear, it springs from a desire to throw upon him the responsibility of all moral and physical evil, and thus to quiet the apprehensions of conscience under a sense of guilt.

The objection asserts that God, if he had seen fit, might have so constituted matter, as to render the organized beings composed of it incapable of injury. Let us consider, for a moment what we can do towards forming an idea of the *mode* in which this could have been accomplished. In doing so, we shall take for granted that matter is in reality what it seems to be — actual substance possessing inherent constitutional properties — and that in the formation of our bodies, it is wrought into their several parts in such a manner as to confer upon them through these properties their respective endowments. On any other theory — more especially that which refers all material phenomena to the immediate agency of the Deity — the subject becomes involved both morally and physically in inextricable difficulties. If matter be wholly inert, the animal organs formed of it can have no real part in the functions associated with them. Their elaborate structure is consequently unmeaning and nugatory. It accomplishes nothing, and indicates nothing. No argument whatever can be drawn from it in favor of an intelligent and designing author. Adopt this absurd dogma and the divine light which beams so brightly not only from every part of the human frame, but from the organization of each one of the lower animals and from the whole outward world, is suddenly extinguished. Not a single ray of intelligence or beauty comes from aught above, beneath, or around us; but an impenetrable veil spreads itself over the entire physical creation, robing it in profound darkness. There is nothing left from which the mind can infer the existence even of a Supreme Intelligence, but its own sensations and perceptions. Shut out from every other source of knowledge, it must seek in these, considered in their relations to itself and to one another, the sole proof of the transcendent perfections of the Almighty, with which every part of this wide

universe, to him who views it aright, is so gloriously radiant. If matter possess no inherent powers, and every change, whether in our physical organizations or in the outward world, be produced by the immediate power of God, then are all these changes, of what sort soever they may be, equally an indication of his will and character. We cannot regard some as ends and others as means; some as directly intended and others as connected with the object designed to be accomplished, but forming no part of it. The idea of both the *instrumental* and the *incidental*, on this strange supposition, so repugnant to reason and common sense, is necessarily excluded. The devastation of the whirlwind is as much intended by God and as immediately dependent upon his agency, as the refreshing coolness of the summer breeze upon the flushed cheek and moistened brow of the laborer, or the life-giving influence of the same fluid as he each moment expands his chest and bathes his lungs in it. The fire which rages in our dwellings is kindled by Him and sustained by the continual exertion of His power; and the subtle element is under these circumstances as truly accomplishing His will as when it diffuses its genial rays through our apartments, or lends its ready aid, in melting the brass and forging the iron, in driving the steam car and turning the spindle. In the wasting pains of prolonged and hopeless disease and in the last expiring agony, it is not the deranged, shattered and convulsed body, acting upon the sensitive spirit still held in connection with it, that causes the suffering; it is God by his own immediate and direct agency. He inspires the sense of weariness; He inflicts every pang; it is under the pressure of His hand that the dying groan is extorted. He, too, at man's bidding rivets the fetters of the slave, bars the door of the prisoner, applies the torture of the wheel and the rack, binds to the martyr's stake, and piles the fuel, and kindles the flame, and presses it to the bared and quivering flesh of the innocent sufferer. It is He also that gives edge to the knife of the assassin, and infuses energy into the poisoner's cup. It is His power that is seen and felt on the battle-field; He sends the cannon's iron hail through the serried ranks of the warriors, marring and rending to pieces the fairest specimens of His most perfect handiwork, and strowing the earth with carnage and slaughter. Such are the unavoidable consequences of the philosophy which denying to matter the possession of inherent, constitutional properties, ascribes all the phenomena exhibited by it to the immediate agency of Deity. So abhorrent to every right sentiment are the views of the Divine character to which this monstrous doctrine necessarily leads. Admit it and there is no escaping the conclusion that God is the direct author of each and every event that be-

fals us; the good and the evil, the joy and the woe, the bliss and the agony are alike from him, and alike intended by him. With those, therefore, who adopt as their philosophical creed any form of idealism, whether absolute or virtual, we shall hold no argument. We frankly confess that with such ideas in regard to the mode of the Divine government, we see no way of reconciling that government with the sentiments of our moral natures. The world without and the world within, for aught we are able to perceive, must forever remain in mysterious and inexplicable discordance.

But, if we take the only rational view of the physical universe, if we see in the different kinds of matter so many instrumentalities employed by the Supreme Being in the accomplishment of his purposes, then light breaks in upon the subject. The peculiar difficulties which before surrounded it, vanish. We now behold in the outward world a vast system of means, adapted to the production of wise and beneficent ends. We are able to trace the connection between the several parts of that system, and the particular objects to which they are subservient; and although we do not see these objects in every instance accomplished, or in any, it may be, so perfectly, as we are able to conceive of their being accomplished, yet all the provisions of the system look towards them, and are such as in the great majority of cases to secure more or less fully their attainment. Keeping in view, therefore, the general plan which the Divine Being has seen fit to adopt in carrying forward his designs in our world — either because it was best suited to the ends proposed or because it was most in harmony with his own nature — we proceed to inquire whether it be possible to imagine any change in the constitution of matter which would remove the necessity of the monitory provisions incorporated in the structure not only of man but of all the lower orders of the animal creation.

The liability to accident and disease, under the existing constitution of things, arises from the fact that our corporeal frames are endowed with the same general properties and governed by the same general laws, as the bodies by which they are surrounded, and therefore capable of entering into relations with them; of acting upon them on the one hand, and of receiving impressions from them on the other. Did the material atoms on becoming a part of the living organization lose all their elementary properties, did they from that moment cease to hold relations to other bodies, we should no longer be exposed to any form of outward danger. Neither caloric or electricity, gravity or chemical affinity could in any way harm us. Our bodies would in that case be as incapable of injury as our spirits. At the same time they

would have as little power over the other forms of matter. We could no longer employ them in accomplishing any of the purposes of our existence. Our limbs would cease to be of any use to us as instruments of motion, and our senses would equally fail us as organs of perception. We should be unable to effect the slightest change of any kind whatever, in the world around us, nor could we ever gain a knowledge of that world. We should be as completely cut off from all intercourse with it as if we were without bodies. The entire assemblage of instrumentalities included in our physical organizations, and designed to put us in communication with surrounding existences, would be annihilated.

Nor could the interior processes necessary to the support of life itself be maintained. It is only through the powers and properties of the matter from which they are organized, that the heart, lungs and stomach perform their respective offices. Suspend these and they would at once cease to act, and the vital phenomena connected with them would no longer be manifested. Whether we consider, therefore, the external parts of our bodily frame, as the limbs and senses, or its internal organs, we find them alike dependent, in the exercise of their functions, upon the general properties of matter — the same properties in which our liability to injury, and we may add to disease, has its origin. It is not any particular quality or qualities of the material atoms that cause this liability, but the power possessed by them of acting and reacting upon one another; and it is this power which qualifies them for entering into the constitution of organized beings — through which alone such beings can exercise their functions. Nay, it is this power that lies at the foundation and source of all physical causation.

But although we are unable to conceive of any change in the properties of matter which would exempt our bodies from the liability to accident and disease, may we not suppose these latter differently constituted out of matter as it now exists, and the evil in this manner avoided? It is well known that every part of the animal structure is endowed with a vital force or energy which enables it, within certain limits, to resist the action of causes tending to its injury. May we not suppose this vital endowment to be greatly exalted, so as in fact to afford our corporeal frames adequate protection against all the dangers, whether external or internal, to which they are naturally exposed? The complex system of nerves, which at best only informs us of these dangers, leaving us to escape them as we best may, would then be unnecessary.

However plausible this mode of dispensing with the monitory pro-

visions incorporated in the structure of animals would at first seem, every one, we think, will be convinced on reflection of its utter impracticability. Life, as we have already had occasion to notice, is not a principle but a power. Nor is it superinduced upon the organization, but developed in it and through it. It is the natural and in that sense necessary result of the relations which the several parts of the organization hold to one another and to the outward world. So long as these relations are maintained, so long its phenomena continue to be exhibited but no longer. Neither is life everywhere one and the same power. On the contrary, it varies with the part in which it is manifested, both in kind and degree. The life of the brain is different from that of the heart; and the life of the lungs is different from that of the stomach. The skin possesses a higher vitality than the muscles which lie beneath it, and these again possess a higher vitality than the bones, cartilages, and ligaments. Each organ is constitutionally endowed with all the powers which are necessary, whether for its own preservation or for the performance of its particular functions; and these taken collectively, we denominate its life. Of the manner in which they are developed, we may form some idea from what we know of the effect produced, in numerous instances of chemical union and decomposition, by the mere juxtaposition of bodies having no direct part in the action. Oxygen and hydrogen although mingled in the proper proportions do not combine at ordinary temperatures. The simple presence, however, of platinum foil or platinum sponge immediately determines their union. The copper sheathing of vessels, when fastened by nails of the same metal, is gradually corroded by the substances dissolved in sea water. But if iron nails be used, it is no longer attacked by these substances. On the other hand, when a plate of pure zinc is immersed in diluted sulphuric acid, no perceptible action takes place. But the moment a piece of copper, dipped in the same fluid, is brought in contact with it, water is decomposed, the zinc is rapidly oxydized and an invisible, imponderable agent is evolved which, under proper direction, is capable of producing still further changes. By the presence of a certain substance called diastase, starch is converted into sugar, and by another similar substance sugar is turned into alcohol. A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump, not by entering into combination with it, but by inducing throughout the mass an action similar to that taking place in itself. In these and numerous other instances which might be mentioned, we behold a power analogous in many of its characters to that of life, and altogether as inexplicable, as regards its origin and mode of operation—a power sometimes determining changes and sometimes preventing them, now impelling bodies to unite which under ordinary circumstances manifest

little or no affinity, and now causing the separation of those which are held together by the most energetic attractions. It has been called by chemists the catalytic power and also the power of presence. It is in reality the power of relation. It is developed through the proper arrangement or disposition of the several bodies in connection with which it is manifested. Although springing from the constitutional endowments of the material atoms, it is to be regarded not so much as a primary source of change, as a regulator and modifier of the more essential and permanent forces of matter. Independently of these, it is capable of producing neither combination nor decomposition — of evolving neither chemical nor mechanical phenomena. Its influence as a regulating and modifying principle is, moreover, strictly confined to the circle within which it originates. And even here it continues to operate only so long as the circle remains perfect. The moment that is broken, or the relation of the several bodies composing it is disturbed, either by the introduction of a new body or by some overpowering external influence, its manifestations cease.

All this is true of the power which we are now considering, call it by what name we will, whether exhibited in connection with these artificial combinations of ordinary matter or manifested in the organisms of living beings. Hence we cannot, in the latter case, look to it for the protection required by such beings. It is at best of but limited influence, and, depending upon adjustments and relationships more or less complex, it is liable at any moment to be greatly weakened or altogether suspended by their disturbance. Were what is denominated the vital principle an independent force, manifesting itself in the organizations of animals, but not of them, then there would be no difficulty in conceiving it of an intensity sufficient to resist the action of any of the innumerable causes tending to their destruction. Then there would be no limit to the power that might be assigned to it. But the individual life of each of the bodily organs being developed through its structure, and the general life of the animal being dependent upon the combined action of these organs excited and maintained by the air which surrounds and the blood which pervades them, neither can exceed in intensity the forces operating within the circle that gives it birth, or continue longer than that circle remains unbroken. Both must necessarily yield to the influence of causes attacking the conditions of their existence. Instead therefore of being able to conceive of a constitution that should exempt our corporeal frames from the liability to accident and disease, when we consider how many delicate adjustments are necessarily included in them, and how numerous are the causes of derangement to whose action they are constantly exposed, we are amazed at the ex-

tent of the protection actually secured to them through their present wonderful endowments. "Men that look no further than their outsides," says Sir Thomas Brown in his *Religion of a Physician*, "think health an appurtenance unto life, and quarrel with their constitutions for being sick; but I, that have examined the parts of man and know upon what tender filaments the fabric hangs, do wonder that we are not always so."

But, although we are unable to conceive of such an exaltation of the powers of life as to afford our bodies adequate protection, may we not suppose the influence of the will over them to be greatly extended, and their safety in this manner sufficiently provided for? As at present constituted, the only thing that we can do when admonished of any form of danger, is to withdraw ourselves from it; and as the information not unfrequently comes too late to admit of this, we consequently suffer. Now instead of being limited to the mere contraction of muscles and flexure of joints, may we not suppose the will to have direct control over every molecule of the entire body? May we not imagine ourselves able, by a simple voluntary act, either to suspend the properties of these molecules and thus remove them altogether from the influence of disturbing causes, or else to infuse into them an energy and power which should enable them to resist the action of such causes? Or if it be thought that, under any imaginable constitution, the spirit would be incapable of effecting so great changes in the material atoms composing the body, may we not at least suppose its power to extend to their rearrangement in the several tissues and structures, after they have already suffered disturbance from accident or disease? In obedience to its commands, expressed through the will, may we not suppose the fractured bone, lacerated muscle, and diseased brain to assume their proper and healthy condition, in like manner as the head turns and the limbs move at its bidding?

True we are able to conceive all this; but the difficulty is in imagining by *what means* it may be accomplished; and in solving this difficulty, neither fact nor analogy derived from any part of the universe can afford us the slightest assistance. The spirit, we know, has no direct power over the ordinary forms of matter. Indeed, it is only through the medium of an elaborate and complex system of nerves that it is capable of acting upon the organized body with which it is immediately associated. Within this body, its direct influence is felt only by the muscles, and even here it is limited to a mere shortening of the fibres. In what manner then shall we suppose the spirit to be put into relation with each one of the innumerable particles contained in the entire frame? By what complex system of instrumentalities shall we imagine it en-

abled to act upon these particles — to suspend, exalt, or in any manner modify the properties with which God has endowed them, or even to bring them back into the organic forms and combinations that have been broken up by violence or disease? But, may we not suppose the Creator in constituting us, to have made these results immediately consequent upon our volitions without any intervening agencies? May we not suppose the connection between the two to have been established by special ordinance — by His simply willing it? Is not, in fact, the divine appointment sufficient of itself to secure any event without the provision of means for its accomplishment?

Such an idea, we reply, is absurd. No one can intelligently entertain it. It is directly at variance with that fundamental principle of human belief which requires for every effect a cause adequate to its production. Whatever the Divine Being purposes must be brought about, either by his own direct agency or by instrumentalities specially provided for that end. The will of God is the law of the universe only because he has combined the agents and elements composing it in such a manner that they are continually executing his will.

If by way of invalidating the foregoing considerations it be said, that our conceptions are all limited to the analogies of what we have seen, and that though we cannot imagine in what manner, nevertheless the Creator might have framed the constitution of things so as not only to save the necessity of pain to his sensitive creatures, but also to render them capable of a far greater amount of happiness than they at present enjoy, we say in reply, that this is pure assumption, that there are no facts which justify such an idea, or even suggest it. The supposition, moreover, involves in great difficulties an explanation of the existing order of things consistently with the other attributes of the Deity, and is further opposed by every consideration derived from analogy; for since the Creator has pressed to its outermost limits the capacity of the earth for the production and support of sensitive beings, and under an almost infinite variety of circumstances, has provided for their happiness at so prodigal an expenditure of contrivance, the presumption is, that if by having differently constituted our world, or the beings in it, he could have caused the production of a far greater amount of happiness — the presumption from analogy we say, is that he would have done it.

What should we think of the logic of the Tahitian or New Zealander, who examining the steam-engine should infer from the resources and skill displayed in it, that the author of the wonderful invention had he so chosen, might have constructed it in such a manner that the piston should keep in motion without the constant introduction of wood or coal to the furnace?—that this feature of the contrivance undoubtedly contem-

plated some other object besides the mere working of the engine and was in all probability designed to give employment to the fireman? or witnessing an explosion should conclude that this was one of the ends provided for in the construction of the engine, and that the destruction of life and property attending it was a part of the original design of the contriver? — arguing that if it had not been so, he would have made the boiler of stronger materials. And yet such a conclusion would be reasonable and sober in comparison with the ideas very commonly entertained concerning the Divine purpose in that feature of the constitution of man and of the lower animals which we are now considering. For in the latter case the liability to accident and disease is carefully guarded against by the stationing of sentinels at every exposed point and even when the warning of these has been disregarded and some portion of the organization has suffered we see a still further set of provisions called into play for repairing the injury. It is as if there were connected with the steam-engine at different points, instruments for measuring the strain or pressure, with signal bells attached to inform the engineer whenever it became so great as to endanger any part of the machinery; and in case of accident through the inattention or negligence of the latter, a retained band of fairy artificers immediately appeared and set about stopping the opened seam or uniting the parts of the broken lever.

But while the sensibility of our frames to whatever is liable to injure them is obviously designed for their protection, the suffering actually experienced through it has other uses, which must not be overlooked, if we would form a just conception of the entire economy of our being. As there is no part of our bodily structure, having a *single* function, so there is no provision of our constitution physical, intellectual or moral that contemplates a *single* object. Besides the immediate purpose or purposes accomplished by each there are other and remoter ends which it was equally intended to secure and which concurred in justifying to the Divine wisdom its adoption. Nay more; as there is nothing in the universe isolated, it frequently happens that the means employed for the attainment of a particular end bring, in their train, consequences more or less at variance with what is obviously their chief design. Considered with reference to the provision from which they immediately spring, these consequences must be regarded as so many evils. But, if we extend our view, we often see them change their character by becoming parts of other *related* systems, comprehended within the same general plan. Thus the bodily pain we experience through the means adopted by the all-wise Creator for the protection of our corporeal frames, subtracting so

largely as it does from the sum of human happiness, is itself made a means of spiritual culture. Of the virtues developed through it, and of the intellectual and moral quickening which comes from it, we shall have occasion to speak in connection with another part of our subject. A still more striking illustration of the same thing is seen in the institution of death. This is the great law of all organized beings. Neither animal nor vegetable is exempt from it. It is the stern fate, the inexorable doom of everything that lives. The same agencies by which the bodily structure is built up and the vital processes are constantly maintained, at length undermine that structure and bring those processes to a termination. Nor are we able to conceive of any change by which under the present constitution of things such a result should be prevented or to any considerable extent delayed. What miraculous interposition would have taken place in favor of our own race had the first human pair remained innocent we know not; but that man was not designed for a physical immortality — to live forever on this earth all the provisions of his constitution abundantly show. The remains of the innumerable animal tribes which preceded him in the zoölogical series, while they attest the former prevalence of life in our world are equally monuments of the reign of death. But, although thus connected with life and as far as our knowledge extends inseparable from it, death is of all evils that which we most dread. Whether regarded in itself or in its attendant circumstances it is indeed the king of terrors. It casts its dark shadow over the whole face of human society. The very mention of it is sufficient to sober the gayest spirit and calls up images at which the stoutest heart grows sick and the ruddiest cheek pales. It is the rude severing of the dearest connections and most intimate relationships of life, the sudden extinction of all our worldly interests, the final setting of every earthly hope. It is the removal forever from the light of day, from the warm precincts of human affections and sympathies, and from this bright and beautiful world which we have known so long and loved so well, and which, however marred and scathed by sin, has still so many charms for our delighted senses. Its ministers are pain and wasting sickness and sore disease, and in its train of attendants are the shroud, the coffin and the tomb. Such is death; so chilling to every natural sensibility are the sad images awakened by its contemplation! and yet, besides being the appointed means of introducing us to a more exalted state of existence, it subserves the most important ends in connection with the present life. It is the great equaliser of the diversities of human fortune. It at the same time reconciles the poor man to his poverty and makes the rich feel of how little value is his wealth. It

supports the confirmed and hopeless invalid under the wearying sense of his bodily infirmities, and humbles in the strong man all pride of strength as looking upon his wasted and suffering fellow he remembers how soon they must lie down together and the sods of the valley be alike sweet unto them. It chastens aspiration, moderates desire, subdues selfishness, quickens benevolence, strengthens duty and disposes to the exercise of every Christian virtue. It is the great moral ballast of society. But for the restraining and steadying influences emanating from this source, its noblest institutions freighted with the best hopes of our race would be quickly dashed to pieces upon the rocks of interest or whelmed beneath the billows of passion. It deserves also to be remembered that death is rendered still further subservient to the beneficent designs of our Creator by the means adopted for meeting its ravages, and still continuing our world the abode of life and happiness. The wonderful provisions of our nature, organic and spiritual, having respect to this end and securing it with as much certainty as gravity the motion of the spheres, are the foundation of the most beautiful relationships — the well-spring of the tenderest sympathies and sweetest charities of life. Gathering the otherwise isolated individuals of our race into households and families, they furnish in these not only schools for the acquirement of every civil and social virtue, but nurseries in which immortal spirits are reared for the purity and beatitude of heaven. So graciously and so wonderfully has the all-wise Creator disposed the elements of our being, making the evils incident to the present state — inseparable it may be from it — tributary to good, and building upon the foundation of suffering, disease and death so large a portion of the entire fabric of our earthly happiness.

But, to return to the course of our argument, it is not in the structure or endowments of any single animal, however, perfectly adapted to the circumstances of its existence, that we behold the most convincing proofs of the Divine beneficence; but rather in the endless multiplication of classes, orders and families whereby every part of our globe is furnished with appropriate inhabitants. Not less than half a million of different species are believed to have existed upon the earth since it was first occupied by living beings. About two hundred and fifty thousand, it is supposed, at the present time inhabit its seas and oceans or dwell upon its islands and continents. These are fitted by their diversified organizations and instincts for every variety of physical condition and climate. Over the entire surface of the globe from the equator to the poles, wherever there exist the means of animal sustenance, there we find an appropriate fauna. Along the outer margins

of the temperate zones where the seasons are marked by strong contrasts, and the abundant vegetation of an almost tropical summer is succeeded by ice and barrenness, we see displayed the most remarkable instincts and the most astonishing modes of developing and perpetuating life. Most of the feathered tribes on the approach of winter, guided by an unerring sense seek the ever verdant groves and savannas on the borders of the tropics, where amidst the profusion of a perpetual spring they obtain a plentiful subsistence. Insects gifted with feebleness of flight are incapable of migration. Of these, by far the greater number perish, having made provision in the eggs or pupae which they leave behind them for a new generation the ensuing year. A few of the more hardy species bury themselves beneath the soil, or retire within the crevices of rocks and the hollows of old trees and there pass the cold season in a state of suspended animation. Such of the class of reptiles as are found in these latitudes, sheltered in similar ways from the severity of the frost, pass the winter months in a like torpid and insensible condition. Of the mammals, some like the bear and the marmot sink into a lethargic sleep, the supplies received into their systems during the preceding summer being sufficient to maintain their now reduced temperature, tardy respiration and sluggish vitality. Others like the beaver and the squirrel feed on provisions which they have previously stored away under the guidance of an instinct nearly resembling intelligence; while the carnivora, the ruminants and the most active of the rodents provided with a warmer and more abundant clothing still find a scanty subsistence amidst the snows of winter. In consequence of these wonderful endowments of life in the higher latitudes of the temperate zones, no sooner does the sun throw its rays more vertically, and under their genial influence, field and meadow, woodland and prairie brighten into verdure and beauty, than our ears are regaled by notes of melody poured forth from every tree-top and our eyes gladdened wherever we turn them by innumerable forms of animated and happy existence. Awakened from their long slumbers, or returned from climes far distant, multitudes of eager, joyous beings are seen on all sides, ready to partake of the varied bounties which nature is so lavishly spreading before them.

As there is no part of the earth, whatever its climate or physical condition, without inhabitants, so there is no production of the earth, whatever its character, but some animal or animals are found with appetites and powers of assimilation fitting them to derive sustenance from it. Indeed, few things in the arrangements and provisions of the outward world, impress a thoughtful mind more deeply than the care which is everywhere observed that nothing capable of supporting even the

humblest form of sentient, conscious life should be lost. The lesson so emphatically taught by our Saviour in the direction given to his disciples after he had miraculously fed the multitude with the five loaves and two fishes, stands forth with equal prominence on every page of the book of nature. Not only are the endlessly diversified products of the earth appropriately distributed among the different classes of larger animals, but the fragments left by these are gathered up and made tributary to the sustenance of innumerable smaller tribes. A striking illustration of this wonderful economy of the Divine goodness is afforded in the class of insects. We never look upon these little beings without feelings of pleasure — they are so numerous, they cost so little, feeding for the most part upon what has been either rejected by other animals, or else thrown off as a useless excretion by vegetables; and yet they are so busy, and seem to be so happy; and when they have ended their transitory life, they become food to numerous species of the feathered tribe, and thus continue to pour their contributions into the general stream of happy existence. Nearly allied to the insect tribe in design, though lower in the scale of organized life, are the animalculæ. These microscopic beings seem to have been created for the express purpose of turning to account those portions of nutrient matter, which, having escaped the other forms of the animated creation, pass off in a state of aqueous solution. They are found everywhere, but abound most in the waters of tropical climates, where the process of decay and reproduction is going on with the greatest activity. Within the compass of a few yards only, there are, probably, under such circumstances, more of these little animals, than there are human beings upon the whole face of the earth. And yet, if we may judge from the vivacity of their motions, each one is in a state of constant enjoyment.

Besides the animals which derive their subsistence from the vegetable world, there is a very numerous class which feed upon other animals. An arrangement of this kind would at first, seem inconsistent with the benevolence of design characterizing the other provisions of the animal kingdom. But, on examination, it is found to be only a part of the same general plan, dictated equally by a regard for the happiness of the beings affected by it. If there were no carnivorous animals, those which feed upon vegetables would rapidly multiply, till the earth would be no longer capable of supporting them. Famine and disease would then follow and whole races would perish in all the miseries of absolute starvation. By the introduction of a new class of animals depending for the materials of support upon those previously created, the evils arising from the want of sustenance among the

herbivorous families are prevented, while at the same time, the happiness of this new class is entirely created. And with such care is the relative fecundity among the several species adjusted, that no one race becomes superabundant and no one is exterminated.

Such now is, and such always has been the economy of the Divine Being in conducting the affairs of this world. Having designed it as an instrument for the great end of producing happiness, he has, at every period of its existence, made use of all its capabilities for the accomplishment of that purpose. How well he has succeeded, it is not necessary to say. We suppose there is no one, who, on a fine summer's morning, when all nature is full of life and motion, when the air, the earth, and the water, are each teeming with happy existence, when "the insect youth are on the wing," and when every tree, and plant, and shrub, is swarming with its myriads of inhabitants, can look around him, and observe the countless beings which, on all sides, are every moment bursting into existence, with appetites keen for the gratification of sense, and limbs nimble for the delights of motion, and then consider, over how wide an extent of surface just such scenes as this are occurring, without his soul swelling within him, as he thinks of the amount of happiness which is thus constantly spread out beneath the eye of God, and which is continually sending up to him the incense of gratitude and praise. And further, when he reflects, that in the organization of each of these happy beings there is almost as great a display of contrivance and skill as in the wonderful mechanism of his own frame, he feels how infinite is the condescension of the divine beneficence, in comparison with the simplest and loveliest forms of human goodness. And when he thinks of the lesson designed to be taught by so sublime an exhibition of benevolence, he is ready to respond to the sentiment of the poet,—

"He prayeth well, who loveth well,
Both man, and bird, and beast;
He prayeth best, who loveth best,
All things, both great and small:
For the dear God, who loveth us,
He made and loveth all."

We have thus far considered only the forms of happiness which a beneficent Creator has provided in common for all his sensitive creatures. It remains to inquire what further and peculiar proofs of his goodness he has furnished in the constitution of our own race. As man is by far the most highly endowed being on our globe—the last crowning work of the terrestrial creation—formed as we are taught

by inspiration in the image of his Maker, we should expect to find in him a fuller revelation of the divine character. Nor are we disappointed. Not only do we see the principles of conduct controlling the previous manifestations of the wisdom and power of God more fully illustrated here, but we recognize the influence of other moral attributes whose existence could not have been inferred from aught we behold in the lower orders of the animal creation. Of these, however, we do not propose now to speak. They may perhaps form the subject of a subsequent essay, but at present we shall confine our attention to the additional proofs of the divine benevolence afforded in the peculiar endowments of man. These will be found not so much in his superior bodily organization as in the higher faculties of his soul — more especially in his power of apprehending the beautiful, the true and the good — and in his capacity of deriving pleasure from them. The various forms of happiness immediately dependent upon the ministry of the senses would seem to be very widely enjoyed and constitute it is probable the common heritage of all the higher classes and orders of animals. They affect in our case, it is true, a more exalted spiritual nature and derive greater dignity and importance from this circumstance. Many of the affections also, which with them are but instinctive and temporary, ennobled by association with a loftier intellect and sustained and strengthened by moral reflection, become with us elevated and permanent sentiments, clothing with joy and beauty all the relations of life, and spreading a mantle of perpetual freshness and verdure over even the waste places of existence. Still, however, it is undoubtedly in the higher powers and sensibilities of the soul, to which no bodily organs directly minister, that we must look for the distinguishing characteristics and true glory of man. It is these that raise him so incomparably above the brute creation. It is the possession of these that allies him to spiritual intelligences — makes him but a little lower than the angels and fits him for becoming their companion.

Nor has the Creator confined his beneficence to the endowment of our race with these high capacities. He has placed us in circumstances every way suited to them — in a world adapted not only to supply our more gross and material wants, but to minister to the finer sensibilities of the spirit — a world robed in beauty, pervaded by harmony and radiant in every part with his own glorious perfections. There is, perhaps, no part of our nature, for the exercise and gratification of which, more universal provision has been made than the faculty of taste. Everything around us addresses it, and there are few objects which do not minister to our happiness through it. The

green earth, and the blue o'er-arching sky; the vast expanse of the ocean, forever heaving and tossing, and beating with ceaseless wave the rocky barriers that confine it; the mountain lifting its giant sides laden with forest and glacier, up through the region of clouds and tempests to bathe its snow-clad summit in perpetual sunshine; the mighty cataract, poured as from the hand of the Almighty, and in its ceaseless flow notching in the solid rock the cycles of ages; the glorious orb of day, when first he shoots his orient beams "aslant the dew-bright earth and colored air," or having climbed the high arch of heaven pours from its azure vault his noonday heat, or declining to the western horizon gilds with his setting rays cloud and hill-top, woods and meadow; the starry canopy of night veiling with darkness the narrow circle of the terrestrial scenery, but uncovering the celestial — opening to mortal vision the universal realm of space blazing through all its measureless depths with unnumbered suns equal in splendor to our own — these awaken in the mind of the beholder varied indeed, but still pleasurable emotions. Equally in harmony with this endowment of the spirit are the minor objects with which the Creator has adorned the scene of our earthly existence. The tinkling rill threading its way through copse and meadow, the noisy brook urging its impetuous course along the plain or down the hill-side, and the majestic river, rolling onward its mass of waters, laden with the commerce of nations, towards that ocean with which they are soon to mingle; the swelling bud, the expanding leaf, the opening flower, the waving harvest and the golden fruit; the tender plant bending its delicate and graceful form before the summer breeze, and the moss-grown oak whose sturdy trunk and outspread branches have braved the storms of a hundred winters; the swallow cutting with pliant wing the liquid air, the lark rising from the dewy lawn and "singing up to heaven's gate," the little humming-bird as, poised in air and gleaming in satin and gold, he sips from the painted flower-cup its nectared sweets, and the lordly eagle stooping from his aerial flight to bear away in his powerful talons the unwary hare or the defenceless lambkin; the graceful deer, the fleet gazelle, the stately elephant, the majestic lion, the human form and face divine, all kindle in the soul a like sense of joy and gladness. Whichever way we turn, the eye is greeted by beauty and the ear drinks in melody. Aside from the adaptedness of the objects with which the Creator has surrounded us to their several uses, a mysterious and indescribable attraction is spread over the entire face of nature, and breathes instinctive from all her forms. It is the benignant expression of goodness — the smile of the father's love added to the rich provisions he has made for the welfare of his children.

Nor is the divine benevolence less conspicuous in the sensibility of

the human soul to the forms of truth revealed around and within it. The desire to know is one of the strongest and most operative principles of our nature. It is not confined to any age, character or condition. It manifests itself equally in the simple 'why' and 'what makes it' of the untaught child, and in the laborious researches and profound investigations of the natural philosopher; in the busy curiosity of the unoccupied citizen who spends his time "in nothing else, but either to tell or to hear some new thing," and in the untiring devotion of the scholar, poring with bended form over the classic pages of ancient or modern lore. It is continually prompting to action under all the varied conditions and circumstances of life, and the pleasures arising from its gratification constitute no inconsiderable portion of the entire sum of human happiness. This is true of it regarded in its ordinary manifestations and as directed to the more usual objects. But, when it is associated with high intellectual endowments, and raised above the petty interests of vulgar curiosity to the sublime truths pertaining to God, man, and the universe, it becomes a source of enjoyment the purest and most exalted of which we can have any experience in the present state. And how ample are the materials provided for ministering to it in this divinest of all its forms, how glorious are the vistas opened on every side into the infinity of being around us, how rich a beneficent Creator has thus made the heritage of mind, it is scarcely necessary to say. Whether we regard the displays of the Divine wisdom and power directly about us and within our immediate view, this ponderous globe with its mighty burden of oceans and continents teeming throughout with myriads of living organized beings, as hung in its orbit, it plunges through space with a velocity of more than a thousand miles to the minute; the material atoms composing it, indestructible, unalterable, connected with one another by the most mysterious relationships and endowed with exhaustless energies, varying in their outward manifestations with every new condition, but in essence remaining always the same, the source of all physical causation, evolving by their ceaseless action the entire assemblage of the terrestrial phenomena; the subtle principle of heat, invisible, intangible, without form or weight, or any of the sensible attributes of materiality, like the Being who created it ever present and ever active, and like Him revealing itself only through its effects, surrounding all things, pervading all things, and quickening all things, dissolving by its subtle force the strong bands of cohesion and as with spear of Ithuriel exciting the liberated atoms to either their gentlest or their fiercest play; light shooting through space like the glance of the Omnipotent One, or at the magic touch of the prism

untwisting its braided and parti-colored beams into threads of as varied hues as his own benevolence — or going back through the untold ages of the past to that remote epoch in the history of our planet when it first assumed a habitable condition, trace the successive changes which it has undergone, the different forms of vegetable and animal life which have one after another appeared upon it, the mighty series of physical and organic developments of which it has been the theatre — or retiring from this scene of sublunary changes, back into the depths of immensity, until the world we inhabit is lost in the distance and the entire planetary system of which it forms so insignificant a part has dwindled to a mere point, there amid the splendors of a new heavens behold the wonders of creative power which still surround us — or turning from the various forms of material grandeur, gaze in upon the human soul, which besides containing in itself a world of unexplored mystery and transcendent beauty, reflects so purely from its serene depths the whole outward creation; or with awe and trembling lift our rapt vision to the great Being of whose boundless perfections this glorious universe is but the bright emanation, and in whose nearer presence angelic beings veil their faces, we behold all around, within, beneath and above us radiant with unimaginable splendors and our hearts swell with emotions of joy and gratitude unutterable as we thus survey the grandeur and glory of the spiritual birth-right which our Heavenly Father has bestowed upon us even while here clothed in the habiliments of mortality and dwelling in tabernacles of flesh.

But, however pure or exhaustless the sources of happiness thus opened in the forms of being around us, these alone are not sufficient to satisfy the demands of our whole nature. Back of the taste and intellect, the faculties immediately addressed by them, there is a profounder sensibility which they do not reach — a deeper capacity for enjoyment which they cannot fill. Nay, were there nothing beyond these, the external universe with all its magnificence and glory would be but a vast wilderness, from whose solitary depths not a single voice would come to quicken into life the moral and social elements of our being. These diviner endowments of the spirit respond only to spiritual qualities or affections — to the pure in thought, the beautiful in sentiment, the god-like in virtue and the sublime in devotion and love. They hold no relationship whatever with the outward form or character of either material or immaterial existences. Heart only can answer to heart, and mind to mind, and soul to soul. It is the identity of spiritual nature that constitutes the electric chain of sympathy running through the whole human family and uniting them into one common brotherhood — along which the orator and bard send their

breathing thoughts and burning words and become immortal. It is the golden links of fellowship that bind to the heart of the Christian scholar the inspired verse of David and Isaiah, and that hold the student in classic lore to the glowing pages of Homer and Demosthenes, of Horace, Virgil and Cicero. It is the deep chords of moral feeling pervading and underlying the whole mental structure which breathe through the soul its most exquisite harmonies, and which once struck by the master spirits of our race continue to vibrate through all succeeding time. Indeed, it is through this part of our nature that the sublime and beautiful in the outward world have their chief power over us. Detach from these the spiritual associations which we instinctively connect with them and they no longer move us. Extinguish the light of the indwelling soul and the human form and face would lose all their divinity and the most perfect work of the Creator become a mere piece of colored and figured matter. The sweetest melodies of woodland songsters, but for the joy that animates them and inspires their rapturous notes, would quickly cease to please us. We should look with comparative indifference upon the beautifully-formed leaf or the graceful and delicately-chiselled spray did we know that no mind had conceived it and no hand formed it, and that no eyes but our own had ever gazed upon its trembling loveliness. The surpassing glories of a winter's night, apart from all idea of the great Being, who created the innumerable worlds disclosed to our view, framed their vast orbits and by his powerful arm sped them on their endless career of revolution, and who is each moment accomplishing by these mighty instrumentalities wise and beneficent purposes, would scarcely awaken a single emotion of sublimity or kindle one aspiration to become acquainted with the laws which govern the celestial mechanism. In all the deeper feelings inspired by the objects of external nature, there is a latent and unconscious it may be, but still actual recognition of the conceiving mind and forming hand; and it is this recognition which chiefly stirs us. The poet is thus conducted through his mere sensibilities to the same sublime doctrines of theism at which the philosopher arrives by the more circuitous processes of the reason and the understanding. Had the author of the beautiful lines to Mount Blanc been made acquainted with its entire history from the time when it first emerged from the waters of a primeval ocean to the present hour, the wonders thus revealed could not have impressed upon him more deeply the great truth which he so eloquently utters, than did that silent and awful form as it rose majestically before him.

"Who sank thy sunless pillars in the earth?
 Who filled thy countenance with rosy light?
 Who made thee father of perpetual streams?
 And you, ye five wild torrents fiercely glad,
 Who called you forth from night and utter death?
 From darkness let you loose, and icy dens,
 Down those precipitous, black, jagged rocks
 Forever shattered, and the same forever?
 Who gave you your invulnerable life,
 Your strength, your speed, your fury, and your joy,
 Unceasing thunder and eternal foam?—
 And who commanded and the silence came,
 'Here shall the billows stiffen and have rest?'
 Ye ice-falls! ye that from yon dizzy heights
 Adown enormous ravines steeply slope, —
 Torrents, methinks, that heard a mighty noise,
 And stopped at once amidst their maddest plunge,
 Motionless torrents! silent cataracts!
 Who made you glorious as the gates of heaven
 Beneath the keen full moon? Who bade the sun
 Clothe you with rainbows? Who with lovely flowers
 Of living blue spread garlands at your feet?
 God! God! the torrents like a shout of nations
 Utter; the ice-plain bursts, and answers, God!"

Thus are we led by all the objects around us and by every faculty within us, up to the Creator and Author of all things, "in whom we live and move and have our being," and with whom the soul through all its higher instincts is continually struggling for communion and sympathy. To this it makes all the manifestations of the Divine power and wisdom — all the revelations of the Divine will and character, plans and purposes immediately tributary. In this alone can its burning aspirations and ever-restless desires find permanent satisfaction and repose. Even in the profoundest emotions of human love and sympathy, in the most exstastic moments of terrene bliss, there is a want of that full and perfect fruition for which the soul was made and of which it feels itself capable. It seeks for a still nearer intercourse, a yet closer union, in which no material barrier, no veil of flesh, "no obstacle of membrane, joint or limb" shall intervene to prevent perfect commingling and interfusion of spirit. Such communion it can hold in the present state only with its Maker. It must be sought, not in the outward forms of ceremonial pomp and splendor, not in the solemn temple,

"Where through the long-drawn aisle and fretted vault,
 The pealing anthem swells the notes of praise,"

but in the silent worshipping of a meek and humble spirit, in the exercise of true penitence, of sincere and devout gratitude and of sublime faith

and love. When thus sought, it will not be denied. When thus approached by a believing and contrite soul, the Almighty Creator of the universe, He who filleth immensity by his presence and inhabiteth eternity, condescends to reveal himself in a fulness of peace and joy, which shedding its light on all around, not only gilds with new glory each inferior blessing, but makes even the sorrows of life bright with a more than earthly beauty. Besides the other proofs of his benevolence — in addition to the rich provisions made for the supply of our material wants and the still richer inheritance conferred upon us as spiritual beings, the great Author of all things, the giver of every good and perfect gift, vouchsafes *himself*. Not limiting his favor to the bestowment of every external blessing, he opens within the soul a source of perennial happiness — a fountain of living waters of which they who drink thirst not any more, but, whose stream, as the shallow rills of earthly joy, one after another dry up and disappear, only grows broader and deeper, and as all the higher endowments of our nature bid us hope and as we are expressly taught in the revealed word of God, is destined to flow on forever.

Such are the proofs of the Divine goodness. So varied and so abundant are the provisions which a beneficent Creator has made for the welfare of his creatures. Everything, whether in their own constitution organic and spiritual, or in the circumstances under which they are placed, is so designed as either directly or indirectly to minister to it. Even the destruction of life and of the means of enjoyment occasionally produced by the warring elements — by fire, wind and water, by the earthquake and the volcano — as well as the suffering attendant upon disease and injury, instead of being so many proofs of the Divine wrath, as they have too often been regarded, or of indicating on the part of the Supreme Being a disregard to the welfare of his creatures, when seen in their proper connections, reveal agencies and provisions, in their ordinary and legitimate operation purely beneficent. Nor are we able to conceive of any modification of the general scheme or system of things whereby these incidental evils might be avoided, and at the same time the proposed ends secured. So far as we can see, they grow necessarily out of the conditions under which all organized beings have their existence. The happiness enjoyed by these beings, on the other hand is the object of special design — the direct result of innumerable contrivances, all looking towards it, and the greater part accomplishing their sole purpose in ministering to it. The most extended survey of the Creator's works, therefore, only serves to verify and confirm the ideas of his character derived from the immediate and instinctive suggestions of our moral nature. The light

which shines so clearly from within, is met, whichever way we turn, by an answering beam of equal brightness. The Divine benevolence is as visibly written on each and every part of the universe lying within the sphere of our observation as the Divine wisdom. Nay, it is only through the subordination of the mighty assemblage of means and instrumentalities included in it, to beneficent and worthy ends, that the Divine wisdom is manifested.

ARTICLE VI.

DOCTRINE RESPECTING THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

Translated from the German of Dr. and Prof. J. A. Dorner, with remarks, by M. Stuart, lately Prof. of Sac. Lit. in the Theol. Sem. at Andover.

[IN my exegetical and theological inquiries respecting John 1: 1—18, published in the January and April Nos. of this Review, I gave promise of an appendix, in which the great question respecting the derivation or source of the New Testament Logos is discussed by Prof. Dorner, the latest and by far the ablest of recent critical writers on the history of the doctrine respecting the person of Christ, or of the human and divine nature of Christ. In the introduction to his book, his object is to show, that John derived his ideas of the Logos incarnate, i. e. of the truly divine and human nature united in one person, neither from the Old Testament, nor from the apocryphal books, nor from the Logos-doctrine of Philo. The importance of this inquiry will be quite plain to every well-informed and discerning theologian. For a long time, even from early ages, it has been customary among many writers to compare the *Logos* of John with *Wisdom* in Prov. viii.; with the same, in the apocryphal books of Jesus Sirach and the *Wisdom* of Solomon; and above all, with the *Logos* of Philo Judæus, as exhibited in his philosophical works. Now if it can be shown that none of these writings assign to *Wisdom* or *Logos* a *proper and real personality*, (for such is the view of Dorner, to which I yield my full and hearty assent), so it would follow, that John, who beyond a question makes his *Logos* a *real person*, did not derive his views of the nature and being of the *Logos*, as to his *personality*, from any or all of said writings.

If this can be satisfactorily shown, then does it follow, that, if the adversaries of the doctrine of *God-man* in the person of Christ, can prove that Prov. viii., or the apocryphal writings, or Philo, have exhibited a *Logos* which is really *impersonal*, i. e. have spoken of *Wisdom* and the *Logos* only in the way of *personification*, (and undoubtedly they may prove so much), still all this does not bear directly upon the assertions or developments of John in his gospel, because he has exhibited a *personal Logos*. The opponents in question maintain, that John's views must be conformed to the sources whence, as they assert, he drew. Dorner has shown, that as *personification* merely of *Wisdom* or *Logos* belongs to all the writings named above as sources of John's views, (according to the affirmation of these

opponents), and as John has, beyond all question, united the idea of *proper personality* with the designation *Logos*, so it is not and cannot be made out, that John does not mean something more by his *Logos*, than those writers meant by theirs. If the *Logos* of John be the same as theirs, then his *proper personality* and *divinity* are out of question. They cannot be maintained, so far as his views are concerned with theirs, or dependent on them. If it is not the same, then of course we may attribute to John a meaning of *Logos* different from theirs, and accordant with other declarations of the New Testament.

To any one who has become conversant with the never-ending disputes of the two past centuries, respecting the person of Christ, and specially in regard to the meaning of *Logos*, and the sources from which the appellation was derived, the work of Dorner will appear in a very striking light. The hand of a master is everywhere visible. What has been discussed in quartos and folios and thick octavos, he has compressed into a few pages, and has sat in judgment on the controversy, summing up in his own comprehensive manner all its essential points, and passing such a sentence on them as, in my apprehension, is not likely to be reversed. The grand question is: Whether the *Logos* of John is a *proper and real person*, or only a *personification*, i. e. a philosophical, speculative, or poetical abstraction, amounting to nothing more than a poetico-rhetorical method of describing either divine attributes or divine operations or energies. It is time this dispute was ended. Dorner seems to have brought the matter to a fair, and I would hope a final, consummation.

The old idea of so many of the Christian fathers, which in modern times has been defended by Souverain (*La Platonisme Devoilé*) and his followers, viz. that John borrowed Plato's views of the *Logos*, and transferred them to his pages, is, as I believe, now generally abandoned by all intelligent, fair-minded critics. To suppose John to have been a diligent reader of *Plato*, and to have pursued the study of his philosophical speculations, is a thing so utterly irreconcilable with all that we know of Hebrew taste and pursuits in Palestine, in the days of John, that the bare statement of the thing is its own refutation. John a diligent reader of *Plato*! What is there in all his writings — Gospel, Epistles, and Apocalypse — that gives the least ground for any such suspicion? Nothing, except the single word *Logos*, and some of the powers attributed to the personage which this word designates. But even here is nothing but a sandy foundation. Tennemann, that great master of Platonic philosophy, has shown to general if not universal satisfaction, in an Essay devoted to the discussion of this topic, that the *Logos* of *Plato* is no more than an *abstraction* or a *personification* of divine power, intelligence, and wisdom. The discussion, an able one and highly satisfactory to most persons, may be found in *Paulus Memorabilien* St. I. s. 34—64.

One word, before I close this introduction to Dorner's discussion, in respect to the course which I have pursued with regard to the *Logos*, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* of January last. I have there labored to show *how* and *why* John came to adopt such a *name* as *Logos*. I have endeavored to render it probable, that it resulted from the manner in which the Old Testament speaks of the *word of the Lord*, and from the usage in the Chaldee translations in respect to the same phrase. All this stands on ground entirely different from that of the present discussion. The question now before us is, not *why* John employed the designation *Logos*, or what led him to do this, but: Whether the *Logos* as introduced and described by him, is the same as *Wisdom* in *Proverbs* and in the *Apocrypha*, and the *Logos* in *Philo*? On this question we are now to give Dorner a hearing. He enters upon it, by a

brief preface respecting the difference, in regard to the revelation of the *God-man*, that exists between the Jewish Scriptures and the New Testament, or, in other words, by showing that the main peculiarities of the New Testament descriptions of the Logos, are not to be found in the Old Testament, and consequently that John did not acquire his views from the Old Testament.

I must say a word, in relation to the *translation* which I have made. I have endeavored everywhere to give the exact sense of the original. But I have not slavishly translated the original by endeavoring in all cases to render *verbum verbo*. This would be, to make the piece unreadable and unintelligible. I have broken up many of the long and cumbrous sentences of the original, merely supplying some connecting links between the parts thus separated. What is common practice in the German construction of sentences, would be unendurable in English, and often unintelligible to the common reader. I have in no case purposely made Dörner to say in English, what he has not said in German. But whether I have always attained to his real meaning, or not, is a question of some difficulty. He is intimately acquainted with all the recent philosophy of Germany, and has, insensibly perhaps, been not a little affected by its style and diction. His language is often of a transcendental tenor, and in order to be rightly understood it requires some good knowledge of this kind of diction. About the meaning of a few sentences, I have not been able to decide, with full conviction, whether I have made a correct representation, or not. In such cases, I have aimed at translating *literally*; but inasmuch as I did not feel assured of their real meaning, although I had examined them of course in the original German, I can hardly expect the English reader will find them quite intelligible; in a very few cases, probably my version will have to be unintelligible. I will not say this is not my fault. I can only say, that I have done the best I could, and have after all been obliged to leave the matter in the predicament just described. In general, I would hope that the piece is readable and intelligible. It demands, however, some considerable acquaintance with psychology and with ancient philosophy, in order to make it easily intelligible, and specially to make the discussion a matter of interest to the reader. In some cases, I have been forced upon the use of technical words, which are not properly English, but for the appropriate expression of which our mother-tongue furnishes no adequate diction. Generally, however, these words are intelligible to the readers of Latin and Greek. Any one who knows the modern course of German criticism on John's Gospel, will easily perceive the high importance of the matter discussed. Prof. Lücke of Göttingen, a *quasi* orthodox writer, in his very valuable Commentary on John, has suspended his opinion about the meaning of the apostle in respect to the *Logos*, on the assumption that John has followed in the track of Philo; and consequently, that Philo's *Logos* will show us what John means by his *Logos*. It is this position that Dörner has overturned to its very basis, and thus left the apostle to be interpreted by himself and by other New Testament writers. Prof. Lücke is a writer so learned, so able, and apparently so cool, so candid, and so impartial, that recent commentators, De Wette and Meyer, have done little else on the Gospel of John, than re-produce, sometimes in another form, what he has advanced. Lücke's work is the modern *thesaurus* for John's Gospel and Epistles. Hence the importance of Dörner's disquisition. The latter part of it, where he as it were sums up the whole matter, will show, in the light of noon-day, how immeasurably discrepant are the views of John and of Philo, with respect to the Godhead and the *Logos*. If John read Philo, and could make out any definite and consistent view of his *Logos* from his works, he did what no

other reader of him has ever since done, or can do. Dörner has fully shown the absurdity of his philosophy; the predominance in him of ethnical views of the Godhead, instead of the spiritual ones of the Bible; and his entire lack of acquaintance with the leading truths of proper Christianity. So completely does he ignore the holiness of God, the sins of men as contracting spiritual guilt, and the necessity of atonement, as also the necessity or even possibility of the incarnation of the Logos, that it is utterly impossible to suppose, with any probability, that John chose Philo for his guide].

DÖRNER ON THE LOGOS.

IN the history of religion antecedent to the establishment of Christianity, the Hebrew religion stands alone in respect to insisting upon the fact, that God and the world are to be strenuously contradistinguished; and besides this, that the *personality* of Jehovah and of man is to be fully acknowledged. Inasmuch as God is highly exalted above nature, in regard to his spirituality and unity (עֶחָד), and man is known to be created after the image of God, the distinction between them has such a claim to its own right, that unity between them can be predicated only in a *moral* sense. As to the *essential* relation between God and the world, and particularly human nature, little is said. The Hebrew people were little concerned with metaphysical questions. Still, the moral union is not to be conceived of in a Pelagian way, since according to the Hebrew view, it rests on a religious basis, on divine condescension. This became ever more and more clear to the Hebrews. As the finger of God from the beginning, wrote the Law on tables of stone, so, in the course of development, the divinely enlightened prophets hope for a time when God will wash away the sins of the people, and write his law in their heart. But in the Christian idea of *God-man* there lies a relation of essential being at the basis, and not barely a religious or moral relation. Hence it must *a priori* appear unsatisfactory, to aim at deriving the Christian idea out of the Hebrew national spirit as it was in itself. That Jehovah, who is highly exalted above all that is finite, who according to the very idea of him is invisible, whose very aspect is consuming, should come down to this world, clothe himself with a costume that is finite, and become man — this thought is wholly foreign to the Hebrew religion in itself considered. Much rather must we admit, that the Hebrew religion glories in the fact, that in opposition to the heathen world it holds fast the holy personality of Jehovah, pure and highly exalted above nature and the whole world; but this it could not do, if it had established a *ὁμοεισία*, e. g. of humanity with divinity in any sense. To keep itself above all natural religion, the moral view taken by the Hebrew religion, must form for itself such a meta-

physical view of the relation between God and the world, as lay far distant from God's becoming a man; yea, even such an one, that the Hebrew would shudder and be astonished at a thought like this; although the Hebrews, as already said, generally speculated very little respecting the relation of God's *essence* to the *essence* of the world. One cannot object to this, that Jehovah does not at all appear far removed from the world and incommunicable, under the ancient dispensation; rather does he appear near to the world, and filling it everywhere with his presence. For after he had, in various ways, revealed himself to the patriarchs, he was specially near to his covenant people, as their lawgiver, Saviour, and avenger, who animated their leaders and prophets, and by various phenomena or symbols manifested himself to them. All this is not excluded by what has been said above; nor is that excluded by these phenomena. Who now can say, that all this, even in the most distant way, resembles the idea of Jehovah's becoming man, — that Jehovah who is, and was, and is to come?

[I cannot assent entirely to this view of the Hebrew Theology. What did Isaiah mean, when he spoke of a "virgin who should conceive, and bear a Son, whose name should be called: GOD WITH US?" Isa. 7: 16. And more specially, what did the same prophet mean, when he says: "Unto us a Son is given, . . . and his name shall be called: Wonder (נִמְרֹץ), Counsellor, MIGHTY GOD, PERPETUAL GUARDIAN (שָׁמַיִל), PRINCE OF PEACE?" Isa. 9: 6. His *humanity* is developed beyond all question, in Isa. liii, and in many other passages. The only question with Dörner would seem to be, whether his *divine* nature is developed in the O. Test. If John is to be regarded as an authoritative expositor of the ancient Scriptures, then does John 12: 41, compared with Isa. 6: 1—3, make it certain that Isaiah had some proper views of Christ's *divine* nature. Many other passages might be adduced; but this is not the place for a continued discussion of this nature. Dörner seems to have been too much influenced by the fact, that the Ebionites, the earliest Jewish heresy, became, or continued to be, unbelievers in Christ's proper divinity; because, as they alleged, of the O. Test. doctrine of *one purely spiritual God*, whose name (*Jehovah*) and whose attributes united in testifying, that he was entirely above and remote from all which is *human*. But while the opposition of the Jews in general, of the apostolic age and afterwards, against the idea of *God-man* is fully admitted on my part, I feel bound to say, that this will not decide the great question, as to what views the prophets entertained. I know not how to dispose of passages, such as are quoted above, without supposing that Isaiah and others believed in an *incarnation*, i. e. in a Θεὸς ἐνσαρκικός. I doubt not that their views were quite of a generic nature, and not altogether special and definitive. The time had not come for the development of the latter. But there was enough to excite hope, yea expectation, and also to administer comfort. This was all which was then needed. "The mystery hidden from ages and from generations" was solved, in many respects, only by the actual coming of Christ — by the λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο. But to carry this matter so far as Dörner does, to say that "the ancient Hebrews would have shuddered and been astonished at the thought" of the *incarnation*, or the idea of a *God-man*, seems to me irreconcilable with the views

which the Saviour and the apostles take of the O. Test. prophecies. Those among the Jews, who like good old Simeon (Luke 1: 25 seq.), were *παράδεχομενοι παράκλησιν τοῦ Ἰσραήλ*, were surely not horrified at the idea of this *Consoler's* appearing in the costume of humanity. — S.]

It need not be denied, that the Hebrew national spirit, particularly in later times, when remote from a living religious process, addressed itself more to inquiry, and sought to fill the chasm which metaphysically resulted from the ethical consideration of the discrepancy between God and the world. Here came in the idea of an angel Jehovah (*יהוה מלאך*), the mediator of Jehovah and of the patriarchs, and afterwards of the nation under the theocracy; and this was the point of union between them. But this mediatorial office is not conferred as one which is constant; for Jehovah often reveals himself without his angel, viz. in visions, voices, and symbols. Nor does the angel in question attain, in the Old Testament, to a fixed personality, being separated on the one hand from the chorus of created angels, who do not (like him) bear on themselves the name of Jehovah; and on the other hand, not always sinking back and commingling with the personality of Jehovah. Such an auxiliary hypostasis does not much exceed the personification of other divine operations at that period; at least it does not serve to reconcile the *essential* relation of God and the world. At most, there are found only some passages,¹ in the Psalms, according to which the angel-Jehovah has bestowed on him not merely a theocratic but a cosmical appellation. But there he appears either as a personification only, and therefore not as a hypostasis; or if as the latter, then merely as a created thing. In the first case, the angel-Jehovah is contained in the *חכמה*, *wisdom*; in the last, he comes forth in the rank of angels, which indeed, in course of time, come forth with more significance, but still are far removed from conciliating the *essence* of God and the world. Much more do they show, that Jehovah's *essence* comes not in contact with the world. But since to these angels is assigned more and more, which belongs to God himself, e. g. creation, preservation, and government, and they are his vice-gerents in the world, there is more of an approach of the early purer religious consciousness to the bewilderment and phantasy of heathenism, while the living God retreats as it were to the back-ground. It is well known, what tasteless and luxurious phantasies the Jewish tradition indulged in with regard to this matter, even before the coming of Christ, and how the ever-increasing angelology of the same filled heaven and earth, Paradise and Gehenna, with wondrous romantic narrations. But to place the fundamental

¹ Ps. 103: 20. 148: 2. 34: 8. 91: 11.

Christian idea in connection with this, is not only inadmissible, because the angels are all created beings, while the Christian church never acknowledges the truly divine except in Christ alone; but more definitively still, because this angelology which fills the fore-ground of consciousness, holds and maintains the truly divine in the back-ground. Hence such angelology begins to come in, in that shape, only from the time when God had ceased to speak with his people, who were without any living nearness and revelation of the Lord.¹

In respect to the *חכמה* of Prov. vii, and the *σοφία* of the Apocrypha, they have undoubtedly a *cosmical* meaning. In them is contained that which is nearer to the Hebrew spirit, religion, and ethics, and which is precise in regard to the relation of the essence of God and the world. Wisdom (Prov. 8: 22 seq.) has an internal relation to the world, and to its wise arrangements, i. e. to the *form* of the world. Although in this way it is only *teleologically* conceived of, and always placed in an internal relation to the practical, still it brings into the world, in one respect, viz. that of form, divine thoughts, and so readily establishes an internal relation between God and the world. It is introduced as *speaking*, as a personality different from God; and yet the passage does not proceed to an actual hypostasizing of Wisdom.

In Sir. 1: 1—10. 24: 8—10, and Wisd. 7: 22 seq., is bare *personification* still clearer. The Son of Sirach imagines, that in Wisdom exists the whole plan of the world, the eternal idea of the world in regard to its extension in space and time, and its inner proportions. In 1: 10 it is said: "He has poured out wisdom over all his works, and over all flesh, according to his grace." Here, indeed, is wisdom not barely conceived of as form, but announced as a substance, as an energy diffused over everything, and wisely adapting it. Still it plainly is not a *person*. Sirach, in ch. xxiv, identifies it with God's word; says that it hovers over the whole earth; and ascribes to it an omnipresence in the abyss, in the sea, and on the earth. Thus it keeps pace directly with the *Logos*-idea of the Alexandrians. Sirach and the book of Wisdom lead us straight forward to Philo. In the beautiful ch. vii. of the last named book, Wisdom is specially conceived of as everywhere operative, and hemmed in by nothing. Hovering over all, it still penetrates all both physically and spiritually. But while it penetrates, it is not thereby limited. It is said (v. 27 seq. Sir. 24: 14) to be permanent. It is

¹ Since this angelology in later times assumed a pantheistic hue, and the created nature as well as essential difference of angels from God gave place to the *emanation-doctrine*, so there still remained, even in this case, the ground-idea, that the truly Absolute makes himself known, although only at a remote distance, while the subordination remains without change. Hence the Christian church could never acknowledge herself as recognising the doctrine of *Aeons*.

called eternal, and yet it is said to connect itself with time. It is represented as shooting up like a palm-tree (Sir. 24: 18); as spreading out its boughs like the oak; as seeking and finding a stable abode in Jacob (Sir. 24: 11 seq.); as ever and anon settling itself in pious souls; as forming the friends and prophets of God, and yet not confined to these, since it *penetrates all spirits*, Wisd. 7: 23, 24. As a principle in the many, it is regarded as manifold, and yet as one, vs. 22, 27. Thus, in the book of Wisdom, more definitively than in Sirach, Wisdom appears not barely as a formal but as a real principle. This, without any doubt, is to be put to the account of a stronger Hellenistic influence on the latter work. But the more universal the meaning of σοφία thus becomes, the more it resembles the Philonic Logos, the more does the possibility vanish of deducing from it the fundamental Christian idea. We must indeed admit, that by all this the firmly-grasped difference between God and the world, among the Hebrews, is somewhat relaxed. On the other hand, the generic idea of the Hellenic Logos-doctrine abstracts from the fundamental Christian idea all anthropological and neological basis; inasmuch as the stand-point of historic revelation, which forms an essential part of the Christology of the church, is abandoned, and it evaporates into a general internal revelation of God in the mind. In accordance with this, nothing more than a Christology of the Docetae can erect itself on this ground. Generally speaking, there remained not, in this universality and pure spirituality of manner in which the Logos operated, any ground more for the assumption of a human nature like that in Christ, in regard to men. Finally, this idea of the Logos, by the generalization of his energy, as well as by the continual reabsorption of his hypostasis in God, i. e. a mere personification, entirely excludes the thought, that the whole Logos, and not merely a part of him, or an effusion of his energy, made his appearance in Christ. This is, named in Christian fashion, *Ebionitish*; and so, therefore, it is an unsatisfactory view of the Christian idea of God-man, to which the Alexandrine formation of the Logos-doctrine would conduct us.

The book of Sirach exhibits a remarkable effort to advance toward this view of the idea of a universal σοφία, so hazardous to a theocratic foundation and to a historical revelation in general, and to unite it with those interests. According to Sir. 24: 10—16 seq., Wisdom seeks a permanent, established abode, a place of more perfect revelation in a concentrated way: "Among all men, among all heathen, it sought a dwelling place, that it might find as it were a home. Then did the Creator of all things appoint for her a dwelling in Jacob, and vouchsafed for her a home in Zion." But Wisdom (v. 16) took root among a highly honored nation, which was God's heritage, which possessed his truth, in

contradistinction from the heathen world, inasmuch as Israel in general is called the *servant of God*, in distinction from the heathen, although in itself it was not perfectly the servant of God. But where now, in Israel, is the proper throne of this *σοφία*, and the full revelation of it? V. 15 points us to the temple; (and to this, the later doctrine respecting the Shechinah attaches itself). Vs. 32, 38, direct our view to the book of the Covenant, the Law from which Wisdom flows. But if the author remained consistent with himself, then would not only the Messianic idea be extinguished in the conceit that the temple and the book of the Covenant would ever be sufficient, but he must content himself with the purely external dwelling of *σοφία* in Jacob. But so little do we find in him or in the book of Wisdom, of the *σοφία* as connected with the Messianic idea,¹ that both acknowledge Wisdom to be satisfied neither with a general taking root in Jacob, nor in that external abode with him. Hence Sirach represents her as ever striving after a constant enlargement (vs. 17—22). It seeks no more. An extensive increase satisfies it. Still more does the author of the book of Wisdom, who is less theocratical in his opinions, satisfy himself with a transition (*μεταβασις*) of Wisdom into the souls of the pious (*ψυχὰς ὁσίων*). But inasmuch as these writers recognize only an imparting to many, so they acknowledge no concentration in one. Thus they more and more lose sight of the need of the same, and in a twofold way institute a levelling process. The Palestine writers do indeed maintain a theocratic standpoint, but the religious process comes to a halt; and instead of strenuous advance, instead of a Messianic idea developed more purely and amply, they seek progress in the extension of it, and in the making of proselytes, and the hope for a political Messiah, whose prosperity, as they view the matter, will be on the most extensive scale.²

The Alexandrians, on the contrary, as the book of Wisdom shows, tasting of heathen-wisdom, suffer to evaporate a sense of the need of a historic God-man; they even lose, by mingling with heathenism, the noble religious foundation and the steadfast belief of the Hebrew fathers. *Does PHILO make an exception to this remark?* This demands, in the present position of our question, a more thorough investigation.

The book of Wisdom shows, that Philo with his method of thought stands not alone, but that in his works has been preserved for us the blooming or philosophic school which undoubtedly was widely extended, since it grew up even on Jewish ground. It is worth the pains

¹ This in itself is to be sure unexpected, since in these ideas an anti-theocratical and philosophical element is in action, while the true Messianic idea shoots up only on theocratic ground.

² Mohammedism is a continuation of this phase of Judaism.

of examining his views with more particularity, because he was not merely a contemporary with Christ, and, while Palestine was beholding the Saviour, was the greatest of the Jews out of Palestine, but also because his system was the most direct counterpart of Christianity, and a corresponding picture which deceived many. In him Judaism, tinged by Hellenism, wrought itself up to an effort to accomplish by the power of reflection, that which the Messianic idea was designed to do, and thereby to make a substitute for the Messiah and render him superfluous. Out of this process of the ideal mutual operation of the heathenish and Jewish, which produces in him a kind of prelude of perfectible Christianity, we may explain the phenomenon, that for a time some persons of slender acuteness for historical sifting, have regarded him as a Christian, and may also explain his changing of colors between two opposite stand-points, which mocks all attempts at conciliation.

In what follows, Philo will be considered principally in respect to the stand-point of his Messianic views; and these may be best exhibited by a right comprehension of his doctrine of the Logos, which has been so diversely understood by different persons.¹

The different views which have been taken of Philo's system appear gradually to have come to an agreement in this, viz. that it is made up of heterogeneous ingredients; and also, that it represents in a peculiar way the ancient distinction between God *revealed* and God *concealed*. Lücke maintains, that the theological positions in respect to *Wisdom* and *Word* run together, as they regard the Philonic Logos separated from God, p. 253 Comm. Others assert, that his Logos, in its ultimate

¹ Comp. Dähne, historical Sketch of the Jewish Alexandrine Philosophy, 1834, (reviewed by Bauer in the Year-Book of scientific Criticism, 1835, Nov. No., 95 seq.). Gröner, Philo and the Alexandrine Theosophy, Stuttg. 1831. Grossmann, Questiones Philoniana, Leipz. 1829. L. A. Simson, Summa Theolog. Joann. Diss. 1839, pp. 28—64. Georgii, On the recent Contrarieties, in the comprehension of the Alexandrine religious Philosophy, particularly of Jewish Alexandrinism, printed in Illgen's Journal for historical Theology, 1839, Part 3 and 4. Dr. Edw. v. Murali, Investigations in respect to Philo, in relation to the MSS. belonging to the Petersburg Academy, viz. of 27 Treatises of the same, read on the 5th of June, 1840. Semisch, Justin Martyr, Vol. II. 1842, pp. 267—274. Bauer, the Christian Doctrine respecting the Trinity and the Incarnation of God, 1844, pp. 59—76; also his Christian Gnosis, 1835, p. 42 seq. Luche, Comm. on John, edit. 3, Vol. I. 253, 272 seq. (which also gives the more ancient literature). A. Frank, the Cabbala, or religious Philosophy of the Hebrews, translated (into German) from the French, by Ad. Gelinek, Leips. 1844, specially pp. 215—249. Ritter, History of Philosophy, Vol. IV. pp. 428, 446 seq. Neander, Church History, edit. 2, Vol. I. pp. 84 seq., dependent on others in its representations; as also, to name no more, Strauss, Critique of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I. pp. 414 seq.

relation, is only an *ideal* potency. So G. A. Meier (History of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Vol. I. p. 20 seq.) regards his Logos only as an abstraction — an idea or notion of the world; and he attributes to it a merely theoretic meaning.

The main controversy, however, has respect to the following questions:

(1) *Is Philo's Logos mere personification, or actual hypostasis?* Many recent writers defend this last view. Besides Grossmann, Dähne, Gfrörer, Ritter, Lücke (p. 279), Semisch (p. 274), there are some of the older writers, e. g. Keil and Ballenstedt. Still Lücke does not deny, that the opposing grounds of the Reviewer of Grossmann and Gfrörer have great weight; (see Leips. Lit. Journal, 1831, No. 126, p. 1001 seq. — 1832, No. 255, p. 2029 seq.). Simson von Muralt, and in part Franck and others, are in opposition to these writers. Lücke concedes that Philo exhibits inconsistencies; as does Semisch also, loc. cit. p. 274. His words are: "To be sure, Philo does not strenuously recognize the personality of the Logos throughout; and indeed he appears sometimes to resolve his personal subsistence fully into an attribute, etc." Lücke has most fully and completely presented the grounds for maintaining *his personality*. These are:

(a) 'Philo calls the Logos *ἀρχάγγελος*.' — But he also names him *ἀρχιερεύς, παράκλητος*; and yet Lücke confesses, that these words prove as little as the appellations *σφραγίς* or *δεσμός*. Besides, granting that these words are to be taken in the same sense as the O. Test. *angel* in Philo, yet they are so identified with *ἰδέαι, λόγοι, δυνάμεις*, that their *personal* meaning is often questionable. Yea, since the Logos is again the principle of unity in these *δυνάμεις* and *ἄγγελοι*, one may, instead of concluding that the angels are *personal*, and the Logos also, with equal right conclude the contrary, viz., that either the Logos is personal, and then for him the angels are not so but impersonal energies of which he is the unity; or that the angels are personal, and then the Logos is no longer their personal unity.

(b) 'Philo calls the Logos *δεύτερος θεός*,' Euseb. Praep. Evang. VII. 13. — But he immediately adds, that he so speaks only *catachrestically*, because *δεύτερος θεός* is for him properly a *contradictio in adjecto*, [i. e. a contradiction of the main principle by virtue of a quality ascribed to it]. The passage undoubtedly refers to something not completely divine, but which is capable of contact with the world, while that which is divine in the highest sense is incapable of this. But whether this imperfectly divine being is *personal*, or is only one aspect of God which ideally has a fixed meaning, namely, that of

revelation, which, without being personal, may be spoken of in the way of personification — is not decided by this. Recent writers also speak of something in God which is not God, and of God as being in something which is different from him, etc.

(c) 'The Logos is the image of God; yet God is personal, and consequently his Logos.' — But the body of man is an image of his spirit; and a mirror reflects back the form. The Logos is indeed a living power; but so are impersonal energies. Moreover we are thus fully entitled to draw the conclusion, that all nature, inasmuch as it is the image of the Logos, must be personal because he is so.

(d) Others, e. g. Semisch, add to this the argumentation derived from the idea of the Logos as mediating between God and the world. Rightly, however, does Lücke acknowledge, that the idea of a mediator (*ἀγγελέν*) proves nothing. God himself can, in one aspect of his being, accomplish the mediation so as it is represented in Philo. This is not ethical, but only physical or metaphysical. Bauer acknowledges in Philo's system a contradiction fully unreconciled. In his view, it contains two systems, one God who cannot reveal himself, and yet a world which, through the Logos, is a revelation of God, p. 68. For this Logos Bauer obtains in one respect a hypostasis, by separating him from *σοφία*, which he assigns to God most high as an attribute, with two other subordinate ones, goodness and power. Out of these three, especially out of wisdom, the Logos is then said to be a hypostatic emanation. The *σοφία* in God stands related to the Logos, as the Logos *ἐνδιάθετος* to the Logos *προφορικός*. But how, from this relation, more than the actual reality of the Logos can be deduced, or how it follows that he exists as a *subject*, does not appear. Indeed Bauer has not once shown any established difference between the Logos and the *σοφία*. The consequence of this would be, that the latter is introduced as speaking and creating, while the Logos is represented as a creature; which are ideas that lie far out of the circle of Philo's vision.

On the other hand, Bauer finds moreover in Philo's Logos a conception altogether empty and formal. In his view, he is only the ideal world, or the world conceived of as a unity; and in this way everything accords with the nominalistic views, (p. 74). In a similar way does Franck decide, respecting the two-foldness of the system in unity, as it stands in Philo. But with a Hellenic ingredient he combines also a Cabbalistic one, educes from Persia; while the conflict of the Hellenic idea in respect to the Absolute Being, (which appeared to Philo exceedingly sublime and imposing), with the O. Test. idea of God, appears to me sufficient to explain all in a satisfactory manner.

Philo has not, like Plotinus, his only fixed stand-point in the Absolute, the τὸ ὄν. But although the Hellenic idea takes so strong a grasp upon him, yet has the O. Test. idea of God an influence over him. The latter he designs to place on a higher eminence; and this it is which involves him in a chaotic circuiting and fluctuating. He succumbs under the self-contradictory undertaking, to show that the O. Test. religion is the religion of the Hellenic Absolute, whose glory consists in this, viz., that all besides itself is only a mere shadow of the glory which it includes in itself. In this way he sacrifices the ethical absoluteness or lofty nature of God to the physical one, vainly imagining that he is doing service to θεογένεια. But with this offering he attains to no definite end, because the other ingredient, his empirical starting point, is the religion, whose vindication as the absolutely true is the main object for which he is striving. He paraphrases it, he generalizes it, he evaporates it, in order to do it honor. But by all this he does not design to arrive at the position, that God only exists, or that only the absolute idea and knowledge respecting it exists, but it still remains his ultimate object, to unite philosophy and religion — that religion which, when rightly understood and comprehended, is the religion of the Old Testament.

Still, however diverse these views may seem to be, all without any difficulty will concede, that the Logos, if he be hypostatized, was regarded by Philo only as a being separate from God, existing out of the divine sphere, and subordinate to the Supreme. If Philo entertained the proper idea of real creation, then the Logos must have appeared to him, in case he designed to hypostatize him as the Arians afterwards did, as a *created* being. Yet he does not maintain that, but regards him rather in the light of the Emanation-philosophy. This brings him apparently nearer to that Christian idea, which was in later times call the *homousian*. In truth, however, the emanation-idea of God stands nearer to Heathenism than to Christianity, inasmuch as, from the nature of the thing, an emanation-hypostasis always comprises something which is evanescent and uncertain. Since now the original archetype, represented in the manner of the emanation-philosophy, differs but little from God revealed (as distinguished from God concealed), it makes but little difference whether one, with Lücke, hypostatizes the Philonic Logos in the manner of the Emanationists; or whether he denies the divine hypostasis in Philo, but concedes the difference between God concealed and revealed. The question respecting the Philonic hypostasis has a much more limited interest than is often assigned to it. Indeed it may be regarded as in a measure a mere vexed question, because it lay, in respect to him, entirely

without the circle of contemplation. He could not at all answer the question, inasmuch as the physical categories with which he had to deal, dispense with all ideas of personality.

(2) The second question is: *Whether Philo's Logos, (however it may be with the matter of hypostasis), can be conceived of as truly divine?*

The answer to this has already in part been given. The first question of all is: Whether God himself is conceived of by Philo as truly divine, or rather is much more regarded only in a physical light? If the last is true, then his incongruity with Christianity is quite plain. In the domain of categories of natural objects, neither the discrepance, nor the unity, can obtain its full claims. (Compare, for example, the categories ground and existence, thing and its attributes, substantiality and mere appearance, whole and part, power and development, substance and accident, in the second volume of the Hegelian Logic). Accordingly, if the true idea of God is lacking in Philo's Logos, true divinity must of course be lacking. But even the divine of Philo, as all agree, cannot actually belong to his Logos. What he regards as truly divine is incommunicable; or, to view it in another light, the Philonic absolute leaves no room for distinctions in the innermost divine sphere, but has only a circle of irradiation, a world of light around, in which it is reflected. This is the divine, as viewed in the light of its revelation, and as comprised in the Logos.

But to return from this special investigation; The two opposing sides of his system, constantly approaching and then receding from each other, are not correctly represented, when any person, in order to preserve unity, seeks to derive one out of the other. No real perfect unity can be found in Philo. The real state of the case is, that the old Hebrew idea is marred by a pagan view of the world. Hence originates a kind of theogonic process; and the abstractness of his idea of God becomes in a measure unstable, by reason of another ethnical ingredient, viz., that derived from Emanation. On the other hand, his abstract monotheistic consciousness reacts against any objective and eternal distinction in God, so that every concrete object, which is appealed to as an image of him in regard to his simple and absolute being, is directly denied in the sequel, and taken back. Philo's Monotheism omits the highest trait of Hebrew Monotheism, namely, the moral energy which speaks out in the righteousness of Jehovah, and that holiness which is certain of attaining the objects it has in view. From the old Hebrew ethics he falls back into the Pagan doctrine of nature. By this it is apparent, that he allows and does not allow a difference between God and the world; establishes a

theogonic and at the same time a cosmogonic process, and destroys the idea of God by that of the world, and again the idea of the world by that of God.

With special predilection have many of the recent investigators of Philo offered to our view this aspect of him, viz., that God, as viewed by him, is a being, who, in his pure absoluteness, is entirely simple and immutable. This absolute retraction of God within himself, they further say, makes an intermediate being, i. e. the Philonic Logos, to be necessary; who, consequently, cannot again be absorbed in God. Otherwise God himself would be placed in immediate contact with the world. It must, therefore, be a proper hypostasis although in a state of subordination.

It is true, that there are numerous passages in Philo, which speak of God's supremacy. 'That God is,' says Philo, 'we know from the world.'¹ Such a work of art, so great a city, came not into being of itself. But *how* God exists, it is impossible for us to discover. We should indeed seek after it, for the seeking has strong attractions; still, nothing in the world can tell us how God exists. Show thyself to me, said Moses. In the whole world I find not one who will tell me what thou art, thou must show thyself to me. I pray thee, suffer thyself to be implored by thy humble servant; and bring help, for thou only canst do this. For as the light, without being shined upon by any other thing, reveals itself, so canst thou, and only thou, show thyself.'

Some suppose, since he commends the desire to know God as noble and divine, that he here stands on the threshold of Wisdom, and demands a knowledge of God through revelation. But in what way does he represent God as answering Moses, who was his representative of human nature in its most pleasing attitude, his sage? Thus: "What thou askest is laudable; but thy request is fitted for no created being. It would be easy for me to grant it; but not for thee to receive the grant. I give to every one worthy of favor, as much as he can bear; but heaven and the world cannot comprehend me; *how much less a human being?*" It is not merely the unknowableness of God by men, which he maintains, but his infiniteness is so described after the manner of the apophatic² theology, that objectively all and every definitive thing, as goodness, beauty, etc., is disclaimed, and only the attribute of undefinableness remains.³

¹ Philo de Monarch. I. § 3—6 (ed. Mangey), II. p. 216—218. De Poster. Cain. I. p. 258. De Somn. I. 40. I. 655.

² [*Apophatic* means, a manner of describing without professing to describe.—S.]

³ Compare Quod Deus sit immutabilis, § 11. p. 281. Richter II. 77. De Praem. et Poen. § 6. II. 444. Richt. V. 226.

But with equal right others may say: 'God, with Philo, is anything rather than an abstract being.' Much more is he the opposite of this. Everywhere is he the beginning and end of all things. Not merely of the Logos is it said, 'that he is the Creator of the world, and everywhere diffused,' but it is also said in a general way of God, that 'he fills all things, and pervades all, and has left nothing empty and vacant; that he was and is the Creator of the Universe, and the Father of the world; that he preserves heaven and earth, water and air, and whatever is therein, and rules over them.'¹ Even there belongs his doctrine of the *providence* of God. So little does the simple self-reposing being of God describe his essence satisfactorily, that he calls him moreover, as he does afterwards the Logos, the repository of ideas, the fulness in himself and through himself,² the place of all, i. e. him who has the universe for his fulness. This we must conceive of as in a state of dividedness, as he appears to us, but in accordance with his unity. The world belongs of necessity to God, and therein it has a pledge of its eternity and indestructibility.³ Should it perish, then would God, through destitution of employment and revolting inaction, lead a life not worth living. Yea, in such loneliness, which can scarcely be described, even death would be the consequence to the divine Being. In order, then, that his sufficiency in himself, of which he says so much, may be rightly conceived of, it is so to be understood, as that by virtue of his goodness he is necessitated to remain not without sympathy with god-like beings. But he declines to say, that we may reverse the case in which God is spoken of as communicating himself to the world, and say that it imparts to him what it has not from him. Permeating all, present in all, he is not comprised by the world, receives nothing from it, and gives to all a part therein, that taking all in all it may be something. So much does it live by participating in him, that he is its verity as the ideal-world, which, in one aspect of his essence, he is. He has no part in it as a world which is the object of sense; unspotted by it, he remains in it. Receiving nothing from it he is its active element (*δραστήριον*), and it (by itself considered) is purely passive and definitive, (*παθητικόν, οὐσία = ὕλη*).⁴

With far too much confidence is the opinion frequently broached, that the Logos of Philo is a special being between God and the world, a hypostasis different from God. How could Philo, in countless

¹ Comp. De Somn. I. 25. Tom. I. 644.

² De Confus. Ling. § 27. Mang. I. 425. See also De Cherub. § 24 ib. I. p. 153.

³ De Mund. incorrupt. II. 503, 504, 508, § 16, 17, 20, 21.

⁴ De Cher. § 24, not. 17. Opific. Mundi, I. 2. § 2.

places and in the manner described, represent God as coming into so immediate contact with the world, only designating it as something passive (*παθητικόν*), as matter external to him, and yet recipient of him? Against a special hypostasis of the Logos, his words speak most decidedly: "Nothing divine is divided in the way of separation; but it merely extends itself."¹ So far now as the Logos is divine, he is only the extended or extending God himself. Nothing that is not divine, however, has Philo's Logos ever in himself. Matter (*οὐσία*) he does not create, but merely shapes it as a seal. Even this is in countless instances ascribed to God himself; so that the Logos can be only God himself in a definite respect. Where has Philo showed himself anxious, to connect anything doubtful as to the unity of God with his doctrine of Logos? And yet, he could not fail of doing this, had he made the Logos, as a hypostasis, coördinate with God.²

When Philo, to place God in the attitude of definite self-extension, of energy, or of the creative thinking of ideas respecting the world, forms for him appropriate categories and names, he still leaves us not destitute of the necessary elements of correction, so as to hold fast the monarchical contemplation of him which appears to be correct. (Comp. De Leg. Alleg. II. 1. Tom. I. 66, 67.) It is true, that he names the Logos (De Mund. Opif.), not barely the world-conceiving and the world-creating power of God, which is his peculiar idea, in order to mark that aspect of God according to which he places him in an active relation (*δραστήριον*) with the world, but he also names him Son, first-born of God, the bond between God and the actual world; and to these are attached the names of mediator, high priest, intercessor, archangel, the pillar, etc.³

¹ Quod deter. potiori insidietur, § 24. I. 209. Comp. De Leg. Alleg. II. 21. Mang. II. 82.

² Read carefully De Somn. I. § 37—41. I. 655 seq. and one will see, that according to Philo all idea of a divine duality or plurality owes its origin only to a subordinate stand-point of the observer, — to *φαντασία*, as he calls it in De Abrah. § 24, 25. This applies also to the case of a Logos with God. To be sure, he regards this *φαντασία* not as purely arbitrary, not as something barely subjective; rather does the one God appear different for the advantage of him who contemplates him, in order that he may comprehend something of him in all gradations. Hence at the highest degree of contemplation, i. e. the true one, this appearance does not absolutely vanish. But it remains no more the highest; still less are two divine persons presented to consciousness. In the form of the Logos, God appeared and was the most high God, which appropriately constituted a person. He is the personal God then only when one has not attained to God most high. If he has done this, the Logos can be regarded as nothing more than the aspect of his revelation, destitute of all divine hypostasis in itself.

³ See De Agric. § 12. I. p. 509. De Confus. Ling. § 28. § 20—28. § 48. De

But from the name Son, in Philo, to draw the inference of hypostasis, is not practicable; for he names the world a son of God, which surely cannot indicate personality, although the world, this younger son of God, appears as animated and intelligent, at least when combined in unity with the Logos his elder Son. Further, if one ponders the various meanings which the Logos of Philo has, yet without referring to different subjects, strong doubts arise against the admission that the Logos is a special and second personality, a counterpart of God. Is his *θεὸς λόγος* always one and the same, (which must be admitted), but only conceived of in different relations, then must his special personality be in unison with all the meanings; if not, then must one feel it to be necessary to examine all the aforesaid expressions which seem to indicate personality, and see whether they must not be understood as *personifications*.

(1) The Logos of Philo is, in the first place, a divine power or faculty of thinking, or of creating, or of both.¹

Somn. I. 39. 656. Also *δεύτερος θεός* in Euseb. Praep. Evang. VII. 13. Mediator (*μέσος*), Quis Rer. div. Haeres, § 42. I. 502, because he is neither un-begotten as God, nor begotten as men, De Somn. II. 28. I. 683. 84. "Who is he, now, if he be not man? Is he not God? I cannot say this, since Moses attained this name, when in Egypt he was called Pharaoh's God, [i. e. because this was after the manner of the heathen]. Man, however, he is not, but he is the one who touches the two extremes, the base and the top." In other words: He is no special divine personage, but God as animating and extending himself. For *ἀρχιερεύς*, see De Somn. § 27. De Profug. § 21. Through him God constituted himself a means — or a mediator — of the creation. Besides himself he needed no other, De Mund. Opif. § 6. I. 5. To suppose a created being capable of creating, would be sinful, (De Cherub. I. 153. § 24). As a creature Philo does not comprehend him. On the contrary, he regards him as one who guards the boundary between creature and Creator, (Quis Rer. div. Haeres, § 42). There also he is called *ἰκέτης, πρεσβευτής*, as in Vit. Moys. III. 14, II. 155, *παράκλητος*. Further, as God he is called *ἀρχάγγελος, ἡνίοχος, ἡγεμὼν*. In relation to God he is called *δόξα* (De Somn. I. 40), *σκιά* of God (Leg. Alleg. III. 34. I. 106). "The shadow of God is his Logos, whom he used as an organ in making the world. This shadow, and as it were image, is the archetype of other things." In relation to the world, names not personal are often given him. Besides *ὄργανον* we have also *σφραγίς, δέσμος κόσμου, νόμος*, the *στήλη* on which all rests, the *τόπος* or the home of all (*μετρόπολις*), the *ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν* = *γενικώτατος λόγος*, (De Mund. Opif. § 6. I. 5 De Migrat. Abr. § 18. I. 452, "That *σφραγίς* is the idea of ideas, according to which God formed the world corporeal and intellectual."

¹ In Philo, *λόγος* and *νοῦς* are identical, both in men and in God. So De Mund. Opif. (ut supra); where to *νοῦς* he ascribes the same things as elsewhere to the Logos. In De Migrat. ACF. § 1. I. 437, it is said, that in God himself is the Logos, the house, the dwelling or hearth (*ἐστία*), of the divine *νοῦς*, and thus designates a fixed ideal central point in God, while *νοῦς* is the active principle which is elsewhere named *λόγος*. In the Logos reposes the world, and also the

But who now will deny, that Philo thinks God himself not to be destitute of wisdom or power? And yet he must think that he is destitute, if he places the faculty of thinking and of action in any other being than God, i. e. in the special hypostasis of the Son.

(2) But the second main signification of the Philonic Logos, is that of *activity* itself. The Logos is not only the power of thinking and creating, but is the thinking-creator.¹ But still he does not attain to a hypostasis different from God, but only to a position that is fluctuating between self-existence and attributes; which is reconcilable with the doctrine of divine potencies. 'God saw that a beautiful copy could not exist without an exemplar; that nothing which is an object of sense could be faultless; nothing which is not formed after an archetype and a conceived idea. Therefore it was, that he created first the ideal world, when he was about to create the sensible one, so that he might have an incorporeal godlike original image for this corporeal world, this younger image of the older. This super-sensible world, consisting of ideas, one must not station in any place. Where it was,

ideal world. He is the *λόγος* or resting place for them, (De Mund. Opif. § 5). All the *δυνάμεις* also repose in him, specially the world-making energy; and whatever has its source in good has a *τόπος* (i. e. source) in him, (ib.). The Logos, in this respect, is identical with *σοφία*. In De Ebriet. § 8. I. 361, is the *ἐπιστήμη* of the Creator the mother of what comes into existence, as God is the father. Communing with her, not *more humano*, God has begotten and produced the birth of the world, (*ἐσπευρε γένεσιν*). "Receiving the divine *σπέρμα*, she has borne the only beloved son of God, the visible world." See Quod Deus sit immut. § 6. I. 277. The ideal world is the elder, the visible one the younger, son of God. Time is the son of the world, and the grand-son of God.

¹ In De Vit. Moys. Lib. III. § 13. Tom. II. 154, the Logos is designated in his relation to the ideal world, be it that he is represented as if he were the ideal material out of which it came, was the formative principle. In the first case, we should compare De Confus. Ling. Tom. I. 414, where it is said: The eldest son imitated his Father's doings; and looking to the original archetype, he created the forms [of the actual world].

This passage proves, that the ideal world is in the *νοῦς* of the Father, and the Father brings it forth. As the same thing is said of the Logos, he can be nothing else than the *νοῦς* of the Father. There remains, therefore, for the elder Son, nothing else than to be the source of the visible world. On this ground there remains then for us to inquire, whether the Son, whom the Father begets or brings forth, is a *hypostasis*. In the second case, if in the passage the Logos means the creative original form, it must be remembered, that God also is represented as bringing forth the ideal world; and consequently the Logos must be identical with the understanding of God as conceiving the idea of the world. The second portion of the passage makes the Logos actual the actual principle of the veritable world. Moreover, in like manner, he frequently considers God only as the Father of all. Vid. seq.

the analogy of a master-builder shows, who projects a city in his own mind, and every particular which he comprises in his own idea, he impresses on his own soul as on wax. This city has still existence in no place; but by virtue of his impression he erects the city with stones, in accordance with the archetype. So God when he created the world, this *megalopolis*,¹ (De Opif. Mund. Tom. I. 4. § 4 seq.). Here it is clear, that to God himself is ascribed the conception of the ideal world, the *κόσμος νοητός*. Philo then proceeds thus: "As the soul of the artificer is the *τόπος* (abiding-place) of the ideal city, so the ideal world has no other *τόπος* than the divine Logos who formed it." It is plain, then, that the Logos of God, is God's understanding, which conceived of a world. Immediately after he says, that 'even the world-creating power has for its source true goodness.' The truly good is God to Philo. Since now he at the same time makes the Logos the *τόπος* for all potencies, so he must understand, by the Logos, God under a definitive relation. 'The Father and Creator,' says Philo, 'is good; hence he does not grudge to matter (*οὐσία*) his best essence. Of itself it has nothing good, although it is capable of becoming anything. Without employing any other assistant, (for what other was there?) only employing himself, God determined to endow nature with overflowing goodness, which of itself was incapable of imparting any good.' (ib. § 6).

(3) As however the Logos in Philo is the thinking, i. e. the ideal-world-building God,¹ so is he in the third place, the result, the thought or the thing thought, that is, the ideal-world itself. "If one may speak plainly," says he, "so is the ideal-world nothing else than the Logos of God as conceived of in the formation of the world," (§ 6). As little as the ideality of the master-builder is different from his mind, (for it has no objective existence, but is only a determination of his mind), so little is the ideal-world different from the Logos. Moreover he is conceived of not as different from God, but he is God as understanding or as creative power. It is plain "that the archetypal seal, which we call the ideal world, is itself the archetypal original image, the idea of ideas, the Logos of God," (ib.). In him the manifoldness of ideas, the fulness, is not negated; much rather does he speak of *ἰδέαι λόγοι* even in this sphere. But here they are in perpetual har-

¹ Passages are often found in Philo, according to which God is the self-illuminating light. But the usual sense of them is not that he himself thinks, but that he reveals himself in accordance with his existence. Of divine consciousness has Philo no idea; for divine thinking has he no other product than the world. Comp. II. 216 — 218, 415.

mony and appropriateness, (in the *φύσις μοναδική*, loc. cit. § 9), not in their development in space and time, like those in the sensible world (the *κόσμος αἰσθητός*), as they appear at least to the beholder.

(4) Fourthly, in respect to what concerns the actual sensible world *κόσμος αἰσθητός*, the Logos is indeed here also named as its active and divine source. It goes forth — is begotten of God — for the purpose that this world might come into existence, (I. 144). Here is the only point where one can imagine a special personality of the Logos. Yet from the words which designate his proceeding from God, this cannot be argued, because the same expressions are applied to the world, which has no personality. It is often called the younger son of God; so that if the obscure is explained by that which is clear, the elder son of God has as little claim to personality as the younger; and this the more, since the Logos is a world as well as the other, i. e. is the ideal-world. Or must the former be personal, in order to be able to penetrate *ὑλη*, matter? If there be any creative act, which Philo ascribes to the Logos and not to God, then, in respect to this point, we might speak of a divine hypostasis. Instead of this, *emanation* does not require personality, in order that it may pass over from the ideal world to the sensible one. Much rather is it ill fitted to such a system.

Now, however, the formation of the world, as already mentioned, is ascribed to God himself. This world, the younger son of God, is not created by the Logos becoming God's representative; but God creates the world by himself, "making use of himself and of no other helper; inasmuch as he impresses on it his world-idea as the elder son of God, as a seal impresses matter." Matter is *παθητικόν* (passive), destitute of soul and motion (De Opif. p. 2), without order, destitute of qualities, full of heterogeneousness, disharmony, and contradiction. But it may become anything; it is susceptible of change into the opposite best, viz. order, definiteness, animation, similitude, equality, congruity, and harmony, (ib. p. 5). It is moved, shaped, animated by the divine intelligence; and thence comes the most perfect work, this world, the *μεγαλόπολις*. Although he usually regards matter as already existing and thus presented as the object of divine activity, and not as created.¹

¹ In Tom. II. 625, a fragment in Euseb. Praef. VII. 24 taken from the treatise *Περὶ Προνοίας*, we have the following: "God met with just sufficient material, when he gave rise to the world; so that there was nothing lacking, nor anything superfluous. Comp. De Incompact. Mundi. From nothing nothing comes, and nothing can be annihilated. From that which does not at all exist, it is incredible that anything should come into being."

Yet he still maintains the predicate of *being created* (De Opif. 2) in respect to the world. By this he can mean nothing more than this information of the Logos into the world, or this self-extension of God in $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ which exists in such a manner. That he may impart himself to it, has its original cause in God. The nature of the world, (as well in respect to matter as to the Logos), did not come to exist in time, and perishes not with it, for it is imperishable, (De Incorr. Mundi, p. 496, comp. passages above). The world is God's *viós*, *ἔργον*; for as seen of God it is nothing but the ideal world, placed in relation to $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, in all its fulness, and apparent through it. The discrete dividing principle is not $\epsilon\lambda\eta$; by this it does not become unity or plurality. The *κόσμος νοητός* is in itself a linked arranged manifoldness of ideas; which separation Philo regards as a prerequisite of true harmony.¹ And this unity, which at the same time is fulness, is in relation to matter, together with this actual world. So little does Philo make out an actual diversity between God or the Logos and the world. There can be no question here about *creation*; for the ideal world goes into the objective actual world, not by any new determination of itself, but only because, being of itself eternal (De Opif. p. 2), it is in position with $\epsilon\lambda\eta$. This is nothing new in respect to the ideal world or Logos, but only for $\epsilon\lambda\eta$.²

According to what has been said, the Logos is now identical with the world, and therefore not personal; then, identical with God and only personal through him and not of itself. If we now superadd the *monotheism* of Philo, which so decidedly excludes the idea of a duality of divine persons, (e. g. De Somn. 1. 39), and also abjures divine power in respect to any one but God; then the assumption, that the Logos is a hypostasis in his view is more than shaken. Moreover the later ecclesiastical doctrine, that the hypostasis of the Son arises from internal divine self-severance, must be altogether foreign to him.

¹ In regard to this, the Logos is called *τομεὺς τῶν ὅλων* (Quis Rer. div. Haeres., p. 491). In p. 491 seq., this is ascribed to God himself. Comp. De Mund. Opif. § 5. I. 5, "The intellectual city is no other than the *λογισμός* of the architect, designing to create the sensible city by the intellectual."

² Philo speaks, indeed, often of the goodness of God, which has compassion on matter, and is the motive of creation or world-forming, (see De Mund. Opif. § 5, I. 5); but only haste and inaccuracy can identify this goodness with love. It has much more the character of *physical goodness*. If moreover matter did not exist, (its existence Philo regards as accidental in respect to God, and independent of him), then there would be no reason for compassion. The creation of the world is always regarded as something accidental. An application to something better, (which is weaker because it is not moral, and is conceived of in a Pagan way), lies therein, that according to him inaction and solitariness would be, for God, equivalent to death.

He holds, that God interiorly is altogether simple, and is and must be incapable of any division. Where God is so little cognized in his free self-existence, so little considered in a moral way, there must remain of necessity only the substance or obscure ground of the world; in which last alone do any distinctions appear.

Still we must consider, how those appellations of the Logos, which seem to sound *personally*, are to be understood; and how, in general Philo unites the divine activity in respect to the world, with the abstract essence of God.

The meaning of those appellations it is not difficult to find out, after what has been said. Is the Logos, as κόσμος νοητός in the sense supposed, a cause of the actual world as existing, so may he be called *Regent of the world*, and of the various potencies which are diffused abroad in it. So far as these potencies, plainly in the way of personification and not of hypostasis, are named λόγοι and ἰδέαι or ἄγγελοι, so can he as their unity be called ἄγγελος προσβύτατος, ἀρχάγγελος πολυώνυμος, (De Confus. Ling. I. 426). To designate the idea, that God has an adequate reflection of himself (εἰκών) in the κόσμος νοητός, and that his activity in respect to the sensible world is not coetaneous with the ideal world-conceiving activity, in which God is identical with himself and remains in his own dwelling-place, (the Logos being the ideal world is such, De Migrat. Abrah. I. 437), Philo can name the Logos, in his relation to the sensible world, the Legate or ὑπαρχος of the cosmical host, (De Agric. I. 308. § 12). God is ποιμήν, etc.; he has however set over the world his pure reason, his first-born Son, i. e. the divine activity in relation to the world retains always, as its ultimate principle, the same in itself out of which sprang the world-idea, which rules over all and pervades all. In like manner, we may now understand the name *high-priest* which is given to the Logos, or to God as Logos. The Logos stands on the borders of the actual and ideal world.¹

On him, the archangel and eldest Logos, has the Father, who beget the Universe, bestowed the distinguished endowment, that he, standing on the extremes, should keep separate from the Creator that which has come into being, and ward off evil from the good. He watches over finite things; he is the limit against Pantheism, at least so far as through the category of *Logos*, it is declared that the world can never be God as he is in himself. Thereby, however, we cannot exclude the idea, that he may not be regarded as God in respect to his living nature or activity, yet Philo wills not that this should be fully done, inasmuch as the world, as it actually exists, is in combination

¹ Quis Her. div. Haeres, I. 501 seq. § 42.

with matter which in itself is not divine. His idea of God will not shield him from the charge of Pantheism in the last sense, for this idea is not held in a *moral* way; but only his views of matter, or his Dualism. In relation to this, he names the world of the Logos the garment of God, (De Prof. § 20. I. 562). For this actual world, "the same Logos is now mortal, an intercessor with the immortal, and messenger of the Lord to his subjects;" therefore mediator between both parties. This office he gladly exercises. "I stand" (so he introduces him as mythologically speaking, I. 501, 502), "in the midst, between the Lord and you, since I am neither unbegotten as God is, nor begotten like you, but in the midst of extremes, I am a surety for both; for the Creator, that he may be assured the whole race will not fall and perish, choosing disorder instead of order; for the created being, that he may have good hope that a gracious God will never overlook his own work. For I would fain be the herald of peace, who brings a joyful message from God, the eternal guardian of peace."

The like may be found elsewhere, (De Prof. § 20. I. 562). Bauer's gradation (loc. cit. p. 68 seq.), viz. (1) WISDOM (God) with its fundamental powers of goodness and might; (2) LOGOS, in the second rank corresponding to σοφία, (θεός and κύριος answering to goodness and might in the first case), I find partly not to be held fast in Philo, and partly that it proves nothing for a special personality of the Logos; yea, as little as thought (λόγος πρεσβύτερος) is something personal in contrast with thinking, or word (λόγος προφορικός) in contrast with thinking. That *power* and *goodness*, together with *wisdom*, are very important designations in Philo, will be shown hereafter. But they are not so in respect to the inner essence of God, or rather they belong not at all to this when strictly considered, but they are δυνάμεις or potencies in him, which have their meaning in respect to his activity, (II. 261, De Sacrificant. § 15. De Profug. § 18 seq. I. 560 seq.). All essence of God is in so far destitute of attributes, as it is the presupposed source of all properties, but cannot in itself be separated. But to proceed:

The high priest is the divine Logos, faultless by birth and essence, his Father being the νοῦς and his mother σοφία. The eldest Logos is clothed with the world, as with a garment; with earth and water, with air and fire, and whatever comes therefrom. He is, as reason, the bond of the existing God which holds all parts together as members, just as the imparted soul (that of man) does the members of his body. The high priest, moreover, is called Logos, at one time, as the faultless unity of the world, which he represents as κόσμος νοητός — as world-idea; and in this idea is individuality reconciled and mediated with God. Real is it, however, in so far as it is not an inoperative

idea, but makes the actual world with its formative material into an actual expression of itself, of the divine seal, or into a garment. Therein, being everywhere present, he lives, and moves, and represents his ideas. And as such a living energetic unity, he gives surety as well to the world for its completeness in the view of God, as to God himself, the existing One. For he is the world itself, according to that which makes it a *κόσμος*; which is not merely ideal, but real. Still this world-idea contains no relation to *history* in itself. The Logos is not the world-idea respecting the world viewed in a moral light by a free agent, and to be realized through a revelation from God in the progress of history, but it is that which is immediately actual, i. e. physical. Here the point becomes prominent, where the deep antagonism of the Philonic system against the Christian idea is clearly disclosed; while at the same time, in what has been heretofore said, there is a deceptive resemblance to Christian doctrines, at least in the mode of expression. But before we treat of this, viz. Philo's attitude in respect to the Messianic ideas of his nation, and his position in regard to Christianity, let us look back for a moment on what has thus far been adduced.

It is clear from this, that nothing obliges us to understand Philo's Logos as a *hypostasis*; but everything which is usually brought forward for this purpose, when closely inspected, is opposed to this. Such a hypostatical plurality in God is altogether against the manner of the man, who with such stringent force is hurried away from plurality to unity. He has sacrificed to this strenuousness for unity the *deep moral discrepancy which ancient Hebraism made between God and the world*; and on the reef of *ἐλπίς*, has only contrived to save himself from sinking into the undistinguishing unity of God and the world.

But after all, success cannot attend on an effort so to merge the mass of Logos-doctrine, with what is appended to it, into the absoluteness of the simple divine Being, that this can become immediately identical with that divine Being. As little as the divine Logos is a hypostasis, so little is he God in himself (*τὸ Ὀν*). Still, since, according to what has gone before, the Logos is at all events to be again reckoned as God himself, we are compelled to say, that in the Philonic doctrine of the Logos, the way is prepared, although remotely, for the doctrine of a distinction in God himself. God is distinguished in respect to his self-existence and his living power. (A higher category Philo could not attain to). As existing in himself, he is the *τὸ Ὀν*; as actual Being, he is Logos. To these two principal elements may be added a third, viz., that he as Logos, (1) Is, inseparably and at the same time, both the world of divine thoughts, and he who thinks

them. (2) He it is who reveals them in matter, which he constitutes the medium of actuality for the ideal-world.¹ *So we have divine life as it were in three stages of development, to which it proceeds or extends itself* (I. 209), viz., *God in himself, the ideal world, and the actual world.* But to separate the three has been a mere matter of endeavor. The discrepancies sink down again into each other, when closely examined. To particularize; the actual world, so far as it is to be regarded as a determination of the divine life, is not through itself separated from the ideal world, but only through something external, viz. its relation to matter, (see above). The ideal world, however, even the Logos generally considered, cannot be fixed upon as an objective distinction of God, from God; for if reason were to be reckoned only on the side of the Logos, so could God hardly be named God. Or if one says, that the Logos is God as the object of thought, a *θεός* who thinks with *σοφία*, so partly this cannot be carried through strenuously, since the Logos means him who thinks the ideal world; and partly we should then have no *being-thought-of* as pertaining to God, since the object of thought is much more only the world. In fact Philo calls, in like manner, God and the Logos the *τόπος* (dwelling-place) of the universe, which encompasses all and is encompassed by nothing, since

¹ Here belongs the question, whether Philo applies to the divine Logos the distinction between Logos *ἐνδιάθετος* and Logos *προφορικός*. In *De Vit. Moys.* lib. III. 154, he uses these words: A twofold Logos should be distinguished, as well in relation to *τὸ πᾶν* as in relation to men. In relation to the first, we must discriminate between that Logos which stands related to the incorporeal and archetypal ideas from which comes the ideal world, and that one who stands related to the visible world, which is a mere imitation and copy of the other. In men, however, the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *λόγος προφορικός* are to be distinguished, e. g. the immanent word [thought] and the spoken one. Unquestionably both the couples correspond, in Philo's view, inasmuch as he unweariedly carries through this relation of the similarity between the Logos and man. Then, moreover, he does not understand, by the Logos *ἐνδιάθετος* in men, reason as inactive, but reason in its immanent activity, the world of man's thoughts; which corresponds to the *κόσμος νοητός* of the Logos. So comprehended, however, the discrimination between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*, according to Philo's meaning, can beyond all doubt be transferred to the divine Logos; and indeed it must be, in accordance with the nature of the thing. It is to be regarded as altogether accidental, that Philo has not himself done this, as later writers did; for their meaning he virtually expresses, since he teaches, that besides God as in himself there is a Logos with the aforesaid twofold relations. These two relations of the Logos, however, are related to each other in a manner not different from that of the Logos in regard to God as in himself, who is so often called his Father. It belongs to the divine pattern, that this relation should be respected in all its gradations, the self-discrimination belonging to all immanent life.

he himself is one and all. He demands that the spirit, in its height of thought, should overleap the plurality of numbers, the three-oneness, and even duality proximate to the *Μονάς*, and elevate itself to the unmixed and altogether simple idea, independent of any want. All apparent manifoldness in God's operations, as well in respect to the ideal as the actual world, belong merely to the person who contemplates them. When he, on one hand, in order to deny that God himself appears, designates the Old Testament theophanies as the radiation of his potencies, (e. g. De Abrah. § 22. II. 17. De Nomin. mut. I. 581. De Confus. Ling. I. 430, 431, § 33), so he conceives of these potencies, not as separate from God, but each one as infinite in itself, (De Monarch. Lib. I. § 6. Tom. 218). Since Moses could not see God, therefore he desires to behold his attendants, the divine potencies, which as a unity are called God's *δόξα*. But God answers, that they are altogether invisible and ideal, also incomprehensible like God in their essence, but that they radiate an image or make an impression of these *ἐνέργεια*. To that which is destitute of quality and form they give shape, without any change in their eternal and essential being. Therefore if God and the potencies were to be placed together, [he could say to Moses]: "Neither myself nor my potencies couldest thou hope to comprehend as to their essence. What is attainable by thee I grant readily and willingly. Therefore I invite thee to the contemplation of the world," (ib. p. 219).

The whole world, formed by God, breathes forth morning and evening thank-offerings to him, (Quis Rer. div. I. 501. § 41). It is animated and intelligent, (De Opif. Mund. I. 28—34. De Incompact. II. 495—507). Its inborn reason is the law, the order of the universe. It is son of God, itself is *θεῖον*, also *μεγαλόπαις πρὸς ἀλήθειαν*. It is through and through one and all. Its power cannot be compelled; for it comprises everything in itself. It is incapable of solution into parts, and is indestructible, (Comp. De Mund. II. p. 616 seq. § 14 seq.). It cannot come into confusion, nor can it increase and have different gradations and age. Otherwise it would, in the beginning, have been a child, and like children *ἄλογος*; which is impious. It cannot, as he supposes, be denied without sin, that the world is always perfect both in soul and body, (De Mund. Incompact. II. 496. § 9 seq.). It is *ἀγέννητος* and *ἄφθαρτος*, (II. 496, 505). Particularly does he inveigh against the doctrine, that the world may be consumed by fire; yea, generally against a regeneration of the world. For the world seems to him to be beautiful and perfect. He has tasted of a Hellenic potion, and omits nothing in it. Sunk down from a moral stand-point to a physical one, he has no apprehen-

sion of matter of fact, and no need of it. In truth there is, according to him, nothing at variance in the world, and no proper reconciliation is needed. But as he, where he must and will speak of God, presents nothing as contained in God but the world, (instead of thinking of God as absolute, he thinks of him only as world), so he speaks, with the same mixture of ideas where he speaks of the world, in such a manner that he denies it to be properly world, and puts immediate divine predicates in its place.

In the world, man takes the first place. Yet strictly taken, only the archetype-man, who is not distinguished from the Logos and hardly can be reckoned to the actual world. (De Opif. Mund. p. 32, 83. § 46. § 47). In the actual world, however, man with all his imperfection occasioned by his body, represents the world in miniature, (I. 494). The world is the great man; man is the little world; and the four elements are physically interchanged in him, (De Opif. Mund. § 51). Above all has God endowed him with lordly reason; and the same that is in God is in men. Hence it follows, indeed, that because the contents of divine reason is only the world, the like must be the case with human reason. Still man forms the point of unity in the actual world; specially that man, who is one in thinking and willing with the order and reason immanent in the world; which in a man's consciousness becomes a *νόμος*, (De Opif. Mund. § 50). Such an one is the pious man (II. 407), and the wise. Among the nations, the race of the Jews represent this flower of humanity, (II. 15. De Abrah. § 19 ad fin.). For all mankind have they obtained the priestly and prophetic office. In Israel itself, the prophets, as divine interpreters and the wise, have obtained this rank, (II. 222. De Monarch. lib. § 9); for the wise man is worth as much as the world, (*ἰσότητος τῇ κόσμῳ*, Tom. I. 165. De Sacrif. Abel. § 3). These nobles are a propitiation, *a ransom for the world*. Specially the Jews, the most beloved of God (ib.), perform the office of priests and prophets for the whole world in a way stated and arranged; (such stand above the rank of a king, II. 124. De Vit. Moy. I. § 50). Therefore the high priest, when he enters the sanctuary, bears the symbols of the whole world, for he is the representative of the universe before God, (De Vit. Moy. III. § 14. Tom. II. p. 155. De Monarch. II. § 6. Tom. II. p. 227). Other priests pray and present offerings only for friends and fellow-citizens. The high priest of the Jews performs prayer and thanksgiving, not barely for the collected race of men, but also for the elements of nature, the earth, water, air, and fire, inasmuch as he regards the world (so it in truth is) as his country, in the place of which he is accustomed to propitiate its Ruler through supplication and prayer.

This representative character is again of a physical nature. The world is propitiated through Israel without its knowledge, and without accomplishing personally in itself any propitiation.

Not less is the essential equality of all men unacknowledged. It is concealed by a *hierarchia terrestris*, which is an image of the heavenly one; which gradation of order in men is connected with the physical character of his system. The more palpable is this, as well as the contradiction contained in it, since the high priest, and also the wise man, has not within himself this world-conciliating power. That the same world, which he will propitiate with God, is with Philo the Son, the perfect *παράκλητος* whom he resembles as the little world, whose support he needs, that his service of God may be acceptable. He must needs carry in himself the symbols of the universe, that, in his universality, individuals (even the high priest himself) may compensate for their fault; and by it God may regard everything as good, (De Vit. Moy. III. § 14. Tom. II. p. 155). He bears, on his holy costume, the image of the universe, in order that by the continual inspection of it, he may fashion his own life in a manner worthy of the nature of the universe, but also that by his divine service, the whole world may have part in his liturgy, (De Monarch. II. § 6. Tom. II. 227). If now Philo conceded a historical development of revelation and of humanity, so this might afford a good meaning, that he by the Universal, leaves the individual to be propitiated; for to the universal would belong then the collectively future development — and if he admitted the idea of a Messiah, through him would be an assured development. However, as the world is, it is said to propitiate man. What now if men be reckoned to the world? Then thus much is said, viz. that he needs no propitiation. He is propitiated by his very being; just as he is, he is good and well pleasing to God, or, if he may be propitiated through the objective world, so has the world a higher rank, and the apparent nobleness of man, his distinction, sinks down again, (De Monarch. I. 248); as also the discrepancy and the conciliation, on which useless efforts have been made.

It is now hardly necessary to draw the conclusion, that Philo did not at all participate in the ardent wishes and hopes, which filled the hearts of Orthodox Jews; (and they were ill satisfied with him, see Tom. II. p. 656). In him the Messianic idea is reduced to an extinguished coal. Nothing but the dregs of that idea remain in him, viz. the hope of a wonderful return of the scattered Jews from all parts of Palestine, under the guidance of a superhuman divine apparition (*ὄψης*), which will be visible only to the righteous. This contrasts singularly with his cosmopolitan citizenship, (which he boastingly as-

cribes to his people), and with his satisfaction with the whole world, (De Excerptat. § 9. Comp. De Praem. etc. § 16. De Vit. Moys. I. § 29). This last remnant of the Messianic idea is, with him, obviously a thing of heritage; it is heterogeneous with his system, and in itself without significance. It gives us, however, by its peculiarity in Philo, a means of conjecture in respect to the energy of the Messianic hopes among the Alexandrian Jews of his times; for it is to his connection with them that this tribute is to be ascribed. Still we are left to inquire, why the Messianic idea, and especially the idea of becoming man, which he so often approaches, find no place in him, (Quod Omn. Prob. liber, §16, Tom. II. 462. Tom. I. 280, 283. Quod Deus sit immut. § 10 seq.). The answer is, that a propitiation appeared to him unnecessary, on account of his idea of sin and of the divine righteousness; the incarnation he deemed absolutely impossible.

He seems desirous to ascribe freedom to man; but he immediately subjoins, that God excepts nothing from his power. In this way the first becomes difficult, on account of Philo's stand-point. *On the category of holy love he says nothing.* Instructive, however, is that which he says of the creation of man.¹ The higher essence of man, his rational *εἶπος*, must be stamped by the divine Logos, and not by God, who is before the Logos, and better than all rational nature. Before the infinite One in the *extensive* sense, (which in reality does not go beyond the *physical*), he shows such reverence, that in his view all that is logical and spiritual is regarded as inferior, because it implies some definiteness in God. On the other hand, because it is a definiteness in God, he calls it *θεός*, but as it were a *θεός δεύτερος*.

On Gen. 1:27 he says: "God speaks of himself as of another, viz. I have made man after the image of God." But why does God speak in the plural number: Let *us* make man, etc.? (Gen. 1: 26. 3: 22. 11:7). This is addressed to the potencies around him, for to him (*τὸ Ὅν*), immediate contact with the world would be unbecoming. The potencies (*ἄγγελοι, ιδέαι*) must form the earthly part of our nature, imitating the act of him who formed the leading part within us. The leading part did he form who is the Leader of all things; the inferior part was formed by inferior powers. But man must needs choose between good and evil; while other beings can have no faults and no virtues, like nature; or virtues only, like the stars. Consequently God assigns to other beings the *γένεσις κακῶν*, while to him-

¹ Leading passages are in De Confus. Ling. I. 430, 431. De Prof. p 556. De Opif. Mundi, p. 17—19. In all these passages, Philo repeats the same doctrine. This his constant doctrine is to be retained, in the interpretation of the above cited fragment (II. 625), in which he appears to speak with difficulty.

self is reserved the authorship of good. That which is of a mixed character is in part suited to God, so far namely as the *idée* of the better is intermingled; in part, it is not suited to him, on account of its opposite nature, inasmuch as he cannot be the father of evil to his children. Accordingly evil has its origin in the creation, to which the subordinate potencies communicated it. In other passages he reverts to matter as the cause of evil; and this position has been built on still further by the Gnostics.

It would be difficult, in this way, to come to any apprehension of personal guilt; for Philo so speaks of evil, as if it belonged not to his conception, that it should be originated by the will of man. If only such physical evil be conceded, then none is conceded. In fact, in accordance with this, evil is very slightly regarded. He ascribes to every soul the divine power of virtue, (Tom. II. 462. *Quod omn. Prob. liber*, § 16 seq.). On the other hand he says: Never to sin is only a prerogative of God; perhaps, also, a thing that belongs to a divine man. This wavering laxity reaches its culmination in his idea of God, in the circumstance that *divine righteousness is goodness*. God is not unmerciful, but gentle by nature. Whoever believes this, he easily comes to repentance, hoping that God may forget, (Tom. I. De Prof. § 10. De Creat. Princip. § 14. Tom. II. 373 seq. De Justit. De Execrat. § 8, etc. Sometimes the old Heb. feeling of righteousness breaks in, Tom. II. 449. De Praem. § 12). If now the Scripture acknowledges not merely gentleness and goodness, but also indignation and righteousness, he ventures so to unite these, that he compares the Lawgiver with a physician, who, in what he says, accommodates himself to the patient, and does not always speak in accordance with truth. With all this, the uncultivated may fear; and to help them essentially, must God, the Lawgiver, be represented as angry, (*Quod Deus sit immutab.* I. 282, 283). Of the earnest struggles, which the noblest men of the ancient dispensation engaged in, to reconcile the holy justice and grace of God, he knows nothing. He removes that which gives intensity to the religious process, viz. holy justice, and degrades it to a figure of speech; whereby the whole becomes relaxed; hope, yea desire after something better is killed, and the moral conscience is poisoned with *eudemonism*. For a divine goodness which is not righteous, can do nothing else but sink into what is physical, and can have for its brightest aim nothing but enjoyment, nothing but a pleasurable state; even supposing this state to be, in its highest point, the repast of knowledge.¹

¹ De Opif. Mund. p. 18. Naturally he cannot deny that evil is the consequence

This knowledge, then, does not find the spiritual, the divine, to be its highest object, but it remains a worldly knowledge, a consciousness of the world, the contemplation and knowledge of the world as its holiest theatre, (De Opif. Mund. p. 18, and Tom. II. 229. De Monarch. lib. I. § 6). In this degradation of divine righteousness is Philo a forerunner of Gnosticism. He has through his doctrine respecting the divine goodness, the appearance of something like that which is Christian, and which goes beyond the Old Testament and the stand-point of mere right; while he in truth sinks back below it, and makes the Christian redemption superfluous. In the passage where he speaks of the return of his nation, he could not divest himself of the ancient Hebrew doctrine respecting the necessity of some previous atonement; but the Jews, as he views the matter, are richly provided with propitiators before the Father, for they will have three *παράκλητοι* (advocates) of reconciliation. (1) The gentleness and goodness of God himself, who always prefers pardon to punishment. (2) The holiness of the ancestors of the race; for their souls, freed from their bodies, and performing a service clean and pure to their Lord, prefer requests for their children and grandchildren, which are not inefficient. As a reward of honor are the hearkenings to their requests made sure by the Father. (3) The third *παράκλητος* is the betterment of those who are brought into covenant.

We have seen above, that according to Philo, the world is continually propitiated with God; that it continually propitiates itself, inasmuch as it always stands as a faultless unity before God, by reason of the Logos immanent in it. Consequently all further revelation is in his view a superfluity; as a disturber of the peace must it appear, and also of the unity and entirety of the world, since this is understood not in a moral but in a Hellenic sense. The law which Moses gave, is the same as the law of the world. The world is rational. The law immanent in it has Moses spoken for our consciousness. Therefore

of the sinful; but so far as he places it in relation to God, the only object of it in his view, is the profit of men, Tom. I. 306. De Agric. § 9. De Opif. Tom. I. 19. He assigns to repentance the office of devising its own good. Hence he views the righteousness of God not as the vindication of the divine law, of that which is unconditionally good, but as a salutary influence on men and on the world according to its various parts, Tom. II. 664. In accordance with this, we must understand the *punitive power*, which he ascribes to the *Ὁν*. There belongs the physical, but not moral or religious, ground of the providence and care of God for us, Tom. I. De Opif. Mund. p. 41, 42, viz. that the father provides for the son in a necessity of nature in its laws and regulations.

is it eternal, and not far from us, (Tom. I. 34). It is perfect and entire, and leaves nothing to be desired.¹

In accordance with his doctrine respecting the image of God in man (De Confus. Ling. I. 426), and the participation of the latter by nature in the divine Logos (ut sup.), it might be expected that he would constitute a most intimate relation between the divine and human nature, and that the idea of God's becoming man would not be foreign to him. He speaks of heroes of mingled immortal and mortal seed, in which the mortal mixture is predominated over by the immortal, and declares it to be possible that others may accomplish the same thing, (Quod omn. Probus lib. ii. 462. § 26. De Migrat. Abr. § 31. Tom. I. 463). But still, the divine nature ever remains foreign to the human one. Where divine light shines, there the human disappears, (Quis Rer. div. Haeres, § 53. Tom. I. 511); and where that withdraws, this comes forth. "It is not lawful, that mortal should dwell with immortal." Hence ecstasy belongs to prophecy. The reason of this is not altogether that Philo separates a concealed God from the actual one; for he introduces God as saying to Moses: "It were easy for me to give what thou requirest, but not for thee to receive it." Much more is his idea of God, on the one hand, always falling back on physical infinitude, and, on the other hand, his *ὕλη*, always mingled with the mortal, the reason that God is not imparted according to the greatness of his grace, but is receivable only according to the capacity of the creature. His power is exceedingly great. All the powers of God are unbounded and infinite. That which is made is too weak to receive their greatness (De Opif. § 6), and so God gave to our nature not everything, but only so much as our mortal condition would admit, (De Opif. § 51. p. 35). Man must first put off the body, before he can attain to a higher stage of being. He knows, as we have seen, only so to separate God and the world, as that God is the active and the immutable, the world the passive and the mutable. This last distinction appeared to him as destroyed, in case God should become man. He knows not how to consider suffering as action, nor to imagine the body as anything different from bounds and limits; while Christianity regards it not merely as an organ of the spirit, but as a representation of it, and an essential ingredient in its self-development. His Christ, if indeed he needed one,

¹ De Justit. Tom. II. 360. Hence he calls the law *λόγος θεῖος*, De Migrat. Abr. § 31. Even the *ὑγραφα ἐθνη* of his nation one must abide by, and make no change therein, De Justit. loc. cit. We must call to mind, that these *ὑγραφα ἐθνη* are specially the traditions of the Jewish people, in order to make an estimate how the sense of development, of the historical, has been extinguished in him, by his reducing of the Hebrew *moral* to the Hellenic *physical*.

could be only the *λόγος αἰδιος*, (comp. Fragm. in Euseb. Præp. Evang. vii. 18). Consequently, he must be a Christ like that of the Docetæ. He entertains no desire after a new theophany of the Logos. So little has he of a metaphysical union of cosmical opposites, of God and the world, that man, most specially to be considered as the point of union, who is pervaded by extremes so far as the divine Logos and *ἐλν* are united in him, in two respects still does not truly represent this unity. To the actual man God is foreign. Philo's idea of God is at an infinite remove from acknowledging that the being man, or becoming man, is a thing that has its determination in God himself. Still man remains so foreign to the other extreme, to the *ἐλν*, that he has a reality without this, for so Philo looks upon the archetypal man, the perfected one. Both extremes, therefore, God and *ἐλν*, lie out of man, absolutely limit his freedom and his knowledge, and they remain as absolute a secret to him as the irresistible power of gravity. They stand, however, over against each other as unreconciled; and as their dualism, reflected in the consciousness of man, must occasion the deepest unhappiness, so he sets even over God himself, (who has not perfect power over matter, although he might have), an obscure fate, deprives the idea of God of its monotheistic absoluteness, and degrades it into what is Pagan.

Philo, who had drank in the Hellenic idea of beauty and wisdom, knows how to cover over these contradictions, and to give to scientific, moral, and religious lack of trust-ground, the colors of cheerfulness and beauty. But far from that beauty of Grecian life which is of natural growth, he renders artificial his harmony. This appears to him something more elevated, namely a union of heathen and Jewish beauty, which before stood as a problem in the world's history; and one must confess, that in his system the human mind has made the attempt, to complete the union of religions antecedent to Christianity. To the newly-born Christianity, his effort stands forth as a rival. But still, blinding for superficial consideration as the likeness of many of his ideas and expressions to those of Christianity are, the principles of the two are fundamentally different, and what sounds as like something Christian, has, in the connection of the whole, a meaning altogether different. Like Christianity, he lets the world solemnize a perpetual conciliation through the Logos. But what only the deed of divine condescension could accomplish, and what pious longing was entitled to hope for as a divine deed, that he imagines to have already happened, yea, as eternally happening; and thus he treads the way of opposition to Christianity. His system then approaches the cradle of Christianity only as a spectral counterpart, and appears, like the undefined dissolving *Fata morgana*, on the horizon where Christianity is about to arise.

With all this I would not deny, that this system may have borne some fruits for Christianity in its development. That however, we may say, is a service done by all the opponents of Christianity, even by its antipodes. But to be in unison with Christianity, is forbidden by his system as historically developed ; and still more is Christianity forbidden to agree with him. Philo's spirit, and without doubt a large multitude also of his contemporaries, labored *philosophically* on the same problems, which, as matters of *fact*, the person of Christ, and from this the church, has historically solved and is solving. Since also Christian *fact*, because it is the ideal of religion realized, will become an object of knowledge, which must reproduce the same ideally as to all its constituent parts, so was the inclination to this without doubt the earlier set free, by the fact that Christianity entered the world pregnant with questions and ideas which were related to it. When reflection began to set the Christian idea in a relation with the sphere of reason, it came into close contact with those ante-Christian essays and ideas, and permitted itself, as we shall see, not unfrequently to be drawn from its own proper path. But the Christian principle, by which those questions were essentially modified in consequence of Christianity as a fact, not only became self-collected, but engaged in that connection with philosophy, in order, at its own time, to take the leading thread into its own hands, and to introduce a new era for philosophy. Of the operation of the Philonic influence on the Christian world, the Alexandrine Gnosticism is the most remarkable example, although by no means, as Justin and the Alexandrine fathers show, the only monument.

It follows from what has been said, that the idea of an *incarnate God* cannot, with any certainty, be derived from Hebraism. This cannot be done, because it lies not, even remotely, in that development of the idea of God which is made in the Old Testament, that the only God, Jehovah, so yields himself up to that which is finite, as to become man in time ; or that he so mingles with the daily concerns of life, and exposes himself to the changes of human development. Sooner than endeavor to unite this with ancient Hebraism, one would connect the Christian idea with Judaism. But here, the two great parties of which we have any accurate knowledge, the Alexandrine and that of Palestine, have, as has been shown, no idea of God's becoming man. One might appeal to that manifold mixture of heathen and Jewish ideas of religion, which is found in secret doctrines, or in the obscure views of several small parties, near the Christian era. But these contain, in part, wonderful and fantastic things ; as e. g. the doctrine respecting Adam קַדְמוֹן, or the archetypal man. One side of this mystical doctrine is that, according to which is understood by him the original *man-woman* ;

from which, by a separation of the sexes, an emanation commences ;— ideas which plainly come from natural religion, and are altogether abhorrent from the whole character of Christianity. The other turn given to this doctrine is, that under Adam קַדְמוֹן is to be understood an exalted being, created in God's image, whether we call it Aeon or archangel. This same Adam runs through a whole series of incorporations. It appeared as Adam, as Enoch, as Noah, etc. ; and at last, it appeared in the Messiah.

That the Christian idea of God-man cannot be explained from this, that in the incarnate archangel God did not appear in humanity, need hardly be mentioned. Only the Christ of Arius can be developed from this ; who is no Christ because he leaves God in the back-ground. Pantheistic emanation does not better the thing, but makes it worse ; for with a multiplicity of incorporations every apparent assumption of humanity is lowered down to a mere semblance. However much among all these mystics, the truly divine Being is the far-distant, secluded original essence, in like measure his nature contradicts the idea of his becoming man, (not man according to the views of the Docetae, but) man in earnest and truly so. This is shown by the gradations of beings in various incorporations of the same exalted Being, which they regarded as the apparent mediator between the truly divine Being and mankind.

A third turn of this doctrine is this, viz. that out of the archetypal *Adam Qadmon* arises a *man-woman*, which is divided into two sexes, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Against this opinion, the grounds are united which have been given in respect to the two former cases ; between which it is oscillating and undetermined. But enough respecting these confused and fantastic representations. Whether they originated before the Christian era or afterwards, they are instructive ; since they show, at all events, how the mind has always felt itself forced upon the same problem, viz. to see established an essential and internal unity between God and humanity. But our unprejudiced feeling may judge, whether *the Christian doctrine of God-man* stands related to it as a copying thereof, or whether it is not itself much more a caricature modified by Paganism, of the archetypal image which appears as a reality in the Christian system.

Thus ends Dorner's discussion of Philo's views respecting the Logos. It is followed by a review of the teaching of the N. Test. writers respecting the human and divine nature of Christ, which is full of close and sober thought, of critical analysis, and of acute and disreptive exegesis. He then proceeds to the examination of the so-called Apostolical Fathers, and various other documents of the first century and of the former part of the second one. Last of all, in this part of his work, he

introduces the subject of the ancient Christian *Hymnology*, with some simple and beautiful specimens of it. At the close of this, he adds a summary view of the doctrine respecting the person of Christ, which, as it is brief and the reader will be gratified by the perusal of it, I will here subjoin.

“To these testimonies of animated feeling, [he refers to the Hymns which he had just cited], we must add the testimonies of animated action, and voluntary martyrdom for the sake of the Christian faith, which are exhibited in their purest form in the two first centuries. We must consider, that martyrdom was regarded as a higher act of service to God, as a baptism of blood; also that denial of Christ and apostasy from him were looked upon not merely as falsehood and unfaithfulness in respect to a man, and to the memory of him which should be held sacred, but as trifling with eternal salvation and communion with God, and therefore a deadly sin, from which one could hardly be recovered. All this considered, the period until after the middle of the second century deserves not generally the name merely of a *testifying period* of the church, but of a *church more definitely testifying THE TRUE GODHEAD AND TRUE HUMANITY of Christ*. This is true, whether we look at the works then written, or to the liturgical elements of divine service, or to the basis of arranging their feasts, or to the beginnings of Christian art and of customs which are characteristic. Here the Eastern and Western churches are one. Essentially one belief, which is ours and that of the apostles, do the systems of the early church speak, that are entirely independent of each other; for one soul animates them, which is the spirit of Christ. And this free internal concord of the most diverse regions, is a conclusive and most striking proof of the unity of the general view in respect to belief in Christ. It should also be regarded as indicative of the existence of a new creative principle in the church, through belief in the Son of God. The church of the epoch in question has received and preserved not only what it derived from the apostles and their immediate successors, and what was communicated to it through the custom, early introduced, of publicly reading the apostolic writings and especially the Gospels in constant succession, but it has also added to this sum the interest that has accrued by means of the treasures committed to its care, (pp. 294 seq. edit. 2. Vol. I.).

ARTICLE VII.

THE SYRIAC WORDS FOR BAPTISM.

By James Murdock, D. D., New-Haven, Conn.

WITH what propriety and for what reasons did the early Syrian Christians designate Baptism, uniformly and exclusively, by the verb **ܠܚܒܬ** and its derivatives, words which convey no idea whatever of the *form* of the Baptismal act, or of its physical effects?

Statement of the facts in the case :

This Syriac use of the verb **ܠܚܒܬ** and its derivatives can be traced back to the ancient Peschito Version of the New Testament. That version was probably made in the very next age after the apostles, by apostolic men, and in a language almost identical with the vernacular tongue of Jesus Christ and his disciples. And it may be supposed that the apostles themselves, and all the first preachers of the gospel among the Syrians, adopted this phraseology ; and of course, that the translators of the Peschito had apostolic authority for their mode of designating baptism.

On looking into this version we find, that it uniformly renders the Greek verb **βαπτίζω** by the Syriac verb **ܠܚܒܬ**, in all the 73 places in which **βαπτίζω** occurs. The Greek noun **βάπτισμα** occurs in the New Testament 17 times, and in 16 of them it is rendered by **ܡܠܚܒܬܐ**, and once by **ܠܚܒܬܐ**, the Infinitive of **ܠܚܒܬ**. The Greek noun **βαπτισμὸς** occurs 4 times, and is always rendered by **ܡܠܚܒܬܐ**. And **βαπτιστής**, the appellative of John the Precursor, occurs 13 times, and is always rendered by **ܡܠܚܒܬܐ**. Thus, wherever the Greek uses **βαπτίζω** or any derivative from it, the Peschito Version uses **ܠܚܒܬ** or some derivative from it.

And the Peschito New Testament never uses the verb **ܠܚܒܬ** or any derivative from it, with reference to anything besides *baptism* ; with this one exception, that the Greek word **στίλος**, a *pillar*, in all the 4 places in which it occurs in the New Testament, is rendered by **ܡܠܚܒܬܐ**. And therefore the only ideas which the Peschito New

Testament ever connects with the root **חָמַץ** and its derivatives, are those of *baptism* and of *pillar*.¹

The Philoxenian or Jacobite Syriac version of the New Testament although it aims to improve the earlier version by adhering more closely to the Greek text, yet follows closely the Peschito in its mode of translating **βαπτίζω** and its derivatives.

It appears to be a fact, that at or before the Christian era, the Shemitish root **עָמַד** had fallen into disuse as a *verb* in all the Aramaean dialects to which we have access, viz. the Syriac, the Chaldee, and the Samaritan; yet that the *noun* **עָמֻד**, which is derived from this root, and signifies a *pillar*, was retained in all these dialects, as well as in the Hebrew and Arabic. For in Hebrew, the verb **עָמַד** is of very frequent occurrence, in the sense of *standing, standing up, standing still*, etc. But in all the Aramaean dialects, we find substituted for it the verb **קָם**, which in Hebrew signifies *to rise up*. Thus in the Pentateuch, the Hebrew verb **עָמַד** occurs 81 times. But in the Targum of Onkelos it is never translated by **עָמַד**, but is translated by **קָם** in 72 places, and in the other 9 places it is paraphrased. In the Peschito Syriac Pentateuch, also it is never translated by **חָמַץ**, but is translated by **חָמַץ** in 75 places, and paraphrased or omitted in the other six. In the Samaritan Version, it is indeed *twice* rendered by **עָמַד**; but in 75 places it is translated by **קָם**, e. g. Hebrew **קָם** Chaldee **קָם**, and Syriac **חָמַץ**. On the contrary, wherever the Hebrew *עָמֻד*, a *pillar*, occurs in the Pentateuch, (between 40 and 50 times), it is translated **עָמֻדָא** by Onkelos, **עָמֻד** by the Samaritan, and **חָמַץ** by the Syriac. Hence we may infer, that the authors of the Peschito New Testament followed the common usage of all the Aramaean dialects, in their disuse of the root **חָמַץ** in the sense of *standing*, and still retaining the noun **חָמַץ** to denote a *pillar*. And the root **חָמַץ** having become obsolescent in all the Aramaean dialects, the Syrians could take it up, and appropriate it to express any new idea for which it might seem to them suitable.

¹ The rendering of **τοὺς ἑπὰξ φωτισθέντας**, in Hebrews 6: 4, by **בְּמַעַן** **אֲשֶׁר חָמַצְתֶּם לְאֵלֹהִים** (*who have once come to baptism*), appears to be no exception; for the translator doubtless considered **τοὺς φωτισθέντας** as equivalent to **τοὺς βαπτισθέντας**, just as the early Greek Fathers did.

And their appropriation of it to denote *baptism*, did not arise from the poverty of the Syriac language, or from its want of any term corresponding in sense with the Greek verb βαπτίζω. For if it be supposed, that βαπτίζω properly signifies *to dip*, or *to immerse*; the Syriac has the verb ܕܥܝܬܐ, which answers to the Hebrew דָּבַעַ and the Arabic صبغ (*tsabog*), and properly signifies *to dip*, *to immerse*.¹ The Syriac retains the Hebrew and Arabic form of this root, viz. ܕܥܝܬܐ.² Or if we suppose βαπτίζω to mean, *to wash*, *to cleanse by washing*; the Syriac has appropriate words for that idea, viz. ܕܥܝܬܐ,³ and ܕܥܝܬܐ,⁴ corresponding with the Hebrew רָחַץ. Or if we can suppose βαπτίζω to denote *affusion* or *pouring out*; the Syrians had ܕܥܝܬܐ, the Aphel of ܕܥܝܬܐ, which expresses this idea.⁵—Or if we suppose βαπτίζω to signify *to sprinkle*, *to lustrate by sprinkling*; the Syrians had the verb ܕܥܝܬܐ or ܕܥܝܬܐ, which expresses precisely that idea.⁶—But the Peschito translators never employ any of these verbs, apparently so suitable for preserving the exact meaning of βαπτίζω. Passing by them all, they take up the verb ܕܥܝܬܐ and its derivatives, as their only terms for baptism.

So firmly established and so universally prevalent, among the Syrian Christians, was the custom of denoting baptism by ܕܥܝܬܐ and its derivatives, that this usage pervaded all their rituals for public worship, and all the discourses and writings of the Syriac Fathers.⁷ Nor has the usage ever been changed by any Christians using the Syriac language, or speaking any modern dialect derived from Syriac. The recent *Nestorian Version* of the New Testament, printed at Oroomiah in 1846, everywhere adopts the usage of the Peschito in the

¹ See Matt. 14: 30, and 18: 6. Luke 5: 7, and 8: 23. Acts 20: 9. 1 Tim. 6: 9.

² See Matt. 26: 23. Mark 14: 20. Luke 7: 38, 44, and 16: 24. John 13: 26.

³ It occurs in Matt. 6: 17, and 15: 2, 20, and 27: 24. Mark 7: 2, 3, 5. Luke 5: 2. John 9: 7, 11, 15, and 13: 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14. 1 Tim. 5: 10. Rev. 7: 14.

⁴ It occurs in John 13: 10. Acts 9: 37, and 16: 33. 1 Cor. 6: 11. Heb. 10: 22.

⁵ Peter 2: 22. Also, from this root, the verbal noun ܕܥܝܬܐ, which is used for "the washing (λουτρον) of regeneration," Ephes. 5: 26.

⁶ See Matt. 26: 7. Mark 14: 3. Acts 10: 45. Heb. 9: 22.

⁷ See Matt. 26: 7. Heb. 9: 13, 19, 21, and 10: 22, and 11: 28, and 12: 24, and 1 Peter 1: 2.

⁸ See *Assemani Biblioth. Orient. Clement. Vaticana, passim*.

translation of βαπτίζω and its derivatives; except in two instances, in which Christian baptism is not intended, viz. Mark 7: 4, ("From the market, except *they wash*, they eat not); and Luke 11: 38, ("They marvelled that he had not *first washed* before dinner); in both which places, they render βαπτίζω by ܠܬܠܝܬ (Chaldee ܠܬܠܝܬ), *he washed*. And in the translation of βαπτισμός, they follow the Peschito, except in Mark 7: 4, 8, where "the *washing* of cups and pots," is translated ܡܬܠܝܬܐ. And the Rev. D. T. Stoddard, one of the missionaries at Oroomiah, who had a hand in bringing out this version, states, that among the Nestorian Christians, the word ܬܠܝܬ is the only term ever used to denote baptism; that they so exclusively appropriate it to this use as never to use it for anything else; and they seem not to know that the word ever had any other meaning. It has been already stated, that the Jacobite or Philoxenian Version of the New Testament closely follows the example of the Peschito. And I now add, that the same example is often followed by the Arabic Version, which — as is generally conceded — was originally made from the Syriac; for in 49 places out of 73, it renders βαπτίζω — just as the Syriac does — by ܥܡܕ (ܬܠܝܬ); and in 23, renders it by ܠܬܠܝܬ (ܬܠܝܬ) *to immerse*.

The facts in the case are now before us; and the question to be answered, is, With what propriety and for what reasons, did the early Syrian Christians designate baptism, uniformly and exclusively by the verb, ܬܠܝܬ and its derivatives?

In answering this question, it is necessary that we should first ascertain the primitive and proper meaning of the word ܬܠܝܬ. For this Shemitish root was certainly not invented by the Syrian Christians, for the special purpose of denoting baptism. It existed and was in common use long before the gospel was published, although, as already stated, it had become obsolescent in all the Aramaean dialects.

As we have no Syriac works except the writings of Christians, and as they from the first appropriated the obsolete verb ܬܠܝܬ exclusively to the reception of baptism, we cannot expect to find this verb used in any other sense, in any of the existing Syriac books. Whatever meaning, or meanings, it may have previously had, they were all laid aside or discontinued by the Syrian Christians. Yet, notwithstanding the transfer of the root to altogether a new application, one of its early derivatives was retained, and therefore seems to be indicative of its primitive physical meaning. This derivative is the noun ܬܠܝܬܐ,

which signifies a *pillar* or *column* that stands erect, and therefore associates with this root the idea of *standing up*, or *standing erect and firm*. And as this ancient derivative is retained, with the same signification, not only in the Syriac but in all the Aramaean dialects, and also in all the Shemitish languages, it affords strong evidence that it is a good index to the primitive meaning of this root.

But, for further evidence on this subject, let us recur to the kindred Shemitish languages and to the other Aramaean dialects. Our first recourse will be to the Hebrew, the best understood of all the languages of the Shemite family, and of which we have by far the most ancient and authentic specimens.

In *Hebrew* we find, that the root עמד is an intransitive verb, and that it signifies, as *Gesenius* informs us, (1) *To stand*, before, over, or by a person or thing; (2) *To stand firm*, to be enduring; (3) *To stand still*, to stop moving; (4) *To stand up*, to rise up. And in Hiphil, the causative conjugation, it signifies, *To cause to stand up*, to set up, to erect. The Hebrew derivatives from this root are עומד a stand or stage, עצמה a stopping or lodging place, עמוד a pillar or column, מצודה a station; and the participle עומד signifies established, made firm or stable. Here every one can clearly see, that the primary meaning of the root עמד, in Hebrew, is to stand up, in opposition to sitting or lying down, to stand firm or still, in opposition to tottering and to moving onward.

If now we turn to *Buxtorf's Lex. Chald. Talmud. et Rabbinicum*, we find that he makes עמד signify, *Stare, consistere, persistere, subsistere*; and in the Talmudic writers, *Surgere*; and he says, with the Hebrew grammarians, עמד עומד, *verbum stans*, is an intransitive verb; and among the Rabbins, the noun עומד is a perpendicular or a perpendicular line. He also mentions most of the Hebrew derivatives, as above stated; and likewise adds עומד stans, erectus, in pedes constitutus, the opposite of sedens, in sella constitutus; and עומד consistentia, firmitas, firmitudo.

If we go to the Arabic, *Freytag's Lex. Arabico-Latinum* will tell us, that عَمِد (עמד) signifies, in Conjug. I. to afflict or oppress, to prop up or make stable, to write with a pole, etc.; in II. Conj. to abstract, resist or sustain, as the banks of a river a flood; and to administer baptism; in IV. Conj. to support with a prop or pillar; and also, to receive baptism; in V. Conj. to intend, to purpose; in VII. Conj. to become established; in VIII. Conj. to lean upon, be supported by. It also mentions more than a dozen derivatives from this root, with the significations, respectively, of a fixed purpose, advice received, a compact, a gall or bruise on a camel's back, a tall structure, pillar, or tent-pole, vigorous youthfulness, to be relied on, or trust-worthy, a prop,

pillar, or *support* (very common; e. g. Koran Sur. 13: 2, and 31: 9, and 104: 9), the *advanced part of an army, protracted, supported by pillars*, and also *baptism*, and a *baptizer*.

If we go to the Ethiopic, *Castell's Lex. Heptaglot.* informs us, that this root denotes *columnam erexit, statuit, stabilivit*; and that one of its derivatives denotes *a column* or *pillar*.

If we return to the Aramaean dialects, which are allied more closely with the Syriac, *Castell* will tell us, that the Chaldee verb ܥܬܬܐ *signifies surrexit*, *imprimis ad orandum*; and that its derivative ܥܬܬܐܝܢ *signifies surrectio, statio, subsistentia, duratio*. And we have before seen, that the Chaldee noun ܥܬܬܐ is used for a *pillar*, more than 40 times, in the Targum of Onkelos on the Pentateuch. In the Samaritan Version of the Pentateuch, the root ܥܬܐ, (though generally translated by ܥܬܐ, *to stand up*), is twice retained in its unchanged form, ܥܬܐ; viz. Gen. 19: 27, and Deut. 4: 11; and its derivative ܥܬܐܝܢ, *a pillar*, occurs over 40 times.

Schindler, in his *Lexicon Pentaglotton*, says, that the root, ܥܬܐ, in this family of languages has *three* significations, viz., I. *Stetit, substitit, constitit, perstitit, mansit, perseveravit, duravit, moratus est, perseveravit, desit*; *stabilitas, firmus fuit*; *item ministrare, resistere*. In all these acceptations the idea of *standing*, or some modification of that idea, seems to be involved. He next mentions the various Hebrew, Arabic and Rabbinic derivatives from this root, all retaining the same primary idea. — II. In Syriac and Arabic, this root signifies, *Baptizatus, in aquam immersus, tinctus, lotus fuit*; and he offers this explanation: *Stabant enim, qui baptizabantur*. With this *second* signification he connects those Syriac and Arabic derivatives which relate to *baptism*. — III. In Arabic, with *Gain* instead of *Ain*, ܥܬܐ (*gamd*) denotes the *pod* of beans and other leguminous plants; also *a casket, a box, a sheath*, etc.

This mass of evidence seems to prove, beyond all controversy, that the primary meaning of the verb ܥܬܐ was, *to stand, stand up, stand firm, stand still*, etc.

We now proceed to say, that in appropriating this verb to denote the *reception of baptism*, the Syrian Christians did not change entirely the radical idea attached to it. They only transferred it from a physical to a metaphorical sense, or used it to denote a mental and not a bodily act. The proof lies in the fact, that they retained perfectly its grammatical character and its syntactical construction. In its primary meaning, ܥܬܐ is an *intransitive* verb, or denotes a physical act, which is confined to the person performing it and does not affect another person.

And precisely so the Syriac verb ܠܚܦܝܐ, when applied to baptism. It does not signify *to administer* baptism to another person, but intransitively *to baptize* or *to become a baptized person*. Thus in Luke 3: 7, Then said he to the multitude that came forth ܠܚܦܝܐ *to baptize*, or to pass under the rite of baptism; i. e. to perform an intransitive; not as in the Greek and English, βαπτισθῆναι, *to be baptized*. So in Acts 2: 38, Repent and baptize (ܠܚܦܝܐ) every one of you; not *be baptized*, βαπτισθήτω, as in the English and Greek. Acts 22: 16, Arise and baptize (ܠܚܦܝܐ); not, *be baptized*, as in the English. And so in all cases where the baptized subject is made the nominative to the verb. And whenever the administration of baptism to a second person is spoken of, the verb is put in the causative conjugation, (*Aphel*, answering to the Hebrew *Hiphil*) which makes the sense *to be, causing another to baptize*. This grammatical character and construction of the Syriac verb ܠܚܦܝܐ in reference to baptism, corresponding exactly with that of the Hebrew verb עמד signifying *to stand*, shows that the Syrian Christians did not essentially change the character of this verb when they applied it to baptism. They found it an intransitive verb, and they let it remain so, deeming it a suitable term to denote metaphorically the internal act of a person who receives baptism.

But what is the analogy between the physical act of *standing, standing up, standing firm*, etc. and the religious act of *receiving baptism*, or, how did the two things stand connected in the view of the Syrian Christians? This is the great problem which we must attempt to solve.

Some have supposed that, because the Syrian Christians always *stood up* at the time they were baptized, or always received baptism in a *standing posture*, therefore they denoted *baptism* by a word signifying *to stand*. But, if they ever baptized by *immersion*, they could not have always *stood erect* in the act of baptism. Besides, they undoubtedly *stood up* in various other religious acts, no less than in this; as in singing the *praises* of God, in repeating the *Doxology*, in receiving the public *Benediction*, etc. Moreover, the posture assumed in the reception of baptism was altogether too circumstantial and trivial a matter, to give a name and character to this sacred institution. We must therefore endeavor to find some more important relation or analogy between the primitive meaning of this verb and the Christian rite of baptism.

J. C. W. Augusti,¹ who agrees with us as to the primitive meaning

¹ See his Handbuch d. christl. Archæologie, B. II. S. 309—312.

of this verb, thinks that the Syrian, like the other oriental Christians, were accustomed to join the rite of *confirmation* with that of *baptism*, the one being administered immediately after the other and by the same person; and by thus uniting the two rites and considering them as constituting but one transaction, they gave to it a name appropriate to one part of it, confirmation, but not suited to express baptism. But if this were true, why did they not put the verb into the passive conjugation *Ethiaphal*, whenever it denotes the *reception* of baptism? For, surely, the person was as passive in receiving confirmation as in receiving baptism; and if the causative conjugation only could properly denote the *administering* of confirmation, then only the passive form of the same conjugation could properly express the *receiving* of confirmation. But there is another and very serious objection to this hypothesis, namely, the very dubious existence of confirmation as a necessary part and the consummation of baptism, at so early a period as that in which the apostles and their associates introduced and established the Syriac terms for denoting baptism. We read of no such appendage to baptism anywhere in the New Testament. For the apostolic imposition of hands and benediction, by which the Holy Spirit with his gifts was sometimes imparted to baptized Christians, though sometimes urged as a scriptural warrant for Episcopal confirmation, can hardly be supposed to have led all the early preachers of Christianity to administer confirmation along with baptism to all whom they baptized. From the numerous instances of the administration of baptism mentioned in the New Testament, it would seem that, in those early times, baptism was administered without any appendage called confirmation; and that the simple rite of baptism was then considered as the only evidence needful, to prove a man a professed and an established believer in the Christian religion. We are therefore disposed to give up the hypothesis of Augusti, so far as it makes confirmation, viewed as an appendage to baptism, give name to the whole baptismal transaction.

Our theory would be, that the early Syrian Christians,—in conformity, very probably, with Apostolic example and usage,—employed the neuter verb *ܥܡܕ* to denote the *reception of Baptism*, because they associated with that act the idea of *coming to a stand*, or of *taking a public and decisive stand*, on the side of Christianity. They considered all baptized persons as being *established* in the Christian faith, and as having made a public *profession* of that faith, in and by their *baptism*, so that now, they *stood up before the world* as professed or visible Christians.

According to this idea of the latent, etymological meaning of the term, the commission of our Lord to his apostles, in Matt. 28: 19,

might be rendered,—not, “Go ye and teach all nations, *immersing* (or *washing*) them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” as in the Greek;—but, “Go ye and teach all nations, *making them to stand fast* in the name of the Father,” etc. And the declaration in the parallel passage, Mark 16: 15, 16, which in the Greek reads, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature: He that believeth and is *immersed* shall be saved; but he that believeth not, shall be damned,” would in the Syriac, read, “Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.” He that believeth, and *standeth fast*, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.” According to the Greek, our Lord seems to state *two* conditions of salvation; namely, *believing*, and being *immersed* or *washed* in the name of the Holy Trinity; but, according to the Syriac, he states in reality only *one* condition, namely, that of *believing* and *standing fast* in our confidence in the triune God. And therefore, very pertinently, the last part of the apostolic commission omits the clause respecting the *baptism*, and simply says: “He that *believeth not* shall be damned.” Such views of these texts are in perfect harmony with the doctrine everywhere inculcated in the New Testament, that it is only the *steadfast, persevering* Christian, that will be saved.

Comparing now this Syriac word for baptism with the Greek, we shall see, that while the Greek word indicates the *great change* of character and life requisite to salvation, by the figure of a *moral purification*, or perhaps of a *death and burial to sin*; the Syriac word indicates the same great change, by the figure or metaphor of *standing firm* in the faith, or *standing up* before the world as one of those who follow Christ, or who love and obey the gospel. The Greek term has been adopted by all the Western churches; and it may therefore seem to us, much to be preferred. But, in reality, if it is more descriptive of the physical act which accompanies baptism, it less clearly and forcibly represents the permanent change of character and action, to which a baptized person becomes pledged. And if the Syriac term has the disadvantage of not being so descriptive of the outward and visible rite of baptism, it was less liable to abuse, by leading to heated controversies respecting the proper mode of baptism,—whether it should be by immersion, or by some other application of water. And hence, while this controversy has caused permanent divisions and separations among our Western churches, it has never, so far as we know, been agitated at all in the East. Moreover, if the Greek term has the advantage of being more significant of the new birth or of that mysterious internal renovation effected by the Holy Spirit, it was, at the

same time, more liable to produce a superstitious veneration for the more external rite as if it were itself the *cause* or the appointed and necessary *instrument* of a saving change in man; thus giving rise to all the discussions among Western Christians respecting *baptismal regeneration*. If the Jesuit missionaries had obtained their ideas of the nature and import of Christian baptism from the phraseology of the Syriac Bible, they could hardly have adopted the belief that, by stealthily sprinkling water upon an ignorant pagan in the name of the Trinity, they converted him into a real Christian, and plucked him from perdition. Nor would some Protestants have been led to believe, that the mere rite of baptism translated a person into the kingdom or church of God, entitled him to divine grace, and was necessary to a man's salvation.

But whatever may be thought of the comparative merits of the two modes of designating baptism, the Grecian and the Syrian, the first seems to be clear and undeniable, that the Apostles, when writing in Greek, designated baptism by the verb βαπτίζω and its derivatives, but that their associates and followers probably adopting the usage of the apostles in the like circumstances, did in Syriac designate Baptism by the verb **ܠܡܕܢܐ** and its derivatives, which properly signify to *stand up, to be firm, erect and stable*, like pillars. Of course, both modes of designating baptism rest on good authority; both are suitable, and it is allowable for Christians to adopt either.

It may not be impertinent here to remark, that the conduct of the Syrian Christians in giving such a name to this sacrament, was exactly parallel with that of the early Greek and Latin Fathers in giving the name of *Eucharist* (εὐχαριστία) to the other sacrament, for which the biblical name is the *Lord's Supper*. For, if the Syriac term **ܡܫܚܬܐ** entirely disregards the physical act performed in the symbolical *washing*, and only indicates the internal or mental act which should always accompany and follow baptism; just so the Greek term εὐχαριστία entirely disregards the physical act of *eating* the symbolical bread and drinking of the symbolical cup, and indicates only the internal or mental act of *giving thanks* for the inestimable gift of a Saviour.¹ The Greek Fathers and their modern imitators, therefore take the same liberties with the Scriptural term δειπνον κυριακον, that the Syrian Christians take with the scriptural terms βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα.

¹ On this use of εὐχαριστία by the early Greek and Latin Fathers, and the reasons for it, see *Suiceri Nov. Thesaur. Philol.* Tom. I. p. 1270.

Finally *Augusti*, in the work already cited, after giving to the verb **خَضَعَ** the same original meaning that we do, and also the same derivative meaning when applied to baptism, ingeniously suggests, that the Syrian Christians may have chosen to translate βαπτίζω by **خَضَعَ** to *stand*, rather than to render it more literally by **دُغِيَ** to *dip*, to *immerse*; because this latter word had been taken to denote their own sect by the ZABIANs or *Hemerobaptists*, a Jewish sect then existing among the Aramaeans, and sometimes called *Mendaeans* and *Disciples of John*. For the very name of that sect, *Zabians* (in Syriac **ܙܒܝܐܢܝܐ** or **ܙܒܝܢܐ**, in Arabic **صبيان**, being derived from **ض**, literally signified *the immersed* or *the dipped*; and therefore, if the Syrian Christians had said that they were **ܙܒܝܢܐܢܝܐ**, *baptized*, they would have denominated themselves *Zabians*. And hence, to avoid ambiguity in their theological language, and to distinguish themselves from a religious sect with which they had no communion, they chose to designate Christian baptism not by the verb **ض**, which corresponds with the Greek βαπτίζω, and equally well describes the outward act in baptism, but rather by **خَضَعَ** which describes metaphorically the internal act of the baptized person.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE VOYAGE AND SHIPWRECK OF PAUL AS RELATED BY LUKE. A COMMENTARY ON ACTS 27: 1—44; 28: 16.

By Prof. H. B. Hackett, Newton Theol. Institution.

Departure from Caesarea and arrival at Myra, Vs. 1—5.

Verse 1. ἐκτίθη relates to the time of departure, not to the decision itself that they should be sent. — ἡμᾶς. It will be observed that the historian is one of the party. The plural of the pronoun was last used in 21: 18. παρέδιδον is not so vague as the third person plural impersonal (see St. § 174; Win. § 49. 1), but expresses the idea more concretely: *they delivered*, i. e. those who acted in this case under the command of the procurator. — ἐτέροις, *additional* prisoners, not different in character from Paul, i. e. heathen, as Meyer supposes. Luke

uses that term and ἄλλων indiscriminately; see 15: 85. 17: 84. — *σπειρὶς Σεβαστῆς*, of the *Augustan cohort*. It is well established that there were several legions in the Roman army at this time, which bore the above title. No ancient writer, however, mentions that any one of them was stationed in the East. Some critics suppose, notwithstanding the absence of any notice to this effect, that such may have been the fact, and that one of the cohorts belonging to this legion, and distinguished by the same name, had its quarters at Caesarea. The more general opinion is that the Roman cohorts, instead of being incorporated always with a particular legion, existed often separately; and that such an independent cohort was now at Caesarea, known as the Augustan or imperial, because with reference to its relation to the procurator it corresponded in some sense to the emperor's life-guard at Rome. It was identical, in all probability, with the Italian cohort mentioned in 8: 1, which was so called because it consisted chiefly of Italians or Romans, while the other cohorts at Caesarea, as stated by Josephus (Antt. 20, 8. 7; 19, 9. 2) were made up, to a great extent, of Caesareans, or Samaritans. It is on account of this last circumstance that some explain *σπειρὶς Σεβαστῆς* as meaning *Sebastenean* or *Samaritan cohort*, since the city of Samaria bore also the Greek name *Σεβαστή* in honor of the emperor Augustus. But in that case, as Winer,¹ De Wette, Meyer, and others decide, we should have expected *Σεβαστηνῶν*, instead of *Σεβαστῆς*, or an adjective equivalent in sense, formed like *Ἰταλική*, 10: 1. Wieseler² has proposed still another view of the expression. It appears that Nero organized a body-guard, which he denominated Augustani (Suet. Ner. c. 20. 25) or Augustiani (Tac. Ann. 14. 15). The critic just named thinks that Julius may have been a centurion in that cohort, whose station of course was at Rome; and that having been sent to the East for the execution of some public service, he was now returning to Italy with these prisoners under his charge. But that guard, as Wieseler himself mentions, was organized in the year 60 A. D.; and, according to his own plan of chronology in the Acts, it was in that very year that Paul was sent from Caesarea to Rome. This coincidence as to the time of the two occurrences, leaves room for a bare possibility that the supposition referred to may be true, but it arrays against it a strong presumption of improbability.

V. 2. *πλοῖον Ἀδραμυττηνῶν*, a vessel of *Adramyttium*, one which belonged there and was now bound thither; a seaport of Mysia, opposite to Lesbos. We have more authority for reading here *μέλλοις*

¹ *Biblisches Realwörterbuch*, B. II. s. 338.

² *Chronologie des apostolischen Zeitalters*, etc. s. 391.

than μέλλουσι, though several editors sanction the latter. — πλεῖν—τόπος, *to sail, visit, the places along* (the coast of) *Asia*. This verb, which is properly intransitive, governs an accusative, after the analogy of πορεύεσθαι ὁδόν and the like. Kühn. § 279. R. 5; Krüg. § 46. 6. 3. It is less correct to regard τόπος as the place whither. A few copies have εἰς after πλεῖν, which was inserted no doubt to render the construction easier. Ἀσία, according to Luke's prevalent use of the term, would denote here the coast of Asia Minor washed by the Aegean. See 2: 9, 10, where Pamphylia and Cappadocia at least are excluded from the word. — It would appear that they embarked in this Adramyttian ship because they had no opportunity at this time to sail directly from Caesarea to Italy; and they knew that they could rely on finding a vessel having that destination, at some one of the Asiatic ports at which it was proposed to touch. Such a vessel they found at Myra, v. 6. — Ἀριστάρχου, who has been mentioned 19: 29. 20: 4, our English translators speak of very strangely, as *one* Aristarchus, as if he were otherwise unknown. That he accompanied Paul to Rome appears also from Philem. 24. Col. 4: 10, which epistles the apostle wrote while in that city. In the latter passage he terms Aristarchus συναϊχμάλωτος, which, if taken literally, would lead us to suppose that he too had been apprehended and was now sent as a prisoner to Rome. But in Philem. 24, he is called merely συναργός, and hence it is more probable that he went with the apostle of his own accord, and that he received the other appellation merely as a commendatory one, because by such devotion to him he had thus made Paul's captivity as it were his own. This is the general opinion of critics. We have every reason to suppose that Luke also went as the voluntary companion of the apostle.

V. 3. κατήχθημεν, etc., *we landed at Sidon*. See 21: 3. This city had anciently one of the finest harbors in the East, and was celebrated at this time for its wealth and commerce. It was the rival of Tyre. The vessel stopped here perhaps for purposes of trade. The distance from Caesarea to Sidon was sixty-seven geographical miles. As they performed the voyage in a single day, they must have had a favorable wind. The prevailing winds now in that part of the Mediterranean at this season of the year, are the western;¹ and such a wind would

¹ See p. 22 of "The Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul," etc. By James Smith, Esq. Lond. 1848. This able work was noticed with deserved commendation in the Bibl. Sac. Vol. VI. p. 792. I have availed myself freely of the illustrations of this valuable treatise in the commentary on these chapters. No work has appeared for some time, which has thrown so much light upon any equal portion of the Scriptures. The author is entirely justified in expressing his belief that the searching

have served their purpose. The coast-line, between the two places, bears N. N. E. The season of the year at which Paul commenced the voyage is known from v. 9. It must have been near the close of summer or early in September. — *φιλανθρωπίως*—*χρησάμενος*. It is interesting to observe that the centurion manifested the same friendly disposition towards the apostle throughout the voyage. See v. 43. 27:16. It is not impossible that he had been present on some of the occasions when Paul defended himself before his judges (see 24: 1. 25: 23), and that he was not only convinced of his prisoner's innocence, but had been led to feel a personal interest in his character and fortunes. — *τοὺς φίλους*, the friends, believers in that place. Sidon was a Phœnician city; and, as we see from 11: 19, the gospel had been preached in Phœnicia at an early period. The narrative presupposes that Paul had informed the centurion that there were Christians here. *πορευθέντα* agrees with the suppressed subject of *τυχεῖν*, comp. 26: 20; see Kühn. § 307. R. 2. It is corrected in some manuscripts to *πορευθέντι* sc. *αὐτῷ*, as if dependent on the preceding verb.

V. 4. *ὑπεπλεύσαμεν*—*ἐναντίους*, we sailed under Cyprus because the winds were contrary. It is evident from the next verse that they left this island on the left hand and passed to the north of it, instead of going to the south, which would have been their direct course in proceeding from Sidon to proconsular Asia. The reason assigned for this is that the winds were adverse to them. Such would have been the effect of the westerly winds which, as before stated, prevail on that coast at this season, and which had favored their progress hitherto. It may be supposed, therefore, that these winds still continuing, they kept on their northern course after leaving Sidon, instead of turning towards the west or north-west, as they would have done under favorable circumstances. It is entirely consistent with this view that they are said to have sailed under Crete, if we adopt the meaning of that expression which many of the ablest authorities attach to it. Wetstein has stated what appears to be the true explanation as follows: *Ubi navis vento contrario cogitur a rectu cursu decedere, ita ut tunc insula sit interposita inter ventum et navem, dicitur ferri infra insulam*.¹ According to this opinion, *ὑπὸ* in the verb affirms merely that the ship

examination to which he has subjected the narrative, has furnished a new and distinct argument for establishing the authenticity of the Acts. See a brief but discriminating notice of the work in Gersdorf's "Leipziger Repertorium," Bd. II. 3 Hft. for 1849. The part relating to the "Ships of the Ancients," the reviewer pronounces a valuable contribution to that branch of archaeology, eminently deserving of the attention of the ablest German scholars in that department.

¹ See Wetstein's Novum Testamentum, Vol. II, p. 637.

was on that side of the island from which the wind was blowing, i. e. to use a sea-phrase, on the lee-side. It decides nothing of itself with respect to their vicinity to the island. Other things must show whether they passed near it or at a distance from it. Many commentators, on the other hand, render the preposition *near*, as it were, under the projecting shore; in which case they must have had a different wind from that supposed above, in order to enable them to cross from the coast of Palestine to that of Cyprus; but having gained that position, they must then have gone around the north of that island, in accordance precisely with the other representation.

V. 5. τὸ πῆλαγος — Παμφυλίαν, *the sea along Cilicia and Pamphylia*, i. e. the coast of those countries. The Cilician Sea extended so far south as to include even Cyprus. That pass the Greeks called also *Aulon Cilicium*.¹ The Pamphylian Sea lay directly west of the Cilician. Luke says nothing of any delay in these seas, and the presumption is that the voyage here was a prosperous one. This agrees perfectly with what would be expected under that coast, at that season of the year. Instead of the westerly winds which had been opposed to them heretofore, they would be favored now by a land breeze² which prevails there during the summer months, as well as by a current which constantly runs to the westward along the coast of Asia Minor.³ Their object in standing so far to the north was no doubt to take advantage of these circumstances which were well known to ancient mariners. — Μύρα τῆς Λυκίας. This place was in the south of Lycia, about ten miles from the coast, and at that time was an opulent and populous city, as the magnificent ruins still found there testify. The port of entrance was Andriaca.⁴

Incidents of the Voyage from Myra to Crete. Vs. 6—12.

V. 6. πλοῖον — πλέον, *an Alexandrian ship about sailing*. The participle describes a proximate future, as in 21:2, 3, etc. This ship

¹ Hoffmann's *Griechenland und die Griechen*, B. II. s. 1385.

² See Smith's *Work*, p. 28. M. de Pagès, a French navigator, who was making a voyage from Syria to Marseilles, took the same course, for which he assigns also the reason which influenced probably the commander of Paul's ship. "The winds from the west," he says, "and consequently contrary, which prevail in these places in the summer, forced us to run to the north. We made for the coast of Caramania (Cilicia) in order to meet the northerly winds, and which we found accordingly."

³ "From Syria to the Archipelago, there is a constant current to the westward." — Beaufort's *Description of the South Coast of Asia Minor*, p. 39. Pococke found this current running so strong between Rhodes and the continent, that it broke in to the cabin windows even in calm weather.—*Description of the East*, II. p. 236.

⁴ See Forbiger's *Handbuch der alten Geographie*, B. II. s. 256.

was bound directly for Italy, having a cargo of wheat as we learn from v. 35. See the note there. Egypt at this time, it is well known, was one of the granaries of Rome; and the vessels employed for the transportation of corn from that country were equal to the largest merchant-vessels of modern times. Hence this ship was able to accommodate the centurion and his numerous party, in addition to its own crew and lading. Josephus states (Life, § 3) that the ship in which he was wrecked in his voyage to Italy, contained six hundred persons. Myra was almost due north from Alexandria; and it is not improbable that the same westerly winds which forced the Adramyttian ship to the east of Cyprus, drove the Alexandrian ship to Myra. The usual course from Alexandria to Italy was by the south of Crete; but when this was impracticable, vessels sailing from that port were accustomed to stand to the north till they reached the coast of Asia Minor, and then proceed to Italy through the southern part of the Aegean.¹ — ἐπιβίβασεν — εἰς αὐτό is a *vox nautica*: they put us on board. It will be found that Luke observes almost a technical precision in the use of such expressions.

V. 7. ἐν ἰκαναῖς — βραδυπλοῦντες. The distance from Myra to Cnidus is not more than a hundred and thirty geographical miles. They occupied, therefore, "many days" in going a distance which with a decidedly fair wind they could have gone in a single day. We must conclude from this, that they were retarded by an unfavorable wind. Such a wind would have been one from the north-west, and it is precisely such a wind, as we learn from the Sailing Directions for the Mediterranean, that prevails in that part of the Archipelago during the summer months. According to Pliny it begins in August and blows for forty days. With such a wind now, says Mr. Smith, the ship could work up from Myra to Cnidus; because until she reached that point, she had the advantage of a weather shore, under the lee of which she would have smooth water, and as formerly mentioned, a westerly current; but it would be slowly and with difficulty. μολὺς refers evidently to this laborious progress, and not, as our English version would suggest, to the fact of their having advanced barely so far. — Κνίδος. Cnidus was a peninsula of Caria stretching out into the Aegean, between Rhodes on the south and Cos on the north. To have gone further north would have been not only entirely out of their way, but against such a wind, impossible, since the westerly current which had favored them till now, terminates here, and the coast also takes a different direction. It only remained for them, therefore, either to put into that harbor and wait for a fair wind, or to run towards Crete. — μὴ προσεῖν

¹ See the proofs of this statement in Wetstein on the passage.

τος — — ἀνέμου, *as the wind did not suffer us*, lit. *unto it*, i. e. to approach Cnidus, to take shelter in the harbor there, which would have been their first preference. They adopted, therefore, the only other alternative which was left to them. προσεάω does not occur in the classics. πρὸς cannot well mean *further*, as some allege, since they would have had no desire to continue their voyage in that direction, even if the weather had permitted it. — ὑπεπλεύσαμεν — — Σαλμώνην, *we sailed under Crete towards Salmone*, a promontory which forms the eastern extremity of that island. It retains still the same name. An inspection of the map will show that their course hither from Cnidus must have been nearly south. Having turned that promontory, they could find a north-west wind as much opposed to them in navigating to the westward as it had been between Myra and Cnidus; but on the other hand, they would have for a time a similar advantage: the south side of Crete is a weather-shore, and with a north-west wind they would advance along the coast, until they reached that part of it which turns decidedly towards the north. Here they would be obliged to seek a harbor and wait until the wind changed. The course of movement indicated by Luke tallies exactly with these conditions. — μόλις — — αὐτῇ, *and with difficulty coasting by it*, viz. Crete, not Salmone, since the former though not so near, is the principal word. Besides, Salmone was not so much an extended shore as a single point, and at all events did not extend so far as the place where they stopped. — εἰς — — λιμένας, *unto a certain place called Fair Havens*. No ancient writer mentions this harbor, but no one doubts that it is identical with the place known still under the same name on the south of Crete, a few miles to the west of Cape Matala. The plural refers to the fact perhaps that it furnished two or more good places for anchorage. Nautical authorities tell us that this is the furthest point to which an ancient ship could have attained with north-westerly winds, because here the land turns suddenly to the north. — ὧς Λασαιά. Here ἐγγὺς governs ὧς as an adverb. ἦν, *was*, incorporates the notice with the history without excluding the present; see 17: 21, 23. Kühn. § 256. 4. a. Lasaea is otherwise unknown. Ancient Crete abounded in cities, every vestige of which, in many instances, has been swept away.

V. 9. ἰκανοῦ χρόνου we are to reckon from the commencement of the voyage. On leaving Palestine they expected to have reached Italy before the arrival of the stormy season, and would have accomplished their object, had it not been for unforeseen delays. — ὅτις — — τοῦ πλοός, *the voyage*, its further prosecution, *being now*, at this advanced season of the year, *unsafe*. πλοός is a later Greek form for πλοῦ. Win. § 8. 2. b; St. § 22. 2, — διὰ — — παρελθύνειν, *because even*

the fast was now past. καὶ has here an explicative force = *that is, to wit*, and adds this clause to the one immediately preceding, in order to fix more precisely the limits of the ἡδη which occurs there. See Win. § 57. 2. c. τὴν νηστείας denotes *the fast κατ' ἐξοχὴν*, which the Jews observed on the great day of expiation, which fell on the 10th of the month Tisri, about the time of the autumnal equinox. See Lev. 16: 29. 23: 27. Jahn's Archaeol. § 357. Philo also says that no prudent man thought of putting to sea after this season of the year. The Greeks and Romans considered the period of safe navigation as closing in October, and re-commencing about the middle of March. Luke's familiarity with the Jewish designations of time rendered it entirely natural for him to describe the progress of the year in this manner. It was not on account of the storms merely that ancient mariners dreaded so much a voyage in winter, but because the rains prevailed then, and the clouds obscured the sun and stars on which they were so dependent for the direction of their course. See on v. 20. — παρῆγει, *exhorted* them, viz. to remain here and not continue the voyage. That this was his object although not stated in so many words, may be inferred from the argument which he employs; see also v. 21.

V. 10. θεωρῶ, *I perceive*, have reason to think; a judgment which he had formed in view of what they had already experienced, as well as the probabilities of the case, looking at the future. The revelation which he afterwards received respecting their fate, he announces in very different terms, see v. 22, 23. He may be understood here as declaring his own personal conviction that if they now ventured to sea again, the ship would certainly be wrecked, and that among so many some of them at least would lose their lives. — ὅτι — τὸν πλοῦν. There is a union here of two different modes of expression. The sentence begins as if μέλλει ὁ πλοῦς was to follow, but on reaching that verb the construction changes to the infinitive with its object as if ὅτι had not preceded. See Win. § 45. R. 2. Such variations are so common even in the best writers that they are hardly to be reckoned as anacoluthic — μετὰ — ζημίας, *with injury and much loss*. This sense of the first noun, though uncommon, appears to be justified by Pind. P. 1. 140, and, as Bengel suggests, refers more particularly to the ship and its appurtenances. The second noun extends the affirmation to their lives as well as the ship; since we do not speak of life in such a case as being injured but as destroyed or lost. This distinction obviates the objection that the words when rendered as above are tautological. Kuinoel thinks that ὕβρις may denote the violence of the storm, or of the sea which they would have to encounter. He cites τῶν ὀμβρῶν ὕβρις, *imbrium injurias*, Joseph. Anti.

3. 5. But the term in this passage has no such limiting adjunct as it has there. Meyer understands it of the presumption, *rashness*, which they would evince in committing themselves again to the deep. If we assume that meaning here, we are to retain it naturally in v. 21 ; and it would be there a term of reproach which we should not expect the apostle to employ in such an address.

V. 11. *ἐναυτοτάρχης* Luke interchanges with *ἐναυτόνταρχος* as in v. 6. In some manuscripts a uniform termination prevails. Both forms are current in classical Greek. — *τῷ κυβερνήτῃ*, the *steersman*, whose authority in ancient ships corresponded very nearly to that of captain in our vessels. — *τῷ ναυκλήρῳ*, the *owner*, to whom the ship belonged. Among the ancients the proprietor instead of chartering his vessel to another, frequently went himself in her and received as his share of the profit the money paid for carrying merchandise and passengers — *τοῖς* — *λεγόμενοις* changes the object of the verb from that of a person to a thing; comp. 26: 20.

V. 12. *ἀνευθέτω*, not well situated, inconvenient. The harbor deserved its name undoubtedly, (see v. 5) for many purposes, but in the judgment of those to whose opinion it was most natural that the centurion should defer, it was not considered a desirable place for wintering. The question was not whether they should attempt to proceed to Italy during the present season, but whether they should remain here in preference to seeking some other harbor where they might hope to be more secure. In this choice of evils, the advice of Paul was that they should remain here; and the event justified his discernment. — *οἱ πλείους*, the *majority*. Their situation had become so critical that a general consultation was held as to what should be done. — *καὶ ἐκεῖθεν*, also from there, as previously from other places, v. 4: 6. — *εἰς Φοῖνικα*, unto *Phoenix*, a town and harbor in the south of Crete, a little to the west (see v. 13) of Fair Havens. The palm-trees in that region are supposed to have given occasion to the name. Forbiger (Handb. v. 3. p. 1038) thinks that this place is the modern Anopolis, near Aradena. Still other places on the south of Crete as Lutro, Sphakia, Franco Castello, have been supposed to be the ancient Phoenix. They are not far from each other. Mr. Smith decides in favor of Lutro. I do not find that the direction in which Luke says that the harbor opened, is urged as offering any difficulty in regard to the identification with any one of these places. — *βλέποντα* — *χωρὸν*, looking towards *Lips* and *Choros*, the points from which the winds so called blew, viz. the south-west and north-west. So most critics understand the expression. The intermediate point between those winds is west; so that the harbor would have faced in that di-

rection, while the opposite shores receded from each other towards the south and north. Mr. Smith, as stated above, is of the opinion that the Phoenix of Luke is the present Lutro. That harbor, however, opens to the east. To reconcile Luke's statement with this circumstance, he understands *κατὰ Αἶβα*—*Χῶρον* to mean *according to the direction* in which those winds blew, and not as is generally supposed *whence* they blew. "Now this is exactly the description of Lutro, which looks or is open to the east; but having an island in front which shelters it, it has two entrances, one looking to the north-east which is *κατὰ Αἶβα*, and the other to the south-east, *κατὰ Χῶρον*." But it is hardly safe for the sake of such a coincidence to depart from a usage of the language so well established as that on which the common interpretation rests. No violence, it is true, would be done to the preposition by understanding it as he proposes; but such a sense in connection with nouns like those which accompany it here, needs to be proved by surer examples. The expression *κατὰ κύμα καὶ ἄνεμον*, which he adduces from Herod. 4. 110 is not parallel; for *ἄνεμος* does not belong to the class of proper names or nouns equivalent to proper names such as the Greeks were accustomed to employ in geographical designations. The passage from Arrian's *Periplus of the Euxine* is equally inconclusive. To translate *κατ' ἐνῆρον* there *before the east wind*, is to assume the point in dispute. The context presents no reason why that expression should not be understood in conformity with the ordinary sense of such phrases, viz. towards the point whence *Eurus* blows, not whither.

The storm; it rages for many days, and all hope of safety is destroyed.
Vs. 13—20.

V. 18. *ὑποπνεύσαντος δὲ Νότον*, *Now when a south wind blew moderately*. After passing Cape Matala, the extreme southern point of Crete¹ and only four or five miles to the west of Fair Havens, the coast turns suddenly to the north; and hence for the rest of the way up to Phoenix, a south-wind was as favorable a one as they could desire. — *δόξαντες* — *κεκατηχέναι*, *thinking to have gained their purpose*, regarding it as already secured. It was somewhat less than forty miles from Fair Havens to Phoenix. With a southern breeze, therefore, they could expect to reach their destination in a few hours. — *ἄραρες* sc. *τῆς ἀγκυρας*, *having weighed*. — *ἄσσοι* — *Κρήτην*, *they coasted*

¹ See Forbiger, *Handb.* v. 3. p. 1033. It retains still the ancient name.

by *Crete*, lit. *nearer* sc. than usual, i. e. quite near. This clause as we see from the next verse, describes their progress immediately after leaving their anchorage at Fair Havens. It applies, therefore, to the first few miles of their course. During this distance, as has been suggested already, the coast continues to stretch towards the west; and it was not until they had turned Cape Matala that they would have the full benefit of the southern breeze which had sprung up. With such a wind they would be able just to weather that point, provided they kept near to the shore. We have, therefore, a perfectly natural explanation of their proceeding in the manner that Luke has stated.

V. 14. *Μετ'—οὐ πολὺ*, *After not long*, shortly. The tempest, therefore, came upon them before they had advanced far from their recent anchorage. They were still much nearer to that place than they were to Phoenix. It is important to observe this because it shows what course the ship took in going from Crete to Claude;—*ἔβαλε*—*τυφωνικός*, a *typhonic wind struck against it*, i. e. the ship. Some critics, as even Kuinoel, De Wette, Meyer, refer *αὐτῆς* to *Κρητῆν*. But how can we understand it in that way, when it said in the next verse that they yielded to the force of the wind and were driven by it towards Claude, which is south-west from Fair Havens? It is impossible to admit that view, unless we suppose that in the course of a few moments it blew from precisely opposite quarters. The opinion of others appears to be more correct that the writer's mind at *αὐτῆς* was upon the ship, and that he uses that form of the pronoun because the mental antecedent was *ναῦς* which actually occurs in v. 41, though *πλοῖον* is Luke's ordinary word for that idea. Comp. Win. § 65. 7. *ἔβαλε* may be taken as intransitive, (Raph. Annot. 2. p. 197) or as others prefer, may imply after it *ἐαντόν*; see Butt. § 130. N. 2. *τυφωνικός* describes the wind with reference to the whirling of the clouds occasioned by the meeting of opposite currents of the air. Pliny (Lib. 2. c. 48) in speaking of sudden blasts says that they cause a vortex which is called "typhoon;" and Aulus Gellius (Lib. 19. c. 1) mentions certain figures or appearances of the clouds in violent tempests, which it was customary to call "typhoons." This term is intended to give us an idea of the fury of the gale; and its name, *εὐρε*, *πύλων* as the word should most probably be written, denotes the point from which it came, i. e. *Euroaquilo* as in the Vulg., a *north-east wind*. This reading occurs in AB, which are two of the oldest manuscripts, and in some other authorities. It is approved by Grotius, Mill-Bentley, De Wette and others. Lachmann inserts it in his edition of the text. The internal evidence favors that form of the word. A

storm from that quarter accounts most perfectly for the ship's movements and the measures employed to control them, which are mentioned or intimated in the sequel of the narrative. The other principal readings are *εὐροκλύδων*, compounded of *εὐρος* and *κλύδων*, *Eurus fluctus excitans*, or as De Wette thinks more correct, *fluctus Euro excitatus*; and *εὐροκλύδων* from *εὐρύς* and *κλύδων*, *broad wave*. It appears, therefore, that the gentle southern breeze with which they started, changed suddenly to a violent northern or north-eastern wind. Such a sudden change is a very common occurrence in those seas. An English naval officer in his Remarks on the Archipelago says: "It is always safe to anchor under the lee of an island with a northern wind, as it dies away gradually; but it would be extremely dangerous with southerly winds, as they almost invariably shift to a violent northerly wind."

V. 15. *συνναρπασθέντος*, *being seized*, caught by the wind. *ἀντοφθαλμεῖν*, *to look in the face*, withstand. It is said that the ancients often painted an eye on each side of the prow of their ships. It might not be easy to determine whether the personification implied in this mode of speaking, arose from that practice, or whether the practice arose from the personification. *ἐπιδόντες*, *giving up* to the wind *αὐτὸ πλοῖον* as most prefer, on account of what precedes, or *ἐαυτούς* in anticipation of the next verb. See Raph. Annot. 2. p. 197. — *ἀφερόμεθα*, *we were borne*, not hither and thither, but at the mercy of the wind, the direction of which we know from the next verse.

V. 16. *Νησίον* — *Κλαύδην*, *running under a certain small island called Claude*. This island Ptolemy calls Claudos. It bears now the name of Gozzo. As the gale commenced blowing soon after the departure from Fair Havens, the ship in order to reach Claude, must have been driven to the south-east. Their course, had they been near Phoenix at the commencement of the storm, would have been due south. The effect which the wind produced, shows what the direction of the wind was; it must have been from the north or north-east, which agrees, as we have seen, with the probable import of the name which Luke has employed to designate the wind. In the nautical language of the ancients as in that of the moderns, *to run* appears to have meant to sail before the wind. Comp. 16: 11. *ὑπὸ* in the participle according to the view suggested on v. 4, would signify that they passed Claude so as to have the wind between them and that island, that is, since the direction of the wind has been already determined, they went to the south-east of it instead of the north. That they approached near to the island at the same time, may be concluded from the next words. Others infer their vicinity to the island from

the preposition, which they take to be, = *under the coast* ; but as in the other case they suppose that this was the southern coast from the direction in which such a wind must have driven the ship. — μόλις — — τῆς σκάφης, *we were able with difficulty to secure the boat*. Those expert in maritime affairs say that the boat of a large vessel cannot be taken on board while the vessel is scudding before a strong gale, without extreme danger. Hence it is probable, that when on the southern side of Claude, they were sheltered somewhat against the storm, and were able to arrest the progress of the ship sufficiently to enable them to accomplish this object. Yet the sea even here was still apparently so tempestuous as to render this a difficult operation. It may have added to the difficulty that the boat having been towed more than twenty miles through a raging sea, could hardly fail to have been filled with water. They had omitted this precaution at the outset because the weather, was mild, and they had expected to be at sea but a few hours. It will be observed that Luke has not stated why they found it so difficult to secure the boat. We are left to conjecture the reasons.

V. 17. βοηθείαις ἐχρῶντο, *they used helps*, i. e. ropes, chains and the like, for the purpose specified in the next clause. So the expression is understood by most scholars. De Wette thinks that βοηθείαις may denote *helping expedients* in general, of which ὑποζωννύσας τὸ πλοῖον, *undergirding the ship*, was one. It cannot well mean *the services* of the passengers as some maintain ; for the limiting term which that sense of the expression would require, is wanting. Falconer in his *Marine Dictionary* describes the mode of undergirding ships as practised in modern navigation, in the following terms : “To frap a ship (*ceintrer un vaisseau*) is to pass four or five turns of a large cable-laid rope round the hull or frame of a ship, to support her in a great storm, or otherwise, when it is apprehended that she is not strong enough to resist the violent efforts of the sea. This expedient, however, is rarely put in practice.” In ancient times it was very common to resort to this process. The larger ships on their more extended voyages carried with them ὑποζώματα or ropes for undergirding, so as to be prepared for any emergency which might require them. The Attic arsenals kept a supply of them always on hand for public use. This mode of strengthening a ship at sea, although not adopted so often as it was anciently, is not unknown in the experience of modern navigators. In 1815, Mr. Henry Hartley, was employed to pilot the Russian fleet from England to the Baltic. One of the ships under his escort, the *Jupiter*, was frapped round the middle by three or four turns of a stream-cable. Sir George Back on his return from his Arctic voyage

in 1837, was forced in consequence of the shattered and leaking condition of his ship, to undergird her.¹ The Albion, a British frigate, in 1846, encountered a hurricane on her voyage from India, and was under the necessity of frapping her hull together, to prevent her from sinking. To these more recent instances many others of an earlier date might be added.² The common representation in regard to the ancient mode of applying the hypozomata to a ship, makes it different from the modern usage. Boeckh's view is the one followed in most of the recent works. According to his investigation, the ropes instead of being passed under the bottom, and fastened on deck, "ran in a horizontal direction around the ship from the stern to the prow. They ran round the vessel in several circles, and at certain distances from one another. The length of these tormenta as they are called in Latin, varied accordingly as they ran around the higher or lower part of the ship, the latter being naturally shorter than the former. Their number varied according to the size of the ship."³ Mr. Smith in his Dissertation on the Ships of the Ancients, controverts the foregoing opinion, as being founded on a misapprehension of the passages in the ancient writers, which have been supposed to prove it. He maintains that the cables instead of being applied lengthways, were drawn around the middle at right angles to the ship and parallel to it.⁴ The other mode, he says, "must have been as impracticable as it would have been unavailing for the purpose of strengthening the ship." Luke states a fact simply in relation to this matter; he does not describe the mode. The question, therefore, is one of archaeological interest merely; it does not affect the writer's accuracy. — *μη — ἐκπίπτειν*, lest they should be stranded upon the Syrtis, lit. fall out, i. e. from the sea or deep water upon the land or rocks: comp. vs. 26, 29, 30. Syrtis Major is here meant which was on the coast of Africa, south-west from Crete. This gulf was an object of great dread to

¹ See Mr. Smith's work, pp. 65, 66.

² Many scholars suppose that Horace alludes to this practice in Od. I. 14. 6: — Sine funibus vix durare carinae Possint imperiosius Aequor. The writer was once explaining this passage according to that view, to a college-class, when one of the members who had been at sea, stated that he himself had assisted in such an operation on board a vessel approaching our own coast.

³ This is quoted from the Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, p. 830, Eng. ed. The account rests on Boeckh's authority. The writer of the article *Navis* in Pauly's Real-Encyclopædie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft, follows the same authority. See Band V. S. 463.

⁴ The mode of executing this manoeuvre as I am informed, is to sink the ropes over the prow, and then draw them towards the middle of the ship fastening the ends on deck.

mariners on account of its dangerous shoals. The other Syrtis was too far to the west, to have been the one to which they would have felt exposed in their present situation. — *χαλάσαυτος τὸ σκεῦος*, *having lowered the gear*. The latter term is indefinite and may be applied to almost any of the ship's appurtenances, as sails, masts, anchors and the like. Many have supposed it to refer here to the mast, or if there were more than one in this case, to the principal mast; but it would seem to put that supposition out of the question, that according to all probability the masts of the larger sailing ships among the ancients were not movable, like those of the smaller vessels, but were fixed in their position and would require to be cut away; a mode of removal which the accompanying participle shows could not have been adopted in the present instance. See Juv. 12. 59. The surprising opinion of some that *σκεῦος* is the anchor, contradicts the very next words which follow. Of the other applications of the word, the only one which the circumstances of the ship at this juncture naturally suggest, is that it refers to the sail. It is not certain how we are to take the article here. It leads us to think most directly perhaps of the large square sail, which was attached to the principal mast. The ancients had vessels with one, two and three masts. *τὸ* would then point out that sail by way of eminence. The presumption is that if the ship carried other sails as cannot well be doubted, they had taken them down before this; and now having lowered the only one which they had continued to use, they let the vessel "scud under bare poles." This is the general view of the meaning. It would follow from this, that the wind must have changed its direction before they were wrecked on Melite; for some thirteen days elapsed before that event, during which the storm continued to rage; and within that time, had they been constantly driven before a north-east wind, they must have realized their fear of being stranded on the African coast. If, on the contrary, we assume that the storm blew during all this time from the same point, we must suppose that they adopted some precaution against that danger, which Luke does not mention, although he may imply it. The only such precaution according to the opinion of nautical men, which they could have adopted in their circumstances, was to turn the head of the vessel as far towards the north-west as the direction of the wind would allow, and at the same time keep as much sail spread, as they could carry in so severe a gale. For this purpose, they would need the principal sail; and the sail lowered is most likely to have been the sail above it, i. e. the top-sail or *supparum* as the Romans termed it. By the adoption of these means they would avoid the shore on which they were so fearful of being cast, and drift in the direction of the

island on which they were finally wrecked. τὸ according to this supposition would refer to the sail as definite in the conceptions of the writer, or as presumptively well known to the reader. — οὕτως ἐφείποντο, *thus*, i. e. with the ship undergirded, and with the main-sail lowered; or it may be, with the top-sail lowered and the storm-sail set, *they were borne on*, at the mercy of the elements. Here closes the account of the first fearful day.

V. 18. τῇ ἐξῆς. The night brought to them no relief. The return of day disclosed to them new dangers. It was evident that the ship must be lightened, or founder at sea. Their next step, therefore, was to try the effect of that measure. — ἐκβολὴν ἐποιούντο, *lit. they made a casting out*, of what the expression does not define; perhaps of the supernumerary spars and other rigging, and some of the heavier articles of merchandise with which the ship was laden. The wheat which appears to have constituted the bulk of the cargo, they reserved till the last; see v. 38.

V. 19. τῇ τρίτῃ. The third day arrives and the storm has not abated. They are obliged to lighten the ship still more. This renewed necessity appears to indicate that the ship was in a leaking condition, and that the danger from this source was becoming more and more imminent. — αὐτόχειρες — ἐξήρψαμεν, *we cast out with our own hands the furniture of the ship*, such as tables, beds, chests and the like. σκευὴν is variously explained. Meyer, De Wette, and others attach to it the sense given above. Some understand it of the masts, yards, sails and other equipments of the ship, similar to these. If we adopt this interpretation, we must limit it so as to make it consistent with vs. 18, 29, 44. Some again, as Wetstein, Kuinoel, Winer, suppose it to denote the baggage of the passengers. πλοίου must then be taken as the genitive of the container = *on board the ship*.

V. 20. μήτε δὲ, etc. The absence of the sun and stars increased their danger, since it deprived them of their only means of observation. The Greeks and Romans, in the most improved state of navigation among them, were reluctant to venture out to sea beyond the sight of land. During the day they kept the high lands or shore or some island in view, to direct them; and at night depended for the same purpose on the position, the rising and setting of different stars. — πλείονας ἡμέρας, *several days*. These include probably the three days which have been mentioned, but how many of the eleven days which followed before the final disaster, is uncertain. We do not know how long the interval was between Paul's address and that event. — λοιπὸν, *for the future*, thenceforth. They relinquish now their last hope of escape; destruction seemed to be inevitable. In their condition they

must have felt that their only resource was to run the vessel ashore. But the state of the weather rendered it impossible for them to distinguish in what direction the shore lay; and thus they were unable to make the only further effort for their preservation, which was left to them. In judging of the dangers which menaced them, we must take into account the state of the vessel, as well as the violence of the storm.

In their despair the Apostle cheers them with the hope of deliverance.
Vs. 21—26.

V. 21. πολλῆς ἀστικής, *much abstinence* as to time and degree, i. e. both long continued and severe, but not entire; see on v. 33. This was not owing to their want of provisions, see v. 36, but was the effect in part at least, of their fears and dejection of mind, see vs. 22, 36; and in part also, of the difficulty of preparing food under such circumstances; and of the constant requisition made upon them for labor. — εἶδει μὲν, etc. The apostle recalls to mind their former mistake in disregarding his advice, in order to show his claim to their confidence with reference to the present communication. The δέ which μὲν required, does not follow. — κερδῆσαι — — ζημίαν, *and to have escaped*, lit. *gained this injury and loss*. *Lucrari* was used in the same manner. The phrase involves a just conception: an imminent danger avoided is so much gained.

V. 22. πλὴν τοῦ πλοίου, *except of the ship*. This limitation qualifies not the entire clause which precedes, but only ἀποβολὴ οὐδεμία εἶναι, which we are to repeat before the words here. μόνον would have marked the connection more precisely. See Win. § 65. 7.

V. 23. Whether the angel appeared to the apostle in a vision, or a dream, the mode of statement does not enable us to decide. — νυκτὶ ταύτῃ, *this night* just passed, or that which was passing. Most think it probable that he did not communicate the revelation to them until the return of day. — οὗ εἰμί, *whose I am*, to whom I belong as his property; in other words, whose servant he is. — ᾧ καὶ λατρεύω, *whom also I worship*, to whom I offer religious service and homage. This verb, in the New Testament, refers to external acts of worship, not, except by implication, to a religious life in general.

V. 24. Καίσαρι — — παραστήναι. See 23: 11. To remind the apostle of this still unfulfilled purpose of God, was the same thing as to assure him that he would escape the present danger. — κεχάρισται — — σοῦ, *God has given to thee all those who sail with thee*. They should be preserved for his sake. No one supposes the declaration here to affirm less than this. Many think that it implies also that Paul had

prayed for the safety of those in the ship with him; and that he receives now the assurance that his prayer in their behalf had prevailed. Such is the view of Calvin, Bengel, Olshausen, De Wette, and others. Bengel remarks here: *Facilius multi mali cum paucis piis servantur, quam unus pius cum multis reis perit. Navi huic similis mundus.*

V. 25. *πιστεύω γάρ, etc.* It is evident from v. 32 that the apostle had acquired a strong ascendancy over the minds of the passengers in the ship, if not of the others. He could very properly, therefore, urge his own confidence in God as a reason why they should dismiss their fears, so far at least as concerned the preservation of their lives.

V. 26. *εἰς νῆσον δὲ τινα, upon some island.* More than this was not revealed to him; see v. 39. — *ἐκπλεεῖν, be cast away.* See the remark on v. 17.

The discovery of land; and the frustrated attempt of the mariners to desert the ship. Vs. 27—32.

V. 27. *τεσσαρεσκαίδεκάτῃ νύξ, the fourteenth night* since their departure from Fair Havens. — *διατρεπομένων—Ἀδρία, as we were borne through so the waters (see v. 5) in the Adriatic.* It has been said that the modern Malta lies too far south to be embraced in the sea so designated. But the statement is erroneous. In its restricted sense, the Adriatic was the sea between Italy and Greece; but in a wider sense it comprehended also the Ionian Sea around Sicily, near which was Melite.¹ The later writers gave the name to the entire sea as far south as Africa.² — *ὑπερόουσιν — χόϊρας, the mariners suspected that some land was approaching them.* “Luke uses here the graphic language of seamen to whom the ship is the principal object, whilst the land rises and sinks, nears and recedes.” He does not state on what ground they suspected their vicinity to the land. It was no doubt the noise of the breakers. This is usually the first notice of their danger which mariners have in coming upon a coast in a dark night. This circumstance furnishes reason for believing that the traditionary scene of the shipwreck, is the actual one. It is impossible to enter St. Paul's Bay from the east without passing near the point of Koura; and while the land there, as navigators inform us, is too low to be seen in a stormy night, the breakers can be heard at a considerable distance, and in a north-easterly gale are so violent as to form on charts the distinctive feature of that head-land.

¹ See Forbiger, Handb. B. 2. s. 19. Note 36. Win. Realw. B. 1. s. 23.

² See Biscoe's History of the Acts, confirmed from other Authors, etc. p. 251. ed. 1840.

V. 28. *βραχὺ δὲ διαστήσαντες*, etc.* There was but a short distance, it will be observed, between the two soundings; and the rate of decrease in the depth of the water is such as would not be found to exist on every coast. It is said that a vessel approaching Malta from the same direction, finds the same soundings, at the present day.—*ὀργυιά*, *fathom*, (from *ὀρέγω*, to stretch,) *σημαίνει τὴν ἔκτασιν τῶν χειρῶν σὺν τῇ πλάτει τοῦ στήθους*. Elym. Magn.

V. 29. *εἰς τραχεῖς τόπους*, upon rough (rocky) places. Their apprehension arose not from what they saw but from what they had reason to fear in a dark night, on an unknown coast. — *ἐκ πρύμνης* — — *τέσσαρας*. The ancient vessels did not carry, in general, so large anchors as those which we employ; and hence they had often a greater number. Athanaeus mentions a ship which had eight iron anchors. Paul's ship, as we see from the next verse, had other anchors, besides those which were dropped from the stern. The object of anchoring in that way was to arrest the progress of the ship more speedily. No time was to be lost, as they knew not that they might not founder the next moment upon the shoals where the breakers were dashing. The ancient ships were so constructed that they could anchor by the prow or the stern, as circumstances might require. Another advantage of the course here taken, was that the head of the vessel was turned towards the land, which was their best position for running her ashore. That purpose they had no doubt already formed. — *ἤχοντο* — *γενέσθαι*, they desired that it might be day. In the darkness of the night they could not tell the full extent of the dangers which surrounded them. They must have longed for returning day on that account. In the mean time it must have been difficult to preserve a vessel which had been so long tempest-tossed from sinking. Their only chance of escape was to strand the ship, as soon as the light enabled them to select a place which admitted of it. It is evident that every moment's delay must have been one of fearful suspense as well as peril to them. The remark is full of significance.

V. 30. *τῶν δὲ ναυτῶν* — — *θάλασσαν*. This ungenerous attempt of the seamen to escape, confirms the remark before made that the ship was probably in so shattered a state, as to render it uncertain whether they could outride the storm until morning. They may have had another motive for the act. The shore might prove to be one on which they could not drive the vessel with any hope of safety; and they may have deemed it more prudent to trust themselves to the boat, than to remain and await the issue of that uncertainty. — *ἀγκύρας ἐκτείνειν*, to carry out anchors, not cast them out, as in the English version. Favored by the darkness and under color of the pretext assumed, they

would have accomplished apparently their object, had not Paul's watchful eye penetrated the design.

V. 31. *εἶπεν* — *στρατιώταις*. He addresses himself to the centurion and the soldiers, because the officers of the ship were themselves implicated in the plot, or, in consequence of the general desertion, had no longer any power to enforce their orders. — *οὗτοι ὑμεῖς*. The soldiers were destitute of the skill which the management of the ship required. It could not be brought successfully to land without the help of the mariners. This remark of Paul proves that the plan to abandon the vessel was not confined to a portion of the crew, but was a general one.

V. 32. *ἐκπνεσεῖν* to *fall off*, i. e. from the side of the ship, to which it had been made fast, v. 16.

Paul renews his assurance that their lives would be saved. They partake of their first regular meal since the commencement of the storm; and again lighten the ship. Vs. 33—38.

V. 33. *ἄχρι* — *γίνεσθαι*, now until it should be day, i. e. in the interval between the midnight mentioned v. 27 and the subsequent morning. — *προσδοκῶντες*, waiting for the cessation of the storm. *ἄσπονα διατελεῖτε*, ye continue fasting, where the adjective supplies the place of a participle. Win. § 46. *μηδὲν προσλαβόμενοι*, having taken nothing, adequate to their proper nourishment, no regular food, during all this time; see v. 21. "Appian speaks of an army which, for twenty days together, had neither food nor sleep; by which he must mean that they neither made full meals nor slept whole nights together. The same interpretation must be given to this phrase."—Doddridge.

V. 34. *τοῦτο ὑμᾶς*, for this (viz. that they should partake of food) is important for your preservation. On *πρὸς* with this sense, see Win. § 51. 4. f. They would have to submit to much fatigue and labor before they reached the shore, and needed, therefore, to recruit their strength. — *οὐδενός* — *πνεσῆται*. This was a proverbial expression, employed to convey an assurance of entire safety. See 1 Kings 1: 52. Luke 21: 18.

V. 35. *ἄρτον*, bread. This word, by a Hebraistic usage, often signifies food in the New Testament; but *κλάσας*, which follows, appears to exclude that sense here. Yet the present meal had no doubt its other accompaniments; the bread only being mentioned because that, according to the Hebrew custom, was broken and distributed among the guests after the giving of thanks. The apostle performed, on this occa-

sion, the usual office of the head of a Hebrew family. Olshausen expresses the fanciful opinion, as it seems to me, that the Christians among them regarded this act as commemorative of the Lord's Supper, though the others did not understand Paul's design. The language employed here, it is true, more frequently describes that ordinance, but it is used also of an ordinary meal; see Luke 24: 35.

V. 36. καὶ αὐτοί, *also themselves* as well as he. They followed his example.

V. 37. αἱ πᾶσαι ψυχαί, *all the souls together*. This has been termed an adverbial use of πᾶς = τὸ πᾶν, τὰ πάντα. See also 19: 7, where the words have the same order. It is usual to put the adjective with this force after the noun. See Vig. ed. Herm. p. 135. Kühn. Ausf. Gr. § 489. διακόσμιαι — — ἐξ. The ship must have been one of the larger size to have contained so many persons. See the remarks on v. 6.

V. 38. ἐκούριζον τὸ πλοῖον. Luke states the fact merely, but gives no explanation. The object may have been to diminish the depth of water which the ship drew, so as to enable them to approach nearer to the shore before striking. It has been conjectured also that the vessel may have been leaking so fast, that the measure was necessary in order to keep her from sinking. — τὸν σῖτον, *the wheat or grain, corn*, since the term has frequently that wider sense. If we adopt the view which was suggested on v. 18, we are to understand here that they threw into the sea the grain which constituted the cargo (Win. § 17. 1. c), or the bulk of the cargo which the ship carried. The fact that the ship belonged to Alexandria is presumptive proof, that she was loaded with grain, since that was the principal commodity exported from Egypt to Italy. The explicit notice here that they lightened the ship by throwing the grain into the sea, harmonizes with that presumption and tends to confirm it. Some have thought that σῖτον may denote the ship's provisions; but these would have consisted of various different articles, and would not naturally be described by so specific a term as this. The connection, which has been said to favor the opinion last stated, agrees equally well with the other. Having their hopes revived by the spectacle of Paul's undisturbed serenity, and by his animating address, and being re-invigorated after so long a fast by the food of which they had partaken, they were now in a condition both of mind and body to address themselves to the labors which their safety required. This view, therefore, places their lightening of the ship in a perfectly natural connection with the circumstances related just before. In addition to this, as Hensen urges,¹ their remaining stock of provisions, after so protracted a voyage, must have been already so reduced that it could have

¹ Der Apostel Paulus, Sein Leben, Wirken und Schriften, s. 583.

had but little or no effect on the ship, whether they were thrown away or retained.

The Shipwreck ; those on board escape to the shore by swimming, or on fragments of the vessel. Vs. 39—44.

V. 39. τὴν γῆν etc., *they recognized not the land*, within view. The day had dawned and they could now distinguish it. It has appeared to some surprising that none of those on board should have known a place with which those, at least who were accustomed to the sea, might be expected to have been so well acquainted. The answer is, that the scene of the shipwreck was remote from the principal harbor, and as those who have been on the spot testify, distinguished by no marked feature which would render it known even to a native if he came unexpectedly upon it. — κόλπον — ἀγιάλον, *they perceived a certain inlet, creek, having a shore*, i. e. in a seaman's sense of that expression, a shore in which they could run the ship with a hope of saving their lives. The remark implies that the coast generally was unsafe for such an attempt. The present conformation of the coast on that side of Malta, confirms Luke's accuracy in this particular. The shore there presents an unbroken chain of rocks interrupted by a beach at only two points.

V. 40. καὶ — — θάλασσαν, *and having entirely cut away the anchors they abandoned them unto the sea*. On this force of περὶ, comp. v. 20. It has been referred to the position of the anchors as being around the ship ; but they had all been dropped from the stern and could not well have got scattered so as to be on different sides of the vessel. The English translators in their inaccurate version of this clause followed the Vulgate. — ἅμα — πηδαλίων, *at the same time unfastening the bands of the rudders*. Ancient vessels had sometimes one but more commonly two rudders. They were attached to the stern, one on each quarter, distinguished as the right and the left rudder. In the larger ships the extremities of the helms were joined by a pole which was moved by one man and kept the rudders always parallel. See Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antt. p. 458. When a vessel was anchored like the one in this case, by the stern, it would be necessary to lift the rudders out of the water and to secure them by bands. These bands it would be necessary to unfasten when the ship was again got under way. — ἐπάραντες — τῇ πρεουσῇ sc. αὐρᾷ, *having hoisted the fore-sail to the wind*. ἀρτίμων has been taken by different writers as the name of almost every sail which a vessel carries, e. g. main-sail, top-sail, jib, etc. We have no ancient definition of the term which throws any certain light upon its meaning. The nautical argument is said to be in favor of the fore-sail, i. e. the sail attached to the mast nearest to the prow ; or

if there was but one mast, fixed to a spar or yard near the prow. See Smith, p. 553. With that sail raised, it is said, that a vessel situated like this would move towards the shore with more precision and velocity than with any other.

V. 41. *περιπεσόντες* — — *διθάλασσον* *falling upon a place having two seas*. This has been supposed by many commentators to have been a concealed shoal or sand-bank, formed by the action of two opposite currents. In the course of time such a bank, as is frequently the case at the mouth of rivers or near the shore, may have been worn away,¹ so that the absence of any such obstruction there at the present time, decides nothing against that supposition. It has also been understood to have been a tongue of land or promontory, against the shores of which the sea beat strongly from opposite quarters. It is not stated that any projection exists there now, to which Luke's description, if explained in that manner, would apply. Mr. Smith is of the opinion that *τόπος διθάλασσος* may refer to the channel, not more than a hundred yards in breadth, which separates the small island Salmone from Malta; and which might very properly be called a place where "two seas meet," on account of the communication which it forms between the sea in the interior of the bay and the sea outside. He would place the scene of the shipwreck near that channel, and according to the representation on his map, a little to the north of the place to which tradition has generally assigned it. There is still a creek here which may have been the one towards which they directed the ship, and which must have had formerly a sandy beach, although it has now been wasted away by the action of the sea. The final shock ensues next. *ἡ μὲν πρῶρα* etc., *the prow sticking fast remained immovable, but the stern was broken by the violence of the waves*. "This is a remarkable circumstance, which but for the peculiar nature of the bottom of St. Paul's Bay, it would be difficult to account for. The rocks of Malta disintegrate into extremely minute particles of sand and clay, which when acted upon by the currents, or surface agitation, form a deposit of tenacious clay; but in still water, where these causes do not act, mud is formed; but it is only in the creeks where are no currents, and at such a depth as to be undisturbed by the waves, that the mud occurs. A ship, therefore, impelled by the force of a gale into a creek with a bottom such as has been described, would strike a bottom of mud into which the forepart would fix itself and be held fast, whilst the stern was exposed to the force of the waves." See Smith's Monograph, p. 103.

¹ For examples of this, see Lyell's Principles of Geology, p. 285 sq., 8th ed. 1850.

V. 42. *τῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν*, etc. *Now a plan was formed on the part of the soldiers to put to death*, etc. Most critics allow that *ἵνα* with a finite mood in cases like this serves merely to circumscribe the infinitive. Win. § 45. 9; St. § 162. 3. 2. Of the rigor with which those were liable to be punished who were charged with the custody of prisoners, if the latter escaped from them in any way, we have proof in 12: 19. 16: 27.

V. 43. It will be recollected that according to the Roman custom each of the prisoners was chained to a particular soldier who was his keeper. The centurion had the general oversight of all the soldiers and the prisoners. — *ἐκώλυσεν* — *βουλήματος*. Thus it happened again that Paul's companions were indebted for the preservation of their lives to their connection with him. — *ἐκέλευσε*. It is most natural to suppose that he gave this direction to those only under his command. *αὐτοῖς* which precedes suggests also that limitation. *πάντας* in the last clause of the next verse comprehends both passengers and crew. — *ἀπορρίψαντας*, reciprocal. — *ἐξιέναι*, *should go forth*, not from the ship which is the force of *ἀπό* in the participle just before, but from the sea upon the land.

V. 44. *τοὺς λοιπούς* is the subject of *ἐξιέναι*. — *ἐπὶ σανίσιν*, *upon boards*, such probably as were in use about the ship, but not parts of it, which would confound this clause with the next. — *ἐπὶ τινων — πλοίου*, *upon some of the pieces from the ship* which they themselves tore away or which the surge had broken off. Most critics distinguish the two expressions in this way. Kuinoel renders *σανίσιν*, *tables*. A few understand that term of the permanent parts of the vessel, and *τινων* of such things as seats, barrels and the like which were floating away from the wreck. These last they are likely to have lost or thrown into the sea before this.

Their abode during the winter at Melite. Ch. 28: 1—10.

V. 1. *ἐπέγνωσαν*, *they ascertained*, by intercourse probably with the inhabitants; see on 27: 39. — *Μελίτη ἢ νήσος*. That this was the modern Malta, cannot well be doubted. An island with the same name, now Meleda, lies up the Hadriatic on the coast of Dalmatia, which some have maintained to have been the one where Paul was wrecked. Bryant defended that opinion. It is advocated still in Valpy's notes on the New Testament. The argument for that opinion founded on the name Hadriatic, has been already refuted in the remarks on 27: 27. It has also been alleged for it that no poisonous serpents are found at present on Malta. The more populous and culti-

vated state of the island accounts for their disappearance. Naturalists inform us that the extinction of such reptiles follows in the natural train of events as the aboriginal forests of a country are cleared up, or as the soil is otherwise brought under cultivation. It would be difficult to find a surface of equal extent in so artificial a state as that of Malta at the present day.¹ The positive reasons for the common belief are that the traditional evidence sustains it; that Malta lies in the track of a vessel driven by a north-east wind; that the reputed locality of the wreck agrees with Luke's account; that the Alexandrian ship in which they reëmbarked would very naturally winter there but not at Meleda; and that the subsequent course of the voyage to Puteoli is that which a vessel would pursue in going from Malta, but not from the other place.

V. 2. οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι. The inhabitants are so called with reference to their language which was not that either of the Greeks or Romans. They belonged to the Phoenician race and spoke a Semitic dialect, most probably the Punic, i. e. the Phoenician as spoken by the people of Carthage.² See Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar, § 2. 2. The Greeks and Romans occupied the island at different times as conquerors but never introduced to any great extent their speech or manners.—διὰ τὸν ἑνὸν—ψύχος. This remark disproves the assumption of some critics that it was Scirocco wind, i. e. from the south-east, which Paul's ship encountered. That wind does not continue to blow more than two or three days, and is hot and sultry even as late as the month of November.

V. 3. ἔχιδρα, a viper, which appears to have been thrown into the fire with the twigs which Paul had collected. ἐκ τῆς θερμότητος, from the heat, the effect of it. A few good manuscripts read ἀπὸ, a more exact preposition for that sense. This is the common view, to which De Wette also adheres. This may also mean from the heat, the place of it, as rendered by Winer (§ 51. 5. b.), Meyer and some others.

¹ Mr. Smith has illustrated this point fully, p. 110 sq. See also the article *Melita* in Pauly's Real-Encyclopædie, written by Forbiger.

² It has been frequently asserted that the ancient Punic is the basis of the language spoken by the native Maltese of the present day. That opinion is incorrect. Malta at the time of the Saracen irruption, was overrun by Arabs, from whom the common people of the island derive their origin. The dialect spoken by them is a corrupt Arabic, agreeing essentially with that of the Moors, but intermixed to a greater extent with words from the Italian, Spanish, and other European languages. To Gesenius belongs the merit of having first investigated thoroughly this dialect in his Versuch über die maltesische Sprache, etc., Leipzig, 1810. He has given the results of that investigation in his Article on *Arabien* in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædie.

ix is kept nearer in this way to its ordinary force. — ἐξελθούσα, *coming forth*, with a spring probably, according to the habit of that reptile. The horned viper has been known to leap three or four feet, in order to reach his victim. — καθήψε, *fastened itself*, in the sense of the middle. This reflexive use of the active occurs only here, which accounts for καθήψατο as read in some copies.

V. 4. κρεμάμενον — αὐτοῦ, *hanging from his hand*, to which it clung by the mouth. Luke does not say expressly that Paul was bitten; but the nature of the reptile — the leap — the clinging to his hand — leave us to infer that with almost entire certainty. Those who stood near and witnessed the occurrence, supposed evidently that such was the fact. That he should have escaped being bitten under such circumstances would have been hardly less miraculous than that the ordinary effect of the poison should have been counteracted. We seem to be justified according to either view, in regarding his preservation as a fulfilment of the promise of Christ in Mark 16: 17, 18. On the form of the participle, see Kühn. § 179, 5. — φορεύς — οὗτος. They perceived from his chain perhaps or some other indication, that Paul was a prisoner. The attack of the viper proved to them that he must have committed some atrocious crime. φορεύς points not to a specific offence, but to the class of offenders to which they supposed he might belong. — ζῆν οὐκ εἴαsen, *suffered not to live*. They consider his doom as sealed. Vengeance in their view had already smitten its victim.

V. 5. ἐπαθεν — κακόν. This statement agrees either with the supposition that he had not been bitten, or that the poison had produced no effect upon him.

V. 6. πίμπρασθαι, lit. to burn, to be inflamed, which is attended with heat. — καταπίπτειν — νεκρόν. Sudden collapse and death ensue often from the bite of serpents. οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, *nothing bad*, injurious; in a moral sense, Luke 23: 41. μεταβαλλόμενοι may take after it τὴν γράμην or omit it. — θεὸν — εἶναι. Bengel: Aut latro, iniquus, aut deus; sic modo tauri, modo lapides, 14: 13, 19. Datur tertium; homo DEI.

V. 7. τῷ πρωτῷ — Ποπλίῳ, *the chief of the island, by name Publius*. Melite was first conquered by the Romans during the Punic wars, and in the time of Cicero (4 Ver. c. 18.) was annexed to the praetorship of Sicily. The praetor of that island would naturally have a legate or deputy at this place. The title πρωτός under which he is mentioned here has been justly cited by apologetic writers (Tholuck, Ebrard, Krabbe, Lardner, Paley), as a striking proof of Luke's accuracy. No other ancient writer happens to have given his official designation; but a coin has been discovered in Malta, inscribed to a

certain Prudens on which he bears exactly the title — *πρώτος Μελιταιῶν* — which Luke has employed in this passage. It is impossible to believe that Publius or any other single individual would be called the *first man* in the island, except by way of official eminence. It will be observed that the father of Publius was still living, and during his life-time he would naturally have taken precedence of the son, had the distinction in this case been one which belonged to the family.

V. 8. *πυρεταῖς*. The plural has been supposed to describe the fever with reference to its recurrent attacks or paroxysms. This is one of those expressions in Luke's writings which have been supposed to indicate his professional training as a physician. See also 13: 23. 13: 13; and especially the comparison in his gospel 22: 44. It is correct to attach to them that significance. No other writer of the New Testament exhibits this sort of technical precision in speaking of diseases.

V. 10. *οἱ καί, who also*, on their part, i. e. while they came and received such benefit. — *πολλαῖς τιμαῖς*, with many honors, courtesies. They were entertained with a generous hospitality and distinguished by marks of special regard and kindness. Some render the word *rewards* or *presents*; but the next clause appears to limit their reception of such favors to the time of their departure and to the relief also of their necessary wants. It is certain that they did not, even then, accept the gifts which were proffered to them as a reward for their services; for that would have been at variance with the command of Christ in Matt. 10: 8.

Prosecution of the journey to Rome. Vs. 11—16.

V. 11. The three months are the time that they remained on the island. They were probably the months of November, December and January. The season may have admitted of their putting to sea earlier than usual — *ἐν πλοίῳ*. Luke does not state why this vessel had wintered here. It is a circumstance which shows the consistency of the narrative. The storm which occasioned the wreck of Paul's vessel, had delayed this one so long that it was necessary on reaching Melite to suspend the voyage until spring. — *παρασῆμυ Διοσκούροισι*, with the sign *Dioscouri*, or distinguished by its having images of Castor and Pollux painted or carved on the prow, from which images the vessel was named. This use of figure-heads, on ancient ships, was very common. See Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antt. p. 518. Castor and Pollux were the favorite gods of seamen, the winds and waves being supposed to be specially subject to their control. Comp. Horat. Od. 1. 3. 2. *παρά-*

σύμφ may be a noun or an adjective. The former appears to have been most common in this application. The other construction is common as regards the dative, and is preferred by De Wette.

V. 12. *Συρακούσας*. This place, the capital of Sicily, on the eastern coast of that island, was about eighty miles north from Melite. The detention here may have been occasioned by business.

V. 13. *περιελθόντες*, *having come around or about*. The sense of the preposition it is impossible to determine with certainty. One supposition is that it refers to their frequent alteration of the ship's course ; in other words, to their tacking, because the wind was unfavorable. Another is, that they were compelled by that cause to follow closely the sinuosities of the coast, to proceed circuitously. De Wette says, which is much less probable, that they may have gone *around* Sicily, or the southern extremity of Italy. — *εἰς Ῥήγιον*, Rhegium, now Reggio, was an Italian seaport, opposite to the north-eastern point of Sicily. Here they remained a day, when the wind, which had been adverse since their leaving Syracuse, became fair, and they resumed the voyage. — *ἐπιγενομένου*, *having arisen* on them. The dative of the person often follows *ἐνί* in this sense ; see Herod. 8. 13. — *δευτεραίῳ*, *on the second day* ; comp. John 11: 39. This adverbial use of the ordinals is classical. — *εἰς Ποιτόλους*. Puteoli, now Pozzuoli, was eight miles north-west from Neapolis, the modern Naples. It derived this name from *putei*, being famous for the baths which abounded there. Its earlier Greek name was *Λικαιάρχεια*. It was the principal port south of Rome. Nearly all the Alexandrian and a great part of the Spanish trade with Italy, was brought hither. The seventy-seventh Letter of Seneca gives a lively description of the interest which the arrival of the corn-ships from Egypt was accustomed to excite among the inhabitants of that town. The voyage from Rhegium to Puteoli, which the Dioscuri accomplished in less than two days, was about 180 miles. The passage, therefore, was a rapid one ; but as examples of the ancient rate of sailing show, not unprecedented. The course was nearly due north, and they were favored with a south wind.

V. 14. *ἐπ' αὐτοῖς*, *with them*. Win. § 52. c. — *ἡμέρας ἐπτά*, comp. 22: 6. 21: 4. They had an opportunity to spend a sabbath with them. The centurion granted this delay, not improbably, in order to gratify the wishes of Paul. — *καὶ οὕτως*, etc. *and so*, after the interval so spent = and then, *we went* (not came) *unto Rome*. The verb has both senses. The incidents in v. 15 occur on the way thither. It is unnecessary to regard the remark as proleptic.

V. 15. Two companies of the Christians at Rome went forth to meet the apostle ; but separately and at different times. Hence the advanced

party reached Appii Forum, forty miles from Rome, before Paul appeared; the later party met him at Tres Tabernae, which was thirty miles from Rome. Both places were on the Via Appia, which Paul would take at Capua. See Horat. Sat. 1. 3.

V. 16. τῷ στρατοπεδάρχῃ, *to the commander of the camp*, the praetorian camp, where the emperor's body-guard was quartered; see Phil. 1: 13. Nearly all critics at present, as Olshausen, Anger, De Wette, Meyer, Wieseler, and others, suppose this officer, i. e. the *praefectus praetorio*, to be meant here. The prisoners who were sent to Rome from the provinces, were committed to his custody. There is a difference of opinion in regard to the article. The command of the praetorian guard was divided between two praefects, except during a part of Nero's reign, when Burrus acted as sole *praefectus praetorio*. He held the office as late as the beginning of the year 62 A. D., which was not far from the time of Paul's arrival at Rome. Wieseler finds the explanation of τῷ in this fact, and at the same time as an argument for the correctness of the chronology, which assigns the apostle's arrival to that or the preceding year. This view is very possibly the correct one. It would furnish a striking coincidence between Luke's narrative and the history of the times. Yet in speaking of *the praefect* the writer may have meant the one who acted in this particular case, he who took into his charge the prisoners whom the centurion transferred to him, whether he was sole praefect or head colleague with him. De Wette assents to Meyer in this explanation of the article. The expression, as so understood, does not affirm that there was but one praefect or deny it. — μένει καθ' ἑαυτὸν, *to dwell by himself*, instead of being confined with the other prisoners. This was a favor which the Roman laws often granted to those who were not suspected of any very serious offence. The centurion who had already acted so friendly a part towards the apostle, may have procured for him this indulgence, or it may have been owing to the terms in which Festus stated the accusation against him. — σὺν στρατιώτῃ, *with the soldier who guarded him*, and to whom he was fastened by a chain. Different soldiers relieved each other in the performance of this office. Hence, as Paul states in Phil. 1: 13, he became, in the course of time, personally known to a great number of the praetorian soldiers, and through them to their comrades. The notoriety which he thus acquired, served to make his character as a prisoner for the sake of the gospel, more widely known, and thus to aid him in his efforts to extend the knowledge of Christ. To this result he refers in Phil. 2: 12 seq.

¹ Chronologie des apostolischen Zeitalters u. s. w., p. 86.

ARTICLE IX.

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DR. DE WETTE.¹

By B. B. Edwards, Professor at Andover.

WE shall not undertake to furnish in the following article, a complete account of the life and writings of this distinguished theologian and commentator. It will rather be our object to give some notices of his personal and social character, so far as his friends have provided the materials. Entertaining, as we do, on many subjects in biblical criticism, radically different views from those propounded by this eminent writer, it is refreshing to know how estimable and honored he was in all his relations as a man and a citizen, with what singular attraction he drew friends and students around him, how earnest, childlike and simple his manners were, how comprehensive in his views and unflagging in his studies, how happily he blended culture and a pure taste with talent and knowledge, and how, especially towards the close of life, his thoughts and hopes seemed to gather around Him, without whom there is no salvation, the Rock of Ages, the only Life and Light of man. Before proceeding to our task, a few preliminary observations may not be unimportant.

German writers, both in Philosophy and Theology, have been arranged into various classes, the right, the centre, the left, the extreme right, the extreme left, etc. But there are important points where they coincide. In some essential respects they are formed in one mould. Various influences have been at work for many years, which have affected them all alike, the naturalist and the supernaturalist, the young Hegelian and the evangelical scholar. Now in judging of individual character, it is essential to bring into account those influences which all have shared in common. Otherwise, we shall form unjust judgments. Instead of exercising candor and an enlightened discrimination, we shall condemn men *en masse*, and thus violate some of the plainest principles of Christian morality. Often it

¹ 1. Locke, zur freundschaftlichen Erinnerung an D. De Wette, Studien u. Kritiken, drittes Heft. 1850.

2. Rede bei der Beerdigung des Herrn Dr. De Wette, gehalten den 19. Juni 1849, von Dr. K. R. Hagenbach.

3. W. M. L. De Wette, und die Bedeutung seiner Theologie für unsere Zeit, von Dr. Daniel Schenkel, Pfarrer am Münster, Schaffhausen. 1849.

4. Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette. Eine akademische Gedächtnisrede, von Dr. K. R. Hagenbach, Leipzig, 1850.

is the system which is in fault, not the man ; it is the institution which we should denounce, not the individual. The root of the difficulty may be in the national temperament, in causes which have been in operation for centuries, and of which particular writers are in a great measure the innocent and unconscious exponents. By overlooking such obvious considerations, many persons are accustomed to pronounce harsh and sweeping judgments, which only serve to create and perpetuate melancholy prejudices. We will advert to some of the more obvious of these causes.

First. Among the influences which have given a general likeness to German writers, is that which we may trace to the union of the church with the State. If the government and the leading ecclesiastical authorities happen to be rationalist, as for example, has been the case in the Grand Duchy of Weimar, then the pulpits and the schools would be brought under the same destructive influence. Strong temptations would be held out to the abandonment of the old creeds and to the profession of rationalist opinions. If the higher powers were evangelical, as in Prussia, motives would be brought into action which would lead to the hypocritical profession of evangelical views ; an unsuccessful applicant for office might charge his failure to his frank avowal of opinions that were considered unsound. Besides, the system strikes at the root of all ecclesiastical discipline. By tolerating avowed deists and pantheists as teachers in the church and professors of theology, all the interests of piety and truth would be compromised. The young theologian sees that the widest departures from the confessions and from biblical truth is no hindrance to preferment.

Second. The despotic character of many of the governments in Germany, has been one of the most fruitful sources of theological and philosophical error. In some respects, the Prussian government has been as arbitrary as that of Russia or Austria. These *paternal* governments have acted on one vast system of regulations, of minute and vexatious interference. The political, social, religious and private life is harassed by an all-pervading espionage. A business partnership cannot be formed, an inn cannot be kept, a marriage cannot be consummated, without its being made a subject for government inspection. The poor man has a supervisor over him from the cradle to the grave. All must attend the school, all must be confirmed, baptized, and buried under the formalities of a special code. In short, in certain great departments of thought and action, freedom has existed only in name. But the mind is free and must have scope. In the provinces of abstract, scientific, historical, theological truth, the Germans have had the

"largest liberty." Once escaped from government domination, they have run wild over the regions of "the absolute." The individual, who, in practical life, is obedient, obsequious and timid, in speculation is bold as a lion. In politics he is on forbidden ground; in antiquities, he has free range; the divine right of kings may not be questioned; divine inspiration may be denied and scouted; the vice-gerent of God must be honored; God himself may be resolved into an abstraction. In short, in proportion to the absence of freedom in some spheres of action, is the reckless abuse of it in others.

Third. The influence of Leibnitz, Kant, and their followers has contributed to give to the race of German scholars a thoroughly subjective character. In whatever respects the different schools of theologians and philosophers may differ, all, or nearly all, agree in dwelling upon truth in its subjective relations. Neither mind or matter is considered practically, in its bearings on man's happiness and well being. A history is not a detail of actual life, but the evolution of a principle, or the creation of a tendency, or the development of a myth, with only a germ of objective truth. A miracle, stripped of its adventitious costume, is a great event in the struggle of some heroic spirit, or a sudden bound which humanity makes in its everlasting progress. Facts, objective truth, are of little account, unless they can be adduced as links in a theory, or be shown to have roots in the mind. The German cannot rest upon them as ultimate grounds. All history is uncertain, all experience is vacillating, unless the alleged phenomena can be made to accord or symbolize with what is fitting and natural in the view of the investigator. This intense subjectiveness makes German literature and theology one-sided and so far unphilosophical. German writers have never had an adequate understanding and perception of the treasures of thought which exist in the English language. The very works, which of all others, were needed in German education, have been unknown or depreciated. The great masters of thought in the English language have been set down as practical, shallow, empirical. The illustrious names that will shine forever in our firmament, Baxter, Howe, Bates, Butler, Edwards, are hardly worth enumerating in a German catalogue, or are placed on a level with some fifth-rate, paltry, Teutonic writer.¹ No one has read the history of the various branches of theology in German writers, without being struck with the meagreness of the English list. Such men as Neander mourned over the want of the practical in the German character and theology, yet his favorite English authors were

¹ One of the greatest living German theologians had never heard of Edwards on the Will!

those who most resembled the German. It is to be feared that he did not use his great name and influence in effecting that revolution which German literature and modes of thinking so urgently need. Much of the ill effects of De Wette's views might have been prevented, if he had made himself at home in the practical, wholesome, objective and yet profound writers in English literature.

Fourth. The dead orthodoxy which prevailed in the German churches so extensively in the latter part of the eighteenth and in the beginning of the nineteenth century, was fitted to damp all generous aspiration, to destroy all influences favorable to a vital, orthodox piety. Nothing could have been more artfully adapted to disgust ingenuous young men with creeds and confessions. The professed defenders of biblical truth betrayed a frigid indifference. The church service was gone through with as an empty formality, in some instances as a prelude to a theatrical performance. Rationalism, bad as it was, was preferable to this twice-dead orthodoxy. It had learning, zeal, honesty, which orthodoxy often had not. At the door of this cold, stiff Lutheranism, is to be laid much of the evil of the rationalism of later times, and of the vulgar infidelity of the present day. The staid, precise, passionless formalists of the eighteenth century failed of course to commend vital Christianity to the people. The various forms of rationalism to which they gave birth, were powerless of good, where they were not positively pernicious. The consequences are, the socialism, the low democracy, the godless Hegelianism, the infinite confusion of Germany as it now is. Which was most in fault, the sapless orthodoxy, or the icy rationalism, it would be hard to decide. At all events, the various phases which rationalism has assumed, and the various partial reactions from it, have revealed the sad effects of the dead forms which oppressed the country of the Reformation fifty years ago. No party has wholly escaped from its contaminating touch. Individuals of evangelical views and of eminent piety have not been able to keep themselves wholly clear from the contagion.

De Wette, while exposed, in common with his countrymen, to these general influences, was subjected to peculiar dangers. He was educated at the great intellectual centres, where the luminaries of German literature shed their brightest light. But Weimar and Jena and Heidelberg, at the beginning of this century, had little of the spirit of Luther and Melancthon. The gods that they worshipped were earth-born. Weimar showed how easy it may be to unite the highest intellectual pleasures with the lowest moral aims. Even Herder, with all his excellences and his world-wide knowledge, was not, in some respects, a teacher such as the highly endowed and susceptible De Wette needed. And what

could be expected at Jena from the easy indifference of Griesbach and the impious naturalism of Paulus? De Wette's expulsion from Berlin, on grounds apparently so slight, was not fitted to conciliate his feelings towards the reigning orthodoxy of the Prussian court, or abate the rationalistic tendencies of his mind. Injustice so palpable could not but leave an unfavorable impress on his character. A continued residence at Berlin, in the midst of the favorable influences by which he was there surrounded, might have given a more conservative character to his biblical investigations. In Switzerland, though he came to regard it as a permanent and pleasant home, he must have had, in a measure, the feelings of an exile; he was looked up to as a master by admiring pupils; he was far away from the genial and modifying influences of his equals in age and knowledge, and his superiors in correctness of views. In Berlin, he might have reached earlier those practical and objective conceptions of divine truth which seemed to shine out in his last days. But we are anticipating our narrative.

Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette was born at Ulla near Weimar, Jan. 12, 1780. He was the eldest son of the clergyman of that place, Johann Augustin De Wette and of Margaretha Dorothea Christiane Schneider. He passed his childhood in his native village, and the impressions there made upon him may have laid the foundation for his pure, childlike feelings, for his susceptibility to the beauties of nature and for the decided inclination for the culture of gardens and flowers, which animated and refreshed him through life. Of his school days at Buttstädt, his friend, Peucer of Weimar, thus writes: "He dwelt with an old, worthy artisan, Wilke, living on the hill so-called. I resided with my parents at the pot-market. We sat together in the school (the rector was the clergyman in Lehnstädt, who died some years ago, the assistant was Schneider), and carried on our studies in common for the most part; hence in the evening, I often visited my friend at the aged Wilke's and labored with him. I remember how we busied ourselves with our books and *hefts* at a side-table, while Wilke was toiling in the same room, near an evening lamp which commonly stood in a glass globe filled with water that it might throw a clearer light on the place where the stitch was to be made. In June, 1796, we left Buttstädt and were examined in Weimar by the director, Böttiger, and took the two lowest places in Prima, I the last but one, De Wette the last. So we made our way, always together, through the whole Prima till 1799, when De Wette went to Jena, and I to Göttingen. In those three years at Weimar, an acquaintance and close intimacy were formed with the like minded friends,

Hase, now in Paris, Zinserling, who died as a professor at Warsaw, and Schmidt, government counsellor at Weimar."

Weimar at this time was in its most flourishing state. It was illuminated by stars of the first magnitude in the German literary heavens, Herder, Goethe, Wieland and Schiller. Among De Wette's teachers was Böttiger, afterwards the Dresden archæologist. He also heard and saw Herder as *ephorus* of the gymnasium, and also in the pulpit, and received from this great man ineffaceable impressions. In 1844, De Wette thus wrote: "I have yet a vivid recollection how with youthful reverence I looked up to Herder's form, alike venerable and pleasant, listened to his well-sounding voice and pathetic words, when he opened the public examination of the gymnasium; how I heard with a beating heart his decision on the theme that had been handed in; how, in the examination of the alumni at his house, I translated before him, tremblingly, out of Horace, and how, when encouraged by the warm interest which he took in what had been read and translated, and by the manner in which by his observations and questions he penetrated into the spirit of the favorite poet, I forgot my fear and myself. Every one of his words spoken there yet cleaves to my soul. I see him still standing in the pulpit with his hands crossing each other, and hear him expounding in a manner peculiar to himself, monotonous, yet grave, pleasant, impressive, — the Lord's Prayer, which he so explained that, at one and the same time, he profoundly unfolded and clearly exhibited its sense." The influence of Herder on De Wette was rather of an exciting and preparatory than of a permanent nature, for before De Wette had begun his career as a theologian and author, Herder had closed his eyes.

De Wette pursued his theological studies at the University of Jena. Among the theological teachers were Gabler, Paulus and Griesbach, the great critic and New Testament editor. De Wette, in his "Theodore," probably refers to Griesbach as "an old, very learned and clear-thinking man, who in his exegesis laid before his hearers a multitude of opinions and views, and gave the reasons pro and con, without himself definitely deciding for the one or another." To this mild, venerable, undecided teacher, De Wette was specially indebted. The free method and acuteness of Dr. Paulus also made a strong impression upon him. He now shared with Paulus and Eichhorn in their fundamental rationalistic view in regard to miracles. But still there was an important difference. They believed that miracles were common occurrences and to be explained as ordinary events. But De Wette, in opposition to this naturalistic view, regarded miracles as myths, as the offspring

of a poetic spirit, but having at the foundation an objective reality. He was thus led to employ himself not only with the criticism of the text, but with the facts narrated and with the authorship of the different portions of the Bible. The Roman Catholic, Richard Simon, who flourished in the latter half of the seventeenth century, attacked in his "Literal History of the Old Testament," the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, agreeing with the Jewish philosopher, Spinoza. Among the German theologians of the eighteenth century who carried out these skeptical views of Simon, the name of Semler was conspicuous. While professing the highest regard for science and true criticism, Semler was far from being free from arbitrary judgments and subjective opinion.¹ Many persons were soon afloat on a wild sea of what was named biblical criticism. Under these influences, which furnish an explanation of much in his character and writings, De Wette commenced his career as an author. In his first treatise he sought to show that Deuteronomy was not written by Moses but by a later author.² This was merely preparatory to a greater and more comprehensive work on the Pentateuch in general. The hopes of the youthful author were suddenly cast down by the news that a treatise on the subject and of similar contents was about to appear from the pen of Vater of Halle. This was a severe trial to a young man, without pecuniary means, and who had just been married.³ At this juncture Griesbach showed himself a true friend. He advised De Wette to reëdit and enlarge his work. He accordingly included the books of Chronicles in his researches. The first volume of his "Contributions to an Introduction to the Old Testament" was published at Halle in 1806. Griesbach introduced his young friend to the world in a characteristic preface of a semi-apologetic character, in which he avoided committing himself to the views propounded by De Wette. The second volume followed in 1807, under the title, "Criticism of the Israelitish History." According to the author's view, there exists in the history a poetry, and this poetry of history is often more wonderful and poetic than poetry itself. The entire history of the Pentateuch was transformed into a magnificent theocratic epos of the Israelites,

¹ See the curious developments in Semler's autobiography.

² This was his inaugural dissertation, Jena, 1805, reprinted in his *Opuscula*, Berlin, 1833.

³ De Wette was married at Jena, in April, 1805, to Eberhardine Boye, of Baireuth. She died in less than a year. In 1809, he was again married to the widow Henriette Beck of Heidelberg, who died in Oct., 1825. There were two children of this marriage, a son, an eminent physician in Basil, and a daughter, who also resides in Basil. De Wette was married the third time, in 1833, to the widow Sophie Von Mai, of Berne, who survives him. His domestic relations were of the happiest kind.

proceeding from the national inspiration of a later period, which with free fancy transformed its ideal models into a mythic antiquity in order, with these heroic forms, to comfort itself in times of oppression. The Pentateuch thus becomes what the Homeric Poems became in the hands of F. A. Wolf, a clear, beautiful mirror in which are reflected the entire poetry of the people, their peculiar religion, philosophy and patriotism.

The critical inquiries which De Wette began at Jena, he prosecuted to the end of his life. He subjected to a sharp, critical process all the books of the Old Testament. His investigations embraced, also, the more difficult problems of the New Testament, the origination of the gospels, their relation to each other, etc. He did not merely consider what others had written, but formed independent judgments of his own. The entire results of his investigations, he embodied in his "Introductions to the Old and New Testaments."

The sixth edition of the Introduction to the Old Testament was published in 1845, and the fifth of that to the New, in 1848. These Introductions have great and acknowledged merits. A large amount of material is condensed into a small space. The whole disposition of the topics reveals the impress of a master. The arguments for and against a position are skilfully stated. The literature is fresh, and so far as Germany furnishes the material, is brought up to the time of publication. Still, with all the advantages which these Manuals possess, in a scientific and aesthetical point of view, we regard them, especially the Introduction to the Old Testament, as beset with radical difficulties. The method in which the Pentateuch is dislocated is at war with the dictates of sound judgment and the principles of science, as well as with the common ideas of inspiration. Let the reader just think of disarranging the beautiful narrative respecting Joseph, and assigning parts of it to one period and parts to another, — e. g. Gen. 39: 1—5 and 21—23 to one document, and 39: 6—20 to another, all in order to make out a theory! And then if some passages prove refractory, a very easy resort is had to interpolation. For the purpose of explaining what is a real difficulty in the Pentateuch — the intermingled use of the words *Elohim* and *Jehovah*, recourse is had to an hypothesis which is encompassed with absurdities. The diversity, not to say contrariety, of the critics on the Pentateuch in relation to this matter — Tuch, Stähelin, De Wette, Ewald — is enough to condemn the entire procedure. It is an arbitrary assumption from beginning to end, of what the critic knows little about. It is a case where common sense and an unperverted judgment are worth more than the acutest criticism or the most extensive learning. The same remarks are applicable to De Wette's positions on many other portions of the Bible.

Some of the views which he early and confidently maintained, have been shown, even in the opinion of rationalists, to be incorrect. E. g. the credibility of the Chronicles has been firmly established by Movers against the objections of De Wette. The *πρώτον ψεύδος* of the author was his belief or want of belief on the subject of inspiration and miracles. With his wavering or skeptical views on these subjects, there is no firm footing. If the declarations of our Lord and his inspired apostles in regard to the Old Testament are not to be taken as one element in our estimate of the inspiration of Moses and the prophets, then an authoritative revelation appears to us to be impossible.

The university of Jena was then enjoying a high degree of prosperity. Among its teachers were Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Fries. De Wette soon attached himself with special zeal to Fries,¹ though he listened with admiration to Schelling's Lectures on Academical Studies.

In 1807, De Wette went to Heidelberg as professor extraordinarius of philosophy. In 1809, he became professor ordinarius of theology. From the year 1802, this university, through the labors of the immortal Charles Frederic, had been raised to new life. About contemporary with De Wette were Daub, Marheinecke, Böckh and Creuzer. During this period De Wette prepared his Commentary on the Psalms; it was published in 1811. New editions appeared in 1823, 1829 and 1836. The translation was published in 1809. In the Introduction, he handles the rhythm of Hebrew poetry, the parallelism of the members, etc. with a clearness, a taste and judgment, which

¹ On the one hand, Fries sought to perfect Kant's critical method, and, on the other, to give a greater philosophical precision to Jacobi's doctrine of Feeling and Faith. He called his system, "Philosophical Anthropology," since he made all further philosophical knowledge dependent on man's self-knowledge. He distinguished three grades of *erkenntnis*; we know (*wissen*) the phenomena of our subjective thinking; this is the realm of philosophy. We believe (*glauben*), that there are appearances — *erscheinungen* — out of the mind, that all is not a mere subjective creation. We have a feeling, a presentiment, (*ahnen*) that there is a reality, a substance behind these appearances; here Fries places all that pertains to God, the existence of the soul and immortality. De Wette had much conversation with Fries, first at Jena, then at Heidelberg, and to him he essentially owed his transition from the dry Kantian Rationalism to the method which may be most simply named the *ideal-believing*. After listening to this system, De Wette says, that he gathered up, as by magic, his previously scattered knowledge and convictions into a well-ordered and beautiful whole. The philosophy of Fries seemed to commend itself in this, that it preserved the formal, logical reflection of Kant, without sharing in the metaphysical insipidity, yea emptiness of the contents of that philosophy.

have been universally recognized. In the Commentary, he took pains to explain the contents of the Psalms from an historical point of view, and from the Hebrew manner of thinking, without pressing single words too far or doing violence to them. In the later editions, he modified or retracted some of his earlier judgments, giving greater prominence, e. g. to the Messianic idea.

• He now performed another great service, not only for the German people, but for all biblical students, viz. the translation of the Bible into German. From the time that Luther gave his immortal work to the world, many had undertaken to tread in his footsteps, but generally without success. A principal fault of most modern translators arose from the notion that they could make the sense clearer by circumlocution or paraphrase. Thus originated the diluted modern translations, disfiguring the sense of the Scriptures. De Wette had no sympathy with this false taste. On the contrary, he labored to give, wherever it was possible, a literal translation, one exactly conformed to the original; this purpose was admirably accomplished. Luther's Bible is not thrown into the back ground by De Wette's labors; they rather complete, illustrate and correct the reformer's work. Though some persons may prefer the tone and spirit of Luther's Bible where an immediate influence on the feelings is concerned, still, at other times, they will welcome a translation, which has a scientific interest and exactly hits the expression. Every unprejudiced mind will bear witness that De Wette never foists into the Bible his subjective opinions, never presses his own view upon the biblical writers. If he had left us nothing else but the translation, he would rightly claim our thanks and those of the whole evangelical church. Competent judges have pronounced it as probably the most accurate translation of the Scriptures which has ever been made in any language. In the first edition, 1809-14, De Wette was assisted by Dr. Augusti. In the second edition, 1831, De Wette performed the labor alone, so as to give greater uniformity to it. The translation of Isaiah was mostly copied from Gesenius. The third edition appeared in 1838.

In 1810, De Wette had the honor of an invitation to the newly-founded university at Berlin, which was intended to concentrate the most illustrious scholars of Germany. One of his colleagues, and a main pillar, was Schleiermacher, at that time less known by his theological than his philosophical tendencies. De Wette, at this period, is thus described by his friend, Lücke:

"In De Wette's first appearance, there was something stiff, dry, curt, a kind of cold seriousness. But such lean and arid natures often have an abundant intellectual sap, which, like the generous vine-stock,

rejoices the heart. The thorough friendliness of his soul, his living, inward vigor and the benevolent cast of his disposition did not leave those long in suspense who conversed with him. An essay of mine on the Nature and History of Mysticism in Tzschirner's Archives for Church History, had attracted his notice in spite of its youthful imperfections. In kindly giving me to understand that he agreed essentially with my views, he laid me under obligations to him for the first encouragement which I received, in my timidity and depression, at my first abode in Berlin; an encouragement in the highest degree needful, as the topic in question the nearer I looked at it, became the more difficult. It is not in every man's power, but it is a noble and wholesome academical art and gift, and De Wette had it in the highest degree, to draw young men to one's self, to win their confidence and thereby open their hearts, without any appearance of management or unseemly importunity. Many, very many, in Switzerland and Germany, besides Schenkel and Hagenbach, will say with me—to the honor of this estimable friend, how well he understood in what manner to hold intellectual intercourse with young men, and enter into close relations of friendship with them. To pert, exclusive, proud teachers, this is not possible. But De Wette was not one of these. With all that was prompt, sure and definite in his learning, and with the fundamental tendency of his theological thinking, he was, and he remained to the end of his life, a youthlike, open soul, in all treasures of knowledge ever seeking, and living, and making progress; of the poetic, I might say, dramatic element, he had enough to make his way into the minds and hearts of youth of differing temperaments, and enough of humble love to learn of younger men and to enjoy himself with them."

The manner in which De Wette first came to stand on intimate terms with Schleiermacher is thus described by Lücke:

"I found him at first quite isolated, without any intimate theological intercourse with his colleagues of the same faculty. Marheinecke had been his colleague in Heidelberg. But the entire individual manner and tendency of the men were too diverse to allow of any close connection between them. Now Schleiermacher and Neander possessed an inward sympathy with him. Yet, much as he loved and sought for friendly, literary intercourse, still he came into close reciprocal contact with no one. The fact that individuals lived far apart from each other, and in general the entire manner of life in the great city, checked and rendered very difficult mutual acquaintance and intimacy. There were then in Berlin, no permanent scientific, theological unions, which facilitate intercourse. The passion for associated effort, in its good or bad aspects, did not exist then. Studious men loved solitary

study rather than that which was in common and associated. And as Schleiermacher and Neander, after their manner, chose to let themselves be sought after for purposes of intercourse, rather than to seek that intercourse themselves, so it was, also, with De Wette, although it was more natural for him to connect private and associated study. Thus stood the three excellent men at a distance and alien from one another; each having his special circle particularly of younger men. The different direction of their pursuits was not without a share in this reciprocal estrangement. With Neander and De Wette the difference had gradually, in the existing crisis of theology, acquired the sharper tone of definite opposition, yea of mutual aversion, while Schleiermacher, in accordance with his entire manner, was more inclined to give full due, not only to each individuality, but also to every serious theological tendency. He then exercised that manifold tolerance which was characteristic of him; he exercised it especially towards Neander and De Wette. Where he found so much that was able and excellent, there he placed his esteem openly and zealously; and in order to bring an able man into effective sympathy, he loved, as he said, to unclothe him, so as to come to the ground and kernel of the truth held in common. This noble art, De Wette did not then understand. I found him at first somewhat out of humor both towards Schleiermacher and Neander. Of course, he highly esteemed both. Towards Schleiermacher, besides, he had a certain thankful feeling for incitements and aids which he had received from him at an earlier period. But on the position where he then stood, he could do nothing else than keep aloof from Schleiermacher's entire theological course and method, yea at least for himself to oppose them. He openly made known this opposition, as I enthusiastically described to him at the beginning of our acquaintance, the satisfaction which Schleiermacher's sermons had given me. His opinion was then that in Schleiermacher, the preacher in the pulpit must work an injury to the theologian in the chair. The pure truth which the theologian had to investigate and acknowledge, the preacher could not, might not, express before the church, and so the result might be, a theology of concealment, not one perfectly sincere. When I explained that this ambiguous, concealing Schleiermacher did not appear to me, in this light, either in the pulpit or in his theological writings, and that I found that his way of sermonizing was perfectly grounded in his theological principles, a discussion originated between us, the more protracted as it entered deeply into the relation of the historical and ideal in Christianity, and of the positive and critical, of the theoretical and practical in theology. In his uneasy feelings, De Wette had not attended for a long time Schleiermacher's

church, and he still retained the impressions which he had first more or less received from his sermons. It belonged to me to induce him to begin again to hear him. It was a beautiful summer's morning when I first drew him off to Schleiermacher's church. He listened to the sermon most attentively. When the service was ended, and we had exchanged our thoughts on what we had heard, he declared that he must perfectly agree with the sermon, and that he found nothing in it, which he could not acknowledge from the bottom of his heart. From that time he attended regularly on Schleiermacher's discourses. We always stood together, invariably by the side of a small man, whose wakeful attention was a gratifying sign to us, that the preacher, as much as he exacted from the church, still knew how to satisfy the uneducated part of his hearers, provided they would only give attention, and were acquainted with the Scriptures, inasmuch as he took special pains to expound the Scriptures in his discourses — a circumstance so fortunate for us. Certainly my friend and myself were irresistibly attracted by this practical, vital exposition of the Bible in the sermon, whereby the learner could easily perceive the two-fold source whence it was drawn, now from the philosophical insight into the ground of the thoughts and the connection of the Scriptures, and now from personal religious experience, and the immediate actualizing of the Christian ideas in the soul. The artistic satisfaction which one has in seeing an unwritten sermon freshly originated before him, was not overlooked, yet the leading point remained for us both — namely, the aid in the knowledge of the Divine word, which each sermon brought to us. Until we heard a new sermon, our conversation, not seldom, through the whole week, ran in the ethical or doctrinal course of thought of the discourse last heard."

Schleiermacher ever afterwards remained his firm friend. When efforts were made to throw suspicions on De Wette's teachings, and when rumors were circulated of an active opposition to him in the court, Schleiermacher came forward and dedicated to him, in warm terms of friendship and confidence, his treatise on the evangelist Luke. This was very grateful to De Wette, and he reciprocated the kindness by inscribing to his friend the second edition of his *Biblical Theology*.

Lücke was less successful in effecting a close intimacy between Neander and De Wette. They met twice under the auspices of their mutual friend, and entered into a pleasant discussion. Lücke ascribes his want of success in this instance partly to external relations, and partly to the fact that there were no means of approximation and union in preaching, as had been the case with Schleiermacher. They con-

tinued to live on terms of high, mutual respect, but not of intimate friendship. De Wette's Preface to his Commentary on the Apocalypse, written near the close of his life, in which he declares his faith in the Son of God as the only Saviour of the world, gave great satisfaction to Neander. In a note to the first number of the "*Deutsche Zeitschrift*" for 1850, Neander speaks of De Wette as a "genuine Nathaniel-soul."

Lücke recalls, with special satisfaction, the regular walks which he took with De Wette, Saturday afternoons, to Charlottenburg, often in company with Böckh, who shared in their theological and philosophical debates. The topics — the previous studies of the week — were handled with great freedom, the younger disputants sometimes diverging widely from the views of De Wette, or standing in direct opposition to him. His candor and real friendliness were seen conspicuously on these occasions. Lücke states that he was greatly indebted to these Peripatetic studies. Many things, which he heard from De Wette, first brought forth fruits years afterwards. The friends then planned some joint literary undertakings, a Synopsis of the first Three Gospels, a Theological Journal in which they were to have the aid of Schleiermacher, and a new critical edition of Luther's entire works. The Synopsis was published in 1818. The Journal was commenced, but not continued long, as Lücke soon went to Bonn, and De Wette left Berlin. Luther's Letters, "collected from different editions of his works and letters, from other books, and MSS. not before used, critically and historically illustrated," were brought out by De Wette alone, in five volumes, Berlin, 1825-28. The work was prepared with special ability, and has been received with great favor.

In 1818, Hegel was called to the university of Berlin. De Wette, with a minority of the academical senate, earnestly remonstrated against the appointment. A paper on this subject has been found among his MSS., from which one or two paragraphs are extracted. "One thing it may be allowed to me to point out, that on which particularly my decided opposition to this philosophy [that of Hegel and Schelling] is founded. I am a theologian and it well behoves me to look at a philosophy on this point, whether it will promote or hinder a sound religious conviction. Not as if I would make the dogmatic system formed by the church a touch-stone to genuine philosophy, as blind zealots do, but because I believe that between Christianity and true philosophy, in its spirit and inward nature, there must be an intimate agreement. The revelations of God in reason and in history cannot stand in opposition. According to my conviction, the Christian religion rests, in its deepest grounds, on the three doctrines of the Immortality of the Soul,

God and Redemption. But it is satisfactorily shown that in the philosophical naturalism these three ideas find no place. The soul can be no proper, true existence, since everything is resolved into the absolute; a God split into fragments and divided, a God who is in the process of *becoming*, is no God; and meaningless must be the idea of redemption for those to whom moral evil is nothing else than a going out from the absolute, by which it will be again swallowed up, as a shadow which the broken light of the absolute casts, and which admits of being resolved again into the pure light through a few philosophical formulas."

"Against Hegel I adduce again the following. The senate recognizes the need of a second teacher of logic; but while it proposes Hegel therefor, it in effect wishes that no logic shall be taught. This philosophy rejects all logic. Its science of logic is nothing else than a 'nature-philosophic metaphysics' and aims to utterly put down all which has been hitherto called logic. A science, of which Aristotle laid the foundation, and which has been recognized for two thousand years, is not merely to be made better (for that it needs amendment no thinking man denies), but it is to be thrown overboard, as Hegel has done."

De Wette and a large minority of the senate were in favor of Fries, but Hegel was appointed.

The first part of De Wette's *Manual of Christian Dogmatics* containing the Biblical Doctrines, was published in 1813; the second edition in 1818. The second part, containing the Church Doctrines, appeared in 1816; the second edition in 1821. According to De Wette neither the rationalizing or the supernatural system meets the wants of the times. He sought to introduce a theology which should reconcile the opposing elements, retaining the essential doctrines of the gospel, while it satisfied the claims of reason and science. There are, doubtless, grievous and fundamental errors in this new theology of De Wette. His ideas on the topics of inspiration, miracles, etc., must more or less vitiate his doctrinal belief on other subjects. There is, indeed, reason to suppose that the author himself was gradually returning, on some points, to the doctrinal statements of the Confessions. In 1828, he sought to show in an essay, that the change which modern theology had sought to introduce into Christian truth, had respect more to the form than the contents. "There is no leading doctrine," he affirms, "in the system of our [Lutheran] church, to which in its real, spiritual sense, I cannot subscribe." "Whatever were the heterodox elements in his system," says Hagenbach, "it was essentially Christological. It made Christ, the Son of God, the centre of the whole."

De Wette published in 1814 a *Manual of Hebrew-Jewish Archaeology* with the leading outlines of the Hebrew-Jewish history. Good judges have pronounced this, notwithstanding some faults, the best manual of the kind. The third edition appeared in 1842.

The first part of the *Christian Morals* (*Christliche Sittenlehre*), containing the general doctrines of the same, was published in 1819; the second, containing the general history of Christian morals, in 1821. This was viewed, by the author, as the best of all his works. We subjoin a single remark of Dr. Schenkel. "What seems to me specially important and worthy of consideration, and which is independent of the methodical handling of the subject, is the profound conviction lying at the ground of De Wette's ethical system, that Christianity is, through and through, moral, and that true morality is one with and inseparable from Christian faith. This, according to my conviction, is one of the most fruitful and productive thoughts of the modern theology. For if it can be shown — what is presupposed as an undoubted fact by some opponents of the Christian faith — that morals have a province wholly independent of the life of faith, yea that Christian faith ever stands in contradiction with the eternal principles of morals, and must be destroyed that thereby love may take its place as ruling the souls of men, then is the death-hour of Christianity actually struck, and we have nothing better to do, than to exchange the gospel sermon in our pulpits, as soon as possible, for the moral-philosophical essay."

The end to De Wette's labors in Berlin was now approaching. In the autumn of 1818, on a tour to the Fichtelgebirge, in Bavaria, he was hospitably entertained in the paternal home of Karl Sand, whom he had seen accidentally and for a short time in Jena, his companions on the tour having a letter of introduction from young Sand to his parents. When the news of the assassination of Kotzebue by Sand reached him, he wrote a letter of sympathy to Sand's afflicted mother, dated March 31, 1819. On the 28th of August, he was summoned, by royal command, before the academical senate, and asked whether he had written the letter, of which a copy was placed before him. He did not deny that he had written a letter of this kind, but he affirmed that after an interval of five months, he could not determine whether this copy was an exact transcript of the original, and he must ask for the production of his own manuscript. In his letter the following passage occurred: "The spirit of faith and confidence with which the deed was performed, is a beautiful sign of the times. The deed, generally considered, is immoral and at variance with the moral law. Evil is not to be overcome by evil, but only by good. No right can be established by

injustice, fraud or violence, and a good end does not sanctify unrighteous means." De Wette explained, that in his letter, according to the copy that was laid before him, he by no means justified assassination; rather he rejected it, and not merely as unlawful, but he rejected it as immoral, and he expressly affirmed that he could never exhort or counsel to such a deed. And if his opinion was here and there expressed in milder tones and forbearing towards the criminal, it must be remembered that his letter was private and intended to console a mother. At the same time he requested that there might be a formal investigation before competent men. To this explanation and request, the ministry communicated the following reply: "That since he still sought to defend the justification expressed in his letter, of the assassination perpetrated by Sand, his majesty, the king, would hold it to be a violation of his conscience if he should any longer commit the education of the young to a man who held assassination under certain circumstances or conditions, as justifiable, and herewith his dismissal from his office was made known." The academical senate interposed, and sought to place the obnoxious letter in a milder light, but they obtained in return only an emphatic admonition. De Wette made known his departure from Berlin to the king, to the minister, Von Altenstein, and to the academical senate in a respectful and very dignified letter; the senate replied in honorable terms. With manly independence, De Wette returned his quarter's salary sent him by the minister, and left Berlin without the smallest prospect of finding any public situation, charged as he was with being a defender of assassination. But he found, in his hard lot, warm sympathy in every part of Germany.

De Wette retired to Weimar, where he lived several years, in the circle of endeared friends. Among the works which he published, during this period, was "Theodore or the Consecration of the Skeptic." A second edition was published in 1828, which has been translated into English by Rev. J. F. Clarke, of Boston. In the form of a romance, the writer mirrored his own life and culture. Its poetic fervor led educated laymen to read it, as it discussed not only the theological contests of that period, but art, morals, the study of nature, etc. At the same time it encountered opposition. Dr. Tholuck's book entitled "The *true* Consecration of the Skeptic," is well known.

De Wette now assumed in earnest the office of a preacher, supplying the pulpits of many places in his native land. He accepted an unanimous invitation from St. Catherine's Church in Brunswick. The government however interposed difficulties, acting doubtless in accordance with intimations from Berlin. The unanimous judgment of the theological

and philosophical faculties of the universities of Jena and Leipsic, that De Wette's letter to the mother of Sand ought not to disqualify him for the preacher's office, was of no avail in obviating the difficulties.

The interest which De Wette felt in his new calling as a preacher is thus alluded to by Lücke. In 1822, after De Wette had received an invitation from the university of Basil, Schleiermacher, Lücke and De Wette happened to meet at Nordhausen, in the Hartz mountains. One morning, the circle assembled for breakfast in Schleiermacher's chamber. While Schleiermacher sat silent by himself, writing, in the midst of the conversation, on the Notes to a new edition of his *Discourses on Religion*, De Wette was talking earnestly on the nobleness of the preacher's work, and of his own joyful hope that as a preacher he should ever penetrate deeper and deeper into the nature and life of the church.

De Wette concluded to accept the invitation from the university of Basil. He commenced his labors there as professor of theology in 1822. The following passages, translated from Hagenbach, will show the previous condition of the university, the salutary changes effected by De Wette amid the difficulties of his position, and the character of his labors in the various spheres which he filled.

"In order to estimate De Wette's relation to our university and the importance of his services for it, we must remember the condition in which he found it; we must call up again before us that ruin, which though venerable for its antiquity, was crumbling and falling, and which looked out upon a neighborhood that had become strange to it. A university which for more than a century had passed out of all connection with Germany, which had studiously repelled every influence from without, and with a pitiful exactness had preserved its ancient forms untouched by the spirit which moved the age, was now making the effort to raise itself out of the long and deep slumber, and to venture the trial whether it were possible, under the new and in many respects favorable circumstances, to regain the ancient renown. A worthy attempt, and in the fresh enthusiasm with which it was undertaken, well fitted to draw upon itself the eyes of the learned world and to awaken fair hopes. If there was one who more than any other cherished these hopes, if there was one who bent all his efforts, who made it as it were the task of his life, to raise the university of Basil into the rank of her German sisters, that one was our De Wette. His address in entering upon the duties of rector of the university in May, 1823, gives a clear and vigorous expression of his feelings on this point! 'Never shall the name of Basil,'—so he cries in his enthusiasm for his new father-land—'never shall the name of Basil fall from the annals of learning, nor her star cease to shine in the heaven of science.'

He reminded his fellow-citizens how much a free State honors itself in honoring learning, and what power there is in sincere love of learning to overcome all difficulties. Especially did he insist upon the mutual connection of the several branches of learning, and the advantages of a *university*, in which all should be taught together, over separate professional schools. He urged the authorities to supply the deficiencies which yet remained, to complete in the same spirit what they had nobly begun. And also since that time he has never neglected, whether as a member of the Council of Education, or in any other capacity, to further by every means the interests of the university.

"It was he too who sought to promote a literary spirit among us by founding, in connection with other professors, a literary Journal, to which he contributed many valuable articles.

"But, next to his care for the university as a whole, was his deep interest in the theological department of it. The older and estimable men whom he met here as colleagues, and with whom his relations were of the most friendly nature notwithstanding the difference of views, were accustomed to a method of instruction with which his own could not possibly be brought into harmony. Several branches of theology were not only without any professor, but even entirely unknown in their scientific form. In his demands for a systematic course of instruction, as it had been given at the German universities since the memory of man, De Wette stood alone. He found it necessary, first of all, to draw to his assistance those who would unite in carrying forward his plans. After a vain attempt to obtain for Basil an already distinguished German theologian (Ullmann), he saw himself compelled to take under his wing unpractised Swiss youth who had but just graduated from the university, and to train them up for the academic office. With what devotion and self-sacrifice he has done this, those only can testify who have been the objects of his care. During the twenty-seven years in which he taught among us, De Wette remained ever the soul of the faculty. It was his name which gave reputation abroad and which furnished to his younger associates an introduction to the learned world.

"Here we may notice also De Wette's remarkable talent as an *instructor*. In his lectures, as well as in his treatises, he possessed the rare art of presenting the essential points of his science with clearness and precision, and of limiting himself. Following a well pondered plan, he gave his various courses of lectures upon exegesis, dogmatic theology, and ethics, one after another in logical order, and he brought each of them, within the appointed time, to conclusion and to *completion*. His *delivery* was calm and equable. He withheld himself from all curious

speculations (*sich Gebenlassen*), from all outbursts of enthusiasm, from any intermingling of his subjective feelings with the truth. He ever maintained the earnestness and dignity of theological science; and, much as he might enjoy wit and humor in their place, he allowed them here no approach. This gained him the esteem of all, even of those who listened to his lectures with some mistrust.

“ He however by no means regarded his duties as discharged by his public lectures. He directed the students in practical exercises, encouraged the diligent, and let the indolent feel his disapprobation. It was also a subject of frequent thought with him, how the candidates for the ministry, after their examination, might be encouraged and directed in continuing their studies, and especially how they might have practice in preaching. We find among his papers a detailed plan of a *Seminary* for the practical training of candidates, which he had indeed attempted to carry into effect, but without being properly seconded in the attempt.

“ He extended his labors also beyond the circle of the students. The admirable custom of delivering lectures to a larger circle of cultivated persons, owes its existence chiefly to him. He lectured before such an audience with great success, for two winters upon *Ethics*, and another winter upon *Religion in its Principle and its Developments*.

“ In the latter part of his life, it came to be with him more and more an inward want to preach in public; although he felt that mere occasional preaching to different congregations, did not furnish the true satisfaction. He accordingly cherished for a long time the idea of establishing a distinct service of Divine worship for the students of the university. But he met with manifold difficulties which prevented the realization of this idea. It was only in the last weeks of his life, that he had the satisfaction of being able to deliver a connected series of sermons, in one church, and, more or less, to the same audience; a labor in which death interrupted him.

“ If we may allow ourselves here a word with regard to De Wette as a *preacher*, we shall find at the very outset something remarkable in this, that a man of mature years had the inclination, the energy, and the skill to fit himself for a vocation, which in order to success ought to be practised from youth up. De Wette had many of the requisites for a preacher: a rich store of biblical knowledge, together with the gift of expounding; a tenacious memory, a logical habit, a refined taste, a clear, finished, animated, chaste style, as is fitting in the pulpit; with this a harmonious voice, in which there lay something peculiarly sweet, winning, and touching. He was not one of those who trust to the in-

spiration of the moment. He wrote his sermons carefully, elaborated and polished them, and committed them to memory word for word. This gave them to be sure sometimes a scholastic air, which stood however in so natural connection with his person and his office that it was readily overlooked. A popular preacher De Wette was not, and did not seek to be. He felt it to be *his* calling, to bring the truths of Christianity home to such, as by reason of their education, have fallen into that discord of faith and reason, which it was the object of his entire theology to remove. We shall accordingly find few of his sermons, in which this theme, in one form or another, does not appear. His discourses ever formed a satisfying complement to the pastoral sermon, such as is fitted to the wants of the popular mind.

"De Wette not only endeavored in his own discourses to give his students a living model; he also took much pains to *train* them as preachers. Theoretical lectures upon homiletics, he held, so far as I know, only once. But he conducted regularly homiletical exercises, and here the points upon which he especially insisted, were thorough Development of the Text, and lucid Arrangement. In order to improve their style of delivery, he held, from time to time, exercises in declamation with the students, in which he had to contend not a little with the roughness of the Swiss articulation.

"De Wette was fully aware, and he often expressed his conviction, that the practical duties of the clergyman by no means end with preaching. On the contrary, the sermon seemed to him to have quite too great predominance in public worship, especially in our Reformed church; and in several of his writings he has given valuable hints with regard to the liturgical changes which our church needs.

"Although bound by his office to no pastoral or pulpit duties, De Wette nevertheless acknowledged that a professor of theology, in a small community like ours, ought to take his place in the ranks of the clergy. Accordingly as early as the year 1825, he requested and received ordination in our church; and though a Lutheran, he had no scruples in assenting on that occasion to our Basil Confession of Faith (of 1534), the most catholic of all creeds. De Wette stood—to add a word upon this point—*above* the dispute between the two churches, which is now again making itself so sadly prominent. He did not disown his unchanging adherence to the Lutheran church, in which he was born and educated; but he was candid enough to acknowledge the peculiar excellences of the Reformed. So he was at home in both churches, in heart, as well as in act;—here too, a *man of union*."

The great public labor which De Wette performed at Basil, and, undoubtedly, the most valuable service of his life, was the preparation

of his Commentary on the entire New Testament. It was printed at Leipsic, 1836-48, in eleven parts, or three volumes. At the time of his death, three editions of the Commentary on the Gospels and the Acts had been published, four editions of that to the Romans, two of that on all the books from Romans to the epistle of James, and one edition of the remainder of the New Testament. As this work has often been adverted to by us, e. g. Bib. Sac. V. 263, and as portions of it have been translated for our pages, it is not necessary particularly to characterize it. For the advanced student in sacred philology, no work on the whole New Testament, or any large part of it, is to be compared with this, though there may be a few specimens of exposition of particular books, which approach nearer to the ideal of excellence. The author had an extraordinary combination of qualities which fitted him for a work of this nature. The defects in his theology and principles of criticism are far less apparent than in some of his other publications.¹

One of the most remarkable characteristics of De Wette's talents and acquisitions was their universality. His classical taste gave him a thorough disrelish to all which was dry, or strained, or pedantic. The principles of true taste, of genuine culture are manifest in all his writings. In his theological works, there are many references to philosophy, art and natural scenery. After his visit to Rome in 1846, he published some Thoughts on Painting and Architecture, especially in relation to Churches. He sought, indeed, to perfect himself in all departments of knowledge, and made use of every facility for this purpose. There was hardly a teacher in the university whom he did not consult, and from whom he did not learn in respect to one thing or another. Even of his pupils he gladly received instruction, for he had the modesty of true science. Even in the last years of his life, he resorted to others for instruction. With a learned Rabbi in the vicinity, he read the Talmud. He sought from an eminent musical friend an explanation of the principles of thorough bass. He likewise took lessons in the modern languages. In French he had attempted to preach. With all these diversified studies, he was no recluse or dry book-worm. He greatly enjoyed nature (and who would not in Switzerland?), and was accustomed often to refresh himself in longer or shorter tours. He took recreation in the culture of gardens and flowers with the simple feelings of a child. In social life he was equally

¹ The whole number of De Wette's works was about forty-five, not including (with a few exceptions) his many contributions to periodical publications, amounting in all to nearly sixty volumes. One of the works, "The Principal Articles of the Christian Faith, in a series of Sermons," has been published since his death, Basil, 1849.

winning and delightful. His house was a kind of social centre to the university. Notwithstanding all the seriousness of his character, he still relished wit and humor, and could heartily rejoice with those who rejoiced. He was a lover of peace, ready to forgive injuries, and eminently faithful in all his relations as a man in domestic life, a citizen and a teacher in the university.

Dr. Lücke thus describes a visit which he made to his friend in 1845 :

"I saw my friend for the last time in the autumn of 1845, in Basil, still enjoying the cheerful youthfulness of a *vegeta senectus*, which he knew how to retain in the midst of all his labors. He had just finished his 'Representation of the Nature of Christian Faith,' and was then preparing for a journey to Italy, with fresh and lively feelings. I was permitted once more to see in union all the beautiful traits of his amiable and lovely disposition. He happened to be alone in his house, removed from the city, and almost in the country; his wife and daughter had already gone to Italy. But he knew how, in the most beautiful manner, to perform the offices of an host, and to provide for the comfort and welfare of his house, almost with housewifely care. He was early in the morning at his work, but gladly broke off, partly for the sake of conversation, partly to do little jobs in the garden, among the flowers and vines which he had always loved. Of a morning conversation, I especially recollect in what terms of recognition and kindness he spoke of Ewald, with whose Commentary on Job he had just been busied; in his noble love of truth and in his modesty he was at no time led astray by the many sharp experiences which he had of being misapprehended, and of the hostility of others. At noon and in the afternoon, he mingled, fresh and lively, in a larger circle of friends, in good humor at every stroke of pleasantry, full of joy in the beautiful nature and in all the intellectual life of conversation. Thus I received from him this pleasant living picture, — which will never leave me — both of the fine sunny days and charming nature in the environs of Basil, and of the intellectual brightness of a happy old age, and of a beautiful, domestic life with beloved children. And in this image, the dear, true friend was separated from earth.

"So stands he now before my soul in earthly serenity and at the same time in heavenly brightness, along with Schleiermacher, a fair, illumining, two-fold image from above, which beckons to the sacred heights, where all is light, and all theological problems are solved.

"I thank God that he has given me the blessing of having intimately known such men in life, of enjoying them in love and reverence, and of being elevated and edified by them. The sweeter it was

when I was accustomed to be with them, the more I often miss them, especially in this time of confusion. But it is something, yea it is much to have beyond the grave, such glorified examples, before the eyes, and in the heart. And well may I call sorrowfully after my dear friend, De Wette :

‘ Quis desiderio sit pudor aut modus
Tam cari capitis ? ’

‘ Cui Pudor et Justitiæ soror,
Incorrupta Fides nudaque veritas,
Quando ullum inveniet parem ? ’ ”

We close this narrative by some particulars of the last illness of De Wette and of the affecting funeral solemnities by which he was honored. The testimonies to the feelings and views, which he cherished, at this closing period, by such men as Hagenbach and Hoffmann, are particularly gratifying. Dr. Hoffmann was the pious and most estimable successor of Dr. Blumhardt, as head of the Missionary Institute in Basil.

In the last months of De Wette's life, traces of advancing age were observed, but still he was in the enjoyment of good health ; there was not a gray hair on his head ; his firm gait, his intellectual activity and sympathy, gave ground to hope for many years. But God had otherwise determined. On Thursday evening, June 7th, after a session of the government of the university, rheumatic pains compelled him to relinquish his accustomed labor and to betake himself to his bed. No one suspected that the illness would soon assume a serious aspect. After the 13th, critical symptoms manifested themselves ; wandering fancies prevailed ; he spoke of “ God's almighty power,” of “ perfect love,” and the like, and he desired to write in his usual manner ; lucid states of mind returned only as exceptions. On the 15th there seemed to be some amendment, but hope was of only short duration, for on the 16th of June, at 5 P. M., he departed without a struggle and without pain, faithfully attended by his son, a physician (aided by an older medical friend), by his wife and daughter, and an attached servant, who revered him as a father.

The funeral ceremonies were very interesting, and testified how much De Wette was beloved and revered. The students of the university and of the *pædagogium* led the procession. Some of them bore the hearse of their beloved teacher, which the wives of some of his colleagues had adorned with evergreens and laurel wreaths. The hearse was followed by the relatives, the magistrates of Basil, the corporation of the university, with the prorector at their head, in aca-

demie robes, and many persons of all ranks. The procession moved to the Elizabeth church, where De Wette had delivered most of his sermons. Two verses were sung from the hymn of Benjamin Schmolck :

Schlaf, Simeon!
 Fahr, Diener Gottes, hin
 Zu deines Herren Ruh'!
 Du darfst hinweg aus Noth und Jammer flieh'n,
 Und eilst dem Himmel zu, etc.

Prof. Hagenbach then prayed, and delivered an address from the words, "Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart." "That Jesus Christ, the Son of the living God, the ground of our peace, that he was the Author, the Prince, the Beginner and Finisher of the same, — this De Wette, not merely in a degree and occasionally, this he often and abundantly confessed, yea, as we all know who were intimately acquainted with him or who took pains to ascertain, this was the cornerstone of his Christian edifice. Though on this foundation, along with the costly gold, silver and precious stones, he had here and there introduced other materials, which would not stand the fiery test, still in this has he only shared the fate of us all, for who can say that he is free from error? But how fast hold he kept of that one foundation, which is laid for all times, ye may best learn from his own lips. From his last book, with which he completed his Commentary on the New Testament, may a testimony be taken — a solemn testimony here at this hour: 'I cannot know what the fate will be of our dear Protestant church. Only this I know, that in no other is there salvation except in the name of Jesus Christ the crucified, and that for the human race there is nothing higher than the God-man realized in him and the kingdom of God planted by him — an idea and a proposition, which is not always rightly apprehended and introduced into the life, even by those, who else are justly regarded as the most zealous and warm-hearted Christians. Were Christ indeed and in truth our Life, how would such an apostasy from Him be possible? Those, in whom he lived, would, through their whole life, testify so mightily for Him, in word, in writing, in deed, that unbelief must be dumb!'"

Prof. Hagenbach closed the Address with the following prayer: "Yea, unto Thee, O true God and Father in Christ, unto thee we commit all our cares in this mournful hour. Be thou near to us all with thy fear. Rule thou over us with thy mercy. Let church and university, let our city and our fatherland be under thy protection, and introduce thou the peace after which men sigh and languish in these days

of confusion, of trouble and of sorrow. Open the eyes of the world that they may seek peace in Him who only can give them peace, in Him whom thou hast prepared before all people, a light to enlighten the gentiles and for the glory of thy people Israel!"

The choir then sang a stanza, concluding as follows :

Er weck' einst alle deine Schafe,
So sanft wie dich vom letzten Schlafe!
Schlaf, Simeon!

L. Spohr's Oratorium, "The Last Things," "Blessed are the dead," etc. was then sung, with instrumental accompaniment. At the burying-ground, "Gottesacker," the procession was received by one of Beethoven's funeral marches, and while the body was lowering into the family grave, the words were sung :

Aufersteh'n, ja auferstehn wirst du,
Mein Staub, nach kurzer ruh', etc.

A concluding prayer was then offered.

At 9 o'clock in the evening, the students assembled at the university, and walked in procession to the burying-ground, each with a torch-light, and singing Klopstock's ode :

"Wie sie so sanft ruhn, alle die Seligen,
Zu deren Wohnplatz jetzt meine Seele schleicht!
Wie sie so sanft ruhn in den Gräbern,
Tief zur Verwesung hinabgesenket," etc.

A theological student, R. Künzler, addressed his companions with a few brief and touching words. Dr. Hoffmann, inspector of the Mission Seminary and professor in the university, then spoke. He referred with special interest to two MSS. of De Wette which he had just read. In a sermon which De Wette had intended to preach, he proclaimed the love which flows from faith in Jesus Christ, and affirmed that it was this love, only this love, which had sufficient strength to transform our earthly life, or to take away the immeasurable troubles of the times, which went so near his heart. In the poem he casts a glance on the labors of his whole life, "in which he had sought the truth with all the powers of his soul. This he did, for he desired the truth, even when he doubted and doubted greatly." "He said, 'I have the faith for myself freed from all doubt, faith in the living God and in Jesus Christ the Crucified and Exalted at the right hand of God.' This it is, dear fellow-laborers in the field of knowledge, which I would heartily commend to you and myself in this solemn place, in these

memorable hours, for I only let our dear and revered friend utter his last words. Faith in Jesus Christ is the immovable rock on which we must stand in fearful, dark times. How often have aged inquirers — and the deceased belonged to them — expressed the fear, that, through the demoniac powers of the present time, which ferment beneath us, the civilization, for which we are indebted to Christianity, in religion and the church, in art and science, might, in the next generation, go down, and yield to a barbarism like that which broke in with destructive force in the irruption over Western Europe. This concerns us, this concerns you, the academical youth who are to assume a leading position in the different departments of cultivated life. We stand here in the night, but darker is the night of the spirit which hangs over us. Let us take the deceased as a model in earnestness of investigation, of seeking for the truth. We will lay to heart his last word, which points to faith as the root of all Christian life, of all Christian science, of all Christian civilization. With faith falls science, for which we all in different departments serve. As you now, in solemn testimonial of your remembrance of the departed, reach forth your torches into the night, so bear ye, when the night approaches, before which we fear, bear ye high, I entreat you, the torch of the truth which is in Christ Jesus. The time is serious, and well it behoves us, standing among the graves, in this solemn hour, to covenant that we will strive with all the fire of youth and with all manly strength, to keep the faith, and with sharp weapons to serve the ever-abiding truth, in ardent strife, in conflict in life and death, in word and deed."

The hymn was then sung:

"Peaceful is death's slumber,
And cold the bosom of the earth."

We conclude with a paragraph from Dr. Schenkel.

"So then even to the end of his life, he labored indefatigably for the church and for the kingdom of God revealed through the same. Where others were accustomed only to reap and to gather the full and ripe sheaves into their garner, De Wette was ever sowing anew the seed of a philosophic spirit and of Christian life. His zeal for the furtherance of the church and his sympathy in the practical interests of Christian communion, led him from time to time into the pulpit; and in the last half year of his life, he preached every Sunday, moved by a remarkable impulse of feeling to exhibit openly and clearly to the Christian church the convictions of his faith. A popular preacher in the common acceptation of the word he was not; the compressed earnestness of his thoughts, the reflection pervading his discourses — though they never

lacked the mixture of a noble warmth of emotion, repelled the larger public that were accustomed to a lighter Sunday food."

"He now sleeps, and his weary body rests in the still bosom of the earth. But his spirit lives, not only in that church triumphant, in whose eternal victory in heaven and on earth he joyfully believed, but he helps us on who are yet toiling and combating in the church militant." "Never can his remembrance disappear from any of those who knew and loved him in life. In my heart his image is engraven with ineffaceable lines. He remains, especially for youthful students, a shining example. With that example which he furnished in laboring during many years, with never-wearying love and faithfulness, in a comparatively small sphere, would we constantly instruct our younger friends. We would also often recall to our remembrance that which was of the deepest significance in his theological labors, viz. 'that truth in none of the relations of life, but particularly in theology and the church, can subsist without freedom, nor freedom without truth.' Truth made De Wette free, and truth alone can make us free in church and State."

ARTICLE X.

EXTRACTS FROM CORRESPONDENCE.

1. From a friend in Germany, dated Halle, July 20, 1850:—"The shock occasioned by the outbreak of 1848, and the consequent demand for politics on the public attention, has had a direct effect in withdrawing many from their literary pursuits, and an indirect, in discouraging the publication of works of substantial value. It has happened that some in the progress of publication have been suspended; others altogether withheld for want of publishers who would take the responsibility of the results. Tholuck's "Anzeiger," though well sustained for the previous twenty years or more, and though fed to the last from the same richly flowing fountains that had strengthened it in its growth, yet fell, under these destructive influences. Other literary works, of the same scientific character, met with the same fate. In January last was commenced, under the editorship of Professors Neander, Nitzsch, and Müller, a *Zeitschrift*, each number consisting of eight pages and appearing weekly. It has already, from its highly popular character and the absence of rival publications, attained a permanent footing. The character of its articles is

practical ; that is, they present the results of the most varied and extensive researches, free from the dryness usually attending such endeavors. Already articles of great value have appeared from the able editors as well as other contributors. One article is usually continued through several numbers, and often occupies the whole of each. Tholuck is now contributing a very long one on Inspiration; if he had advanced a little further, I would give you summarily his view upon this subject ; but as yet it is impossible.

"A few literary notices I can communicate : Tholuck has in the press a new edition of his commentary on the Hebrews. It will appear in almost a new form. — Rödiger will, in the coming winter, publish the sixteenth edition of Gesenius's Hebrew Grammar, in which he will introduce many improvements upon the last. — From Prof. Knobel of Giessen has just appeared a work entitled "*Ethnographische Untersuchungen über die Völkertafel der Genesis*," contained in the tenth chapter. Prof. K. has undertaken the exposition of the Pentateuch, as a part of the "*Condensed Commentary on the Old Testament*." The present publication he has considered as too bulky to find its place in the regular commentary, and therefore has given it in the form of a monography. It is one of the ablest treatises which has been written upon the subject, and, as he says in the preface, "the fruit of many years' study;" it is contained in 358 pages octavo, price 2 thaler. — "*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Clementinischen Homilien und Marcionia. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ältesten Evangelien-Literatur*," by Adolf Hilgenfeld, an octavo of 476 pages.

"The publication of the correspondence between Göthe and Schiller has been announced ; it is already in the press. This correspondence was in Göthe's possession at the time of his death, and was left by him sealed and under the condition that it should not be opened until 1850. Its appearance is expected with the greatest interest, as revealing much in regard to the times in which those men lived. — I notice also that selections from Dr. Channing's writings have been given in a German translation.

"I have omitted to allude to one work of great importance to the philosophical and historical student, which is just from the publisher. It is a German translation of the celebrated Sharsatani, written in the year 1121, and containing an account of all the religious and philosophical views prevalent throughout the Eastern world up to that date. Mr. Pococke gave, in his *Specimen historiae Arabum*, selections from the work, which awakened a great desire among literary men that the whole might be rendered accessible to those unacquainted with the Arabic. Prof. Cureton has recently published it entire in the original language, from which the

present translation has been made by Mr. Haarbrücker of the university in this place. The 1st vol. has appeared, consisting of 299 pages; the remaining is expected in the winter."

2. From S. P. Tregelles, LL. D., dated Hamburg, Aug. 1, 1856. [Dr. T. has been, for many years, engaged in preparing a revised, critical text of the New Testament. See Bib. Sac. VI. 404]:—"Last August there was a report which reached me from friends of mine at Florence, that the MS. B. had disappeared from the Vatican. In consequence of this, I commissioned my cousin, Mr. Thomas Smith Tregelles, who was about to go into Italy, to make particular inquiries. (I should say that I knew that it was safe there at least till the beginning of April). My cousin ascertained that the MS. was still safe in *October*, but he could not procure a sight of it. However, soon after my arrival in Paris, I met with M. Daremberg, librarian of the School of Medicine, who was just come from Rome, and he saw the MS. in the hands of cardinal Mai, in the month of December; the cardinal had it then at his abode (in part of the Palazzo Altieri), and M. Daremberg informed me that he was engaged in revising his edition, and that its publication might be expected before the lapse of many months. I wish it may be so. The difficulty about 1 John 5: 7 has been got over, he told me, by interpolating it within brackets! Whether it is a *fac-simile* edition (I mean an edition, line for line, and page for page), seems doubtful; cardinal Mai himself told me that it is not. Others, who have seen part of it, say that it is; and thus till I see it myself, I know not what I should believe. If the book is published, its value will be considerable, though not absolutely satisfactory. It will, at least, help us in places where the collations of Bentley, Birch, and Bartolucci differ, and also in remarkable readings, in which they are all silent;—but I fear that we could not depend on *minute* accuracy; "*pro minimis non curo*" is too often the maxim on which Mai has acted in editing works.

"I may now briefly inform you what I have done as to the collation of MSS. since my prospectus was published. In the spring of 1849 I went to Paris; I collated D of the Epistles once through and copied Bartolucci's collation of the Vatican MS.; I then began to collate K of the Gospels;—all this was done with great difficulty, as I had been out of health for some time, and with the exception of one day I was quite unwell from the time I reached Paris. My work was cut short by a severe attack of cholera on the 9th of June, which brought me very low; for some days it seemed as though I were on the edge of the grave; my mind and body were weakened so that I was incapable even of the slightest exertion of

thinking; but never did I feel the consoling preciousness of the gospel of Christ more blessedly than when it seemed as if each breath might be my last. I desire thankfully to acknowledge the hand of God in my restoration. As soon as I was at all capable of being removed, I returned to England under the efficient care of my dear wife, who had passed through a time of much weariness and anxiety. The return of strength was very slow, and I was obliged to keep very quiet through the winter. My power of mental exertion was much lessened. I am now again about in my usual health, which is none of the strongest, but my head and eyes are not capable of the same continuous application in study as formerly.

"In the early part of last April I returned to Paris; and there I have continued my collations at the Bibliothèque du Roi; one great hindrance has been the regulation of the library, which prevents one from using printed books belonging to the library in the same room as MSS.; this can only be done through the ambassador of the country to which one belongs; but although I had the fullest introductions, I was never able to see his Excellency the ambassador.

"I finished the collation of K; then I collated the cursive MS. 33 of the Gospels (17 of the Epistles); this was of extreme difficulty from its state in some parts, especially in the Acts; damp formerly made the leaves adhere so that in whole pages there can be found no trace of ink belonging to the page itself, but only that which has come off from the *opposite* page, and which therefore must of necessity be read *backwards*. I often feared lest my eyes would fail me when toiling, week after week, on this MS. I then collated M of the Gospels, and compared my collations of K and M with Tischendorf's, noting corrections in my memorandum book. I then took D of the Epistles in hand again, and reëxamined my collation with Wetstein's and with Tischendorf's. This was an important and a difficult operation, so many hands have corrected the MS. that it is not easy always to distinguish. Last year Tischendorf proposed to me that we should establish the text of this MS. *conjunctis curis*, and this has led me to bestow as much care as possible on the revision; it has been quite worth the pains which I have taken, for my labor will render the joint publication more accurate than it would otherwise have been. Tischendorf talks of getting it published at Leipsic, about the end of this year or a little later; he has now the text of the Codex Amiatinus (Jerome's version) at Florence, in the press, from the joint results of his collation and mine.

"While in Paris I met with Dom. J. B. Pitra, a Benedictine monk, of learning and diligence — a very fair Biblical scholar; he belongs to the Abbey of Solesmes, in the Department of the Sarthe. He is engaged

with some of his fellow Benedictines in getting out ten 8vo. volumes under the title of 'Spicilegium Solesmense.' They will contain unedited ecclesiastical fragments and works from the second to the twelfth century. The very early centuries supply only fragments except the *Clavis* of Melito of Sardis; this will make a large 8vo. volume of about 500 pages. This has been discovered in a Latin version, (the same as that used by Jerome) in seven MSS. and its importance is very great, as to evidence of the Books of the New Testament in the second century. The price of the whole collection will be 10 francs a volume to the first 300 subscribers; to others 15 francs a volume. The address of the editor is 'à l'abbaye de Solesmes, pres Safé sur Sarthe, Dep. de la Sarthe.' In England the publisher will be Charles J. Stewart, 11 King William St. West Strand, London, who can furnish full prospectuses."

3. Dr. Schmitz, rector of the High School, Edinburg, writes in a note: "Our series of classical school books is still going on; the volumes that are now in the press are four books of Livy and a Latin dictionary, which, though small, will, I hope, be of some service to comparative philologists, as great attention has been paid to etymology."

4. From Dr. Bridgman, dated Shanghai, China, May 10, 1850: "In committee of delegates we are now endeavoring to give the finishing strokes to the version of the New Testament. We commenced with Matthew's Gospel early in January, 1847; at first, and for months our progress was only four or five verses daily; when we had reached the end of Acts, it was twenty or so; we then turned back and reviewed the four gospels and the Acts, and proceeded on to the end of the book, which we reached on the 20th ult. We are now on a review of the whole, advancing about two or three chapters each day; as book by book thus passes under review, copies of the same will be made and sent to our brethren at the other stations: the design is that these copies go out and return to us, with criticisms and suggestions, so as to be by us, in committee, still further considered before going to press. The version will have cost a great amount of labor, and will, I trust, meet with favor.

"In the meantime arrangements are in progress to do the like, or better with the Old Testament; and it is expected the delegates for that will commence their labors here, in Shanghai, as soon as the New is finished. When we shall have sat down to this work, I propose to write you about it; but if you will at once, on receiving this, sketch for me the list of apparatus we should have, it will be no small favor. The best critical works such as will most assist in gaining the sense, are what we need.

"On the translation of $\theta\acute{\iota}\omicron\varsigma$ and מִלְכָּם we are yet unable to see alike.

The word *Shin* was used by the first translators, Morrison, Milne, and Marshman, and is still preferred by many; against it, however, there has been, and is, violent opposition; but what to put in its place, its opposers are at a loss to determine. The truth is, it seems to me, there is no other word: it stands, I think, precisely where the word *God* does in English, *Θεός* in Greek, and *אֱלֹהִים* in Hebrew. The word *Shin* has great extension, and *this* has given rise to this opposition; but this very extension makes it (as the case is) the word, and the only word. You will understand this *extension*, if you take, instead of the *GOD*, the Latin-derived word *divinity*, the noun, in its various shapes and forms abstract and concrete, adjective, adverb, etc., and then we can say in good English, the soul divine, divinely fair, etc. etc. What is secured to the *English* by all these changes in the *form* of the word, the Chinese have secured to them by *position* and structure, and without mistake."

ARTICLE XI.

MISCELLANIES, THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY.

A Philological and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles by H. B. Hackett, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Newton Theological Institution, will soon be put to press, and will be published in the spring of 1851. It will make a volume of 350 or 400 pages. Its aim will be to give a full exhibition of the meaning of the text, supported by the best critical authorities. Some questions of special difficulty will be discussed in an appendix. The Commentary on the last two chapters, inserted in the present number of our journal is much more copious than that which will appear in the volume. In the latter the results only of extended investigations will, in most cases, be given. The friends of biblical learning and of a correct knowledge of the Scriptures, may confidently expect from Prof. Hackett the rich fruits of a long and patient examination of this portion of the Bible.

Rev. W. C. Fowler, late Professor of Rhetoric in Amherst College, has been, for several years, engaged on a literary work, which is now published. It is entitled, "The English Language in its Elements and Forms. With a History of its Origin and Development, Designed for use in Colleges and Schools." It is printed by the Harpers, in a volume of 675 pages octavo. The paper, type, etc., are all which could be de-

sired. It will be seen to be on the first glance a very elaborate and comprehensive treatise. It discusses in eight parts the origin and history of the English language, its phonology or sounds, orthographical forms, and etymology, logical forms, syntax, rhetorical forms, and prosody or poetical forms. Prof. Gibbs of Yale College, who has long been well known, as an able and successful student in comparative philology, has written about 130 pages of the volume, principally in that department of etymology, which treats of the derivation of the language. The author acknowledges his special obligations to the treatises of Dr. Latham. A work of this general character has long been a great desideratum in our colleges and higher seminaries. We may offer more extended remarks hereafter.

We have before us the first two volumes of the great work of Col. Chesney, entitled, "The Expedition for the Survey of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, carried on by order of the British Government, in the years 1835, 1836, and 1837." The four volumes will contain 14 maps and charts, 97 plates, besides numerous wood-cuts. Vol. I. contains 706 pages, including an Index of 58 pages; Vol. II. contains 778 pages, including an Index of 72 pages. The author had previously, by command of the British government, surveyed the Red Sea, the Euphrates from its source to its mouth, the rivers of Susiana, and the country between the banks of the Euphrates and the Mediterranean. The results of his researches in relation to the relative advantages of the routes from England to India, by the Red Sea and the Euphrates, were laid before the government. This led to the Expedition to determine the possibility of navigating the Euphrates by steam, which left England, Feb. 16, 1835. The two iron steamers, the Euphrates of 50 horse power, and the Tigris of 20, were transported from the Orontes to Bir on the Euphrates and commenced the descent, March 16, 1836. The number of officers, interpreters, passengers and seamen was 70. The expedition reached Basrah in June, 1050 miles by the windings of the river. The first volume is wholly introductory and of a topographical, geographical and statistical nature, including descriptions of the Tigris, Euphrates, Armenia, the Russian provinces, Assyria, Afghanistan, each of the provinces of Persia, each of the districts of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, Arabia; the contents of the second volume are historical, tracing the great events, sacred and secular, which have occurred in these regions, from the beginning to the present time. Among the concluding topics are the Intercourse between Europe and Asia, Literature and Science of the East, Ancient and Modern Commerce, Architecture, Sculpture, Boats and Hydraulic Works, etc. The appendices contain valuable official papers, with some of the results of the labors of Major Raw-

Linson and others in deciphering the inscriptions, etc. On some future occasion, we shall endeavor to give a more extended account of this immense work. The narrative part, describing an expedition through regions, once trodden by mighty conquerors, and portions of them by inspired prophets, and now yielding back at the call of science, long buried treasures, must be crowded with interest.

The 4th Number of the *Studien u. Kritiken* for 1850, has the following articles. The first is on the handling of the doctrine of the Trinity in sermons, by Prof. Sack, of Bonn. His aim is to show that, on the one hand, an essentially church value and a permanent living character of the doctrine of the trinity, is independent of its strongly enstamped dogmatic forms, and on the other, that the sermon as a genuine sermon, which rests on the Scripture, gains a firm and pure church support by a vital reference of its main points to the Divine Trinity. In the second article, Prof. Grimm, of Jena, vindicates the genuineness of the epistles to the Thessalonians against the attack of Baur. It is an elaborate discussion of 64 pages, and closes with the words, "That so long as the opponents of the genuineness can adduce no better reasons, we hold fast to the unbroken church tradition." The preacher, Hauff of Waldenbach, offers, in the third article, some remarks on Ps. 119, 62: 3, and Is. 64: 8. The Washing of the Disciples' feet by Christ, in respect to its Sacramental value, is the title of the fourth article, by Prof. William Böhmer of Breslau; "That the Protestant church has not recognized the washing of the feet by Christ as a sacrament, is an offence against the Holy Scriptures, which is the more striking, as this church sees in the Scriptures the source of her Christianity, and the only standard of her faith and practice." The next article is a review by Wächtler of Essen, of Göbel's History of the Christian Life in the Rhenish Westphalia. Three works on the Waldenses by Schmidt, Monastier and Herzog, the first two in French, the last in Latin, are reviewed, in the fifth article, by C. U. Hahn. The last article is an extended "opinion of the theological faculty of the university of Heidelberg on the Plan laid down of organization of the Evangelical church of the Palatinate." This Plan was adopted in the stormy period of 1848, "proceeding on the broadest basis after the model of a political election, depressing as far as possible the spiritual and conservative element, and bringing out the secular and progressive element." This opinion of the theological faculty, written by Ullmann, was prepared at the request of 76 clergymen and laymen.

The ninth volume of Ritter's History of Philosophy treats of philosophy in the revival of letters, and during the ecclesiastical movements from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century. It describes the position

which philosophy in modern literature bears to philology, theology, mathematics, natural science and Christian life. — A third edition of J. A. Bengel's *Gnomon Novi Testamenti* — a Commentary on the entire New Testament, edited by his son, has lately been published at Tübingen. Dr. H. A. Meyer is preparing a Commentary on the Apocalypse, to complete his *Critico-Exegetical Commentary*. It is not mentioned who will write the Commentary on the Hebrews and the seven following epistles. The first volume of Hengstenberg on the Apocalypse contains 632 pp. and closes with the twelfth chapter. The first part of the second volume is published. The second part, which concludes the work, will appear in a short time.

The university of Breslau had in the summer semester, just closed, 780 students, a diminution of 39 from the winter; Giessen, 438, an addition of 8; Halle, 636, a diminution of 16, 335 in theology; Marburg, 807.

"The Present." (*Die Gegenwart*.) This work, which is a continuation of the *Conversations Lexicon*, was noticed in Vol. VI. p. 197, of the *Bibl. Sacra*. We have now received 52 numbers or Hefsts, making four volumes of about 700 pages each, and one third of the fifth volume. It is published by Brockhaus of Leipsic, each No. costing about 15 cents, the volume, one dollar and eighty cents. The topics discussed in the last six Nos. are as follows: Prussia at the time of its national Congress, Charles Gutzlaff; Human Physiology on the Position of existing Science; Franz von Pillersdorf; The Revolution in Venice; Hungary before the March Revolution; France and Paris in the months after the February Revolution; War of 1849 in Baden; German National Congress; Hungarian Revolution in 1848. These topics are treated with fulness of learning and accuracy of information, and a decidedly liberal spirit. We could wish that more space were given to topics of a literary, scientific and miscellaneous character, and to political subjects outside of the "Fatherland." Perhaps England and America do not belong to "The Present."

ERRATA.

Page 626, last line, for *in* read *for*. Owing to the state of the MS. of article IV. some errors remain. Page 650, for Jacob T. M. Falkenau, read Jacob I. M. Falkenau; in line 15, dele. figure 1, and insert §; transpose lines 5 and 6 from bottom to the beginning of the preceding paragraph; line 16 from bottom insert a point in ; page 651, line 4th for Talisha read Telisha; last line for ⁷⁸ read ⁷⁸; 652, 8th line from bottom, omit final *h* in Pashtah; page 653, 4th line, read Tiph'ha for Tephha; page 654, 14th line from bottom, for Tlisha, read T'lisha.

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